https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c3eefb1b9b796b33bf6ffe50896542d8.pdf 6c0df0451d6a05ef4d4e51f4459de0d9 PDF Text Text CLASSIFIED ..QS-**«JT?fl VOLS HO. xHm —L W TITLE—TITRE: 5Hf POLITICAL AFFAIRS INTERNAL SECURITY TASK FORCE ON KIDNAPPING ORAL HISTORY P R O G R A M ^ ERNEST COTE 4C: •s?T*^ \ «!• EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA V s Retention period-Periode de retention AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES ET COMMERCE EXTERIEUR CANADA I CLASSIFIE �Presumably the RCMP had assessed the FLQ before the crisis. Was the evaluation y A ii correct? Did it change during the course of the crisis? There is reference to the RCMP assessment of the FLQ, October 5th, which the DEA accepted as valid, and to the assumption th^t the FLQ "may conceivably have enlisted outside 'professional' help". What help did they have in ramd specifically? Following the attempt to kidnap Harrison Burgess, what preparations were made to v avert other diplomatic kidnappings? How real a danger did you consider the«? In ^Aat^way^-aad-how regularly did you (the Solicitor Geheral's Office) brief U » cabinet? * How great an influence on the Prime Minister'.s initial decision on policy do you v feel the RCMP's assessment was? How would you describe the relationship of the Solicitor General, Earnest C6t6, and Commissioner Higgit, and their influence on the government8 a policy toward A \£#« the FLQ demands? Was there concensus among them on most issues? Did any among you support the idea of exchanging one or more prisoners for Cross, E and later, Laporte? A^<-rr V : < - •' ^ "• - ' —• <• A ' V*-' ' t[y ' '\ c ' '• ' - With what departments did the !ftCMP have the greatest direct contact? (DEA, DND,PMO, PCO, Justice?) How large a role did the Task Force play in the work of the RCMP? How important ..U-NA^-yrA-tc.;v-;V\s-\ CJL A P v \ /,.,,. U_rA>-v_c Sis. >c*v-\Tv~w. • 010708 �T i l l \A,-.A * 3 B3fJ -2- was the work of Inspector Feraris? Whom did he report to in the RCMP? Jtew did the kidnapping and murder of Laporte affect the work of the RCMP?«f i*yvu o¥f** , Did the RCMP already have a well-established pattern of conduct with the provincial police forces? How was police work apportioned among the forces? How would you describe relations with the Montreal Police and QPP at different levels? How would you assess the work of the Montreal Police and the QPP? EJS) .QJ^ EO~&^_^ Do you know of any points of policy on which Mcllwraith, C5te, or others may / have attempted successfully or otherwise to alter or influence the government's line? "S-L-E yy Ct At what point was the RCMP made aware of the immenence of the War Measures Act? What was the reaction to such drastic measures? ... . How much political guidance did the police have in making arrests after (as well • • as before) the invocation of the WMA? A Did you offer advice to the federal or provincial governments on the subject of releasing detainees under the WMA? / Did the RCMP and the provincial police agree on the nature of the danger during the crie crisis? 010709 �' ,* ' t f Wi There were comments in the press about periods of efficiency and inefficiency in police work. Were they justified? How were they occasioned? What significant impediments did the police encounter in their work? v (For example, the unregimented nature of Canadian society, jealousy among police forces, cleverness of the FLQ, lack of preparedness, lack of personel, attitude of the general public, irresponsibility of the press.) V Was there tension between the RCMP and the army? •J Did you (in the RCMP) regard the negotiations with the FLQ as a possible means of giving more time to the police, or did you anticipate direct, positive results? i What was the turning point in finding the rue des Recollets? What measures were exercised to avoid a shoot-out at the end? Were police rewards ever paid? In your view were rewards desirable? Was the question of police rewards as distinct from government rewards just a matter of presentation? Did you regard the offer of the safe-conduct as workable, desirable, and perhaps instrumental in saving Cross' life? . ... What priority did the crisis have in the work of the RCMP? How would you describe the crisis in terms of RCMP history (as distinct from Canadian history) - its greatest challenge? One tremendous challenge among others equally great? 010710 �•tot * .-' ? - J ••- - 1", • ••<• A •• •-.'•' r \ l t I" • ' " 7 . 3 ; - AA.7t7v . -l*r- What lessons did the RCMP learn from their experience in this crisis? What measures have been taken to correct the mistakes? What changes in. orgnaization to deal with crises have been made in the RCMP as a direct result of the crisis? 