https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/913701e1641d64c06e3b2e9eccaef374.pdf 351bda133c0887ff137c9889bb1609e7 PDF Text Text File No. Dossier Volume / 20-22-TFK-11-10 .From-De _ Z M ^ _ T o - A 7?J?^£ CLASSIFIE CLASSIFIED m YoiS )di^ wo -<- 1 . " . TITLE—TITRE: POLITICAL AFFAIRS INTERNAL SECURITY TASK FORCE ON KIDNAPPING ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM^* FRED BILD w Retention period-Periode de retention: EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONALTRADE CANADA AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES ET COMMERCE EXTERIEUR CANADA I 1010647 �ORAL HISTORY ACCESSION FORM HISTOIRE ORALE: FORMULE D'ACCESSION A c c e s s i o n number \Vuni«*ro i/VnfriV 1-10 flection FLQ and 1970 E r i s i s Interviewee 'Enquete Interviewer,'En queteur Fred Bild' Arthur Blanchette Np. uf t a p e s ' T r a n s i ripts V° de bobine s/Transcript ions Duration ''Duree Date 26/9/74 Quality of recording/Qua/ii •' de Kside 2 only)/! Location Canadian Embassy, Paris t'enrefiistrement Description INTER INTERVIEWER VIEWEE/ENQUETE sent/envoye Contract/Conrrat I received sent 'envoye j Contract 'Contrat Tope checked by interviewer for quality QuatitS de Ja bobine veritiee pat Venqueteut de i ' l ' J_ New interview required Nouvelle intrevue necessaire Date classification CLOSED UNTIL,'FERME JUSQU'A . In accordance with government regulations Conform4ment aux reglements du gouvernement 2. Death of interviewee 'De'ee's de I'enquetS 3. OtherAAufre Copywrite held by /Droits Date ,rece L ved 'Ve^u Letter/Lettre |_ Letter/Lerrre f Level of s e c r e c y /Niveau 'ENQUETEUR re$u j •I • I • • d'auteur detenus par Restrictions EXTERNAL AFFAIRS Additional comments/Aufres comrnentairea P e r s o n ( s ) r e s p o n s i b l e for collection/JResponsab/efs.) de la co//ecfEm S- gnature Signature EXT 162 010648 �Accession NumDer/Numero 1-10 WORK PROGRESS/ACHEMINEMENT a'entree DU TRAVAIL Verified by/ Date verifie Tape received/Reception de la par bobine. X Re-recording/Re-enregistrement. prepared/transcription. Transcript X Transcript checked for errors/ verification typographique. Transcript checked against tape/ confrontation transcription - bobine. References checked in Library/ verification bibliothe*que des references en Final Proofreading/ verification finale. Retyping if necessary/ Nouvelle copie si necessaire. Copy sent to interviewee/ verification par Copy sent to interviewer/ verification par sent/envoye received/regu sent/envoye received/regu enquete. enqueteur. finale. Final typing/'copie Subject index (on card)/ Index sujet (sur fiche). Filing of Tape/'Rangement de la bobine. Filing of Transcript/ Rangement de la transcription. Filing of Index card/ Rangement de la fiche sujet. Filing of accession form/ Rangement de la formule d'accession. EXT 161 010649 �V .Iks i b sp -C: A. EEEE and 'A. '.. E Blanchette on the sub j eel of Formation of the Task Eorc : and the reaction of bh Under-Secretary at that l±:\-. 010650 �This interview is being conducted at the Canadian Embassy in Paris on September 2.6, 19741 with EE-. Fred Bild who is one the the earliest members of the Departmental Task Eorce that handled the La Crosses-La Porte Kidnapping in October 1970. P.Ell we are in business now, I was wondering if you would like to perscribe wka how the message of the kidnapping came to your attention on October 1970, bhat fateful morning, and would you be a position also to describe also the reaction of the Under-Secretary at the time, and bhe formation of the Task Force that was set up to handle the kiddnapping. As I remember it, the message came to us from the operation centre. As you know tlie operation centre had only been in existence for a couple of years, and part of their daily duties was to get latest news spread around throughout the department. During the night they would prepare summary of telegrams that EsE coins in fro varies posts, ind '•'• se are ssrgaiakadcirculated throughout the department and other government departments, and they also do a slow summary of the latest imformatior on the 'sirs services k which is of interest to bhe department of External Affairs. Well how this one came in, somebody in the operational services, in the operation KS£EK centre obviously realized that this was a very urgent news, it had to be spread around quickly, and he made sure that it was sent to the Under-Secretary, he came into my office as I recall, because the Under-Secretary was still just on his way to a, to the office, I think he just in the staircase, he came to my office sind brought it to me, and I took it immediately to the Under-Secretary. Then Mr. Ritchie then called in his closest associates, the