https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e8284a2937dae393a31ffdc21b383ba6.pdf 88c512342d83bfbc0df737bb13899d20 PDF Text Text 20-22-TFK-11-5 File No. Dossier Volume / Fmm-np 7/£>/<^/ TWA 7/^<^(f CLASSIFIE CLASSIFIED DP -'*1*Mf*> m x "-\ 01 TITLE—TITRE: POLITICAL AFFAIRS INTERNAL SECURITY TASK FORCE ON KIDNAPPING ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM!* ROBERT DEMERS n C* o M « Retention period-Periode de retention EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES ET COMMERCE EXTERIEUR CANADA �ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA '„ A A A ^ A February 18, 1 9 7 1 V L DECREE The U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for External Affairs, Room 200, Daly B u i l d i n g , Ottawa, O n t a r i o . y Attention: k^ Mr. Claude Ramjet Dear Mr. Roquet: You will no doubt find the attached report of an interview with lawyer Robert DEL1EEE3 quite interesting.. During the October 1970 crisis, you will recall, DEMEK3 acted as negotiator for the Government of the Province of Quebec to obtain the release, of Messrs. Cross end Laporte. 2. We will keep you abreast of any additional details which may come to light. Yours si JL John Starnes Director General Security and Intelligence Defence and International Affairs/Defense et affairs Internationales ..'Ar • p n Ay, , &A. ••'< A ' r 010376 �£ INTERVIEW OE LAWYER RORERT DEMERS S E C R E T On January 21, 1971 Robert DEMERS volunteered to supply the Royal Canedian Mounted Police, Montreal, any details he could recall relative to negotiations he had with members of the Front de Liberation du Quebec (F.L.Q.) and their appointed representatives, with a view to obtaining the release of kidnapped Quebec Labour Minister, Pierre LAPORTE and British Trade Commissioner, Jait\es R. CRCSS. Upon his arrival at the R.C.M.P. offices DEMERS stated that he had no notes on the incidents and that at no time did the Provincial Department of Justice or any i other Provincial or Federal Government Department request a report from him. He was prepared to discuss his entire participation but stated that it would be from memory only and would endeavour to be as accurate as possible regarding details. 2. On October 12, 1S70 DEMERS was appointed to act as negotiator by the Government of the Province of Quebec. On t£e same date he held a meeting with lawyer Robert LEMIEUX whom he did not know personally previously, who was incarcerated in a Montreal City Police jail cell. LEMIEUX was not yet aware that he had been ' appointed by the F.L.Q. to act as negotiator on their behalf and therefore, prior to entering into any Eiscussions he requested he be supplied with a copy of the F.L.Q. communique which contained his appointment. Lawyer DEsiERS requested copies of all F.L.Q. communiques from the Quebec Police Force which were supplied and promptly passed to LEMIEUX by DEULRS. It should be pointed out 2 SECRET 010377 �_2_ tWn SECRET although the Q.P.P. supplied the communiques they could, nonetheless, have been acquired from the M.C.P. Prior to handing them to LEMIEUX, DEMERS did not peruse the communiques, however, he did notice that they also contained police reports and in particular, one emanating from the R.C.M.P. dealing with fingerprints. As a result, DEMERS was aware that LEMIEUX did in fact acquire some police reports dealing with the CROSS-LAPORTE affair, which likely prompted LEMIEUX's statement to the effect that this was a case of inefficiency on the part of the Police. A request by LEMIEUX that charges against him be dropped and seized documents be returned was immediately refused by DEMERS. 3. During their second meeting on the same day DEMERS found LEMIEUX to be weak of character and perplexed as to what he should do as a result of his being appointed F.L.Q. negotiator. As a press confercnpe had already been organized by LEMIEUX, DEMERS t o l d • him to ask the F.L.Q. to explain his mandate more clearly. 4. On the morning of October 14, LEMIEUX appeared in court, was conditionally released, and afterwards held a meeting with DEMERS which lasted 2i hours. TE. first hour of the meeting centred around LEMIEUX's sexual conquests and marital problems, at which time it became clrar to DEMERS that LEMIEUX was obsessed with sex. Other impressions gained by DEMERS at that time were that LEMIEUX lacked self-confidence, was not str< PS willed and contrary to his deportment in public, is-relatively calm in private discussions. LEMIEUX continually employs the terminology used by those with whom he associates, i.e. persons of an extreme left ideology. 