010711 i 1 �At what moment did the police know about the membership of the two cells? Lord Dunrossil suggests that there was some hesitation oa the part of the police to share information with the Task Force. Can you shed any light oa this? Did the three groups of police meet frequently in Montreal? At what level? Do. you know whose inspiration it was to try to encourage Mr. Cr ss to use a code ia his letters by having Mrs. Cross send "edited^letters which were obviously aot ia her owa style. �Did you lose contact with the kidnappers immediately on their In Cuba, December, 1970, or were you able to maintain dir ct or indirect surveillaaoo oa thorn during the stay in Havana? What about RCMP surveillance of Cuban intelligence activities in Montreal? We understand they have a very big operation there. Are they in any way linked with members of the FLQ - apprehended or free? What intelligence arrangements do you have in Cuba? Do you maintain careful checks 01 persons entering and leaving the country? 010713 �EVENTS OF OCTOBER 1970 The main objective that Blanchette will be seeking to achieve during such interviews as he may have on the occasion of his forthcoming trip to Europe will be designed essentially to fill gaps in the Departmental files on the subject. Who determined the initial line taken in External on October 5, which seemed ready to countenance negotiations, possible parole for prisoners, and compromise generally? These were described as half-way compromises. What was the Minister's Did he agree? response? The Minister and Prime Minister spoke at 11 a.m. that morning (October 5)» Any idea about what they said, they decided? (We shall be interviewing Jon Church soon about this and other matters). On October 6, the idea of a safe conduct had already appeared. "Diis was the key to the eventual solution of the problem. It would be interesting to know whose idea this was. There is no evidence on the file as to its origin. Task Force? The Department seemed to be in favour of the provision of money, the release of some prisoners, and suggested that the FLQ ! request that its memo might be published should be ignored. Who killed the first two ideas and how ditA.it come to pass the third one was the first step taken? Again on October 6, there is a memorandum from Gordon Robertson stating that Mr. Jamieson had objections to even the promise of a safe conduct. Gordon Robertson took a very tough line in his memo stating that no FLQ demands should be met. This line �was eventually softened, although the Minister's statement in the House of Commons that evening made no mention of a possible safe conduct. Who were the hawks and the doves or was there general unanimity regarding the general approach? Among Cabinet members? /~ ( Among officials? Who drafted the Minister's statement which took a somewhat softer line bearing in mind that Cabinet had rejected most of the initial suggestions contained in the Department's (Who in Cabinet determined t.he initial line? memo on the subject? (How Has it determined? (Who were mo3t influential? It is not clear from the files which Cabinet Committee first handled the crisis. At times it would seem to be the Cabinet V-A,. -. • V -31 Committee on Priorities and Planning; at times, that on Security and Intelligence. Could this be clarified? The file mentions that, on the morning of October 6, the Prime Minister and Mr. Bourassa had a long talk over the telephone. Could light be thrown on what they discussed? There is no evidence on the file. (This might be cleared up by later interviews on tha political level of course.) / 0' 3 V" A^ I On October 10 Mr. Sharp had several telephone conversations with Mr. Choquette. There is virtually no evidence on the file as to whether it was these conversations that decided Mr. Choquette to be firm against the release of prisoners or whether his decision reflected other pressures. It was immediately after his statement at 5:30 that evening (October 10) that Mr. Laporte was kidnapped. On October 11, the Prime Minister and Mr. Bourassa had several further conversations. They discussed the War Measures Act^ the possibility of military assistance and the attitude of the Quebec 010715 • �^^ Government on the possible release of the prisoners, as well as Federal security measures and means of contact and communication between the two levels of government. The file merely mentions the subjects discussed. It gives no idea as to the tenor of the conversations nor the decisions reached. There are several discrepancies. For instance, on October 11, the Prime Minister and <- -•'- •-• Mr. Bourassas A,--..- - - v - seemed to agree on the possibility of releasing some prisoners. Yet earlier, this seemed to be ruled out completely. y — ^ - " Likewise later. What happened? Regarding the War Measures Act, there is evidence on the file that very early during the crisis, perhaps even as early as October 6, somebody in the Department of Justice was drafting in English possible legislative action. Whose idea was this? Between October 10 and October 14, Prime Minister Bourassa toughened his stand. Why? The file indicates several telephone conversations at various levels between Ottawa and Quebec at the Prime Ministerial and official levels. Who was most influential in persuading Mr. Bourassa to take a tougher stand? What factors involved? V st In the more detailed sector, who chose Demers as / • negotiator? Who set his mandate? Bearing in mind that Departmental and other Federal officials had suggested quite different people for the post, for instance, Claude Ryan, Louis Laberge, etc. Who decided on a Task Force type of operation on October 5? Were other possibilities considered? 