https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d61b1df371535c57251e4099bb1c1d99.pdf 7f02b9da7e1fd322baf9625c4f970582 PDF Text Text w 001699 �File No. Dossier Volume Ao 20-22-TFK-l F r o m - D e AJZZTZZk Tn-A 7b°\Q\ ;-.* f^ (FAMAXiXArp) L L A b b i A I.fc«2- Xrjt '-,. :1X*-lt^A%_.rS Hi .:'..,.* m x -\ Ol TITLE—TITRE: cn POLITICAL AFFAIRS INTERNAL SECURITY TASK FORCE ON KIDNAPPING POLICY & 4/0 o / ? ! 7' Retention penod-Penode de retention | ts*ss5«s** EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AN& INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES ET COMMERCE EXTERIEUR CANADA WSBKtfi w®m. VdF-i MP Si§S �cc. M. Barker, POP. ,^ _-. File ££, ! Diary v FIE / J. Demers / mm 20-22 -TF/< - } iv^Div. diary / OTTAWA 2, Le 16 decembre 1970. Cher monsieur Hofley, ffcus tenons a vous remercier vivement pour 1'excellente cooperation avec notre Mlnistlre dont vous, ainsi que vos services, aves fait preuve tout au long de la situation d'urgence resultant du double enlevement Gross-Iaporte. En particulier, votre participation au Comite special de notre Centre d*Operations fut vivement appreci^e. L'apport de votre Ministere £tait essentiel et il ne nous fut point menag^j votre attitude de franche cooperation accroit notre assurance et notre determination pour faire face dans 1'avenir a d1autres situations de ce genre• Encore une fois, merci. Veuille3 recevoirj cher monsieur Hofley, l*assurance de nos sentiments les .meilleurs. 6 D W A R D G. LEE Direction des affaires juridiques* Ministere des Affaires exterieures. M. B.C. Hofley, Sous-mlnistre adjoint, Ministere du Solliciteur general, Edifice Sir Wilfrid laurier, Ottawa, Ont. 001701 " J j "FM �FLE / J. Demers / mm cc. Mr. Barker, POP. ;• F i l e ^ Diary Div. diary .. . 2.CX- Z-eL-AYK^ APT i / \ wtmso'7., Ls 16 decembre 1970. Cher monsieur Christie, Nous tenons a vous remercier vivement pour 1'excellente cooperation avec notre Ministere dont vous et vos services avez fait preuve lors de la recente situation d'urgence creee par le double enlevement Gross-Lapofcte. Mime lorsque nous vous pressions pour une reponse rapide a des questions complexes ou insuffisamment precisees, nous avons constamment trouve chez vous une oreille attentive, une disponibillte" encourageante. L'apport de votre Ministere otait essentiel et il nous fut largement accorde" j cette attitude de franche cooperation rencontree che a vou3 aecroit notre assurance et notre determination pour faire face dans 1'avenir a dfautres situations de ce genre. Veuillez Egalement transmettre nos remerciements particuliers a Mile D. B&Lisie, du bureau du Sous-Mlnistre et a Mile P.M. Sprague de la Direction juridique. Veuillez recevoir, cher monsieur Christie, 1'assurance de nos sentiments les meilleurs. E D W A R D G. L7B Direction des affaires juridiques, Ministere des Affaires exterieures. M. D.H. Christie, C. R., Sous-procureur general adjoint, Ministere de la Justice, Edifice de la Justice, Rue Wellington, Ottawa, Ont. 001702 0-^ �;GCO/D.M.Cornett:NC ^ -1 when sod Please return to AFFK - Mr. U.S. Craig ^\^A\Mr\ys2^Si UNCLASSIFIED iiecember 1 6 , 1970 m Return of I-Ir. J.R, Cross to Britain Travel Claims GRF {J.-M. Dery) 2D As part of the Task Po*?ce Operation on the Cross Kidnapping; Mr. .'B.I-I. Cornett of Commonwealth Division and Mr. J.-M. DSry of Francophone were designated as departmental representatives to accompany Iir. Cross and others on the return flight to Britain. Kr. Cornett and Kr. Dery carried out this duty over the period December 5-7, 1970. p. R C G U E T C. Rcquot .-•<» *.<•• f. • VA' ;«•,© r C Ve' n " a JT' 001703 �s s .• y / ^ % CANAOA SECRET ATTACHMENT OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER • CABINET DU PREMIER MINISTRE Ottawa (4), December 16, 1970. c^-.W-P^-ffO MEMORANDUM TO Mr. A.E. Ritchie, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs. Attached is a copy of the partial transcript of the discussion with Mr. J.R. Cross of December 5th, 1970, together with an explanatory note. You will also find attached a copy of my letter to Lord Dunrossil, transmitting a copy of the transcript. I think it had been agreed at one stage that the transcript would be transmitted to the British via External and our London High Commission. However, given the poor quality of the tape and the fact that Lord Dunrossil had been present during the conversation, plus the possible sensitivity of some of the material, it seemed to me perhaps more politic to let him have a look at it first. J. M. Davey. OC /•>: Fy 77 7l7P.f-7 Ab v. W ( 001704 • * — - — s J < . . j _ �I Ottawa (4), December 16, 1970. Vicount J.w. Dunrossil, Head of Chancery, British High Coaaission, 80 Elgin Street, Ottawa 4, Ontario. Dear Lord Dunrossilt I aa enclosing a copy of the transcript of Mr. Cross* conversation with us on December 5th, 1970. Given the poor quality of the tape, that X aa aentionlng in the explanatory note, you aight wish to take a look at the transcript before forwarding it to the appropriate British authorities. If there are any questions, please don't hesitate to call ae. In the aeantias, X aa working oa the second tape. If I don't have the opportunity of seeing or speaking with you before, best wishes for Christans and aay Lady Dunrossil and yourself have a. sore pleasant aad less exciting 1971 in Canada than was 1970. Yours sincerely, O^PPU S'GA PAR o n p p p e.iaeaa BY ).!-.\. DAVEY J . M. Davey. �SECRET ; December 16, 1970, INTERVIEW WITH MR. J.R. CROSS DECEMBER 5, 1970. Explanatory Note During his flight to England on December 5th, 1970, Mr. J.R. Cross kindly consented to answer a number of questions that were put to him by the undersigned concerning the impressions he had gathered of the FLQ. Travelling on the flight were: Mr. Cross His daughter Susan Lord Dunrossil of the British High Commission Mr. J.M. Dery of External Affairs Mr. D. Cornett, External Affairs Constable R. Bennett, RCMP Mr. J.M. Davey, PMO The interview took place at a table in the front of the plane in the presence of Lord Dunrossil and Mr. Dery, who themselves asked one or two questions. Constable Bennett joined us briefly and also asked one question. The conversation was recorded, but because of the background aircraft engine noise, it is of poor quality. An attempt has been made to transcribe, as faithfully as possible, the recorded remarks, but in one or two cases j t has been necessary to make an interpretation of what was actually said. A certain number of repetitious remarks have also been edited out. The transcript is, I believe, as complete and as faithful as possible, but if there are any doubts it can be checked against the original. After Mr. Cross had answered the specific questions that were put to him, a more general conversation took place amongst himself, Lord Dunrossil, Mr. Dery and myself on events in Quebec. This was also partially recorded and an attempt will be made to provide an edited version including all significant facts relating to the FLQ as soon as possible. J. M.Davey •:*A • 001706 \-f.r �SECRET PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF DISCUSSION WITH MR. J.R. CROSS DECEMBER 5, 1970 DAVEY: We now have a pretty good picture of why events in Quebec moved from where they were, starting with the kidnapping of yourself and Mr. Laporte, to a major crisis. There were many elements involved, and we have put some of the pieces together. What we would really like to get is the best possible understanding of the kind of people they were, the things that motivate them, their ideological beliefs, the possibility of orders from above, how .they reacted to Laporte's murder, the War Measures Act, inquest proceedings, what their plans might be for the future, their mentality. It is essentially things of this order. CROSS: Well, I think the most interesting thing for me, and possibly for you, is the question of their political beliefs. days. I discussed this a great deal the first few After that, I'm afraid, I became very tired - my French isn't good enough really to conduct long, involved, philosophical discussions in French. After the death of Laporte, I didn't really want to talk to them very much. I would say that there are two main streams, two main influences, on their political thought. The �SECRET - CROSS: 2 - - (Cont'd) first one is a reading of Quebec history. They are very full of all the events of Quebec history. They have studied it. One of the girls particularly, I think probably had a history degree. And they see the total of Quebec history as the series of two centuries or three centuries of oppression, the first by the Seigneurs of France, since 1759 by les Anglais, and now by the Americans. They see the Quebec people as an oppressed colonial people who are now struggling for national liberation. And I would have said that this is the spark plug of the group I was with. How far this is true of the other groups, I don't know, but I would slightly go away from your area of feelings, I would say that this is the driving force rather than the international side. The second driving force is what I would call, for want of a better term, revolutionary Marxism, and revolutionary Marxism in terms not of Russia, which they regard as state capitalism. Not so much of China, about which they seem to know very little, but about the peasant revolutions of Cuba, and particularly of Algeria. And it's from Algeria that they draw their main intellectual background. This may have started because the work in Algeria is in French and therefore it's easier for them to read. • A' i L * - •FA '*fxA-- >-'V 001708 •• �SECRET CROSS: 3 - (Cont'd) The literature they gave me was firstly Vallieres' book, which they seem to regard as a very good statement from the Quebec point of view; and secondly, the works of Franz Fanon on the Algerian position. They also gave me some stuff on South America, and one of the things they showed me was an article in Ramparts by one of the Brazilians who is now in Algeria. So that if I were to define their aims, they are to create an independent, socialist Quebec, socialist in Algerian terms, and an independent socialist Quebec which is brought about by violence. Now violence is an essential theme of this, and what I would like to do when I get to London is try and find, out from our people whether Fanon's book, "The Damned of the Earth", is available in English because I read it in French. a difficult book to read. It's I don't know enough of Algerian and North African history to take up his allusions and I may have missed some of the points. But from what I understand, the argument is roughly thus. A colonialized people, and these people define the Quebec people, and when I say the Quebec people I mean the French, the Quebecois, as a colonialized people, are full of complexes and neuroses - I don't know the right term which are created by their environment, their social, political, economic environment. It's because of this �SECRET •_ CROSS: 4 - (Cont'd) that you have among colonialized peoples a very high rate of violence, a very high rate of murder, a very high rate of family crimes. You have things like outbursts of tribal war, you have secret societies like the Leopard men, you have the release of violence in tribal dances. Now the sole way to cleanse the soul, to liberate these people, the sole way to achieve a catharsis, to make them a free people, is to achieve a revolution by violence. A revolution by peaceful means, if this is not a contradiction in terms, a change of power by peaceful means, is a betrayal because all it does is replace the metropolitan bourgeois by a local bourgeois who has been trained in the metropolitan image. And all they do is adopt the metropolitan institutions. And because they are less efficient than the metropolitan bourgedis, you are merely in a worse situation than before. So therefore the aim of the FLQ is, by violent means, to bring about an overthrow of the Government in Quebec and the establishment of an independent Quebec. They do not, I think, see