https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f6aea321e2a72034ad4ae375e214d220.pdf 8f20d81bd17eca3ea661198d072d6dd1 PDF Text Text f I EP LEVTET.J BETWEEN E0S3 FRANCIS APED MR. A . E . BLANCHETTE ON NOVEMBER I E THE F . L . Q . CEI3IE IN MONTREAL 010637 �T 'IE IS AN INTERVIEW TAKEN PLACE WITH ROSS FRANCIS I ' M R S r< JJ9¥5M8S!ri8 IE LONDON Mr. Francis was S#st officer October 1970 and he played quite a crufial role in this sector. Press relations being one of the most difficult of the aspects of the crisis. I wonder if we could start off Eoss first by going back to the cr1 ition. When did you first, hear about the crisis. F I heard within >:iinutes of tlie actual kidnapping taking place because this was made known to the press straight away. It came unto the wire service. I first, heard about it because a radio station phoned to ask if there was any departmental reaction. At that point I hadn't seen the wire copy. I went to phone my office which was on the third floor of the East Block to the second floor office pith the operations centre were the Canadian Press Telecommunications outprint v/as. I found news there, and immediately alterted the others in the building too. At that point we all heard more or less slrniltaneously fe heard, from the British who heard from their consular in Montreal. Bat It wis very early Monday morning. B Jere you there when they started the Task Force? As far as I could remember. The Task Force starts by a process of spontaneous grov/th simply because the senior members oP the departmental establishment, the Eeleo-printer avid office space were all in the same part of the building, started more or less spontaneously. de it I recall after alerting people to what, was on the printer, I X H E X vmsk went back to my office for a few minutes, and quite soon reaslised that the only part that they could operate was the increasing number of calls that we were getting from the press was on the second floor that I could keep i n touch vrith oar managment, and of c o a r s e with a l l t h e JE.elba.ck nrxfckx .from a l l t h e newspapers in Montreal. E Who was there among the very first pioneers themself. SHHkgx Claude would have been there. Claude was there, and Andry also. I saw him very quickly. I think those v/ere trie principal people, of course also tho people that were in the 010638 �2 ^^porations centre at the time, Jim Parker. B _ . , _ . ? I'm afraid I don't recall at the moment, sorry you will have to check those. disappeared in the very very early stages , and I wondering A -eve Lis thoughts. I think he had less to do with in then Claude. the intire operation. Claude I would regard to through I think he did most of the work, and many of the ideas were his, Aind he was more or less there day and night. B Well it is interesting to know that it started that way because there is not ; comment on the file of any sort to En the task Force came into being. "A thought it was quitely started on the part of the Under-Secretary. F I think at some point during probably the first day, certainly by the second, but I think during the first day that Mr. Ritchie had Claude to take the formal responsibility for it. But it was natural that in view of the way that we had been operating particularly with the new equipment in the operation centre to have conference there, we had. the conference centre, we had the extra telephone, the extra desks, the extra radios, the telecommunication rooms was the obvious place to begin operation. Because it became fully structured very vary early on that afternoon, the 5th afternoon, some people had not been present at the First meetings, were called and appointed on term, .-/ore choosen to represent the varies part in the personnel branch, federal co-ordination division, so on and. so forth. F The Commonwealth was also dealing with Britain at that time, the reason being for the people who were initially dealing with the Eritish High Commission. 'E came over fee fairly shortly from Protocal because of some of the problems involved and so on. B How v/as the press line determined at that point in the very first day or two? F Well in the first place I think it is fair to say that under the departmental managment at that time, was Minister and Mr. Ritichy was Under010639 �3 £k tary. We had. a very open approach to the press. The basic press line v/as to be fairly open, so that we v/ere telling people more or less what was actually happening. However of course what became poretty clear in the first few hours, was that we were using the contacts with the press not merally to communicate to the press and through them and then through the public v/hat was happening. ; This v/as our .777 rsrs ssKLky our only channel of communication with the kidnappers so that we had to be very careful to ensure '.