010716 �Those are the main gaps of substance of direct concern to us in our files, which should be cleared up for future researchers. The lists of questions in the pages below are of course much more detailed and will at times duplicate some of the themes mentionned above. It will not be possible to ask all the questions nor cover all the themes contained therein of course. Nevertheless it is hoped that all this material will help to focus attention and recollections. There are many other gaps, but they concern our files less than those of other Departments and also less than those on the political level and those of other Governments. Some of the more detailed questions concern these gaps and are perhaps unanswerable by Task Force members. We shall be reaching ouc to other levels eventually. �His Excellency, presently "This is January 16th, the Pearson Building in Ottawa. Ernest C6t6, Canadian ambassador toe Finland , but formerly Deptity Minister to the Solicitor General, is going to U*lk-about his experience. during the FLQ crisi of 1970. St-J is going to throw some light on the FLQ crisis of 1970. Four years ago is a long time to recall details, but the traumatic nature of the crisis must make some aspects of it really memorable. E.A(^E A^ S\ A A < A- O/VU/i 010718 �I Ernest CSTe 16.1.75 How did you fisrt hear about the crisis? CSte heard about the kidnapping from the radio; he was not informed by the RCMP, who may possibly have informed the Solicitor General, if, in fact, they had already been informed by the Montreal police. Mcllwraith kept his relations with the RCMP to himself. (Incidentally, the previous operations on his eyes did not in any way incapacitate him during the crisis.) CSte volunteered that on the ocassion of the proclamation of the WMA, Mcllwraith had not informed him place. - his own Deputy Minister - about what was going to take The real imminence of such strong measures was kept pretty much to Cabinet circles. On the night of the proclamation, Mcllwraith's special assistant showed CSte the document during the time the Solicitor General vras actually procuring signatures and signing it himself. The press had pointed out the possibility of special measures being taken, but CSte was quite unprepared for such a drastic move. CSte. the Solicitor General, and the special assistant waited in the Mcllwraith's office that night (October 15-16) until the Governor General actually procalimed the act. Once CSte was privy to the information he was more or less obliged to remain closeted. CSte thought the initiative for the EJMA had come from the P.M. after entreaties from Quebec to take some unspecified action. Lalonde, Davey, Goyer, and maybe Colonel Bourne v/ere all aware of the Government's intentions. CSte was not, because of Mcllwraith's policy of exclusing him. 010719 �Following the proclamation of the WMA did you participate in discussion within your department about the scale of arrests that might be made? No. Higgit discussed the question with the Solicitor General. CSte was excluded from all the Minister's relations with the RCMP, who reported to him directly. Can you tell us anything about the importance of Ryan's counter-government plot in convincing the Cabinet of the need for the WMA? Were you in contact with R yan at any point? No. CSte had nothing to do with Ryan or the WMA. In what specific way were you connected with the crisis? CSte felt he had to keep himself informed on the crisis in order to be able to advise the Solicitor General. He took up a sort of listening post in the Op Centre. But even there the RCMP denied him information on the specific instructions of the Solicitor General. The RCMP is a paramilitary organization with the same method of thinking as the armed forces. There was a problem of policy being under the general control of the civil side of the government. On occasion, CSte, when informed of something by Ferraris in the Task Force, had spoken directly to Lalonde, bypassing the Solcitor General in order to save time. �TAPE CUT CSte requested the tape recorder be stopped because he wanted to say something in privacy about the eventual downfall of the Solicitor General, who on one occasion had given a ridiculously inadequate briefing to the Cabinet on the FLQ, putting his own judgment in serious question. CSte emphasised the nature of his situation in the Op Centre, where he was able to give advice to AER, Davey, and sometimes, La. l.onde. He considered the Op Centre to be the focal point for top level officials. CSte drew a distinction between setting a general line of policy an ordering specific