https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/976b1dfab9488742b0078cc23b847415.pdf e5cceb96362196c1188afbaaec911db5 PDF Text Text File No. Dossier Volume / ^AX^77A^-//y,j From-De 7A£&£RA& TO-A 7? oSA±A 74/A>6J& " CLASSIFIED VOLS ACCESSION N O . r i T - TITLE—TITRE POLITICAL AFFAIRS INTERNAL SECURITY TASK FORCE ON KIDNAPPING ORAL HISTORY PROGRAhUBi K.C. BROWN « % A Retention period-Periode de retention EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONALTRADE CANADA AFFAIRE&EXTEIHEURES ET COMMERCE EXTERIEUR CANADA TCOHBHSri^fl �d e p a r t m e n t of External ^ffnirg JWtuistcre foes ^ f f a i r c s exterteurea (Caitaba May 27, 1974 ;>w \U Tou may recall that Andr6e Anjyot and I have been working under Arthur Blanchette on an oral history project concerning the crisis of October, 1970* We would be very grateful if we could have the benefit of your hindsight and insight on the events. We realize, of course, that you were not directly concerned with the affair until mid-November. But we are sure that your familiarity with Cuba, and the breadth of your wisdom and experience generally would enable you to make an interesting contribution toward future understanding of this period. We are submitting a number of rather general questions for your perusal in the hope that sometime, at your convenience, you might address yourself to our taperecorder on these or other related points (which you might like to raise yourself). Perhaps you could give us a ring (2.3364) to let us know if your schedule will allow such digressions. Jean Halstead 010686 �1. Who was on tha Canadian Mbaaay staff in Havana apart from Warden (Charged»Affairaa) and Bilodeau (2nd secretary)? 2. What gave rise to problema in c«—unicstiona? Were they technical? Did tat go via Washington, D.C.? Did they arise from people being absent to work in the fields? 3. How freely ware you abla to talk with them? Apart from your formal calls oa Roa, with whom did you deal on crisis questions? Ua How seriously did tha Cubans regard the crisis? 5. It waa noted in a memorandum that "the Cuban Government appreciate the faat by aiding us, Cuba would expect Canada to be more amenable to future trade ralationa mere favourable to Cuba." Have there been tangible consequenceaT 6. How would you describe their motivation in making the arrangements? Did you feel they wanted to clear the air over their previous association with separatists? Did they want better relatione with the federal govern—at at the expence of their ralationa with the Quebec Govern—nt? know about their ralationa with the Quebec Government? Do you With Separatists? Is there evidence of direct dealings? 7. In a report of Oetobar 15th, Dery said that Cuba had FLQ members training ta* What about this? 8. What waa tha significance of Bachand's presence in Cuba? there? 9. Have wo kept track of him? How long waa be (cf. Havan. Tel #672, 2.9.70) When did the decision in favour of Cuba over Algeria become definite? Was it settled by Oetobar 16th? 10. The kldnappera, in a communique* of October 13th, stated that Cuba prefered to keep out of tha situation and that they would therefore be left with the possibility of Algeria. Could you ahed light on this? Were you aware of the communique or of such a Cuban reaponae? 11. Did you negotalte or talk with the Cubans about the conditions at Montreal? What waa their reaction to the choice of Terre des Hommea over the Cuban office in Montreal? 010687 �"%12. Waa there difficulty in getting acceptance of a temporary group travel document? 13. Did the Cubans say anything about accompanying lawyers and Journalists? 14. Did you discuss costs for the kidnappers with them. 15. Did you request guaranteea from them relating ta the political activity of the kidnappers? 16. What about extradition? 17. Did you ever broach the question of sending "political prisoners"? 18. Did you have contact with Mayrand during the crisis? 19. When did Ken Brown actually arrive? 20. Did you have contact with the kidnappers after their arrival in Cuba? (Did any Canadian wives help Madame Lanctot?) 