ones who work immediately around him. I Can't exactly recall how the people involved, but I think Bill Barton was there, and ... Probably Andry , 010651 �2 ^B I'm not absolutely sure, I can't sware to that, Bill Barton was there. There weren't many people there right away. And his first reaction as I can recall was what to be done about this, and who was to handle it, was it our department or the department of Justices. That was discussed for a view minutes, very intensely but only for a few minutes, and it was desided that because James Cross -was a diplomate he was the responsibility of bhe Department of External Affairs, and since we Hrs have the Operation Centre which was in the position to co-ordinate all the news that 'would come in on this, and imformation bhat v/e would get. thing 'was to get everyone concerned involved. Tlie wisest I think one of his first actions was to phone the 3 :partrnents solitor general, and to invite him to come over for a • tipping meeting. In the mean time while bhis was being discussed I remember looking out POT a few linutes, and I wenb md called oa Claude — — — , nobody asked me to do this, I just took it on myself, because I thought he would be interested. because he was at the time a special assistanct to the Under-Secretary and incharge with a Franc-a—phone m a t t e r s . I announced t h i s t o him v/ith a a much dKEKEitiE dramatic feeling of fluster, and. he reacted in a very uninterested fashion, oh he said, isn't that something, something to that effect. Ee didn't consider himself particularly involved. Ee didn't want bo get involved, he had alot of tilings to daa lo, E, was vary busy and he really didn't want bo got involved. I remember bh b very clearly because lie after all became the person who was most ixivolved. B F.B. Yes ksasixBcfxfeks bhey hit him with the decisions. Yes. I bhink about within one hour, or one hoar and one half From bhat moment on we had a meeting, a fairly sizeable meeting within the operation contre, which we called togetherpcxK. I called a number of the people that were suppose to be bhere A the Under—Secretary -nd I called a few other people who called a few other people, I. remember the Deputy-Solitor General was there. E That v/as ! T . S . fiafclrifry C o t i l l y F.B. U.S. Cobilly, Chief of Protocall was there, I think Sy Taylor was there in tho Minister's office, and the director of P.S.I, was ther,:, I think some of bh i jolitical 010652 �3 ^ » * ppe-p; sntatives of the division were there, T don't remember which. At one sts there ess a number of people from the Prime Ministers office bhere, at o : st —-—_ , came in, but there sere far more people than I knew. Now one of the first things that bhe Under-Secretary was nov/ suppose to do was, that he thought that there should be a Task Force created and he v/as asking Claude to take on the job of creating It. And in the mean time I remember Claude, he was sitting In the opposite side oE the talle from me, and he was very busy sjar scribbling drawing up a agenda for a meeting and a number of question that would be answered. And that really is the beginning to the creation of the Task force, end I think it SPAS decided at thab stage that bhe ns± centre for it should be right tEiere in the Operation's centre because v/e A/ere equiped to communicate with all branches of bhe Government immediately and to get imformation from all sources ss quickly as possible. I t v/ould be u s e f u l t o have i n some form of isKscsnui r e c o r d , because t h e r e I s nothing on the file describing the very personnel powers in the Fask Force a i.d who ;EaniH.ad decided on ths Task Forco to talcs effect, and who v/as present. Once the Task Force pas seb up could you give me an idea as to hov/ ib reacted it' s this decisions. Eas it sort of a consences type atmosphere was ib sn at hoc1' type of arrangement, let us say two or three people looking v/ith that aspect of the matte fter this byp or where bhere genera], dE )f subject bes out of which bhe EE..E of act arose 1 burn Ay. F.B. I didn't attend El of the meetings of the Task Force bh r • wan many bh; b I didn't attend because I v/as just sort of a part time member. The ones bhat had got going had developed it's o n staf? and very often I wasn't there, there was no reason for me bo be there. I really pent /lion I night have be p. of use bo th : Under-Secret .ry c sring out something that the Under-Secretory was about to take on. So rry impression are quite general, and may nob always be accurate either, of it's .p PIG of opcrabion. From what I recall, there "as a genera], sort of discussion, and I think some of the earlier dccission were taken by consences yes. That