themselves as able to do this by masses of armed men in the streets. that this is possible. They never believe But what I think they believe is that by acting as the spark plug at pressure points, y •* y *d ..v > ••«a 001710 .;"'' �SECRET CROSS: 5 - (Cont'd) by acting in the same way as the Bolshevik terror squads, the Irish Republican Army, the Irgun Zwai Leumi, or probably even more the Stern Gang - I don't know how far you're familiar with them, but they combine some of these. I was in Palestine in '46 in the King David Hotel when it was blown up, so I have -some experience with this. They would regard themselves in the role of either the Stern Gang or the Irgun Zwai Leumi in this situation. By dramatizing, by forcing, the situations which arise, like the taxi, like the struggle for a French language, like the workers of St. Henri, like the Gaspe situation, to make the situation worse, to force the Government into repressive operations, and to create a situation in which the anglophones would give up and clear out, and therefore a change would take place. They do not, I think, see themselves, - I made jokes about meeting them when they were Ministers and receiving them in London and giving them diplomatic banquets, because I know very well the British government would shake hands with anybody. we need is time. All The moment they arrive with a contract for ten fighters, they would be received at Buckingham Palace - but I don't think they see themselves as taking power, but they see themselves as the Messiahs of power or as voices crying in the wilderness, the people who will, by forcing the situation, create a position c-a 'Xpy X- - ^-.i *' A* - , F-o "**•• �SECRET _ CROSS: 6 - (Cont'd) in which this independent Quebec can come about. But with violence as the essential ingredient. And that really, I think on the broad political level, is the fundamental approach which I got. I tried then to go on to discuss their Marxism. I think they claim themselves to be Marxists, but my feeling is that their intellectual basis in Marxism is very weak. They have read very little in some things, they have probably read the Communist manifesto. But they didn't seem to know anything very much; they had the ABC of Communism in the place, but they seemed to know very little really of the fundamental developments of Communism. They had very little idea of how the new independent Quebec state was going to be organized. They sort of mouthed parrot phrases from Vallieres book about autogestion of factories and things. DAVEY: Did they regard Vallieres as the intellectual leader of this group? CROSS: Well, I wouldn't have said necessarily intellectual leader, but a man who expressed their thoughts and whose statements should be referred to as an expression of FLQ thoughts. But when you tried to get down to ask them, I mean, how are you going to run the factories, �SECRET CROSS: 6a - (Cont'd) who's going to run independent Quebec, they had no real idea. They resembled, I think, very much the anarchist syndicalists in Catalonia in '36 and '38. This was their sort of great weakness when one tried to get into an intellectual discussion. They hadn't got to the second stage; they had got to the revolution stage, but they hadn't got the dictatorship of proletariat stage and they certainly hadn't got to the organization of the state stage. And that really is the gist. If you ask me questions, other things may come back to me. But that is the gist of my appreciation of their political thought. DAVEY: What impression did you form of their organization as such? I mean did you get the impression it was a large number of cells who were working, that there was a hierarchy? Were they taking orders from anyone, or were they operating on an independent basis? CROSS: All I can give you is an impression. My impression is that there is a network of individuals and possibly other members of the cell do not necessarily know, and that there are certain broad guidelines laid down. Kidnapping was laid down, shall we say, as the target for 1970. And that within this, certain cells will go . .fc • • '^A .p -^ • X'-** v P F - : 7 A . . • • 001 . . • A • �;j3^. ...P.- SECRET CROSS: 7 - (Cont'd) off and do things. And once they decide to do it, it's left pretty much on their own whether they will use for security reasons other cells for communication. There was obviously communications between Chenier and Liberation; there was communication, I think, with another, then another communications cell. But that there is no, as it were, in a detailed sense, a general council of the FLQ which would be meeting and then decide what we're going to do next. DAVEY: The targets of say kidnapping in 1970, by what means would those objectives be arrived at? CROSS: Well, I think that some early time in the year somebody laid these down, perhaps three or four people meeting together who then went off and passed messages to other people. But this was all sheer deduction on my part from vague things. I heard very little really of what they were talking about. DAVEY: How did they react, for example, to Mr. Laporte's murder? CROSS: They knew about it. came on. They knew he was dead, before it You'll find in the police record two contra- dictory statements. On the Friday night, and I can't remember who made the statement on the Friday night, • \: - . . .. , \ • Alto-•A'P X" i .2x2^7.-2 . • -.•.•<• • , V *' . 001714 -a �SECRET CROSS: 8 - (Cont'd) whether it was Trudeau or whether it was Bourassa, or whether it was Bourassa, or whether it was both of them, but after one of the statements, the girl, CossetteTrudel, said - I heard her clearly - "Laporte est mort.". Now it's impossible for me to really judge the terms in which she said it, whether she said, "Laporte est mort?", or whether it was a statement of fact. I took it to mean, because there was then some talk of Laporte used, ; that a plan had been worked out between the two cellules that in certain events, certain things would happen and that if there was a complete rejection, Laporte would be killed. I mean I deduced this after, that I would be held. On the other hand, certainly when Laporte's death was announced, it was no surprise to them. They knew it. On the other hand, one of them, whom I now think to be Lanctot, or now know to be Lanctot, told me that he was sick to his stomach when he heard of Laporte's death. These are two, in a sense contradictory state- ments, and now I can't reconcile them. DAVEY: If the first statement were made on the Friday night, Laporte didn't die until the Saturday..... :Z2:X- AAz - 7 ' 'A. 'JV_ ^ v'« F. •' F ' .. " 2' : •;'••' 001715^ .. ' ' x • •• • �1% SECRET _ CROSS: Are we sure of this? 9 _ The police didn't seem, when I talked to them, to be terribly clear. There is some doubt as to whether the folding of the body in the trunk might affect the post mortem. But this is something that you'll want to check. DAVEY: Going back to one of the other things you said, you said that there seemed to be some understanding of what would happen after Laporte had been captured and various events.... CROSS: No, not from the beginning. I think this was established during the week of Laporte's kidnapping. DAVEY: There must have been communications? CROSS: Oh there was communication. *I heard about how Laporte was being treated about 'Monday. I was told that he was being much worse treated than I was, that he was babbling away all the time and finding difficulty in keeping control Of himself. DAVEY: How did they react to the War Measures Act, to such massive response. CROSS: Did they expect this? No, I don't think so. Their response to almost every reaction of the Government in a legal sense, every police action, was fascinating. .A--'' '. J aI'V" ' ( ' • It was to claim that this was . • AAA'--. J ',7x7 :. • „• 001716 �SECRET CROSS: 10 - (Cont'd) contrary to British justice. And I found this the most amazing statement and I kept on pointing it out to them. But they were most indignant about what they regarded as retroactive legislation which they regarded as contrary to British justice. DAVEY: How did they react to various personalities like Mr. Trudeau, Mr. Bourassa....? CROSS: They laughed at them. DAVEY: What about Rene Levesque? CROSS Oh they had respect for Levesque, but they weren', t going to take any notice of him. They regarded Levesque, to go back to our previous analogies, I suppose rather as the Irgun Zwai Leumi regarded the head of the Jewish agency. DAVEY: / And the Claude Ryans, and the Laberges, and people like/ that? CROSS: They laughed at them, really. They regard Claude Ryan as someone who has sat on the fence so long, ....they laughed at the Archbishop. DAVEY: Chartrand? Michel Chartrand? �SECRET CROSS: 11 Oh they thought Chartrand was a good chap, but not much more. My impression was that they thought people like Chartrand and Lemieux were people who went around shooting their mouths off.... DAVEY: ....Robert Lemieux? CROSS: Robert Lemieux who weren't really in the organization, This would be my guess. But is is only an impression. DAVEY: How did they react to the inquest proceedings? CROSS: They were fascinated by the whole thing and followed it terribly closely. They didn't give any great response or reaction. DAVEY: Did you get any sense of factions or dissent at all in the FLQ ranks in terms of•what was happening? j y CROSS: There were a whole lot of heated arguments but < I couldn't follow them, they were too fast. I think they were mostly about tactics on communiques and things and about what they should do next. tell you that. It was in very fast French. Cossette Trudel kept on. But I can't But Madame She was a very violent bitch. She kept on shouting at the others on occasions and screaming. But it was difficult to sort of follow. terribly hard. It's My Frer\ch is poor and when people talk fast it's very, very tiring and I reckoned that my business was to keep my s th up and to keep alive and not really worry aboui. they;were up to. 001718 Ti �SECRET DAVEY: 12 - What impression did you form of them as just human beings? ....if this is possible outside of the situation? CROSS: Personally, they were very kind to me - except for that women. She was, I think, as so many female revolu- tionaries are, so dedicated that she allowed her personal feelings to mix with her political feelings. The rest were very kind to me, treated me politely, but they were absolutely dedicated. They had committed themselves to thi3 and they had committed themselves, I think, to go to death in this cause. And in some ways I think they would have been happy to have been killed in the cause of being sort of martyrs of the revolution. DAVEY: And yet in most of the other cases, immediately the FLQ have been surrounded by obvious, by superior forces, usually they have given in fairly quickly. < CROSS: Well, here again.... there are all sorts of contradications in this and I can't resolve them. DAVEY: Could you just say a few words about each of the personalities who were there, Carbonneau �A'A- 13 - ' ''xA: No, I can't, because remember until two o/cloce on Thursday morning I couldn't distinguish who was who. I mean it's very difficult to distinguish voices in a foreign language. Lanctot, I think now, was the man who did most of the negotiations with me. He, I would say, is somebody - I don't know what his father was - my guess is that his background would be very similar to Vallieres', someone brought up in a workingclass background, with great frustrations in his life, unable to achieve what he wanted. Funnily enough, and now it comes back to me, one morning they brought in to me two words in English. they? Now what the hell were The words will come back to me. They were something like embittered - two words which*would describe a man who has attempted to achieve something and has failed and is embittered against the whole world. They were trying to get me to translate these into French. And I would have said that this was, in a