police action. The WHAT and the HOV! of police activities were separate, and ought not to be confused. The necessity to keep them separate explained the attitude of the police and perhaps the attitude of the Solicitor General as well. Did you regularly attend Cabinet Committee meetings? No, although the Solicitor General did. CSte was in daily contact both with AER and Mcllwraith. He kept watch on the crisis from the Op Centre. What role did the Solicitor General's Office play in the crisis? Assessment of the FLQ, CSte's two reports on the FLQ, and Mcllwraith's guidance of the RCMP. The role of the Solicitor General's Office would have been greater except that (l) Cross was a foreign diplomat, and (2) the Solicitor General's Office was new and lacked facilities. 010721 �^ne RCMP feared the information would get to the Montreal police, who in turn would "blow it". The RCMP were able to break the case by being very secretive, since the danger always existed of infiltration of the Montreal police by the FLQ. In Bourassa's office was a woman with a complete list of all the Quebec police officers their families and phone numbers. No one knew precisely why, but they felt it indicated possible foul play. The liaison problem was solved by the P.M.'s giving instructions to the next Solicitor General, Goyer, clearly defining the channels of communication. Had protective measures been taken on the basis of the RCMP assessment of the FLQ, and were they in effect when Cross was kidnapped? Prior to the crisis, John Starnes had prepared an excellent report for the responsible minister predicting the likelihood of diplomatic kidnappings. The paper was not read by cabinet, however, because it had been presented in July and conflicted with the summer holidays. About protective measures taken by the police, the RCMP, Ottawa group, would be in a position to know. Later, in any event, they set up a highly organized surveillance protection group for diplomats and VIP's. Can you explain why the shoot-out apparently became an important issue? Were there conceivably people in favour of a shoot-out? Although CSte did not know in specific terms, he presumed that the influence of DEA in formulating policy during the crisis was an important and moderating element in this respect. 010722 �After the crisis, deficiencies in the Solicitor General's Office were remedied, an Op Centre was created under Bourne, who had previously been in the PCO and was a confideant of Mcllwraith's successor, Goyer. What did you do about the lack of coordination between the three police forces? Sometime in late October, RGR and Lalonde called CSte to the PCO (knowing that he had no authority over the RCMP) to see what might be done about coordinating police work with the military presence. They wanted some kind of direct intervention, which CSte considered impracticable. CSte arranged with considerable difficulty and humiliation to go to Montreal on an armed forces plane (having been refused the convenience of his own ministry's plane, which was being used instead for the purpose of consulting Gustave Morf). The RCMP appointed Ferraris to accompany CSte and the DCIGS to Montreal. After another moment of uncooperativeness on the part of the police in Montreal, Gilles Turcot, commander of the forces in Montreal, persuaded the initially reluctant St. Pierre to meet with CSte's delegation. In the end, the police were cooperative in helping CSte analyse the liaison problem, which had arisen in part from the extreme discretion of the RCMP. RGR was also concerned that the RCMP were lacking in strong civil authority, and were therefore perhaps not conducting themselves in a way seen fit by the PCO. The following is an example of the kind of difficulty CSte was up against: CSte would be unable to get information from Ferraris in the Op Centre, although Ferraris would pass the information to Mcllwariath's special assistant. CSte would then ask the assistant for the information, and would be told to get it from Ferraris, who then had to go back to his superior in the RCMP for permission to relay the information to the deputy minister. The information in question was about the actual events of the crisis and not about the work methods of the RCMP. 010723 �^Pi your estimation was the FLQ indigenous or partly influenced by foreign elements? There was a lot of foreign influence (mainly by pieds noirs from Algeria) in the schools, inciting student action - even CSte's ovm children. There was perhaps not so much foreign organization, but rather, a lot of foreigners who contributed to the fomentation. (Many of these had been adoles ceitt spy-courriers in Europe during the last war, and had grown up in an unsettled atmosphere.) There were also financial elements that could be traced to Cuba, through leading artists in Montreal but CSte was not sure of the exact cases. Do you know how Cabinet was divided on the initial policy toward the demands of the FLQ? CSte felt the question was inappropriate, and he would