https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/62e5ea619b3a670811eaa7b79285a8a4.pdf 87d0db91756061037263dab78aa1b999 PDF Text Text 20-22-TFK-ll-ll File No. Dossier Volume^/ From-De 7(/ £jJ>&o-k 7yd?<P£=> CLASSIFIE CLASSIFIED VOLS ACCESSION NO. „*-,—*_3_. 9* TITLE—TITRE POLITICAL AFFAIRS INTERNAL SECURITY TASK FORCE ON KIDNAPP ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM BILL BARTON Retention period-Periode de retention EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES ET COMMERCE EXTERIEUR CANADA I �ORAL HISTORY ACCESSION FORM HISTOIRE ORALE: FORMULE D'ACCESSION A c c e s s i o n number '.\unit*to ii'ontr^:••• 1-11 FLQ and 1970 C r i s i s merviewec Enquere Interviewer 'En Bill Barton queteur Arthur Blanchette No. of t a p e s T r a n s c r i p t s V° dr b-tbines/Transcript ions 7Wfe£ Duration/'Durre Aside A / 1 Quality of recording f Qua fit '• de I'enregit Location trement De scription INTERVIEWEE 'ENQUETE INTERVIEWER sent/envoyc' Contract/Confrar Letter/^efrre ^ I Contract''Contrat I J Letter^Lefrre I Tape checked by interviewer for quality Qualite de la bobine verifiee par l'enqueteur Level of s e c r e c y /Niveau de c j ' l ' sent 'envoy6 Date received 7 re^u New interview required Nouvelle intrcvue n e c e s s a i r e tassification CLOSED UNTIL/FERME JUSQU'A . In accordance with government regulations Contormement aux reglements egtements du gouvernement gc 2. Death of interviewee 'Deeds de J'enquSte* 3. Other/,4 urre C'opywnte held by /Droits 'ENQUETEUR received/re•, u j I j ( • • d'auteur detenus par Restrictions EXTERNAL AFFAIRS Additional comments /A utres c ommentaires Person(s) r e s p o n s i b l e for c o l l e c t i o n / / ? o s p o n s a h / e [ ' s ) de la collection Signature Signature XT 16 2 010670 �accession Number/mimero a'entree 1-11 WORK PROGRESS/ACHEMINEMENT DU TRAVAIL Verified by/ Date Verifie Tape received/Reception de la par bobine. X Re-recording/RS-enregistrement. Transcript prepared/transcription. X Transcript checked for errors/ verification typographique. X Transcript checked against tape/ confrontation transcription - bobine. References checked in Library/ verification bibliothdque des references en Final Proofreading/ verification finale. Retyping if necessary/ Nouvelle copie si necessaire. Copy sent to interviewee/ verification par par received/regu sent/envoye recelved/regu enquete. Copy sent to interviewer/ verification sent/envoye enqueteur. finale. Final typing/copEe Subject index (on card)/ Index sujet (sur fiche). Filing of lapelRangement la bobine. de Filing of Transcript/ Rangement de la transcription. Filing of Index card/ Rangement de la fiche sujet. Filing of accession form/ Rangement de la formule d'accession. EXT 161 010671 �Talks between Bill Barton and ARE. Blanchette on the formation of the Operation Centre (Task Force) during the F.L.Q. Crisis. 010672 �• B.B. The Checkoslovakia case in I96S. Ee didn't have an office to work in, we used to borros' from killers row as we used to call it isa the East Block when somebody was away, and we used bo operate out of that, to the sxtent that saa possible. Sometime in 1969, I guess it was the idea orginated that we should build a proper operations centre, and work on this was pretty well advanced, and by the time the kidnapping took place, the operations centre basic construction had been completeed a good deal of the equipment wasn't there, but the basic equipment ASPS there, so that when the kidnapping did take place, I think that it was just taken in red that we would assemble a task force, of course what we didn't know at that time was at the time, the day the incipient took place of how extensive it would Ee, and how long it would 30 oil, or ths form that it would unlimately t ike, this was our immedri b reaction. As I recollect that morning, it was quite early in the morning, 1 had just come into the office, it would be somewhere between E:30 and 9:00, and Tom Eeed fror.i Protocal phoned me to say that they had word from the British, as I recollect direct from Montreal, but I'm not certain and he could variiy that, reporting that Cross had been kidnapped. I imediately got onto the phone to the Under-Secretary who was having a morning meeting with the Minister got him out of the meeting and toid him what had happened. He came back to the office immediately, and we discuss A AA who we should ;et in right away uad I pot ahold of Zed Eeady in the intellegence division and vrith the operation centre, I persumed './ere the other logical people to get ahold of who were concerned with the matter, and since the operations centre was concerned., and the group? forgathered very rapidly and by 9:30 or * 10:00 it was in session. At that point my main concern that first day or so I got involved in drafting, the ldsnd of ii statements that SKA would issue if we