https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c5768060893f429b692aaf0e48f63ea0.pdf 507374e280a92be40ac025b2b3f0e3e5 PDF Text Text 20-22-TFK-ll-l File No. Dossier Volume .From-De / 73/AUJ .TO-A 7ZA23£2 CLASSIFIE CLASSIFIED VOLSACCESSION NO m; r^ r^ H Ul I ^ « Ul 3 . *V> MU V ' ———.—— -1——- TITLE—TITRE: c ) ^ 3s $ !2 POLITICAL AFFAIRS INTERNAL SECURITY TASK FORCE ON KIDNAPPING ORAL HISTORY PROGRAMMI SIR PETER HAYMAN r ^ S as Retention period-Periode de retention: EXTERNAL A F F A I R S A N D INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES E t COMMERCE EXTERIEUR CANADA ——— • • ¥' HHHHw • �\ • i * "1 - Tour "Fidnappin^ Crisis telephone list'* has inspired us to wonder About a number of people whose precise role in the crisis is not altogether clear although they nay very well have been aware of incidents not on file. We are thinking of people like .Ton Church, T'ary FacDonald, *"iss ^ugal (?), Pat "Rlack, Delano "^oily, d'Iberville Fortier, Fen "ro^n, Peter Roberts, Tvan *?ead, »ni .Tohn starnes. If we (Tould send them each a letter now fa version of the rou?h draft enclosed), we mi^ht be able to prepare the ?rround in advance for further "winter works" in Ottawa.. Such a letter "-rmldn't actually commit us to interviews, but would ^ive us a better Dicture of the possibilities. Fere too, for your perusal, is a possible letter to send Claude Coquet at an appropriate time - nerhans in January - together with the revised questions for m om Read. (AndrSe "nd T are concerned lest he think our elementary Questions were iesi^ned for someone of his stature. "r. Pardy, w)^o is at present stud^inT French, kindly lent us his cony of Rumors of "'ar, which we nass alon» to you. T am sure you will find it fascinating reading, though tendentious an^ inaccurate. Perhaps you would like to have the account conied from ^he FT-Q, Seven Years of Terrorism as well, ^hat wa" you can m^ke not<=s and comments in the margins. ^ , - A , , J£( -EP A E M 7' 010061 �"Dear The Historic?! T)ivisi">n of t^e "Department of ^xtarnal kf fairs is en^a^ed in an oral history project on the FLQ crisis o r October, 1970 (the kiina.ppin? of J.*5. Cross and Pierre Taporte) with special emphasis on the role of the "Department of Fsxtprral Affairs throughout. TTntil now, our main source of information hag been the "Den-rtment••^secret files on the crisis. Thesp, as you may imagine, leave m^ny questions unanswered, inclu^in^ questions on the real extent to which many people were actively involved in the events. Tt w o u H be extremely useful to have your general comments, "n-i your additions to the over-all picture from vour experience of the crisis. '"ould you be in a position to indicate thp scone of your involvement with a view to our preparing some questions for a possible taperecorded interview? The interview w o u H be informal, open to your own editing, n nd erf course, su.iect to ti#ht security in keepin^ with "Departmental regulations. w e would be able perhaps to supply you in advance with documents you mi<*ht require to refresh your memory, as well as the questions.themselves. We look forward v/ith Treat pleasure to having the benefit of your experience. Very t r u l y yo :rs, 010062 �Recemment M. Blanchette vous remettait un questionnaire se rapportant a l a crise d 1 octobre 70. Cette s £ r i e de question? sp^cialement pr^parees 3 1 ' i n t e n t i o n de M. Puddington eft autant pour notre information personnelle que pour des interviews f u t u r s . Par l a mftne occasion, nous vous faisons par- venir une l i r t e revis^e de questions dirige>s vers M. Read. Nous vous serions t r e s reconnai-santes s i voua pouviez nous l a i s s e r savoir s i l e ton de n o t r e questionnaire e s t adequat et s i nous avons d i r i g e nos recherches dans l e bon sens. Des que l e temps vous l e pennettra, vos comraentaires corrections et d i r e c t i o n s nous seraient des plus precieux. Veuillez agreer, cher monsieur Roquet, BOS remerciements a n t i c i p e s et 1'expression de nos meilleura sentiments. 01 �Dear J o h n , S i r P e t e r H. was T ood enough t o - w r i t e m&~"thf^—grornfffr^H be r i . l l i n r ; i n r e p l y t o our r e q u e s t f o r scxxkxi an "interview** i ^ of T <<if W W about t h e k i d n a p p i n g • »E^ • v ' r . Hross i n 1 9 7 0 , ' i i i1 h i—ml -1 fgjma p a r t o r ai^jyoral h i s t o r v p-r-oftr^mme ] KKJSgMSiiHg t h a t we Plight fea h-->ve a c h a t v,'ith you a b o u t t h e aQxts_p3-£ q u e s t i o n s fee. T n r e o l y t o o u r r e q u e s t f o r ^n " i n t e r v i e w " ( p a r t of t h e "Department of "External A f f a i r s H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n ' s a o r a l h i s + o r y programme on k i d n a p p i n g of " r . C r o s s i n 1 9 7 0 ) , S i r P e t e r H. was -70 od enough ! o -he surest O J ^ 1 t h a t we might have a c h a t w i t h you on t h e n a t u r e of t h e questions^{JJ*SA\A*^<.'^- W^-V^ * Oo^ **** would be t r u l y grasfceful N$**"N. I f you c o u l d s n a r e u s t h e t i m e f o r such a chat^_a juiLl fee - rtnrhria"i..mrrr •V/^I^K^ me a r i n g any t i m e , any n l a c e , a t y o u r c o n v e n i e n c e . at the office o r a t home 7 3 1 - 3 6 9 9 ^ P e r h a p s you could Tiv e to arrange something. 010064 �January 7, 1974 ^is "Ercallency, Sir Peter Hayman British nlgh Commission 80 ^lgin Street, Ottawa I was delighted when we met the other day at Rideau Hall by your interest in our oral history programme on the kidnnpping of Vr. Cross in 1970. Arthur blanchette, head of "External Affairs* Historical Division, who directs thia project, is noat enthusiastic about the possibility of your recounting your views and experiences on taps, and his asked me to approaeh you about confirming your intention and arrnn?in? a time and place* If, as T -v^ry much hone, you are still willing to share your knowlefge with us, perha^a yon cmld <*!•« me a c^ll (c°r* of "iss Margaret T'oore, 9$?-Ol^?) to arranare the details. T am really looking forward to it! Tours, Jean Falstaad �BRITISH H I G H COMMISSION 8 0 ELGIN STREET OTTAWA 4 10 January 1974 Mrs Jean Halstead Department of External Affairs Ottawa qy CXA^C vi-^OLw, Many thanks for your letter about the oral history programme on the kidnapping of Jasper Cross. I shall be glad to do all I can to help over this. I hope I am right in thinking that you would like from me some general impressions rather than detailed factual responsesI I am going to be away in London all next week so I am asking John Dunrossil who also had a good deal to do with the Cross affair, to have a chat with you about the sort of _qu^stions_jou would like to ask.~&s~~"lt"aTI~TJook place^ nearly 5J years ago, lAtiope you will not mind if I have a little time to think about my answers! MAA/ P 0? Hayman �BRITISH H I G H COMMISSION 8 0 ELGIN STREET OTTAWA 4 10 January 1974 Mrs Jean Halstead Department of External Affairs Ottawa "7 •1 7 -A" V4--ci33'Af Many thanks for your letter about the oral history programme on the kidnapping of Jasper Cross. I shall be glad to do all I can to help over this. I hope I am right in thinking that you would like from me some general impressions rather than detailed factual responses! I am going to be away in London all next week so I am asking John Dunrossil who also had a good deal to do with the Cross affair, to have a chat with you about the sort__o^gjiesti^ns_you would like TTo~"5C5ksr—1£~ it alT took place nearly 5£- years ago, I hope you will not mind if I have a little time to think about my answers! s\U / P T Hayman 010067 �'7 3 (Oft'm- itf (Calling IUI Aln> IlmVr $Vnvhini nt* $>'hth> §«ur-S»>rrrhihv R'thR p$*$^r^ fur) t3ctrnutl Affnins (Ati-miEn nux Affairs* exierbeurva February 18, 1974 His Excellency, Sir Peter Hayman British High Commission 30 KLgin Street, Ottawa y i It was delightful to find you last Saturday back in Ottawa, in such an agreeable setting and in such fine form. I am sure you most ba frightfully busy picking up January's dangling ends. Nevertheless, if you should find a moment in the near future to read the enclosed questions and to reflect on those first dramatic days in Canada, we would be most grateful. Perhaps you could giveraea ring to tell us your reaction, and if possible to arrange for a meeting (if you are still so inclined). Looking forward to hearing about your adventures in retrospection, TT Jean G. Halstead �E; A |MAi dw^i (Offia- A »SP^ML f *a^^E.«3-. w l (Calmn'S- rui (li-ta lUuVr ^srrrhirn uf §hxh? ^|ip® ^Ait£-Si\rn'hiin? n'ichR •»<*RiK|*£* (En nail a ftni t.>Errnal Affairs aux Affuinss r-vtrruMtrrs February 18, 1974 His Excellency, Sir Peter Hayman British High Comnission 80 Elgin Street, Ottawa ~^__ \a\ "•• ~m .|P It was delightful to find you last Saturday back in Ottawa, in such an agreeable setting and in such fine form. i I am sure you most be frightfully busy picking up January's dangling ends. Nevertheless, if you should find a moment in the near future to read the enclosed questions and to reflect on those first dramatic days in Canada, we would be most grateful. Perhaps you could give me a ring to tell us your reaction, and if possible to arrange for a meeting (if you are still so inclined). Looking forward to hearing about your adventures in retrospection, 0 Jean G. Halstead 010069 �gncJ.{ ^ U E X _ " U /if] (IIM ^.^JE^^I^J) I was distressed and dreadfully embarrassed to find on opening our security briefcase that we had, in collecting our own papersm inadvertently your copy of the questions as well as my letter to you. picked up Please forgive this clumsy mistake! And be assured at least that it—was under lock and key until we discovered it this afternoon. 5( , a- A- J E- Loo A^, , We have been-PJ±atuning with enormous pleasure to your discourse on tape. Your answers are masterful, delicate, and most interesting. They will make, to be sure, make an important contribution to future generations' understanding of international terrorism - and of commonwealth friendship. Andr6e Amyot and I personally are most grateful for your graciousness in contributing, and for your warm welcome. With humble apologies and with heartfelt thanks, y 010070 �BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION 8 0 ELGIN STREET OTTAWA 4 8 March 1974 Mrs J e a n H a l s t e a d C/o Mr J G H H a l s t e a d Department of E x t e r n a l L e s t e r B Pearson Bldg 125 Sussex Drive Ottawa K1A 0G2 Affairs //¥ &JL&M J-^XAAf Many thanks for your nice letter and for sending back the questions: I had not noticed they had gone. I thoroughly enjoyed our exchanges yesterday and hope that what I said could make a small contribution to future understanding of the 1970 crisis. f Oar P T Hayman 010071 �BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION 8 0 ELGIN STREET OTTAWA 4 i. . 8 March 1974 Mrs Jean Halstead C/o Mr J G H Halstead Department of External Affairs Lester B Pearson Bldg 125 Sussex Drive Ottawa K1A 0G2 /?f tit** < IfLou^i Many thanks for your nice letter and for sending back the questions: I had not noticed they had gone. I thoroughly enjoyed our exchanges yesterday and hope that what I said could make a small contribution to future understanding of the 1970 crisis. *h P T Hayman \ 010072 �At long last, the interview on October, 1970, which you so graciously accorded us, has been transcribed. The copy which we are enclosing is for you to keep. May we re-emphasise the absolute dicretion with which the External Affairs copies will be guarded. And may we thank you again on behalf of future generations, the present government, and those of us directly concerned, for your great kindness and generosity in sharing your experience. How much we shall miss you and Rosemary! But that is another story. �OCTOBER CRISIS r W£i.e with S i r P e t e r Hayman Mrs. Amyot It is very nice of you Sir Peter Hayman to allow the Department of External Affairs to benefit from your experience during the crisis of October, 1970. It seems appropriate somehow that on the eve of your departure from Canada you are speaking to us about the situation that developed on the eve of your arrival. Shall we begin then, for the first question, before your arrival in Canada by asking you to describe the atmosphere in London immediately following the kidnapping of Mr. Cross. Mr.Hayman Yes of course I'll do that, and I absolutely echo what you say about the intense interest of this whole business really in my life and in my wife's life. It is appropriate I think to be talking on the eve of our departure, after the happiest period we've ever spent in the diplomatic service in Canada and about the period three and a half years ago when we came here. The first question you ask me is about the interest and the atmosphere in London before ones arrival and I would say there of course a great deal of interest and concern in this whole case. Partly because of Jasper Cross, he was a British diplomat who'd been kidnapped, in the sense it was right at the beginning of the great kidnapping era. But there was also really genuinely concern about the effect of the PLQ crisis on the stability of one of our oldest and closest friends - Canada. So that there were the two strands^on the one hand there was great concern about a British national, or about a British diplomat but also concern about the effect on Canada, the political effect on Canada. Mrs . H a l s t e a d What sort of effect did you think there might have been? Mr. Hayman This was very much the effect that I'd expected of course. Mrs . H a l s t e a d When you were speaking of having the effects.... Mr. Hayman On Canada you mean? Mrs . H a l s t e a d Yes. Mr .Hayman A The effect on Canada, one must always, at the beginning of ones time here, one, knowing what one did about the problems of Quebec separatism, one was naturally concerned to see how far this kind of potentially serious threat would be met by the Government in Ottawa or and indeed by Mr. Bourassa. Mr. Bourassa was/relatively unknown person^in London, few I dare say could remember the name of the Quebec Premier. Mr. Trudeau was better known of course, he'd been in London not too long before as a, as leader of the Canadian delegation to the Commonwealth Conferenee in 1969, he made a lot of friends there. But it was not understood as to how he would in fact face up to a rather special problem of this sort. Those were the kinds of thoughts that were certainly milling around amongst the people that I talked to in London. ... 2 010074 �_ 2 - Mrs.Halstea',^_ Mr. Hayman So that the, the rapid response of the Government was reassuring? Oh indeed. Yes indeed, of course it was, very much so. I mean there was a great deal of satisfaction, I think, on the way the reaction took place. You ask of course whether in fact the, how far was Britain concerned with other things at the same time and on that I think I should say that I'd been dealing up till then with the Middle East. I was the Under-Secretary looking after the Middle East and also North and South America and the United Nations and there were a good many other problems on our mind. One of the curiously sort of prelude to this was the hijacking of all those airplances in Jordan in which I personally had been very much concerned with, dealing with. And then the additional horror of course was the capture and the death of Mr. Laporte. It was on the day of Mr. Laporte's death that I arrived in Canada. I should say that of course the moment I heard of Jasper's kidnapping I wanted immediately to come out to Canada even though that would have been several months, no several weeks or a month or two in advance of my time here. I heard about it when I was staying with a friend, my wife and I were staying with a very old friend in South Wales doing some fishing and I came down to breakfast and he in turn told me about this, and I immediately telephoned the Foreign Office and said I'd like to come stseaight away. But I think reasonably enough we both felt and everybody felt, George Whitehead who was my deputy and the acting Charge d'affaire, felt that if I'd rushed out immediately that would have implied some sort of comment on how Canada was actually handling this crisis and that of course we didn't want to give. We wanted to be as normal as possible Over this. I would like in fact to pay a tribute at this time to the work of George Whitehead who handled the early part of the crisis from the British point of view with a considerable amount of skill and firmness. Mrs .Halstead Theres reference in the files on the kidnapping to the discussion in Cabinet in London immediately, the day following the kidnapping. Could you tell us anything about that? Mr .Hayman Well British officials on the whole don't attend Cabinet meetings. I didn't go to any Cabinet meeting on this. But I did in fact talk to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alex Douglas Home on two occasions, three occasions following discussions which he must have had with Ministers and it was then during that time that the British Government decided that the whole affair was a matter for you to handle*— A^matter for Canada to handlej It so happened I think that our respective attitudes on the subject of ttie kidnapping were very much the same, which obviously made it easier for us. There was no division of opinion as to the fact that one should not in general give way to kidnappers so that the general approach was the same. But our tactical approach, JA quite clearly, was that it would be quite improper^.I certainly 'that the propriety would be quite wrong and not at all useful for the British Government to take any initiative/ the hand had to be played by the Canadian Government. It was Mr. Laporte, it was the PLQ crisis, it was very much a matter of domestic concern to Canada and this was the attitude in London. /in this, I think in a way it would be foolish not to emphasize, this is partly because of our old friendship and Canada's not just . 3 010075 �...a member of Jasper's family in Ireland, I don't know whether it was a relation of hers or his who was inclined to say why is nothing more being done... 010076 �...Mr. Charles Wiggin, who was really tremendously expert on this abd did a great deal. I mean it was endless consultation to and fro ..... ...and at that time, Georgi Whitehead here, which in, of course. was privy to and joined �- 3had another country. I mean Canada and British have/these kind of problems, I mean world war problems and all these kind of problems and I think itf made it easier if you like to the British Ministers to feel that Canada was handling this in some way, especially as we agreed with that way, for us to go along with that because it was Canada. I think I should emphasize that as well. If this had been Mauritania or Transilvania where we didn't know well the principle people concerned we should naturally have found it more difficult. Mrs.Amyot Would you have felt that it would have been more a Canadian affair than a Quebec affair if for instance Laporte would not have been kidnapped? Mr .Hayman No, I don'tthink so. I mean I think that the, I mean that the element of Mr. Laporte's kidnapping and death clearly made it an even more difficult political problem for both Ottawa and Quebec obviously. Therefore it made it even more a matter of important internal political concern to Canada in our view as we saw it from London, and therefore it was not at all just a question of a British dip^nat^" being kidnapped. It was obviously posing a considerable internal political problem for Canada and the fact that Mr. Laporte was, I suppose the most considerable man in Mr. Bourassa's Cabinet, in fact the only one in Bourassa's Cabinet of any political experience and some would say Mr. Bourassa's rival, things like that, something of that sort, this is what one observes from afar. Obviously as I say it posed a, some very major problems, and you know, and his addition made them more serious. .Halstead • Hayman So the feeling in Whitehall was more or less unanimous was it about the policy? Yes, Yes. I never found any differences in Whitehall. I should say, Jean,that I mean on this I'instructed by the senior official, the permanent under-secretary, the Ed Ritchie of Whitehall who was Sir Dennis Greenhill, who was almost my closest friend in the foreign service and then as I say both he and Ifoeent to see Sir Alex on two or three occasions and the day to day work of course was carried out by the Department which dealt with Canada and the United States which was under the direction of Mr. Charles Wiggin who really was also tremendously &v( - \ concerned abe«t- this and did a great deal. I mean it was endless conceetrnti^bh to and fro, endless talk to and fro, not really consultation because I think we'd all agreed on the line but endless factual information passing to and fro between the North American Department and the PCO under Charles Wiggin and at that time George Whitehead here. Which I was privileged to4join in of course. <T^V pE'Vy • Halstead .Hayman Mrs .Halstead ..and so there wasn't very much discussion, I mean within the country apart from Whitehall.... About.••.., no again I think looking back and thinking about press comment, of which there was a great deal, I don't remember any any general feelings of dismay over the line being taken on the whole. I think the British maintained a fairly cool attitude on this. There was, a member of Jasper's family, I don't know whether it was a relation of hers or his who was -^ymg'to $ay why isn't nothing more being done, are we moving as fast as we should, etc., etc. But I don't remember any other examples of that. This was in fact after I was out here, so this was at a later time, a later time scale. But i t wasn't used as a political. J «<E I . . . 4 010078 �... was a very important element in our thinking because, you know, the Montreal Quebec - Ottawa syndrome was an element in this whole business. 010079 �- 4 Mr .Hayman No, no, oh no there was certainly no dissent from the Labour benches on this at all. Mrs.Halstead Most of the discussions between Canadians and British were carried on here I suppose, were they? Mr.Hayman Most of those discussions were carried on here. I did in fact, you ask a question I know the back of your mind rather, you ask a question about how far Canada House was involved. I know that Charles Ritchie with whom I'd had two or three talks was very well up to date with factual information you know the various, those awful wireless messages and things, and press messages which kept on coming out. I think Charles established some form of, not exactly a war room, but an information centre in Canada House which I remember Sir Dennis Greenhill praising as being a means of getting some quick factual information. But certainly the meelangs between Canada and Britain on this were conducted through here, between here and the Department of External Affairs. That was where much of, most took place. I should of course mention here, perhaps I don't want this to be overlooked that another element of the British end in Canada was , George Whitehead dispatching John Dunross*l the Head of Chancery to take charge of the Montreal Office as soon as Jasper was kidnapped and I think that was a very wise thing to have done. Dunrftss^l had only been in Canada with his wife for - . yabout three weeks or so and had just pract^Lca'ily been entertained by *^v.-W-*A the Crosses on his way through Montreal a little time before and therefore we did have a fair, but he did have a good deal of experience in this kind of work in his past life and so we had for him, I know George Whitehead had and certainly I found that to have John stationed in Montreal and therefore of course necessarily in touch with the Montreal or Quebec police and so on was a very important element in our thinking-A ' i " V-A-VI andnot only in our Montreal-Quebec-Ottawa syndrome btrt"±fr-this- whole '* \AAA(business. ^ u. Mrs.Halstead Mr.Hayman It would be very indiscreet I suppose to ask if it were, in an effort to...influence the Quebec Government or more as a listening post No, No it wouldn't be indiscreet to ask thatjJean^because I can give you a perfectly clear answer. There was no question about dealing with the Quebec Government at all. I mean it was a listening post operation, we did in fact, John being a very sensible guy, got on in perfectly gocd terms with Jerome Choquette and with some of the leading policemen but therete no question about dealing with the Quebec Government, _§o far as this crisis was concerned, our dealingswere with the Canadian Government here in Ottawa. I say that very clearly and very categorically and I would like here to say quite flatly that the main channel of communication was Ed Ritchie himself. I always have a vivid recollection of arriving at the Ottawa airport and being very kindly met by Ed, whom I'd never met before as a matter of fact. He's an extraordinary man, I mean he made himself available to me at anyEour of the day or night really, and we used to see each other frequently of course, sometimes onee or twice a day until that memorable moment when he woke me up in the early hours of that December morning and told me that at last we were on to, quite definitely on to where Cross was. Even though although you know that its very difficult to hear his voice as I understand it. So that this is, and again I'd like to say that this is the sort of, you know, an element of �...is the geographical location, I mean the proximity. You know, the Department going over there might make it more difficult... 010081 �- 5 the sort of Canadian-British link that one eould get on to those terms with someone like Ed Ritchie. I did in fact, during the time that I was here, of course I was paying, delivering my letters to the Prime Minister, letters of credence to the Prime Minister, had some speech with him and of course talked in general terms about the whole business and of course to Mitchell Sharp, I paid my first calls on him. But I'd like especially to, when I first arrived I of course called on as many ministers as possible as quickly as possible. The person in a sense, from whom I learned the most during my course about PLQ mentality was Mr. Pelletier. Mr. Pelletier, perhaps characteristically,kept me waiting for three quarters of an hour because of a lot of other things. He then kept the next person waiting for, well this is probably rather indiscreet, for at least another hour. But he is intensely interesting on, you know, the whole mentality of the PLQ. Thats one of the most memorable discussions and interviews that I've had, I'd like to say that. And then of course I used to go to Operations Room in External and my chaps of course did very often, Rs ,, was the Acting Head of Chancery. He used to go over there regularly once a day or more often. Of course part of it is the geographical location, I mean this is perhaps, you know, the Department . might make it more difficult but the fact ' that I was unpacked in the Chateau Laurier, and of course Rosemary hadn't arrived by then. I was in a room with a lot of RCMP guys next door and oh I mean my geographical boundaries were really for my first two or three weeks here were the Chateau Laurier, this room and Ed's office in the East Block; punctuated three times a week by going down to visit Barbara Cross in Montreal. I went to see her the second day that I came here and the third day I went down to Mr. Laporte's funeral and I think I had almost as ^-aTB%3ZL escort as Mr. Trudeau had. I had O^Ert gnj» gun carrier in front and a gTTjrgun carrier behind and an extremely tough cookie from the Royal Canadian Regiment from whom I learned a great deal about the Rechelons of the Canadian Armed Forces as we drove \t\t-or along. Mrs,Amyot When you arrived here in Ottawa, the general feeling of the people in 12ie office here in Ottawa, «exe—the^Eab equal or did you feel that some people, I mean without any names, but you know, did you have the impression that some people....... U-nr»J3.cl J k ^ ^ JtX^pj- ^ \ oAy^-^ Mr. Hayman Absolutely not, absolutely not there was no, I mean I can lay my hand on my heart and say that there was no differences in opinion between us. George Whitehead's handling of the policy which he handed over to me when I arrived was reflected in his little team, _L and \" - • • ,• , and others and we were all concerned, we were obviously concerned with the question of, I suppose primarily being English chaps, with the future of Jasper Cross,with trying to see how far these strange messages (Jrould be interpreted and that sort of thing and but in no way did we dissent on the handling of the matter by the Canadian Government. Mrs. Halstead I wonder if we could return for a moment to what you were, to your comments on your talk with Mr. Pelletier. Mr. Hayman Yes. ....and could you tell us what his interpretation of Uie FLQ Mrs. Halstead was or. Mr. Hayman Well Jean I am not, I mean, I think that he was really talking about these kind of people. I don't think it would be proper for me, as a diplomat would it to comment on what a Cabinet Minister told me and I don't in fact remember any very sharp terms, precisely what his views were. 010082 �...the quiet revolution had perhaps not brought along enough people to believe in Canada as such. That is all for you rather jejeune stuff, but for me as a new arrival... ...quite a tricky kind of programme. Not at all ... �- 6Let me just say this that I was after all a stranger to Canada, I was the Under-Secretary looking after our relations in these parts but I really didn't know a great deal about the FLQ mentality. I wanted to, I was concerned to see how far they would go in a domestic operation, whether they had any ties with Algeria, training in Algeria and so on. I merely got from him good leads on what the young in Quebec were thinking and how so many of them were in a sense automatically separtists before they really started tothink and thajbeven the quiet revolution had perhaps brought along^JflaeAee^^_^_i^£e_-beli«£-in Canada as such. •V •;• ' -•" ' but for me as a new arrival in Canada it was intensely interesting and of course the other, my other informant I mean the only peron in fact who told me anything about the FLQ crisis before I came was in fact Jasper Cross himself and the story of that was that,asd as I say I was mainly concerned with the Middle East with a bit of • A\ j thrown in and really Middle East, Mid Arab, Israel all the time, every hour of the day and night. But, and I have wide interests and I heard that there was a fellow called Cross about in the office and so I sent for him to ask him why the hell we weren't selling more British motor car^s in Montreal you see. He didn't, he wasn't in the least interested in that, he changed the subject after five seconds. Well he did then talk about, gave me a first inkling of the problems of separatism as epitomized by the FLQ, Mrs. Amyot How long was that before October, 1970? Mr. Hayman That was,,,, I would say perhaps six months before, Mrs. Amyot ...six months before. Mr. Hayman When he came out you see, being Jasper, being the sort of Irish _or extrovert guy, when he was released the first thing he did long before he talked to Mr. Trudeau on the telephone or anything else, he rang me up you see and said, "reporting for duty sir". Then the second remark was remarkable 4. ^e said, "About that conversation we had in London, I can novgive you some more information". When I went down to see him next day, which I hastened to do in t he Jewish Hospital in Montreal, he was in his dressing gown and pyjamas and I thought we were going to talk really about the administrative arrangements for his departure and whether or not he was going to be received at number ten and all this kind of thing you see , kind-of- R-^^- CKtrickfi^g- alB6S_tT^jae program<mot at all, he wasn't in the least interested in it, he was quite interested in the various things which he subsequently told all of you. I mean, the mentality of Lab tot g^a Carbonneau and their wives and so on, and how far his views had been borne out. But I mean, I don't want to enlarge on what he said to me because he, I know talked to all of you in pretty fair detail about his thoughts on the FLQ. So you were working really quite, quite closely, all of your Mrs. Halstead team. Mr. Hayman Yes. Mrs. Halstead ...and quite closely with the Operations Centre? Mr. Hayman We were and I think that was, I mean, I think that it was terribly, terribly important and terribly sort of , I mean I think * 010084 �.think it worked extraordinarily well considering it had only just been formed. It was most interesting to see the machine working. 