https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a5952cce40364ddacbc746fc006838fc.pdf d293e60a61f17754e88687a4f4c13d34 PDF Text Text 20-22-TFK-11-19 File No. Dossier 1 Volume. From-De 7 ^d/^Tn-A J^O^Qr CLASSIFIE CLASSIFIED *$ VOLSACCESSION J 0 A ~ ~ ti m x i : '. ' ' 5o'm H TITLE—TITRE: —A J". Ofcj 8C 3r ^zS £ SSo POLITICAL AFFAIRS INTERNAL SECURITY TASK FORCE ON KIDNAPPING ORAL HISTORY PROGRAMME IVAN HEAD s >** p pp. i £A*§ EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA Retention period-Periode de retention: AFFAIRES E>CTtRiEURES ET COMMERCE EXTERIEUR CANADA 1010781 �Had you in the Prime Minister and you in the Minister's office been concerned with the possibility of the FLQ kidnapping a diplomat before the event - either on the basis of police assessments or the Burgess incident? Did the Prime Minister consider the FLQ as primarily Quebec operated, or did he believe that foreign influence (Marighella's inspiration and possible assistance from non-Canadian activists) was an important element in it? (Did the Prime Minister follow the South American kidnappings closely, and were they significant in shaping his attitude toward the FLQ?) Was the responsibility of establishing a Canadian precedent in facing terrorism head on an important factor in his thinking? (The Brazilians gave in to demands, while the Uruguayans were dogmatically opposed to any concessions.) Is it your impression that at the beginning of the crisis the Prime Minister made an immediate and independent decision not to meet the initial FLQ demands? Did he decide at that time to offer a safe conduct and to publish the manifesto as a conciliatory gesture? Were these measures suggested to him by someone else? Did the Prime Minister's assessment of the threat posed by the FLQ change during the crisis? Did the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Laporte, and the threats in the communiques affect his assessment? During the crisis, who were the people in the Prime Minister's entourage who had the greatest influence on him? Did Lalonde second the Prime Minister's thoughts or did he exercise an influence on him as well? VJhat sorts of roles did Pelletier and Marchnad play? 010782 �It has been said that the Prime Minister and the USSEA were the real decisionmakers throughout the crisis. Is the observation justified? in agreement? What about R.G.R.? Were the two generally SSEA? What can you tell us about divergences within the federal Cabinet regarding the basic decision to refuse to capitulate, but instead, to offer the safe conduct and to publish the manifesto? were cabinet meetings and cabinet committee meetings arenas for making decisions, or were they used for gentle persuasion after the decision had already been taken? Who attended the first Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence (ministers and advisers) which met in response to the Cross kidnapping? Do you know what sort of liaison existed between the committee and the Task Force? Did the committee discuss the position papers prepared October 5th and 6th by the Task Force (and USSEA) concerning the attitude the government might take toward the FLQ demands? Did they consider the FLQ demands individually at that time? Did they consider the possibility of releasing any or all of the prisoner; exchanging one prisoner or more for Cross; the principle of the safe conduct; the publication of the manifesto; the ransom; the Lapalm boys? 010783 �Were you aware of much discussion at the ministerial level about the approach to take in dealing with the Quebec Government? Was there much talk: about dissension or conflict within the Quebec Government? Could you tell us anything about direct telecommunications between the Prime Minister and Bourassa? Did they communicate daily? VJhat did the Prime Minister regard as the real possibilities of negotiations with the FLQ? Did he think of them as much more than a means of gaining time? On October 12th, the USSEA consulted directly with the Prime Minister about (l) the appointment of Lemieux, (2) the possible release of prisoners, and (3) the appointment of the federal negotiater. Do you know anything about the tenor or outcome of these talks? VJas the Prime Minister himself in favour of appointing a federal negotiater or team of negotiaters? Can you throw light on what happened to hold up the nomination? How did he react to the appointment of Demers as Quebec negotiater? On October U+th, Bissonnette prepared draft instructions for Demers' negotiations. (These included propositions that two journalists could accompany the kidnappers, Dorval could be used a la rigueur, and up to twenty-five kidnappers might be included in the safe-conduct without referring back to the Government for confirmation.) Were these instructions approved by the Prime Minister or the Cabinet? Do you know if they were received by Demers? 010784 �Is it your impression that at the beginning of the crisis the Prime Minister made an immediate and independent decision not to meet the initial FLQ demands? Did he decide at that time to offer a safe conduct and to publish the manifesto as a conciliatory gesture, or were these measures suggested by someone else? During the crisis, who were the people in the Prime Minister's entourage who had the greatest influence on him? Did Lalonde second the Prime Minister's thoughts or did he exercise an influence on him as well? VJhat sort of roles did Pelletier and Marchand play?