not be free to answer it even if he knew. Did you follow the Demers-Lemieux negotiations? Hov; v/as Demers appointed? Bourassa v/as worried about infiltration by the FLQ; even his ovm secretary was in question. He did not want to be another Kerensky. Demers v/as confidant of Bourassa, having worked for him already in this field (?). He became Bourass's Lalonde. His abrupt appointment by the Quebec premier was due in part to the fact that the province had responsibility for the administration of justice, at least until the proclamtion of the IMA. The Quebec Government v/as jealous of its authority vis a vis the Federal Government. The appointment of Demers had doubtless been worked out jointly between the two prime Ministers, who were in almost hourly contact. Demers was also in constant touch v/ith the Op Centre, and relayed information regularly to Lalonde. 010724 �How was Bourassa persuaded to make his "petit virage"? The P.M. and Lalonde probably influenced him. Choquette was more in favour of concessions than Bourassa. Relations between Choquette and Bourassa were strained but did not impede the functioning of government. CSte was less familiar with the Quebec situation than with the federal scene. Were arrangements between the Federal and Quebec Governments made on the phone and left unrecorded? Except for the participants' memories, yes. VJhat about the conflicting views between Bourassa and the P.M. regarding the pardon or parole of the five prisoners under provincial jurisdiction? Experience shows that it is seldom necessary to compromise with kidnappers after a period of nonety-six hours. Furthermore, the FLQ needed money and food. Nevertheless, CSte considered the Liberation Cell as menacing as the Chenier Cell at that time. Did you and AER see eye to eye on policy? Yes. They agreed among other things about not exchanging prisoners for Cross's life. Mcllwraith was firmly opposed to releasing prisoners. Parole was left as a possibility. It could have been justified if the prisoners were practically ready for parole anyway, enabling the Government to make psychological capital of the situation. Parole was not followed up because it was not necessary. Perhaps the Federal Government objected to Bourassa's offer of parole for the five provincial prisoners because it constituted anticipatory parole. In any case, all solutions to policy issues were fluid to a considerable degree because the situation itself v/as constantly changing, or could do. 010725 �^•was Cross's life a high priority in Government policy? It was high, but Cress's life was not to be saved at the expence of flouting the law. The Government wanted to save both his life and general respect for the law. Laporte's assassination hardened the Government's determination to uphold the law. It also increased the danger of a second assassination; (CSte did not distinguish between the motivations of the two cells' members). 010726 �* Ernest CSTe" 16.1.75 How did you fisrt hear about the crisis? CSte heard about the kidnapping from the radio; he was not informed by the RCMP, who may possibly have informed the Solicitor General, if, in fact, they had already been informed by the Montreal police. Mcllwraith kept his relations with the RCMP to himself. (Incidentally, the previous operations on his eyes did not in any way incapacitate him during the crisis.) CSte volunteered that on the ocassion of the proclamation of the WMA, Mcllwraith had not informed him place. - his own Deputy Minister - about what was going to take The real imminence of such strong measures was kept pretty much to Cabinet circles. On the night of the proclamation, Mcllwraith*s special assistant showed CSte the document during the time the Solicitor General was actually procuring signatures and signing it himself. The press had pointed out the possibility of special measures being taken, but CSte was quite unprepared for such a drastic move. CSte. the Solicitor General, and the special assistant waited in the Mcllwraith's office that night (October 15-16) until the Governor General actually procalimed the act. Once CSte was privy to the information he was more or less obliged to remain closeted. CSte thought the initiative for the WMA had come from the P.M. after entreaties from Quebec to take some unspecified action. Lalonde, Davey, Goyer, and maybe Colonel Bourne were all aware of the Government's 010727 intentions. CSte was not, because of Mcllwraith's policy of exclusing him. �Following the proclamation of the WMA did you participate in discussion within your department about the scale of arrests that might be made? No. Higgit discussed the question with the Solicitor General. CSte was excluded from all the Minister's relations with the RCMP, who reported to him directly. Can you tell us anything about the importance of Ryan's counter-government plot in convincing the Cabinet of the need for the WMA? Were you in contact with R yan at any point? No. CSte had nothing to do with Ryan or the WMA. In what specific