010085 �- 7 as we saw it, it was very lucky perhaps a bit fortuitous, but very lucky that the Operations Centre had been established not long before, I believe thats right. Certainly, I mean I've sat in on interdepartmental meetings occasionally with which all the elements concerned, the RCMP and other departments as well as External were sitting around the table and I think it worked extraordinarily well considering tha-adrjustment and V _J( ^ t & ,A,,y—.r b-« through*. v v , Mrs. Halstead In what way was that fortuitous? Mr. Hayman Well haven't you any deefe-copy? Mrs. Halstead Yes but I, oh I see just because it was there or had been formed V^JA\ \tc Atk A? at a l l . Mr. Hayman Yes, it was lucky it was just formed then, and I know that Ed found it of great value having it, you know, a(hundredJS»eh ten yardsy away from his own office. He was always peeking in there to see how' things were going along, all this was rather, well again this could only be done in a rather family atmosphere of External and I would like to think the family atmosphere that exists may not have existed until then but certainly has existed since between us and External. From that date comes the time that I absolutely, flatly refuse to show my pass whenever I am in External, I just showed it once and its always been respected ever since. Pauline fixed it. (laughter) Mr. Hayman We're about number nine. Mrs. Halstead About number nine, yes. Mr. Hayman I CA - ' ^ <-A I mean, you see one of the agitating things that we had to talk to each other about was interpretation of messages. It was the interpretation of messages you see, I mean how could you know what was intended to be inplied by this or that and how could you react to this or pthat at thejmoment. There was a great deal of discussion on that and your legal people and so on. I think Andre Bissonnette played a, played an important part in this, he was doing some work and I well remember Mark Lalonde coming in and joirig in a group at one point, having something to say about some French message and the way it was ov-'^-v.fl. PCow termed and its phraseology. ^ JC joxi ', ,' Mrs.Amyot ( Did you have a feeling that, in the letter that Mr. Cross wrote that there was a kind of information-code £or something? Mr. Hayman Well... Mrs. Amyot We know that, but did you have any. Mr. Hayman 'I Well we endlessly speculated on this. I mean, we twisted it around, you know and turned it upside down we, I mean, one of the things that one always wonders is whether one should in fact establish a sort of code so that if one is kidnapped and you mentioned the word raspberry it means that I am now one and a half miles due north of somewhere or other ,but thats in a way too elaborate to do that. But we just wondered, yes of course, endlessly we speculated on the interpretation of letters and phraseology of letters endlessly and messages endlessly, so did you. . 8 010086 �8 Mrs. A-nyot Yes. Mr. Hayman Much more then we did. Mrs.Halstead Well this is one way of not feeling quite so helpless. Mr. Hayman Yes, Mrs. Halstead Mr. Hayman Mrs. Amyot this is true. But in fact Mr. Cross seemed to resent this speculation in the end. in that it caused a threat to his life possibly because it was speculated on, so publicly and in the press. Well....no Jean no, I think I wouldn't worry about that. I mean don't forget that when Jasper was released he had been through a most ghastly ordeal thats possible to imagine. He had.seen his own ^ n death announced on television, now that is not at all a thri11ine thing to have seen and he but I remember him saying to me rather vividly once that he had, I think this was during our time in the Jewish Hospital, he said to me, "I'd arranged in my own mind what it was like to die there and. the»". -^The only thing that I was worried about was how Barbara was going to .what was going to happen to my wife". So you know if you've been through that however much as an Irish -eWr6r chap you appear, at least on the surface and he was astonishingly clam. Frankly, on the surface when he came out , you know, at that original press conference in Montreal he was calmer then I was. But one didn't realize that there was a tremendous amount of sort of agitation and concern underneath and I would make very, very great allowances for his sort of general feelings. Did he tell you that at the moment he had the feeling that it was really coming, his own death? Mr. Hayman Yes, I think if you see your own death announced on television you, even though it isn't quite true yet, its very likely to happen in a matter of time. Thats the really terrifying thing and you see if you then go on sitting for quite a long time looking at the television and nothing else then you do get into a...., however brave you are, it has a very powerful effect on you. Mrs .Halstead Perhaps you could tell us something about the practical effects of the War Measures Act. Hayman V'^"\,>«"\_ri d L f p . P •. Yes. Well as far as I was concerned, to be really flippant first of all on a very unflippant subject, it has enabled men to see a side of, I mean^a domestic point of view, this was all rather, as it turned out rather good because I could talk to ordinary chaps in the RCMP. I do know from th e lower echelons of the RCMP and lower echelons of the Canadian military a great deal about Canada and no arriving diplomat could possibly have an poignant introduction but at the same time an introduction to ordinary people which you would not get. I find that as a personal instance it was well worth the obviously very honest inconvenience of being guarded incessantly which was of course what happened with ones first month or two here and oh for much longer. When we went out to visit outside Ottawa we were guarded incessantly. I remember Rosemary and I in our first visit to Banff we were trying to climg^ a local hill, or mountain and two gentlemn from the RCMP never left us out of their sight. In case now of some of th e provinces they were far more agitat6<yobviously then Ottawa and I got to know a very 010087 �9 wide conspectus of members of the RCMP, policemen, soldiers, etc.,etc. Thats a rather flippant comment. But in general, I would share quite honestly the general admiration for that element of Canadian life who hadn't been all that much alarmed until then, ie,the soldiering. You suddenly found that they were quite useful members of the military and so many military in Canada feel they're irrelevant and they suddenly found they were very relevant in doing a good job and I would haare thcught that waa another, you know, comment and thought on Canada. As to the need to use the War Measures Act I sould simply make, again a not very profound remark, as an observer,that it was the only thing you had to use and I don't, as an observer at the scene subscribe to the view that it was using a steam roller to crack a nut. You only had a steam roller, you didn't know whether it was going to be a nut or a iorL^'omb and I am not sure everybody knows that yet. I mean those/critics/, John Turner and others who subsequently with the wisdom of hindsight say, oh it was all _J—(aStar^fll' exaggeratedAreaction, I would disbute that very strongly as being one of the be J characters of that scene. Of course there was no insurrection really or uprising in Quebec, how could there have been say some people but..... what.... It simply seemed to be in the mind of everyone because you say some people have really the impression that people were going to come out in the streets, etc. Thats it and I think, and I mean this is the remarkable thing, so far as the British themselves were concerned and I say quite clearly this was the first time we'd seen Mr. Trudeau in action and this was damned impressing* Mr. Trudeau1s, the general view of Mr. Trudeau, you know in London was that he was highly intelligent^somewhat of a dilettante, an intellectual dilettante of some considerable means in Quebec. Now he was shown as an extremely tough guy, he wasn't going to give way. He emerged as the sort of, to the British observers as the sort of a very considerable figure, and in so far as a pragmatic relationship between Britain and Canada has evolved, particularly in the way epitomized by Ted Heathand Mr. Trudeau. I think a lot of it started vo.-tp thei-r- beginnings with them. _>_ f" • A Mr. Bourassa of course did not-* in those two terms at all, to us, in fact people were wondering how he fitted into, the picture. I in fact, again as a sort of credit bonus ao I call itZ/J two interviews with Mr. Bourassa very soon after I arrived which I certainly wouldn't have done. I had an hour with him very soon after I arrived and Jasper was still incarcerated, he was very, obviously very shaken and he spoke entirely in French. He was pretty moved by it, you know, not frightened but pretty moved and worried __$PsftE£ii. ' Then I saw him not long after Cross had been released and then he was much more relaxed. No its only subsequently that onei( realized that he's not just there, as a product of the Harvard business school with rich friends in New York at all. The fact of course as one observes? itb not my business its yours, but only in recent months ec year or so that one realized that he seems to have won however much he may nave been in \\\ • A ' , • v . in dealing with that sort of crisis, he has seized the one point which really mattered in Quebec which was to attract capital and to transform the economic background and this is the only comment I will make on that but was of course not a matter of in London. • ' P . . . 10 �10 c Mrs .Hals t-WR Did you anticipate the invokation of the War Measures Act, did you imagine that it was going to Mr .Hayman Well I think it would be, and I am just trying to remember the timing of this.... Mrs.Amyot The day of Laporte's death. Mr.Hayman Yes, and the answer is probably not because I didn't know enough about it. I was in fact still in London I hadn't really sort of faced up to what it was necessary for me to do. Mrs.Halstead No of course, and I suppose it probably wasn't discussed in the High Commission as such. Mr. Hayman No I don't think so really, I don't, I mean again our immediate comment on that would be that this is very much your business how you deal with what is primarily a Canadian, a serious, serious Canadian internal problem and we wouldn't presume to give them advice on that matter, I mean it isn't any of our business, it has nothing to do with us. Mrs. Halstead Yes apparently some, some compatriot journalists took a rather different view I guess. Mr. Hayman Yes I think I didn't really understand the drift of this question. Nobody in the British High Commission commented on this matter then or I think wish to do so now, it seems awfully unimportant really I would have thought it was some sort of Canadian internal dilemma which got caught in the British newspapers maybe but it made no impression on me at all. I can honestly say that. I talked to John Dunrussel about this and we both, you know scratched our heads, we were very puzzled about it. Mrs. Halstead Well it was really appropos with the loss of rights, whether individual rights in Canada, wnether it caused a stir in Britain. C No, No I don't think so. Oh I see because of the invocation of the War Measures Act. Yes, Yes in the sort of line taken, was it, by the NDP on this, well how far was that oompared to in Britain - A' [ A < • not much, not much. I mean I think that if any paper, if any paper would have reflected it the Guardian obviously would do so. But I am really, really on looking back I can't remember any particular line taken by the British press in this sense. Mr. Hayman Mrs.Amyot Mr. Hayman jjA$tA*-->Cji-- i Did you also have, get the feeling that the press here in Canada was putting too much emphasis on the crisis? Well I mean this is, of course you ask a question of a civil servant who is irritated by the BBC or the CBC as you do here. I mean one often gets,.irritated with the Canadian press, with the CBC from time 'to time; Theres always a minor risk that something, that some comment in the press, on the CBC would have endangered Cross's life, and one at home was conscious of that. But I mean I would answer emphatically however that I wouldn't have wanted to have seen any greater control 11 010089 �. . . q u i t e outweighed any c r i t i c a l comment he could have made, wouldn't you? 010090 �11 y\A»cJEU' of the press because therein lies much greater danger. However irritated one gets with the,, ggcedom , for different reasons. The Canadian CBC's attitude on Northern Ireland from time to time, I used to get very irritated indeed by the radio program on Sunday morning which tended to begin with the IRA war song and end with the IRA war song, and I should suppose I went to see George Davidson about five times about that, but thats the sort of thing that one has to put up with and of course at the end one wouldn't want to put on greater controls. Mrs. Halstead But what about friendly persuasion? Mr. Hayman V/ell friendly persuasion Jean is a tricky thing. Mrs .palstead ...and it wasn't something you tried? Mr. Hayman Not, well its not, well I mean it wasn't again for us to deal with the Canadian press on this of course, oh no, I mean we would again expect you to deal with your own press. Certainly we wouldn't, I mean, it would be the worst possible thing for a quote foreign unquote High Commission or Embassy to attempt to do any friendly persuasions on the press, we wouldn't possibly do it. As to how far you did it I don't know but again its jolly tricky with the governments to do that, the press really has got a job to do. It would never have been at all right for us to have gone to the press and say, "hi you may be endangering Jasper Cross's life'.' I think we should have, if we had done that and I think I do remember talking on those lines with friends in External, I mean if anyting could have been done there they would have been able to do it, whether you did or not I don't know. Mrs. Amyot I think the last question on that page was giving you some, I mean it gave you some.... Mr. Hayman Yes I saw your reasons and I think in a sense I've answered that, cause I think he was under tremendous strain and, and frankly I am astonished that he remained pretty calm. Quite frankly also, perhaps the other point I should make in this when I was looking through the questions I would have thought that the excellent information that he gave you all on • 3 > •. • . .-• A • ; • A i critical comment should be made, wouldn't you? Mrs.Halstead It wasn't by way of criticism.... Mr. Hayman No... Mrs. Halstead ...of him or lack of diplomacy on his part that the question arose but rather whether in fact there were some positive suggestions that or some conclusions that Mr. Hayman Well this is what one, I mean you know, everyone carried out a postmortem here as I am sure you did in External as to what, is there anything else that one could have done, and you know you might have wondered whether one should have got the people to adopt secret codes which you know would have been recognized by the rest of the Embassy . I remember we went into this in a rather informal way and we came to the .... 12 010091 �...he'll be fairly nimble with giving his views ... 010092 �12 conclusion that it was probably too elaborate and as to other things which we did not, which we left undone which we could have done I wasn't myself conscious of anything of that sort but there may have been. That leads us on incidentally to number 14 which, about what, perhaps this ifl&v* .-., really sort of covered that ground. I would like just to say on that, that we were both really, both you and we, because I think one wants to emphasize this was an early stage in the kidnapping malaise which A " .1 -rk waSAttLffphsV—trfeSFttfigg-the world, quite early, I mean quite early not >.*-> £w-«-fc^-**** -(foe first, but it was quite early and we had to adapt to a new, a pretty well new situation and make our policies as we were going along and as I say fortunately that our conclusions were the same. ^ -' Shave A I don't think honestly that we'd /had—to improve with the benefit of hindsight on the informal daily consultation, I mean which we had with you I think thats terribly important. It was personal, it was simply _i, • , Ac ., down here which I believe it was, it was personal, it was immediate, and it was informal. I don't think there is any other country then Canada with whom we could have had that, we certainly couldn't have that in the States. I suppose we might have done that in Australia but we couldn't have had this, it would have been much more elaborate in the States. We don't have the same kind of personal ties with the United States, you look surprised, oh no this is a fact. I stress those words - personal, immediate and informal these three things you see. I'd like also to put, to mention again John Dunrussel's operation in Montreal where we had very good liaison. I know it to, I mean I am well aware of some of the problems which you necessarily had with the provincial government because of gang raids, federal-provincial problems and the RCMP quote strong arm anglo-saxon loose horse unquote it isn't like that now and it wasn't ftcAiLfS ^ < Areally then. But I mean there persons who said that and our own relations with the Montreal and Quebec police. As I understand it, the relaionts on the very highest level between the three police forces were very good and the relations on the riot squad or whatever it was, was pretty good on the lower, on the actual chaps who pursued criminals. On the medium range it is very necessarily understandably and its not unknown between the Scotch and the Ireland provincial police forces tool can tell you, there were some frictions I understand this was not really, I think are we going to talk to John Dunrussel at some stage? Mrs. Amyot Mr. Hayman Yes. A us He will give, you will be able to enlarge a bit more on that and he'll you know put that into his views from this and that source but as, I would like to emphasize again which he certainly will do but his role in Montreal was that of a ^pE^lai.^nM', a passer-oner. I don't want anybody to get under any impression whatever that we were doing any business as such with the provincial government. Its far too tricky, an attitude of federal-provincial relations it would have been quite foolish of us even if we had thought of doing so but we didn't really. I mean it had to be, our tie had to be inescapably and completely with Ed Ritchie and External. If we'd adopted any other method we'd have only added to your troubles. So that all Dunrussel, all John Dunrussel was doing was, where at the scene of the crime and keeping Barbara reasonably happy and getting his information passed on to us from the Quebec, the Montreal police, the RCMP and Jerome Choquette's office, all of which he did. . . . 13 010093 �13 Mrs. Hals tea Mr. Hayman Mrs. Halstead I understand that your police.,.. Yes I just have one other thing to say incidentally and sne other point to make which I'd forgotten to make. I would have thought, well just one other obvious point really cause its only a comment on your own attitude. I mean I think you talked about your firmness in all this but of course it wasn't firmness alone, it was mixed with the Cuban loop-hole. This was again dead right, I mean if you were just firm and said no, no, no then we would have lost Jasper Cross. In fact of course it was firmness mixed with the Cuban loop-hole, aid I've always imagined, I don't know, I didn't know him then and I've never actually discussed this with*my"Cuban colleague must have been damned helpful, I don't know, I've never ever really discussed it with him but I know from talks with Ed Ritchie and others that they were very forthcoming. So it was firmness coupled with a loop-hole and that got Cross out. You feel that its a loop-hole that should be used in the future? Mr. Hayman Well I think, Yes I think in a way you have to, of course each circumstance Jean is different, each circumstance is different. I think you have to, you may well have to adopt some sort of tactical loop-hole of that kind. That was the one that you decided upon which as I say got Cross out. But the circumstances must vary each time. Mrs. Amyot It certainly depends on the person who is kidnapped as well as other events. Mr. Hayman Yes, what are the demands, what other countries would be prepared be to/helpful and. what are the kidnappers like and how far they are dictated to by quote outside sources unquote, or how far are they, are they purely local, a local business or are they just cells which are within the body politic not dominated by outside sources. Mrs. Halstead Could I ask if, a question about the British police, I think some British police came here during the crisis perhaps to assist the RCMP. Mr. Hayman I don't think any British police came to assist the RCMP but I think they had a visiting group which fortuitously happened to be going around dealing with problems of this kind or which chap, or which, I think it was during this time they were going around dealing with sort of sabotage, kidnapping problems and happened to be here and the group. There was a policeman and a soldier and the policeman happened to be Robert Mark, who is now the head of Scotland Yard, he is obviously sort of a tremendous chap, but I don't think there was any collaboration with the British police on the spot at all. It may be that things like Interpol and you know internal police consultation as to whether there was any outside, again outside influence I dare say that we may have helped with advice on that but I am not aware of any British police participation in the, what was happening. I say as an old Home Office man, the Home Office in our country looks after the police, the police have a fear for the press really they can never really, they can never really tell anybody what they're doing because they then tell the criminals what they're doing and so one's heart bled really for the RCMP and the Montreal and Quebec City police while they were being pretty severely criticized for being quote slow unquote but when you look back they did act quickly. I think to have found a diplomate in the . . . 14 010094 �Anglo-Canadian relations. Naught but good, naught but good... ...very quickly, a la First and Second World Wars, a la lots of other problems. You know the first week or two of one's life here was intensley interesting. I mean I got the entree to contact I don't know how many people very quickly, and I got to know Ed very quickly indeed... 010095 �14 space of time was a pretty considerably good professional job, I really do. Because it was not easy, the role of the police in Montreal, I don't know enough about the methods used, I know something about the methods used which you probably know equally well and I am sure know a lot more then I do but it was a really good professional, police professional job done in pretty quick time as we would say. ^iIiT-iilwM" ITi MrjuJialsiead ( l Anglo-Canadian relations. Nothing but good, nothing but good is one that, because I mean, you know, its well, I mean it showed that once again that we could collaborate on this sort of personal, informal basis very quickly.- Our'- K A<. -i|-'-' " ••• A ' - j •'" • -, 'c -'• •- \ Ai "»"\ Est you know, it could be.the kind of attitude that I found in, the first "weei or two when I first was here was immense, I mean' I got the P AE. A•. -\ . of the people very quickly and I got to know Ed very quickly indeed, far quicker then I would have done in the normal way. I got to see ministers which I would never have got, I mean I was telling you just now about getting to terms with Bourassa, he's not the easiest person in the world to get to know, well I can't say that I did get to know him well, but I got the opportunity to meet him and I think its demonstrated a domestic trend, friendly family, an admiration fop Caftartiinnq^jivhich. I have no doubt would happen again under similar circumstances. -~^--^. j^ , .^ Mr. Hayman 3- Mrs. Halstead The same technique would be used really basically a reliance on friendship and understanding. .ou:,. Mr. Hayman With a minimum Mrs. Amyot A minimum, yes thats it. Mrs. Well you've covered the t e r r i t o r y with great c l a r i t y . Halstead Well I think we've covered all the points Jean, I. Mr. Hayman Mrs. Halstead You've certainly contributed, fascinating insights foi which we are extremely grateful. Mr. Hayman Well it was a joy to do it. THE END / \ - '7 V 010096 �We are returning the Hayman tape, which we have listened to from start to finish. The neumber of corrections probably makes it necessary to re—type the whole interview. bit more punctuation - If so, we might at the same time insert a a few more periods and commas to make it easier to follow. Would it not also be desirable to refer to the interviewee as Sir Peter rather than Mr. Hayman? Would you also consider the possibility of a different format? For example: SIR PETER Yes, of course I'll do that, and I absolutely echo what you say about the intense interest... Or, alternatively, this format: SIR PETER: Yes, of course I'll do that, and I absolutely echo what you say about the intense interest... 010097 �OCTOBER CRISIS ed interview with Sir Peter Hayman. __k Mrs. Amyot: It is very nice of you Sir Peter Hayman to allow the Department of External Affairs to benefit from your experience during the crisis of October, 1970. It seems appropriate somehow that on the eve of your departure from Canada you are speaking to us about the situation that developed on the eve of your arrival. Shall we begin then, for the first question, before your arrival in Canada by asking you to describe the atmosphere in London immediately following the kidnapping of Mr. Cross. Sir Peter: Yes,of course I'll do that, and I absolutely echo what you say about the intense interest of this whole business really in my life and in my wife's life. It is appropriate I think to be talking on the eve of our departure, after the happiest period we've ever spent in i;he diplomatice service in Canada and about the period three and a half years ago when we came here. The first question you ask me is about the interest and the atmosphere in London before ones arrival, and I would say there of course a great deal of interest and concern in this whole case. Partly because of Jasper Cross, he was a British diplomat who'd been kidnapped. In the sense it was right at the beginning of the great kidnapping era. But there was also really genuinely concern about the effect of the PLQ crisis on the stability of one of our oldest and closest friends - Canada. So that there were the two strands; on the ono hand there was great concern about a British national, or about a British diplomat but also concern about the effect on Canada, the political effect on Canada. Mrs. Halstead: What sort of effect did you think there might have been? Sir Peter: This was very much the effect that I'd expected of course. Mrs.Halstead: V/hen you were speaking of having the effects Sir Peter: On Canada you mean? Mrs.Halstead: Yes. Sir Peter: The effect on Canada, one must always, at the beginning of ones time here, one, knowing what one did about the problems of Quebec separatism, one was naturally concerned to see how far this kind of potentially serious threat would be met by the Government in Ottawa or and indeed by Mr. Bourassa. Mr. Bourassa was a relatively unknown person in London, few I dare say could remember the name of the Quebec Premier. Mr. Trudeau was better known of course, he'd been in Londop not too long before as a, as leader of the Canadian delegation to the Commonwealth Conference in 1969, he made a lot of friends there. But it was not understood as to how he would in fact face up to a rather special problem of this sort. Those were the kinds of thoughts that were certainly milling around amongst the people that I talked to in London. ... 