* Ij&as been said that the Prime Minister and the USSEA were the real decision-makers throughout the crisis. Is the observation justified? agreement? What about R.G.R.? Were the two generally in Mitchell Sharp? VJhat can you tell us about divergences within the Federal Cabinet regarding the basic decision to refuse to negotiate, but instead, to offer the safe conduct and to publish the manifesto? Were cabinet meetings and cabinet committee meetings arenas for making decisions or were they used for gentle persuasion after the decision had already been taken? Who attended the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence (ministers and advisers)? is Do you know what sort of liaison ex£ed between the committee and the Task Force? 010785 �Did the committee discuss the position papers prepared October 5th and 6th by the USSEA and the Task Force concerning the attitude the government might take toward the FLQ demands? Did they consider the FLQ demands individually at that time? Did they consider the possibility of releasing any or all of the prisoners; exchanging one or more prisoners for Cross; the principle of the safe conduct; the publication of the manifesto; the ransom; the Lapalm boys; the "stool pidgeon"? Were you aware of much discussion at the ministerial level about the approach to take in dealing with the 'Quebec Government? VJas there much talk about dissension or conflict within the Quebec Government? How did the Prime Minister and Cabinet reaction to the appointment of Demers as negotiator? 010786 �• For how long had emergency legislation been considered a possible necessity? (VJas its use discussed during the post 1963 bombing incidents?) Was the first initiative from Montreal, Quebec, or Ottawa? When? Is it your understanding that Bourassa called Trudeau October 10th to discuss the VJMA, and got agreement in principle on its use then? Had Trudeau seriously considered its use before the Laporte kidnapping? Had he discussed it with Bourassa before the Laporte kidnapping? Were the interests of the Federal Government and the Provincial Government in invoking the the act identical? Can you describe the way in which the Prime Minister reached his decision? Were police evaluations of the danger of paramount importance? Were they corroborated by the RCMP evaluation? VJere political considerations (concerning the stability of the Quebec Government) of great importance? Was the timing of the invocation ultimately determined in Ottawa? VJhat influence did Bourassa have in the timing of the VJMA? VJas the course of 010787 �What was the importance of Ryan's parallel government? The "petit virage"? i 010788 VJhat r o l e did Jim Davey play i n t h a t drama? �negotiations a factor, as he claimed, or did he tailor the negotiations to fit in with the Draconian measures? On the Quebec side who was the strongest proponent of the WMA? How would you describe Saulnier's motivation in urging invocation? How great was his influence in Quebec and in Ottawa? What about Drapeau? VJhat part did the Department of Justice and the Solicitor General's Office play in promoting the use of the act? Who instigated the study made by Scollin, October 13, on the use of the act, its consequences and alternatives? When was the question of the VJMA first put to cabinet? Can you describe the reactions? Who in cabinet made positive alternative suggestions? Who decided on the use of the WMA instead of special legislation? What in the PMO did you envisage as the immediate outcome of the invocation? The longer range significance in the context of Canadian history? �Would you say the Prime minister's somexvhat derogatory attitude toward the DEA was a factor in his method of dealing with the crisis? From your vantage point, how ivould you describe the actual role of the Task Force? Did it initiate any policy ideas that you are aware of? Did the Task Force seem to function throughout the crisis more or less as anticipated at its inception, or did its role change with events? Seen from the PMO, what would you say were the most significant contributions of the Task Force to the crisis? Establishing liaison between governments? Establishing liaison within the Federal Government? Establishing the general balance and emphasis on the line toward the FLQ? Evaluating the scope of the danger at home and abroad? Working out nuances in the negotiating technique? Dealing with foreign governments? Planning the safe conduct? Monitoring and coordinating information? Would you say there was an obvious need for SOC as a supplement to the Task Force? VJas its purpose in part to give the PCO more direct participation in the operation? 010790 �^Rjid the Prime Minister personally feel that the Quebec Government (the P>uebec Attorney General in particular) abused the powers in the Public Order Regulations? Had the Prime Minister anticipated the manner in which the Regulations would be enforced? After the invocation of the WMA, when the release of detainees became an important issue, there was considerable discussion within the DEA as to (l) whether release might be a negotiable question, (2) whether it might be contrary to the spirit of the VJMA, or (3) whether it might be positively desir able. How did the Prime Minister stand on the question? Could you comment on the Prime Minister's approach to new emergency legislation? 