https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4449477455828cc08b56b985b3e7e8ae.pdf 2e2fc56db5524ca19c6ff4f803a0e3f4 PDF Text Text File No. Dossier Volume. 3-0 0-P-- .From-De 7 7 ^ / / 7&JML 7 VO/O/ CLASSIFIED VOLS fccctssioMG- nr;> TITLE—TITRE: POLITICAL AFFAIRS INTERNAL SECURITY TASK FORCE ON KIDNAPPING ORAL HISTORY PROGRAMME A. BISSONNETTE l> Retention period-Periode de retention: EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES ET COMMERCE EXTERIEUR CANADA �BISSONNETTE 1. Were you influenced by reading during the crisis? 2. What were the major factors in forming your position in the crisis? 010407 �How aware wore you of t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n viewpoint w i t h i n t h e Quebec Government on t h e negotiations? VJhat l e d up t o B o u r a s s a ' s p e t i t virago? Who among members of t h e Task Eorce a n t i c i p a t e d t h e VJMA? Did you i n your c o n t a c t s w i t h Quebec r e a l i z e t h a t t h e Quebec Government v/ere about t o r e q u e s t t h Did you concur v/ith t h e e v a l u a t i o n of apprehended WMA? insurrection? Was t h e WMA t h e p r i c e t h e f e d e r a l govenmnet paid for t h e p e t i t v i r a g e ? .Pith which f e d e r a l m i n i s t e r s were you in d i r e c t contact? VJere ycu t h e person Prom t h e Task Eorce c l o s e s t t o t h e Quebec Government? Who else- i n Ottawa was i n c l o s e c o n t a c t ? (Lalonde, Marchand, P e l l e t i e r , e t c . , when?) VJas q u e s t i o n of r e l e a s e of p r i s o n e r s debated i n Task Eorce, or was everyone more or l e s s agreed on a firm l i n o ? T e l l us about your d i s c u s s i o n s with dp C o s s i o . Did you have frequent c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Demers on t h e n e g o t a t i n g t e c h n i q u e ? Did i n t e r cE paibmental j e a l o u s y hamper t h e e f f i c i e n t l y of t h e Task Eorce? Was t h e proun surrounding Ryan (Ryan's r e b e l l i o n ) a f a c t o r i n invoking t h e WMA? Do you t h i n k bhe Prime M i n i s t e r changed h i s p o s i t i o n toward n ; o t i a t i n g or w s i t simply not c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n t h e b e g i n n i n g . Who were t h e r e a l i n f l u e n c e s on bhe Prime M i n i s t e r ' s t h i n k i n g i n your view? VJere opinions ( l e g a l ) asked of DEA r e g a r d i n g tiie d r a f t i n g of B i l l G 181? Has t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from l e g a l d i v i s i o n a t t e n d t b e Committee on Law and Order t o a s s i s t i n t h e d r a f t i n g of f u t u r e emergency l e g i s l a t i o n followed through? 010408 �VJhat p r e c i s e I s s u e s or problems Pes you t o Montreal for d i r e c t t a l k s ? With v/hom did you talk? DEA's r o l e in t h e c r i s i s had an important e f f e c t i n I n c r e a s i n g t h e d e p a r t m e n t ' s p r e s t i g e v / i t h i n t h e government. nov/ play a s i m i l a r r o l e ? Would t h e diminut i o n of i t s importance i n a f u t u r e have a correspomgin e f f e c t ;'/er Do you f e e l t h a t i n a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n t h e DEA v/ould on i t s crisis prestige? a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t h e following consid r e d e x t e n s i v e l y ? 7-elaese of p r i s o n e r s 'i-elase of d e t a i n e e s WMA Eanifesto publication ( c i r c u m s t a n c e s un"! r v/hich i t was P cided) Hansom Did yon t a l k v/ith Ryan, E a u l n l e r , Di ap'qau? Did "i-ltchie and SSExi work v/ell t o g e t h e r on t h i s ? inhancirp: t h e d e p a r t m e n t ' s p r e s t i g e ? Zei -Vera they e q u a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n Her- you aware of c o n f l i c t s between them on a n y h t i n ? t h e r e long tarm e f f e c t s of t h e c r i s i s on r e l a t i o n s v/ith t h e p r o v i n c e ? \j VJhat Hid you I n t h e Rask Eorce expect t o Ee t h e immediate e f f e c t s of t h e VJMA? i C i'P'1 you comment on t h e r e l a t i v e r o l 3 of SParee and t n e PE i n t h e crisis? 010409 �BLEEDING HEARTS «*1. Suggests Sharp's speeach of October 6 was the rsult of a hard line taken in Cabinet Committee for Prioroties and Planing. -* 2. Was part of the Government's assessment of FLQ that they wouldnt murder? 3* Did Cosette-Trudel write the first »ommunique? _4 4. Was there a decision taken during the first week of the crisis that S harp would be government spokesman and would play down the concern to the public? 5. Was hard line really less risky in the long run than compromise? — 6. When was Op Centre set up and for what particular purpose? — 7» Was Marshall McLuhan really consulted by the government (PMO) as reported by Anthony Westall in Toronto Daily Star for the purpose of analysing the technique and use of the media by the FLQ? 8. (p.153) Did the Task Force consider the effect on the public of the reading of the manifesto? — 9. Did the Prime Minister read Task Force recommendations himself? *. 10. Did no one on the Task Force urge complete silence toward the kidnappers after the first communique? »- 11. Did anyone consider that temporizing might not have had a beneficial effect? v, 12. What did the Prime Minister think of the Quebec line? — 13. Do you feel that Choquette's famous speech represented a compromise among all the conflicting elements, that it desired to satisfy the FLQ with half measures, and that it sought to rally Quebec opinion against the FLQ? — 14. Was pressure in fAVOUR OF THE WMA greater from Ottawa or from Quebec? ... 15. W hat was the effect of Robart's speech on the Quebec Government? the Task Force take any action Did you or on it? — 16. Did Quebec consult Ottawa on the suggestion of exchanging two hostages from the FLQ cells to be held until the realease of Cross and Larporte? 17. Did Cross resent the WM A? *- 18. What conflicts were there between the govenments of Montreal and Quebec? 19. If Trudeau had enforced a really hard lione during the first week of the crisis (the second week would have been too late) Kould the WMA have been avaoided? •*• 20. Was the WMA not a response to a conspiracy or piot, but rather, as Turner suggested, araeANSOF REASSURING THE PUBLIC AND RESTORING pulic confidence which had been degenerating through the climate of weakness? — ^ 21. Turner talks about FULL DETAILS ON WHICH GOVERNMENT ACTED AS NOT BEING APPARENT, while the P.M. says government's justification rests on available evidence. 010410 �22. Note Turner's House of Commons speech October 16 referring to Bourassa's weakness (p. 47). 23. Book says the FI/3 did not present a threat to overthrow the government because it 24 was anarchist-utopian in theory. 24. Suggests hard line czused the death of Laporte (p.71t last paragraph). 25. Reistance to -^police action is usually passive (p74)» 26. Evidence of APPREHENDED INSURRECTION (p. 71) Descente dans la rue CNTU, CEGEP support Ryan's rebellion FLQ long term plans (four stages) 010411 �BISSONNETTE 1. On October 10th, both Choquette and ShARP agreed not to make public statements during the day. Subsequently (about noon^ Choquette called Sharpe to say he had an idea for a pulblic statement, which indluded his so-called Department for Social Peace. Then the long telephone conversations ensued among Chouinard Lalonde. Roquet, Sharp, Choquette, etc. to try to modify at least the statement. What led Choquette to change his mind that monrning in your view? Chouinard said in regard to the above that the Quebec ministers were deeply divided on the question of parole. Have you any light to throw on the situation in the " 3. Quebec cabimet? In the paper dated October 9th which was read at the Cabinet Committee meeting on Security and Intelligence and dealt with the governments negotiating position, reference is made to a decision as yet unmade about the possib&lty of exchanging one prisoner for Cross. possible ..."J ("If it is decided that nosubstantial compromise is Was this possibility still being considered within cabinet so far as you know? When was a final decision on it taken? How was it viewed in DEA and Task Force? 4. Reference is also made to the likelihood that the government would feel that they could cease police activities during negotations. Would the cessation have been real or illusory? 5. In a memo of Ocotber 5th, Roquet indicates that there is no news from the Quebec side on the cessation of police activities. Did the Quebec government in fact halt the activities or simply spread a rumour? 6. What were the circumsjrances in Ottawa concerning the selection of an intermediary to talk with the FLQ? Who initiated the idea of an intermediary? Did the Federal Government bog down in taking the initiative? 7. When Lemieux was designated by the Felquistes Demers without consultation with Ottawa? did the Quebec government appoint How do you explain the rejection of a federal representative to coneult with the negotiator and the authroities? W re you then tacitly accepted by both sides as just that person? 