sense, Lanctot, that he was, he tried to do various things and things that failed on him, and he had a terrible bitterness against the whole establishment in Quebec. And they were all - it reminded one very much of arguing about Communism - they were all full of sort of parrot phrases about, which appear all through the communiques, about big,bosses in Westmount, Power corporation and these sprinkled their conversation all the time0 �SECRET - 14 - DAVEY: Do they have any sense of humour at all? CROSS: Oh, yes. It was strange in the midst of the worst situations, one burst out laughing. Susan. I was just telling At 3 o'clock on Thursday morning as we were all sitting there with a thousand police and soldiers all around us, they were writing out the message that they threw out, and each of them, you know, added a few words, say this, say that, say the other. And then as they finished it, somebody said, "Ah, but put in nous vaincrons." And at that moment we all burst out in a howl of laughter. It seemed so absurd in the situation. And there was another occasion, I don't know if you remember, when the police arrested the wrong Bernard Lortie in Hull. And I turned to them and said, "Ah, you see what's gone wrong, you've arrested the wrong Mr. Cross." And you know there were roars of laughter on that occasion. situation. There was a lot of humour about the Particularly when people would come on and make statements which were, in the circumstances, absurd, you know, that I had departed to Switzerland or that Lanctot was in Mexico, or that I was kept gagged, bound, amongst machine guns and bombs tied to my feet. was a lot of humour. There It was one of the things that kept me going all through. If it hadn't been for that, I wouldn't have stayed sane. 7 -"' �SECRET - 15 - DAVEY: How many people were you actually dealing with? CROSS: To the best of my knowledge, I was dealing with six people, four men" and two women, one of the women who left some weeks, ago. DAVEY: How many did you see on a regular basis? CROSS: I never saw anybody - their faces - but all of them would come into the room sometime during the day and at nights they would pretty all be sitting in the room, except, I think, they probably always left one outside. Except for Carbonneau, who I think came to the house about two weeks after the kidnapping. DAVEY: When you say you didn't see their faces.... * CROSS: I never saw their faces in the house. I told the police this, so I don't think you'll need the details of the actual modalities of my holding. DAVEY: But that would mean pretty rigorous mentality and discipline.... CROSS: Absolutely rigorous discipline. There were always two people guarding me, at least two people guarding me every 24 hours a day, day and night. DAVEY: OK. CROSS: Fine, unless you want to go on while I'm in stream. DAVEY: All right.... �•/' *-"•• 7 SECRET '•ijA ., • *%,-? 1 6 V DAVEY: So that when I was saying at the beginning that these people had more in common with the Maoists in Vancouver than with the PQ, what I was implying was in the revolutionary sense. As they would say of the PQ in much of their own literature, it's just substituting an Anglo American bourgeois for a French Canadian bourgeois. And you find in many of their documents that they are contemptuous of the PQ. CROSS: I d i d n ' t g e t t h a t impression t h a t they were contemptuous of the PQ. I think they would regard the PQ as an i n s t r u m e n t , I think t h a t as I s a i d , as a John the B a p t i s t , who would serve i t s purpose i n one of the measures of drawing a t t e n t i o n to the problems of Quebec. DAVEY: Did they have any sense of plans for the future beyond the short term? Was there any sort of timetable in their minds for achieving the things they are aiming at? CROSS; No. The long term plan, they said to me, we don't know that we will see independence in our time, but perhaps -in our children's time. The short term, the only thing I did notice, and I mentioned this to the police, I think they are working on parcel bombs, to be sent through the post to people. They showed me some boxed games which they were working on, booby traps with batteries inside. They had a little game, sort of Parker game, or some sort of thing and as you opened it a light came on and that had a battery inside. 001723 �'M*». SECRET •':§-8.2 RCMP CONSTABLE: CROSS: We found that. This terrified me, the thought of that being opened by kids on Christmas morning. DERY: Latin America, which you mentioned. Did you form any impression they were patterning themselves on what was happening down there? CROSS: Oh, yes. On Marighella or Guevara? The name of Marighella wasn't mentioned to me nor Che Guevara. But they gave me one book on the Brazilian thing and they obviously had studied the Brazilian kidnapping situation. DAVEY: Who did they acquire their beliefs from? To be pretty well indoctrinated in that way, to think in that way, they must have done a fair amount of studying. ' Does this trace back to any location like in the University of Montreal or circles in Montreal € CROSS: Oh I don't know. My impression is that at least one of them had been to university, one or perhaps two, but I couldn't say. I don't know whether Lanctot was ever at university. I wouldn't know. RCMP CONSTABLE: Jacques Lanctot had his political beginning with the Socialist Labour League in Canada. Did he ever mention his participation with the Socialist Labour League in Canada? CROSS: No. �SECRET •*\j* 1 8 DAVEY: The youth in the CEGEPs and in the universities are very much a focus of attention of these people. Did you get any- sense that they were concentrating on them at all? CROSS: No, only in the sense that they were terribly pleased with these measures of support from CEGEPs. was one of the things they were aiming at. I mean, this But I would have thought that they would regard themselves as an action cell and it would be other people's job to, as it were, you know actually go out and do the stirring up. DAVEY: You say that they laughed at Trudeau and Bourassa and these people. Do they mak*e any connection at all with them, do they have any sort of feelings other than total dismissal? CROSS: Total dismissal. Establishment figures who have no sense of the reality of Quebec. DAVEY: Have they respect for any people outside of their own group in Canada or any people in Canada or the States? CROSS: The only person I thought they might have a bit of respect for was Rene Levesque. DAVEY: Would you say that they were an entirely Quebecdominated movement in their mentality? �SECRET 'AA*:'At' •: 19 CROSS: As far as I could gather. To come back to my original point, I think the dominant feature is Quebec nationalism to which something else is added, rather than international Communism with a national flavour. This would be my guess. DUNROSSIL: So, otherwise, they are a sort of avant garde in a vacuum, aren't they, unless you really know what they're" an avant garde for? Did you get a feeling of their being, an avant garde at all, that something was going to happen after they'd done their'work, or....? CROSS: No, I mean I don't think they'd got beyond this, I think their timescale as I said was a fairly long one. DUNROSSIL: Strictly an operation? CROSS: An operation to achieve Quebec independence. DAVEY: To what sort of things would they be sensitive if you wanted to get back at them? CROSS: I don't think they're sensitive to anything. I mean they are committed to revolution, and how do you recommit revolutionaries. The only people you could talk to on this are our chaps who did brainwashing in Malaya who claimed that they reconverted communists. Whether they did or not, whether they just went underground, I don't know. I don't see any measure that you're going to convince these people.... 001726 �.'•••" ; ' ' *;"J" •* • ' :' - ' . ' • / .•"••'•• -. :'•'• *&•'• T " Ax '•„*«& •,'b * A<" f • - •• DERY: • . SECRE1: . 1ii di-A&p h2H7 %r2° - Did they give you any indication from earlier conversation, talking about revolutionary action, did they receive any hope eventually to get moral or physical support from revolutionary states, like Algeria? There have been reports that they have been to Algeria to seek support and to Cuba. Did they at any time mention even hopes? CROSS: I wasn't talking with them in these terms. I was talking with thera in terms of trying to find out their political beliefs. The only thing I did know, and I think it is clear, that one of them, two of them, had visited the Cuban consulate in Montreal. They knew the name of the ex-Cuban consul, the chap who was there some months ago. They knew about the Cuban consulate in Montreal. DAVEY: How did they regard the French from France? CROSS: No real interest, no real contact. They roared with laughter when people suggested that de Gaulle was responsible for all this. They roared with laughter when people suggested that the Deuxieme Bureau had organized the whole affair. Lanctot told me that he had spent three months in England, and enjoyed it enormously, and he said to me, "I suppose the British Government will never let me back in now." �ZkikT.. SECRET DAVEY: 21 - What about this British sense of justice? You mentioned that they didn't like the idea of retroactivity. Was that in the sense that some trick was being pulled on them, that this was a game that you were involved in, or was it just something that was going to make things more difficult? CROSS: No, I mean, it's clear that they just thought that the rules of the game are that you have British rules of law and order and you chaps have gone and changed the rules of the game, and this bloody well wasn't fair. DUNROSSIL: In other words, their type of activity won't flourish where British justice flourishes because they are the chaps who are shaking up the box. CROSS: I don't think they've gone that far. You're in the game, and then these are'the rules of the game and somebody changes the rules. It's bloody unfair. You can change the rules. The Government is supposed to behave differently from us. DAVEY: I think that's great. •• -'F^k1- A '-^."j -•ts* ^ -$. i XT£'' p 001728 f �SECRET PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF DISCUSSION WITH MR. J.R. CROSS DECEMBER 5, 19 70 . DAVEY: We now have a pretty good picture of why events in Quebec moved from where they were, starting with the kidnapping of yourself and Mr. Laporte, to a major crisis. There were many elements involved, and we have put some of the pieces together. What we would really like to get is the best possible understanding of the kind of people they were, the things that motivate them, their ideological beliefs, the possibility of orders from above, how .they reacted to Laporte's murder, the VJar Measures Act, inquest proceedings, what their plans might be for the future, their mentality. It is essentially things of this order, CROSS: Well, I think the most interesting thing for me, and possibly for you, is the question of their political beliefs. days. I discussed this a great dea], the first few After that, I'm afraid, I became very tired - my French isn't good enough really to conduct long, involved, philosophical discussions in French. After the death of Laporte, I didn't really want to talk to them very much. I would say that there are two main streams, two main influences, on their political thought. The 001729 �SECRET - 2 •• - i CROSS: (Cont'd) first one is a reading of Quebec history. They are very full of all the events of Quebec history. They have studied it. One of the girls particularly, I think probably had a history degree. And they see the total of Quebec history as the series of two centuries pr three centuries of oppression, the first by the Seigneurs of France, since 1759 by les Anglais, and now by the Americans. r They see the Quebec people as an oppressed colonial people who are now struggling for national liberation. ''• i And I would have said that this is the spark plug of the group I was with. How far this is true of the