3 SECRET �-35. SECRET During the remainder of the meeting, LEMIEUX admitted being sympathetic to the F.L.Q. but not a member of that organization. It appeared to DEMERS that LEMIEUX wants to be used by the F.L.Q. and others having extreme leftist ideas as he shares their beliefs and feels that it would be advantageous for the Province of Quebec to have a Maoist or Cuban type Government. He states thet a revolution in Quebec would be a great feat in tnat it would be the first to te carried out in'an industrial society. He does not appear to favour the Parti Quebecois although he foresees Quebec acquiring independence through their efforts, followed by a revolution by left wing extremists. In essence, LEMIEUX is not a separatist but supports 'this cause as it could^result in independence for Quebec. He doesn't believe the conflict to be one of race or language but one of capitalist and socialist systems. The discussion progressed to a point where LEMIEUX stated that only under Maoism could there be a Just Society, although he was unfile to forecast the conditions which would .exist after a revolution in Quebec. DEMERS was given the impression that LEMIEUX is not too well indoctrinated in Maoism. Although LEMIEUX favoured the kidnappings, he stated being against the assassination of CROSS or LAPORTE because it would bring repressive measures but such measures would in the long run benefit the revolution in Quebec. LEMIEUX also indicated thet he is enti-Rus. ia. He is a socialist first and a separatist second% sharing the same beliefs as Quebec terrorist Pierre 6. VALLIEPPS. LEMIEUX claimed knowing all the socialist types but was 4 SECRET 010379 �•O »— >-^ » •vt—. » -4n^^ aware of who the kidnappers were, although he stated that when their identity became known he v/ould undoubtedly know them personally. According to DEMERS, LEMIEUX is regarded in judicial circles as a person who is "Spouse a la. cause de ses clients" that is, he does not only defend his clients but shares their viewpoints as well as their activities. LEMIEUX described the F.L.Q. terrorists presently in jail (on October 14th) as revolutionaries, except for two. or three who had been recruited whilst incarcerated. 7. It was evident to DEMERS that LEMIEUX was publicity hungry and following each meeting, he would always call a press conference. DEMERS had advised LEMIEUX to be careful during these press conferences, however,, there were three points the t were agreed upon in private which were completely reversed by LEMIEUX when released to the public. These three points were: (a) LEMIEUX was to request further explanation of his 7 mandate by the F.L.Q. but instead stated that the negotiations v/ere over; \ (b) Dur:ng a previous meet.ng with BEYERS, LEMIEUX agreed that a F.L.Q. communique he was given gave him "carte blanche" to negotiate and to arrive at a settlement but during the press conference LEMIEUX stated that he did not have "carte blanche", (c) Becau.st of a cabinet meetin, DEMERS was reauired to ? proceed to Quebec City and arrangements were made with / LEMIEUX for him to accorartr. , DEMERS, in order to continue negotiations. This v/as agreeable to LEMIEUX, ( however, at a rress conference LEMIEUX stated that he would not go to Quebec City to continue negotiations. SECRET 010380 �-5- v SECRET i From these actions and his general observations, DEMERS does not ; consider LEMIEUX to be a leader but feels that the latter's decisions are actually made by his entourage. This appears to te tne case in a list of questions submitted to the Quebec Provincial Government on October 14. DEMERS noted that two of \E P4. the questions on this list contained specific wording which reappeared in an F.L.Q. communique the following, day. ^> One of those JJ ( he recalled, was the question, "Qu'elle est la situation sur les fouilles, perquisitions et arrestations?" The words "la situation" vere used in the question and again in the same context in the communique. 8. On October 1 5 , 1.S70, LEMIEUX v/as a d v i s e d of t h e Government's A ~ decision regarding the F.L.Q. conditions to be met for trie release of ^% t h e kidnapoed v i c t i m s and a e a i n LEMIEUX c a l l e d a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e . 9. 0 AJ> LSEIEUX was seen again by DEMERS between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. \_/] on October 17, after the proclamation of the War Measures Act. He was in jail again and at thia time expressed his disappointment * y that the Montreal student population hi d not taken to the streets vb> I for mass demonstrations a;; he believed they would have done on this -^ 1 of safe-conduct to Cuba for the kidnappers and offered the assistance occasion. DEMERS offered him the opportunity to review the conditions_^4 ' of Pierre VALLIERES and Charles GAGNOE in this .venture. LEMIEUX ^ •n was also asked to communicate with the F.L... to secure the release of CROSS and LAPORTE tut he refused both requests. LEMIEUX stated that he was disgusted with himself at th* t time becsuse he had suffered a loss of prestige among tEe leftist element and was afraid to take any further action which might lov/er his image in their esteem. 