-/hat we v/ere saying would not cause unnecosary alarm to the kidnappers and would also convey a very accurate impression of terms, once we had decided what they v/ere, we v/ould EP: willing to grant. B Did you co-ordinate very closely vrith people and the privy council. You v/ere probably being bombarded v/ith questions. The Prime Ministers office In that case A/as on the other block. My relationship with Romeo by agreement and also for the cost of the two weeks. I suppose in essence it v/as a accidient that the Eidskxsh first kidnapping v/as a diplomate which meant that our department v/as involved insstfcax from the start looking at it from the press point of viev/. The press looked to us because it was a diplomate who was kidnapped .and of course the British v/ere looks.ny to us, the External Affairs department as a departsient because it was one of theres that was kidnapped, and Ptomeo aggreed very quickly that all calls that they received beyond I suppose ones that were on the very personnel basis on what the Prime Minister v/as doing, that all the calls would be channeled up to us. For the first fe ; Pays there was certainly no question of a conflick, and there never v/as any point, bat It was agreed that we vers handle press quires a on that subject, and of course in the usually way we v/ere able to provide a very rapid sourse of information extending frankly to questions the press while come to rather than someone else, because they know where they can best be serviced. Then over the course of the first tvro weeks and really I was involved primarily over the first two weeks, because with the la-rtrJrnryfctsra declaration and the state of KB2 emergency of our equal change. 1 E: 'dually th • A te of th • Prime Minister.' office EP ••' to nl y a diff -ent kind of role. In the first place of course with the kidnapping oE Piere La Porte the whole trust of the political implications we] 010640 �4 ^fcifferentsbecause here v/e had a senior Quebec politician kidnapped, it was much ^^ problem more clearly a domestic, not that it wasn't a domestic problem, but much more clearly. There v/ere occassions when it became more appropriate for it, the Prime Minister to be quoted than ths Mr. Sharp as a result, .and I was in close touch with Romeo throughout this period gradually certain kinds of questions again Romeo v/ould answer bettwe rather than I. of course were Then with the declaration state of emergency in a completely a new ball game, he was dealing with technical questions about what the task force was doing, Claude still had the i-esponsibility. Throughout the terrible weekend which Mr. Ea Porte v/as murdered I was dealing with the Federal Aspect of most of the questions. The terms of anouncing the declaration of the state of emergency iiiKiixibcHacpisroixMhxkxxxx^^ on television, these were all handled by the Prime Minister. explaining I should say that there v/as another press section Involved v/hich could have been involved with the RCMP by agreement again v/e had a RCMP liason officer with us in the task force on hand. I handled most of the questions v/hich might vary in direction to the federal case in that period. Also we v/ere in close contact with the Montreal and Quebec end of the business. I didn't deal with the Press officers there but other officers in the task force were dealing with them. We had agreement of a press line between us. Did the ta.sk force in it's dicussions tend to bet-up the senior levels in line. Or was it the Prime Minister first and then A • Minister, or p> >nRe in that group i Id have Z'.c-.-o, con', they F v/ould come down, or did it work both ways. Well I never dealt with the Minister, so on the roles of the other Ministers I can't speak of a source of imformation on the subject. As far as our relationships with the Department I would say that the process was on of mutual interaction. The advance was moving very qyickly, KKEEXMEKKX v/e were working physically under a very closed inviroment, people v/ere coming in aid. out. Put we did as a fact have the Prime Minister into our operations as you know, but not on a regular bases. Mr Sharp however v/as regular in the operations centre or v/e v/ould go over to Iris office in the house were he was working. I would say that the process of Interaction was 010641 �^functionary even to the point that It -.-ould cause alittle difficult;/' in sorting out in my mind v/ere ideas v/ere originally Mr. Sharps where the senior level of management and whether the level of task force operators v/hich way the idc s were going, which is the very next question of interaction "which v/ere operating. B I'm glad to know this because in the .Accounts of the task force were, It programs, it's deliberations, it's problems, one jpsLfcasc gets the impression that the press aspects v/ere not paramount, and I sometimes get the impression that you were probably left on your own a great deal as to what to suggest on the basis of your knowledge of what was going on in the Task Force. F Well this depended on the kind of question that I v/as answering at one particular point. I had been press officer for a coupsla of years at that point, and I v/as fairly close with Mr. Sharp, and I had a, I think a fairly reasonable E±HX£XXE±H$±0JBC xxJEExxjuscSkasspixx good apperesiation of what he was thinking about on one point, and the Under-Secretary, and I think they trusted my judgement