https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c49806b8a49e5148988d07abcd60ce20.pdf 9ea4081bf0726dfa652c0a5cfbaef0c5 PDF Text Text Interview with Lord Dunrossil July 4, 1974 Lord Dunrossil's reason for granting an interview was to register his government's thanks to the Governement of Canada for their handling of the Cross affair. He was only secondarily interested in adding to our fund of information, or so it appeared oecause of the way in which he dodged questions concerning relations with the police, with the provincial government, the War Measures Act, and negotiation with the FLQ. Lord Dunrossil's technique was to side step the question by bringing in a human interest story remotely related, to plead ignorance, or the inappropriatene of the question. It is in fact quite possible that he was unaware of some details, for example, the safe conduct and the negotiations, though he must have been acutely aware of their implications. And he clearly did not consider that recording his opinion was pertinant to oral history. How much his cautiousness was self-imposed, and how much was directed is moot. Andree Amyot and I were considerably more at ease during th±3 interview than durvv previous ones. We both knew our victim, we were more familiar with the equipment, and we had had more experience. Furthermore, the interview took place in the Salle de Conference, and was therefore home territory. Lord Dunrossil was somewnat nervous at the outset, though never as tense as Sir Peter Hayman had been. He wa* more flexible in accepting variation in the order and intent of the questions than Sir Peter, and did not have all his answers prepared (though some had been reharsed through previous tellings). And he was less touchy than Sir Peter when questions were persued beyond the point he wanted. Perhaps the most successful technique with such an interviewee would be (l) to encourage casual, relaxed (rather than intensly precise) replies, and (2) to try to keep him talking as much as possible. It seemed that the most unguarded responses came toward the end of the interview when he felt socially at ease, but almost "talked out", and wanted to fill in. 010199 �^^ Lord Dunrassil On the morning of October 5th, Dunrossil was informed of the kidnapping on his arrival at the office (and before Whitehead's) by one of the first secretaries. He confirmed the fact by phoning Montreal, and then informed protocol in DEA. He received his marching orders from Whitehead, and left for the Cross house in Montreal, arriving about noon. Head of chancery In Ottawa, Dunrossil was in charge of intelligence and security. In Montreal, his role was to allow Iaray to run the Trade 0 flee by assuming responsibility for everything concerned with the Cross affair, and to maintain a link with the High Commission in Ottawa. Dunrossil moved into Ashford's house (he was 3-I-C in charge of press and information) allowing Ashford, who was a close friend of the Cross family, to move into the Cross home. An Op Centre was set up in Cross' study with a private direct line to the High Commission. The house phone was left open to recieve regular calls possibly even calls from the kidnappers. Mrs. Cross' morale was a problen to be dealt with. In orde to keep her from breaking down and making embarrassing public statements, she was cut off fron TV and radio, given only selected facts, and no information about dead lines. Although she did not oppose the firm policy, she felt her husband's quasi-diplomatic status diminished her own interest in establishing precedents for diplonatic kidnappings. And on one occasion she allowed to Dunrossil that she thought more effort was being given to finding Laporte than Cross. Her suggestion that police rewards be given or offered directly to the kidnappers was not followed up because of Canadain reaction to it. 010200 �Letter writing and broadcasting messages to Cross were considered for a long time (l) in order to raise Cross' morale, and (2) to encourage Cross to write a coded reply. It was thought that if Mrs. Cross' meesage were not quite in her own style Cross might take the hint to try code. But the press talked so much about codes that the idea became impracticable. And in any event Cross didnt know where he was. Nevetheless, the entourage of Mrs. Cross spent long hours trying to "decode" Cross' reference to Winnie the Pooh (signing himself Jaspie Pooh). Cross' daughter and son-in-law caused some consternation in the household, partly strained personal Information / renseignements personnels The police tried unsuccessfully to trace the kidnappers by changing the prescription for Cross' medicine, and announcing the change publicly. Two CAT members in Cross's house suggested the police should meet and form a coordinated plan for getting Cross back in good shape. After receiving the blessing of Choquette and Sir Peter Hayman, Dunrossil arranged a meeting with St. Pierre (who in turn called St. Auban) and Dub£. Dunrossil implied that meetings of the three forces were rare if indeed they took place at all, and that relations with the RCMP were 3trained. It was left to Dunrossil to find a hospital for Cross, which he did through Cross doctor. Montreal police predicted two days before the death of Laporte, on the basis of their understanding of the group dynamics and personalities of the members of the two cells, that Laporte would be killed and that Cross would survive. The main 0102oi �danger to Cross was supposed to be a shoot-out if the cell were discovered by accident or surprise. Police assumed the cells were acting independently because their cumnnmication was cut off. The British were satisfied that the police placed a high priority on avoiding a shoot-out, as did Choquette himself. Dunrossil reported from Montreal by direct phone to the High Commission, which in turn reported to the Task Force. The Police at Redpath Crescent told Dunrossil he would have to stop telling everything to Sir Peter Hayman, who relayed it to DEA, who then started asking too many questions. Cross' own assessment of the FLQ was the basis for the High Commission's evaluation. He had briefed Sir Peter Hayman some six months previously on the subject. Cross had for a long time been associated with leftist groups. Mrs. Cross herself decided to leave Canada for Switzerland, though Dunrossil had recommended her departure from the outset. The only people who knew about her leaving Montreal were the BOAC representative, the police present at the Joint meeting on November 3rd, and her police escort. On December 3rd, Choquette invited Dunrossil to his office for the afternoon, and to accompany him to Terre des HOnraes. The Cubans allowed Choquette to come but asked him to wait until after the Felquistes had left. Bourassa arrived before Choquette. Both he and Choquette had photographers. Dunrossil was at Terre des Hommes to keep rapport with the Cubans in case of trouble. 010202 �. ... ... i.ppju.g oi .u^parte com; the situation but osLdnt diminish the police efforts to find Cross. Cross became less important to the FLQ ^ P remained important as the kidnapper's only ticket to freedom. as a hostage, but (Only Mne. Cosstte- Trudel was willing to take the chance to kill Cross.) Police asked if the British still had confidence in them after Lortie's arrest. They continued house to house searches even after they knew the whereabouts of the Liberation Cell (and Cross) as a blind. Although most of the Anglo-Canadian contacts were federal, Dunrossil made contact with casually Choquette (and with Bourassa), visited his office at least once and spent the afternoon of December 3rd with him. Dunrossil was unable or unwilling to comment on the dissension within the Quebec Government or about the desirability of the Quebec Government's negotiations with the FLQ. Dunrossil did not want to comment on the War Measures Act, but supposed it was invoked because of inadequate information about the FLQ. Dunrossil was uniformed about the particulars of the safe conduct. 010203 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00126 Title A name given to the resource Interview with Lord Dunrossil Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 4-Jul-74 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - Lord Dunrossil, RG25, vol. 25748, 20-22-TFK-11-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Summary of interview Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en