6 SECRET 010381 �-610. SECRET Throughout t h e meetings t h a t he had w i t h LEMIEUX, DEEERS g a i n e d the d e f i n i t e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t LEMIEUX would be w i l l i n g t o .drop alJL-thje-JRrl*^—conditions f o r t h e r e l e a s e of the kidnap v i c t i m s e x c e p t f o r o n e , which c a l l e d f o r t h e r e l e a s e of t h e p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s . At t h a t time of c o u r s e , t h e r e was no q u e s t i o n of the k i d n a p p e r s a c c e p t i n g a s a f e - c o n d u c t to Cuba as t h e i r i d e n t i t y was n o t known and same would have been s a f e g u a r d e d b y the F.L.Q. 11. On December 3 , 1970, DEMElvS met lawyer Bernard MERGLER f o r t h e f i r s t time a t t h e o f f i c e s of the Quebec P o l i c e Force i n Montreal. MERGLER s t r u c k DEMERS as being an i n t r o v e r t and he i m m e d i a t e l y made known t h e f a c t t n a t he had no d e s i r e t o be g i v e n any p u b l i c i t y r e g a r d i n g h i s appointment by the F.L.Q. as negotiator. their I n f a c t , MERGLER appeared unhappy a t h a v i n g been so chosen and was p h y s i c a l l y a f r a i d of a p p r o a c h i n g the k i d n a p p e r s , one j of t n e r e a s o n s being t h a t h i s name was m i s s p e l l e d on t h e i r communique, i n d i c a t i n g he was n o t t o o w e l l known by them. Another reason,for h i s r e t i c e n c e was the fact t h a t -,e f e a r e d b e i n g p r o s e c u t e d f o r h i s c o m p l i c i t y i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s a fcei they had t e r m i n a t e d . This ^ f e a r was a l l e v i a t e d when D-MLR5 a d v i s e d t h a t i t was he who had r e q u e s t e d MERGLER'a s e r v i c e s on b e h a l f of t n e F . L . Q . ( He f i n a l l y c o n s e n t e d to a c c e p t the t a s , ; when informed t l i a t J a c q u e s COSSETTE-TRUDEL and h i s wife had a l r e a d y been a r r e s t e d ty the P o l i c e . 12. From t h e * Q . P . F . o f f i c e s , DEMERS and MPRGLER proceeded to the Cuban Trade Office i n Montreal whej e a s h o r t c o n v e r s a t i o n was h e l d w i t h a Cuban, whom MLRGEPR s u g g e s t e d accompany them to s e e tne ,7 Si ^CT 010382 �_7— kidnappers. 5pC.V»^rvtl, I MERGLER also asked a woman working at the Trade Office to accompany them because of the fact that she was a women and spoke fluent French, however, from the tone of their conversation DEMERS feels MERGLER and the woman in question are more than just friends. The woman did not accompany them as authority would have been required from Cuba, which DEMERS felt would delay the proceedings for too long a period of time. DEMERS and MERGLER then proceeded to Des Recollets Street, Montreal where MERGLER spoke with the kidnappers for -J of an hour. Three conditions were demanded of, DERIERS by the F.L.Q. through MERGLER. Tae first two were accepted and the third was rejected by both negotiators. These conditions were: (1) That the wives and children of the kidnappers be allowed to proceed to Cuba. (2) That Jacques COSSETTE-TRUDEL and his wife also be allowed to accompany the kidnappers, presently holding CROSS, to Cuba. (DEMERS mentioned that this condition had already been promised to the COSSETTE-TRUDELs during the early morning of December 3rd by a member of the Q.P.E. who wa. involved in the interrogation, ater having been instructed to do so by his superiors). (3) That Claude RYAN or Rene LEVESQUE proceed to the house on Des Recollets Rtreet to v^sit the kidnappers. A suggestion was? also made tha" RYAN accompany the kidnappers to Cusa but this was discouraged by Julien CHOUIMARD of the Quebec Provincial Government and 8 SECRET 010383 �-8- SECRET RYAN himself, who v/as contacted in this respect, did not wish to leave. All perties having agreed to the first two conditions, it then took 20 to 30 minutes to leave the house end proceed to the Man and His World Site. MERGLER stated at that time that he would arrange for Suzanne LANCTOT to be escorted to Man end Kis World for her flight to Cuba. One and one-half hours elapsed before MERGLER advised DSEERS that', it would be his daughter Donna EARLO and another unidentified female who would be providing this escort. 13. Regarding Yves LANGLOIS, DEMERS feels MERGLER may have learned his identity from the Cubans as he himself was not made aware of this jerson's identity earlier in the discussions. A j uJ^ Although he coul: not definitely recall, DEMERS believes that he A j) j*t{A Ms/ »;7 ' did transmit this information to the Department of External Affairs » in Ottawa during his discussions on December 3rd. __, 14. DEMURS criticized the availability of communications facilities to contact Government representatives, trie only telephone being' "at the observation , ost which had \ een secured a week earlier by the R.C.M.P. DEMERS w»s told tn. t better arrangements could have been made but were not as the negotiators were supposed to use *' another dwelling on the same street for this purpose. DEMEES then recalled this suggestion having been mad- but for some unknown reason, no use was made of it. 15. DEMEES woUld have appreciated hivam his associations with LEMIEUX and MERGLER recorded, which ne wis ' id /.ould be tne case, but to his knowledge this was not done. The me<tings in question were held at M.C.?..and Q.P.E. cells and at an office in tne Hydro Quebec Building. c . . . . . . .J j ^ �SECRET Wa At the commencement of the i n t e r v i e w , we e x p r e s s e d to DEMERS our s u r p r i s e t h a t he had n o t been r e q u i r e d to submit a r e p o r t to e i t h e r Quebec J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r , Jerome CHCQUE'LTE, or to the Q . E . E . , s i n c e h i s a s s o c i a t i o n t h r o u g h o u t t n e c r i s i s was w i t h t h a t d e p a r t m e n t , and i n p a r t i c u l a r , w i t h I n s p e c t o r BENOIT. In view of t h e f a c t t h a t he did n o t keep n o t e s , i t i s believed t h a t DEMERS had n o t e x p e c t e d to be asEed to supply a d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t of t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s . 