learned that he had been killed, and I forget what else, but there was s sarics of sort of draft statements 010673 �2 that we worked out for the occassion, that we could forsee, and I also got involved ^^itP: Pas local police, and with the ECE? about protection of diplomats in the Ottawa, area. My memorary at the time of these things is alittle hasy after all it is 4 .years ago. Apart from that my personnel involvement -was, with the task force was very x secondary, I used, to go and sit in on the morning meetings sometimes. And of course when it involved assisting and getting magestic support I used to help.) on that, and throw the weight of my job behind it, hub Iclcti't isike any bt sp'- to follow A fine print of b! nagoti bion that / nt IA, ctive I • .. A c that First norning well hen Mr. Ritchie c .s 1 ack from the Ministers office. Es talked about who we should pick to head the task force, I couldn't tell you who first suggested Claude, he just came to mind of all of us at the time, but he -.saa a logical person to do it, so lie was dragged over and out to work right away. After all it involved Federal Provincial relations, as well as the kidnapping itself, and he seemed like the logical person to have, and admirabley suited to it, and that was the way it got started as I recollect. For the sake of Future interviews, could you recall who v/as present at that first meeting in the Under-Secretaries office, yourself and Claud, I suspect that Fred Biid Alight have been there, but I'm not sure. E.E I couldn't recall. It wasn't even a sit down meeting, it was sort of a gathering in the outer office, people who were right there, and. it could have been Fred Bild, it could have been Join Hollstead, I just don't remember. B To introduce the very first steps, we do lack the names of the, or the identies of the people. B.B. It was a total group, as I recollect, people v/ere coming in and out, and we v/ere all just sorb oE talking on the fly, El would think up something and one oC us would go off and do it, and we oould come back and. then eventually the group move.], down into the operation centre, And by then of course it •ssa a larger group, and we began to sort of establish it on a clightly more formal liases. Eaa there a genera], consences to sort this activity, which the Department should be involved in, secondly that it should be dealt with by group rather than by individual 010674 �^^ B.B. bhcre more unity of outlook on this or some different views on this. I don'b recollect any different views, I tliink we just took it for ;ranted that this pa th " s' to do it ••;A we very [uickly realised that v/ith procession of the operation KEfcrx centre v/e had. the equipment In bhe government where you could focus attention k on the problem, and provide a natural focus for getting together, and sorting it out, and of course subsequently you were aware that the department started to get into the act, the Privy Council Office decided, that they ne .6 1 sonetPELng like that, because this v/as sometime later, and also that it v/as the Solicitor Generals Office, that there's were much later and siors domestically oriented, And this was just the only equipment that there was and we just thanked the good lord that bhe thing had been brought to the point that we could use it, by the time this sposode broke, it certainly paid off, it made us look as If v/e were pressiented at a time when v/e had been under considerable critisum from other department in the government about the so called inificiatcics of the department I believ B.B. it v/as the first time that the operation centre had ever been used. That is right, It v/as. I was really just coming into action and it v/as only partly equiped, vie idn't have alot of the recording apperatus, and things like that, that v/ere subsequently added. It was a very useful operation. The people who were in it at the time as I recollect, Jim Barker, and Alan Row, and Jim Buddington, did a sterling job, as well as oE course Claude. Pare you yourself xnxfckExdHysxEg EEuss'Ebsidi during the first days, an participate in the task force meetings. PJere you there quite frequently. B.B. I v/as in and out. I v/as not actually engaged In the actual work of the bask force. I got some of the other taks in my, and one of my jobs v/as to try and see that tilings v/ere meeted, I could do that and run a department administratively. Eo I didn't attemjjb to do more than to maintain an interest in what v/as :poing on. Then as It became evidenb that it v/as going to be a long drawn out operation , that involved further. B I asked, because I'm brying to build up information on the decision making 010675 �4 ^fcroc .PPA regarding the task force, and 7E.30 the influence of the task Tores on Government thinking. You mentioned the sinister awhile back, can you recall his early