is operational decissions. How one should go about dealing with this problem. EPnat machinery 010653 �^ ^ should be set up to coupe with it and so .Forth. And I think crucial decisions about what replies should Ee made to the varies communicaies, from the varies e ZZ.c and so forth, 1 think those were done in conjunction v/ith the Prime Ministers Office. Eere suggestions feed up from the Task Force to the Prime Ministers Office or were they tend first to be thrashed out first within the Task Force .and dealt v/ith tks by the Under-Secretary to the Minister. I ask because there is an interesting gap on the file. A memorandum v/ent to the Under-Secretary to the Minister about piossible forces of action in reply to the first Eemeinds. Ib was quite a soft line that negotiations should be in order, the bargaining 'point should be put forward, and there is no evidence on the file whether the Minister sxsns: exc spt A this, First position in a memo. It was prob 1 Eg Ir ifted by Claude, by there is no evidence on the file that it v/as. The Under-Secre" y signed it met some of the F.L.Q. demands in part, but bhere is no evidence that the Minister agreed, or disagreed, and the line that eventually emerged from the cabinet v/as a good deal tougher, and E v/as wondering whether in the context that you reminded us with just a minute ago, whether this sort of paper was a xmgnifc part of the imput put into the Prime Ministers office, whether there night have been other sources of imformation reaching him, at tills particular time. F.B. I think bhere problely v/ere. I API fc he had. many sources of imformabion, md I also think that not everything in the very earlier stages v/as sifted through the task force, and I recall Er. Ritchy had a number of meetings in his own office with vairsxs varies people from the Department, and some of them -/ere of course from the Task Force, weren't necessarily all of th m members. And he of course had alot of conversation, continuing conversation about It with the Minister everyday, so bhere was continuing diologue there, and I'm sur v/as happening. the Minister v/as aware of everything that Ac to the specific proposals that were pub up to tlie Prime Minister I couldn't really tell you if all of bhe followed the same route. I doubt it rrys A" I sure that some offcksxsthem "/ere nut up through the 'Sinister directly to the Prime Minister and perhaps didn't even originate through the Task Force in the 010654 �5 W early stages. I'm speaking about the very first moments in the Task Force, later on it was quite F.B. Eo I think ib happened in a fairly skabtsred half hass v/ay at the beginning. "sy Taylor taybe ible to give you some tse.ful information 'A' er-,, ' A US he vras bhe Ministers Offic D representative. That vri.ll be one of the first questions that I shall ask him. VJhat was the Ministers first position, he might be able to clear up this little nystery, the )epartment position put forward to him by Mr. Ritchy. There is no evidence of bhe Ministers agreement or disagreement with it, and. Sy will probably be able to clarify that point, because the line eventually emerging from the Cabinet v/as not totally different, but it was generally firmer and generally more persess of course they weren't a position to decide '/here as the department was only in a position to suggest, ib makes quite a difference. F.B. puite. I know that Mr. Ritchy attended some of the meetings in the Cabinet on the subject, sndsckE in the cabinet, and he is therefore in bhe position to know what happened bo our proposal and hov/ they got, and how they clianged within the Cabinet. On the file it v/ould appear that he was in constant attendance on the Task Force, and also he v/as heavily involved with the , while the main cabinet ministers who were dealing vrith the crisis. F.B. He was available to the Task Force at a moments notice, anytime, -and during most of the period , that berribly long period between October p>, and December 3» I think was the release, it v/as a extremely long period for us, and I remember every day he v/ould come to the office, and he v/ould pass by the operation centre to see if there v/as any news. For weeks of course nothing happened. The task force was almost ground to a hault in some way, but know he v/as there at it, he was at there disposal at any time as I recall. He was very heavily involved in every process oP decision making I think. 