17. S u r v e i l l a n c e confirmed t n e m a t t e r of Bernard MERGLER's d a u g h t e r driving-. Suzanne LANCTOT to t h e Man and His World s i t e and DEMERS h i m s e l f p o i n t s out t h e f a c t t h a t MERGLER was aware t h a t Yves LANGLOIS used t h e a l i a s , SEGUIN. A 18. It is understood by DEMERS that in all probability we will wish to interview him further, at which time we will have copies of the F.L.Q. communiques and press clippings relating to his endeavours in oidor to assist his recollection of specific events. Clarification of any points covered in this interview which, may be forthcoming *ill be forwarded at a later date. SECRET SECRET 010385 �Ideas for future interview with Demers 010386 �DEMEES Did Demers ask to become (Quebec negotiator? was aware of? Were there ot,her candidates that he Did he follow the case very closely in consultation with the government before he was appointed? Does Demers know why the Ruebec Government decided to appoint a provincial represen -tive instead of a federal-provincial team? Was Demers aware of conflict between the federal and provincial governments at various noints during the crisis? Did Demers actually receive the federal negotiating instructions? regard them in relation to his mandate? How did he In relation to his options in the technique of negotiating? Did Demers at any point attempt to influence the Quebec or Federal Government about the policy line or the negotiations? Demers called R oquet just after the Laporte murder to suggest reiterate the safe conduct offer to the Liberation Cell. Had Demers consulted the Quebec authori beforehand? Demers phoned Bild on December 3rd to say that Mergler had gone into the kidnappers* house for the final negotiations. Demers was very unhappy and upset about the position he himself was about to be in, as the government hadn't given him much leverage. What position v/ould he have liked to be able to take? 010387 �• V/hat was the real significance of the shift from Montreal to Quebec, October 14th? (Ostensibly it was so be nearer the ''Quebec cabinet - but why? Jos Demers really surprises that Lemieux did not accompany him? net mentio. that the nomination od Demers diminished the importane of other lines of communication vrith Quebec. How often did Demers communicate vrith Ottsiwa? With whom did he speak most freauently? How did he regard the Ottawa-Quebec relationship? Viewed from Quebec, how important was the Task Force and the DEA? Demers had a number of talks with Bissonnette in Montreal. Does he recall what they were about, why they took place, and wnat the up shot was? How aware of "Ryan's rebellion" was Demers? How seriously did he take it? conscious of the effect of the "rebellion" on thinking in Ottawa? Was he Could he describe Eis own viewpoint toward it? What personal factors in the Quebec political scene played an important part in determining the approach of the Quebec Government to the crisis? How much pressure was there from Ottawa on Quebec police to avoid a shoot-out? Was it a very delicate issue? Demers talked to Ss. Pierre about the avoidance of a shoot-out. On whose instigation was this? Did he make known his thoughts on the extent of arrests ans the relase of detainees? How did Demers feel about the invocation of the VJMA? Was Demers instrumental or influential in arranging the release (for the purpose of 010388 �Were there other times at which Demers felt the policy he was persuing was not the most desirable one? With the aid of hindsight would he have altered his own techniq in negotiating? Did he feel that the affair should have been handled differently from Ottawa? From Quebec? • At the outset of the negotiations, what results did Demers anticipate? Might the results have been different if Lemieux had not been his opposite number? (How much of the difficulty arose from Lemieux' personality and now much from the limitations in the mandate of the Felquistes?) Were Lemieux' press conferences really a total misrepresentation of his discussions with Demers, or more a distortion? Hov/ independent was Demers? his side? How free was he to direct the line of negotiations on Did he feel that he had influenced the attitudes of Bourassa and Choquette toward the negotiations? How close was Demers personally to Bourassa and Choquette? he of their intentions? How closely informed was Did he know beforehand about the Quebec offer of parole for the five prisoners and the suggestion of the use of the ICRC? USSEA and the federal cabinet originally opposed the five prisoner parole proposition until Bourassa made it anyway. But later, on October 23rd, they decided they might be able to use it to indicate their flexibitilty to the FLQ. Could Demers throw light on the thinking of Bourassa and Choquette on this issue, and their attitude toward the Federal Government in this regard? 