2 010098 �- 2 Mrs.HalsteaJS^ So that the, the rapid response of the Government was reassuring? Sir Peter: Oh indeed. Yes indeed, of course it was, very much so. I mean there was a great deal of satisfaction, I think, on the way the reaction took place. You ask of course whether in fact the, how far was Britian concerned with other things at the same time and on that I think I should say that I'd been dealing up till then with the Middle East. I was the Under-Secretary looking after the Middle East and also North and South America and the United Nations and there were a good many other problems on our mind. One of the curiously sort of prelude to this was the hi-jacking of all those airplanes in Jordan in which I personally had been very much concerned with, dealing with. And then the additional horror of course was the capture and the death of Mr. Laporte. It was on the day of Mr. Laporte's death that I arrived in Canada. I should say that of course the moment I heard of Jasper's kidnapping I wanted immediately to come out to Canada even though that would have been several months, no several weeks or a month or two in advance of my time here. I heard about it when I was staying with a friend, my wife and I were staying with a very old friend in South Wales doing some fishing and I came down to breakfast and he in turn told me about this and I immediately telephoned the Foreign Office and said I'd like to go straight away. But I think reasonably enough we both felt and everybody felt,George Whitehead who was my deputy and the acting Charge d'affaire, felt that if I'd rushed out immediately that would have implied some sort of comment on how Canada was actually handling this crisis and that of course we didn't want to give. We wanted to be as normal as possible over this. I would like in fact to pay a tribute at this time to the work of George Whitehead who handled the early part of the crisis from the British point of view with a considerable amount of skill and firmness. Mrs. Halstead: There's reference in the files on the kidnapping to the discussion in Cabinet in London immediately, the day following the kidnapping. Could you tell us anything about that? Sir Peter: Well British officials on the whole don't attend Cabinet meetings. I didn't go to any Cabint meeting on this. But I did in fact talk to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alex Douglas Home on two occasions, three occasions following discussions which he must have had with Ministers and it was then during that time that the British Government decided that the whole affair v/as a matter for you to handle - a matter for Canada to handle. It so happened I think that our respective attitudes on the subject of the kidnapping were very much the same, which obviously made it easier for us. There was no division of opinion as to the fact that one should not in general give way to kidnappers so thatthe general approach was the same. But our tactical approach, quite clearly, was that it would be quite improper. I certainly think that the propriety would be quite wrong and not at all useful for the British Government to take any initiative in this. The hand had to be played by the Canadian Government. It was Mr. Laporte, it was the FLQ crisis, it was very much a matter of domestic concern to Canada and this was the attitude in London. I think in a v/ay it would be foolish not to emphasize, this is partly because of our old friendship and Canada's not just another country. I ... 3 010099 �- 3 n Canada and Britain have had these kind of problems, I mean World War blems and all these kind of problems and I think it made it easier if • you like, to the British Ministers to feel that Canada was handling this in some way, especially as we agreed with that way, for us to go along with that because it was Canada. I think I should emphasize that as well. If this had been Mauritania or Transilvania where we didn't know well the principle people concerned we should naturally have found it more difficult. Mrs. Amyot: Would you have felt that it would have been more a Canadian affair than a Quebec affair if for instance Laporte would not have been kidnapped? Sir Peter: No, I don't think so. I mean, I think that the, I mean that the element of Mr. Laporte's kidnapping and death clearly made it an even more difficult political problem for both Ottawa and Quebec obviously. Therefore, it made it even more a matter of important internal political concern to Canada in our view as we saw it from London, and therefore, it was not at all just a question of a British diplomat being kidnapped. It was obviously posing a considerable internal political problem for Canada and the fact that Mr. Laporte was, I suppose the most considerable man in Mr. Bourassa's Cabinet, in fact the only one in Bourassa's Cabinet of any political experience and some would say Mr. Bourassa's rival, things like that, something of that sort, this is what one observes from afar. Obviously as I say, it posed a, some very major problems, and you know, and his addition made them more serious. Mrs.Halstead: So the feeling in Whitehall was more or less unanimous was it about the policy? Sir Peter: Yes, yes. I never found any differences in Whitehall. I should say, Jean, that I mean on this I was instructed by the senior official, the permanent under-secretary, the Ed Ritchie of Whitehall who was Sir Dennis Greenhill, who was almost my closest friend in the foreign service and then as I say both he and I went to see Sir Alej, on two or three occasions and the day to day work of course was carried out by the Department which dealt with Canada and the United States which was under the direction of Mr. Charles Wiggin, who was really tremendously expert on this and did a great deal. I mean it was endless consultation to and fro, endless talk to and fro, not really consultation because I think we'd all agreed on the line but endless factual information passing to and fro between the North American Department and the PCO under Charles Wiggin and at that time,George Whitehead here, which I was privy to and joined in, of course. Mrs. Halstead: ....and so there wasn't very much discussion, I mean within the country apart from Whitehall Sir Peter: About...., no again I think looking back and thinking about press comment, of which there was a great deal, I don't remember any, any general feelings of dismay over the line being taken on the whole. I think the British maintained a fairly cool attitude on this. There was, a member of Jasper's family in Ireland, I don't know whether it was a reltion of hers or his who was inclined to say why is nothing more being done, are we moving as fast as we should, etc., etc. But I don't remember any other examples of that. This was in fact after I was out here, so this was at a later time, a later time scale. . .. 4 �- 4Mrs. Halstea*^ But it wasn't as a political Sir Peter: No, no, oh no there was certainly no dissent from the Labour benches on this at all. Mrs. Halstead: Most of the discussions between Canadians and British were carried on here I suppose, were they? Sir Peter: Most of those discussions were carried on here. I did in fact, you ask a question I know the back of your mind rather, you ask a question about how far Canada House was involved. I know that Charles Ritchie with whom I'd had two or three talks was very well up to date with factual information you know the various, those awful wireless messages and things, and press messages which kept on coming out. I think Ciarles established some form or, not exactly a war room, but an information centre in Canada House which I remember Sir Denais Greenhill praising as being a means of getting some quick factual information. But certainly the dealings between Canada and Britain on this were conducted through here, between here and the Department of External Affairs. That was where much of, most took place. I should of course mention here, perhaps I don't want this to be overlooked that another element of the British end in Canada was George Whitehead dispatching John Dunrossil, the Head of Chancery, to take charge of th? Montreal office as soon as Jasper was kidnapped and I think that was a very wise thing to have done. Dunrossil had. only been in Canada with his wife for about three weeks or so and had just in fact been entertained by the Crosses on his way through Montreal a little tine before and therefore we did have a fair, but he did have a good deal of experience in this kind of work in his past life and so we had for him, I know George Whitehead had, and certainly I found that to have John stationed in Montreal and therefore of course necessarily in "Pouch with the Montreal or Quebec police and so on was a very important element in our thinking because, you knov/, the Montreal - Quebec - Ottawa syndrome was an element in this whole business. Mrs. Halstead: It would be very indiscreet I suppose to ask if it were, in an effort to...influence the Quebec Government or more as a listening post.... Sir Peter: No, no it wouldn't be indiscreet to ask that,Jean, because I can give you a perfectly clear answer. There was no question about dealing with the Quebec Government at all. I mean, it was a listening post operation, we did in fact, John being a very sensible guy, got on in perfectly good terms with Jerome Choquette and with some of the leading policemen but there's no question about, dealing pish the Quebec Government. So far as this crisis was concerned, our dealings were with the Canadian Government here in Ottawa. I say that very clearly and very categorically and I would like here to say quite flatly that the main channel of communication v/as Ed Ritchie himself. I always have a vivid recollection of arriving at the Ottawa airport and being very kindly met by Ed, whom I'd never met before as a matter of fact. He's an extraordinary man, I mean he made himself available to me at any hour of the day or night really, and we used to see each other frequently of course. Sometimes once or twice a day until that memorable moment when he woke me up in the early hours of that December morning and told me that at last you v/ere on to, quite defintely on to where Cross was. Even though, although you know that its very difficult to hear his voice as I understand it. So that this is, and again I'd lik to say that this is the sort of, you know, an element of the sort of Canadian-British link �- 5A a t one could get on to those terms with someone like Ed Ritchie. I did W fact, during the time that I was here, of course I was payir-g, delivering my letters to the Prime Minister, letters of credence to the Prime Minister, had some speech with him and of course talked in general terms about the whole business and of course to Mitchell Sharp, I paid my first calls to him. But I'd like especially, to when I first arrived I of course called on as many ministers as possible,as quickly as possible. The person in a sense, from whom I learned the most during my course about PLQ mentality was Mr. Pelletier. Mr. Pelletier, perhaps characteristically, kept met me waiting for three quarters of an hour becatise of a lot cf other things, lie then kept the next person waiting for, well this is probably rather indiscreet, for at least another hour. But he is intensely interesting on, you know, the whole mentality of the PLQ. Thats one of the most meisorable discussions and interviews that Ive had, I'd like to say that. And then of course, I used to go to the Operations Room in External and my chaps of course did very often. McConville was the Acting Head of Chancery. He used to go over there regularly once a day or more often. Of course part of it is the geographical location, I mean the proximity. You know, the Department going over there might make it more difficult, but the fact that I was unpacked in the Chateau Laurier, and of course Rosemary hadn|t arrived by then. I was in a room with a lot of RCMP guys next door and oh I mean my geographical boundaries were really for my first two or three weeks here were the Chateau Laurier, this room and Ed's office in the East Block; punctuated three times a week by going down to visit Barbara Cross in Montreal. I went to see her the second day that I came here and the third day I went down to Mr. Laporte's funeral and I think I had almost as large an escort as Mr. Trudeau had. I had a Bren gun carrier in front and a Bren gun carrier behind and an extremely tough cookie from the Royal Canadian Regiment from whom I learned a great deal about the lower echelons of the Canadian Armed Forces as we drove along. Mrs. Amyot: When you arrived here in Ottawa, the general feeling of the people in the office here in Ottawa, was equal or did you feel that some people, I mean without any names, but you knov/, did you have the impression that some people would have thought differently? Sir Peter: Absolutely not, absolutely not. There was no, I mean I can lay my hand on my heart and say that there was no differences in opinion between us. George Whitehead's handling of the policy which he handed over to me when I arrived was reflected in his little team, McConville and Noakes and others and we were all concerned, we were obviously concerned with the question of, I suppose primarily being English chaps, with the future of Jasper Cross, with trying to see how far these strange messages could be interpreted and that sort of thing and....but in no way did we dissent on the handling of the matter by the Canadian Government. Mrs.Halstead: I wonder if we could return for a moment to what you were, to your comments on your talk with Mr. Pelletier. ir Peter: Yes. Mrs.Halstead: ...and could you tell us what his interpretation of the FLQ was or..... a a a 6 �- 6Sir Peter: ^ ^ Well Jean, I am not, I mean, I think that was really talking about ^Pese kind of people. I don't think it would be proper for me, as a diplomat would it, to comment on what a Cabinet Minister told me and I don't in fact remember any very sharp terms, precisely what his views were. Let me just say this that I was after all a stranger to Canada, I was the Under-Secretary looking after our relations in these parts but I really didn't know a great deal about the FLQ mentality. I wanted to, I was concerned to see how far they would go in a domestic operation. Whether they had any ties with Algeria, training in Algeria and so on. I merely got from him good leads on what the young in Quebec were thinking and how so many of them were in a sense automatically separatists before they really started to think and that even the quiet revolution had perhaps not brought along enough 'people in Canada as such. That is all for you rather jejeune stuff, but for me as a new arrival in Canada it was intensely interesting and of course the other, my other informant, I mean the only person in fact who told me anything about the PLQ crisis before I came was in fact Jasper Cross himself and the story of that was that, and as I say I was mainly concerned with the Middle East. With a bit of Angueilla thrown in and really Middle East, Mid Arab, Israel all the time, every hour of the day and night. But, and I have wide interests and I heard that there was a fellow called Cross about in the office and so I sent for him to ask him why the hell we weren't selling more British motor cars in Montreal you see. He didn't, he wasn't in the least interested in that, he changed the subject after five seconds. Well he did then talk about, gave me a first inkling of the problems of separatism as epitomized by the PLQ. Mrs. Amyot: How long was that before October, 1970? Sir Peter: That was...., I would say perhaps six months before. Mrs. Amyot: ...six months before. Sir Peter: When he came out you see, being Jasper, being the sort of Irish elan or extrovert guy, when he was released the first thing he did long before he talked to Mr. Trudeau on the telephone or anything else, he rang me up you see and said, "reporting for duty Sir". Then the second remark was remarkable. He said, "about that conversation we had in London, I can now give you some more information". When I went down to see him next day, which I hastened to do in the Jewish Hospital in Montreal, he was in his dressing gown and pyjamas and I thought we were going to talk really about the administrative arrangements for his departure and whether or not he was going to be received at number ten and all this kind of thing you see, quite a tricky kind of program. Not at all, he wasn't in the least interested in it, he was quite interested in the various things which he subsequently told all of you. I mean, the mentality of Lanet&t and Carbonneau and their wives and so on, and how far his views had been borne out. But I mean, I don't want to enlarge on what he said to me because he, I know talked to all of you in pretty fair detail about his thoughts on the FLQ. Mrs.Halstead: So you were working really quite, quite closely, all of your team? Sir Peter: Yes. Mrs. Halstead: ...and quite closely with the Operations Centre? ... 7 �7Sir Peter We were, and I think that was, I mean, I think that it was terribly, ^^ribly important and terribly sort of...., I mean I think as we saw it, it was very lucky perhaps a bit fortuitous, but very lucky that the Operations Centre had been established not long before. I believe that's right. Certainly, I mean I've sat in on interdepartmental meetings occasionally with which all the elements concerned, the RCMP and other departments as well as External were sitting around the table and I think it worked extraordinarily well considering it had only just been formed. Mrs.Halstead: In what way was that fortuitous? Sir Peter: Well haven't you only just formed it? Mrs.Halstead: Yes, but I, oh I see just because it was there or had been formed at all. Sir Peter: Yes, it was very lucky it was just formed then, and I know that Ed found it of great value having it, you know, a hundred-ten yards away from his own office. He was always peeking in there to see how things were going along, all this was rather, well again this could only be done in a rather family atmosphere of External and I would like to think the family atmosphere that exists may not have existed until then but certainly has existed since between us and External. From that date comes the time that I absolutely, flatly refuse to show my pass whenever I am in External. I just showed it once and its always been respected ever since. Pauline fixed it. (Laughter) We're about number nine. Mrs.Halstead: Sir Peter: /tactical Mrs .Amyot: About number nine, yes. I mean, you see one of the agitating things that we had to talk to each other about was interpretation of messages. It was the interpretation of messages you see, I mean how could you know what was intended to be implied by this or that and how could you react to this or that at the/moment. There was a great deal of discussion on that and your legal people and so on. I think Andre Bissonnette played a, played an important part in this, he was doing some work and I well remember Marc Lalonde coming in and joining in a group at one point, having something to say about some French message and the way it was termed and its phraseology. It was most interesting to see the machine working. Did you have a feeling that, in the letter that Mr. Cross wrote that there was a kind of information-code or somethiig ? 3ir Peter: Well. Mrs .Amyot: We know that, but did you have any. Sir Peter: Well, we endlessly speculated on this. I meaa, we twisted it around, you know and turned it upside down we, I mean, one of the things that one always wonders is whether one should in fact establish a sort of code so that if one is kidnapped and you mentioned the word raspberry it means that I am now one and a half miles due north of somewhere or other, but that's in a way too elaborate to do that. But we just wondered, yes of course, endlessly we speculated on the interpretation of letters and phraseology of letters endlessly and messages endlessly, so did you. 8 010104 �- 8 Mrs .Amyot: Yes. Sir Peter: M u ch more then we did. Mrs. Halstead: Well this is one way of not feeling quite so helpless. Sir Peter: Yes, this is true. Mrs.Halstead: But in fact, Mr. Cross seemed to resent this speculation in the end in that it caused a threat to his life possibly because it was speculated on, so publicly and in the press. Sir Peter: Well....no Jean no, I think I wouldn't worry about that. I mean don't forget that when Jasper was released he had been through a most ghastly ordeal that's possible to imagine. He had seen his own death announced on television, now that is not at all an agreeable thing to have seen and he.... but I remember him saying to me rather vividly once that he had, I think this was during our time in the Jewish Hospital, he said to me, "I'd arranged in my own mind -what it was like to die. The only thing that I was worried about was how Barbara was going to.••••what was going to happen to my wife". So you know if you've been through that however much as an Irish elanful or chap you appear, at least on the surface and he was astonishingly calm. Frankly, on the surface when he came out, you know, at that original press conference in Montreal he was calmer then I was. But one didn't realize that there was a tremendous amount of sort of agitation and concern underneath and I would make very, very great allowances for his sort of general feelings. Mrs. Amyot: Did he tell you that at the moment he had the feeling that it was really coming, his own death? Sir Peter: Yes, I think if you see your own death announced on televsion you, even though it isn't quite true yet, its very likely to happen in a matter of time, Thats the really terrifying thing and you see if you then go on sitting for quite a long time looking at the television and nothing else then you do get into a,.,., however brave you are, it has a very powerful effect on you. Perhaps you could tell us something about the practical effects of Mrs.Halstead: the War Measures Act. Sir Peter: Yes. Well, as far as I was concerned, to be really flippant first of all on a very unflippant subject, it has enabled me to see a side of, I mean provide a domestic point of view, this was all rather, as it turned out rather good because I could talk to ordinary chaps in the RCMP. I do know from the lower echelons of the RCMP and lower echelons of the Canadian military a great deal about Canada and no arriving diplomat could possbily have in a sense a more poignant introduction but at the same time an introductuion to ordinary people which you would not get. I find that as a personal instance it was well worth the obviously very honest inconvenience of being guarded incessantly which was of course what happened with ones first month or two here and oh for much longer. V/hen we went out to visit outside Ottawa we were guarded incessantly. I remember Rosemary and I in our first visit to Banff we were trying to climb a local hill, or TAKmntfdn and two gentlemen from the RCMP never left us out of their sight. In case now of some of the provinces they were far more agitatory obviously then Ottawa and I got to know a very wide conspectus of members of the RCMP, . . .9 010105 �- 9licemen, soldiers, etc., etc. Thats a rather flippant comment. But in * neral, I would share quite honestly the general admiration for that element of Canadian life wno hadn't been all that much alarmed until then, i.e. the soldiering. You suddenly found that they were quite useful members of the military and so many military in Canada feel they're irrelevant and they suddenly found they were very relevant in doing a good job and I would have thought, that was another, you know, comment and thought on Canada. As to the need to use the War Measures Act, I could simply make, again a not very profound remark, as an observer, thet it was the only thing you had to use and I don't, as an observer at the scene subscribe to the view that it was using a steam roller to crack a nut. You only had a steam roller, you didn't know whether it was going to be a nut or a time feomb and I am not sure everybody knows that yet, I mean those loud critics, John Turner and othersjwho subsequently with the wisdom of hindsight say, oh it was all far too exaggerated a reaction, I would dispute that very strongly as being one of the minor characters of that scene. Of course, there was no insurrection really or uprising in Quebec, how could there have been say some people but,,,,what,,,, C Mrs .Amyot: It simply seemed to be in the mind of everyone because you say some people have really the impression that people were going to come out in the streets, etc. Sir Peter: Thats it and I think, and I mean this is the remarkable thing, so far as the British themselves were concerned and I say quite clearly this was the first time we'd seen Mr. Trudeau in action and this was damned impressive. Mr. Trudeau's, the general view of Mr. Trudeau, you know, in London was that he was highly intelligent but somewhat of a dilettante, an intellectual dilettante of some considerable means in Quebec. Nov/ he was shown as an extremely tough guy, he wasn't going to give way. He emerged as the sort of, to the British observers, as the sort of a very considerable figure, and in so far as a pragmatic relationship between Britain and Canada has evolved, particularly in the way epitomized by Ted Heath and Mr. Trudeau. I think a lot of it was tiny beginnings with them. Mr. Bourassa of course did not fit in those two terms at all, to us, in fact people were wondering hov/ he fitted into the picture. I in fact, again as a sort of credit bonus as I call it, had two interviews with Mr. Eourassa very soon after I arrived which I certainly wouldn't have done. I had an hour with him very soon after I arrived and Jasper was still incarcerated, he vas very, obviously very shaken and he spoke entiiely in French. He was pretty moved by it, you know, not frightened but pretty moved and worried, concerned. Then I saw him not long after Cross had been released and then he v/as much more relaxed. No its only subsequently that one realized that he's not just there as a product of Harvard business school with rich friends in New York at all. The fact of course as one observes, its not my business its yours, but only in recent months, a year or so, that one realized that he seems to have won however much he may have been ill-attuned in dealing with that sort of crisis, he has seized the one point which really mattered in Quebec which was to attract capital and to transform the economic background and this is the only comment I will make on that but was of course not apparent in all the tune we were talking about. . . . 10 010106 �- 10 Mrs.Halstead: Did you anticipate the invocation cf the War Measures Act, did you ^•sgine that it v/as going to... Sir Peter: Mrs. Amyot: Sir Peter: Well I think it would be, and I am just trying to remember the timing of this...... The day of Laporte's death. Yes, and the answer is probably not because I didn't know enough about it. I was in fact still in London I hadn't really sort of faced up to what it was necessary for me to do. Mrs. Halstead: No of course, and I suppose it probably wasn't discussed in the High Commission as such. Sir Peter: No. I don't think so really, I don't, I mean again our immediate comment on that would be that this is very much your business how you deal with what is primarily a Canadian, a serious, serious Canadian internal problem and we wouldn't presume to give them advice on that matter. It is not our business to do that. Mrs.Halstead: Yes apparently some, some compatriot journalists took a rather different view I guess. Sir Peter: Yes I think I didn't really understand the drift of this question. Nobody in the British High Commission commented on this matter then or I think wish to do so now, it seems awfully unimportant really I would have thought it was some sort of Canadian internal dilemma which got caught in the British newspapers maybe but it made no impression on me at all. I can honestly say that. I talked to John Dunrossil about this and we both, you know, scratched our heads, we were very puzzled about it. Mrs.Halstead: Well it was really apropos with the loss of rights, whether individual rights in Canada, whether it caused a stir in Britain. Sir Peter: No, no I don't think so. Oh I see because of the invocation of the War Measures Act. Yes, yes in the sort of line taken, v/as it, by the NDP on this. Well how far was that reflected in Britain - not much, not much. I mean I think that if any paper, if any paper would have reflected it the Guardian obviously would do so. But I am really, really on looking back I can't remember any particular line taken by the British press in this sense. Mrs.Amyot: Did you also have, get the feeling that the press here in Canada was putting too much emphasis on the crisis? Sir Peter: Well I mean this is, of course you ask a question of a civil servant who is irritated by the BBC or the CBC as you do here. I mean one often gets intensely irritated with the Canadian press, with the CBC from time to time. There's always a minor risk that something, that some comment in the press, on the CBC would have endangered Cross's life, and one at home was conscious of that. But I mean I v/ould answer emphatically however that I wouldn't have wanted to have seen any greater control of the press . . . 