01041 2 �••• A- i^~° t ' I, • 3 E I - / ' I / 010413 ��^AtyA • How aware were you of t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n viewpoint w i t h i n t h e Quebec Government on t h e negotiations? VJhat led up t o Bour.?.3sa r s p e t i t virage? Who among members of t h e Task Force a n t i c i p a t e d t h e VJMA? Did you i n your c o n t a c t s with Quebec r e a l i z e t h a t t h e Quebec Government were about t o r e q u e s t t h WMA? Did you concur w i t h t h e e v a l u a t i o n of apprehended insurrection? ••Jas t h e WMA t h e p r i c e t h e f e d e r a l govenmnet paid for t h e p e t i t v i r a g e ? With which f e d e r a l m i n i s t e r s were you in d i r e c t contact? Were you 'Pae person from t h e Task Force c l o s e s t t o t h e Quebec Government? Who e l s e i n P t t a v a was i n c l o s e c o n t a c t ? (Lalonde, Marchnnd, P e l l e t i e r , e t c . , when?) Was ginsti - n of r e l e a s e of p r i s o n e r s debated I n Task F o r c e , or was everyone more or l e s s agreed on a firm l i n e ? T e l l us about your d i s c u s s i o n s with de C o s s i o . DiJ you have : frequent c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Demers on t h e n o p o t a t i n technique? Di-" i n t e r d^paitmfitttol j e a l o u s y hamper t h e e f f i c i e n t y of the l a s ' " Force? • PAS t h e group surrounding Ryan (Ryan's r e b e l l i o n ; a f c t o r i a ip.-oking t h e WMA? Do y ai t h i n k t h e Frime M i n i s t e r changed h i s p o s i t i sn toward n g o t i a t i n g or ;•/ c. i t simrly not c l e a r l y s t a t e d i s t h e b e g i n n i n g . Who were H • re-'.l Inf] ler-^os en hi Prime M i n i s t e r ' r> t h i n k i n g in your view? VJere c-r:'-nc ( l e g a l ) askeP of DEA r e g a r d ; - . • Ace ,:" PP:; Ha- is-- • as g ' e s t i o n bhat a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e frp"i 1 •• eA I-.-iv an'I y.'dev \e- a s s i s t le. t h e dr-ifting of EP.i r» r--- -o 3i]R ", 1R1? E'/isEsr: •A-,--:A t r e '•• «;imittee on • -y Pfg-is! i t i o n follows : Par ugh? 010415 �iAjiA-A Fl p. (M*. Ty ^ £ HI'RKW*) (iK.CfrMSr/ <= ) 8 , 1910 midJAUrm TOR YHS HIHI3TEa ttotottaa aT J J l . position I t ta aat too aoaa to la federal o f f i c i a l (ta ) to aeslgaatod to aai that to to taatrMtod a) Ta to i t ta sat ta a poaitioa to agree t o requests that I t raaatds entirely aa^aatiflabla an t t o baaia of VU*tarntl, bat that i t i a axsdoaa to piaeaise Hr. Croaa' U f a . Mora a p a a l f l a a l l / tha Q o n n a m t w i l l aat y i e l d t o tha threat of htaatomlJ an thoee request* which, i f granted, would tand t o atotoay t t o toaia of law aad ordar i a thia eoantry. OD thaaa amttara that relate to t t o abdaetlon l t a a l f tha Oovenwent la praparad t o ataoaae than ta tha context of aa arraayaaat which would lead t o Mr. Croaa* relcaae. b) Por exaaple, with regard t o t t o eo-oallod attnlfeeto, tha wider publication of i t ta aat l a l t a a l f relevant t o t t o aaiataaance of law aad ordar. I f I t ta taairtad that tha publicity thot tha aanifaato tea already reoeivsd ia insufficient, tha woveraneat would ba praparad to aoaaldar allowing i t a f a c i l i t i e s t o ba aaad ta thia oonaaotloa. (Thia l s subject t o aa opinion ft-oe tha Dapartoaat of Justice on tha risk of incurring l i b a l aotloa t*aa tha paraaai mentioned in tha aanifaato.) o) Sinoa farther pabltalty w i l l ao doubt ba sought, i f only for reason af face, you should than aay that tha Oowawaeant i s praparad ta agree t o thia particular raquiraaant aa part of a package d) Turning than very serious by thair aat they aaat be t o aora eahatanttal aattara, jou should refer t o tha position i a whioh tha abductors hava pat tbaneelves and to indicate that tha Govercatant recognises that ooaeerned about their position; in the context of an 010416 �mm - 2 - arrangement for Kr. Cross' release, the Goverment would be prepared to discuss arrangements relating to thair preaent exposed position. 3uch arraagaaaota aight include thair transfer to another country if there is one willing to accept them. a) With regard to the other ri—nils of the abductors, the Government would not to prepared to bargain with regard to (i) tto release of prisoners aow in custody, (ii) tha ransom, (iii; the re-engagement of tha Lepalme worker*? except en the terms already offered to them, and (iv) tha question of tha alleged informer. (However, in subsequent diaeusaioas of the raaacm demand, it could be indicated that tto Goearamaat would reoognise in the concept of a settlement involving their transfer to another country that they would have certain expenses to aeet. Thia aaaoapt should aat, however, be raised until the discussion of transfer to another saautrj ta being actively pursued with prospect that it might land to a settlement.) f) Ton should encourage than to pursue the idea of catting their looses and accepting a safe-conduct arrangement aa the basis for a settlement aad ta thia and encourage than to discuss some of tto practical prehUSM which would be involved! (i) tto mechanics whereby Mr. Cross weald to released following their safe transfer to another country, (li) who would be holding hin meanwhile, (iii) tha numbers requiring tto safe conduct, (iv) tto question whether a country acceptable to than ta willing to receive them, (v) tto arrangansnta far transport (if other matters are agreed, tto Government woald presanmbly be prepared to provide an aircraft) g) In the context of a discussion oa the aafa conduct, you oould oaa ths granting of monies for actual expenditures aa an Inducement to facilitate their accepting a settlement baaed on safs conduct. h) Siaee we do net expect that all details of the above arrangement will be settled at the first Booting, you should make clear that you wish te have further meetings with them. 2. I t w i l l to both p o l i t i c a l l y and l e g a l l y (granting of immunity r e s t s principally with guebec Government} neoessary to obtain guebee approval oa above position. 3* This has already been discussed with o f f i c i a l s of Justice end PCO. You nay wish aow t o consult the Pri*e minister about t r e s s ideas and about who night be ths Federal representative.. I assume that the o f f i c i a l should be a Preoah-apsaklng Canadian (good p o s s i b i l i t i e s from t h i s Jepartaant would be Claude coquet at the i n i t i a l period and Andre Bisaonaette i f l a t e r someone with a more fcanal o f f i c i a l position were to be required). 010417 �' • i What were t;v, ., • M P V J E . U P i . g *•• rtgiRficni ose ot contributions of the Ta, the crisis? For the danger at home PCCIH. nbroa Workir;g 9 it nuances in the negotiating technique Dealing with foreign governments? Planning the safe conduct? Monitoring nnd coordinating information? J . Was the Op Centre the sine qua non of the whole operation? . • • • ; • J.. I. . • ' I >• • • • - * ••*. A. • m». . - j;|* '&. 4 • • u 010418 �October ?9th Roou«t vrrote ^bout p u b l i c opnion abroad to Lalonie s u g g e s t i n g tbsi. ••-. Leblanc, Vime M i n i s t e r should r e p a i r t h e c o u n t r y ' s ba ; 3/.age on c i v i l r i g h t s 17 making a TV -.pp^a; ance following t h e new l e g i s t l a t i o n . Di 1 h*'' A 010419 �rfofc Could you recreate the scene of October, 1970, indicating the context in which you saw the crisis? How did it seem to figure in the general picture of international terrorism? What aspects of the crisis appeared at the time most likely to be important? (e.g., relations with Quebec? Relations with the U.K.?) What elements appear different to you now in 1974? , In what way did the crisis change your outlook on Canada? (On life?) As of now, what appears to have been the most important result of the crisis for DEA? For Quebec? Internationally? 010420 �A\H BISSONNETTE 1- La d6couverte du complot " Harisson Burgess " de juillet 70 a-t-il permi aux gouvernements de se preparer en prevision d'une crise. De quelle fagon pratique a-t-on re"agi au ministere en particulier? A-t-on pense, qu'un jour, un projet semblable pouvait se concretiser?. 2J0 Pensez-vous que des amities snterieures, avec des gens ds tendan- ce felquiste, ont pu jouer sur le raisonnement d'horane conme Trudeau, Marchand, Pelletier etc? 3- Ryan dans son livre " La crise d'octobre H dit: " Le gouverne- ment quebecois gardait l'assemblee nationale a l'ecard de toute participation " ttes-vous de son avis? h- Nous aimerions bien que vous nous parliez de 1'atmosphere qui rSgnait au gouvernement a "Quebec, N'est-il pas vrai qu'au tout debut de la crise, apres 1'enlevement de Cross et avant celui de Laporte, Bourassa avait donne toute 1*initiative a Choquette ainsi que sa confiance et que apres l'enlevement de Laporte 11 ait decide que lui-meme prendrait les choses en mains? 5- Nous savons qu'a Quebec les ministres n'etaient pas d*accord sur bien des points. M. Chouinard dit qu'il y avait " UNE CffiANDE DIVERGENCE D'OPINIONS " entre les ministres: sur quels points les discussions ont ete les plus vives* Les negotiations? La tuyurnure que prenaient les negotiations? La liberation des prisonniers: 23 - 5- 7- ? " " " detenus? Les mesures de guerre? Quoi encore? 6- A Quebec encore: Quel etait au juste le r<Jle de Chouinard? 