way were you connected with the crisis? CSte felt he had to keep himself informed on the crisis in order to be able to advise the Solicitor General. He took up a sort of listening post in the Op Centre. But even there the RCMP denied him information on the specific instructions of the Solicitor General. The RCMP is a paramilitary organization with the same method of thinking as the armed forces. There was a problem of policy being under the general control of the civil side of the government. On occasion, CSte, when informed of something by Ferraris in the Task Force, had spoken directly to Lalonde, bypassing the Solcitor General in order to save time. 010728 �TAPE CUT ^rCSte requested the tape recorder be stopped because he wanted to say something in privacy about the eventual downfall of the Solicitor General, who on one occasion had given a ridiculously inadequate briefing to the Cabinet on the FLQ, putting his own judgment in serious question. CSte emphasised the nature of his situation in the Op Centre, where he was able to give advice to AER, Davey, and sometimes, La.I.onde. He considered the Op Centre to be the focal point for top level officials. CSte drew a distinction between setting a general line of policy an ordering specific police action. The V/HAT and the HOV/ of police activities were separate, and ought not to be confused. The necessity to keep them separate explained the attitude of the police and perhaps the attitude of the Solicitor General as well. Did you regularly attend Cabinet Committee meetings? No, although the Solicitor General did. CSte was in daily contact both with AER and Mcllwraith. He kept watch on the crisis from the Op Centre. What role did the Solicitor General's Office play in the crisis? Assessment of the FLQ, CSte's two reports on the FLQ, and Mcllwraith's guidance of the RCMP. The role of the Solicitor General's Office would have been greater except that (l) Cross was a foreign diplomat, and (2) the Solicitor General's Office was new and lacked facilities. 010729 �^ttThe RCMP feared the information would get to the Montreal police, who in turn would "blow it". The E.CMP were able to break the case by being very secretive, since the danger always existed of infiltration of the Montreal police by the FLQ. In Bourassa's office was a woman with a complete list of all the Quebec police officers their families and phone numbers. No one knew precisely why, but they felt it indicated possible foul play. The liaison problem was solved by the P.M.'s giving instructions to the next Solicitor General, Goyer, cleaELy defining the channels of communication. Had protective measures been taken on the basis of the RCMP assessment of the FLQ, and were they in effect when Cross was kidnapped? Prior to the crisis, John Starnes had prepared an excellent report for the responsible minister predicting the likelihood of diplomatic kidnappings. The paper was not read by cabinet, however, because it had been presented in July and conflicted with the summer holidays. About protective measures taken by the police, the RCMP, Ottawa group, would be in a position to know. Later, in any event, they set up a highly organized surveillance protection group for diplomats and VIP's. Can you explain why the shoot-out apparently became an important issue? Were there conceivably people in favour of a shoot-out? Although C6te did not know in specific terms, he presumed that the influence of DEA in formulating policy during the crisis was an important and moderating element in this rasspect. 010730 �After the crisis, deficiencies in the Solicitor General's Office were remedied, an Op Centre was created under Bourne, who had previously been in the PCO and was a confideant of Mcllwraith's successor, Goyer. What did you do about the lack of coordination between the three police forces? Sometime in late October, RGR and Lalonde called CSte to the PCO (knowing that he had no authority over the RCMP) to see what might be done about coordinating police work with the military presence. They wanted some kind of direct intervention, which C6t£ considered impracticable. CSte arranged with considerable difficulty and humiliation to go to Montreal on an armed forces plane (having been refused the convenience of his own ministry's plane, v/hich was being used instead for the purpose of consulting Gustave Morf). The RCMP appointed Ferraris to accompany CSte' and the DCIGS to Montreal. After another moment of uncooperativeness on the part of the police in Montreal, Gilles Turcot, commander of the forces in Montreal, persuaded the initially reluctant St. Pierre to meet with CSte's delegation. In the end, the police were cooperative in helping CSte analyse the liaison problem, which had arisen in part from the extreme discretion of the RCMP. RGR was also concerned that the RCMP were lacking in strong civil authority, and were therefore perhaps not conducting themselves in a way seen fit by the PCO. The following is an example of the kind of difficulty CSte