11 010107 �- 11 J^cause therein lies much greater danger. However irritated one gets with ^Pb media, for different reasons. The Canadian CBC's attitude on northern Ireland from time to time, I used to get very irritated indeed by the radio program on Sunday morning which tended to begin with the IRA war song and end with the IRA war song, and I should, suppose I went to see George Davidson about five times about that, but thats the sort of thing that one has to put up with and of course at the end one wouldn't want to put on greater controls. Mrs.Halstead: But what about friendly persuasion? Sir Peter: Well friendly persuasion Jean is a tricky thing. Mrs.Halstead: ...and it wasn't something you tried? Sir Peter: Not, well its not, well I mean it wasn't again for us to deal with the Canadian press on this of course, oh no, I mean we would again expect you to deal with your own press. Certainly we wouldn't, I mean, it would be the worst possible thing for a quote foreign unquote High Commission or Embassy to attempt to do any friendly persuasions on the press, we wouldn't possibly do it. As to how far you did it I don't know but again its jolly tricky with the governments to do that, the press really has got a job to do. It would never have been at all right for us to have gone to the press and say, "hi, you may be endangering Jasper Cross's life". I think we should have, if we had done that and I think I do remember talking on those Lines with friends in External, I mean if anything could have been done there they would have been able to do it, whether you did or not I don't know. Mrs. Amyot: I think the last question on that page was giving you some, I mean it gave you some.... Sir Peter: Yes I saw your reasons and I think in a sense I've answered that, cause I think he was under tremendous strain and, and frankly I am astonished that he remained pretty calm. Quite frankly, also, perhaps the other point I should make in this when I was looking through the questions I would have thought that the excellent information that he gave you all quite outweighed any critical comment he could have made, wouldn't you? Mrs.Halstead: It wasn't by way of criticism. Sir Peter: No Mrs.Halstead: ...of him or lack of diplomacy on "his part that the question arose but rather whether in fact there were some pes itive suggestions that or some conclusions that••*.. Sir Peter: Well this is what on^ I mean you know, when one carried out a postmortem here as I am sure you did in External as to what, is there anything else that one could have done, and you know you might have wondered whether one should have got the people to adopt secret codes which you know would have been recognized by the rest of theEmbassy. I remember we went into this in a rather informal way and we came to the conclusion that it was probably 12 010108 �- 12 exclusion that it was probably too elaborate and as to other things ^ P c h v/e did not, which we left undone which we could have done I wasn't myself conscious of anything of that sort but there may have been. That leads us on incidentally to number 14 which, about what, perhaps this has really sort of covered that ground. I would like just to say on that, that we were both really, both you and we, because I think one wants to emphasize this was an early stage in the kidnapping malaise which has since affected the world, quite early, I mean quite early not the first, but it was quite early and we had to adapt to a new, a pretty well new situation and make our policies as we were going along and as I say fortunately that our conclusions were the same. I don't think honestly that we could have improved with the benefit of hindsight on the informal daily consultation, I mean which we had with you, I think thats terribly important. It was personal, it was - I have written down here which I believe it was, it was personal, it was immediate, and it was informal. I don't think there is any other country then Canada with whom we could have had that, we certainly couldn't have that in the States. I suppose we might have done that in Australia but we couldn't have had this, it would have been much more elaborate in the States. We don't have the same kind of personal ties with the United States, you look surprised, oh no this is a fact. I stress those words - personal, immediate and informal these three things you see. I'd like also to put, to mention again John Dunrossil1s operation in Montreal where we had very good liaison. I know it to, I mean I am well aware of some of the problems which you necessarily had with the provincial government because of gang raids, federal-provincial problems and the RCMP quote strong arm anglo-saxon police force unquote it isn't like that now and it wasn't really then. But I mean there persons who said that and our own relations with the Montreal and Quebec police. As I understand it, the relations on thevery highest level between the three police forces were very good and the relations on the riot squad or whatever it was, was pretty good on the lower, on the actual chaps who pursued criminals. On the medium range it is very necessarily understandably and its not unknown between the Scotch and the Ireland provincial police forces too I can tell you, there were some frictions I understand this was not really, I think are we going to talk to John Dunrossil at some stage? Mrs. Amyot: Sir Peter: Yes. He will give, you will be able to enlarge a bit more on that and he'll, you know, he'll be farily nimble with giving his views from this and that source but as, I would like to emphasize again which he certainly will do but his role in Montreal was that of a listerner, a passer-on-er. I don't want anybody to get tinder any impression whatever that we were doing any business as such with the provincial government. Its far too tricky, an attitude of federal-provincial relations it would have been quite foolish of us even if we had thought of doing so but we didn't really. I mean it had to be, our tie had to be inescapably and completely with Ed Ritchie and External. If we'd adopted any other method we'd have only added to your troubles. So that all Dunrossil, all John Dunrossil was doing was, where at the scene of the crime and keeping Barbara reasonably happy and getting his information passed on to us from the Quebec, the Montreal police,the RCMP and Jerome Choquette's office, sll of which he did. . . . 13 010109 �- 13 Mrs.Halstead^^ 3ir Peter: Yes. I just have one other thirg to say incidentally and one other point to make which I'd forgotten to make. I would have thought, well just one other obvious point really cause its only a comment on your own attitude. I mean, I think you talked about your firmness in all this but of course it wasn't firmness alone, it v/as mixed with theCuban loop-hole. This was again dead right. I mean if you were just firm and said no, no, no then we would have lost Jasper Cross. In fact of course it was firmness mixed with the Cuban loop-hole, and I've always imagined, I don't know, I didn't know him then and I've never actually discussed this with him - my Cuban colleague must have been damned helpful. I don't know, I've never ever really discussed it with him but I know from talks with Ed Ritchie and others that they were very forthcoming. So it was firmness coupled with a loop-hole and that got Cross out. Mrs.Halstead: Sir Peter: I understand that your police... You feel that its a loop-hole that should be used in the future? Well I think, yes I think in a way you have to, of course each circumstance Jean is different, each circumstance is different. I think you have to, you may well have to adopt some sort of tactical loop-hole of that kind. That was the one that you decided upon which as I say got Cross out. But the circumstances must vary each time. Mrs.Amyot: It certainly depends on the person who is kidnapped as well as other events. Sir Peter: Yes, what are the demisnds, what other countries would be prepared to be helpful and what are the kidnappers like and how far they are dictated to by quote outside sources unquote, or how far are they, are they purely local, a local business or are they just cells which are within the body politic not dominated by outside sources. ilrs. Halstead: Could I ask if, a question about the British police, I think some British police came here during the crisis perhaps to assist the RCMP. Sir Peter: I don't think any British police came to assist the RCMP but I think they had a visiting group which fortuitously happened to be going around dealing with problems of this kind or which chap, or which, I think it was during this time they v/ere going around dealing with sort of sabotage, kidnapping problems and happened to be here and the group. There v/as a policeman and a soldier and the policeman happened to be Robert Mark, v/ho is now the head of Scotland Yard, he is obviously sort of a tremendous chap, but I don't think there was any collaboration v/ith the British polio§ on the spot at all. It may be that things like Interpol and you know internal police consultation as to v/hether there was any outside, again outside influence I dare say that v/e may have helped v/ith advice on that but I am not aware of any British police participation in the, v/hat was happening. I say as en old Home Office man, the Home Office in our country looks after the police, the police have a fear for the press really they can never really, they can never really tell anybody v/hat they're doing because they then tell the criminals what they're doing and so one's heart bled really for the RCMP and the Montreal and Quebec City Police while they were being pretty severely criticized for being quote slow unquote but v/hen you look back they did act quickly. I think to have found a diplomat in the space of time was a pretty considerably good professional job, I really do. Because it was not eacy, the role of the police in Montreal, I don't know enough . . . 14 �- 14 ai^it the methods used, I know something about the methods uses v/hich yWr probably know equally well and I am sure know a lot more then I do but it was a really good professional, police professional job done in pretty quick time as we would say. Anglo-Canadian relations. Naught but good, naught but good is one that, because I mean, you know, its v/ell, I mean it showed that once again that v/e could collaborate on this sort of personal, informal basis very quickly, a la First and Second World Wars, a la lots of other problems. You know the first week or two of one's life here v/as intensely interesting. I mean, I got the entree to contact I don't know how many people very quickly, and I got to know Ed very quickly indeed. Far quicker then I v/ould have done in the normal v/ay. I got to see ministers which I vould never have got, I meanl v/as telling you just now about getting to terms v/ith Bourassa, he's not the easiest person in the world to get to know, well I can't say that I did get to know him well, but I got the opportunity to meet him and I think its demonstrated a domestic trend, friendly family, an admiration betv/een us, v.'hich I have no doubt would happen again under similar circumstances. Mrs.Halstead: The same technique would be used really, basically a reliance on friendship and understanding. Sir Peter: 'with a minimum of formality. Mrs.Amyot: A minimum, yes thats it. Mrs. Halstead: V/ell you've covered the territory with great clarity. Sir Peter: Well I think we've covered all the points Jean, I.... Mrs.Halstead: You've certainly contributed some fascinating insights for which we are extremely grateful. Sir Peter: Well it was a joy to do it. THE END 010111 �ORAL HISTORY ACCESSION FORM HISTOIRE ORALE: FORMULE D'ACCESSION A c c e s s i o n number '/Vunn 1-1 RLQ and 1970 C r i s i s Iiierviewee 'Enquete Interviewer En quefeur Mrs. Jean Halstead Sir Peter Hayman No. of t a p e s ''Transcripts A ° de bob tne s-./Transcriptions Deration/Dure'f Date Location 7/3/74 Quality of recording-'^ua/iff' de 0 / 2 Ottawa t*enregistr-ement Prescription INTERVIEWEE /ENQUETE INTERVIEWER/ENQVE sent/envoye Contract/Contrat I j Letter/jRerr/e |_ J TEUR received ' ?eci s e n ' 'envoye Contract/Contmf |_ Letter 'Lettre [_ Date received 're$u J_ Tape checked by interviewer for quality QualitS de Ja bobine verifiee par l'enque,» L e v e ! of secrecy /Niveau de c lass , • New Interview required Nouvelle hit revue necessaire ificotior CLOSED U N T I L / F E K M E JUSQU'A . In accordance with government r< ^illation's Conlormement aux reglements du gouvernement 2. Death of interviewee /De"ce.s de I d* auteur detenus I I j I I j enquete 3, Othet/Autre Copy write held by 'Droits • Restrictions par EXTERNAL APPATPS Additional comments /A utres commentaires P e r s o n ( s ) r e s p o n s i b l e for collection/tiesp >n$able(s) de lu collection Si ^ lature Signature FX7 162 010112 �Accession NumDer//VMmer*c> 1-1 WORK PROGRESS/ACHEMINEMENT d'entree DU TRAVAIL Verified by/ Date verifie Tape received/Reception de la par bobine. NO Re-recording/Re-enregistrement. prepared/transcription. Transcript 2 Transcript checked for errors/ verification typographique. X Transcript checked against tape/ confrontation transcription - bobine. X References checked in Library/ verification biblioth&que des references en Final Proofreading/ verification X finale. Retyping if necessary/ Nouvelle copie si Copy sent to interviewee/ verification par par sent/envoye received/regu sent/envoye received/regu enquete. Copy sent to interviewer/ verification X necessaire. enqueteur. finale. Final typing/copEe Subject index (on card)/ Index sujet (sur fiche). Filing of Tape/Rangement de la bobine. Filing of Transcript/ Rangement de la transcription. Filing of Index card/ Rangement de la fiche sujet. Filing of accession form/ Rangement de la formule d'accession. EXT 161 010113 �t % OCTOBl'iil CRISIS Taped interview with Sir Peter Hayman. Mrs. Am^PR It is very nice of you Sir Peter Hayman to allow the Department of External Affairs to benefit from your experience during the crisis of October, 1970. It seems appropriate somehow that on the eve of your departure from Canada you are speaking to us about the situation that developed or; the eve of your arrival. Shall we begin then, for the first question, before your arrival in Canada by asking you to describe the atmosphere in London immediately following the kidnapping of Mr. Cross. Sir Peter: Yes,of course I'll do that, and I absolutely echo what you say about the intense interest of this whole business really in my life and in my wife's life. It is appropriate I think to be talking on the eve of our departure, after the happiest period we've ever spent in "the diplomatice service in Canada and about the period tliree and a half years ago when we came here. The first question you ask me is about the interest and the atmosphere in London before ones arrival, and I v/ould say there of course a great deal of interest and concern in this whole case. Partly because of Jasper Cross, he was a British doplomat who'd been kidnapped. In the sense it was right at the beginning of the great kidnapping era. But there was also really genuinely concern about the effect of the FLQ crisis on the stability of one of our oldest and closest friends - Canada. So that there were the two strands; on the one hand there was great concern about a Eritish national, or about a British diplomat but also concern about the effect or; Canada, the political effect on Canada. Mrs. Halstead: V/hat sort of effect did you think there might have been? Sir Peter: This was very much the effect that I'd expected of course. Mrs.Halstead: When you were speaking of having the effects Sir Peter: On Canada you mean? Mrs.Halstead: Yes. Sir Peter: The effect on Canada, one must always, at the beginning of ones time here, one, knowing what one did about the problems of Quebec separatism, one was naturally concerned to see how far this kind of potentially serious threat would be met by the Government in Ottawa or and indeed by Mr. Bourassa. Mr. Bourassa was a relatively unlcnown person in London, few I dare say could remember the name of the Quebec Premier. Mr. Trudeau was better known of course, he'd been in Londo: not too long before as a, as leader of the Canadian delegation to the Commonwealth Conference in 1969, he made a lot of friends there. But it was not understood as to how he would in fact face up to a rather special problem of this sort. Those were the kinds of thoughts that were certainly milling around amongst the people that I talked to in London. ... 2 010114 �_ 9 _ Mrs.HaD^ead: Sir Peter: So that the, the rapid response of the Government was reassuring? Oh indeed. Yes indeed, of course it was, very much so. I mean there was a great deal of satisfaction, I think, on the way the reaction took place. You ask of course v/hether in fact the, how far was Britian concerned with other things at the same time and on that I think I should say that I'd been dealing up till then with the Middle East. T was tne Under-Secretary looking after tlie Middle East and also Worth and South America and the United Nations and there were a good many other problems on our mind. One of the curiously sort of prelude to this was the hi-jacking of all those airplanes in Jordan in which I personally had been very much concerned with, dealing with. And then the additional horror of course was the capture and the death of Mr. Laporte. It was on the day of Mr. Laporte's death that I arrived in Canada. I should say that of course the moment I heard of Jasper's kidnapping I wanted immediately to come out to Canada even though that would have been several months, no several weeks or a month or two in advance of my time here. I heard about it when I was staying with a friend, my wife and I were staying with a very old friend in South Wales doing some fishing and I came down to breakfast and he in turn told me about this and I immediately telephoned the Foreign Office and said I'd like to go straight away. But I think reasonably enough we both felt and everybody felt,George Whitehead who was my deputy and the acting Charge d'affaire, felt that if I'd rushed out immediately that would have implied some sort of comment on how Canada was actually handling this crisis and that of course we didn't want to give. We wanted to be as normal as possible over this. I would like in fact to pay a tribute at this time to the work of George Whitehead who handled the early part of the crisis from the British point of view with a considerable amount of skill and firmness. Mrs. Halstead: There's reference in the files on the kidnapping to the discussion in Cabinet in London immediately, the day following the kidnapping. Could you tell us anything about that? Sir Peter: Well British officials on the whole don't attend Cabinet meetings. I didn't go to any Cabinet meeting on this. But I did in fact talk to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alex Douglas Home on two occasions, three occasions following discussions which he must have had with Ministers and it was then during that time that the British Government decided that the v/hole affair v/as a matter for you to handle - a matter for Canada to handle. It so happened I think that our respective attitudes on the subject of the kidnapping were very much the same, which obviously made it easier for us. There was no division of opinion as to the fact that one should not in general give way to kidnappers so thatthe general approach was the same. But our tactical approach, quite clearly, was that it would be quite improper. I certainly think that the propriety would be quite wrong and not at all useful for the British Government to take any initiative in this. The hand had to be played by the Canadian Government. It was Mr. Laporte, it v/as the FLQ crisis, it was very much a matter of domestic concern to Canada and this was the attitude in London. I think in a way it would be foolish not to emphasize, this is partly because of our old friendship and Canada's not just another country. I • • • 5010115 �- 3 mean Canada and Britain have had these kind of problems, I mean World War ^fc problems and all these kind of problems and I think it made it easier if ^ ^ you like, to the British Ministers to feel that Canada was handling this in some way, especially as we agreed with that way, for us to go along with that because it was Canada. I think I should emphasize that as well. If this had been Mauritania or Transilvania where v/e didn't knov/ well the principle people concerned we should naturally have found it more difficult. Mrs. Amyot: Would you have felt that it would have been more a Canadian affair than a Quebec affair if for instance Laporte would not have been kidnapped? Sir Peter: No, I don't think so. I mean, I think that the, I mean that the element of Mr. Laporte's kidnapping and death clearly made it an even more difficult political problem for both Ottawa and Quebec obviously. Therefore, it made it even more a matter of important internal political concern to Canada in our view as we saw it from London, and therefore, it was not at all just a question of a British diplomat being kidnapped. It was obviously posing a considerable internal political problem for Canada and the fact that Mr. Laporte was, I suppose the most considerable man in Mr. Bourassa's Cabinet, in fact the only one in Bourassa's Cabinet of any political experience and some would say Mr. Bourassa's rival, things like that, something of that sort, this is what one observes from afar. Obviously as I say, it posed a, some very major problems, and you know, and his addition made them more serious. Mrs.Halstead: So the feeling in Whitehall was more or less unanimous was it about the policy? Sir Peter: Yes, yes. I never found any differences in Whitehall. I should say, Jean, that I mean on this I was instructed by the senior official, the permanent under-secretary, the Ed Ritchie of Whitehall who was Sir Dennis Greenhill, who was almost my closest friend in the foreign service and then as I say both he and I went to see Sir Alex on two or three occasions and the day to day work of course was carried out by the Department which dealt with Canada and the United States which was under the direction of Mr. Charles Wiggin, who was really tremendously expert on this and did a great deal. I mean it was endless consultation to and fro, endless talk to and fro, not really consultation because I think we'd all agreed on the line but endless factual information passing to and fro between the North American Department and the FCO under Charles Wiggin and at that time,George Whitehead here, which I was privy to and joined in, of course. Mrs. Halstead: ....and so there wasn't very much discussion, I mean within the country apart from Whitehall Sir Peter: About...., no again I think looking back and thinking about press comment, of which there was a great deal, I don't remember any, any general feelings of dismay over the line being taken on the whole. I think the British maintained a fairly cool attitude on this. There was, a member of Jasper's family in Ireland, I don't know whether it was a reltion of hers or his who was inclined to say why is nothing more being done, are v/e moving as fast as we should, etc., etc. But I don't remember any other examples of that. This was in fact after I was out here, so this was at a later time, a later time scale. . . .4 010116 �- 4Mrs. Halstead: Sir PetW: But it wasn't as a political No, no, oh no there v/as certainly no dissent from the Labour benches on this at all. Mrs. Halstead: Most of the discussions between Canadians and British v/ere carried on here I suppose, were they? Sir Peter: Most of those discussions were carried on here. I did in fact, you ask a question I know the back of your mind rather, you ask a question about hov/ far Canada House was involved. I know that Charles Ritchie with v/hom I'd had two or three talks was very well up to date with factual information you know the various, those awful wireless messages and things, and press messages which kept on coming out. I think Charles established some form or, not exactly a war room, but an information centre in Canada House which I remember Sir Dennis Greenhill praising as being a means of getting some quick factual information. But certainly the dealings between Canada and Britain on this were conducted through here, between here and the Department of External Affairs. That was where much of, most took place. I should of course mention here, perhaps I dor't want this to be overlooked that another element of ihe Brit: Ac end. in Canada was George 'Ehitebes.J dispatching John Dunrossil, the Head of Chancery, to take charge •"•" sp Montreal office as soon as Jasper was kidnapped and I think that was a very wise thing to have acre. Dunrossil had only c^er in Canada with his wife for about three v/eeks or so and had just in fact been entertained by the Crosses on his v/ay through Montreal a little time before and therefore we did have ;:• fair, but he did have a good deal of experience in this kind of work in his past life and so we had for him, I know George Whitehead had, and certainly I found that tc have John stationed in Montreal and therefore of course riecpp SEPS Py is 'ouch v/ith the Montreal or Quebec police and so on was a ver;/ important • lement in our thinking because, y-.r knov, E'e Montreal - Quebec - Ottawa syndrome was an element in this whole busiresr-:. Mrs, ip.Pkterd: It would be very indiscreet I suppose to ask if it were, in an effort to,.. .PniEueiire the pv-bec Government or more as a listening post.... Sir Peter: No, no it wouldn't be indiscreet to ask that,Jean, because I can give you a perfectly clear answer. There was no question about dealing with the Quebec Government at all. I mean, it was a listening post operation, we did in fact, John being a very sensible guy, got on in perfectly good terns with Jerome Choquette and with some of the leading policemen but there's no question about dealing pith thve Quebec Government. So far as this crisis v/as concerned, our dealings were with the Canadian Government here in Ottawa. I say that very clearly and very categorically and I v/ould Like here to say quite flatly that the main channel of communication was Ed P.i tohie himself. I always have a vivid recollection of arriving at the Ottawa airport and being very kindly met by Ed, whom I'd never met before as a matter of fact. He's an extraordinary man, I mean he made himself available to me at any hour of the day or night really, and we used to see each other frequently of course. Sometimes once or twice a day until that memorable moment when he woke me up in the early hours of that December morning and told me that at last you were on to, quite defintely on to where Cross was. Even though, although you know that its very difficult to hear his voice as I understand it. So that this is, and again I'd lik to say that th; r is the sort of, you know, an element of the sort of Canadian-British link 010117 �^^ ^P that one could get on to those terms with someone like Ed Ritchie. I did in fact, during the time that I v/as here, of course I was paying, delivering my letters to the Prime Minister, letters of credence to the Prime Minister, had some speech with him and of course talked in general terms about the whole business and of course to Mitchell Sharp, I paid my first calls to him.. Bu.t I'd like especially, to when I first arrived I of course called on as many ministers as possible,as quickly as possible. The person in a sense, from whom I learned the most during my course about FIQ mentality was Mr. Pelletier. Mr. Pelletier, perhaps characteristically, kept met me waiting for three quarters of an hour because of a lot cf other things, he ther. kept the next person waiting for, well this is probably rather indiscreet, for at least another hour. But he is intensely interesting on, you knov/, the whole mentality of the FLQ. Thats one of the most memorable discussions and interviews that Ive had, I'd like to say thato And then of course, I used to go to the Operations Room in External and my chaps of course did very often. McConville was the Acting Head of Chancery. He used to go over there regularly once a day or more often. Of course part of it is the geographical location, I mean the proximity. You know, the Department going over there might make it more difficult, but the fact that I was unpacked in the Chateau Laurier, and of course Rosemary hadnft arrived by then. I was in a room with a lot of RCMP guys next door and oh I mean my geographical boundaries were really for my first two or three weeks here were the Chateau Laurier, this room and Ed's office in the East Block; punctuated three times a week by going down to visit Barbara Cross in Montreal. I went to see her the second day that I came here and the third day I went down to Mr. Laporte's funeral and I think I had almost as large an escort as Mr. Trudeau had. I had a Bren gun carrier in front and a Bren gun carrier behind and an extremely tough cookie from the Royal Canadian Regiment from whom I learned a great deal about the lower echelons of the Canadian Armed Forces as we drove along. Mrs. Amyot: When you arrived here in Ottawa, the general feeling of the people in the office here in Ottawa, was equal or did you feel that some people, I mean without any names, but you know, did you have the impression that some people would have thought differently? Sir Peter: Absolutely not, absolutely not. There was no, I mean I can lay my hand on my heart and say that there was no differences in opinion between us. George Whitehead's handling of the policy which he handed over to me when I arrived was reflected in his little team, McConville and Noakes and others and we were all concerned, we were obviously concerned with the question of, I. suppose primarily being English chaps, with the future of Jasper Cross, with trying to see how far these strange messages could be interpreted and that sort of thing and....but in no way did we dissent on the handling of the matter by the Canadian Government. Mrs.Halstead: I wonder if we could return for a moment to what you were, to your comments on your talk with Mr. Pelletier. Sir Peter: Mrs.Halstead: Yes. . . . a n d could you t e l l us what h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the FLQ was o r 0 . . 0 o . . . 6 010118 �- 6Sir Peter: • Well Jean, I am not, I mean, I think that was really talking about these kind of people. I don't think it would be proper for me, as a diplomat would it, to comment on what a Cabinet Minister told me and I don't in fact remember any very sharp terms, precisely what his views were. Let me just say this that I was after all a stranger to Canada, I was the Under-Secretary looking after our relations in these parts but I really didn't know a great deal about the FLQ mentality. I wanted to, I was concerned to see how far they would go in a domestic operation. Whether they had any ties with Algeria, training in Algeria and so on. I merely got from him good leads on what the young in Quebec were thinking and how so many of them were in a sense automatically separatists before they really started to think and that even the quiet revolution had perhaps not brought along enough people in Canada as such. That is all for you rather jejeune stuff, but for me as a new arrival in Canada it was intensely interesting and of course the other, my other informant, I mean the only person in fact who told me anything about the FLQ crisis before I came was in fact Jasper Cross himself and the story of that was that, and as I say I was mainly concerned with the Middle East. With a bit of Angueilla thrown in and really Middle East, Mid Arab, Israel all the time, every hour of the day and night. But, and I have wide interests and I heard that there was a fellow called Cross about in the office and so I sent for him to ask him why the hell we weren't selling more British motor cars in Montreal you see. He didn't, he wasn't in the least interested in that, he changed the subject after five seconds. Well he did then talk about, gave me a first inkling of the problems of separatism as epitomized by the FLQ. Mrs. Amyot; How long was that before October, 1970? Sir Peter: That was...., I would say perhaps six months before. Mrs. Amyot: ...six months before. Sir Peter: When he came out you see, being Jasper, being the sort of Irish elan or extrovert guy, when he was released the first thing he did long before he talked to Mr. Trudeau on the telephone or anything else, he rang me up you see and said, "reporting for duty Sir". Then the second remark was remarkable. He said, "about that conversation we had in London, I can now give you some more information". When I went down to see him next day, which I hastened to do in the Jewish Hospital in Montreal, he was in his dressing gown and pyjamas and I thought we were going to talk really about the administrative arrangements for his departure and whether or not he was going to be received at number ten and all this kind of thing you see, quite a tricky kind of program. Not at all, he wasn't in the least interested in it, he was quite interested in the -various things which he subsequently told all of you. I mean, the mentality of LanctSt and Carbonneau and their wives and so on, and how far his views had been borne out. But I mean, I don't want to enlarge on what he said to me because he, I know talked to all of you in pretty fair detail about his thoughts on the FLQ. Mrs.Halstead: So you were working really quite, quite closely, all of your team? Sir Peter: Yes. Mrs. Halstead: . . . a n d quite closely with the Operations Centre? . . . 