010791 �By October 23rd, the PMO appears to have been mapping out a strategy with respect to public reaction toward civil rights. Could you elaborate on the plan? Were you aware that the Prime Minister was making many and frequent trips to Montreal for direct consultations with the Quebec representatives? Do you know it the two prime ministers used the occasion of their call on Mrs. Cross (October 20th at 6:15) for substantive talks? On October 31st, the Prime Minister and Lalonde went together to Montreal. VJas this visit a significant one? 010792 �It has been suggested that Saulnier had an important influence on the Prime Minister in persuading him to invoke the WMA. Are you in a position to say that Saulnier's personal judgment as given in testimony before the 1969 Parliamentary Standing Committee on broadcastin, films, and assistance to the arts, and in the circumstances immediately surrounding the invocation, was of considerable importance to the Prime Minister in making his own decision? Had the Prime Minister anticipated the possibility of kidnappings, assassinations, etc., before the Cross case, possibly on the basis of the Burgess attempt, or the information supplied by the RCMP or the Cabinet Law and Order studies? Had he already made up his mind on the propoer course of action to follow? The book Rumours of War mentions that there had been a number of exchanges between federal and provincial authorities (largely instigated by the Montreal Police) to make contingency plans. Are you aware of contingy plans (and was the Prime Minister also aware) before Octoebr 5th? 010793 �In the mind of the Prime Minister, how important was the evidence given is 1969 before the Standing (Parliamentary) Committee on Broadcasting, Films, and Assistance to the Arts at which Saulnier testified? What was the Prime Minister's personal reaction to the fact that the July briefing by the PtCMP on the FLQ had been overlooked because of the summer holiday? 010794 �DRAFT LETTER FOR IVAN HEAD Tou may recall that at the very beginning of the electoral campaign (when your time was already pre-empted) we had a talk about the events of October, 1970, • and more particularly about the circumstances surrounding the War Measures Act. I ^ at ttat « . I ~ t i ~ r f t * « * * # * , ft«_ - , tb. . u . p i c of the Department for External Affaire, and explained our special interest in sharing your experience during those months, in an Interview. I still hope that when your schedule eventually retains te "normal" you may feel able and inclined to discuss and record certain aspects of the crisis, with a view to preserving a comprehensive picture for future researchers. To give you an idea of the sort of information we are looking for, I am enclosing some sample questions. The interview would consisit of such questions which my cohort and I would put to you informally and record on tape. The whole operation would be under the strictest security ^described In some detail in the accompanying letter from Mr. Blanchette)* And you would be perfectly free to ignore or alter questions during the interview, or to edit the aapes and transcripts in any way you liked. I do hope yen will find it possible to accept. We are eagerly anticipating your revelations and insights from PMO to broaden our own limited view! 010795 �For how long had emergency legislation been considered as a possible necessity? (Was its use discussed during the post 1963 bombing incidents?) VJas the first tentative initiative from Quebec, Montreal, or Ottawa? When? Can you put yourself back into the atmosphere of the crisis amd describe your own attitude and thought processes regarding emergency legislation and the WMA.? Did most of your colleagues share your point of view? VJhat in the PMO did you envisage as the immediate outcome of the invocation? Can you describe the way in which the Prime Minister reached his decision? VJhat part did Justice and the Solicitor General's Office play in instigating the use of the act? When was the question first put to cabinet? Can you describe the reactions? VJho decided on the use of the VJMA over special legislation? Who in the cabinet made positive alternative suggestions? VJere Quebec police evaluations of the danger of paramount impoortance? VJere they corroborated by the RCMP evaluation? '•Jere political considerations (conveming the stability of the Quebec Govememtn) of great importance? VJhat in 1974 di you see as the significance of the invocation of the WMA in the larger context of Canadian history? �Wop] ' yr- r-^-r t.he Prime Minister' spmewiiat derogatory attitiuae towar^ the DEA ;-!-•• o. : i.