010655 �6 ^P Eou yourself did you carry on 1th bhe Ess Pore- work throughout bhe --hole period., that is not entirely fair. F.B. Eisxu ±s "PA I didn't, ev s • •'» ' Ei bh P ': null P E p peopl • o b, if bher /as some gap .nd if there was somebody around when they should Ee I of course did rry turn as almost every officer of the department in spending a night there. Ho I wasn't really a full fledge member of the Task Force. However I did become again deeply involved in the last day, the day of the TA . V<= r. • xe s F.B. And when Claude left and went to Montreal first, and v/hen alot of other peopl id to go off 1 wont into bhe operation centre at that stage, said I spent the whole day there, in fact I was probably, it v/as Jerry Kinsman and I who were probably the last peopole to leave after the ha whole things -vis wrapped up, and close the operation centre that night at the very end. B It must of been with a sigh of releaf. E.E. Yes and with a very good feeling too. Well bliis is a very valueable contribution to, male about the atmosphere of the very first moments, and also the way the Task Force came into being. Would p-ou like to try your Land at recalling from your recollections hov/ bhe : rly line tight have been decided, for instance, there is no record whatsoever on the File as to who decided v/hat at the very sinior levels, at the cabinet level, there is nothing, we have a decision of the government that gave a position to offer safe conduct. Ee don't know who's idea it v/as, in terms of file we will eventually find out. Ess it Claude EI AS, -PS it the Under-Secretaries idee, did it originate in another government department, v/e J e.E. don't know. From pea"::' recollection you v/ould not gather. F.B. I don't, I didn't attend any discussions on that, of that land, I don't remember anyone trying to decide what to do about them. E For instance Ross Frances v/as able to paraphrase another, not the crusial ; >. In the first position by the departmenb one of the non—negotiatble position v/as 010656 �7 that the government should not agree to broadcasting the F.L.Q. fiscal, ib was one oZ the first of the consections nadi , after it v/as propose1, and Boss said that it v/as very definitely Er. Sharps idea. Mr. Sharp took the position that v/e should not let ourselfs reliable to any accusation thab a man's life cms lost because of a refus;si on the part of the Canadian Government to publish a non-fiscal, and. Pose was under the Impression that Ace, Sharp and 'AT. Trudeau did not see eye to eye on that, and IE1. Sharp stuck to his guns and evendually it was agreed ipon. That for instance is the, is an example of the type of g p bhat :xists in our office which future historians night like to know, and biographers should like to like Mr. Sharp, someday show us some aspects of his personality. I remember that there •-.;• s a general sentiment at the beginning, among the members of the Task Force, that non of the demands should 1 : net, nsnfcrs-c certainly the question of the non-fiscal A the, as among those. I didn't attend any discussions of whether -sip a.p should PASS any of the demands and how and v/hich Was the Task Force split in i±fcs it's approach Ear Instance, oE course bhe task .Force was largo, but were there more liberal groups, v/ere there more conservative groups. Eere there hard liners, -/here ther: hawks, s c • bh r loubts c sa you recall? E coulE. tell you that, b e use, I di In't really .tt nd ny discussions of task force oolicv, bhat sort of thing only comes out of policy discussions. The times bhat I was involved wdre operation 1 moments, and p,rou had bo coupe v/ith the situation when information is coming in you have to transmit it to others, you have to decide who should be called in on what. I didn't attend any oT the policy sessions, so I couldn't tell you know. On the little evidence that we have on the file, It Is there that some cabinet Ministers A/ere very very hot, others were not, v/e will Exanfex eventually clarify 3 p. In Eue course. The position of the Prime Minister is oaa of conflicting ECBEX evidence in the file that we have. Some evidence points to a very hard Eins, some evidence points on the other hand, to just the opposite. 010657 �That sounds right to ne, Anaaae, all the information is second hand bub I remember Mr. Ritchy at one time saying that on some of the issues the Prime Minister had taken a very tough stand, but on the other hand, that he thought that in some ways the Prime Minister had been instrumental in keeping down the hard Einero in the cabinet, and he v/as by any means the hardest liner of all, bhat is hear say, you will have to ask him yours If. He is neat on our project. Ee is willing to be interviewed '/ben he pets the chance, this may take some time, he is very busy now. We were wondering if rhethere he would have more time this fall, but the lections have taken a differ sab twist, in principal he has agreed bo be interviewed and I