other ! groups, I don't know, but I would slightly go away from your area of feelings, I would say that this is the driving force rather than the international side. The second driving force is what I would call, for want of a better term, revolutionary Marxism, and revolutionary Marxism in terms not of Russia, which they regard as state capitalism. Not so much of China, about which they seem to know very little, but about the peasant revolutions of Cuba, and particularly of Algeria. And it's from ' Algeria that they draw their main intellectual background. This may have started because the work in Algeria is in French and therefore it's easier for them to read. 001730 �SECRET - CROSS: 3 - • . . (Cont'd) The literature they gave me was firstly Vallieres' book, which they sesm to regard as a very good statement 'from the Quebec point of view; and. secondly, the works of Franz Fanon on the Algerian position. They also gave me some stuff on South America, and one of the things they showed me was an article in Ramparts by one of the Brazilians who is nov; in Algeria. So that if I were to define their aims, they are to create an independent, socialist Quebec, socialist in Algerian terms, and an independent socialist Quebec which is brought about by violence. Now violence is an essential theme of this, and what I would like to do when I get to London is try and find, out from our people whether Fanon's book, "The Damned of the Earth", is available in English because I read it in French. a difficult book to read. It's I don't know enough of Algerian and North African history to take up his allusions and I may have missed some of the points. But from what I understand, the argument is roughly thus. A colonialized. people, ahd these people define the Quebec people, and when I say the Quebec people I mean the French, the Quebecois, as a colonialized people, are full of complexes and neuroses - I don't know the right term which are created by their environment, their social, political, economic environment. It's because of this 001731 �.SECRET „ CROS_S: 4 „ (Cont'd) that you have among colonialized peoples a very high rate of violence, a very high rate of murder, a very high rate of family crimes. You have things like outbursts of tribal war, you have secret societies like the Leopard men, you have the release of violence in tribal dances. Now the sole v/ay to cleanse the soul, to liberate these people, ;the sole way to achieve a catharsis, to make them a free people, is to achi_eye_ a revolution_by violence. A revolution by peaceful means, if this is not a contradiction in terms, a change of power by peaceful means, is a betrayal because all it does is replace the metropolitan bourgeois by a local bourgeois who has been trained in the metropolitan image. And all they do is adopt the metropolitan institutions. And because they are less efficient than the metropolitan bourgeois, you are merely in a worse situation than before. So therefore the aim of the FLQ is, by violent means, to bring about an overthrow of the Government in Quebec and the establishment of an independent Quebec. They do not, I think, see themselves as able to do this by masses of armed men in the streets. that this is possible. They never believe But what I think they believe is that by acting as the spark plug at pressure points, A- • 001732 �SECRET CROSS: (Cont'd) . by acting in the same way as the Bolshevik terror squads, the Irish Republican Army, the Irgun Zwai Leumi, or probably even more the Stern Gang - I don't know how far you're familiar with them, but they combine some of these. I was in Palestine in '46 in the King David Hotel when it was blown up, so I have some experience with this. They would regard themselves in the role of either the Stern Gang or the Irgun Zwai Leumi in this situation. By dramatizing, by forcing, the situations which arise, like the taxi, like the struggle for a French language, like the workers •J of St. Henri, like the Gaspe situation, to make the situation worse, to force the Government into repressive operations, and to create a situation in which the. anglophones would give up and clear out, and therefore a change would take place. They do not, I think, see themselves, - I made jokes about meeting them when they were Ministers and receiving them in London and giving them diplomatic banquets, because I know very well the British government would shake hands with anybody. we need is time. All The moment they arrive with a contract for ten fighters, they would be received at Buckingham Palace - but I don't think they see themselves as taking power, but they see themselves as the Messiahs of power or as voices crying in the wilderness, the people who will, by forcing the situation, create a position 001733 �SECRET 6 CROSS: (Cont'd) in v/hich this independent Quebec can come about. But with violence as the essential ingredient. And that really, I think on the broad political level, is the fundamental approach which I got. I tried then to go on to discuss their Marxism. I think they claim themselves to be Marxists, but my feeling is that their intellectual basis in Marxism is very weak. They have read very little in some things, they have probably read the Communist manifesto. But they didn't, seem to know anything very much; they had the ABC of Communism in the place, but they seemed to know very little really of the fundamental developments of Communism. They had very little idea of how the new independent Quebec state was going to be organized. They sort of mouthed parrot phrases from Vallieres book about autogestion of factories and things. DAVEY: Did they regard Vallieres as the intellectual leader of this group? CROSS: Well, I wouldn't have said necessarily intellectual leader, but a man who expressed their thoughts and whose statements should be referred to as an expression of FLQ thoughts. But when you tried to get down to ask them, I mean, how are you going to run the factories, (: 001734 �SECRET CROSS: 6 a -- (Cont'd) who's going to run independent Quebec, they had no real idea.. They resembled, I think, vex~y much the anarchist syndicalists in Catalonia in '36 and '38. This was their sort of great weakness when one tried to get into an intellectual discussion. They hadn't got to the second stage; they had got to the revolution 1/ stage, but they hadn't got the dictatorship of proletariat r stage and they certainly hadn't got to the organization of the state stage. And that really is the gist. If you ask me questions, other things may come back to me. But that is the gist of my appreciation of their political thought. DAVEY: What impression did you form of their organization as such? I mean did you get the impression it was a large number of cells who were working, that there was afthierarchy? Were they taking orders from anyone, or were they operating on an independent basis? CROSS: All I can give you is an impression. My impression is that there is a network of individuals and possibly other members of the cell do not necessarily know, and that there are certain broad guidelines laid down. Kidnapping was laid down, shall we say, as the target for 1970. And that within this, certain cells will go « 001735 �SECRET -. .7 CROSS: - (Cont'd) off and do things. And once they decide to do it, it's left pretty much on their own whether they v/ill use for security reasons other cells for communication. There was obviously communications between Chenier and Liberation; there was communication, I think, with another, then another communications cell. But that there is no, as it were, in a detailed sense, .^general council of the FLQ which would be meeting and then decide what we're going to do next. DAVEY: The targets of say kidnapping in 1970, by what means would those objectives be arrived at? CROSS: Well, I think that some early time in. the year somebody laid these down, perhaps three or four people meeting together who then went off and passed messages to other people. But this was all sheer deduction on my part from vague things. I heard very little really of what they were talking about. DAVEY: How did they react, for example, to Mr. Laporte's murder? CROSS: They knew about it. came on. They knew he was dead, before it You'll find in the police record two contra- dictory statements. On the Friday night, and I can't remember who made the statement on the Friday night, - 001736 �SECRET 8 CROSS; (Cont'd) whether it was Trudeau or whether it was Bourassa, or whether it was Bourassa, or v/hether it was both of them, b u t after one of the statements, the girl, CossetteTrudel, said - I heard her clearly - "Laporte est mort.". Now it's impossible for me to really judge the terms in which she said it, whether she said,. "Laporte est mort?", or whether it was a statement of fact. I took it to mean, {. because there was then some talk of Laporte used, that a plan had been worked out between the. two cellules that in certain events, certain things v/ould happen and that if there was a complete rejection, Laporte would be ••;• killed. I mean I deduced this after, that I would be held. On the other hand, certainly when Laporte's death was announced, it was no surprise to them.. They knew it. On the other hand, one of them, whom I nov/ think to b e Lanctot, or now know to be Lanctot, told me that he was sick to his stomach when h e heard of Laporte's death. These are two, in a sense contradictory state- ments, and now I can't reconcile DAVEY: them. If the first statement were made on the Friday night, / Laporte didn't die until the Saturday ' 001737 �SECRET CROSS: Are we s u r e of this? 9 - The p o l i c e d i d n ' t seem, v/hen I t a l k e d to thern, t o be t e r r i b l y c l e a r . There is some d o u b t a s t o ' w h e t h e r t h e f o l d i n g of t h e body i n the t r u n k might a f f e c t t h e p o s t mortem. t h i s i s s o m e t h i n g t h a t y o u ' l l want t o DAVEY: But check. Going back to one of the other things you said, you said that there seemed to be some understanding of what would happen after Laporte had been captured and various events.... CROSS: No, not from the beginning. I think this was established during the week of Laporte's kidnapping. DAVEY: There must have been communications? CROSS: Oh there was communication. 'I.heard about how Laporte was being treated about Monday. I. v/as told that he was being much worse treated than I was, that he was babbling away all the time and finding difficulty in keeping control of himself. DAVEY: How did they react to the War Measures Act, to such massive response. CROSS: Did they expect this?. No, I don't think so. Their response to almost every reaction of the Government in a legal sense, every police action, v/as fascinating. It was to claim that this was . 001738 �SECRET CROSS: 10 (Cont'd) contrary to British justice. And I found this the most amazing statement and I kept on pointing it out to them. . But they were most indignant about v/hat they regarded as retroactive legislation which they regarded as contrary to British justice. DAVEY: How did they react to various personalities like Mr. Trudeau, Mr. Bourassa....? CROSS: They laughed at them. DAVEY: What about Rene Levesque? CROSS: Oh they had respect for Levesque, but they weren't going to take any notice of him. They regarded Levesque, to go back to our previous analogies, I suppose rather as the Irgun Zwai Leumi regarded the head of the Jewish agency. d DAVEY: And the Claude Ryans, and the Laberges, and people like that? CROSS: They laughed at them, really. They regard Claude Ryan as someone-who has sat on the fence so long, ....they laughed at the Archbishop. DAVEY: Chartrand? Michel Chartrand? �SECRET CROSS: 11 - Oh they thought Chartrand .was.' a good chap, but not much more. My impression v/as that they thought people like Chartrand and Lemieux were people who went around shooting their mouths off.... DAVEY: ....Robert Lemieux? CROSS: Robert Lemieux. ....who weren't really in the organization. This would be my guess. But is is only an impression. DAVEY: How did they react to the inquest proceedings? CROSS: They were fascinated by the whole thing and followed it terribly closely. They didn't give any great response or reaction. DAVEY: Did you get any sense of factions or dissent at all in the FLQ ranks in terms of what was happening? CROSS: There were a whole lot of heated arguments but I couldn't follow them, they were too fast. I think they were mostly about tactics on communiques and things and about what they should do next. tell you that. It was in very fast French. Cossette Trudel kept on. . • ——-—-~—~~ - But I can't But Madame She was a very, violent bitch. **z " - -—• . She kept on shouting at the others on occasions and screaming. But it was difficult to sort of follow. terribly hard. It's My French is poor and when people talk fast it's very, very tiring and I reckoned that my business was to keep my strength up and to keep alive and not really worry about what they were up to. . 