-r.o in Eis method of dealing with the crisis? EJ,., fro-i your vantage point, would you describe the - "' ;~A role of the Task Eorce? ..as it a compjlier and synthesizer of information-7 Di '• it initiate son? oociy ideas that you are aware of? '/OP.] i you nay there was a definite need for SOC as i supplement to the Task Force? Eow would you describe its role? Aii the Task Force seem to function throughout the crisis more ~>r less as anticipated at its inception, or did its role change .rith eventa? E'oul 1 you say the Op Centre was the sine qua non of rhc whole operation? Seen from the PMO, what would you say were the most significant contributuons of the Task Force to the crisis? Evalutaing the scope of the danger at home and abroad? Establishing the general balance and emphasis on the line toward the FL'P? Working out nuances in the negotiating technique? Dealing with foreign governemtns? PI-anning the safe conduct? Monitoring and coordinating information? 010797 �DRAFT LETTER FOR IVAN HEAD You may recall that at the very beginning of the electoral campaign (when your time was already pre-empted) we had a talk about the events of October, 1970» and more particularly about the circumstances surrounding the War Measures Act. I believe at that time I mentioned the Oral History Programme under the auspices of the Department for External Affairs, and explained our special interest in sharing your experience during those months, in an interview. I still hope that when your schedule eventually returns to •,normal', you may feel able and inclined to discuss and record certain aspects of the crisis, with a view to prexerving a comprehensive picture for future researchers. To give you an idea of the sort of information we are looking for, I am enclosing some sample questions. The interview would consisit of such questions which my cohort and I would put to you informally and record on tape. The whole operation would be under the strictest security ^described in some detail in the accompanying letter from Mr. Blanchette). And you would be perfectly free to ignore or alter questions during the interview, or to edit the aapes and transcripts in any way you liked. I do hope you will gind it possible to accept. We are eagerly anticipating your revelations and insights from PMO to broaden our own limited view! 010798 �Before you escape to Mexico, would it not be worth while to leave with us an undated letter to Ivan Head about the security side of the Oral History Programme? We would send it with a letter from me (of which I am enclosing an uninspired first draft) and some questions (which are also enclosed in draft form). I'm afraid if we dont nail him down now, he may escape to some university in the FAR WEST, and we'll never find him again. What do you think? ACL,O_TH . JEA:J „ our ^- .71P p- c a v e r s a t i n r i t h Ivan -lead, i t would seem t h a t Pie i s ver;y nowledgeable. Zn tlie c i r c u m s t a n c e s , r a t h e r tlian to rush i n a t aim (as i t w e r e ) , I would much p r e f e r a w e l l - p h a s e d a p p r o a c h . Could pou and A n d r & p r e p a r e a s e r i e s of q u e s t i ns f o r him, n e t only on t h e War Pleasures Act b u t on the e a r l y cays of the c r i s i s , t h e f i r s t d e c i s i o n s , e t c . " i s e v e n t u a l l o c a l e a f t e r tlie e l e c t i o n s i s nu r e a l problem, bj Zu.e wapy. We CcPi always i n v i t e him b^ Ottawa a t our expense i f ue r e t u r n s bo A l b e r t a and he may be d e l i g h t e d t o come Rack. ti/l "% I hi 0*/f/jv / h*J kirrn- / / • 1—~— )/y<>k /Qh~r u/»] £—- flt3UiA.<> " : *fit te<^ ^J.cr- ,'J*i9 riu A*Jn~-£-<•»" A>brS**i*iA, *'' 010799 �,T DRAFT LETTER FOR I7AH HEAD • '*. Tou may recall that at the Tory beginning of the electoral campaign (when your time was already pre-empted) we had a talk about the events of October, 1970, and more particularly about the circumstances surrounding the War Measures Act. I believe at that time I mentioned the Orel History Programme under the auspices of the Department for External Affaire, and explained our special interest in sharing your experience daring those ninths, in an interview. I still hope that when your schedule eventually returns to "normal" you may feel able and inclined to discuss end record certain aspects of the crisis, with a view to preserving a comprehensive picture for future researchers. To give you an idea of the sort of information we are looking for, 1 am enclosing some sample questions. The interview would consisit of such questions which my cohort end I would put to you informally and record on tape. The whole operation would be under the strictest security (described in some detail in the accompanying letter from Mr. Blanchette)* And you would be perfectly free to ignore or alter questions during the interview, or to edit the tapes and transcripts in any way you liked. I do hope you will find it possible to accept. We are eagerly anticipating your revelations and Insights from PMO to broaden our own limited view! 010800 - �- i Before you escape to Mexico, would it not be worth while to leave with us sn undated letter to Ivan Head about the security side of the Orel History Programme? Wo would send it with a letter from me (of which I am enclosing •p en uninspired first draft) and some questions (which ere also enclosed In draft form). I'm afraid if we dont nail him down now, he may escape to university in the FAR WEST, and we'll never find him again. What de you think? V * \ . JEAN Many thanks. On the b a s i s of your e a r l i e r conversation with Ivan Head, i t would seem t h a t he i s very knowledgeable. a t him (as i t were), I In the circumstances, r a t h e r than to rush i n I would nuofa prefer a well-piiased approach. Could you and Andreiprepare a series of questions for him, net only on the War Measures Act but jton the early days of the c r i s i s , the f i r s t d e c i s i o n s , e t c . A i . His eventual locale after the elections is no real problem, by the way. We can 1 i . always invite him to Ottawa at our expense if he rtburns to Alberta aad he may be delighted to come back. . A~) . 