010421 �BISSONNETTE II semble qu'ici a Ottawa on ait eu bien confiance a son jugement, qu'on lui ait demande d'intervenir aupres de son gouvernement mais qu'en realite il lui etait difficile de le faire, car on ne lui demandait pas son avis. 7- INTERMEDIAIRE: devra etre un DKERMEDIAIRE La personne qui devra representer le gouvernement et non un MEDIATEUR La premiere suggestion, concemant un Interred!aire, faite par M.A.E. a ete de personnalitesquebecoises Suggestion faite le 7=1&: et non de quebecois travaillant pour le federal. le choix final a ete fait le 12-10 UNIQUEMENT par le Quebec: Comment expliquer le silence sur le choix d'un interraediaire entre le 7 at le 12. La T.F. a-t-il ete consulte pendant ce temps? Le cabinet ? a-t-il donne son avis? ESst-ce que vous (.M.A.E.) auriez prefere un autre dandidat que Demers comme representant du gouvernement dans les negotiations? La sugges- tion proposee par le T.F. a savoir Mrs. Ryan. Gaudry, Laberge n'a pas ete retenue? 8- Quelle iraportanve attribuez-vous aux element suivants dans l'orientation du M.A.E. vi s a vis de la crise? a) Obligation de rencontrer l'interet international? b) Etablir un precedent, qui serait canadien, dans la fagon de traiter le terrorisme international? c) Rehausser le prestige du nrinintere au gouvernement? d) Etablir une legislation d'urgence permanente? ) Assurer que les relations federales-provinciales se maintiennent a un bon niveau? 9- A Montreal, avez-vous eu des conversations positives avec Messieurs Bourassa, Choquette, Demers, ou autres. Avez-vous pu discuter avec eux: a) Liberation des p r i s o n n i e r s . n b) " detenus? 010422 �c) Mesures de guerre d) Recompense. e) ou encore: la publication du manifeste, la rancon? to) Y a-t-il eu, des la premiere assemble du cabinet, c'est a dire le 6—10 au matin, accord general sur la rigidite qu'il fallait appliquer ou si les personnes presentes avaient des oponions differentes? b) A-ton, des cette premiere assemble considere. Jes 7 demandes globalement ou les a-t-on etudiees individuellement? c) Egalement a cette m&ne assemble a—t-on etabli les bases sur la facon dont il faudrait traiter avec le Quebec? 11) �Nous savons que dans la constitution canadienne le gouvernement canadien n'a pas le choix d1 accepter ou de refuser une telle demande ( armee, mesures de 0 1 0 4 2 4 e) �11- Auriez-vous quelques details ou quelques reflections a nous communiquer sur la dimension relative des roles joues par Messieurs Sharp et le premier ministre Trudeau au cour de cette crise? Y avait=il desacord entre eux sur des questions politiques. Pendant la crise pensez-vous que ^entourage du premier ministre certaines personnes ont pu l'influencer ( Lalonde, Marchand, Pelletier, Robertson ) ET M. Sharp lui s'en tenait-il particulierement aux raisonnements de Messieurs Ritchie et des principaux membres du T.F. comme messieurs Bissonnette et Roquet? Finalement poour resumer toute cette question? " A qui ,attribuez-vous le credit de 1'initiative dans cette affaire ? " 12guerre: C'est le gouvernement du Quebec qui a fait appel aux mesures de quelles sont les raisons invoquees pour justifier son application? " La rumeur voulant que Trudeau y aurait pense DES le tout debut " serait-elle vraie? N"est-il pas juste de penser que " le complot mene par un groupe quebecois influents aurait ete une des causes? de et que le •* petit virage de Bourassa serait le resultat de la decouverte de ce complot? Ne faut-il pas penser que les allusions de Marchand seraient justifiees. " a savoir: que la proclamation des M.de G. serait liee aux elections municipales, que I'influence de messieurs Drapeau et Saulnier aurait ete forte? Que les menaces pesant sur les tStes .des me decins,de personnes importante a Quebec, de raliiements dans la rue, que tout 5a justifiait une telle demande? 13- Finalement, les evenements de 70 auraient-ils au moins servis & la formulation de mesures plus adequates en temps de crise?? 010425 �i i-i-»-bi;ji3onne"Gt,e . Quelle e t a i t l a raison p r i n c i p a l s de votre premier voyage a Montreal? Vos rapports perconnels cvec M. Croquette vous o n t - i l s f a c i l i t e l a tache? Lors de votre 2e voyage a Montreal vous avea, eu une longue conversation avec M. Demers. Qu'elle en e t a i t l a nature exacte? Vous souvenez-vous de moments ou i l y avait desacord entre l e s membres du T J . et q u ' e l l e etaient l e s raisons de ces desacords? I EtieZTVOUs au courant au T.F.qde l a proclamation des M. de G. s e r a i t invoquee? SlTceue nouvelle vous a - t - e l l e p r i s par surprise? Qu'a ete la reaction au TJF. en apprenant c e t t e nouvelle? Qui a eu l ' i d e e de SOC? La presence de Montpeilt e t a i t strategiquo? A l a suite de l a formation de S.O.C. y a - t - i l eu diminution de t r a v a i l au T . P . Comment e t a i t l e s r e l a t i o n s de t r a v a i l entre l e s deux groupes? La communication entre l e s deux groupes e t a i t - e l l e automatique? E s t - i l v r a i que l a c r i s e d'octobte a ete profitable au Ministere, en ce sens q u ' e l l e a redors notre e t o i l e aux yeux du P.M. I Etes-vous en mesure de nous d i r e si l a p a r t i c i p a t i o n du P.M. e t a i t d i r e c t e ou influencee par des conversations ou consultations q u ' i l auraient eues avec ses amis ( Marchand - P e l l e t i e r - Lalonde ) Rondo Leblanc Dan3 un memoirs m. Ritchie d i t qu'un representant des A J ) , devrait e t r e present au moment ctfcibu MMH.01 s e r a i t compose. S ' a g i t - i l de manoeuvre habile pour assurer l a presence du Ministere? ou avons-nous vraiment un mot a d i r e dans l a formulation d'un t e l b i l l ? Etes-vous en mesure de nous d i r e s ' i l y avait entente complete entre l e ' membrea du cabinet Quebecois? Aa point da vue l e g a l , laa vues da •totatare d i ta j u s t i c e concordaleot-ellee aeaz c e l l e s da atatatara? Laa tonnes qui represantaiant ces ministeres e t a i a a W i l l da atoe avis? Laa relations feaeralaa prerlnslsles o n t - e l l e s ete plotot tendue, pendant l a crise Depuis ea nonent aves-vou* i assi nad qn*une anslioration sensible s"stait operee? 010426 �Nous nrtavons pas ce qu"On appele ( The Emergency Powers) mais avons nous apafata quelque chose, depuis la csise qui serait equivalent? Dans la proclamation des mesures de guerre, les pouvoirs sont generaux et coupent tous les droits aux provinces comme: censure, arrestation, detention,controle des postes,transport etcrt^ya-t-il rata pas de lois moins radicales? La proclamation DES M.De. G. ler fois 1914 par Borden 2e " 1939 King. La proclamation des. M.de G. etait-elle, en realite une mesure reassurante pour le peuPle plus qu*'une necessite, en raison du danger persistant et meme augmentant? Quelqu@un a-t-il pense reviser la loi,des M.D. G, car je crois qunan 1939 aussi toaaxSopc bien quMen 1970 ces mesures se sont avgrees axx inadequates. ( il ne faut pas oublier qunune revesion a ete faite en I960 par " Canadian Bill of Rights " Etes-vous au courant de la visite de M*P. au O.C. Quel en etait la nature? Au moment de vos visites a Montreal, vos rencontres avec les representants Cubains ont-elle ete construetives? Amicales? Tendues? Fructueuses? Robert Demers, etait un ami et confrere de Bourassa, c"est semble-t-il une bdnne raison pour qu@il ait ete choisi par le Quebec, mais , par exemple le T.F. a-t-il ete Kmnm\ktekxm*ii**pg1c9Tnrlm9iVit*mm*parLima%T!imrx»j^^ consulte a ce sujet? 010427 ��POP/C. RQpUET/Ke • f y m y > ^ 1 \ r < r < < A OctobeAl,C1970 fr-tf-TfX-hQq S E C R E T % BOTE FOR FIIE AyyA&<A Subject: Events surrounding Mr. Choquette'a statement of October 10 , / y * ft I.*..«-- C_y1<f First call by Mr. Choquette to Mr. Sharp; — Mr. Choquette phoned Mr. Sharp around mid-day indicating that he proposed to make a statement in the afternoon appealing to the kidnappers to release Cross, and giving them inducements to do so. He read to Mr. Sharp on the phone a draft of his statement. Text attached as Annex 1 ) . The Minister indicated he could not give a definitive reaction on the basis of a text read quickly on the telephone in French. However, he expressed strong reservations on scats of its aspects, even hinting that he might not be able to associate himself with such a text. He asked that it be dictated to us in full on the telephone. After studying it, Mr. Sharp would phone back Mr. Choquette. Ths Minister pointed out that we had not Intended that any statement be issued. In particular there were objections to making public what concessions we were willing to make to the kidnappers. Our line was that negotiations should take place privately, in the context of specific arrangements for Mr. Cross's release. 