think someday I tliink Sa±ax Claude himself Trill interview him from the departmental sources he would be the East man to Eo so, but this will be in the future, on the 10th anniversary of tha events or something like that. Well I tliink in the S U E circumstances that we have taken this as far as we Cap. F.B. I can let you have some information on the last Eve- If you like. Do you w nt pe bo say nything on the last say. If you ,/ish, because there is one point, that I didn't realise that you were so heavily Involved in the phase events. I'm not in much of a position to ask you for knov/ledge of a question, but if you -would, like on the bases of your memory to give descriptions, thatvould be very much appreciated. F.B. Now v/hat happened the last day v/as, for me ib started off as a v-:;o-y similar one to the first day. IE-. Ritchy came into my office and said that things seem Pa A j happ siing, and I think v/e will Ess neeting v/ith the Task aorce labor on in the morning, and the next thing I knew I had a call from Claude 3 ying that can you be hear for nine thirty, and everybody v/as there, the grand Task Force, at that time it v/as of course a fully bloomed flower, and every one v/as there. Again I wouldn't remember all of the people, but Claude has a list of them. And it v/as desided that Claude v/ould r:o to Montreal. Wno was the Deoutv-Chief of Protocall, 010658 �9 a l s o v/ent t o M o n t r e a l . among t h o s e who went t o Montreal t h e r e v/as S a l Claude, Tom Eeid, Tom Dior, , j a l s o , J i l AOZDZ ]-)on •' 1 3 , no t Don P'aEE what i s 'via nana, ho fvent t o Londc ); v e y . Jim Davey that is right, as a result of v/hich there was a reduced number of us left in Ottawa, and v/e had to coupe, not only with the keeping in touch vrith the varies, v/ith the R.C.M.P., varies other arms of the government who s/cre involved with tills all throughout the day, and v/ith the people in Montreal who were phoning information, wo also had to keep our E.G. in Ravenna informed of happenings, and that turned out to be one oE the big problems because nobody was particularly assigned to letting Havanna know what v/as happening, and one jsxtgK stage I remember getting a drastic telegram back from Havanna saying v/e know that everything is unfolding, but please Eat as know what is happening. So v/e got a few tele ;ra is together and told them how khsing things v/ere -unfolding bit by bit. In the mean time there was Robert Demasse who v/as negotiating v/ith Bernard araongest others. Bernard. was the lawyer for the F.L.Q. who eventually v/ent into the house. I remember that there v/ere serious discussion about this. It seemed that MEDSEKS himselfwas abit reluct nt to do this. on exposing himself that 'cy. He wasn't all that keen There v/as also a report at one stage that he had gone and cunsulteel the Cubans before coning back. But the stage thab I cgc got personnally Involved was v/hen Robert Demasse phoned in, and. Claude v/as gone off, everybody else was gone, and I was there v/ith a few people only, v/as there, .and I was there vrith a few people only in the operation centre, and I took the call from lo]y3rt Acrcez -. ^.^ h e s a ± d jjeJJ^ hag , one i n t Q thQ house, and in somev/ays that v/as the first break, the First break of the Acy, of cours tl Irst PAP A- P O C o • A -. bh This was the most important break police had liscovercd where tl y re. that came and I spread the news around, everybody v/as very interested to hear this, Because that meant that we v/ere infect negotiating we had established contact with the kidnnappers, and. negotiations v/ere goin;; on 010659 �IP ho v/as just waiting. At that stage I remember he didn't talk bo vie for very long, but he A/as upset by bhe position that he would have to defend if you like, the poistion that he could put. He *elt that the government sid i hadn't given him .Pop oE leverage, but in any case he hung up and he said-that he would phone back A n he had some news out, s learned ? r-xi — . Well lafrer on v/hen came Prat there conditions v/ere and we also learned that v/ithout even waiting Eor a reply, they had got their car all fixed up, it seems that tP y had a bomb in the back of the c ir. centre, We spend the Entire day in the operations number of us, and not evenjping out for lunch, course to m nd Ph.: mow;-: nom nt of lb A I trill always remember, v/as the very last minute, and I don't know if you have come to any of this, at the very last minute, Pre. Ritchie c back, he wasnted to be there of course, and the curcial ctizxsxa desisions had already been taken, by that time Cross had been fr ed, the Iddnnappers --ore on in fact they /ere In the pal ane, conZ the decision