7 010119 �- 7 Sir Peter: We were, and I think that was, I mean, I think that it was terribly, terribly important and terribly sort of...., I mean I think as we saw it, it was very lucky perhaps a bit fortuitous, but very lucky that the Operations Centre had been established not long before. I believe that's right. Certainly, I mean I've sat in on interdepartmental meetings occasionally with which all the elements concerned, the RCMP and other departments as well as External were sitting around the table and 1 think it worked extraordinarily v/ell considering it tiad only just been formed. Mrs.Halstead: In what way was that fortuitous? Sir Peter: Well haven't you only just formed it? Mrs .Halstead: Yes, but I, oh I see just because it was there or had been formed at all. Sir Peter: Yes, it was very lucky it was just formed then, and I know that Ed found it of great value having it, you know, a hundred-ten yards away from his own office. He was always peeking in there to see how things were going along, all this was rather, well again this could only be done in a rather family atmosphere of External and I would like to think the family atmosphere that exists may not have existed until then but certainly has existed since1 betwreen us and External. From that date comes the time that I absolutely, flatly refuse to show my pass whenever I am in External. I just showed it once and its always been respected ever since. Pauline fixed it. (Laughter) We're about number nine. Mrs .Halstead: About number nine, yes. Sir Peter: I mean, you see one of the agitating things that we had to talk to each other about was interpretation of messages. It was the interpretation of messages you see, I mean how could you know what was intended to be implied /tactical by this or that and how could you react to this or that at the/moment. There was a great deal of discussion on that and your legal people and so on. I think Andre Bissonnette played a, played an important part in this, he was doing some work and I well remember Marc Lalonde coming in and joining in a group at one point, having something to say about some French message and the way it was termed and its phraseology. It was most interesting to see the machine working. Mrs.Amyot: Sir Peter: Mrs .Amyot: Sir Peter: Did you have a feeling that, in the letter that Mr. Cross wrote that there was a kind of information-code or somethiig ? Well. We know that, but did you have any. Well, we endlessly speculated on this. I meai, we twisted it around, you know and turned it upside down we, I mean, one of the things that one always wonders is whether one should in fact establish a sort of code so that if one is kidnapped and you mentioned the word raspberry it means that I am now one and a half miles due north of somewhere or other, but that's in a way too elaborate to do that. But we just wondered, yes of course, endlessly we speculated on the interpretation of letters and phraseology of letters endlessly and messages endlessly, so did you. . . . 8 010120 �- 8 Mrs .Amyot: Yes. Sir P e ^ : Much more then we did. Mrs. Halstead: Well this is one way of not feeling quite so helpless. Sir Peter: Yes, this is true. f Mrs .Halstead: But in fact, Mr. Cross seemed to resent this speculation in the end in that it caused a threat to his life possibly because it was speculated on, so publicly and in the press. Sir Peter: Well...,no Jean no, I think I wouldn't worry about that. I mean don't forget that when Jasper was released he had been through a most ghastly ordeal that's possible to imagine. He had seen his own death announced on television, now that is not at all an agreeable thing to have seen and he.... but I remember him saying to me rather vividly once that he had, I think this was during our time in the Jewish Hospital, he said to me, "I'd arranged in my own mind what it was like to die. The only thing that I was worried about was how Barbara was going to.....what was going to happen to my wife". So you know if you've been through that however much as an Irish elanful or chap you appear, at least on the surface and he was astonishingly calm. Frankly, on the surface when he came out, you know, at that original press conference in Montreal he was calmer then I was. But one didn't realize that there was a tremendous amount of sort of agitation and concern underneath and I would make very, very great allowances for his sort of general feelings. Mrs. Amyot: Did he tell you that at the moment he had the feeling that it was really coming, his own death? Sir Peter: Yes, I think if you see your own death announced on televsion you, even though it isn't quite true yet, its very likely to happen in a matter of time. Thats the really terrifying thing and you see if you then go on sitting for quite a long time looking at the television and nothing else then you do get into a,..., however brave you are, it has a very powerful effect on you. Perhaps you could tell us something about the practical effects of Mrs .Halstead: the War Measures Act. Sir Peter: Yes. Well, as far as I was concerned, to be really flippant first of all on a very unflippant subject, it has enabled me to see a side of, I mean provide a domestic point of view, this was all rather, as it turned out rather good because I could talk to ordinary chaps in the RCMP. I do know from the lower echelons of the RCMP and lower echelons of the Canadian military a great deal about Canada and no arriving diplomat could possbily have in a sense a more poignant introduction but at the same time an introductuion to ordinary people which you would not get. I find that as a personal instance it was well worth the obviously very honest inconvenience of being guarded incessantly which was of course what happened with ones first month or two here and oh for much longer. V/hen we went out to visit outside Ottawa we were guarded incessantly. I remember Rosemary and I in our first visit to Banff we were trying to climb a local hill, or mountain and two gentlemen from the RCMP never left UG out of their sight. In case now of some of the provinces they were far more agitatory obviously then Ottawa and I got to know a very wide conspectus of members of the RCMP, 010121 o �- 9- • policemen, soldiers, etc., etc. Thats a rather flippant comment. But in general, I would share quite honestly the general admiration for that element of Canadian life who hadn't been all that much alarmed until then, i.e. the soldiering. You suddenly found that they were quite useful members of the military and so many military in Canada feel they're irrelevant and they suddenly found they v/ere very relevant in doing a good job and I would have thought, that v/as another, you. know, comment and thought on Canada. As to the need to use the War Measures Act, I could simply make, again a not very profound remark, as an observer, that it v/as the only thing you had to use and I don't, as an observer at the scene subscribe to the view that it v/as using a steam roller to crack a nut. You only had a steam roller, you didn't know whether it was going to be a nut or a time bomb and I am not sure everybody knows that yet. I mean those loud critics, John Turner and others who subsequently with the wisdom of hindsight say, oh it was all far too exaggerated a reaction, I would dispute that very strongly as being one of the minor characters of that scene. Of course, there was no insurrection really or uprising in Quebec, hov/ could there have been say some people but....what.... Mrs.Amyot: It simply seemed to be in the mind of everyone because you say some people have really the impression that people were going to come out in the streets, etc. Sir Peter: Thats it and I think, and I mean this is the remarkable thing, so far as the British themselves were concerned and I say quite clearly this was the first time we'd seen Mr. Trudeau in action and this v/as damned impressive. Mr. Trudeau's, the general view of Mr. Trudeau, you know, in London was that he was highly intelligent but somewhat of a dilettante, an intellectual dilettante of some considerable means in Quebec. Nov/ he was shown as an extremely tough guy, he wasn't going to give way. He emerged as the sort of, to the British observers, as the sort of a very considerable figure, and in so far as a pragmatic relationship between Britain and Canada has evolved, particularly in the way epitomized by Ted Heath and Mr. Trudeau. I think a lot of it was tiny beginnings with them. Mr. Bourassa of course did not fit in those two terms at all, to us, in fact people were wondering how he fitted into the picture. I in fact, again as a sort of credit bonus as I call it, had two interviews with Mr. Bourassa very soon after I arrived which I certainly wouldn't have done. I had an hour with him very soon after I arrived and Jasper was still incarcerated, he v/as very, obviously very shaken and he spoke entirely in French. He was pretty moved by it, you know, not frightened but pretty moved and worried, concerned. Then I saw him not long after Cross had been released and then he was much more relaxed. No its only subsequently that one realized that he's not just there as a product of Harvard business school with rich friends in New York at all. The fact of course as one observes, its not my business its yours, but only in recent months, a year or so, that one realized that he seems to have won however much he may have been ill-attuned in dealing with that sort of crisis, he has seized the one point which really mattered in Quebec which was to attract capital and to transform the economic background and this is the only comment I will make on that but was of course not apparent in all the time we were talking about. . . . 10 010122 �10 Mrs.Halstead: Did you anticipate the invocationrf"the War Measures Act, did you ^^ imagine that it was going to... Sir Peter: Mrs. Amyot: Sir Peter: Well I think it wo\ELd be, and I am just trying to remember the timing of this....c. The day of Laporte's death. Yes, and the answer is probably not because I didn't know enough about it. I was in fact still in London I hadn't really sort of faced up to what it was necessary for me to do. Mrs. Halstead: No of course, and I suppose it probably wasn't discussed in the High Commission as such. Sir Peter: No. I don't think so really, I don't, I mean again our immediate comment on that would be that this is very much your business how you deal with what is primarily a Canadian, a serious, serious Canadian internal problem and we wouldn't presume to give them advice on that matter. It is not our business to do thate Mrs.Halstead: Yes apparently some, some compatriot journalists took a rather different view I guess. Sir Peter: Yes I think I didn't really understand the drift of this question. Nobody in the British High Commission commented on this matter then or I think wish to do so now, it seems awfully unimportant really I would have thought it was some sort of Canadian internal dilemma which got caught in the British newspapers maybe but it made no impression on me at all. I can honestly say that. I talked to John Dunrossil about this and we both, you know, scratched our heads, we were very puzzled about it. Mrs.Halstead: Well it was really apropos with the loss of rights, whether individual rights in Canada, whether it caused a stir in Britain. Sir Peter: No, no I don't think so« Oh I see because of the invocation of the War Measures Act. Yes, yes in the sort of line taken, was it, by the NDP on this. Well how far was that reflected in Britain - not much, not much. I mean I think that if any paper, if any paper would have reflected it the Guardian obviously would do so. But I am really, really on looking back I can't remember any particular line taken by the British press in this sense. Mrs.Amyot: Did you also have, get the feeling that the press here in Canada was putting too much emphasis on the crisis? Sir Peter: V/ell I mean this is, of course you ask a question of a civil servant vho is irritated by the BBC or the CBC as you do here. I mean one often gets intensely irritated with the Canadian press, with the CBC from time to time. There's always a minor risk that something, that some comment in the press, on the CBC would have endangered Cross's life, and one at home was conscious of that. But I mean I would answer emphatically however that I wouldn't have wanted to have seen any greater control of the press . . . 11 010123 �- 11 because therein lies much greater danger. However irritated one gets with the media, for different reasons. The Canadian CBC's attitude on Northern Ireland from time to time, I used to get very irritated indeed by the radio program on Sunday morning which tended to begin with the IRA war song and end with the IRA war song, and I should, suppose I went to see George Davidson about five times about that, but thats the sort of thing that one has to put up with and of course at the end one wouldn't want to put on greater controls. Mrs .Halstead But what about friendly persuasion? Sir Peter: Well friendly persuasion Jean is a tricky thing. Mrs.Halstead: ...and it wasa't something you tried? Sir Peter: Not, well its not, well I mean it v/asn't again for us to deal with the Canadian press on this of course, oh no, I mean we would again expect you to deal with your own press. Certainly we wouldn't, I mean, it would be the worst possible thing for a quote foreign unquote High Commission or Embassy to attempt to do any friendly persuasions on the press, we wouldn't possibly do it. As to how far you did it I don't know but again its jolly tricky with the governments to do that, the press really has got a job to do. It would never have been at all right for us to have gone to the press and say, "hi, you may be endangering Jasper Cross's life". I think we should have, if we had done thi and I think I do remember talking on those lines with friends in External, I mean if anything could have been done there they would have been able to do it, whether you did or not I don't know. Mrs. Amyot: I think the last question on that page was giving you some, I mean it gave you some.... Sir Peter: Yes I saw your reasons and I think in a sense I've answered that, cause I think he was under tremendous strain and, and frankly I am astonished that he remained pretty calm. Quite frankly, also, perhaps the other point I should make in this when I was looking through the questions I would have thought that the excellent information that he gave you all quite outweighed any critical comment he could have made, wouldn't you? Mrs.Halstead: I t wasn't by way of c r i t i c i s m . S i r Peter: No. ...of him or lack of diplomacy on his part that the question arose but Mrs.Halstead: rather whether in fact there were some pes itive suggestions that or some conclusions that Sir Peter: Well this is what on^ I mean you know, when one carried out a postmortem here as I am sure you did in External as to what, is there anything else that one could have done, and you know you might have wondered whether one should have got the people to adopt secret codes which you know would have been recognized by the rest of theEmbassy. I remember we went into this in a rather informal way and we came to the conclusion that it was probably 12 010124 �- 12 conclusion that it was probably too elaborate and as to other things which we did not, which we left undone which we could have done I wasn't myself conscious of anything of that sort but there may have been. That leads us on incidentally to number 14 which, about what, perhaps this has really sort of covered that ground. I would like just to say on that, that we were both really, both you and we, because I think one wants to emphasize this was an early stage in the kidnapping malaise which has since affected the world, quite early, I mean quite early not the first, but it was quite early and we had to adapt to a new, a pretty well new situation and make our policies as we were going along and as I say fortunately that our conclusions were the same. I don't think honestly that we could have improved with the benefit of hindsight on the informal daily consultation, I mean which we had with you, I think thats terribly important. It was personal, it was - I have written' down here which I believe it was, it was personal, it was immediate, and it was informal. I don't think there is any other country then Canada with whom we could have had that, we certainly couldn't have that in the States. I suppose we might have done that in Australia but we couldn't have had this, it would have been much more elaborate in the States. We don't have the same kind of personal ties with the United States, you look surprised, oh no this is a fact. I stress those words - personal, immediate and informal these three things you see. I'd like also to put, to mention again John Dunrossil's operation in Montreal where we had very good liaison. I know it to, I mean I am well aware of some of the problems which you necessarily had with the provincial government because of gang raids, federal-provincial problems and the RCMP quote strong arm anglo-saxon police force unquote it isn't like that now and it wasn't really then. But I mean there persons who said that and our own relations with the Montreal and Quebec police. As I understand it, the relations on thevery highest level between the three police forces were very good and the relations on the riot squad or whatever it was, was pretty good on the lower, on the actual chaps who pursued criminals. On the medium range it is very necessarily understandably and its not unknown between the Scotch and the Ireland provincial police forces too I can tell you, there were some frictions I understand this was not really, I think are we going to talk to John Dunrossil at some stage? Yes. He will give, you will be able to enlarge a bit more on that and he'll, you know, he'll be farily nimble with giving his views from this and that source but as, I would like to emphasize again which he certainly will do but his role in Montreal was that of a listerner, a passer-on-er. I don't want anybody to get under any impression whatever that we were doing any business as such with the provincial government. Its far too tricky, an attitude of federal-provincial relations it would have been quite foolish of us even if we had thought of doing so but we didn't really. I mean it had to be, our tie had to be inescapably and completely with Ed Ritchie and External. If we'd adopted any other method we'd have only added to your troubles. So that all Dunrossil, all John Dunrossil was doing was, where at the scene of the crime and keeping Barbara reasonably happy and getting his information passed on to us from the Quebec, the Montreal police,tlie RCMP and Jerome Choquette's office, dl of which he did. 1 A? a a a -., 010125 �- 13 Mrs.Halstead: 3ir ^Rer: Yes. I just have one other thitg to say incidentally and one other point to make which I'd forgotten to make. I would have thought, well just one other obvious point really cause its only a comment on your own attitude. I mean, I think you talked about your firmness in all this but of course it wasn't firmness alone, it v/as mixed v/ith theCuban loop-hole. This was again dead right. I mean if you were just firm and said no, no, no then v/e would have lost Jasper Cross. In fact of course it v/as firmness mixed v/ith the Cuban loop-hole, and I've always imagined, I don't know, I didn't know him then and I've never actually discussed this with him - my Cuban colleague must have been damned helpful. I don't know, I've never ever really discussed it with him but I knov/ from talks with Ed Ritchie and others that they were very forthcoming. So it was firmness coupled with a loop-hole and that got Cross out. Mrs.Halstead: Sir Peter: I understand that your police.,... You feel that its a loop-hole that should be used in the future? Well I think, yes I think in a way you have to, of course each circumstance Jean is different, each circumstance is different. I think you have to, you may well have to adopt some sort of tactical loop-hole of that kind. That was the one that you decided upon which as I say got Cross out. But the circumstances must vary each time. Mrs.Amyot: It certainly depends on the person who is kidnapped as well as other events. Sir Peter: Yes, what are the demands, what other countries would be prepared to be helpful and what are the kidnappers like and how far they are dictated to by quote outside sources unquote, or how far are they, are they purely local, a local business or are they just cells which are within the body politic not dominated by outside sources. /hrs. Halstead: Could I ask if, a question about the British police, I think some British police came here during the crisis perhaps to assist the RCMP. Sir Peter: I don't think any British police came to assist the RCMP but I think they had a visiting group which fortuitously happened to be going around dealing with problems of this kind or which chap, or which, I think it was during this time they v/ere going around dealing with sort of sabotage, kidnapping problems and happened to be here and the group. There was a policeman and a soldier and the policeman happened to be Robert Mark, who is now the head of Scotland Yard, he is obviously sort of a tremendous chap, but I don't think there was any collaboration with the British polio© on the spot at all. It may be tliat things like Interpol and you know internal police consultation as to whether there was any outside, again outside influence I dare say that we may have helped v/ith advice on that but I am not aware of any British police participation in the, what was happening. I say as an old Home Office man, the Home Office in our country looks after the police, the police have a fear for the press really they can never really, they can never really tell anybody what they're doing because they then tell the criminals what they're doing and so one's heart bled really for the RCMP and the Montreal and Quebec City Police while they were being pretty severely criticized for being quote slow unquote but when you look back they did act quickly. I think to have found a diplomat in the space of time v/as a pretty considerably good professional job, I really do. Because it was not eacy, the role of the police in Montreal, I don't knov/ enough 010126 ... 1 �- 14 about the methods used, I know something about the methods used v/hich you probably know equally well and I am sure know a lot more then I do but it was a really good professional, police professional job done in pretty quick time as we v/ould say. Anglo-Canadian relations. Naught but good, naught but good is one that, because I mean, you know, its well, I mean it showed that once again that v/e could collaborate on this sort of personal, informal basis very quickly, h. la First and Second V/orld Wars, h la lots of other problems. You know the first week or two of one's life here was intensely interesting. I mean, I got the entree to contact I don't know how many people very quickly, and I got to know Ed very quickly indeed. Ear quicker then I would have done in the normal way. I got to see ministers which I vould never have got, I meanl v/as telling you just now about getting to terms v/ith Bourassa, he's not the easiest person in the v/orld to get to know, v/ell I can't say that I did get to know him well, but I got the opportunity to meet him and I think its demonstrated a domestic trend, friendly family, an admiration between us, which I have no doubt would happen again under similar circumstances. Mrs.Halstead: The same technique would be used really, basically a reliance on friendship and understanding. Sir Peter: With a minimum of formality. Mrs.Amyot: A minimum, yes thats it. Mrs. Halstead: Well you've covered the territory with great clarity. Sir Peter: Well I think we've covered all the points Jean, I.... Mrs.Halstead: You've certainly contributed some fascinating insights for which we are extremely grateful. Sir Peter: Well it was a joy to do it. THP END 010127 �Sir Peter Hayman - October Crisis, 1970 1. What was the atmosphere in London before your arrival in Ottawa on the day of Mr. Laporte's death. 2. Was this crisis of pre-emptive concern to the Foreign Office? 3. Were you privy to the import of the discussion in cabinet (in London) on Y^j October 6th? 4. Was there general agreement in Whitehall on the broad line of policy toward the kidnappers? 5. Did'you have extensive consultations with Charles Ritchie before leaving London? 6. Was there dissension within the High Commission in Ottawa about the line the Canadian Government should take? 7* Did your government assume that the Canadian Government would have changed their basically "firm'1 policy if urged to do so? \E 0 8. With whom did you deal primarily in Ottawa? 9. (0fA Did you make suggestions to the Task Force or to members of the government about the conduct of policy? 10. Did the invocation of the War Measures Act make a practical difference to your work? 11. The Manchester Guardian of October 17th suggested that the Canadian Government was playing the same game as the kidnappers by taking hostages. Would you care to comment on this? 12. Did you consider recommending some form of greater government control over the press as a protective measure for Cross? s 13. In your view, how justifiable were Cross's criticisms of the British and Canadian Governments? 010128 �14* What suggestions would you now feel, with the benefit of hindsight, might usefully have been made? 15. What was the affect of the experience on British-Canadian relations? 010129 �Did you consider that it would hare been a desireable tactic not to publish any of the FLQ communiques? Why do you think the kidnappers held on to Cross for so long after the death of Laporte? Did you calculate that Laporte's kidnapping diminished Cross's chances for survival? Did you interpret M. Bourassa's speech of October 10th as temporising or a ruse, or rather as a genuine prelude to negotiation with the FLQ? How did the kidnappers obtain Serpesil without the police knowing about it? Did you encourage this line of investigation? What details in the search did you feel were overlooked by Canadian authorities that it would have been desireable to include or consider? (For example, you initiated steps to attend to the moral and physiacal well-being of Cross immediately on his realease since this aspect had thereto fore been overlooked.) �Did you feel a loss of confidence in the police at the moment of Lortie's discovery? Were you informed by the Canadian Government of the imminence of the War Measures Proclamation before the Prime Minister's pronouncement? Have you any comments to amke on the visit of Mr. Sharp tp London November 25th? The British High Commission reported Mrs. Cross's suggestion that the police the kidnappers be offered^reward directly should they themselves come forward. If this suggestion had been followed do you think it would have had the desired results? (A propos the statement "The British Government would feel bound to support any last minute appeal made by Mrs. Cross.'*) Did you have occasion to restrain Mrs. Cross from appealing to the Canadian Government about the War Measures Act lest it have an unfortunate effect on her husbands*s fate? �How familiar were you with the developments during the crisis before your arrival in Cuba? Were you satidfied with the arrangements which Mr. Warden made with the Cubans before your arrival? Was the possibility of the Felquistes moving to another country discussed with the Cubans in Havana? Was the question of subsistance money ever raised with the Cubans after the arrival of the Felquistes? 010132 �Hayman Tape 1. Sir Peter had been dealing with the hijackers in the Middle East before coming to Canada. 2. He came to Canada earlier than he had anticipated, breaking into a holiday, but delayed his arrival for a few days so as not to give the impression of a lack of confidence in the Canadaian Government. 3. He did not attend the cabimet meeting on October 6th, but did talk with the minister about it afterward. 4. He is a close friend of Sir Denis Greenhill, and together they had several ,balka with Sir Alec. Charles Wiggens ran Canadian affairs. 5. There was no dissent from Labour benches on policy. 6. Canada House ran an information centre which Greenhill praised highly. 7. The only British-Quebec Government relations were those between Dunrossil and Choquette. 8. Sir Peter's main contact was A.E.R., though he had a talk with Trudeau, Sharp, and Pelletir as well as Bourassa (after the affair). 9. He found the geographical set-up a great asset. 10. He did not want to disclose much about his discussion with Pelletier. 11. He had talked in London before coming with Cross on the subject of the FLQ. He talked to him again on the subject in the Jewish Hospital. 12. He was present at some Task Force meetings. 13. He stressed the family atmosphere between the British and Canadians as an important aspect of their policy. 010133 �14. He noted that the British had considered developing a code for people who were kidnapped and in a similar situation, but gave it up as impractical. 15. He said that OF COURSE THERE HAD BffiHUO APPREHENDED INSURRECTION, but indicated some confusion about the legal implications of the WMA. 16. He found the M.G. reference to the Canadian Government's taking hostages insignificant and not indicative of British opinion. 17. He volunteered that Bourassa had been "ill-attuned to the crisis." 010134 �Interview with Sir Peter Hayman March 7, 1974 Sir Peter requested and was given written confirmation of the confidentiality of the Interview, It appeared that he had discussed the advisability of the undertaking with Whitehall during his recent visit to London. He and his colleagues in London ware particularly concerned that we not ask to interview Mr. Cross. In contrast to his usual off-hand approach, Sir Peter was rather formal and serious In his presentation. He made it clear that ha had consulted Lord Dunrossil on the answers, which were hand-written, and followed closely though not always read. Before beginning, he carefully ascertained the following: (l) who was going to ask the questions, Andree or Jean, (2) whether the typewritten list would be followed exactly, (3) what had been said in the pro-taped introduction. (Wa than re-taped it In his presence.) Although ha had previously suggested that the interview take place over a drink at Earnscliffe in the presence of his wife and John Halstead, circumstances dictated otherwise. (Lady H. had the flu and John H. was abroad.) The interview took place in Sir Peter's office, accentuating its formatily, and introducing considerable background noise. Nevertheless it was undoubtedly a more suitable situation than the salon at Earnscliffe. We were slightly nervous, and had some difficulty in setting up the machines became at that moment we seemed to be all thumbs. 