010389 �the safe conduct) of the Cossette-Trudels? How was this negotiated? How does Demers explain that no record was made by the Quebec police of his conversations during the negotiations either with Lemieux or with Mergler? Did the RCMP ever have a second interview with Demers? How does Demers explain that the Quebec Government never requested a written report? 010390 �Why was Demers chosen instead of someone else? Did Demers ask to become the Quebec negotiator? VJas he following the case very closely (and in consultation with the Government) before he was appointed by the Quebec Government? Why did the Quebec Government decide to appoint a provincial negotiator instead of a federal-provincial team? Was Demers aware of conflict between the federal and provincial governments at various points during the crisis? Did Demers receive the federal negotiating instructions? in relation to his mandate? How did he regard them In relation to his options in technique of negotiating? What results did he anticipate at the outset? Could the results have been different if Lemieux had not been his counterpart for the FLQ? (How much of the difficulty in negotiating arose from Lemieux' personality and how much from the limitations in the mandate of the Felquistes?) Did Lemieux' press conference really have NO relation to the discussions with Demers? How does Demers explain that no record was made by the QPF of his conversations during the negotiations with Lemieux or with Mergler? Was his assessment of FIQ motivations very similar to his assessment of the motivations of Lemieux the man? 010391 �^Jid he feel the affair should have been handled differently? From Ottawa? From Quebec? Did he consult frequently by phone with Ottawa? Was his principal interlocutor AER? Demers had a number of talks with Bissonnette in Montreal. Does he recall what they were about, why they took place, and what the upshot was, if any? • What personal factors in the Quebec political scene played an important part in determining the approach of the Quebec Government to the crisis? Did Demers at any point attempt to influence the Quebec or federal Government about the policy line or the negotiations? What was the real significance of the shift from Montreal to Quebec (ostensibly to be nearer the cabinet, but why?) during the negotiations? Was Demers really surprised that Lemieux did not accompany him? How did he feel about the invocation of the WMA? Did he make known his thoughts on the arrestsaand the release of the detainees? How does Demers explain that the Quebec Government never requested a written report? Did the RCMP ever have a second interview with Demers? 010392 �ORAL HISTORY ACCESSION FORM HISTOIRE ORALE: FORMULE D'ACCESSION A c c e s s i o n number 'Numero d'entrt; 1-5 Al,^Rk~ FTO Interviewee and 1970 C r i s i s 'Enquete Interviewer 'En q icteur Robert Demers N P . of t a p e s / T r a n s c r i p t s V° de bobines/ Transcript iorts Date Duration/Dur^e Quality of recording 0/1 (resume) Location 21/1/71 / Quali e de I'enregistrement Description INTERVlEWEE/E.VQt/ETE received/rec,u sent/envoye INTERVIEWER 'ENQUETEUR Contract /Con trat I J Contract 'Contrat Letter/Leffre j Letter/Leffre I" Tape checked by interviewer for quality Qualite de la bobine veriliee par t'enquetettr Level of secrecy /Niveau de l l —' l Date a e n t ' e n v o v e received 'recu j | j_ i New interview required Nouvelle intrevue necessaire classiticatic CLOSED UNTIL./FERME JUSQU'A In accordance with government regulations Contormement aux regtements du gouverneme 2. Death of interviewee 'DiSces de VenquetS 3. O t h e r M u f r e A>pywrite held by /Droits • • d'auteur detenu** par Restrictions EXTERNAL AFFAIRS Additional comments/Aufres commentaires Peraon(s) r e s p o n s i b l e for c o l I e c t i o n / R e s p o n s e b / e f s ) de la coltectiot} Signature Signature XT !*2 010393 �Accession Number/Numero 1-5 d'entree WORK ?K.OGRESS/ACHEMINEMENT DU TRAVAIL Verified by/ Date Verifie Tape received/Reception de la par bobine. Re-recording/Re-enregistrement. prepared:/transcription. Transcript RESUl^ Transcript checked for errors/ verification typographique. Transcript checked against tape/ confrontation transcription - bobine. References checked in Library/ verification biblioth£que des references en Final Proofreading/ verification finale. Retyping if necessary/ Nouvelle copie si necessaire. Copy sent to interviewee/ verification par par received/regu sent/envoye received/regu enquete. Copy sent to interviewer/ verification sent/'envoye enqueteur. Final typing/copie finale. Subject index (on card)/ Index sujet (sur fiche). Filing of Tape/'Rangement de la bobine. Filing of Transcript/ Rangement de la transcription. Filing of Index card/ Rangement de la fiche sujet. Filing of accession form/ Rangement de la formule d'accession. EXT 161 010394 �50-2.-2. -TFK- ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA igUU' I - S~~ OTTAWA 7. I 7 \ . fl February 1 8 , 1971 l L SECRET fc/^%j! ' i The U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r Extern&l A f f a i r s , Room 200, Daly B u i l d i n g , Ottawa, O n t a r i o . Attention: 0 Mr. Claude R^ e l Dear Mr. Roquet: You will no doubt find the attached report of an interview with lawyer Robert DEMERS quite interesting. During the October 1970 crisis, you will recall, DEMERS acted as negotiator for the Government of the Province of Quebec to obtain the release of Messrs. Cross and Laporte. 