2. A study of Mr. Choquette's draft confirmed the Minister's fears. One weakness of tha draft was to imply that the FLQ was inspired by idealism. It announced a major social initiative of the Quebec Government (creation of a "social peace department") in a context clearly suggesting that this was a concession to the FLQ. It implied that this organisation was the spearhead of efforts in Quebec to remove profound injustices prevailing in the Province. Another grave flaw was that, after stressing that the Judicial institutions could not be tampered with, Mr. Choquette stated that the kidnappers would receive only symbolic sentences. The reference to review of paroles could be taken to mean that such reviews in the past had not necessarily been honestly carried out. A third major defect was that the text not only referred to safe conduct for the kidnappers, but did so in such a way as to make it impossible for them to accept it. 010429 �- 2 - SECRET Counterproposal by Ottawa; — 3. It was felt in Ottawa that a flat refusal to let Mr. Choquette issue his statement might not prevent him from doing so, given his attitude. Furthermore, if we succeeded in preventing issuance of this statement, there was a risk (should Cross be killed) that we would appear as; having prevented Quebec from making a positive appeal to the kidnappers. In the circumstances the best approach seemed to be to prepare a counter-draft. This was done, in consultation with Mr. Gordon Robertson, and the text despatched to Mr. Choquette. (Text attached as Annex 2 ) . Mr. Lalonde was informed of the situation on the phone and his comments obtained. The Minister sought to reach the P.M. on the phone. First talk with Mr. Chouinard;— U. With Mr. lalonde*s agreement, we called Mr. Chouinard, Secretary of the Quebec Executive Council. We described the situation to him, outlined Mr. Choquette's draft, read him our counterdraft, and sought his comments. Mr. Chouinard questioned the need for any statement. We told him we had seen no need for a statement, but that Mr. Choquette seemed determined to proceed; hence our counter-draft. Mr. Chouinard strongly agreed with every one of the changes we proposed to the Choquette draft. In addition he doubted whether any reference should be made either to safe conduct or to parole. He said he had never Jieard of any proposed "ministry of social peace". ,He quite agreed with our view that any announcement on this point could not be made in a statement about the FLQ, as this would suggest that it was a response to FLQ pressure. Unfortunately, Mr. Chouinard was not sure he could intervene. He had a mandate from Premier Bourassa to deal with the Cross affair, but could not invoke this mandate and overrule Mr. Choquette. He mentioned that Quebec Ministers were deeply divided over the matter of parole. Since Mr. Sharp was having a second talk with Mr. Choquette at that point, it was agreed that we would call back Mr. Chouinard. Second Sharp-Choquette telephone call;— 5. Mr. Choquette had seen our draft and wanted to stick essentially to his own. He was willing to drop the reference to a ministry of social peace. As for safe conduct he would prefer not to mention it at all if we did not agree to his text. Mr. Sharp explained in detail all our objections to his text, and said quietly but firmly that he would have to dissociate himself from the Choquette statement if issued. This would be an unthinkable and highly dangerous situation. Mr. Choquette said he would think matters over and call back. �3 — SECRET Second call to Mr. Chouinard;— 6. We informed Mr. Chouinard of the situation resulting from the second conversation between the two Ministers. We suggested Mr. Chouinard get in touch with Mr. Choquette's headquarters by way of enquiring into developments. He might thus be given an opening for offering advice to Mr. Choquette. Chouinard said he doubted that the Minister would take his advice. However, Chouinard might be able tp provoke intervention by someone in Mr. Bouraasa'a office who could overrule Mr. Choquette. This would be difficult, however, since we did not wish Mr. Choquette to realize that Ottawa had alerted anyone else in Quebec. Mr. Chouinard could not therefore commit himself to any particular course of action, but would do his best. Third Sharp-Choquette conversation;— 7. It appeared to Mr. Sharp that the most plausible explanation for MT. Choquette's draft statement would be that the latter had received firm infonaation that the terms of his appeal would be immediately accepted by the FLQ. The Miniater therefore put to Mr. Choquette a direct question. Did he have any specific reason or information leading him to believe that such a deal would be accepted by the FLQ? Mr. Choquette said that he had no such information (arising for instance from covered contacts with the FLQ). His planned statement was based on the advice of a prominent, highly respected personality in Montreal. (The Minister Immediately surmised that this must be Mr. Claude Ryan) — Mr. Choquette was less adamant at this point. He was willing to revise his statement along the lines of our suggestions. He now wished to keep in the section on safe conduct, as re-drafted by us. He said he would use substantially our text with seme changes of wording and with an introduction of a purely personal character. In the middle of the afternoon Mr. Choquette's press conference had been announced for 5;00 o'clock. In the event it was delayed to 5:30 as a result of our discussions with him. We sought to obtain the final text of Mr. Choquette's proposed statement early enough to pass on further reactions. In fact, the final text was received only a few minutes before the press conference — too late for any further communication with Mr. Choquette concerning it. However the text on the whole was perhaps better than we had reason to expect and was mostly based on our re-draft. A copy of this final statement is attached as Annex C. Claude Roquet 010431 �TT- • « " , »>«iEE r L^ c/2 fr. A > t . A l^NOTE FOR FIIE Subject: f' Events surrounding Mr. Choquette's statement of October 10 ^>w. ft C.»,»— Cyf"p ^ M First call by Mr. Choquette to Mr. Sharp: — Mr. Choquette phoned Mr. Sharp around mid-day indicating that he proposed to make a statement ta ths afternoon appealing to the kidnappers to release Cross, and giving than Inducements to do so. He read to Mr. Sharp ca the phone a draft of his statement. Text attached as Annex 1). Tha Minister Indicated ha could not give a definitive reaction on ths basis of a text read quickly on the telephone in French. However, he expressed strong reservations on sone of its aspects, even hinting that he might not be able to associate himself with such a text. He asked that it be dictated to us in full on the telephone. After studying it, Mr. Sharp would phone back Mr. Choquette. The Minister pointed out that we had not intended that any statement be issued. In particular there were objections to making public what concessions we were willing to make to the kidnappers. Our line was that negotiations should take place privately, in the context of specific arrangements for Mr. Cross's release. 2. A study of Mr. Choquette's draft confirmed the Minister's fears. One weakness of the draft was to imply that the FLQ was inspired by idealism. It announced a major social initiative of the Quebec Government (creation of a "social peace department") in a context clearly suggesting that this was a concession to the FLQ. It implied that this organisation was the spearhead of efforts in Quebec to remove profound injustices prevailing in the Province. Another grave flaw was that, after stressing that the judicial institutions could not be tampered with, Mr. Choquette stated that the kidnappers would receive only symbolic sentences. The reference to review of paroles could ba taken to mean that such reviews in the past had not necessarily been honestly carried out. A third major defect was that the text not only referred to safe conduct for the kidnappers, but did so in such a way as to make it impossible for them to accept it. 010432 �- 2 - S E C R E T Counter-proposal by Ottawa:— 3. It was felt in Ottawa that a flat refusal to let Mr. Choquette issue his statement might not prevent him from doing so, given his attitude. Furthermore, if we succeeded in preventing issuance of this statement, there was a risk (should Cross be killed) that we would appear as? having prevented Quebec from making a positive appeal to the kidnappers. In the circumstances the best approach seemed to be to prepare a counter-draft. This was done, in consultation with Mr. Gordon Robertson, and the text despatched to Mr. Choquette. (Text attached as Annex 2). Mr. Lalonde was informed of the situation on the phone and his comments obtained. The Minister sought to reach the P.M. on the phone. First talk with Mr. Chouinard:— 4. With Mr. Lalonde's agreement, we called Mr. Chouinard, Secretary of the Quebec Executive Council. V/e described the situation to him, outlined Mr. Choquette's draft, read him our counterdraft, and sought his comments. Mr. Chouinard questioned the need for any statement. We told him we had seen no need for a statement, but that Mr. Choquette seemed determined to proceed; hence our counter-draft. Mr. Chouinard strongly agreed with every one of the changes we proposed to the Choquette draft. In addition he doubted whether any reference should be made either to safe conduct or to parole. He said he had never Jieard of any proposed "ministry of social peace". ,He quite agreed with our view that any announcement on this point could not be made in a statement about the FLQ, as this would suggest that it was a response to FLQ pressure. Unfortunately, Mr. Chouinard was not sure he could intervene. He had mandate from Premier Bourassa to deal with the Cross affair, but could not invoke this mandate and overrule Mr. Choquette. He mentioned that Quebec Ministers were deeply divided over the matter of parole. Since Mr. Sharp was having a second talk with Mr. Choquette at that point, it was agreed that we would call back Mr. Chouinard. Second Sharp-Choquette