010135 �The "all-thumbs" syndrome seemed to affect Jean's capacity for asking articulate questions, though Andrea held up her end extremely well. We should have had a formal, or at least a prepared conclusion to the interview. It seemed conspicuously lacking. The interview, which lasted exactly one hour, was followed by the entry of Lord Dunrossil and a round of drinks which were quaffed by us four standing up, cocktail party style. The "all-thumbs" syndromestruck again during the moment of packing up. We somehow swept Sir Peter's copy of the questions together with a letter written by Jean requesting the interview, into our security briefcase, and carried them off with our own papers. As soon as we noticed the odstake (the following afternoon) we Immediately telephoned Sir Peter's secretary to alert her, wrote a letter of apology to Sir Peter, and delivered it and the documents to the High Commission by hand. 010136 �You are very kind, Sir Peter Hayman, to allow the Department of External Affairs to benefit from your experience during the crisis of October, 1970. It seems appropriate somehow that on the eve of your departure from Canada you are speaking to us about a situation that developed on the eve of your arrival. Shall we begin, then before your arrival in Canada by asking you to describe the atmosphere in London immediately following the kidnapping of Mr. Cross. �OCTOBER CRISIS A Taped interview with Sir Peter Hayman. Mrs. Amyot: It is very nice of you Sir Peter Hayman to allow the Department of External Affairs to benefit from your experience during the crisis of • . October, 1970. It seems appropriate somehow that on the eve of your departure from Canada you are speaking to us about the situation that developed on the eve of your arrival. t Shall we begin then, for the first question, before your arrival in Canada by asking you to describe the atmosphere in London immediately following the kidnapping of Mr. Cross. Sir Peter: Yes,of course I'll do that, and I absolutely echo v/hat you say about the intense interest of this whole business really in my life and in my wife's life. It is appropriate I think to be talking on the eve of our departure, after the happiest period we've ever spent in the diplomatice service in Canada, and about the period three and a half years ago when we came here. The first question you ask me is about the interest and the atmosphere in London before one's arrival, and I v/ould say there of course a great deal •\'~ of interest and concern in this whole case. .Partly because of Jasper Cross, ^e was a British diplomat who'd been kidnapped. In the sense it was right at the beginning of the great kidnapping era. But there was also really genuinely concern about the effect of the PLQ crisis on the stability of one of our oldest and closest friends - Canada. So that there were the two strands; on the one hand there was great concern about a British national, or about a British diplomat, but also concern about the effect or. Canada, the political effect on Canada. Mrs. Halstead: What sort of effect did you think there might have been? Sir Peter: This was very much the effect that I'd expected of course. Mrs.Halstead: When you were speaking of having the effects. Sir Peter: On Canada you mean? Mrs.Halstead: Yes. Sir Peter: The effect on Canada, one must always, at the beginning of ones time here, one, knowing what one did about the problems of Quebec separatism, one was naturally concerned to see how far this kind of potentially serious threat would be met by the Government in Ottawa,or and indeed by Mr. Bourassa. Mr. Bourassa was a relatively unknown person in London^ |few I dare say could remember the name of the Quebec Premier. Mr. Trudeau was better known of course, he'd been in London not too long before as a, as leader of the Canadian delegation to the Commonwealth Conference in 1969« fie made a lot of friends there. But it was not understood as to how he would in fact face up to a rather special problem of this sort. Those were the kinds of thoughts that were certainly milling around amongst the people that I talked to in London. 010138 �- 2 Mrs.Halstead: Sir Peter: So that the, the rapid response of the Government v/as reassuring? Oh indeed. Yes indeed, of course it was, very much so. I mean there was a great deal of satisfaction, I think, on the way the reaction took place. You ask_.,of course, whether in fact the,.how far was Britian concerned with other things at the same timet&nd on that I think I should say that I'd been dealing up till then with the Middle East. I was the Under-Secretary looking after the Middle East and also North and South America and the United Nations and there were a good many other problems on our mind. One of the curiously sort of preludec,to this was the hi-jacking of all those airplanes in Jordan, ia which I personally had been very much concerned with, dealing with. And then the additional horror of course was the capture and the death of Mr. Laporte. It was on the day of Mr. Laporte's death that I arrived in Canada. I should say that of course the moment I heard of Jasper's kidnapping I wanted immediately to come out to Canada^even though that would have been several months, no several weeks or a month or two in advance of my time here. I heard about it when I was staying with a friend,, \ay wife and I were staying with a very old friend in South Wales, doing some fishing}and I came down to breakfast,and he in turn told me about this,and I immediately telephoned the Foreign Office and said I'd like to go straight away. But 1 think reasonably enough we both felt and everybody felt,George Whitehead who was my deputy and the acting Charge d'affaire, felt that if I'd rushed out immediately that would have implied some sort of comment on how Canada was actually handling this crisis, and that of course we didn't want to give. We wanted to be as normal as possible over this. I would like in fact to pay a tribute at this time to the work of George Whitehead who handled the early part of the crisis from the British point- of view with a considerable amount of skill and firmness. Mrs. Halstead: There's reference in the files on the kidnapping to the discussion in Cabinet in London immediately, the day following the kidnapping. Could you tell us anything about that? Sir Peter: Well, British officials on the whole don't attend Cabinet meetings. I didn't go to any Cabind; meeting on this. But I did in fact talk to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alex Douglas Home on two occasions, three occasions following discussions which he must have had with Ministers.and it was then during that time that the British Government decided that the whole affair was a matter for you to handle - a matter for Canada to handle. It so happened I think that our respective attitudes on the subject of the kidnapping were very much the same, which obviously made it easier for us. There was no division of opinion as to the fact that one should not in general give way to kidnappers, so thatthe general approach was the same. But our tactical approach, quite clearly, was that it would be quite improper. I certainly think that the propriety would be quite wrong and not at all useful for the British Government to take any initiative in this. The hand had to be played by the Canadian Government. It was Mr. Laporte, it was the FLQ crisis, it was very much a matter of domestic concern to Canada and this was the attitude in London. ' i I think in a way it would be foolish not to emphasize, this is partly because of our old friendship and Canada's not just another country. I 010139 �mean Canada and Britain have had these kind^of problems^I mean World War problems and all these kinckof problems.4nd I think it made it easier if you like,ftj^.the British Ministers to feel that Canada was handling this in some way, especially as we agreed with that way, for us to go along with that, because it was Canada. I think I should emphasize that as v/ell. If this had been Mauritania or Transilvania where we didn't know well the principle people concerned>we should naturally have found it more difficult. Mrs. Amyot: Would you have felt that it would have been more a Canadian affair than a Quebec affair if for instance Laporte would not have been kidnapped? Sir Peter: No, I don't think so. I mean, I think that the, I mean that the element of Mr. Laporte's kidnapping and death clearly made it an even more difficult political problem for both Ottawa and Quebecjobviously. Therefore, it made it even more a matter of important internal political concern to Canada in our view as we saw it from London, (end therefore, it was not at all just a question of a British diplomat being kidnapped. It was obviously posing a considerable internal political problem for Canada;,and the fact that Mr. Laporte w/as, I suppose the most considerable man in Mr. Bourassa's Cabinet, in fact the only one in Bourassa's Cabinet of any political experience! and some would say Mr. Bourassa's rival, things like that, something of that sort,, "^his is what one observes from afar. Obviously, as I say, it posed a, some very major problems, and you know, and his addition made them more serious. Mrs.Halstead: So the feeling in V/hitehall was more or less unanimous was it about the policy? Sir Peter: Yes, yes. I never found any differences in Whitehall. I should say, Jean, that I mean on this I was instructed by the senior official, the permanent under-secretary, the Ed Ritchie of Whitehall who was Sir Dennis Greenhill, who was almost my closest friend in the foreign service, j^nd then as I say, both he and I went to see Sir Alex on two or three occasions,pnd the day to day work of course was carried out by the Department which dealt with Canada and the United States which was under the direction of Mr. Charles Wiggin, who was really tremendously expert on this and did a great deal. I mean it was endless consultation to and fro, endless talk to and fro« ^ot really consultation, because I think we'd all agreed on the line^ut endless factual information passing to and fro between the North American Department and the FCO under Charles Wiggin and at that time,George Whitehead here, which I was privy to and joined in, of course. Mrs. Halstead: ....and so there wasn't very much discussion, I mean within the country apart from Whitehall Sir Peter: About...., no again I think looking back and thinking about press comment, of which there was a great deal, I don't remember any, any general feelings of dismay over the line being taken on the whole. I think the British maintained a fairly cool attitude on this. There was, a member of Jasper's family in Ireland, I don't know whether it v/as a reltion of hers or his who was inclined to say why is nothing more being done', are we moving as fast as we should, etc., etc A' But I don't remember any other examples of that. This was in fact after I was out here', so this was at a later time, a later time scale. �_ 4 Mrs. Halstead: Sir Peter: But it wasn't as a political No, no, oh no there was certainly no dissent from the Labour benches on this at all. Mrs. Halstead: Most of the discussions between Canadians and British were carried on here I suppose, were they? Sir Peter: Most of those discussions were carried on here. I did in fact, you ask a question-I know^the back of your mind rather, you ask a question about how far Canada House was involved. I know that Charles Ritchie with whom I'd had two or three talks was very well Ep to date with factual information-you knowjthe various, those awful wireless messages and things, and press messages which kept on coming out. I think Charles established some form or, not exactly a war room, but an information centre in Canada House which I remember Sir Dennis Greenhill praising as being a means of getting some quick factual information. But certainly the dealings between Canada and Britain on this were conducted through here, between here and the Department of External Affairs. That was where much of, most took place. I should of course mention here, perhaps I don't want this to be overlooked that pnother element of the British end in Canada was George Whitehead dispatching John Dunrossil, the Head of Chancery, to take charge o" the Montreal office as soon as Jasper was kidnapped,ftndI think that was a very wise thing to have done. Dunrossil had only been in '"anada v/ith his wife for about three weeks or so and had just in fact been entertained by the Crosses on his way through Montreal a little tine before and therefore we did have a fair, but he did have a good deal of experience in this kind of work in his past life and so we had for him, I know George Whitehead had, and certainly I found that to have John stationed in Montreal and therefore of course necessarily ii. 'ouch v/ith the Montreal or Quebec police and so on was a ver;,' important clement in our thinking because, you knov/, the Montreal - Quebec - Ottawa syndrome was an element in this whole business, Mrs. Halstead: It would be very indiscreet I suppose to ask if it were, in an effort to...influence the Quebec Government or more as a listening post.... Si?" Peter: No, no it wouldn't be indiscreet to ask that,Jean, because I can give you a perfectly clear answer. There was no question about dealing with the Quebec Government at all. I mean, it v/as a listening post operation* Uze did in fact, John being a very sensible guy, got on in perfectly good terns with Jerome Choquette, and with some of the leading policemen but there's no question about dealing vrith the Quebec Government. So far as this crisis v/as concerned, our dealings were with the Canadian Government here in Ottawa. I say that very clearly and very categorically and I would like here bo say quite flatly that the main channel of communication was Ed Ritchie himself. I always have a vivid recollection of arriving at the Ottawa airport and being very kindly met by Ed, whom I'd never met before.as a matter of fact. He's an extraordinary man* I mean he made himself available to me at any hour of the day or night really, and we used to see each other ^ c .frequently of course, -Sometimes once or twice a day,until that memorable moment when he woke me up in the early hours of that December morning and told me that at last you were on to, quite defintely on to where Cross was. Even though, although you know that its very difficult to hear his voice ! as I understand it. So that this island again I'd like to say that this is the sort of, you know, an element of the sort of Canadian-British link . . . 5 010141 �- 5that one could get on to those terms with someone like Ed Ritchie. I did in fact, during the time that I was here, of course I was paying, delivering my letters to the Prime Minister, letters of credence to the Prime Minister, had some speech with him.and of course talked in general terms about the whole business, and of course to Mitchell Sharp^.1 paid my first calls to him. But I'd like especially^ to-when I first arrived I of course called on as many ministers as possible",as quickly as possible. The person in a sense, from whom I learned the most during my course about FLQ mentality was Mr. Pelletier. Mr. Pelletier, perhaps characteristically, kept met me waiting for three quarters of an hour because of a lot of other things. Ee then kept the next person waiting for, well this is probably rather indiscreet, for at least another hour. But he is intensely interesting on, you knov:, the whole mentality of the FLQ. Thats one of the most memorable discussions and interviews that iVe had# I'd like to say thato And then of course, I used to go to the Operations Room in External, and my chaps of course did very often. McConville was the Acting Head of Chancery. He used to go over there regularly once a day or more often. Of course part of it is the geographical location, I mean the proximity. You know, the Department going over there might make it more difficult, but the fact that I was unpacked in the Chateau Laurier^ and of course Rosemary hadn!t arrived by then. I was in a room with a lot of RCMP guys next door,^nd oh,I mean my geographical boundaries were really for my first two or three weeks here were the Chateau Laurier, this room and Ed's office in the East Block; punctuated three times a week by going down to visit Barbara Cross in Montreal. I went to see her the second day that I came here^and the third day I went down to Mr. Laporte's funeral.jluid I think I had almost as large an escort as Mr. Trudeau had. I had a Bren gun carrier in front and a Bren gun carrier behind_,and an extremely tough cookie from the Royal Canadian Regiment from whom I learned a great deal about the lower echelons of the Canadian Armed Forces as we drove along. Mrs. Amyot: When you arrived here in Ottawa, the general feeling of the people in the office here in Ottawa, was equal or did you feel that some people, I mean without any names, but you know, did you have the impression that some people would have thought differently? Sir Peter: Absolutely not, absolutely not. There was no, I mean I can lay my hand on my heart and say that there was no differences in opinion between us. George Whitehead's handling of the policy^,which he handed over to me when I arrivedjwas reflected in his little team, McConville and Noakes and others, ^nd we were all concerned, we were obviously concerned with the question of, I suppose primarily being English chaps, with the future of Jasper Cross, with trying to see how far these strange messages could be interpreted and that sort of thing and....but in no way did we dissent on the handling of the matter by the Canadian Government. Mrs.Halstead: I wonder if we could return for a moment to v/hat you were, to your comments on your talk with Mr. Pelletier. Sir Peter: Mrs.Halstead: Yes. . . . a n d could you t e l l us what h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the FLQ was o r 0 . . 0 8 . . . 6 010142 �Sir Peter: Well Jean, I am not, I mean, I think that was really talking about these kind of people. I don't think it would be proper for me, as a diplomat would it, to comment on what a Cabinet Minister told me,and I don't in fact /^remember/any very sharp terms, precisely what his views were. Let me just say this that I was after all a stranger to Canada, I was the Under-Secretary looking after our relations in these parts, but I really didn't know a great deal about the FLQ mentality. I wanted to, I was concerned to see how far they would go in a domestic operation. Whether they had any ties with Algeria, training in Algeria and so on. I merely got from him good leads on what the young in Quebec were thinking and how so many of them were in a sense automatically separatists before they really started to think) and that even the quiet revolution had perhaps not brought along enough people in Canada as such. That is all for you rather jejeune stuff, but for me, as a new arrival in Canadajit was intensely interesting.^nd of course the other, my other informant, I mean the only person in fact who told me anything about the FLQ crisis before I came was in fact Jasper Cross;himself^ j^pd the story of that was thai^Eand as I say I was mainly concerned with the Middle East.Op(Iith a bit of Angueilla thrown in'and really Middle East, Mid Arab, Israel all the time, every hour of the day and nighlL But, and I have wide interests/ and I heard that there was a fellow called Cross about in the officet|^nd so I sent for him to ask him why the hell we weren't selling more British motor cars in Montreal you see. He didn't, he wasn't in the least interested in that, \%e changed the subject after five seconds. Well he did then talk about, gave me a first inkling of the problems of separatism as epitomized by the FLQ. Mrs. Amyotj How long was that before October, 1970? Sir Peter: That was...., I would say perhaps six months before. Mrs. Amyot: ...six months before. Sir Peter: When he came out you see, being Jasper, being the sort of Irish elan or extrovert guy, when he was released the first thing he did long before he talked to Mr. Trudeau on the telephone or anything else, he rang me up you see and said, "reporting for duty Sir". Then the second remark was remarkable. He said, "about that conversation we had in London, I can now give you some more information". When I went down to see him next day, which I hastened to do in the Jewish Hospital in Montreal, he was in his dressing gown and pyjamas and I thought we were going to talk really about the administrative arrangements for his departure and whether or not he was going to be received at number ten and all this kind of thing you see, quite a tricky kind of program. Not at all, he wasn't in the least interested in it, he was quite interested in the various things which he subsequently told all of you. I mean, the mentality of LanctSt and Carbonneau and their wives and so on, and how far his viewrs had been borne out. But I mean, I don't want to enlarge on what he said to me because he, I know talked to all of you in pretty fair detail about his thoughts on the FLQ. Mrs.Halstead: So you were working really quite, quite closely, all of your team? Sir Peter: Yes. Mrs. Halstead: ...and quite closely with the Operations Centre? *010143 �-7 Sir Peter: We were, and I think that was, I mean, I think that it was terribly, terribly important and terribly sort of...., I mean I think as we saw it, it was very lucky perhaps a bit fortuitous, but very lucky that the Operations Centre had been established not long before. I believe that's right. Certainly, I mean I've sat in on interdepartmental meetings occasionally with which all the elements concerned, the RCMP and other departments as well as External were sitting around the table and 1 think it worked extraordinarily v/ell considering it toad only just been formed. Mrs.Halstead: In what way was that fortuitous? Sir Peter: Well haven't you only just formed it? Mrs.Halstead: Yes, but I, oh I see just because it was there or had been formed at all. Sir Peter: Yes, it was very lucky it was just formed then, and I know that Ed found it of great value having it, you know, a hundred-ten yards away from his own office. He was always peeking in there to see how things were going along, all this was rather, well again this could only be done in a rather family atmosphere of External and I would like to think the family atmosphere that exists may not have existed until then but certainly has existed since" between us and External. From that date comes the time that I absolutely, flatly refuse to show my pass whenever I am in External. I just showed it once and its always been respected ever since. Pauline fixed it. (Laughter) We're about number nine. Mrs .Halstead: Sir Peter: /tactical Mrs .Amyot: Sir Peter: Mrs .Amyot: Sir Peter: About number nine, yes. I mean, you see one of the agitating things that we had to talk to each other about was interpretation of messages. It was the interpretation of messages you see, I mean how could you know what was intended to be implied by this or that and how could you react to this or that at the/moment. There was a great deal of discussion on that and your legal people and so on. I think Andre Bissonnette played a, played an important part in this, he was doing some work and I well remember Marc Lalonde coming in and joining in a group at one point, having something to say about some French message and the way it was termed and its phraseology. It was most interesting to see the machine working. Did you have a feeling that, in the letter that Mr. Cross wrote that there was a kind of information-code or somethiig ? Well. We know that, but did you have any. Well, we endlessly speculated on this. I meai, we twisted it around, you know and turned it upside down we, I mean, one of the things that one always wonders is whether one should in fact establish a sort of code so that if one is kidnapped and you mentioned the word raspberry it means that I am now one and a half miles due north of somewhere or other, but that's in a way too elaborate to do that. But we just wondered, yes of course, endlessly we speculated on the interpretation of letters and phraseology of letters endlessly and messages endlessly, so did you. . . . 8 010144 �_ 8 Mrs .Amyot: Yes. Sir Peter: M u ch more then we did. Mrs. Halstead: Well this is one way of not feeling quite so helpless. Sir Peter: Yes, this is true. Mrs.Halstead: But in fact, Mr. Cross seemed to resent this speculation in the end in that it caused a threat to his life possibly because it was speculated on, so publicly and in the press. Sir Peter: Well....no Jean no, I think I wouldn't worry about that. I mean don't forget that when Jasper' was released he had been through a most ghastly ordeal that's possible to imagine. He had seen his own death announced on television, now that is not at all an agreeable thing to have seen and he.... but I remember him saying to me rather vividly once that he had, I think this was during our time in the Jewish Hospital, he said to me, "I'd arranged in my own mind what it was like to die. The only thing that I was worried about was how Barbara was going to.....what was going to happen to my wife". So you know if you've been through that however much as an Irish elanful or chap you appear, at least on the surface and he was astonishingly calm. Frankly, on the surface when he came out, you know, at that original press conference in Montreal he was calmer then I was. But one didn't realize that there was a tremendous amount of sort of agitation and concern underneath and I would make very, very great allowances for his sort of general feelings. Mrs. Amyot: Did he tell you that at the moment he had the feeling that it was really coming, his own death? Sir Peter: Yes, I think if you see your own death announced on televsion you, even though it isn't quite true yet, its very likely to happen in a matter of time. Thats the really terrifying thing and you see if you then go on sitting for quite a long time looking at the television and nothing else then you do get into a...., however brave you are, it has a very powerful effect on you. Mrs .Halstead: Perhaps you could tell us something about the practical effects of the War Measures Act. Sir Peter: Yes. Well, as far as I was concerned, to be really flippant first of all on a very unflippant subject, it has enabled me to see a side of, I mean provide a domestic point of view, this was all rather, as it turned out rather good because I could talk to ordinary chaps in the RCMP. I do know from the lower echelons of the RCMP and lower echelons of the Canadian military a great deal about Canada and no arriving diplomat could possbily have in a sense a more poignant introduction but at the same time an introductuion to ordinary people which you would not get. I find that as a personal instance it was well worth the obviously very honest inconvenience of being guarded incessantly which was of course what happened with ones first month or two here and oh for much longer. When we went out to visit outside Ottawa we were guarded incessantly. I remember Rosemary and I in our first visit to Banff we were trying to climb a local hill, or mountain end two gentlemen from the RCMP never left us out of 1heir sight. In case now of some of the provinces they were far more agitatory obviously then Ottawa and I got to know a very wide conspectus of members of the RCMP, 010145 • • • y �_9 policemen, soldiers, etc., etc. Thats a rather flippant comment. But in general, I would share quite honestly the general admiration for that element of Canadian life who hadii't been all that much alarmed until then, i.e. the soldiering. You suddenly found that they were quite useful members of the military and so many military in Canada feel they're irrelevant and they suddenly found they were very relevant in doing a good job and I would have thought, that v/as another, you knov/, comment and thought on Canada. As to the need to use the War Measures Act, I could simply make, again a not very profound remark, as an observer, that it was the only thing you had to use and I don't, as an observer at the scene subscribe to the view/ that it v/as using a steam roller to crack a nut. You only had a steam roller, you didn't know whether it was going to be a nut or a time bomb and I am not sure everybody knows that yet. I mean those loud critics, John Turner and others who subsequently with the wisdom of hindsight say, oh it was all far too exaggerated a reaction, I would dispute that very strongly as being one of the minor characters of that scene. Of course, there was no insurrection really or uprising in Quebec, how could there have been say some people but,...what.... Mrs.Amyot: It simply seemed to be in the mind of everyone because you say some people have really the impression that people were going to come out in the streets, etc. Sir Peter: Thats it and I think, and I mean this is the remarkable thing, so far as the British themselves were concerned and I say quite clearly this was the first time we'd seen Mr. Trudeau in action and this was damned impressive. Mr. Trudeau1 s, the general view of Mr. Trudeau, you know, in London was that he was highly intelligent but somewhat of a dilettante, an intellectual dilettante of some considerable means in Quebec. Nov: he was shown as an extremely tough guy, he wasn't going to give way. He emerged as the sort of, to the British observers, as the sort of a very considerable figure, and in so far as a pragmatic relationship between Britain and Canada has evolved, particularly in the way epitomized by Ted Heath and Mr. Trudeau. I think a lot of it was tiny beginnings with them. Mr. Bourassa of course did not fit in those two terms at all, to us, in fact people were wondering how he fitted into the picture. I in fact, again as a sort of credit bonus as I call it, had two interviews with Mr. Bourassa very soon after I arrived which I certainly wouldn't have done. I had an hour with him very soon after I arrived and Jasper was still incarcerated, he v/as very, obviously very shaken and he spoke entirely in French. He was pretty moved by it, you know, not frightened but pretty moved and worried, concerned. Then I saw him not long after Cross had been released and then he v/as much more relaxed. No its only subsequently that one realized that he's not just there as a product of Harvard business school with rich friends in New York at all. The fact of course as one observes, its not my business its yours, but only in recent months, a year or so, that one realized that he seems to have won however much he may have been ill-attuned in dealing with that sort of crisis, he has seized the one point which really mattered in Quebec which was to attract capital and to transform the economic background and this is the only comment I will make on that but was of course not apparent in all the time we were talking about. . . . 