010688 �ORAL HISTORY ACCESSION FORM HISTOIRE ORALE: FORMULE D'ACCESSION * Accession number '/Vumero i/Vi 1-13 LO and 1970 C r i s i s Interviewee Enquefe' Interviewer 'En quvteur K.C. Brown Mrs. Amyot? N P . .of t a p e s / T r a n s c n p t s \ ° de bobines/TranN. riptions Di ration/Duree Dale Location 20/6/74 Quality of recording 'Quality -ie l*enregistrement 1/0 Pescnption Canada and Cuba r e l a t i o n s durinu the 1070 C r i s i s INTERVIEWEE /EIVQUETE Pa te INTERVIEWER rece i ved/ret," it sent/envoye /ENQUETEUR Contract /Con trat 1 j Contract, 'Conttat Letler/Leffre j Letter 'Lettre [^ Tape checked by interviewer for quality L e v e l o f s e c r e c y / / V i v e a u de rn ••Jew interview re quired aux ceglements du douvernement 2. Death of interviewee/De*c£s de t'enquett \_ _ I l _ Pale j { I • • 3. Other/Aufre Restrictions Copywrite held by/Droits d'auteur detenus par EXTERNAL AFFAIRS Additional c o m m e n t s / A u f r e s 1 1 Date .received Vefu classification CLOSED UNTIL/FEKAfE JUSQU'A , In a c c o r d a n c e with government r e g u l a t i o n s Conformement | sent 'envoye commentajres . Person(a) r e s p o n s i b l e for c o l l e c t i o n / R e s p p n s a b / e f s ) de la collecti Signature Signature 010689 �Accession NumberlNumero d'entree 1-13 WORK PROGRESS/ACHEMINEMENT DU TRAVAIL Verified by/ Date Verifie Tape received/Reception de la par bobine. X Re-recording/RS-enr egistr ement. Transcript prepared'J transcription. Transcript checked for" errors/ verification typographique. Transcript checked against tape/ confrontation transcription - bobine. References checked in Library/ verification biblioth§que des references en Final Proofreading/ verification finale. Retyping if necessary/ Nouvelle copie si necessaire. sent 1'envoye Copy sent to interviewee/ verification par enquete. serxt/envoye Copy sent to interviewer/ verification received/regu par received/'regu enqueteur. finale. Final typing/copEe Subject index (on card)/ Index sujet (sur fiche). Filing of Tape/Rangement de la bobine. Filing of Transcript/ Rangement de la transcription. Filing of Index card/ Rangement de la fiche sujet. Filing of accession form/ Rangement de la formule d'accession. EXT 161 010690 �Cuba - Canadian Embassy Warden - Charge" Bilaudeau - 1st Secretary John Hill - Commercial attache" Glen Grice - Communicator 010691 �Head of DSE/G2 Vice Minister - Ministry of Interior Major Jose ABRANTES Fernandez 010692 �« Direootr - Liberation Directorate 1st Vice Minister - Techinoal Vice Minister Manuel PINEIRO Losada 010693 �Mr. Brown Could you describe in general terms the state of relationa between Cuba and Canada in October, 1970, touching on the changes in political climate after Mayrand's tenure of office (was DEA fully aware of Mayrand's fall from favour with Castro?), the change in the Cuban Government * 8 attitude toward the diplomatic corps, and and changes in the staff of the Canadian Embassy which reflected thia development. Bissonnette notes that Castro could not be reached for starting the talks on hijacking the preceding February. Did that situation reflect our relatione with Cuba particularly, or the diplomatic picture in Havana generally? How seriously did the Cubans really take the cancellation of the five charter flights? (Ambassador de Cossio said the action "Implied a relationship between Cuba and the Quebec situation.") i How would you describe and evaluate the factors underlying the Cuban approach to the Cross crisis? (For example, their desire for Canada to remain united, and their interest In encouraging further trade.) Could you elaborate on the "conflict of Interests" experienced by Cuban leaders regarding their policy toward Canada during the Cross crisis? what lntellogenee arrangements do we have In Cuba? Did you ever discuss guaranteea with the Cubans relating to political activity of the kidnappers? Extradition? Thier possible departure from Cuba, or their eventual return to Canada? Did you have contact with the kidnappers after their arrival in Cuba? How do you assess the effect of the crisis on Canadian-Cuban relations? * 010694 �Kenneth Brown The Felquistes are apparently fed up with life in Cuba, largely because of boredom (monotonous food, no interesting occupation) rather than with hardships. They attempted to go to Algeria, France and Belgium, but the DEA made representations to those countries to short circuit their attempts, and to make their return to Canada necessary if they should leave Cuba. In the spring of 1973 the Gaulist ambassador in Havana even made available to Mr. Brown the copy of a letter written by the Felquistes requesting the ambassador's help in arranging departure for France. After the initial agreement with the Cubans in October, 1970 there was no further discussion with the Cubans about the future of the Felquistes. Mr. Brown arrived in Cuba on November 3» 1970 for his second