had been taken to let go along rith them with their child, and bh t v/as a sorb or i difficult decission because those poeopale were in the hands of the police already v/e could of keep them. PEL! those decissions had been taken, they v/ere in the plane, and there was only one question mark remaining, -and that was the idenity of one of the members, Semare. Plie R.C.M.P. v/ere afraid that it was one oZ the people who had been involved vrith the la Porte murder. The thought it v/as one of the brothers who had been involved in bhe La Porte. Porte murder, thab is right, they A/ere very much afraid to let fc him go. So a photograph .From had to be got from "lontreal to Ottawa, to the E.G.PI.P. lade and what nob, and examined before bhe final decision could be mad :. Wall it looked, ho looked very much like, It wasn't the man thab they feared, they had identified him, Mr. Ritchy wanted to 1 s sure, ana in the mean time the plane hadn't baken off, and the pilot said can I t A off, Mr. Ritchy got on th to the pilot, and he had another phone In his other hand, '/ere he P E in his other h nd s "l the R.C.M.P. nd they were going to glbre him final decision on the idenity of 010660 �S3 bills 2 K B E S . rd. He was juite sure, 9?p sure that he could lab him go, so he bold the pilot to go clown IE a ?Z id slowly, bit to not to take off until he told him. End ho waited on bhe other lino, finally he had bhe cl ar nee from the R.C.M.P. nd 1 . s Z\ O.K. you can go and the plane took off. The whole process of delay A/as about 20 minutes, betv/een the first communication to Montreal And Ottawa, to Ottawa 20-25 minutes. Tnat is right. But the trouble is that soma of the peopale did nob know wh A the o as : of delay was n d rere concerned Of coiu-se. bout all of this. I don't know if you want me to continue talking .about this. You mentioned awhile back, can you recall who choose as the .:.. Abator? Eo I had the impression that Ib was a decision that v/as reached bet reen the Trudeau and . Because the department put up other names, a series of other names, and suddenly this one, comes, and there is no evidence on the file ar; to who may of chose him or v/hy, and as astonishing as it map/ seem nobody seems to have asked him to make the final proformance. At least there is no evidence that laa ever made one oar file is pretty complete towards the end, aid so at some point I will go around and have a word with him later on, and see If he had anything to add nov/, after this late date. There v/as also the delay because they s also needed a doctor on board, because -/as on the point of giving birth, and some stage or another, somebody said well can't h v/e get an RCMP doctor on board. This fact was taken care of rather opuiclcly, the decision was made, I think it was made by Mr. Pdtely at baa: time, and phoned the E.C.M.P. and said let us have a doctor and bhey sent him off to Montreal and put on board the pi n . '. 11 some of the names lentioncd in the D part nt 1 icmo's, — was one, a couple oE the labour leader:; in Montreal -/ere mentioned.. 010661 �11 lEgj^ I don't know anything about hov/ the messages /ere choosen. Referring to the last day, this is a question that EE'. Ritchy has asked me to ask people, there was very vouch concern Zn the task force quite clear].;/ about a risk of a shoot-out, and this keep coming backs in the memo's, that tho minister should speak to — and in oreler to make sure that no shoot-out takes place, comes back constantly In tlie memo's, there :riEE Ee nobion that v/e v/ill take :cvery every percaution, But as you Inow, one-, can never forsoe Ea bEis kind if situation, whether violence v/ill occur. Will you be al ] A to shed any light as to why this theme of a shoot-out kept recurring. Mr. Ritchy was wondering v/hether v/as really prepared bo have a shoot-out, end our Minister kept after him to make sure that there v/ould be none. It is a mysterious little question, there v/as no shoot-out actually. F.B. Of course not, I know that one of the tilings that worried us in the D part lent was the fact that the offer of safe conduct had. been made to the Cross IcLddnnappers but ib certainly didn't apply to PE . urd :rs of Pierre La REarte md one could perdict v/hether those two KSSQC selves lied merged a certain casbcub, if they wounldn't have mixed themselves ua '.Pit Before the end, before the Cross kidnnappers were found. I remember during that whole interval of when the Lav: Cross kirlnnappsrs -/ere still being looked for, and this question came up, v/hat if they are found, and they found to have arnongest them some of the people /ho were responsible for the L; A1. 