telephone call;— 5. Mr. Choquette had seen our draft and wanted to stick essentially to his own. He was willing to drop the reference to a ministry of social peace. As for safe conduct he v/ould prefer not to mention it at all if we did not agree to his text. Mr. Sharp explained in detail all our objections to his text, and said quietly but firmly that he would have to dissociate himself from the Choquette statement if issued. This would be an unthinkable and highly dangerous situation. Mr. Choquette said he would think matters over and call back. r-A A. * U JZ �— 3 — SECRET Second call to Mr. Chouinard:— 6. We informed Mr. Chouinard of the situation resulting from the second conversation between the two Ministers. We suggested Mr. Chouinard get in touch with Mr. Choquette's headquarters by way of enquiring into developments. He might thus be given an opening for offering advice to Mr. Choquette. Chouinard said he doubted that the Minister would take his advice. However, Chouinard might be able tp provoke intervention by someone in Mr. Bourassa*s office who could overrule Mr. Choquette. This would be difficult, however, since we did not wish Mr, Choquette to realize that Ottawa had alerted anyone else in Quebec. Mr. Chouinard could not therefore commit himself to any particular course of action, but would do his best. Third Sharp-ChoQuette conversation:— 7, It appeared to Mr. Sharp that the most plausible explanation for Mr. Choquette's draft statement would be that the latter had received firm information that the terms of his appeal would be immediately accepted by the FLQ. The Minister therefore put to Mr. Choquette a direct question. Did he have any specific reason or information leading hin to believe that such a deal would be accepted by the FLQ? Mr. Choquette said that he had no such information (arising for instance from covered contacts with the FLQ). His planned statement was based on the advice of a preminent, highly respected personality in Montreal. (Tha Minister immediately surmised that this must be Mr. Claude Ryan) — Mr. Choquette was less adamant at this point. He was willing to revise his statement along the lines of our suggestions. He now wished to keep in the section on safe conduct, as re-drafted by us. He said he would use substantially our text with acme changes of wording and with an introduction of a purely personal character. In the middle of the afternoon Mr. Choquette's press conference had been announced for 5:00 o'clock. In the event it was delayed to 5:30 as a result of our discussions with him. We sought to obtain the final text of Mr. Choquette's proposed statement early enough to pass on further reactions. In fact, the final text was received only a few minutes before the press conference — too late for any further communication with Mr. Choquette concerning it. However the text on the whole was perhaps better than we had reason to expect and was mostly based on our re-draft. A copy of this final statement is attached as Annex C. Claude Roquet 010434 �A - / CONFIDENTIAL October 7, 1970 MEHGHAHEHH TO THE I Kidnapping of Cross - Use of an Intermediary for Contact with the Abductors In view of the difficulties we are encountering in the receipt and analysing of a variety of "communications" from the YL-4, about which you have already seen ny memorandum of today's date, may I have your comments on the following tentative proposal? 2. Perhaps consideration could be given to appointing an intermediary for the governments of Canada and Quebec who might meet an intermediary for those responsible for Mr. Cross's abduction. This person appointed by the governments would be empowered to meet the other side at a location mutually acceptable to both sides. /Je would have to ensure that the intermediary for the abductors understood that such a meeting would be on the basis of safe conduct for him, with a solemn undertaking that there would be no police interference, surveillance, etc., either of this and subsequent meetings, or of contacts which the abductors' spokesman would need to make with them. iVe understand that, should the two governments agree to such a proposal, such solemn undertakings with regard to these points could be arranged. 3. The choice of a government intermediary will be of major importance. He could be a person like Claude Ryan, Roger Gaudry, Rector of the University of Montreal, or Louis Laberge of the C.L.C. The eventual choice would, I feel, be best left to the collective judgment of the Cabinet, since your colleagues will have views on the acceptability of various of the names proposed above and undoubtedly will suggest others who might be considered. The person should not, I suggest, be a mediator. There would be real danger in such a person proposing a compromise unacceptable to the Canadian government. This would gravely undermine our (now excellent) moral position. k. It strikes me that, if we should decide to appoint a government intermediary, he might have with him, at the first meeting, some points which the two governments feel are negotiable. Although not exhaustive, I would suggest consideration of: (a) an offer of immunity from immediate arrest and prosecution and of safe conduct for the kidnappers to any country of their choice which would be willing to accept t(iem; and 010435 �2 (b) release of most (if not all) of those people whom the Quebec police have recently picked up in their various raids and searches. It of course is understood that these conditions hinge on assurances that Mr. Cross will be released safely at a time and place which the abductors may wish to choose and which can be verified simultaneously. 5. The above is a very general outline of this proposal, but one which, I feel, merits consideration. By our proposing an intermediary (whether publicly or privately) we have two distinct advantages: (a) we have made a meaningful gesture, and (b) we place the abductors in the position of better understanding the fact that their "communications" are not coining through loud and clear, and thus offering them a chance to make direct contact, even if only for their propaganda purposes. A. E. R. �. Ea?ic questions related to areas being EEA^.. A investigated WHO MADE ,A ^ x ^jnr (^AC^O (R HJH NOT TO MEET THE FLQ'S SEVEN DEMANDS IN THE FJhsg ;OMMUNlQUe? E Was it an irnmp.iiate and independent reaction on the part of the Prime Minister? E Was the decision reached after ouch, discussion or little? Who were the strongest proponents of th? firm line ir. the federal government? \j Were cabinet meetings and cabinet committee meetings arenas for making decisions, or were they used for genf » ->ersua9ion a: • er the decision had already been taken" 010437 �During .. s' Ene : r i s i s , h »SP f st ./ere the p e o p l e ir. the Prime M i n i s t e r ' ? L- . entourage -A e on him? It has beer, suggested that USSEA and the Prime Minister wore the real decision makers in the crisis. But were they in agreement? Is the suggestion justified? 010438 �*.. t,tended ; *Eat Wa mee - s ther< .. . . on : .-• p • . •' nsmittee enuritp an< .: a d v i s o r s } ? vi ted oetween t h e committee ind 7 ...• t rce? lgreement among the m i n i s t e r s from the o u t s e t of the meeting t h a t the government should take a g e n e r a l l y firm l i n e toward t h e FLQ demands' agrpement (Was t h e deci i ri imposed by t h e Prime M i n i s t e r , or was reached during t h e m e e t i n g , or was i t never reached?) Did the committee d i s c u s s t h e p o s i t i o n papers prepared October 5th and 6th by USSEA and t h e Task Force concerning t h e a t t i t u d e t h e government might t a k e toward the FLQ demands? Did they c o n s i d e r the FLQ demands i n d i v i d u a l l y at t h a t time? Did they c o n s i d e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of r e l e a s i n g any or a l l of t h e p r i s o n e r s ; exchanging one or more p r i s o n e r s for C r o s s ; t h e p r i n c i p l e of t h e 3afe conduct; t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e m a n i f e s t o ; t h e ransom; t h e workers from Lapalm; t h e " s t o o l pidgeon"? Did t h e y c o n s i d e r what approach t o t a k e i n c o n s u l t i n g with t h e Quebec Governsent? 010439 �; 0 _ HOW FIRM WAS TIE INITIAL DECISION, AND WHAT PRESSURES WAS IT SUBJECTED TO? Who in the >ral and provincial cabinets, and in influential advisory roles f a vour e 7 ana opposed the decision? sy Who, xf anyone, of influence fundamentally opposed a firm line'? Who were in favour of establishing contact with the FLQ? AJ Who introduced the idea of token or appamet concessions in the form of publishing the manifesto and arranging a safe conduct for the kidnappers? How flexible was the cabinet on the questions of ransom, the Lepalme workers? Was the question of the possible release of prisoners or the exchange of prisoners for the hostages reopened in cabinet? How centralized was the direction on the federal side? s/ Was there frequent consultation at the cabinet level with advmsory bodies the Task Force, departments? v How real was the influence of the Task Force? Through what channel? 