2. We will keep you abreast of any additional details which may come to light. Yours sii John Starnes Director General Defence and International Affairs/Defense et affairs i n t e r n a t i o n a ? e l C U r i t y " ^ E ^ 1 1 ^ 6 1 1 0 6 "7*yu* : "Am. d*£* Ayy fr 010395 �• • \:R—-** INTERVIEW OF LAWYER ROBERT DEMERS ' ! S E C R E T On January 21, 1S71 Robert DEMERS volunteered to supply the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Montreal, any details he could recall relative to negotiations he had with members of . the Front de Liberation du Quebec (F.L.Q.) and their appointed representatives, v/ith a view to obtaining the release of kidnapped Quebec Labour Minister, Pierre LAPORTE and British Trade Commissioner, James R. CROSS. Upon his arrival at the R.C.M.P. • • offices DEMERS stated that he had no notes on the incidents and that at no time did the Provincial Department of Justice other Provincial or Federal Government Department requestor a any report from him. He was prepared to discuss his entire participation - A *a but stated that it would be from memory only end would endeavour to be as accurate as possible regarding details. • 2, On October 12, 1970 DEMERS was appointed to act as negotiator by the Government of the Province of Quebec. On tfie same date he held a matting with lawyer Robert LEMIEUX whom he did . not know personally previously, who was incarcerated in a Montreal • : i City Police jail cell. LEMIEUX was not yet aware that he had been \\ •• appointed by the F.L.Q. to act as negotiator on their behalf and therefore, prior to entering into any discussions he requested he i be supplied with a copy of the F.L.Q. communique which contained his appointment. Lawyer DEMERS requested copies of all F.L.Q. communiques from the Quebec Police Force which were supplied and ! promptly passed to LEMIEUX by DEMERS. It should be pointed out *••••*- SECRET i . 010396 �&ECRET -2- that although the Q.P.F. supplied the communiques they could, •• nonetheless, have been acquired from the M.C.P. Prior to handing . ', them to LEMIEUX, DEMERS did not peruse the communiques, however, he did notice that they al3o contained police reports and in particular, one emanating from the R.C.M.P. dealing with fingerprints. As a result, DEMERS was aware that LEMIEUX did in fact acauire some police reports dealing with the CROSS-LAPORTE affair, which likely prompted LEMIEUX's statement to the effect that this was a case of inefficiency on the part of the Police. A request by LEMIEUX that charges against him be dropped and seized docunents be returned was immediately refused by DEMERS. 3. During their seqond meeting on the same day DEMERS found * LEMIEUX to be weak of character and perplexed as to what he should do as a result of his being appointed F.L.Q, negotiator. As a press conferenpe had already been organized by LEMIEUX, DEMERS told him to ask the F.L.Q. to explain his mandate more clearly. 4. : On the morning of October 14, LEMIEUX appeared in court, *A was conditionally released, and afterwards held a meeting with DEMERS which lasted 2$ hours. The first hour of the meeting centred around LEMIEUX*s sexual conquests and marital problems, at which time it became clear to DEMERS that LEMIEUX was obsessed with sex. Other impressions gained by DEMERS at that time were that LEMIEUX lacked self-confidence, was not strons willed and contrary to his deportment in public, is relatively calm in private discussions. LEMIEUX continually employs the terminology used by those with whom he associates, i.e. persons of an extreme left ideology. • • • * • J> SECRET •• �-3- SECRET S3 5. During the remainder of the meeting, LEMIEUX admitted being sympathetic to the F.L.Q. but not a member of t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t appeared to DEMERS t h a t LEMIEUX wants to be used by the F.L.Q. 1 and others having extreme leftist ideas as he shares their beliefs and feels that it would be advantageous for the Province of Quebec to have a Maoist or Cuban type Government. He states that a • revolution in Quebec would be a great feat in that it would be the first to be carried out in'an industrial society. He does not • - appear to favour the Parti Quebecois elthough he foresees Quebec acquiring independence through their efforts, followed by a A. revolution by left wing extremists. In essence, LEMIEUX is not ' 3 a separatist but supports 'this cause as it could^result in independence for Quebec. He doesn't believe the conflict to be • one of race or language but one of capitalist and socialist systems. The discussion progressed to a point where LEMIEUX stated that only under Maoism could there be a Just Society, although he was unatle to forecast the conditions which would .exist after a revolution in Quebec. DEMERS was given the impression that LEMIEUX is not too well indoctrinated in Maoism. Although LEMIEUX favoured the kidnappings, he stated being against the assassination of CROSS or LAPORTE becauae it would bring repressive measures but such measures would in the long run benefit the revolution in Quebec. LEMIEUX also indicated that he is anti-Russia. He is a socialist - first and a separatist second, sharing the same beliefs as Quebec terrorist-Pierre V A L L I E R P S . 