10 010146 �10 Mrs.Halstead: Did you anticipate the invocation cf the War Measures Act, did you imagine that it was going to... Sir Peter: Mrs. Amyot: Sir Peter: Well I think it would be, and I am just trying to remember the timing of this..,.c. The day of Laporte's death. Yes, and the answer is probably not because I didn't know enough about it. I was in fact still in London I hadn't really sort of faced up to what it was necessary for me to do. Mrs. Halstead: No of course, and I suppose it probably wasn't discussed in the High Commission as such. Sir Peter: No. I don't think so really, I don't, I mean again our immediate comment on that would be that this is very much your business how you deal with what is primarily a Canadian, a serious, serious Canadian internal problem and we wouldn't presume to give them advice on that matter. It is not our business to do thato Mrs.Halstead: Yes apparently some, some compatriot journalists took a rather different view I guess. Sir Peter: Yes I think I didn't really understand the drift of this question. Nobody in the British High Commission commented on this matter then or I think wish to do so now, it seems awfully unimportant really I would have thought it was some sort of Canadian internal dilemma, which got caught in the British newspapers maybe but it made no impression on me at all. I can honestly say that. I talked to John Dunrossil about this and we both, you know, scratched our heads, we were very puzzled about it. Mrs.Halstead: Well it was really apropos with the loss of rights, whether individual rights in Canada, whether it caused a stir in Britain. Sir Peter: No, no I don't think so*, Oh I see because of the invocation of the War Measures A.ct. Yes, yes in the sort of line taken, was it, by the NDP on this. Well how far was that reflected in Britain - not much, not much. I mean I think that if any paper, if any paper would have reflected it the Guardian obviously would do so. But I am really, really on looking back I can't remember any particular line taken by the British press in this sense. Mrs.Amyot: Did you also have, get the feeling that the press here in Canada was putting too much emphasis on the crisis? Sir Peter: V/ell I mean this is, of course you ask a question of a civil servant who is irritated by the BBC or the CBC as you do here. I mean one often gets intensely irritated with the Canadian press, with the CBC from time to time. There's always a minor risk that something, that some comment in the press, on the CBC would have endangered Cross's life, and one at home was conscious of that. But I mean I would answer emphatically however that I wouldn't have wanted to have seen any greater control of the press . . . 11 010147 �- 11 because therein lies much greater danger. However irritated one gets with the media, for different reasons. The Canadian CBC's attitude on Northern Ireland from time to time, I used to get very irritated indeed by the radio program on Sunday morning which tended to begin with the IRA war song and end with the IRA war song, and I should, suppose I went to see George Davidson about five times about that, but thats the sort of thing that one has to put up with and of course at the end one wouldn't want to put on greater controls. i Mrs.Halstead: But what about friendly persuasion? Sir Peter: Well friendly persuasion Jean is a tricky thing. Mrs.Halstead: ...and it wasn't something you tried? Sir Peter: Not, well its not, well I mean it wasn't again for us to deal with the Canadian press on this of course, oh no, I mean we would again expect you to deal with your own press. Certainly we wouldn't, I mean, it would be the worst possible thing for a quote foreign unquote High Commission or Embassy to attempt to do any friendly persuasions on the press, we wouldn't possibly do it. As to how far you did it I don't know but again its jolly tricky with the governments to do that, the press really has got a job to do. It would never have been at all right for us to have gone to the press and say, "hi, you may be endangering Jasper Cross's life". I think we should have, if we had done thsb and I think I do remember talking on those lines with friends in External, I mean if anything could have been done there they would have been able to do it, whether you did or not I don't know. Mrs. Amyot: I think the last question on that page was giving you some, I mean it gave you some.... Sir Peter: Yes I saw your reasons and I think in a sense I've answered that, cause I think he was under tremendous strain and, and frankly I am astonished that he remained pretty calm. Quite frankly, also, perhaps the other point I should make in this when I was looking through the questions I would have thought that the excellent information that he gave you all quite outweighed any critical comment he could have made, wouldn't you? Mrs.Halstead: I t wasn't by way of c r i t i c i s m . S i r Peter: No. ...of him or lack of diplomacy on his part that the question arose but Mrs.Halstead: rather whether in fact there were some pes itive suggestions that or some conclusions that..... Sir Peter: Well this is what on§ I mean you know, when one carried out a postmortem here as I am sure you did in External as to what, is there anything else that one could have done, and you know you might have wondered whether one should have got the people to adopt secret codes which you know would have been recognized by the rest of theEmbassy. I remember we went into this in a rather informal way and we came to the conclusion that it was probably 12 010148 �conclusion that it was probably too elaborate and as to other things which we did not, which we left undone which we could have done I wasn't myself conscious of anything of that sort but there may have been. That leads us on incidentally to number 14 which, about what, perhaps this has really sort of covered that ground. I would like just to say on that, that we were both really, both you and we, because I think one wants to emphasize this was an early stage in the kidnapping malaise which has since affected the world, quite early, I mean quite early not the first, but it v/as quite early and we had to adapt to a new, a pretty well new/ situation and make our policies as we were going along and as I say fortunately that our conclusions were the same. *• I don't think honestly that we could have improved with the benefit of hindsight on the informal daily consultation, I mean which we had with you, I think thats terribly important. It was personal, it was - I have written down here which I believe it was, it was personal, it was immediate, and it was informal. I don't think there is any other country then Canada with whom we could have had that, we certainly couldn't have that in the States. I suppose we might have done that in Australia but we couldn't have had this, it would have been much more elaborate in the States. We don't have the same kind of personal ties with the United States, you look surprised, oh no this is a fact. I stress those words - personal, immediate and informal these three things you see. I'd like also to put, to mention again John Dunrossil's operation in Montreal where we had very good liaison. I know it to, I mean I am well aware of some of the problems which you necessarily had with the provincial government because of gang raids, federal-provincial problems and the RCMP quote strong arm anglo-saxon police force unquote it isn't like that now and it wasn't really then. But I mean there persons who said that and our own relations with the Montreal and Quebec police. As I understand it, the relations on thevery highest level between the three police forces were very good and the relations on the riot squad or whatever it was, was pretty good on the lower, on the actual chaps who pursued criminals. On the medium range it is very necessarily understandably and its not unknown between the Scotch and the Ireland provincial police forces too I can tell you, there v/ere some frictions I understand this was not really, I think are we going to talk to John Dunrossil at some stage? Mrs, Amyot: Sir Peter: Yes. He will give, you will be able to enlarge a bit more on that and he'll, you know, he'll be farily nimble with giving his views from this and that source but as, I would like to emphasize again which he certainly will do but his role in Montreal was that of a listerner, a passer-on-er. I don't want anybody to get under any impression whatever that we were doing any business as such with the provincial government. Its far too tricky, an attitude of federal-provincial relations it would have been quite foolish of us even if we had thought of doing so but we didn't really. I mean it had to be, our tie had to be inescapably and completely with Ed Ritchie and External. If we'd adopted any other method we'd have only added to your troubles. So that all Dunrossil, all John Dunrossil was doing was, where at the scene of the crime and keeping Barbara reasonably happy and getting his information passed on to us from the Quebec, the Montreal police,tlie RCMP and Jerome Choquette's office, ELI of which he did. 010149 �- 13 Mrs.Halstead: 3ir Peter: Yes. I just have one other thixg to say incidentally and one other point to make which I'd forgotten to make, I would have thought, well just one other obvious point really cause its only a comment on your own attitude. I mean, I think you talked about your firmness in all this but of course it wasn't firmness alone, it was mixed with theCuban loop-hole. This was again dead right. I mean if you were just firm and said no, no, no then we v/ould have loat Jasper Cross. In fact of course it was firmness mixed with the Cuban loop-hole, and I've always imagined, I don't know, I didn't know/ him then and I've never actually discussed this with him - my Cuban colleague must have been damned helpful. I don't know, I've never ever really discussed it with him but I know from talks with Ed Ritchie and others that they were very forthcoming. So it was firmness coupled with a loop-hole and that got Cross out. Mrs.Halstead: Sir Peter: I understand that your police..... You feel that its a loop-hole that should be used in the future? Well I think, yes I think in a way you have to, of course each circumstance Jean is different, each circumstance is different. I think you have to, you may well have to adopt some sort of tactical loop-hole of that kind. That was the one that you decided upon which as I say got Cross out. But the circumstances must vary each time. Mrs.Amyot: It certainly depends on the person who is kidnapped as well as other events. Sir Peter: Yes, what are the demands, what other countries would be prepared to be helpful and what are the kidnappers like and how far they are dictated to by quote outside sources unquote, or how far are they, are they purely local, a local business or are they just cells which are within the body politic not dominated by outside sources. Irs. Halstead: Could I ask if, a question about the British police, I think some British police came here during the crisis perhaps to assist the RCMP. Sir Peter: I don't think any British police came to assist the RCMP but I think they had a visiting group which fortuitously happened to be going around dealing with problems of this kind or which chap, or which, I think it was during this time they were going around dealing with sort of sabotage, kidnapping problems and happened to be here and the group. There was a policeman and a soldier and the policeman happened to be Robert Mark, who is now the head of Scotland Yard, he is obviously sort of a tremendous chap, but I don't think there was any collaboration v/ith the British polio© on the spot at all. It may be that things like Interpol and you know internal police consultation as to whether there v/as any outside, again outside influence I dare say that we may have helped v/ith advice on that but I am not aware of any British police participation in the, v/hat was happening. I say as an old Home Office man, the Home Office in our country looks after the police, the police have a fear for the press really they can never really, they can never really tell anybody what they're doing because they then tell the criminals what they're doing and so one's heart bled really for the RCMP and the Montreal and Quebec City Police while they were being pretty severely criticized for being quote slow unquote but when you look back they did act quickly. I think to have found a diplomat in the space of time was a pretty considerably good professional job, I really do. Because it v/as not eacy, the role of the police in Montreal, I don't know enough ,010150 �- 14 about the methods used, I know something about the methods used which you probably know equally well and I am sure know a lot more then I do but it was a really good professional, police professional job done in pretty quick time as we would say. Anglo-Canadian relatione. Naught but good, naught but good is one that, because I moan, you know, its well, I mean it showed that once again that we could collaborate on this sort of personal, informal basis very quickly, & la First and Second P'orld Wars, h. la lots of other problems. You know the first week or two of one's life here was intensely interesting. I mean, I got the entree to contact I don't know hov/ many people very quickly, and I got to knov/ Ed very quickly indeed. Far quicker then I would have done in the normal way. I got to see ministers which I vould never have got, I meanl was telling you just now about getting to terms v/ith Bourassa, he's not the easiest person in the world to get to know, v/ell I can't say that I did get to know him well, but I got the opportunity to meet him and I think its demonstrated a domestic trend, friendly family, an admiration between us, which I have no doubt would happen again under similar circumstances. Mrs.Halstead: The same technique would be used really, basically a reliance on friendship and understanding. Sir Peter: V/ith a minimum of formality. Mrs.Amyot: A minimum, yes thats it. Mrs. Halstead: Well you've covered the territory with great clarity. Sir Peter: Well I think we've covered all the points Jean, I.... Mrs.Halstead: You've c e r t a i n l y contributed some fascinating i n s i g h t s for which we are extremely g r a t e f u l . Sir Peter: Well it was a joy to do it. THE END �. ..3 ol,j Taped interview with Sir Peter Hayman. Mrs. Amyot: It is very nice of you Sir Peter Hayman to allow the Department of External Affairs to benefit from your experience during the crisis of October, 1970. It seems appropriate somehow that on the eve of your departure from Canada you are speaking to us about the situation that developed on the eve of your arrival. Shall we begin then, for the first question, before your arrival in Canada by asking you to describe the atmosphere in London immediately following the kidnapping of Mr. Cross. Sir Peter: Yes,of course I'll do that, and I absolutely echo v/hat you say about the intense interest of this whole business really in my life and in my wife's life. It is appropriate I think to be talking on the eve of our departure, after the happiest period we've ever spent in the diplomatice service in Canada and about the period three and a half years ago when we came here. The first question you ask me is about the interest and the atmosphere in London before ones arrival, and I would say there of course a great deal of interest and concern in this whole case. Partly because of Jasper Cross, he was a British diplomat who'd been kidnapped. In the sense it was right at the beginning of the great kidnapping era. But there was also really genuinely concern about the effect of the FLQ crisis on the stability of one of our oldest and closest friends - Canada. So that there were the two strands; on the one hand there was great concern about a British national, or about a British diplomat but also concern about the effect on Crnada, the political effect on Canada. Mrs. Halstead: What sort of effect did you think there might have been? Sir Peter: This was very much the effect that I'd expected of course. Mrs.Halstead: When you were speaking of having the effects Sir Peter: On Canada you mean? Mrs.Halstead: Yes. Sir Peter: The effect on Canada, one must always, at the beginning of ones time here, one, knowing what one did about the problems of Quebec separatism, one was naturally concerned to see how far this kind of potentially serious threat would be met by the Government in Ottawa or and indeed by Mr. Bourassa. Mr. Bourassa was a relatively unknown person in London, few I dare say could remember the name of the Quebec Premier. Mr. Trudeau wras better known of course, he'd been in Londos not too long before as a, as leader of the Canadian delegation to the Commonwealth Conference in 1969, he made a lot of friends there. But it was not understood as to how he would in fact face up to a rather special problem of this sort. Those were the kinds of thoughts that were certainly milling around amongst the people that I talked to in London. 010152 �Mrs.Halstead: Sir Peter: So that the, the rapid response of the Government was reassuring? Oh indeed. Yes indeed, of course it was, very much so. I mean there was a great deal of satisfaction, I think, on the way the reaction took place. You ask of course whether in fact the, how far was Britian concerned with other things at the same time and on that I think I should say that I'd been dealing up till then with the .'Piddle East. I was the Under-Secretary looking after tlie Middle East and also North and South America and the United Nations and there were a good many other problems on our mind. One of the curiously sort of prelude to this was the hi-jacking of all those airplanes in Jordan in which I personally had been very much concerned with, dealing with. And then the additional horror of course was the capture and the death of Mr. Laporte. It was on the day of Mr. Laporte's death that I arrived in Canada. I should say that of course the moment I heard of Jasper's kidnapping I wanted immediately to come out to Canada even though that would have been several months, no several weeks or a month or two in advance of my time here. I heard about it when I was staying with a friend, my wife and I were staying with a very old friend in South Wales doing some fishing and I came down to breakfast and he in turn told me about this and I immediately telephoned the Foreign Office and said I'd like to go straight away. But I think reasonably enough we both felt and everybody felt,George Whitehead who was my deputy and the acting Charge d'affaire, felt that if I'd rushed out immediately that would have implied some sort of comment on how Canada was actually handling this crisis and that of course we didn't want to give. We wanted to be as normal as possible over this. I would like in fact to pay a tribute at this time to the work of George Whitehead who handled the early part of the crisis from the British' point- of view with a considerable amount of skill and firmness. Mrs. Halstead: There's reference in the files on the kidnapping to the discussion in Cabinet in London immediately, the day following the kidnapping. Could you tell us anything about that? Sir Peter: Well British officials on the whole don't attend Cabinet meetings. I didn't go to any Cabinet meeting on this. But I did in fact talk to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alex Douglas Home on two occasions, three occasions following discussions which he must have had with Ministers and it was then duri that time that the British Government decided that the whole affair was a matter for you to handle - a matter for Canada to handle. It so happened I think that our respective attitudes on the subject of the kidnapping were very much the same, which obviously made it easier for us. There was no division of opinion as to the fact that one should not in general give way to kidnappers so thatthe general approach was the same. But our tactical approach, quite clearly, was that it would be quite improper. I certainly think that the propriety would be quite wrong and not at all useful for the British Government to take any initiative in this. The hand had to be played by the Canadian Government. It was Mr. Laporte, it was the FLQ crisis, it was very much a matter of domestic concern to Canada and this was the attitude in London. I think in a way it would be foolish not to emphasize, this is partly because of our old friendship and Canada's not just another country. I ... 3 010153 �mean Canada and Britain have had these kind of problems, I mean World War problems and all these kind of problems and I think it made it easier if you like, to the British Ministers to feel that Canada was handling this in some way, especially as we agreed with that way, for us to go along with that because it was Canada. I think I should emphasize that as well. If this had been Mauritania or Transilvania where we didn't know well the principle people concerned we should naturally have found it more difficult. Mrs. Amyot: Sir Peter: Would you have felt that it would have been more a Canadian affair than a Quebec affair if for instance Laporte v/ould not have been kidnapped? No, I don't think so. I mean, I think that the, I mean that the element of Mr. Laporte's kidnapping and death clearly made it an even more difficult political problem for both Ottawa and Quebec obviously. Therefore, it made it even more a matter of important internal political concern to Canada in our view as we saw it from London, and therefore, it was not at all just a question of a British diplomat being kidnapped. It was obviously posing a considerable internal political problem for Canada and the fact that Mr. Laporte was, I suppose the most considerable man in Mr. Bourassa's Cabinet, in fact the only one in Bourassa's Cabinet of any political experience and some would say Mr. Bourassa's rival, things like that, something of that sort, this is what one observes from afar. Obviously as I say, it posed a, some very major problems, and you know, and his addition made them more serious. Mrs.Halstead: So the feeling in Whitehall was more or less unanimous was it about the policy? Sir Peter: Yes, yes. I never found any differences in Whitehall. I should say, Jean, that I mean on this I was instructed by the senior official, the permanent under-secretary, the Ed Ritchie of Whitehall who was Sir Dennis Greenhill, who was almost my closest friend in the foreign service and then as I say both he and I went to see Sir Alex on two or three occasions and the day to day work of course was carried out by the Department which dealt with Canada and the United States which was under the direction of Mr. Charles Wiggin, who was really tremendously expert on this and did a great deal. I mean it was endless consultation to and fro, endless talk to and fro, not really consultation because I think we'd all agreed on the line but endless factual information passing to and fro between the North American Department and the FCO under Charles Wiggin and at that time,George Whitehead here, which I was privy to and joined in, of course. Mrs. Halstead: ....and so there wasn't very much discussion, I mean within the country apart from Whitehall Sir Peter: About...., no again I think looking back and thinking about press comment, of which there was a great deal, I don't remember any, any general feelings of dismay over the line being taken on the whole. I think the British maintained a fairly cool attitude on this. There was, a member of Jasper's family in Ireland, I don't know whether it v/as a reltion of hers or his who was inclined to say why is nothing more being done, are we moving as fast as we should, etc., etc. But I don't remember any other examples of that. This was in fact after I was out here, so this was at a later time, a later time scale. ... 4 010154 �Mrs. Halstead: Sir Peter: But it wasn't as a political No, no, oh no there was certainly no dissent from the Labour benches on this at all. Mrs. Halstead: Most of the discussions between Canadians and British were carried on here I suppose, were they? Sir Peter: Most of those discussions were carried on here. I did in fact, you ask a question I know the back of your mind rather, you ask a question about how far Canada House was involved. I know that Charles Ritchie with whom I'd had two or three talks was very well up to date with factual information you know/ the various, those awful wireless messages and things, and press messages which kept on coming out. I think Charles established some form or, not exactl a war room, but an information centre in Canada House which I remember Sir Dennis Greenhill praising as being a means of getting some quick factual information. But certainly the dealings between Canada and Britain on this were conducted through here, between here and the Department of External Affairs. That was where much of, most took place. I should of course mention here, perhaps I don't want this to be overlooked that another element of the British end in Canada was George WhitepipaJ dispatching John Dunrossil, the Head of Chancery, to take charge o" 3v Montreal office as soon as Jasper was kidnapped and I think that was a very wise thing to have done. Dunrossil had only heen in "anada with his wife for about three weeks or so and had just in fact been entertained by the Crosses on his way through Montreal a little time before and therefore we did have a fair, but he did have a good deal of experience in this kind of work in his past life and so v/e had for him, I know George Whitehead had, and certainly I found that to have John stationed in Montreal and therefore of course necef jariiy ii. Pouch v/ith the Montreal or Quebec police and so on was a very important element in our thinking because, you know, the Montreal - Quebec - Ottawa syndrome was an element in this whole business. Mrs. He Ls tend: It would be very indiscreet I suppose to ask if it were, in an effort to...influence the Quebec Government or more as a listening poet.... Sir Peter: No, no it wouldn't be indiscreet to ask that,Jean, because I can give you a perfectly clear answer. There was no question about dealing with the Quebec Government at all. I mean, it was a listening post operation, v/e did in fact, John being a very sensible guy, got on in perfect!;/" good terns with Jerome Choquette end with some of the leading policemen but there's no question about dealing vrith the Quebec Government. So far as this crisis was concerned, our dealings were with the Canadian Government here in Ottawa. I say that very clearly and very categorically and I would like here to say quite flatly that the main channel of communication was Ed Ritchie himself. I always have a vivid recollection of arriving at the Ottawa airport and being very kindly met by Ed, whom I'd never met before as a matter of fact. He's an extraordinary man, I mean he made himself available to me at any hour of the day or night really, and we used tc see each other frequently of course. Sometimes once or twice a day until that memorable moment when he woke me up in the early hours of that December morning and told me that at last you were on to, quite defintely on to where Cross was. Even though, although you know that its very difficult to hear his voice as I understand it. So that this is, and again I'd lik - to say that this is the sort of, you know, an element of the sort of Canadian-British link ... 5 010155 �that one could get on to those terms with someone like Ed Ritchie. I did in fact, during the time that I was here, of course I was paying, delivering my letters to the Prime Minister, letters of credence to the Prime Minister, had some speech with him and of course talked in general terms about the whole business and of course to Mitchell Sharp, I paid my first calls to him. But I'd Dike especially, to when I first arrived I of course called on as many ministers as possible,as quickly as possible. The person in a sense, from whom I learned the most during my course fbout FLQ mentality was Mr. Pelletier. Mr. Pelletier, perhaps characteristically, kept met me waiting for three quarters of an hour because of a lot cf other things. lie then kept the next person waiting for, well this is probably rather indiscreet, for at least another hour. But he is intensely interesting on, you knew, the whole mentality of the FLQ. Thats one of the most memorable discussions and interviews that Ive had, I'd like to say that0 And then of course, I used to go to the Operations Room in External and my chape of course did very often. McConville was the Acting Head of Chancery. He used to go over there regularly once a day or more often. Of course part of it is the geographical location, I mean the proximity. You know, the Department going over there might make it more difficult, but the fact that I was unpacked in the Chateau Laurier, and of course Rosemary hadn!t arrived by then. I was in a room vrith a lot of RCMP guys next door and oh I mean my geographical boundaries were really for my first two or three weeks here were the Chateau Laurier, this room and Ed's office in the East Block; punctuated three times a week by going down to visit Barbara Cross in Montreal. I went to see her the second day that I came here and the third day I went down to Mr. Laporte's funeral and I think I had almost as large an escort as Mr. Trudeau had. I had a Bren gun carrier in front and a Bren gun carrier behind and an extremely tough cookie from the Royal Canadian Regiment from whom I learned a great deal about the lower echelons of the Canadian Armed Forces as we drove along. Mrs. Amyot: When you arrived here in Ottawa, the general feeling of the people in the office here in Ottawa, was equal or did you feel that some people, I mean without any names, but you know/, did you have the impression 1hat some people would have thought differently? Sir Peter: Absolutely not, absolutely not. There was no, I mean I can lay my hand on my heart and say that there was no differences in opinion between us. George Whitehead's handling of the policy which he handed over to me when I arrived was reflected in his little team, McConville and Noakes and others and we were all concerned, we were obviously concerned with the question of, I suppose primarily being English chaps, with the future of Jasper Cross, with trying to see how far these strange messages could be interpreted and that sort of thing and....but in no way did we dissent on the handling of "the matter by the Canadian Government. Mrs .Halstead: I wonder if we could return for a moment to v/hat you were, to your comments on your talk with Mr. Pelletier. Sir Peter: Mrs.Halstead: Yes. . . . a n d could you t e l l us what h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the FLQ was o r 0 . . 