010440 . �Do you feel that the DEA had been sufficiently warned by the RCMP and by virtue of their own assessments of the possibility of diplomatic kidnappings? What preparations were made toward such an eventuality following, for example, the attempt on Harrison Burgess? Was the Federal Government more or less unanimous in believing that the danger to Cross (and later to Laporte) was real? Did the "federal evaluation" change during the crisis? �• Hov vn? te-'i de- AT . ' '... to run oeyi>n i t h e c l e a r - c u t what way •ir if d i s c u s s e d a n d d e l i b e r a t e i en th v Huw roj af Quebec? .ii v 3 the e f f o r t t o ensure c l o s e c o l l a t o r a t i >n and s i m i l a r i t y of •tweer tne p r o v i n c i a l and f e d e r a l govememtns? i What p o s i t i v e a t t e m p t s were t h e r e t o f o r e s t a l l ( e . g . Sharp ievlat.ions i n Quebec? Choquette t e l e p h o n e c a l l , October 10) How profound an e f f e c t d i d the kidnapping and death of Laporte have on t h e b a l a n c e of i n f l u e n c e and b a s i s for c o o p e r a t i o n ? 010442 �• ' ' •.-.; . i s • iO" • . • • i i r Choquette S irce or el sewb re s u i t of such sn arrang' mi . t l y • r i n d i r e c t l y of t h e way i:i whl s. ind v i c e v e r s a ? ' Was Chouinard an important force in • ssa influenced formulating Quebec p o l i c y ? Was the method of d e a l i n g with Quebec g e n e r a l l y t o t a k e a d e c i s i o n i n Ottawa f i r s t and t h e n t o d i s c u s s t h e d e c i s i o n with the Quebec Goverr.emt? Was B o u r a s s a ' s " p e t i t v i r a g e " more the result, of p r e s s u r e w i t h i n h i s own government than from t h e f e d e r a l side? �. 1 Bo ssa's absence from the scene during the fir. oi How did it affect relations with Ottawa? 010444 �r D'apr*a vous, l e sv~bre. p o u r ' j w l , *» vpfuet .<3, ? - S - l . re- vnrso" la d e c i s i o n p r j | ^ ai accop' s '*c M. 2Y.no-,. in n« p^? .•*! *u ^ J ! 3 p - (cf. iocument) *—/ Eti **-•*• du „y»t caJal-J E« contenu • ant 1e* cor.yaraatlooa eatr« ]•<» • .»•-.. a .sc-ijialoo antra Trodeaa at Koiuaas* »»ant p a»a «t caat • iarot^r* da s, qu* .s i l a r a l t pari* dea * p r l a o n n l e r a p o l i t i c a l " voua a t a i t «ean rate mv.- ."t-ti«is Veldphenlqeea aatra laa a l n i a t r * ? S* L<»r*ux-preTinciaaax noua d t a l t p o r t * a rotra coiwiaissaaea? Laa r e l a t i o n * antra laa gourernaaanta municipal da Montreal at p r o v i n c i a l concemant la c r i s e , • t a i t e & n - a l i a s oaesxIiqaeeoT Laa dirvrgancaa antra l a s eaaiirss da geeiiarnamamt da -juebac ont - a l i a s joma ma rdla important dans la p o l i t i q u e d'Ottawa? l e v - c a qoa 1' amltvaaMct da Laperta • influeoa* laa r e l a t i o n e antra Quebec et Ottawa? D'aprea • o u s , qeela ••ralmt l e s e f f e t e d« langwa turaa Tenant la ia c r i s e , aur las r e l a t i o n s antra l a provlmce at l a f u n n w a t fadUrai? 010445 �<?_WHAT WERE THE JDST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS AND INFLUENCES IN CONDUCTLNG NEGOTIATIONS? Why -ae- ts -A o i- :eral or joint representative postponed until after t he •:. inapt '. .. of ' aport •? How unexpected was the unilateral appointment of a Quebec negotiator? What attitude and situation in the Quebec Government did the appointment reflect? Were federal and provincial objectives in negotiations dissimilar? How would you describe them? Was the outcome of the negotiations anticipated? Was it staged? Could it have been otherwise? What were the circumstances leading up to Bourassa's proposed parole for five prisoners? . I When and by whom was it decided not to negotiate the release of detainees? How instrumental in ultimately saving Cross' life was the offer of safe conduct? How important were those "modalities" to its success? 010446 �•y, La nomination do Lemieux par les Felquistes a-t-elle 6t6 accepts1 par le gouvernement du Quebec apres consultation avec Ottawa, ou sans consultation? La possibilite d'une Equips de negotiateurs federale-provlnciale, a-t-elle 6t6 proposed au gouvernement du Quebec? A-t-elle 6t6 formellement reniS par le gouvernement du Quebec? Quel etait la reaction au cabinet federal a la nomination unilaterale de 1*intermediare par ls gouvernement du Quebec? L'intertt du gouvernement du Quebec a noomer un intermediare provincial en excluant un representant federal 6tait-il base" simplement sur un desir de proteger le pouvoir provincial, ou etait-il aussi stimuli - complique par des divergences ds vue au sein du gouvernement du Quebec meme? Demers ayant 6te* mandate1 par le gouvernement du Quebec, de quelle faccon devrait 11 reagir aux institutions sur la technique des negotiations venant de 1'equipe speciale? De quellernanierea-t-on, du cSte federal, esay£ d'influencer d'avantage le cours des negotiations? Psr quelle voie, 1*equipe speciale 6talt-elle informe1 du progres des negotiations? Ces renseignments <§taient—elles a la minute? Est-ce que M. Bissonnette a accepts la tSche d'organiser le sauf-conduit a fin de pouvoir expliquer discretement sa presence a Montreal, et au meme moment de parler avec Me. Demers, enfcre autres? 010447 �\/)k,'h Avez-vous initio le projet de permettre les ravisseurs (et non les prisonniers) quitter le pays sous un sauf conduit? A ce moment la, quels aspects des modalites vous semblaient Stre les plus importants? SI vous aviez pu 1'organizer avec retrospective, quels changements auriez-vous faits? Estimez-vous que le sauf conduit 6tait pratiquement indisponsable pour eviter l'assasinat de M. Cross? Quel effet,* quel resultat sur les relations Canado-Cubaines a-t-elle eu, la crise de 1970? Avez-vous eu des problfimes chatoullieux avec les Cubains? 010448 �E Savez-vous ?> quel moment la decision definitive a ete prise oar le cabinet federal de ne sss negotier 'sine echange d'un prisonnier fePquEite pour Gross? (II semble qu'au moins jusq'au 12 octobre cette decision n'avait pas ete etablie.) gu'en etait la reaction aux MAE? 010449 �Did Demers read the federal (Task Force) instructions for negotiations before talking with Lemieux? Can you explain Bourassa's suggestion of hostages from the Liberation Cell (or later, from among the "political prisoners") as part of the safe conduct deal? Where did his idea come from, and with whom did he discuss it? Would it have been possible for Demers to conduct the negotiations differently given the limitations of Lemieux's mandate as well as the limitations to his own? Was Lemieux not too sharp to be deluded by the stalling tactics? October 14th, the negotiations were temporarily suspended because of Bourassa's departure with Demers for Quebec - ostensibly for consultations with the provincial cabinet. What was the real explanation for Demers' visit to the capital? Bourassa claimed that all decisions on negotiating policy were unanimous in his govememtn. Comments? Did Demers and Lemieux meet more than once for discussions after the negotiations of October 12 - 15? Did Demers instigate the talks? Could Demers' stsaements (and Bourassa's) about Lemieux's saying one thing in private and the opposite at his press conference have been based on simple misunderstanding of what had been said in private, or perhaps a desire to camouflage his ovm position and inability to negotiate? 010450 �prQ> When was it decided in Ottawa not to release any federal prisoners or to recommend parole? What were the circumstances leading Bourassa to propose parole for the five "political prisoners"? Did Choquette initiate the idea of their release? Was it possibly against Bourassa*s better judgment? With whom on the federal side (apart from AER) had Bourassa and Choquette discussed the release of the five? Were the five prisoners the five in Quebec prisons, as one supposes? Bourassa mentions eleven prisoners under provincial jurisdiction. E. Cote speaks of five. How is the discrepancy explained? It appears tha everyone in DKA was totally in the dark about Bourassa's speech of October 15th. Yet there was constant consultation between Bourassa and Trudeau in anticipation of the WMA. Was the hang-up in communications then between PMO and DEA? Or was the PMO also unaware of the precise nature of the Bourassa declaration apart from the six hour limit? How do you explain the difference in attitude of the Government of Quebec described by Chouinard at the outset of the crisis from the rather more independent line taken by Bourassa during the negotiations? Or was the "independence" an illusion on paper at the official level which did not reflect what actually happened privately at the top level of the two governments'7 �If the federal government had immediatley appointed an intermediary, do you think it would have been possible to keep greater control over the publication of communiques in the press (even if the negotiations had operated on the same system of indirect instructions for negotiation by means of communiques? Was the hang up in the appointment of a joint intermediary in the federal cabinet, or was it with the Quebec Government? Did the Federal Government consider that Demers had a federal mandate as well as a provincial one? Why did federal advisers in DEA suggest that a federal provincial team of intermediaries be appointed when the jurisdiction at that time (Oct. 7 ) was primarily federal? 