001740 �SECRET - DAVEY: 12 - VJhat impression did you form of them as just human beings? ....if this is possible outside of the situation? CROSS: Personally, they v/ere very kind to me - except for that womfiyi. She w a s , I think, as so many female revolu- tionaries are, so dedicated that she allowed her personal feelings to mix with her political feelings. T h e rest were very kind to m e , treated me politely, but they were absolutely dedicated. They had committed themselves to this and they had committed themselves, I think, to go to death in this cause. And in some ways I think they would have been happy tc have been killed in the cause of being sort of martyrs of the revolution. DAVEY: And yet in most of the other cases, immediately the FLQ have been surrounded by obvious., by superior forces, usually they have given in fairly quickly. CROSS: Well, here again:... there are all sorts of contradications -in this and I can't resolve them. DAVEY: Could you just say a few words -about each of the personalities who were there. Carbonneau..... 001741 �SECRET _ CROSS: 1 "J _ No, I can't, because remember until two o'cloce on Thursday morning I couldn't distinguish who v/as who. I mean it's very difficult to distinguish voices in a foreign language. Lanctot, I think now, was the man who did most of the negotiations with me. He, I would say, is somebody - I don't know what his father was - my guess is that his background would be very similar to Vallieres', someone brought up in a workingclass background, v/ith great frustrations in his life, unable to achieve what he wanted. Funnily enough, and now it comes back to me, one morning they brought in to me two v/ords in English. they? Nov/ what the hell were The words will come back to me. They were something like embittered - two words which*would describe a man who has attempted to achieve something and has failed and is embittered against the whole world. They were trying to get me to translate these into French. o' And I v/ould have said that this v/as, in a sense, Lanctot, that he v/as, he tried to do various things and things that failed on him, and he had a terrible bitterness against the whole establishment in . Quebec. And they were all - it reminded one very much of arguing about Communism - they were all full of sort of parrot phrases about, which appear all through the communiques, about big bosses in Westmount, Power corporation and these sprinkled their conversation all the timee 001742 �SECRET - 14 DAVEY: Do they have any sense of humour at all? CROSS: Oh, yes. It was strange in the midst of the v/orst situations, one burst out laughing. Susan. I was just telling At 3 o'clock on Thursday morning as we were all sitting there with a thousand police and soldiers all around us, they were writing out the message that r they threw out, and each of them, you know, added a few words, say this, say that, say the other. And then as they finished it, somebody said, "Ah, but put in nous vaincrons." And at that moment v/e all burst out in a howl of laughter. It seemed so absurd in the situation. And there was another occasion, I don't know if you remember, when the police arrested the wrong Bernard Lortie in Hull. And I turned to them and said, "Ah, you see what's gone wrong, you've arrested the wrong Mr. Cross." And you know there were roars of laughter on that occasion. - situation. There was a lot of humour about the Particularly when people would come on and make statements which were, in the circumstances, absurd, you know, that I had departed to Switzerland or that Lanctot was in Mexico, or that I was kept gagged, bound, amongst machine guns and bombs, tied to my feet. v/as a lot of humour. There It was one of the things that kept me going all through. If it hadn't been for that, I wouldn't have stayed sane. 001743 �SECRET 15 DAVEY: How many people were you actually dealing with? CROSS: To the best of rny knowledge, I was dealing v/ith six people, four men' and tv/o women, one of the women who left some weeks ago. DAVEY: How many did you see on a regular basis? CROSS: I never saw anybody - their faces - but ail of them would come into the room sometime during the day and yd/ at nights they would pretty/all be sitting in the room, except, I think, they probably always left one outside. Except for Carbonneau, who I think came to the house about - two weeks after the kidnapping. DAVEY: When you say you didn't see their faces..., ' CROSS: I never saw their faces in the.house. I told the police this, so I don't think you'll need the details of the actual modalities of my holding. DAVEY: But that would mean pretty rigorous mentality and discipline.... CROSS: Absolutely rigorous discipline. There were always two people guarding me, at least two people.guarding me every 24 hours a day, day and night. DAVEY: OK. CROSS: Fine, unless you want to go on while I'm in stream. DAVEY: All righto... 001744 �SECRET DAVEY: 16 So that when I was saying at the beginning that these people had more in common with the Maoists in Vancouver than with the PQ, v/hat I was implying v/as in the revolutionary sense. As they would say of the PQ in much of their own literature, it's just substituting an Anglo American bourgeois for a French Canadian bourgeois. And you find in many of their documents that they are contemptuous of the PQ. . CROSS: I didn't get that impression that they were contemptuous of the PQ. I think they would regard the PQ as an instrument, I think that as I said, as a John the Baptist, who v/ould serve its purpose in one of the measures of drawing attention to the problems of Quebec. DAVEY: Did they have any sense of plans for- the future beyond the short term? Was there any sort of timetable in their minds for achieving the things they are aiming at? CROSS: No. The'long term plan, they said to me, v/e don't know that we will see independence in our time, but perhaps —in our children's time. The short term, the only thing I did notice, and I mentioned this to the police, I think they are working on parcel bombs, to be sent through the post to people. They showed me some boxed games " which they were working on, booby traps with batteries . j inside. They had a little game, sort of Parker game, or some sort of thing and as you opened it a light came on and that had a battery inside. . 001745 �SECRET RCMP CONSTABLE: CROSS: 17 - We found that. This terrified me, the thought of that being opened by kids on Christmas morning. DERY: Latin America, which you mentioned. Did you form any impression they were patterning themselves on what was happening down there? CROSS: Oh, yes. On Marighella or Guevara? The name of Marighella wasn't mentioned to me nor Che Guevara. But they gave me one book on the Brazilian thing and they obviously had studied the Brazilian kidnapping situation. DAVEY: Who did they acquire their beliefs from? To be pretty well indoctrinated in that way, to think in that way,.., . they must have done a fair amount of studying. Does this trace back to any location like in the University . of Montreal or circles in Montreal..... CROSS: Oh I don't know. My impression is that at.least one of them had been to university, one or perhaps two, but I couldn't say. I don't know whether Lanctot was ever at university. I wouldn't know. RCMP CONSTABLE: Jacques Lanctot had his political beginning with the Socialist Labour League in Canada. Did he ever mention his participation with the Socialist Labour League in Canada? CROSS: Noo ' 001746 �SECRET - 18 - DAVEY:. The youth in the CEGEPs and in the universities are very much a focus of attention of these people. Did you get any- sense that they were concentrating On them at all? CROSS: No, only in the sense that they were terribly pleased with these measures of support from CEGEPs. I mean, this was one of the things they were aiming at. , But I would have thought that they would regard themselves as an action cell and it would be other people's job to, as it were, you know actually go out and do the stirring up. DAVEY: You say that they laughed at Trudeau and Bourassa and these people. Do they make any connection at all with them, do they have any sort of feelings other than total dismissal? CROSS: Total dismissal. Establishment figures who have no sense of the reality of Quebec. DAVEY: Have they respect for any people outside of their own group in Canada or any people in Canada or the States? CROSS: The only person I thought they might have a bit of respect for was Rene Levesque. DAVEY: Would you say that they were an entirely Quebecdominated movement in their mentality? �SECRET 19 CROSS.: As far as I could gather. To come back to my original point, I think the dominant feature is Quebec nationalism to v/hich something else is added, rather than international Communism with a national flavour. This would be my guess. DUNROSSIL: So, otherwise, they are a sort of avant garde in a vacuum, aren't they, unless you really know what they're an avant garde for? Did you get a feeling of their being, an avant garde at all, that something v/as going to happen after they'd done their work, or....? ' ' CROSS: No, I mean I don't think they'd got beyond this. I think their timescale as I said v/as a fairly long one. DUNROSSIL: ; : ••! Strictly an operation? CROSS: An operation to achieve Quebec independence. DAVEY: To what sort of things would they be sensitive if you wanted to get back at them? CROSS: I don't think they're sensitive to anything. I mean they are committed to revolution, and how do you recommit revolutionaries. The only people you could talk to on this are our chaps who did brainwashing in Malaya who claimed that they reconverted communists. . Whether they did or not, whether they just went underground, I don't know. I don't see any measure that you're going to convince these people.... 001748 �SECRET DERY: 20 - Did they give you any indication from earlier conversation, talking about revolutionary action, did they receive any hope eventually to get moral or physical support from revolutionary states, like Algeria? There have been reports that they have been to Algeria to seek support and to Cuba. Did they at any time mention even hopes? CROSS: I wasn't talking with them in these terms. I was talking with them in terms of trying to find out their political beliefs. The only thing I did know, and I think it is clear, that one of them, two of them, had visited the Cuban consulate in Montreal. They knew the name of the ex-Cuban consul, the chap v/ho was there some months ago. They knew about the Cuban consulate in Montreal. DAVEY: How did they regard the French from France? CROSS: No real interest, no real contact. They roared with laughter when people suggested that de Gaulle was responsible for all this. They roared with laughter v/hen people suggested that the Deuxieme Bureau had organized the whole affair. Lanctot told me that he had spent three months in England, and enjoyed it enormously, and he said to me, "I suppose the British Government will never let me back in now." �r* - SECRET L DAVEY: - - 21 - What about this British sense cf justice? You mentioned that they didn't like the idea of retroactivity. Was that in the sense that some trick was being pulled on them, that this was a game that you were involved in, or was it just something that was going to make things more difficult? CROSS: No, I mean, it's clear that they just thought that the rules of the game are that you have British rules of law and order and you chaps have gone and changed the rules of the game, and this bloody well wasn't fair. DUNROSSIL: In other words, their type of activity won't flourish where British justice flourishes because they are the chaps who are shaking up the box. CROSS: I don't think they've gone that far. You're in the game, and then these are the rules of the game and somebody changes the rules. It's bloody unfair. You can change.the rules. The Government is supposed to behave differently from us. DAVEY: I think that's great. 