tour of duty in that country, the first having been before the revolution. From September to November he and his wife brushed up their Spabish in the language school in Cornavaca, Mexico. Brown's arrival was seen by Cubans as the beginning of a new era following a bad I period with Mayrand. During the first month in Havana, there were no discussions with the Cubans about the crisis because the arrangements had already been made. In the years preceding the crisis relations between Cnada and Cuba had deteriorated (after a years' honeymoon between Castro and Mayrand) because (l) Castro cut himself off generally from the Western ambassadors, (2) Mayrand was personally at odds with Cuban authroities, and (3) the role in which Mayrand cast himself as selfappointed honest broker between the U.S. and Cuba was rejected by Castro. This deterioration was more in tone than in subsatnce of relations. 010695 �But the hyjacking negotiations, the Lippert trial and occasional harrassment by police were specific points of contention between the two governments. Compensation to banks and insurance companies had been generous, and relations between them and the Cuban Government remained satisfactory. The Royal Bank was chosen as intermediary generally in hard currency transactions with other countries. There haddbeen widespread reduction in activities with foreign countries. Trade officers had been removed before Mayrand's arrival, but one year before his departure two new trade officers were sent, and trade was encouraged by mutual consent. Aid began after Mr. Brown's arrival, in 1971, and became the first such arrangement with a communist country. Ottwa was apparently not fully aware of Mayrand's fall from favour in Cuba, and requested his assistance during the crisis. Mayrand himself probably had an unrealistic view of his relationship with the Cubans. The Cubans regarded Canada as a "good" capitalist country with possibilities for trade and aid, and didnt want the crisis to interfere in the furtherance of thes prospects. Their image as a revolutionary country was only a secondary factor. The Cubans did not expect a specific quid pro quo for their "humanitarian gesture" but expected it to create a climate of good will. Canadian "gratitude" took no particlar form, but aid, and the sale of locomotives did follow the crisis. Canadian interests remained the the persuit of claims for nationalization, emigation (the re-uniting of divided families outside of Cuba), the bi-lateral hijacking agreement, and the release of Lippert. 010696 �The Cubans wanted to see how far they could go in dealing with a Western country. Since there is no intelligence agency in Canada comparable to the CIA, and since there are no Canadian military attaches in Havana, FSOs had to perform the intelligence tasks both for Canada and for the U.S. There were no covert operations, and the Cubans probably realized what was going on. Brown and Warden and their families visited the supposed Russian nuclear submarine surfacing station with a view to reporting on it, (and under false pretenses). The MinisL ry of the Interior and Immigration is much more important than that of Foreign Affairs. It undoubtedly dealt with the FLQists after their arrival in Havana. Escartin was probably from this minist ry. De Cossio may not be from this ministry but enjoys a special relationship with Castro because of what he endured during the revolution. There was virtually no direct contact between the Felquistes and the Embassy after December, 1970. Cosette-Trudel's father acted as go-between for the registration of the children's birth certificates. 010697 | �fl ^ H Government of Canada Gouvernement du Canada CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET Dated From 2*/ &$ <^7 A compter du -Ay O g ^ Q- To Jusqu'au AyO 6 c? C) AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - A METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTERIEURE VOIR File No. - Dossier n° Volume ^o-a^x- T^/X -//-/. '/? GC 31 (88/08) 7540-21-857-8309 010698 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00138 Title A name given to the resource Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - K.C. Brown Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 27-May-74 to 20-Jun-74 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - K.C. Brown, RG25, vol. 25748, 20-22-TFK-11-13, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Entire file Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en