reaction. I hadn't seen EIgh Taylor yet, I have an appointment with Sigh next week, I'm going to ask him this question. B.B. I Eon't know, I n tl: . ml er A. telling ne that -./hen I phoned over, and he bold li lister, the Minister immediately pot in touch v/ith the Prime Minister, Ed told me that, and I remember on one occassion, the Minister being in the operation centre, and I know he followed it on the Pay to day liases, bub v/hat his views • sre and how ho "orsaw it andvhat the relations were ± K -Z.'C the Prime Minister nd the Minister where on bEis I haven't 113' idea, or other Ministers, I just don't know. Because one oE the paps and mysteries in our vile is the departments Rirst position paper, and the Ministers reaction to it, on the 5th of October, I sus that it must of been Claude who rounded up the varies opinions who aren't in the task force, and in other circles in the East Block, and. bEis PAS presented to Ed for signature, and lb cr^^ varies opinions and it went to the Minister. Ext there is no evidence In our files, either on the original memo, there are no h ldv/ritten comments bo where the Minister agreed or disagreed, and that is v/hy I v/as asking v/hat his first reaction might have 1 e a. B.E. PJell I'm sure, I must of seen the memorandum, but I don't even remember the memorandum particularly, .and my guess is that probably the Minister may nob oP said anything, he may of merrily of of gone and discussed it s.dth the Prime Minister and 7si i.b his re .ction w s. Because the C- sic memorandum, I have it in i.y brief case here, outline a relatively soft line, outline the milder negotiating position that was eventually emerged from the Cabinet, it suggested that a safe conduct might be offered, it even suggested that changes of prisoners might be released. It considered ransom money, not ransom money, but some sort of rev/ard money, and It went up to the Minister, but what emerged from the cabinet v/as a relatively harder line, reflecting some of the first aspects, some of the first relations put forward, generally ib 010676 �5 ^P/cnt, v/hat emerged, was a addition less silling to negotiate, less illing to accomoslate, then v/hat went up in bhe original papocr. B.B. /fell my guess And I'm only guessing is that, if I ever did know, I'm sure I did at the time, I'm sure that I even engaged in conversation, but there v/as eo.iv- uncertainty what the position oZ the provincial government v/as on this, and that may have been taken into account, and the way the department prepared a memorandum v/as that it v/hen it got to cabinet it was subjected to consoltations betwe a Trudeau and Borassa and. maybe whatever his name was, in any event Eederal Provincial confimitations at bhe political level, I suspect that ib h< soinetliing bo Eo with it, but I'm just guessing. They started very very early, v/1 ither they started bhat very morning, or whether they came in before the end of the day, I am not sure from the evidence on the file, it is not quite clear. Can you recall any hesitation on the part of the Canadian gcMsniKjafcs Government to make a decision before the reaction of the British Government became known. 'Tas that ever a Factor? E.E. Can you recall in the... I recollect from the Canadian Government Indicated the line it waa suppose to take to the British, and they said that they agreed with this, that is iry recollection. And then there v/as an arrangement made as I recall almost that day for a ;cx fellow from the High. Commission to be added into the task force for information proposes. I can't remember his name but. Dunross went to Montreal, actually their were over the period of the bwo months, I think that there were two British representatives. names myself. I've forgotten 'Ace Because there is some evidence that there night have been hesitation on the part of the Canadian Government, without consultations with the British on the other hand, there is the very firm evidence that you just mentioned, bhat a Canadian position was put bo the British and the British mix. went along with it too. B.B. My recollection that is. B The other questions that I have are more of a substantive type of question regarding gaps in bhe file on fundirnental issues. One of them is the idea of an 010677 �^fcprigan and the idea of a safe continent which is an idea that came from our department, and from other departments, was it your idea. B.B. I couldn't tell you were it originated. I suspect that it might have originated with Claude, I couldn't tell you, he would be in a much better position to asnwer that kind of a question on his ovm. B Because it eventually provided the kKxfc key bo the probelm. B.B. You know I just couldn't guess. I don't Icnow hov/ it came about. Did you yourself have any deals with kk any of the cabinet Ministers, fhich involved some help bo leterrrdne the