001750 �'-T FICHE DE SERVICE ACTION REQUEST CABINET DU SEAE OFFICE OF THE SSEA 3 PPR De: From: MIN/J. n. TW? KSEN/ke- Lettre cn date du Letter dated Sujet Subject" Dec.9 < . >« from Date D©C^1- High Commissioner for Nigeria Outcome of Cross kidnapping Action requise: — Action required: XX Reponse pour la signature du Premier Ministre Reply for Prime Minister's signature pour avis et retourner S)/i for advice and return Reponse pour la signature du Ministre Reply for Minister's signature noter et retourner note and return Reponse au nom du P.M./ou Ministre "Reply on behalf of PM/or SSEA Reponse pour la signature de "Reply for signature of: Commentaires: Comments: traduction for translation ~ 7> "J —~T~CXLA j 20 A- A'A' A76 /A^ h J^//^ 2.. To F M y (pTiftT) •jv> Mifo A OyisJA^dTLjZ Porter a I'attention des archives du SEAE le B. F. to Minister's registry on Commentaires par D.C.O.: D.C.O.'s comments: M^L nR tojJkJl t 001751 EXT 439/BIL �? THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA SUITE 3 0 3 . THE BURNSIDE BUILDING 151 SLATER STREET OTTAWA, ONTARIO CANADA TELEPHONE 2 3 6 - 0 5 2 1 (s LINES) RESIDENCE 7 2 2 - 2 5 2 4 9th December, 1970 I The Hon. Mitchell Sharp, P.C, M.P., Secretary of State for External Affairs, Room 265, East Block, Parliament Hill, Ottawa, Ont. Honourable Minister, Now that the long nightmare has ended for Mr. James Cross and his family, allow me to rejoice with you on the successful outcome of that frightful episode. May I also convey my compliments on your Government's most courageous handling of an impossibly difficult situation. It could not have been easy to take the decision you did and the fact that your Government was vindicated in the end can only help to reinforce the confidence that all friends of Canada have that the FLQ crisis will soon prove to have been little more than a bad dream. Please accept, Honourable Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration. (Edward 0. Enahoro). s A'2./7.x) 1001752 �SECK December 16, 1970, INTERVIEW WITH MR, J.R, CROSS DECEMBER 5. 1970. 72* - <P<? FfFfA— / Explanatory Note During his flight to England on December 5th, 1970, Mr. J.R. Cross kindly consented to answer a number of questions that were put to him by the undersigned concerning the impressions he had gathered of the FLQ, Travelling on the flight were; Mr. Cross His daughter Susan Lord Dunrossil of the British High Commission Mr, J.M. Dery of External Affairs Mr. D. Cornett, External Affairs Constable R. Bennett, RCMP Mr. J.M. Davey, PMO The interview took place at a table in the front of the plane in the presence of Lord Dunrossil and Mr. Dery, who themselves asked one or two questions. Constable. Bennett joined us briefly and also asked one question. The conversation was recorded, but because of the background aircraft engine noise, it is of poor quality. An attempt has been made to transcribe, as faithfully as possible, the recorded remarks, but in one or two cases it has been necessary to make an interpretation of what v/as actually said. A certain number of repetitious remarks have also been edited out. The transcript is, I believe, as complete and as faithful as possible, but if there are any doubts it can be checked against the original. After Mr. Cross had answered the specific questions that were put to him, a. more general conversation took place amongst himself, Lord Dunrossil, Mr. Dery and myself on events in Quebec. This was also' partially recorded and an attempt will be made to provide an edited version including all significant facts relating to the FLQ as soon as possible. J . M.Davey. /L ,/^.FUJS) V* J 001753 �GCO/J.D. Puddington/eOL Acd?T 2,° OTTAWA, December 17, 1970 Dear Don, Attached i s a telegram received by the Prime Minister from the High Bark Baptist Church in Toronto which he has been asked to transmit to Mr. J.R. Cross. I would be grateful i f you would take the appropriate action. Also enclosed i e a l e t t e r received here addressed to Mr. Cross. lours einoorely, J.BrPuddlngton, Gccffionwealth Division. Mr. D.A. MacLeod, First Secretary, British High Comnission, 80 Elgin Street, Ottawa, Ontario. �O F F I C E OF T H E PRIME MINISTER • C A B I N E T DU PREMIER MINISTRE MEMORANDUM Mr. J.H. Taylor, Senior Departmental Assistant, Department of External Affairs. CLASSIFICATION YOUR FILE NO. Votre dossier OUR'FILE No. Notre dossier Henry Alan Lawless, Correspondence Secretary. DATE H.12.70 Correspondence Received Here for Mr. Jasper Cross Attached hereto the original of a telegram received here and which we were asked to transmit to Mr. Jasper Cross; could you possibly make arrangements for ^SK.V.V \ScJkL__ H.A.L. J001755 �001756 �Referred by direction of the Prime Minister Transmis a la demande du Premier ministre To the Minister of Au ministre d External attn: Far! Pour: Affairs. Mr. J . H . Taylor I—| Information '—' a titre de renseignement • a i—i further reply* '—' reponse ulterieure consideration i—| necessary action* attention '—' y donner suite consideration and further reply at your discretion attention et reponse ulterieure si vous le jugez a propos NOTE: Would you please arrange to have the attached envelope forwarded to Mr. Cross. Thank you. / ^K.yLt^<-< Q J L Henry'Alan Lawless, Correspondence Secretary001757 * May we please have a copy of your further correspondence. V e u i l l e z s.v.p. nous faire parvenir copie de votre lettre. �1 xi..y,x,J.. &..,.. •• - - V • ' is". £•?• ..**S.' :^.*??*SM,saJr •••" % d § ? r P b . » • 5 f t . v - A ' y ^Pd" ' "AdATA ";*' • •- -A:-r^-.• -»-- "Sfe 7,JrFw»-~~ " J •^A,P&3x7yd ft%7 -*»?$ * ete d&ZA&zAy/vicv^ -<?\ e • .• -- s • -*a e*~ • •j*%*>; ?r.:>«5 *;7*Sft^'^^^>. > ^-^ • I A - w . , , A m . . t ' ' r Ld,7 .^i^-.y- i-A... P\;t i x.:.-?? .^e-fce £&*"£ - * j . "^±•70^2 ^i,:-..,Xtx\...f£x.y.l^ij,./i'..:.zt,.&.Jt .iSA.X.-'- X.-i X •••.: .. yXr... • ' :-. --£: • j tx.:.,J ,' :'.' ,,X. . •, .J ^W -: rfr .- -.,- J* ...... X,- Xji. ' *'• •^p.^AA%-,^p-&r£^.~77-7d*?A2i.- ^ . • > s ^ ^ ^ , : ! ^tr-b.-.. ..;-:• • •- •• ia%*^' s • .• yy-d i-i-43?r^*; i-a Tip • • - ••.,•. . -va.. . 1 . . . . • •^i.-.rr. .? -p. #5* ;. .• :.iv,si J ' . a " " • - . • • . • - ' " s * * - - ' ' • * - . » ! > ' . ilp*.^-:. jfcaRSjfci,;. ~ = • ,-„,. • -7...AFXfi*. ... • v.?-- • ••;*£ ..*Hek».7 = , r-vr&?jrM-£:mzxmL .aw& - -i >4"".; JU*" VUJVI/i A^AJ ma*** ***,-**,... .»•»»• **« * »••***.«* •> •* •4****4-*»***«*e#**ea*<MW*»e**k«e.*r#'»9< CNCPTEL OTT TGo PMO PCO OTT CNT GA548 QJF541 ©JF542<031724) CN TNV554 CNT CRT TORONTO ONT 3 524P EST JASPER CROSS CARE PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU OTTAWA ONT EELI6HTED TO HEAR OF YOUR SAFE RELEASE STOP YOU AND YOUR FAMILY HAVE BEEN PRAYED FOR CONSTANTLY BY THE MEMBERS OF HIGH PARK BAPTIST CHURCH TORONTO YOUR COURAGE HAS BEEN AN INSPIRATION MATTHEWS MINISTER AND FELLOW BRITISHER. CNCPTEL OTT TG« PMO PCO OTT 'r-yJ'i •-. p P0\ a a. •- ass'- '.-ici va- i/1^.^.7!, «•» . r - '-.S%jXri - S .Xxr-i- - pPAy AP Xd~X;i v-.a vt^-e; a- -e y, §;• .f •,',..,« ,. .jm77A«y'd.^r "^ J "-^ P£*«JJ=J ~7*7-rxwAPt\ 1A2 2.^7.2 A. •"T -x ,;,«*.-<ii!ir-^J'|:r.'«a"« : r*»*- -' WF -A". ^d£jAf$x:d^77mAzt72x7M7',v'4i <rdtt¥-*--i' ', XX. . ' - &A': A %>-** #•> la ra aaaaamaaaaaeaaaaaaaaaaa*aaaaaamm** ieee»/#*».»*jjl ":'^§Ad2dM:^ .-..: - ^pis^^-y^^ [xd-eAz; -t&Mi&&cm-r3g •mj7&&ssl&mai&fi-zs �-FICHE DE SERVICE CABINET DU SEAE - OFFICE OF THE SSEA Date. Dec.16/70 '.•?'• A C T I O N R E Q U E S T GCO MIN/A .G .VINCENT A e De: From: Lettre en date du Letter dated Memo from PMO Dec. 11 with attached telegram Message t o Mr. Jasper Cross r e h i s safe r e l e a s e Sujet Subject de from Mr. Matthews. Ministerj High Park Baptist Church, Toronto Action requise: — Action required: Reponse pour la signature du Premier Ministre Repty for Prime Minister's signature Reponse pour la signature du Ministre "Reply for Minister's signature Reponse au nom du P.M./ou Ministre Reply on behalf of PM/or SSEA pour avis et retourner for advice and return noter et retourner " note and return traduction for translation A.2^> Fy Reponse pour la signature de Reply for signature of: Commentaires: Comments: Will you please handle as requested. A Porter a I'attention des archives du SEAE le_ B. F. to Minister's registry on Commentaires par D.C.O. D . C O . ' s comments: 001759 EXT 439/BIL �*oS PRIVY COUN /K E C R E T BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVE FFTCE JOttawa, December 17, 19 70, Mr. A.E. Ritchie, Under-Secretary of State for .External Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario. 5.o.a , Dear Mr. Ritchie: jA I am enclosing herewith a copy of^t-he Report of the Str^t^XQ^mraJri^MemCm^eA^n the situation in Quebec, prepared under the direction of Mr. James Davey of the Prime Minister's Office. I believe you will find the Report and its ^appendices of considerable i'nterest in relation to recent events in Quebec and particularly concerning the FLQ. Although the Report as' suoh will not be considered at the forthcoming meeting,of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence on December 21, it will provide useful background for some of the items to be discussed- at that meeting. Yours sincerely, &JLA 1 D.F. Wall, | Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, S E C R E T 001760 MMCt'A �THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR T H E F E D E R A L R E P U B L I C O F NIGERIA SUITE 3 0 3 . THE BURNS1DE BUILDING 151 S L A T E R S T R E E T OTTAWA. O N T A R I O CANADA 9th December, 1970 The Hon. Mitchell Sharp, P . C , M.P„, S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for E x t e r n a l / v f f a i r s , koom 2bb, East Block, Parliament H i l l , Ottawa, Ont„ Honourable M i n i s t e r , Now t h a t the long nightmare has ended for Mr. James Cross and h i s f a m i l y , allow me t o r e j o i c e w i t h you on t h e s u c c e s s f u l outcome of t h a t f r i g h t f u l e p i s o d e . May I a l s o convey my compliments on your Government's most courageous h a n d l i n g of an i m p o s s i b l y d i f f i c u l t situation. I t could not have been easy t o t a k e t h e d e c i s i o n you d i d and the f a c t t h a t your Government was v i n d i c a t e d i n t h e end can o n l y h e l p t o r e i n f o r c e t h e confidence t h a t a l l f r i e n d s of Canada have t h a t t h e FLQ c r i s i s w i l l soon prove t o have been l i t t l e more t h a n a bad dream. Please a c c e p t , Honourable M i n i s t e r , a s s u r a n c e s of my h i g h e s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n , . the 722x72222 (Edward 0. E n a h o r o ) . \/» 001761 �MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE iPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE COMMANDANT -NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE r: \0: O V ^ .1 KINGSTON, ONTARIO KeUM; 21 December 19 AC 7}L%J**.