6. LEMIEUX claimed knowing all the socialist types but was j 4 SECRET �-4• t aware of who the kidnappers were, although he stated that when their identity became known he would undoubtedly know them personally. According to DEMERS, LEMIEUX is regarded in judicial circles as a person who is "epouse a la cause de ses clients" that is, he does not only defend his clients but snares their viewpoints as well as their activities. LEMIEUX described the F.L.Q. terrorists presently in jail (on October 14th) as revolutionaries, except for •two or three who had been recruited whilst incarcerated. 7. It was evident to DEMEES that LEMIEUX was publicity • hungry and following each meeting, he would always call a press A 1 conference. DEMERS had advised LEMIEUX to be careful during these press conferences, however,, there were three points that were agreed upon in private which were completely reversed by LEMIEUX when A, released to the public. These three points were: (a) LEMIEUX was to request further explanation of his mandate by the F.L.Q. but instead stated that the negotiations were over; (b) During a previous meeting with DEEEERS, LEMIEUX agreed that a E.L.Q. communique he w&s given gave him "carte blanche" to negotiate and to arrive at a settlement but during the press conference LEMIEUX stated that he did net have "carte blanche". (c) Because of a cabinet meeting DEMERS was required to proceed to Quebec City and arrangements were made with LEMIEUX for him to accompany DEMERS, in order to continue negotiations. This was agreeable to LEMIEUX, however, at a rress conference LEMIEUX stated that he would not go to Quebec City to continue negotiations. 5 SECRET 0103 99 �-5- SECRET From these actions and his general observations, DEMERS does not consider LEMIEUX to be a leader but feels that the latter's decisions are actually made by his entourage. This appears to be the case in a list of questions submitted to the Quebec Provincial Government on October 14. DEMERS noted that two of the questions on this list contained specific wording which re, appeared in an F.L.Q. communique the following day. One of those i he recalled, was the question, "Qu'elle est la situation sur les fouilles, perquisitions et arrestations?" I The words "la situation" •L\ vere used in the question and again in the same context in the communique.. .• 8. On October 15, 1^70, LEMIEUX was advised of the Government18 A decision regarding the F.L.Q. conditions to be met for the release of the kidnapped victims and again LEMIEUX called a press conference. 9. LEMIEUX was seen again by DEMEES between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. on October 17, after tne proclamation of the War Measures Act. He • was in j8il again and at this time expressed his disappointment jr. • . • A. t h a t tfcie Montreal s t u d e n t population had not taken to the s t r e e t s for mass demonstrations as he believed they would have done on t h i s occasion. f DEMERS offered him the opportunity to review the conditions of safe-conduct to Cuba for the kidnappers and offered the a s s i s t a n c e ' of P i e r r e VALLIERES and Charles GAGNON i n t h i s .venture. - LEMIEUX was a l s o asked to communicate with the F.L.Q. to secure the r e l e a s e . • of CROSS and LAPORTE but he refused both r e q u e s t s . LEMIEUX s t a t e d that he was disgusted with himself at that time beccus-e he had suffered a loss of prestige among the leftist element and was afraid to take any further action which might lower his image in their esteem. • ..... o SECRET 010400 �SECRET . 10. Throughout the meetings that he had with LEMIEUX, DEMERS gained the definite impression that LEMIEUX would be willing to drop all the F.L.Q. conditions for the release of the kidnap victims except for one, which called for the release of the political prisoners. At that time of course, there was no question of the kidnappers accepting a safe-conduct to Cuba as their identity was not known and same would have been safeguarded by the F.L.Q. 11. On December 3, 1970, DEMEES met lawyer Bernard MERGLER for the first time at the offices of the Quebec Police Force in Montreal. MERGLER struck DEMERS as being an introvert and he immediately made known the fact tnat he had no d^esire to be given any publicity regerding his appointment by the F.L.Q. as their negotiator. In fact, MERGLER appeared unhappy at having been so chosen and was physically afraid of approaching the kidnappers, one of tsie reasons being that his name was misspelled on their communique, indicating he was not too well known Ey them. Another reason,for his reticence was the feet that \e fearod being prosecuted for his complicity in the negotiations after they had terminated. This fear was alleviated when DEMEES advised that it was he who had requested MERGLER's services on behalf of the F.L.Q. He finally consented to accept the task when informed tliat Jacques COSSETTE-TRUDEL and his wife had already been arrested by the Police. 