was up against: CSte would be unable to get information from Ferraris in the Op Centre, although Ferraris would pass the information to Mcllwariath's special assistant. CSte would then ask the assistant for the information, and would be told to get it from Ferraris, who then had to go back to his superior in the RCMP for permission to relay the information to the deputy minister. The information in question was about the actual events of the crisis and not about the work methods of the RCMP. 010731 �^^In your estimation was the FLQ indigenous or partly influenced by foreign elements? There was a lot of foreign influence (mainly by pieds noirs from Algeria) in the schools, inciting student action - even CSte's own children. There was perhaps not so much foreign organization, but rather, a lot of foreigners who contributed to the fomentation. (Many of these had been adoles ceitfc spy-courriers in Europe during the last war, and had grown up in an unsettled atmosphere.) There were also financial elements that could be traced to Cuba, through leading artists in Montreal but CSte was not sure of the exact cases. Do you know how Cabinet was divided on the initial policy toward the demands of the FLQ? C6te felt the question was inappropriate, and he v/ould not be free to answer it even if he knew. Did you follow the Demers-Lemieux negotiations? How was Demers appointed? Bourassa was worried about infiltration by the FLQ; even his own secretary was in question. He did not want to be another Kerensky. Demers v/as confidant of Bourassa, having worked for him already in this field (?). He became Bourass's Lalonde. His abrupt appointment by the Quebec premier was due in part to the fact that the province had responsibility for the administration of justice, at least until the proclamtion of the WMA. The Quebec Government was jealous of its authority vis a vis the Federal Government. The appointment of Demers had doubtless been worked out jointly between the two prime %Lnisters, v/ho were in almost hourly contact. Demers was also in constant touch with the Op Centre, and relayed information regularly to Lalonde. 010732 �I How was Bourassa persuaded to make his "petit virage"? The P.M. and Lalonde probably influenced him. Choquette was more in favour of concessions than Bourassa. Relations between Choquette and Bourassa were strained but did not impede the functioning of government. CSte was less familiar with the Quebec situation than with the federal scene. Were arrangements between the Federal and Quebec Governments made on the phone and left unrecorded? Except for the participants* memories, yes. What about the conflicting views between Bourassa and the P.M. regarding the pardon or parole of the five prisoners under provincial jurisdiction? Experience shows that it is seldom necessary to compromise with kidnappers after a period of nonety-six hours. Furthermore, the FLQ needed money and food. Nevertheless, CSte considered the Liberation Cell as menacing as the Chenier Cell at that time. Did you and AER see eye to eye on policy? Yes. They agreed among other things about not exchanging prisoners for Cross's life. Mcllwraith was firmly opposed to releasing prisoners. Parole was left as a possibility. It could have been justified if the prisoners were practically ready for parole anyway, enabling the Government to make psychological capital of the situation. Parole was not followed up because it was not necessary. Perhaps the Federal Government objected to Bourassa's offer of parole for the five provincial prisoners because it constituted anticipatory parole. In any case, all solutions to policy issues were fluid to a considerable degree because the situation itself was constantly changing, or could do. 0107 , �^oJ-i'as Cross's life a high priority in Government policy? It was high, but Grass's life was not to be saved at the expence of flouting the law. The Government wanted to save both his life and general respect for the law. Laoorte's assassination hardened the Government's determination to uphold the law. It also increased the danger of a second assassination; (CSte did not distinguish betv/een the motivations of the two cells' members). 010734 �1 w^ 1 • • Government of Canada Gouvernement du Canada CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET A compter du / S & /1 <Z> Jusqu'au / 0 Q //,£ AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - A METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTERIEURE VOIR File No. - Dossier n° Volume 9C-3L2-TF/Z-A/-/S GC 31 (88/08) 7540-21-857-8809 010735 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00140 Title A name given to the resource Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - Ernest Cote Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 16-Jan-75 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - Ernest Cote, RG25, vol. 25748, 20-22-TFK-11-15, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Entire file Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en