-.3x»i£*^A Mr* R. Harry Jay Head, United Nations Division Department of External Affairs 418 Daly Building Ottawa, Ontario Dear Harry, Many thanks for your letter of December 16th with which you forwarded a copy of London's interesting telegram of December 11th and a copy of Ed Ritchie's circular letter of December 8th concerning the part played by the members of the Department in the Tast Force on Kidnappings. These documents might have reached us through normal channels, but this remains a matter of doubt. All your friends here join me in warmest Season's Greetings. Sincerely yours, P^jjil—Ma-lone Deputy Commandant National Defence College Out** v \A. .*001762 �c.c, PPR/T.H.W. Read/cal MIN smAPx? PARL SEC FPR FIS GAF \2^ RETURN TO-^S"" Dossier Journal Circ. A ;^-i2-TP/C- / Ottawa, December 21, 1970 Dear Mr. High Commissioner, I have received vdth pleasure your letter of December 9. It was good of you to write and offer your compliments on the government's handling of the situation created by the kidnapping of 1-lr. Gross. As you have surmised, the decisions were difficult ones and that they led to the release of tir. Cross is a matter of deep satisfaction to myself and my colleagues. Our rejoicing, hoitfever, is tempered by our profound regret that we did not succeed in securing also the release of the Honourable Pierre Laporte. With kindest personal regards and my best wishes for Christmas and the Nev/ Tear. Yours sincerely, ©MGJNAl- SlCKtrtr, His Excellency E. 0. Inahoro, High Commissioner fbr the Federal Republic of Nigeria, O t t a w a * 7 Ai V i< (001763 �BRITISH HIGH COMMI 80 Elgin Street, OTTAWA p 4 AyiA 'p 23 December, 1970 AcA.d >S^^^L \n^^ i Would you please refer to your letter of 17 December to Donald MacLeod enclosing a telegram and a letter for Mr. Cross. We are passing these on to him. A c^y\x (E. T. Davies) Mr. J.D. Puddington, Commonwealth Division, Department of External Affairs, 220 Langevin Block, OTTAWA. 001764 �Referred by direction of the Prime Minister Transmis a la demande du Premier ministre To the Mktaterakx S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r ( E x t e r n a l Au ministre d Affairs Att'n: Mr. J o n C h u r c h , E x e c u t i v e A s s i s t a n t for. Pour j—i ^-' information a titre de renseignement i—i further reply* '—' reponse ulterieure • consideration attontlnn attention i—| necessary action* ' ' y donner suite '—' • consideration and further reply at your discretion attention et reponse ulterieure si vous le jugei a propos J NOTE: Dec. 24, 19 70. Henry Alan Lawless, Correspondence Secretary. nni 7fi*^ iLf"^ * May we please have a copy of your further correspondence. Veuillez s.v.p. nous faire parvenir copie de votre lettre. �COPY COPIE CANADA PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER ^ ,v _ ^ MINISTRE O t t a w a , December 24, 1970. W Thank you for your letter. Although you do not expect a reply I wanted to express my sincere appreciation for your thoughtfulneso in writing to me concerning the recent events in Quebec. I shall look forward to meeting you again in Singapore in January. Sincerely, Original signe par Original signed by P. E. TRUDEAU The Right Honourable Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, Singapore. •-? cc: Secretary of State for External Affairs Att'n: Mr. Jon Church,* Executive Assistant - Professor Ivan Head (PMO) m * for information. 001766 �CCJ GCO/J.D. Puddington/el JJJJI PDM FPR /.<" A0* P a r i . Sec. FIS (Ext. Policy) OTTAWA%, J@bc**Jjns ^ p & ^ ^ n ^ v %3 ^-^> ./ I <\~) o My dear Prime if i n i s t e r , In t h e l e s t stages of t h e successful relcaoo and safe r e t u r n of Rr. J.R. Cross t o London, i t becwao necessary a t very short n o t i c e , t o arrange for s s t o p over i n Nassau of a Canadian Armed Forcoo a i r c r a f t on i t o return fros Havana en December 4 . t h i s was done by t e l e phone through Kr. L.H. Davies, tee Deputy Ooveroer. I wish to express »y »ans appreciation for tho quick and e f f i c i e n t eenner i n tMch t h e o f f i c i a l s of your government responded to our r e b o o t for a s s i s t a n c e i n Bjaking t h e necessary arrangements. On behalf of tho GovernBient of Canada pleaao accept our sincere thanko. Mith best wishoo for a Horry Chriotetas and Happy Hew Tear. Tours s i n c o r e l y , ORIGINAL S U . J X- iftSICHELL SHARP Mitchell Sharp Ihe Honourable UO. Pindling, Prime Minister, Cosmomealth of the Baharaas, Uassau t Bahamas. p , e 3 s e return P|ease return to Cwlth. Div. wHen s<?3. *e Cw, h *- Div - wh *n sgd. 001767 XPXXidTAAZFAxAd—' °~ �cc: KIN PDM PPR Par! Pari. Sec. Ext. Policy (Iinfo Div.) GCO/J.D. Puddington/el • OTTAWA, _^—~n J2e^^J^sl/Z3 \X7A ./il o Dear Kr. Davies, £ow that tho pace of activity has quieted following the successful release of Mr. <i.U. Crooo and his safe return to London, 1 want to say hou much wo appreciated your quick, efficient and friendly cooperation in arranging literally on a Boacnt' o notice, for the Canadian Anaed Forcoo aircraft to stopover in ilaaeau following its flight to Havana. I understand that your arrangements wore so effective in protecting tho aircrew and representatives on board t*lie they woro in Nassau, that sy Under-Secretary could only reach them by telephone after hio call had beon cleared throu$i you. the success of this aspect of «hat was an extremely sensitive and conplicated operation was due to your efforts and those of other OshoBian official o. On behalf of the Government of Canada, I wish to thank you and ask that our appreciation be convoyed to those Bahamian officials involved in the arrangements. With best tdohes for a Merry Christens and Happy Sew Tear. Tours sincerely, ... -.o "•• Mitchell Sharp oi^wnrfbm fo Cwftfc Dfv. wKen Sq3 Hr. L.M. Davies, Deputy Governor of the Beboaao, Government House, Uassau, Seheoas. t/1/5 001768 \J^ �•"T- _ - jjry b20'O?^-T~p^-/:r S E C R 5 T ,j jnT1 OCTtiBtAfL CdZ/SIS STATEMENT FOR USE IN HOUSE ON ~ AJQ ~T (s&EoJj PROTECTION OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS 0 ^ , 14*1. I should like to make it clear that Canada has always recognized its obligations under international law to take all appropriate steps for the protection of foreign representatives. The fulfilment of this responsibility falls mainly on the established police forces within whose jurisdiction foreign representatives may be at any particular time. Despite the generally high level of protection afforded by local police forces, special precautions have had to be taken in some particular instances. Threats, on the lives and property of foreign representatives in Canada are unfortunately not new. Over the years they have entailed selective and progressive reinforcement of the measures being taken to afford the diplomatic community adequate protection. In most cases the measures involved have arisen from demonstrations and similar incidents. In some instances exceptional steps have been called for, such as the assigning of special guards. The plan to abduct the American Consul- General in Montreal disclosed last June attracted wide public attention, but this was only one of a series of threats from a number of different sources with-differing motives commencing some time earlier. Federal, provincial and municipal authorities have dealt with all of these threats on a basis of close 001769 �- 2 - cooperation. During the past four years some 20 such incidents, both before and since June of this year, have been handled effectively. However, it is clearly not possible in practice to provide absolute security for each one of the 406 foreign diplomats and their families at present in Ottawa and for the 280 members of the Consular Corps in cities throughout the country. To do so would require the imposition of restraints and limitations under which foreign official activity would be brought virtually to a standstill. Foreign representatives must be in a position to fulfil their functions with the maximum freedom of movement. The efficient system of lav/ enforcement we have in Canada, which enjoys the general support of the public remains, therefore, the best means for providing protection to foreign representatives. Vfriere some members of the public deny the validity of the whole concept of law enforcement in a democratic society, special measures.are necessary. has always been recognized. I believe this fact The police forces at all levels have been tireless in searching out and assessing threats to', members of the foreign official community and in providing specific protection to the individual persons or properties affected. Foreign representatives have been encouraged to bring particular concerns to the attention of the appropriate authorities, whether federal, provincial or local. "VJhere this �- 3- has happened, I believe the foreign representatives have without exception received active sympathetic and effective assistance. That a particular threat has not been discovered in advance and thwarted can not be regarded as a failure on the part of the law enforcement agencies to exercise due diligence. The events of thc la?t few days have, of course, been cause for heightened vigilance and I can assure the House that the additional* protective measures for foreign representatives, to which I referred in this chamber some days ago, were put rapidly into effect in recognition of this fact. * You may wish to speak to your colleagues, the Minister of National Defence and the Solicitor General in case they might wish to comment on protective measures nov/ in effect. 001771 �0355 330 P M 4 — W03-fl 77 & PRIME M I N I S T E R , SINGAPORE 1 0 t h December^.L9J7-0%~ -i5tv I r /C—-yC I May I express my respect for the way~"in which you tackled the crises over the kidnappings of Monsieur Laporte and Mr. Cross. It needed courage to pursue a policy which went against the desire to take a softer way out and taking a calculated risk on public sentiment in the long-term interest of Quebec and one Canada. I was in Harvard in October at the time it happened and read and saw you on television. I read of the final release of Mr. Cross with relief and satisfaction. Your policies have now made it less likely that other lunatic elements will use this form of blackmail. The government in Ottawa has made it abundantly clear that it is not to be panicked into sudden surrenders of hostages or money, and eventually of the future of Quebec and Canada by terrorist blackmail. Perhaps your colleagues and you may have the consolation that the murder of the late Monsieur Laporte could be part of the martyrdom required for an integrated Canada. Please do not trouble to reply. tell you how much I respected your quiet see an unpleasant problem through to its it turned out at least one man was saved the less prone to such madness. But I wanted to determination to bitter end. As and Canada made SLASA*. The Hon. Pierre E T r u d e a u , Prime Minister, Prime Minister's Residence, 24, Sussex Drive, . yy^AXs^y^A Ottawa, Canada. 001772 �A+~+£ *$Jl*-*r - - #-&*x .Lr* i: n;:x r. y- </• -*"*;. SECRET CANADA O F F I C E O F THE PRIME MINISTER . C A B I N E T DU P R E M I E R MIN/STRE jb'3t5>-rFA7c< -? Ottawa (4), January 4, 1971, A y7 F.d77AP2"- f ^ p s Attached is a transcript of an additional portion of the conversation that took place with Mr. J.R. Cross on December 5, 1970. Mr. Cross is raising here the question of whether there ought not to be "standing orders" for any future kidnappees. What specifically concerned him was: (1) Whether his wife and family would be takencare of financially should anything JiapnBru to him. 02) Whether any statements that might have been attributed to him in letters would be held against him. I believe that some thought should be given to this matter and instructions issued, even if only informally. d2f\^\ y>*^M^ J. /f./r tq (17.2,7) M. Davey. J'J 001773 �b a p , •' - ' • . : . • , ' • •' - -•' 'F-'A y ' ' . • ' • • • • • a . e a . . ! A ^ u ^ ! d l ' 7"2, ' : i r 4 * < J " ' V > " ^'%;%/r T P A S • E C R E T — - ' | p *•>' PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF "DISCUSSION WITH MR. J.R. CROSS DECEMBER 5, 19 70 Were they educated people? One or two or them were, I don't know how far, but they were all, politically educated. The fascinating thing of course is the sense of dependance you get of them because they are everything to you, they are father, mother, guardian and you become, you get into this funny relationship with them, where you are pathetically grateful to them when they give you little favours like bringing you a cup of coffee when it is not the regular hour, or handing you a biscuit or an apple. You become like a small child and you sulk when you hear them munching sweets in the background and they don't give you one. You know I would sit there hating them for half an hour when I could hear them chewing away on sweets or eating potato chips or something like that. So that their world is your world. There is a terrible feeling that this is the only world and that the outside world is against you and you are alone. But this is, I think, an emotional reaction, every time I sat down. Within the first hour or hour or two when they read me the manifesto I told them there was no hope of this ever being achieved. During the first week there seemed to me to be signs that the government was wavering. Then I thought that possibly we might get an agreement, a limited agreement on the exchange of prisoners. And then of course, there was a �SECRET T' ', . -'.