Line taken by some of the Cabinet Ministers. B.B. Mo. I didn't have any dealings with any of the Cabinet Ministers. My dealings were just vrith the members of the Task Force and with the head itself. B That is another one of the missing elements in the evidence, of our own evidence we have jusb a hand written note on one of the memo's that Mr. Jamison took, with a very tired mind, and was of bhe opinion that note of that note, the demands should be met, and no safe conduct issued, that is the only evidence bhat we have, clearly that '/as enough more than the conplex Eebab and map) that had occurred in the Cabinet, and oar National Cabinet was split along varies lines. B.E. The Department v/as vary conciois of bhe obligation of the Canadian Government to provide protection for foreign Diplomate, and this v/as the tiling that laid behind in all of the proposals that were conceived, it was easy to say lets bake a tough position but that wasn't going to fulfill unless the British Government went along with it, it wasn't going to fulfill our obligation to provide protection, and this was I know a great prominate consideration of bhe mines of all those who were involved in these varies schemes. I suspect that members of the cabinet who sot in giving kkKxtkraxk were a threat and. just invited more threats, were not so influenced by that consideration. The police protection of the Diplomates in Ottawa I remember was sort of a combined sort of Affair. B.B. The Ottawa Police v/ere involved, .and the A m y was involved. Well the Arrry came later after ba Porte kidnapping. First it was the Ottawa 010678 �7 ^fcblice and the E.C.E.B. alas a good number of guard services, part of baa g r a b services that v/ere employed by us, paid for by us. Police to work out the deals v/ith. employed their ovm two. I think we used the Mounted And then actually I think one ot* two Embassies I know that the British had in their houses of the Ambassador sort of an alarm button that they could press and it v/ould ring into the headquarters of one of these securitp/ organisations. B Tom Read and David Cole were particularly involved. B.B. Tom I remember I don't remember David. Tom - ; certainly actively involved in this, he should be able to give you a good scoop on that, and he could bell you were the HBgjpara original message came in. B In your own activities after the initial period you went back to your normal duties. At one point you v/ere involved in v/hat son;-.; people call a death squad, which is rather grewsom word for it, but v/ere there any other activities that you i/ere involved in tov/ard the end of the sock: event. B.B. Uo but v/hen the end event came you know, v;hen the news came that they ." j him, and. that episode of the last one I forget how long it is v/as, ER, lA> hours, v/hen they made their late patrol going v/ith there airplane lights on, I started. following what v/as going on in bhe operation centre, as more of a spectator than a participant, and I very vividly remember the last night when we w r : all in the operation centre, Ed was there and a M.P. I can't remember CC.- name, inspector superentendant, /e suddenly gob word that naybe one of the fellows who had worked for us maybe in Montreal, had seen one of these Fellows get Into the car, said that it looked like some guy who was wanted for murder, .and bhey weren't about to let him rr,° Zr he was in it, so bhey had to ingage in a process of identification without upsetting the kidnappers, and the kidnappers were on the plane by this birne, and it involve!, I don't 'enow if one of bhem went out and Looked out at the aircraft to pretend that he was a mechanic or where they crossed, with some of the people that had been close at hand, they finally came to the conclusion bhat the gap- /isn't on it .and they were actually holding bhe aircraft at the end of the field for ten or 010679 �R ^^Tifte.m minutes, -and the tension really mounted terrific illy, people v/ere wondering what was the matter, and finally it went, we opened a bottle of Champagne. One final question v/hich I should of asked alittle bit earlier, it sliped my mind. Were you involved in the actually slection of the personnel used, that served on the Task Force. the others. B.B. ——• . . was a natural final, but what about How did the composition eventually come into being. It was a case of finding bodies v/ere you could, manpower v/as short, and we just took people from '-/ere we could root them out. If there was a logical connection from one of the divisions which was concerned with the thing, or somebody who just was needed, and then of course there v/ere participants from other departments put forward by them, and that is all my recollection is hov/ we did ib. very major problem. It wasn't a I don't know that any great thought v/as given to it. had to find people to do the basic manning of the op. centre boo. PEien v/e Eds was a period that I recall of running out of the sa call id obsterity program, and v/e pare extremely short of manpower at that time, so it v/as a real experience. Mot only bhat ib, there v/as the general assembly going on at the United Nations which is manpower consumming. B.B. That is right. B And as you say it v/as during a posteriety. questions that I have for you. Well bhat about winds up the It v/as mainly that very first morning, the formation of the Task Force. ., •. .