77, how than do v/e 7:70 nge bh • 7 ' sonduct, dc '. A" aplc Ao were involved in the an Pi re L; Port 'o •' : - """• conduct to th Iddnnapping and murder, and If not hov/ Eo v/e pesE. them off, and that I think was were the concern came from , wh r< there ,.EEght be a shoot-out, if in fact they •cere mixed up, as it turned out that wasn' the case, the two selves had never merged, and I think we were lucky to that extent. Also I remember, as you recall the kidnnappers v/ere found, they had left tho home v/ere James Cross had been kept, so they 'were In the hands of the police, and In the end when they asked that the be sent with them to Cuba, the decision had to be made whether they could be included, in the Safe cond ict 010662 �12 because they had been arrested by the Folic a. I recall ib v/as BE Ritchy th A spoke to tlie Solitor Generals Office, I think he spoke to and betv/een them it v/as yes they v/ould be. That decision as I remember it v/as not , and after the take-off, r&ther than just after, before the take-off 3d Ritchy spoke on the tele-phone to the Prime Minister, and tho Prime Minister said, I didn't hear him, Ent I gather this is what he said, v/hy did you leave, and. Co?. Ritchy explained that the offer had 1 s in let the made to the group that was holding James Gross, the offer of safe conduct. They s/ere part of ib, yet in fact they weren't the actual kidnnappers, nevertheless they v/ere part of it, the offer v/as to be kept, because it had been made, and that v/as also one of the ways of getting the thing through, to getting the kidnnappers to excepot it. It v/as sort of a tense moment. But there is many things that you could say about the last day, you may want to put other questions to ie after you have done interviews v/ith oE .- people who have 1 ecu Involved. ' \ th - 1 st d IA „ It • .. v u\y las : • ELig. Future Historians will Es most y beful to because it v/as his idea to set up the log book on the events, sometimes minute by minute of hov/ it pot started. During the first two weeks some events -/ere noted, and then Elan Row tried to complete the first two weeks of the fc events from his memory, bub there are gaps in the first 13, IE days, but afterwards, it v/as kept An gre b 1 bail. If wo could revert to the very first remarks bhat you. mesa, can you vce IE PA • name of the officer who first got the message in the Operation Centre, just as a clue to allow me to perhaps interview him someday. Bo I couldn't tell you that. Jim Barker van arround at the time, but I don't know if he was there v/hen it happened. Yes, and he was also there the very last day, he saw the A/hole thing. It must of been one of the officers on duty that morning for doing the popsum. Well I eventually 'rill Ee able to track him down sit sime point or another, t h e r e w i l l be someway, somewhere. 010663 �IE ^^ I just wanted to jot your memory, you might of bean able to recall. give you .an idea of the sort of gap bhat But just to ; have, the Under-Secretary gave me - list of questions that he wanted me to ask, and the first one really startled me fch trying to find out who started on the initial line in the Cabinet, avid I said sir, that was bhe First question that I was going to ask you. he di In't Inow, he wasn't sure, and he was sort oE hoping that in the process eC intcrvie Pag, nob o;Z.y our officers :ind others it v/ould eventually come clear, and it his in due course. But I thought that the he had been involved in all of the events, so intimately that I thought he would be the first to shed some light upon this. Anywhay we -.rill learn about tills in due course. This is not a emergency sort of operation this is one of the nice aspects of Historical Division v/e don't v/ork to a deadline, v/e gather knov/ledge and this v/ill go on and. on. F.B. Still prou, memories is fitisig, it is B I have a number of people interested in this project, but posting have intervined . ring rhat oni forgets. Esrfcsr Peter Jackson is interested, and he v/ent off on pouting. John 'Graham is now talcing a interest, he -/as involved in the events in London, Ross Frances would have been but he v/ent off on course, this is one of the occupational hasords. Well thank—you very much, this is a very useful F.B. 3/4 of an hour. Well if E can be of anymore use to you let me know. 010664 �BILD 26.IX.74 How did the news of the kidnapping reach you, and how was the Task Force formed? News of the kidnapping came over the Op Centre line. The message went first to Bild, who took it to AER, then on his way up the stairs. AER called in Barton and a few close associates for discussion. question of who should handle the situation - He raised the DEA or Justice. It was decided that DEA should take the initiative because