12. From the Q.P.P. offices, DEP1ERS and MERGLER proceeded to the Cuban Trade Office in Montreal where a short conversation was held with a Cuban, whom MERGLER suggested accompany them to see the 7 S £Cf^T 010401 �-7i^Kxalappers. SECRET MERGLER also asked a woman working at the Trade Office to accompany them because of the fact that she was a woman and spoke fluent French, however, from the tone of their •' conversation DEMERS feels MERGLER and the woman in question are more than just friends. • The woman did not accompany them as authority would have been required from Cuba, which DEMERS felt would delay the proceedings for too long a period of time. DEMERS and MERGLER then proceeded to Des Recollets Street, Montreal where MERGLER spoke with the kidnappers for f of an hour. Three conditions were demanded of, DEMERS by the F.L.Q. through MERGLER. The first two were accepted and the third was rejected by both negotiators. These conditions were: • (l) That the wives and children of the kidnappers be allowed to proceed to Cuba. (2) That Jacques COSSETTE-TRUDEL and his wife also be allowed to accompany the kidnappers, presently holding CROSS, to Cuba. (DEMERS mentioned that this condition had already been promised to the COSSETTE-TRUDELs during the early morning of December 3rd by a member of the Q.P.F. who was involved in the interrogation, ater having been instructed to do so by his superiors). (3) That Claude RYAN or Rene LEVESQUE proceed to the house on Des Recollets Street to visit the kidnappers. A suggestion was also made that RYAN accompany the kidnappers to Cuba but this vas discouraged by Julien CHOUINARD of the Quebec Provincial Government and * •••*o SECRET 010402 �RYAN himself, who was contacted in this respect, did not wish to leave. All per ties having agreed to the first two conditions, it then took 20 to 30 minutes to leave the house and proceed to the Man and His World Site. MERGLER stated at that time that he would arrange for Suzanne LANCTOT to be escorted to Man and His World for her flight to Cuba. One and one-half hours elapsed before MERGLER advised DEMERS that1, it would be his daughter Donna TARLO and another unidentified female who would be sroviding this escort. 13. Regarding Yves LANGLOIS, DEMERS feels MERGLER may have learned his identity from the Cubans as he himself was not made aware of this ^person's identity earlier in the discussions. A Although he could not definitely recall, DEMEES believes tnat he f tv\ 0 did transmit this information to the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa during his discussions on December 3rd. 14. DEMERS criticized tne availability of communications facilities to contact Government representatives, the only telephone being st the observation po3t which had teen secured a week earlier by the R.C.M.P. DEMERS was told that better arrangements could have been made but were not as the negotiators were supposed to use another dwelling on the came street for this purpose. DEMEES then recalled this suggestion having been msde but f.or some unknown , reason, no use was made of it. .. - 15. , DEMERS woUld have appreciated having his associations with LEMIEUX and MERGLER recorded, which he v,i s told would be tne case, but to his knowledge this was not done. The meetings in question were held at M.C.E..and Q.P.F. cells and at an office in tne Hydro Quebec Building. �SECRET "M— 16. At the commencement of the interview, we expressed to DEMERS our surprise that he had not been required to submit a report to either Quebec Justice Minister, Jerome CHOQUETTE, or to the Q.P.E., since his association throughout the crisis was with that department, and in particular, with Inspector 3EN0IT. In view of the fact that he did not keep notes, it is believed that DEMERS had not expected to be asRed to supply a detailed account of the negotiations. 17. Surveillance confirmed tne matter of Bernard MERGLER's daughter driving-. Suzanne LRNCEOT to the Man and His World site and DEMERS himself points out the fact that MERGLER was aware that Yves LANGLOIS used the alias, SEGUIN. A 18. It is understood by DEMERS that in all probability we will wish to interviev; him further, at which time v/e will have copies of tne F.L.Q. communiques and press clippings relating to his endeavours in order to assist hi3 recollection of specific events. Clarification of any points covered in this interview v/hich. may te forthcoming will be forwarded at a later date. SECRET SECRET 010404 �1+1 Government of Canada Gouvernement du Canada CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET Dated From -» / * , - . / A compter du f / Of <~A-/ To Jusqu'au / f £) <-jL / Q AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - A METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTERIEURE VOIR File No. - Dossier n° Volume ZAO -Zhdx - / FA QC 31 (88/08) - AA- 5 7540-21-857-8809 010405 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00130 Title A name given to the resource Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - Robert Demers Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 21-Jan-71 to 18-feb-71 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - Robert Demers, RG25, vol. 25748, 20-22-TFK-11-5, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Entire File Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en