-• o -> •B.B. Pis I recollect we just sort of moved around in the,office there, that I shared people came in and out, and we talked and we v/ent off and did the little things, and before very long, we just moved logically down to bhe op. centre. It was a just a straight case of just that. B Well thank you very much, we have about a half hour, that well be useful. 010680 �. •- BARTON How did the Task Force get started? DEA experience with the Czech crisis In 1968 indicated a need for an Op Centre. It was set up in 1969f and used for the first time during the FLQ crisis. Read phoned the news of the kidnapping to Barton, who In turn Informed AER by phone during a meeting with SSEA, Barton summoned a number of other people whose names he forgot, but among whom was Rettie. Barton worked on draft statements for use If Cross were assassinated. He called the police and the RCMP regarding the protection of diplomats. • Barton'8 involvement in the Task Force was peripheral. He sometimes attended meetings and occasionally gave logistic support. The choice of Roquet was more or less spontaneous and by acclamation. Who was present at the first meeting with AER? Barton could not recall because it was a fluid gathering of people in changing numbers. Were you involved in the selection of personel for the Task Force? Manpower was generally scarce. If there was a logical connection with a division in DEA or with another department, people were asked to participate. Selection was not a major problem. Were you involved in other special activities than the preparation of texts for use in the event of Cross' death? More as a spectator than as a participant* Barton recalled the identification of Seguin as viewed from the Op Centre. *• 010681 �Was there a concensus that the DEA should handle the crisis, and that the Task Force should deal with it rather than an individual? The Op Centre provided the only possible focus for the crisis. Later the Privy Council decided to create an Op Centre of their ovm, and still later, the Solicitor General's Office as well. What was the SSEA' early reaction to the kidnapping? SSEA telephoned the P.M. upon hearing the news. He came to the Op Centre at least once, and followed the events on a day to day basis. Hov-/ did SSEA feel about taking a firm line politically? SSEA may not have said anything at all about the first memorandum on policy brought out by the Task Force. He may simply have discussed it with the P.M. There was uncertainty in Ottawa about the reaction of Quebec. The firm line may have resulted from federal-provincial consultation at the political level. 010682 �^P Was a policy decision taken before or only after the British Government's reaction became known? (Could the British reaction have been an element in enabling the Canadian Government to take a firm line?) Barton was under the impression that the Canadians proclaimed their position first and the British seconded it. It was suggested that one of the British should join the Task Force. Where did the inspiration for the safe conduct originate? Barton did not know. Are you aware of divided views among members of the Cabinet? Barton did not deal with Cabinet ministers, but only with members of the Task Force and AER. He observed that DEA was greatly concerned about providing adequate protection for diplomats - a responsibility somewhat at odds with a rigidly firm line. Cabinet members may not have had the same concern, and therefore would have found it easier to be firm. 010683 �I>l Government of Canada Gouvernement du Canada CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET A compter du' 7*/® '<*-& Jusqu'au 7 ^(^f'J-^ AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - A METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTERIEURE VOIR File No. - Dossier n° c^O-^p GC 31 (88/04) AAA'-//-// Volume 7540-21 -857-8809 010684 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00137 Title A name given to the resource Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - Bill Barton Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 26-Sep-74 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - Bill Barton, RG25, vol. 25748, 20-22-TFK-11-11, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Entire file Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en