010452 �W H I P S A N D H O W W A P I - 1 3 3 P A W H A T K I N • O F E I C Y L E G I S L A T I V E M E A S U R E S W O U L D iKETi? ' (e.g. '.vrni ";- i n c i ' n t s A .on Was she : PP- vtion been conr ; iere 3 . p tuality? l%d) ' entative initiative from 'Quebec or from Ottaw ? From Montreal? Wher.° Wno decided on the War Measures Act over special legislation? Who in th'j federal cabinet made positive alternative suggestions? Were Quebec Ec-lice evaluations of tne danger of paramount importance in the decision? RCMP evaluations differed'; Were political consiP."rations of paramount importance' How much did the Quebec Covernraent guide the police in arrests and detentions? �I ' l • i • • • * ' « * • Ugal de. . . p ^ , ^ 1 BteUUr# • o l U c i w per Is ! • Bill c Ml ^ ^ Q ^ ... - • • <** Onifrso « j considerations? • -•£< - * • f l l t * * * * * * 1 * * « Wggesticns ic..,- ! Au point ds tag j ^ • • l m *» " * * * * • de le. jurttc. V 1 repr^semtaient ces • - mi . ' 1 • 7 ' - .. , . 3 ' • •- - 010454 �/ %A Was Bourassa consulted, or did he proffer advice on the type of legislation for emergency measures. Were alternatives to the WMA discussed with him? 010455 �detainee Rog.et geejtei to --share « different, a t t i t u d e toward Am s + e ' s considered view. P.-.-; COUP- ha " a e A s e of you shrew acae l i g h t on A t h i a , and put i t i n t o p e r s p e c t i v e ? Did most p e r s o n s i n DEA react ftWf^pftbly t o tha proclamation of the War Measures? For how long before October 16th had 3SSEA and othera on th? Task Foroe aad i n DEA been aware of the immanence of the measures? Waa the diract i n t e r e s t of DEA i n emergency l e g i s l a t i o n aimed at permanent a e a s u r e s , o: were ihere attempts t o influence the nature of measures taken during the c r i s i s too? �< # & ; 4 A WHAT WERE THE MOST IMPORTANT CONTRJP(rri.JfS OF DEA TO THE CRISIS? 0 I How import r.t * ra tne personal relations of SSEA and U S S E A with each other ind with other: E the government as influences in the crisis' • How important were personal relations of Bissonnette and Roquet with confreres ~n' A/ in Quebec? • 1 J Was the Prime Minister's somewhat derogatory attitude toward DSA a factor In nit METHOD of dealing with the crisis? J What were the main elements in DBA orientation toward the crisis? • Heating an international obligation Establishing a Canadian precedent in dealing with international terrorism? Re-establishing ths prestige of DEA within the government? Maintinning equilibrium in relations with the Quebec Government? Influencing the nature of permanent emergency legislation? i ... [ How would you describe the actual role of the Task ror-e throughout the crisis? Compiler and synthesizer of information' *• > itor of policy ideas? •> ' • . • Did the Task Force function throughout the crisis nrre or less as anticipated at • lis inception, or did its role change with events" - • • » 3010457 * �Did Demers read the federal (Task Force) instructions for negotiations before talking with Lemieux? Can you explain Bourassa's suggestion of hostages from the Liberation Cell (or later,, from among the "political prisoners") as part of the safe conduct deal? Where did his idea come from, and with whom did he discuss it? Would it have been possible for Demers to conduct the negotiations differently given the limitations of Lemieux's mandate as well as the limitations to his own? Was Lemieux not too sharp to be deluded by the stalling tactics? October 14th, the negotiations were temporarily suspended because of Bourassa's departure with Demers for Quebec - ostensibly for consultations with the provincial cabinet. What was the real explanation for Demers' visit to the capital? J Bourassa claimed that all decisions on negotiating policy were unanimous in his govememtn. Comments? Did Demers and Lemieux meet more than once for discussions after the negotiations of October 12 - 15? Did Demers instigate the talks? Could Demers' stsaements (and Bourassa's) about Lemieux's saying one thing in private and the opposite at his press conference have been based on simple misunderstanding of what had been said in private, or perhaps a desire to camouflage his ovm position and inability to negotiate? 010458 �When was it decided in Ottawa not to release any federal prisoners or to recommend parole? V/hat were the circumstances leading Bourassa to propose parole for the five "political prisoners"? Did Choquette initiate the idea of their release? Was it possibly against Bourassa's better judgment? With whom on the federal side (apart from AER) had Bourassa md Choquette discussed the release of the five? Were the five prisoners the five in Quebec prisons, as one supposes? Bourassa mentions eleven prisoners under provincial jurisdiction. E. Cotg speaks of five. How is the discrepancy explained? It appears tha everyone in DEA was totally in the dark about Bourassa's speech of October 15th. Yet there was constant consultation between Bourassa and Trudeau in anticipation of the WMA. Was the hang-up in communications then between FMO and DEA? Or was the PMO also unaware of the precise nature of the Bourassa declaration apart from the six hour limit? How do you explain the difference in attitude of the Government of Quebec described by Chouinard at the outset of the crisis from the rather more independent line taken by Bourassa during the negotiations? Or was the "independence" an illusion on paper at the official level which did not reflect what actually happened privately at the top level of the two governments? 010459 �If the federal government had immediatley appointed an intermediary, do you think it would have been possible to keep greater control over the publication of communiques in the press (even if the negotiations had operated on the same system of indirect instructions for negotiation by means of communiques? Was the hang up in the appointment of a joint intermediary in the federal cabinet, or was it with the Quebec Government? Did the Federal Government consider that Demers had a federal mandate as well as a provincial one? Why did federal advisers in DEA suggest that a federal provincial team of intermediaries be appointed when the jurisdiction at that time (Oct. 7 ) was primarily federal? 010460 �-J, ....-n \S /' • m iez-vous s au courant qu'un gouvernement parallels etait en vols de formation a Quebec ? ( ce tout de suite apres 1'enlevement de Laporte et juste avant l'applieation des mesures de guerre ) Le gouvernement federal avalt-il pris au serieux cette menace ? Le gouvernement du Quebec s'est-il inquiet6 a ce sujet ? ( Ne ssrait- 11 pas Juste ds penser que Cetait la une raison de plus pour que los mesures de • guerre soient invoquees?? Nous airaerions egalement savoir si vous personnellement, - vous avez pris cette menace comme une chose possible ? • Comment expliquer les divergences d'opinion du premier ministre et de M. Turner sur la Justification do 1'application dds mesures de guerre? Monsieur Turner dit: que le gouvernement federal ne peut pas tout dire et le premier ministre dit que la situation tendue, le serieux ds la crise et les menaces ont suffis a faire accspter aux communes cette raise en application des mesures de guerre? 010461 �DSSEA and Roquet seemed to share a different attitude toward the release of In detainees Andre Bissonnette's considered view. Could you throw seme light on t h i s , and put i t into perspective? Did most persons in DEA react -rypsfllPably • to the proclamation of the War Measures? For how long before October 16th had DSSEA and others on the Task Foroe aad i n DBA been aware of the immenence of the measures? Was the direct interest of DEA i n emergency l e g i s l a t i o n aimed at permanent aeasures, or were there attempts t o influence the nature of measures taken during the c r i s i s too? 010462 �L avls l4 *1 des e v e r t s du miniate™ , ^ * » ^ l e B i l l C 181 a. U : L L ^ • o l l i c i t e par l e g o u v e r n e n t ? Le gouvernement du Quebsc y av.lt offerf Ls MEA a-t-il a , W±1 M t - SPCCif " c ^ , ^ ^ " « • » « « Aretes. considsrations? " Au point de vue l e g a l , l e s vuss du ministere d- i 1 1 - avec c e l l e s du HEA? etaient-U» mem. avis? - « - « . du .em. a" ta ho„ « a *""" * " • * — - ' - ~ ~ — * " — - 010463 �La r.oi,:'. du Quel ; '. . -: Lemieux p-tr les Felquistes a-t—elle '5t' acceps- >ar Le gouvernement snsultation avec Ottawa, ou sans con? ... .aiion'.' La pessioiPLiti' d'une 4quipe de negotiateurs federale-provinciale, a-t—elle ete proposee au gouvernement iu Quebec? A-t—elle et** forniellement renis par le gouvernement du Quebec? J Quel etait la reaction au cabinet federal A la nomination uniliterale de 1'intermediare par le gouvernement du Quebec? L'int6r8t du gouvernement du Quebec A nommer un intermediare orovincial en excluant un representant federal etait-il base simplement sur un iesir de proteger le pouvoir provincial, ou etait-il aussi stimuie - complique par des divergences de vue au sein du gouvernement du Quebec meme? Demers ayant ete mandate par le gouvernement iu Quebec, ie inelle faccon devrait il reagir aux instrcutions sur la technique des negotiations venant ie l'equipe speciale? De quelle rnaniere a-t—on, du cflte federal, esaye" i'infJuencer d' v/antage le cours des negotiations? Par quelle voie, l'equipe speciale etait-elxe informe ds progre3 des negotiations? Ces renseignments etaient-elles A la minute? Est-ce que M. Bissonnette a accepte la t§che d'organiser le sauf-conduit A fin de pouvoir expliquer discretement sa presence A Montreal, ft parler avec Me. Demers, entre autres? au rn?m<-> moment de 010464 �Avez-vous initie le projet de permettre les" ravisseurs (et non les prisonniers)^ quitter le pays sous un sauf conduit? A ce moment 13L, quels aspects des modalites vous semblaient §tre les plus importants? Si vous aviez pu 1'organizer avec retrospective, quels changements auriez-vous faits? Estimez-vous que le sauf conduit etait pratiquement indispensable pour eviter l'assa%inat de M. Cross? Quel effet, quel resultat sur les relations Canado-Cubaines a-t-elle eu, la crise de 1970? Avez-vous eu des problSmes chatouilleux avec les Cubains? 