0 . . . . 6 010156 �Sir Peter: Well Jean, I am not, 1 mean, I think that was really talking about these kind of people. I don't think it would be proper for me, as a diplomat would it, to comment on what a Cabinet Minister told me and I don't in fact remember any very sharp terms, precisely what his views were. Let me just say this that I was after all a stranger to Canada, I was the Under-Secretary looking after our relations in these parts but I really didn't know a great deal about the FLy mentality. I wanted to, I was concerned to see how far they would go in a domestic operation. Whether they had any ties with Algeria, training in Algeria and so on. I merely got from him good leads on what the young in Quebec were thinking and how so many of them were in a sense automatically separatists before they really started to think and that even the quiet revolution had perhaps not brought along enough people in Canada as such. That is all for you rather jejeune stuff, but for me as a new arrival in Canada it was intensely interesting and of course the other, my other informant, I mean the only person in fact who told me anything about the FLQ crisis before I came was in fact Jasper Cross himself and the story of that was that, and as I say I was mainly concerned with the Middle East. With a bit of Angueilla thrown in and really Middle East, Mid Arab, Israel all the time, every hour of the day and night. But, and I have wide interests and I heard that there was a fellow called Cross about in the office and so I sent for him to ask him why the hell we weren't selling more British motor cars in Montreal you see. He didn't, he wasn't in the least interested in that, he changed the subject after five seconds. Well he did then talk about, gave me a first inkling of the problems of separatism as epitomized by the FLQ, Mrs. Amyotj How long was that before October, 1970? Sir Peter: That was...., I would say perhaps six months before. Mrs. Amyot: ...six months before. Sir Peter: When he came out you see, being Jasper, being the sort of Irish elan or extrovert guy, when he was released the first thing he did long before he talked to Mr, Trudeau on the telephone or anything else, he rang me up you see and said, "reporting for duty Sir". Then the second remark was remarkable. He said, "about that conversation we had in London, I can now give you some more information". When I went down to see him next day, which I hastened to do in the Jewish Hospital in Montreal, he was in his dressing gown and pyjamas and I thought we were going to talk really about the administrative arrangements for his departure and whether or not he was going to be received at number ten and all this kind of thing you see, quite a tricky kind of program. Not at all, he wasn't in the least interested in it, he was quite interested in the various things which he subsequently told all of you, I mean, the mentality of Lanctfit and Carbonneau and their wives and so on, and how far his views had been borne out. But I mean, I don't want to enlarge on what he said to me because he, I know talked to all of you in pretty fair detail about his thou^its on the FLQ, Mrs.Halstead: So you were working really quite, quite closely, all of your team? Sir Peter: Yes. Mrs, Halstead: . . . a n d quite closely with the Operations Centre? . . . 7 010157 �Sir Peter: We were, and I think tliat was, I mean, I think t h a t i t was t e r r i b l y , t e r r i b l y important and t e r r i b l y s o r t o f . . . . , I mean I think as we saw i t , i t was very lucky perhaps a b i t f o r t u i t o u s , but very lucky t h a t the Operations Centre had been established not long before. I believe t h a t ' s r i g h t . C e r t a i n l y , I mean I ' v e s a t i n on interdepartmental meetings occasionally with which a l l the elements concerned, the RCMP and other departments as well as External were s i t t i n g around the table and 1 think i t worked e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y v/ell considering i t 4iad only j u s t been formed. Mrs,Halstead: In what way was that fortuitous? Sir Peter: Well haven't you only just formed it? Mrs.Halstead: Yes, but I, oh I see just because it was there or had been formed at all. Sir Peter: Yes, it was very lucky it was just formed then, and I know that Ed found it of great value having it, you know, a hundred-ten yards away from his own office. He was always peeking in there to see how things were going along, all this was rather, well again this could only be done in a rather family atmosphere of External and I would like to think the family almosphere that exists may not have existed until then but certainly has existed since* between us and External, From that date comes the time that I absolutely, flatly refuse to show my pass whenever I am in External. I just showed it once and its always been respected ever since. Pauline fixed it. (Laughter) We're about number nine. Mrs .Halstead: Sir Peter: /taetical Mrs.Amyot: Sir Peter: Mrs .Amyot: Sir Peter: About number nine, yes. I mean, you see one of the agitating things that we had to talk to each other about was interpretation of messages. It was the interpretation of messages you see, I mean how could you know what was intended to be implied by this or that and how could you react to this or that at the/moment. There was a great deal of discussion on that and your legal people and so on. I think Andre Bissonnette played a, played an important part in this, he was doing some work and I well remember Marc Lalonde coming in and joining in a group at one point, having something to say about some French message and the way it was termed and its phraseology. It was most interesting to see the machine working. Did you have a feeling that, in the letter that Mr. Cross wrote that there was a kind of information-code or somethiig ? Well. We know that, but did you have any. Well, we endlessly speculated on this. I meaa, we twisted it around, you know and turned it upside down we, I mean, one of the things that one always wonders is whether one should in fact establish a sort of code so that if one is kidnapped and you mentioned the vrord raspberry it means that I am now one and a half miles due north of somewhere or other, but that's in a way too elaborate to do that. But we just wondered, yes of course, endlessly we speculated on the interpretation of letters and phraseology of letters endlessly and messages endlessly, so did you. ... 8 010158 �Mrs.Anyot: Yes. Sir Peter: Much more then we did. Mrs. Halstead: Well this is one way of not feeling quite so helpless, Sir Peter: Yes, this is true. Mrs.Halstead: But in fact, Mr. Cross seemed to resent this speculation in the end in that it caused a threat to his life possibly because it was speculated on, so publicly and in the press. Sir Peter: Well....no Jean no, I think I wouldn't worry about that. I mean don't forget that vdien Jasper was released he had been through a most ghastly ordeal that's possible to imagine. He had seen his own death announced on television, now "that is not at all an agreeable thing to have seen and he.... but I remember him saying to me rather vividly once that he had, I think this was during our time in the Jewish Hospital, he said to me, "I'd arranged in my own mind What it was like to die. The only thing that I was worried about was how Barbara was going to....»wbat was going to happen to my wife". So you know if you've been through that however much as an Irish elanful or chap you appear, at least on the surface and he was astonishingly calm. Frankly, on the surface when he came out, you know, at that original press conference in Montreal he was calmer then I was. But one didn't realize that there was a tremendous amount of sort of agitation and concern undeiv neath and I would make very, very great allowances for his sort of general feelings. Mrs. Amyot: Did he tell you that at the moment he had the feeling that it was really coming, his own death? Sir Peter: Yes, I think if you see your own death announced on televsion you, even though it isn't quite true yet, its very likely to happen in a matter of time, Thats the really terrifying thing and you see if you then go on sitting for quite a long time looking at the television and nothing else then you do get into a...., hovrever brave you are, it has a very powerful effect on you. Mrs.Halstead: Perhaps you oould tell us something about the practical effects of the War Measures Act. Sir Peter: Yes. Well, as far as I was concerned, to be really flippant first of all on a very unflippant subject, it has enabled me to see a side of, I mean provide a domestic point of view, this was all rather, as it turned out rather good because I could talk to ordinary chaps in the RCMP. I do know from the lower echelons of the RCMP and lowrer echelons of the Canadian military a great deal about Canada and no arriving diplomat could poSsbily have in a sense a more poignant introduction but at the same time an introductuion to ordinary people which you would not get. I find that as a personal instance it was well worth the obviously very honest inconvenience of being guarded incessantly which was of course what happened with ones first month or two here and oh for much longer. When we went out to visit outside Ottawa we were guarded incessantly. I remember Rosemary and I in our first visit to Banff we were trying to climb a local hill, or mountain and two gentlemen from the RCMP never left us out of their sight. In case now of some of the provinces they were far more agitatory obviously then Ottawa and I got to know a very wide conspectus of members of the RCMP, 010159 �policemen, soldiers, etc., etc. Thats a rather flippant comment. But in general, I would share quite honestly the general admiration for that element of Canadian life who hadn't been all that much alarmed until then, i.e. the soldiering. You suddenly found that they were quite useful members of the military and so many military in Canada feel they're irrelevant and they suddenly found they were very relevant in doing a good job and I would have thought, that v/as another, you know, comment and thought on Canada. As to the need to use the War Measures Act, I could simply make, again a not very profound remark, as an observer, frft it v/as the only thing you had to use and I don't, as an observer at the scene subscribe to the viev/ that it v/as using a steam roller to crack a nut. You only had a steam roller, you didn't know whether it was going to be a nut or a time bomb and I am not sure everybody knows that yet. I mean those loud critics, John Turner and others who subsequently with the wisdom of hindsight say, oh it was all far too exaggerated a reaction, I would dispute that very strongly as being one of the minor characters of that scene. Of course, there was no insurrection really or uprising in Quebec, how could there have been say some people but....what.,,. Mrs.Amyot: It simply seemed to be in the mind of everyone because you say some people have really the impression that people were going to come out in the streets, etc. Sir Peter: Thats it and I think, and I mean this is the remarkable thing, so far as the British themselves were concerned and I say quite clearly this was the first time we'd seen Mr, Trudeau in action and this was damned impressive, Mr, Trudeau*s, the general view of Mr. Trudeau, you know, in London was that he was highly intelligent but somewhat of a dilettante, an intellectual dilettante of some considerable means in Quebec. Now he was shown as an extremely tough guy, he wasn't going to give way. He emerged as the sort of, to the British observers, as the sort of a very considerable figure, and in so far as a pragmatic relationship between Britain and Canada has evolved, particularly in the way epitomized by Ted Heath and Mr. Trudeau. I think a lot of it was tiny beginnings with them. Mr. Bourassa of course did not fit in those two terms at all, to us, in fact people were wondering how he fitted into the picture. I in fact, again as a sort of credit bonus as I call it, had two interviews with Mr. Bourassa very soon after I arrived which I certainly wouldn't have done. I had an hour with him very soon after I arrived and Jasper was still incarcerated, he was very, obviously very shaken and he spoke entirely in French. He was pretty moved by it, you know, not frightened but pretty moved and worried, concerned. Then I saw him not long after Cross had been released and then he was much more relaxed. No its only subsequently that one realized that he's not just there as a product of Harvard business school with rich friends in New York at all. The fact of course as one observes, its not my business its yours, but only in recent months, a year or so, that one realized that he seems to have won however much he may have been ill-attuned in dealing with that sort of crisis, he has seized the one point which really mattered in Quebec which was to attract capital and to transform the economic background and this is the only comment I will make on that but was of course not apparent in all the time we were talking about. . . . 10 010160 �Mrs.Halstead: Did you a n t i c i p a t e the i n v o c a t i o n cf the War Measures Act, did you imagine t h a t i t was going t o . . . Sir Peter: of Mrs. Amyot: Sir Peter: Well I t h i n k i t would b e , and I am j u s t t r y i n g t o remember the timing this,,..*, The day of L a p o r t e ' s d e a t h . Yes, and the answer i s probably n o t because I d i d n ' t know enough about i t . I was i n f a c t s t i l l i n London I h a d n ' t r e a l l y 3 o r t of faced up to what i t was n e c e s s a r y f o r me t o do. Mrs. H a l s t e a d : No of c o u r s e , and I suppose i t probably v/asn't d i s c u s s e d i n the High Commission a s s u c h . Sir Peter: No, I d o n ' t t h i n k so r e a l l y , I d o n ' t , I mean a g a i n our immediate oomment on t h a t would be t h a t i h i 3 i s v e r y much your b u s i n e s s how you d e a l w i t h what i s p r i m a r i l y a Canadian, a s e r i o u s , s e r i o u s Canadian i n t e r n a l problem and we w o u l d n ' t presume t o give them advice on t h a t m a t t e r . I t i s n o t our b u s i n e s s t o do t h a t 0 Mrs.Halstead: Yes a p p a r e n t l y some, some c o m p a t r i o t j o u r n a l i s t s took a r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t view I g u e s s . Sir Peter: Yes I t h i n k I d i d n ' t r e a l l y u n d e r s t a n d t h e d r i f t of t h i s q u e s t i o n . Nobody i n t h e B r i t i s h High Commission commented on t h i s m a t t e r then o r I t h i n k wish t o do so now, i t seems awfully unimportant r e a l l y I would have thought i t was some s o r t of Canadian i n t e r n a l dilemma which g o t caught i n t h e B r i t i s h newspapers maybe b u t i t made no impression on me a t a l l . I can h o n e s t l y say t h a t . I t a l k e d t o John D u n r o s s i l about t h i s and we b o t h , you know, s c r a t c h e d our h e a d s , we were v e r y puzzled about i t . Mrs.Halstead: Well i t was r e a l l y apropos with t h e l o s s of r i g h t s , whether i n d i v i d u a l rights i n Canada, whether i t caused a s t i r i n B r i t a i n . Sir Peter: No, no I d o n ' t t h i n k s o . Oh I see because of the i n v o c a t i o n of t h e War Measures A c t . Yes, yes i n t h e s o r t of l i n e t a k e n , was i t , by t h e NDP on t h i s . Well how f a r was t h a t r e f l e c t e d i n B r i t a i n - n o t much, n o t much. I mean I t h i n k t h a t i f any p a p e r , i f any p a p e r would have r e f l e c t e d i t t h e Guardian o b v i o u s l y would do s o . But I am r e a l l y , r e a l l y on l o o k i n g back I c a n ' t remember any p a r t i c u l a r l i n e taken by the B r i t i s h press in this sense. Mrs.Amyot: Did you a l s o h a v e , g e t t h e f e e l i n g t h a t t h e p r e s s h e r e i n Canada was p u t t i n g too much emphasis on t h e c r i s i s ? Sir Peter: V/ell I mean t h i s i s , of course you ask a q u e s t i o n of a c i v i l s e r v a n t who i s i r r i t a t e d by the BBC o r the CBC a s you do h e r e . I mean one o f t e n g e t s i n t e n s e l y i r r i t a t e d with t h e Canadian p r e s s , with the CBC from time t o t i m e . T h e r e ' s always a minor risk t h a t something, t h a t some comment i n t h e p r e s s , on t h e CBC vwould have endangered C r o s s ' s l i f e , and one a t home was conscious of -that. But I mean I would answer e m p h a t i c a l l y however t h a t I w o u l d n ' t have wanted to have seen any g r e a t e r c o n t r o l of t h e p r e s s . . . 11 010161 �11 because therein l i e s much greater danger. However i r r i t a t e d one gets with the media, for different reasons. The Canadian CBC's a t t i t u d e on Northern Ireland from time to time, I used to get very i r r i t a t e d indeed by the radio program on Sunday morning which tended to begin with the IRA war song and end with the IRA war song, and I should, suppose I v/ent to see George Davidson about five times about t h a t , but thats the s o r t of thing tliat one lias to put up with and of course a t the end one wouldn't want to put on greater c o n t r o l s . Mrs.Halstead: But what about friendly persuasion? S i r Peter: Well friendly persuasion Jean i s a t r i c k y thing. Mrs.Halstead: . . . a n d i t wasn't something you t r i e d ? S i r Peter: Not, well i t s n o t , well I mean i t wasn't again for us to deal with the C a nadian press on t h i s of course, oh no, I mean we would again expect you to deal with your own p r e s s . Certainly we wouldn't, I mean, i t would be the worst possible thing for a quote foreign unquote High Commission or Embassy to attempt to do any friendly persuasions on the p r e s s , we wouldn't possibly do i t . As to how f a r you did i t I d o n ' t know but again i t s j o l l y tricky with the governments to do t h a t , the press r e a l l y has got a job to do. I t would never have been a t a l l right for us to have gone to the press and say, " h i , you may be endangering Jasper Cross's l i f e " . I think we should have, i f we had done t h * and I think I do remember talking on those l i n e s with friends i n External, I mean i f anything could have been done there they would have been able to do i t , whether you did or not I don't know. Mrs. Amyot: I think the l a s t question on t h a t page was giving you some, I mean i t gave you s o m e . . . . S i r Peter: Yes I saw your reasons and I think i n a sense I ' v e answered t h a t , cause I think he was under tremendous s t r a i n and, and frankly I am astonished that he remained p r e t t y calm. Quite frankly, a l s o , perhaps the other point I should make i n t h i s when I was looking through the questions I would have thought t h a t the excellent information that he gave you a l l quite outweighed any c r i t i c a l oomment he could have made, wouldn't you? Mrs.Halstead: I t wasn't by way of c r i t i c i s m . S i r Peter: No. Mrs.Halstead: ...of him or lack of diplomacy on his part that the question arose but rather whether in fact there were some pes itive suggestions that or some conclusions that•..•• Sir Peter: Well this is what on^ I mean you know, when one carried out a postmortem here as I am sure you did in External as to what, is there anything else that one could have done, and you know you might have wondered whether one should have got the people to adopt secret codes which you know would have been recognized by the rest of theEmbassy, I remember we went into this in a rather informal way and we came to the conclusion that it was probably 12 010162 �conclusion that i t was probably too elaborate and as to other things which we did n o t , which we l e f t undone which we could have done I wasn't myself conscious of anything of that s o r t but there may have been. That leads us on i n c i d e n t a l l y to number 14 which, about what, perliaps t h i s has r e a l l y sort of covered that ground, I would l i k e j u s t to say on t h a t , that we were both r e a l l y , both you and we, because I think one wants to emphasize this was an early stage in the kidnapping malaise which has since affected the world, quite e a r l y , I mean quite early not tlie f i r s t , but i t v/as quite early and we had to adapt to a new, a p r e t t y well new s i t u a t i o n and make our p o l i c i e s as we were going along and as I say fortunately that our conclusions were the same. I don't think honestly that we could have improved with the benefit of hindsight on the informal d a i l y consultation, I mean which we had with you, I think t h a t s t e r r i b l y important. I t was personal, i t was - I have written down here which I believe i t was, i t was personal, i t was immediate, and i t was informal. I d o n ' t think there i s any other country then Canada with whom we could have had t h a t , we c e r t a i n l y couldn't have t h a t in the S t a t e s . I suppose we might have done t h a t i n Australia but we couldn't have had t h i s , i t would have been much more elaborate i n the S t a t e s . We don't have the same kind of personal t i e s with the United S t a t e s , you look surprised, oh no t h i s ii a f a c t . I s t r e s s those words - personal, immediate and informal these three things you s e e . I ' d l i k e also to put, to mention again John Dunrossil's operation in Montreal where we had very good l i a i s o n . I know i t t o , I mean I am well aware of some of the problems which you necessarily had with the prov i n c i a l government because of gang r a i d s , federal-provincial problems and the RCMP quote strong arm anglo-saxon police force unquote i t i s n ' t l i k e t h a t now and i t wasn't r e a l l y then. But I mean there persons who said t h a t and our own r e l a t i o n s with the Montreal and Quebec p o l i c e . As I understand i t , the r e l a t i o n s on thevery highest level between the three police forces were very good and the r e l a t i o n s on the riot squad or whatever i t was, was p r e t t y good on the lower, on the actual chaps who pursued criminals. On the medium range i t i s very necessarily understandably and i t s not unknown between the Scotch and the Ireland provincial police forces too 1 can t e l l you, there were some f r i c t i o n s I understand t h i s was not r e a l l y , I think are we going to t a l k to John Dunrossil a t some stage? Mrs. Amyot: S i r Peter: Yes. He w i l l g i v e , you w i l l be able to enlarge a b i t more on that and h e ' l l , you know, h e ' l l be f a r i l y nimble with giving h i s views from t h i s and t h a t source but a s , I would l i k e to emphasize again which he c e r t a i n l y w i l l do but h i s r o l e i n Montreal was that of a l i s t e r n e r , a passer^-on-er. I d o n ' t want anybody to get under any impression whatever t h a t we were doing any business as such with the provincial government. I t s far too t r i c k y , an a t t i t u d e of federal-provincial r e l a t i o n s i t would have been quite foolish of us even i f we had thought of doing so but we d i d n ' t r e a l l y . I mean i t had to be, our t i e had to be inescapably and completely with Ed Ritchie and External. I f we'd adopted any other method we'd have only added to your t r o u b l e s . So that a l l Dunrossil, a l l John Dunrossil was doing was, where a t the scene of the crime end keeping Barbara reasonably happy and g e t t i n g h i s information passed on to us from the Quebec, the Montreal police,tlie RCMP and Jerome Choquette's o f f i c e , d l of which he did. i •? 010163 �Mrs.Halstead: Sir Peter: Yes. I j u s t have one other thirg to say incidentally and one other point to make which I ' d forgotten to make. I would have thought, well j u s t one other obvious point r e a l l y cause i t s only a comment on your own a t t i t u d e . I mean, I think you talked about your firmness in n i l t h i s but of course i t wasn't firmness alone, i t was mixed with theCuban loop-hole. This was again dead r i g h t . I mean i f you were j u s t firm and said no, no, no then we would hai l o a t Jasper Cross. In f a c t of course i t was firmness mixed with the Cuban loop-hole, and I ' v e always imagined, I d o n ' t know, I d i d n ' t know/ him then and I ' v e never a c t u a l l y discussed t h i s with him - my Cuban colleague must have been damned helpful. I don't know, I ' v e never ever r e a l l y discussed i t with him but I know from t a l k s with Ed Ritchie and others t h a t they were very forthcoming. So i t was firmness coupled with a loop-hole and that got Cross o u t . Mrs.Halstead: S i r Peter: I understand that your police You f e e l t h a t i t s a loop-hole that should be used in the future? Well I think, yes I think in a way you have t o , of course each circumstance Jean i s d i f f e r e n t , each circumstance i s d i f f e r e n t . I think you have t o , you may well have to adopt some s o r t of t a c t i c a l loop-hole of that kind. That was the one t h a t you decided upon which as I say got Cross o u t . But the circumstances must vary each time. Mrs.Amyot: I t c e r t a i n l y depends on the person who i s kidnapped as well as other events. S i r Peter: Yes, what are the demands, what other countries would be prepared to be helpful and what are the kidnappers l i k e and how f a r they are dictated to by quote outside sources unquote, or how f a r are they, are they purely l o c a l , a l o c a l business or are they j u s t c e l l s which are within the body p o l i t i c not dominated by outside sources. Irs. Halstead: Could I ask if, a question about the British police, I think some British police came here during the crisis perhaps to assist the RCMP. Sir Peter: I don't think any British police came to assist the RCMP but I think they had a visiting group which fortuitously happened to be going around dealing with problems of this kind or which chap, or which, I think it was during this time they were going around dealing with sort of sabotage, kidnapping problems and happened to be here and the group. There was a policeman and a soldier and the policeman happened to be Robert Mark, who is now the head of Scotland Yard, he is obviously sort of a tremendous chap, but I don't think there was any collaboration with the British polioa on the spot at all. It may be that things like Interpol and you know internal police consultation as to whether there was any outside, again outside influence I dare say that we may have helped with advice on that but I am not aware of any British police participation in the, what was happening. I say as an ol Home Office man, the Home Office in our country looks after the police, the police have a fear for the press really they can never really, they can never really tell anybody what they're doing because they then tell the criminals what they're doing and so one'B heart bled really for the RCMP and the Montreal and Quebec City Police while they were being pretty severely criticized for being quote slow unquote but when you look back they did act quickly. I think to have found a diplomat in the space of time was a pretty considerably good professional job, I really do. Because it was not eacy, the role of the police in Montreal, I don't know enough . . . 14 010164 �about the methods used, I know something about the methods used v/hich you probably know equally v/ell and I am sure know a lot more -then I do but it v/as a really good professional, police professional job done in pretty quick time as we would say. Anglo-Canadian relations. Naught but rood, naught but good is one that, because I mean, you know, its well, I mean it showed tnat once again that we could collaborate on this sort of personal, informal basis very quickly, a la First and Second P'orld i/ars, a la lots of other problems. You know the first week or two of one's life here was intensely interesting. I mean, I got the entree to contact I don't know how many people very quickly, and I got to know' Ed very quickly indeed. Far quicker then I would have done in the normal way. I got to see ministers which I vould never have got, I meanl was telling you just now about getting to terms v/ith Bourassa, he's not the easiest person in the world to get to know, v/ell I can't say that I did get to know him well, but I got the opportunity to meet him and I think its demonstrated a domestic trend, friendly family, an admiration between us, which I have no doubt would happen again under similar circumstances. Mrs.Halstead: The 3ame technique would be used really, basically a reliance on friendship and understanding. Sir Peter: With a minimum of formality. Mrs.Amyot: A minimum, yes thats it. Mrs. Halstead: Well you've covered the territory with great clarity. Sir Peter: Well I think we've covered all the points Jean, I.... Mrs.Halstead: You've c e r t a i n l y c o n t r i b u t e d some f a s c i n a t i n g i n s i g h t s f o r v/hich v/e a r e extremely g r a t e f u l . Sir Peter: Well i t was a joy to do i t . THP END 010165 �1 ^ 1 9 w W Government of Canada Gouvernement du Canada CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET 73J£Al A compter du ^f~uS> U^~ Jusqu'au / U 0'S D / AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - A METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTERIEURE VOIR File No. - Dossier n° Volume 20~A2-TFK-(l-'{ GC 31 (88/08) / 7540-21 -857-8809 010166 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00123 Title A name given to the resource Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - Sir Peter Hayman Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 13-Dec-73 to 7-Mar-74 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - Sir Peter Hayman, RG25, vol. 25748, 20-22-TFK-11-1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Entire File Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en