myself '//hat should, be said at any one point. So far as that is concerned, normal inclination of what v/e -.sere doing, the situation v/as, this I should think was fairly normal. Mow having said that, there v/ere certain situations in which tfcxxE had very specific messages v/hich we wanted to convey to t a very tiny audience, v/hich you •are actually given a different situation ia that case we were working from an actual script. And in the case of one or two of the interviews that Mr. Sharp made, in the case of one particular interview to which I gave to bhe television •is well as radio as well as the press, I pas working from a diffent script. I remember that vividly because I was sent over to the press gallery who would give verpv diffenent prepared answers. You can't of course read a script on television because you have to make it look normal, and I'm not need to doing television, but normally I breif reports than the material is familiar, rather than >pear right off infront of the cameras, I found it ma.de me nervous in some situations, 3 vicing IE*. Sharp, and advicing him, he v/as the one that standing under the cameras and standing on the chock line and machine directing and then, because it is a 010642 �o ^^rsat interest in the subject, and the material is being broadcasted more or less immediately, I had " i-ely time to walk Peck to the operations centre before it v/as 7 A tearing on our television, said the monators on the centre v/ere critising my artistic proformances. EEo v/as literaly responsible for the news ana the publication? That is not answerable, who is responsible for the news and the publication, that is not answerable question. 010643 �ROSS FRANCIS 18.IX.74 When did you first hear about the crisis? Francis heard about the crisis within minutes of the kidnapping when the radio station phoned the press office (which he directed) to ask for DEA reaction to the situation. He then heard about it (along with his colleagues) from the British Consulate in Montreal by way of the British High Commission. Who was present when the Task Force was started? The Task Force started more or less spontaneously in the Op Centre. Bissonnette, Roquet, Barker and his team. Present were Subsequently AER took charge and formally appointed Roquet. How was the press line determined? The basic press line at the outset was to tell the facts freely and openly. 'Within a few hours it became clear that the press was to be the only channel of communication with the kidnappers, and then the information being released had to be more calculated. Was your office closely coordinated with the PMO? Regarding coordination with the PMO press office, Romeo Leblanc had all the press calls channeled to the Task Force, so that Francis handled all the covereage during the initial period. After the kidnapping of Laporte, the PMO took over more responsibility (as the P.M. had more to say than SSEA). Although the two offices remained in close touch throughout, the relationship between Francis and Leblanc altered during the first two weeks, as a result. Francis continued to answer the technical questions about what the Task Force was doing. During the state of emergency, he covered the federal side of the VJMA, though the PMO handled the P.M.' late night interview after the death of Laporte. 010644 �The RCMP press office was linked to the Task Force by agreement through the RCMP liaison officer. Francis v/as also in close touch with Montreal and Juebec (though not with press officers) in order to maintain a similar press line. Did the Task Force pass suggestions to interested ministers, or did the ministers pass down their ideas to the Task Force? Press-senior management - ministerial realations within SSA were characterized by inter-action to the point where it would be difficult to sort out the actual source of inspiration for any particular plan of action. Nevertheless, Francis was allowed to exercise his discretion on many matters, having worked for SSEA during several years previously. It was on his own initiative that Francis stated publicly that the safe conduct was still open to the Liberation Cell after the Laporte murder. When addressing messages to the FLQ, they worked with written scripts to avoid mistakes. Francis worked in a "close environment" with the Minister in the East Block. SSEA went regularly to the Op Centre. Note: Although the question was not raised in the version of the tape summarized here, Mr. Blanchette mentioned in an interview with another member of the Task Force that Francis revealed to him the SSEA's positive support for the publication of the manifesto in opposition to the P.M., who was inclined to refuse. 010645 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00135 Title A name given to the resource Interview with Ross Francis Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 18-Nov-74 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - Ross Francis, RG25, vol. 25748, 20-22-TFK-11-9, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Transcript of interview Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en