010801 �Dinner at the Finnish embassy last night brought to light an unexpected but willing source of information on the War Measures Act. Ivan Head, whom we had written off as not having been involved in the crisis, turns out to have had a great deal to do with the emergency measures. (He introduced the subject himself, obliquely, and I followed through with enough questions to learn that he would be a voluble victim in properly discreet circumstances.) Even in that unpropitious setting he made a number of interesting observations. He said the decision on October 5th was the Prime Minister's, and that the rest of the cabinet followed with somewhat lees certainty. After the Prime Minister, AHt (and RCS) were the real forces in crisis policy, and the brilliant role of DEA completely reversed the P.M.'s previous outlook. As for the WMA, the cabinet was slow and hesitant in deciding. At the meeting of the crisis cabinet(just before the proclamation) which Included General Dare and Commissioner Higget, the former demonstrated efficiency and prcieiom about the possible disposition of troops, while the latter showed a lamentable lack in his grasp of the situation. When did cabinet start discussing emergency measures? Iran wasnt very sure of the date. Was instigation originally from Ottawa or Quebec? Ivan took umbrage in an embarrassed grin and the Public Secrets Act, but said he would "tell all" if secrecy were ensuredl May 17, 1974 010802 �DEPARTMENT Of- EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IwtPlJB MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES EXTFRiEURES CANADA February "; , I'-Ep 'Cr. ['.''.: Eeoo Ppecial Assistant to tne Prime Minister The Prime Minister's Office East Block, Ottawa Dear Ivan, You may recall some time ago I spoke to you about an Extern-'.! Affairs Oral History programme and the possibility of recording for posterity some of your special insight into tae October IRAQ crisis. Knowing how reluctant you might feel for reasons of time and security, I hesitated to approach you immediately. able to find an .iour - But I wonder if in fact you rsight not be any time, anywhere - to recall those traumatic days. AO far as security is concerned, it is perfectly possible for you to keep the tapes yourself in order to ensure their ssf-sy. want to turn them over to the PMO, the RCMP, Externa Or you might, 3'fsirs, or tne Public Archives, all of which have facilities for guard! . • sensitive records. As to their eventual custody or use, you ..sips' vis; So specify that they be kept out of circulation for fifty or seventy-five years, or as some interviewees have done, decide that they be re'ease: in accordance with the Government's policy regarding access- 4 o recor la, or posthumously. The essential thing is to nave an accosms of the affair before memory or circumstance make it impossible. I do hope you will think that retrospection is a we.some relief from facing the pressures of the present, and thai you will ae able te share a moment with me and my tape recorder. And though I know your forth- coming trips will cause some complications, I from you at some convenient time. LOOK Por.'o.r ! to s.enring R. vv, , •„ Jean G. Halsteao (9;a .3i'R ) 010803 �fc. 4? 'A Office of The Prime Minister Cabinet du Premier Ministre February 12, 1975 Mrs. Jean G. Halstead, Department of External Affairs (PSS), Lester B. Pearson Building, Ottawa. Dear Jean: I remember very well our conversation about the Oral History Program. I would be interested in chatting with you and your tape recorder but can't promise to do so before our departure for Europe toward the end of the month. May I call you, however, on our return? In the meantime I will do my best to dredge to the forefront some of my recollections of that busy period, Yours sincerely, *Vi » 4 A Ivan L. Head, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister. > ' '41 i i- ,010804 i Ottawa K1A0A2 �• ^ 1 • w n Government of Canada Gouvernement du Canada CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET Dated From A compter du ~)C/)Z^ /Z>Cycy i \ I <=y- To Jusqu'au A> C / R E) / A-A LA <=^ /< AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - A METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTERIEURE VOIR File No. - Dossier n° do~y QC 31 (88/08) r^-7AA -//-/? Volume 7540-21-857-8809 010805 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00144 Title A name given to the resource Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - Ivan Head Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 12-Feb-75 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - Ivan Head, RG25, vol. 25748, 20-22-TFK-11-19, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Entire file Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en