of the Op Centre and the involvement of a diplomat. AER then phoned the Solicitor General. Bild called on Roquet without being prompted to do so, and announced the kidnapping. Roquet was blase, and obviously did not at that moment want to become involved. Within an hour and a half, a meeting took place which included Ernest CSte, someone from Protocol (Read?), Cy Taylor, the director of PSI (Rettie?), and some people from political divisions. At one point, Marc Lalonde and other turned up. AER created the Task Force and put Roquet in charge. How did the Task Force reach its decisions? Bild did not attend many meetings of the Task Force, but only came to help .AER when needed. The modus operendi of the Task Force v/as (when non-substative decisions were made) to have a general discussion followed by a concensus. Crucial questions v/ere considered in conjunction with the PMO. Were suggestions made directly by the Task Force to the PMO, or did they go via USSEA and SSEA? The P.M. had many sources of information. Not everything from the Task Force to the PMO followed the same route. Not everything from DEA went through the Task Force. AER worked both independently 010665 and closely with SSEA. �Bild was unsure if the initial policy paper went to the PMO. According to Bild, AER attended Cabinet meetings. Did you carry on your work v/ith the Task Force throughout the crisis? Bild filled in where replacements were needed, but was not a full-fledged member of the Task Force itself. Who decided the first policy line? Bild did not participate in policy discussions and did not know. There was a general feeling within the Task Force that no demands should be met. But Bild was unfamiliar with individual attitudes of members of the Task Force. He recalled a comment by AER to the effect that although the P.M. held to a hard line, he v/as instrumental in mollifying even harder-liners v/ithin the Cabinet. Bild volunteered an account of the last day in the Op Centre, and the only one in which he was deeply involved - the denouement of December 3rd, when he and Jeremy Kinsman packed up the operation in Ottawa. On that day, AER said that things were beginning to happen, and called a Task Force meeting for 9:30 that morning. It was decided that Roquet, Read, Davey, Dery, and Dier would go to Montreal, thereby reducing the working staff in Ottawa to the bare bones. One of the big jobs was to establish liaison with Havana (the Canadian Embassy), who v/ere completely in the dark about the deroulement of events. Further liaison was needed among Montreal, the RCMP in Ottawa, Havana, and the Op Centre. Demers phoned Bild to say that Mergler had gone into tje kidnappers' house. Demers was upset by the limitations of his bargaining position. He thought the Government had given him too little leverage. 010666 �AER was constantly in and out of the Op Centre, but returned to guide the identification of Seguin. A photo had to be taken from Montreal to the RCMP lab in Ottav/a before the plane could take off. AER was on two phones simultaneously to the pilot of the plane and to the RCMP. He told the pilot to taxi the plane very slowly without taking off until the identification had been made. AER also had to find a doctor for Mrs. Cossette-Trudel. AER spoke to Ernest C5te about offering safe conduct to the Cossette-Trudels, and the decision was taken at that level. AER then spoke to the P.M., who asked why they had been allowed to leave. tho chose Demers as negotiator? Bild thought it v/as a joint choice of Trudeau and Bourassa. Why did the question of a possible shoot-out appear to be an important issue? Bild felt the possibility of merged cells contributed to the danger of failure for the safe conduct, which would in turn lead to a shoot-out. Do you recall the name of the first man in the Op Centre to receive the news of the kidnapping? Bild did not recall. 010667 �1 ^ 1 Bw m Government of Canada Gouvernement du Canada CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET A compter du / Y OYcA Q> Jusqu'au A ^O /cAyks AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - A METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTERIEURE VOIR File No. - Dossier n° Volume ao^x-TfK'//GC 31 (88/08) '/> 7540-21-8574809 010668 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00136 Title A name given to the resource Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - Fred Bold Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 26-Sep-74 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - Fred Bild, RG25, vol. 25748, 20-22-TFK-11-10, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Entire File Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en