010465 �A que. ...^.uoiit a-t—om aeciae A Ottawa de ne pas relacher aucun des prisonniers federaux, ni de recommander le pardon conditionel? ft Quellss etaient les circonstances amenant Bourassa A proposer le pardon conditionel des cinq prisonnetrs, malgre les objections du gouvernement federal? Est-ce que 1'entente entre le gouvernement provincial et celui du federal a dsterlore sn consequence? Le 14 octobre, les negotiations etaient suspendues durant 1'absence de Bourassa et Demers A Quebec - apparament pour des consultations de pres avec le cabinet provincial. Quel etait la vrai explication pour la visite de Me Demers A la veille capitale? Y-avait-il plusiers entretiens Demers-Lemieux apres la fin des negotiations du 12 - 15 octobre? Qui a ete I'lnstlgateur de ces pourparlers? Me Demers meme? 010466 �By way of fundamentals, here are five general areas for investigation; basic questions related to each of the areas to be investigated; further questions to elaborate specific aspects of the basic questions. They are in a strippeddown form for my use - not the form (or necessarily the language) in which they would actually be posed. Not all the questions, or for that matter all the "areas" are applicable to all the interviewees. For example, PAB has already dealt on tape with the initial policy decision ("area" marked X in his case), and didnt feel he had much to contribute on it. The pages marked PAB and the questions marked with a check A are probably suitable for him. �f •<- AREAS FCR INVESTIGATION | . Who made the iecision not to meet the FLQ's seven demands in the first communique'? y 2. .'How firm was tn° initial. Iecision, and what pressures was it subjected to? Who in the federal and provinoial cabinets, and in influential advisory roles favoured and opposed the decision? J How centralized was the direction on the federal side? How was it decided what part of the show Quebec would run? \J 3 What were the most important elements and influences in conducting the negotiations? V) U When and how was it decided what kind of emergency legislative measures would be taksnT / /A What were the most important contributions of DEA to the crisis? �ORAL HISTORY ACCESSION FORM HISTOIRE ORALE: FORMULE D'ACCESSION ^L^L: At-cession number /Vi 1-6 PI and L970 C r i s i s Interviewee 'Enquete Interviewer 'En jucteur Andre Bissonnette No. of ti.pes / T r a n s t ripts V° de h( 'bines/Transcript ions Date Duration/Dure^e Q.iality of recording 'Qualitu 0/1 (resume) Location dt- I'enregistrement description INTERVIEWEE INTERVIEWER 'ENQUETE sent/envoye Contract/Contrat I Letter/£.ef/re J Contract 'Contrat nt e n v o y e ' received re^u [_ Letter-'Leffre [_ • Tape checked by interviewer for quality Qualite de Ja bobine veritie'e par 1'enqueteur Level of s e c r e c y ' Vjveau de /ENQUETEUR received/re^i New interview required Nouvelle intrevue necessaire • classificati CLOSED UaSTIL/FERME JUSQU'A . In accordance with government regulations Conlormement aux rcglements du gouverneme 2. Death of interviewee 'Deeds de I'enquete* 3. Other/4r<rre Copy-write held by/Droits • • d'auteur detenus par Restrictions EXTERNAL AFFAIRS Additional comments/Autres commentaires P e r s o n ( s ) r e s p o n s i b l e for c o l l e c t i o n / R e s p o n s a b / e f s . ) de la collection Si (-.nature 010469 �Accession Number/Numero 1-6 d'entree WORK PROGRESS/' ACHEMINEMENT DU TRAVAIL Verified by/ Date verifie Tape received/Reception de la par bobine. Re-recording/Re-enregistr ement. prepared/transcription. Transcript RESUME Transcript checked for errors/ verification typographique. Transcript checked against tape/ confrontation transcription - bobine. References checked in Library/ verification biblioth§que des references en Final Proofreading/ Verification finale. Retyping if necessary/ Nouvelle copie si necessaire. Copy sent to interviewee/ verification par par received/regu sent/envoye received/regu enquete. Copy sent to interviewer/ Verification sent/envoye enqueteur. finale. Final typing/copEe Subject index (on card)/ Index sujet (sur fiche). Filing of Tape/Rangement de la bobine. Filing of Transcript/ Rangement de la transcription. Filing of Index card/ Rangement de la fiche sujet. Filing of accession form/ Rangement de la formule d''accession. EXT 161 010470 �RESUME DE LA BOBINE ENREGISTEEE AVEC M. ANDRE BISSONNETTE D'apr&s lui le premier ministre aurait d&s les premiers instants de la crise refuser de repondre affirmativement A toutes les demandes des ravisseurs. Qu'il aurait egalement decide des les premiers moments d'appliquer les mesures de guerre des que necessaire et que sa position n'aurait jamais changee. Monsieur Bissonnette ne se souvient plus qui etait present A la premiere reunion du comite du cabinet, lui personnellement n'y est jamais all£ et n'a rien eu A faire avec le ler ministre. C'est M. Chouinard qui l'informait de ce qui se passait A Quebec et M. Kirkwood des choses A Ottawa. Roquet et lui-mSme 6taient les deux personnes qui communiquaient avec les autorites A Quebec et au plus haut echelon les premiers ministres ensemble et p^s ckfta M. Lalonde. Bissonnette etait trfes preoccupe par les communiques de presse concemant Cuba, il fallait constamment veuiller A ce que tout soit tres precis tout en protegeant leur succeptabilite. II a constatejy que Bourassa n'etait pas interess£ A traiter personnellement avec les cubains. Bissonnette a dit se rappeler qu'aucune rivalite n'existait entre les ministres A Ottawa contrairement A ce qui se passait en ce sens A Quebec. Turner et la G.R.C. sont les promoteurs de 1'application des mesures de guerre. (jTe.d tn -J '— &' *" 'it 010471 �y^~ # K L'insurrection apprehendee n'etait pas vraiment reelle mais c^et-ait la BASE necessaire pour demander l'application de telles mesures.' Si CROSS n'avait pas ete la victime, le minist&re des affaires exterieures n'aurait pas eu A jouer un rSle aussi important que celui qu'il a dd jouer. Le centre d'operation avait une grande importance en raison de la neutrality de la composition de ces membres et des ministeres qui y etaient represents. Malgre sa formation legale Bissonnette n'a rien eu A faire dans l'application des mesures de guerre. Ritchie a et6 le centre, le cerveau de toute cette affaire en raison d'abord de sa personnalite. Bissonnette n'est pas tout A fait certain de 1'importance du TASK FORCE. La liaison semble s'gtre faite particulierement entre le TASK FORCE le A.E.R. et la G.R.C. 010472 �Bissonnette Tapes The E.M. made the decision right at the beginning about the WMA and the response to the demands, including the publication of the manifesto. PAB didnt know who was present at the early cabinet meetings. He himself was never there. What he. learned about Quebec meetings was from Chouinard, and about Ottawa meetings was from Kirkwood. Roquet and Bissonnnette were the main means of communication with Quebec at the official level. Higher up it was the P.M. himself and Lalonde. Bissonnette left Ottawa after two or three days for Quebec and Cuba. He was very watchful of press communiqu^es regarding Cuba. Bourassa was not eager for special relations with Cuba. Bissonnette was unaware of rivalry among ministries in Ottawa. John Turner and RGR were key figutes in the WMA. The insurrection was not real, but was the legal basis for the invocation. DEA would never have been involved had it not been for Cross. The Op Centre was important as neurtral ground among people of different ranks and ministeries. PAB was not involved in the WMA despite his legal background. Laiason link seemed to be Task Force - AER - RGR. PAB wasnt sure of the real importance of the Task Force. 010473 �I ^ fl l " | Government of Canada Gouvernement du Canada CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET Dated From A compter du -7 n , ^ / LA/ Q ( ( To Jusqu'au _ 7H &l Of Af) iJ/)JT/ AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - A METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTERIEURE VOIR File No. - Dossier n° Ao-22 GC 31 (88/08) Volume - TAAAI A? 7540-21-857-8809 010474 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00132 Title A name given to the resource Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - A Bissonnette Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 11-Oct-70 to 1-Jan-74 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - A Bissonnette, RG25, vol. 25748, 20-22-TFK-11-6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Entire file Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en