• • . :•' It* •* '•'*.»v • 7 r *••&**? 2 •X ,ya .%. i . terrible temptation, I suppose a temptation to all of us who spent our lives in the Civil Service managing things, there was a terrible temptation to say to them, "You are not doing this right you know. This is what you ought to do". And I had to continually stop myself,saying that, this isn't your business, keep out of this, keep quiet, to stop saying to thera "You might get something out of the government if you do A and not B" or "Don't write these letters". It was obviously always ridiculous of them to put in political propaganda in the messages sent by me, because it just made it clear to the outside world they were dictated. It would have been much more sensible of them if they allowed me to write messages which were me trying to say something, but I didn't point this out to them. But all the time I had to hold myself back from stopping,as if were trying to run the operation which I felt in some ways I could run much better than they could. We speculated from time to time how far you would in fact attempt to get into this kind of dialogue almost influencing the issue with them in order to influence it your way but it must have been a tremendous.... I never had a chance I think, to influence - well you see this was the terrible trouble, what was influencing it my way.... I wanted my release. On the other hand, I could see the considerations that until and unless this sort of �"••<•• /A : --' 'A'*-'Ay -^$±XX?%7 :A :At,^2<• > • ' :, • "72 -Air AM A,- 1? mA'Af * W &••'•" •"•; ^ F * ••' ' ' • . . • / . • / T%M$, 3 > ,r<A.; SECRET _ ~ thing was broken, nobody was going to be safe and happy. What was the sort of price one pays. And there are various things you know which I will be talking to the government in_London about. About making the minds, if this ever happened again, the minds of the kidnapped officers quieter. I think that I can say, ahd I am not trying to be heroic or anything, it's simply a fact that in the first forty-eight hours, I settled down and rationalized and thought out the consequences of death. And, funnily enough came to the conclusion. -I don't know whether it was funny, I don't know whether people have done it under these circumstances but I wasn't afraid of death. I was worried later on that they might strangle me, I didn't want to be strangled. didn't seem to mind being shot. I But_I_didn't really want to. have a bit or wire around my neck and have it pulled tight. tt But_what I was worried all the time was about my wife - \ because what I was thgjn-^articularly__WQX£J:e<^ about was her financial situation. : Because I calculated it as far as I could and she would have a pension of fifteen hundred dollars) a year and I don't know how the hell she was going to live. ' And I had composed two letters, in my mind only, one was a final testament to my wife saying you know, how much I loved her and everyting, the other was a letter to Mr. Trudeau '. appealing to him to do something for her. i In the sense that my death might mean something to the people of Canada. So I think that we want to think, and I think I would j t j 001776 �7A •'•'• :&:A27&F$A'A" '• a•p-"«t;j \ * -.• 'xnxi-AA-i 2ft7i:.x£7^%A--'dp7d;'' '•' 77:-~2VAZ-X".*y*-••" A-' AxoSFF . '-• '.- y • ->• f • ' . '• r-- ••: -• iJ.... ' • z'•*?'??A.*A: 4 : <'••*•' • •A SECRET _ -%S$V suggest to you that the Canadian Government would want to think in your own terms of reassuring your people that if they had captured in these circumstances someone, that someone is going to look after their families. The chap who has got enough on his plate is trying to fight out his own personal little battle within those four walls without having to worry about whether his wife is going to go out and earn her living. DUNROSSIL: DAVEY: Madame Laporte was taken care of Oh yes, this has all been settled but there has been no publicity given to it. But it is very interesting that you say that because that was the first concern of Mr. Laporte. DUNROSSIL: CROSS: DUNROSSIL: Do you know that his widow has received quite a large sum? No, I didn't know that. I think that this is something that one needs to look at back home in London... CROSS: The other thing I think we ought to say to people is "cooperate". Write whatever the kidnappers want you to write and never think that it will be held against you, that somebody will say when you come out that you demanded that the Government of Canada, the government of somebody else that they release me. Because I think the first duty �'"A-X>72 A>P- ' • ' - *X,/:A7£P7fr.A: . FiJFL*7 -. • • •£&'•*':'':*'" •• }t. <*• •"• a-.'t-*;; • •' - b ^ b • ' ."'• ..'•a •' ••'• o "•v-b*:', • a s a a >a •->;#* ^ : ' , '*,: a, :% - •*_. >>-v;¥S V,;/ %- .'•' ' crr-ppT SECRET •• a %e n^*a, • , ^ * ^ 5 - a• .'V*. ' \Ks "",•* — of the kidnappee is to stay alive. He can only do this by cooperation because his only value is as a cooperating hostage. .And you know I would think, well another twenty- four hours something may happen even if the police don't find me, there may be an earthquake or the gas central heating may blow up or they may all get typhoid fever or something might happen. DAVEY: Was there a stage which you came to after which you thought they were unlikely to kill you? CROSS: They told me right at the beginning they weren't going to kill me but I didn't believe them. I thought that there were two circumstances in which I might get killed; the first was in case of a police attack on the house in which case I might get killed in the crossfire. They told me the night of the declaration of the War Measures Act that they thought we were going to be attacked, they sat up over me all night with sub-machine guns. They told me they weren't going to shoot me if there was an attack but of course with those bullets flying around, you know, they couldn't tell what would hit me. That was one circumstance in which I thought I might get killed. The other circumstance was I thought that if it came to it, that I had ceased to be of any value to them and I became an embarrassment to hold, they would decide to kill me (a) because it was much easier to dispose of a dead body than a live one; ' '•- 001778 �SECRET ; " • ' : A S ^ F 7 X ' ° - '•"A'V^d' - ' ' 6 - ?* - (b) because there was some chance, although security was very good, that I might be able somehow to lead people to the house and that therefore, there was personal friendship, that this, friendship is the wrong word, this personal relationship, that this, would in any way.stand in their way of their eliminating me if it was for the cause. I kept on all the time thinking back to the story which I recommend you to read by Frank O'Connor, the Irish storywriter, called "Guests of the Nation" which is about two British soldiers held hostage in the South of Ireland during the Anglo-Irish war of independance. himself fought on the Irish side in that war. O'Connor This story is of two soldiers who were held on this remote farm and 72 become as > f were friends of the family. comes for them to be executed. Then the order The relationship and the problem which creates their captors but in the end I kept on remembering the finale of the story was that they were executed, that didn't cheer me up. We didn't think actually that they would shoot you. We thought the relationship would be too complicated for them but this is all from outside. We were afraid that they might use one of your alternatives, that they might leave you where you were or leave you somewhere else and not 001 �v%. • -• . • : - •«-a AFF-'OA • • - • ' ' . • . ' ' • ; « i . -. AA J SECRET " <-. •••• "?'•& -7, ' y^°H' •^•Ax-.'J ' •"•-A: • tell anybody for too long and it might be very cold. CROSS: Well, this is what I was worried, if the weather got bad, that I might be left out, that a message should be left with a radio station which wouldn't be followed up then I might be dead by the time anybody got to me. • •/ DAVEY: In that sense, did you get the impression that there was a lack of concern on the part of the government or did you, at any time, get the impression that the government was trying to get a message through to you? CROSS: I never got the impression that the government was trying to tell me anything... DAVEY: Because in point of fact for three weeks in the very beginning, the Federal Government, and the Quebec Government and the Montreal Government did nothing else. degree, the FLQ succeeded. To this They had these three levels, of Government, instead of dealing with the normal process, concentrating on this... You had mentioned earlier, I think when we were waiting at the airport, about their great interest in what went on, in publicity terms; Morf who is the psycho-analyst who met many of them in Bordeaux jail talks,about their great^ involvement and their desire for this kind of publicity, and of symbols, that they live in a world of symbols. Did you feel, in any sense of their getting a personal gratification when they saw... 001780 -.*•* �77J7d--A*7 A.'F SECRET a*.'.*.is?*- * ' "'- .. .- ^3..>-' • '77.? 8 ' - • y-s-. .:. , .7 i", CROSS: Oh yes, enormously. I mean there was a television on, there was a radio on, and reading all the newspapers. Well its terribly exciting to be a kid of 24-25, to be headlines around the world. it possible. You see, modern communications have made This is fascinating, here are six, I use the word kids, Carbonneau was older, with a couple of rooms and a couple of beaten up old guns and they hold the Government of Canada ransom. nations of the world. One of the most powerful It's astonishing. I kept on feeling I am no different from a stone age man who has been kidnapped by the next tribe and they are sitting around the camp fire deciding whether to beat him on the head with a club. I mean, out there, there are 12,000 policemen, there is all the sophisticated modern communications apparatus you can think of and it isn't a bloody bit of use to me. DAVEY: But you know, the thing that comes through in all of this is first of all the sophisticated understanding of the. communication process that exists in what they did, and the fairly sophisticated level of some of the communications that were coming out in terms of symbols. was a radio serial. You know, that Without radio they couldn't have existed and this was the rebirth of radio. If it was just a bomb that is an event, this was a radio serail and everybody was listening. There was some of Franz Fanon in this. 001781 �\'A*f2' r\ 2'2 ' 22 d A % '> «.*• .X.PSr 2A 27.7 y y A •• ' • - 'y • • • • • - * 2 * - A r.«- , p i < K - ' SECRET ¥. : ... t % 2 x F . *e„ .•• "4TJ> I*. , I>" •-•- • Ax** V DUNROSSIL: -. 7 p p The French language stations particularly took it up in great detail... CROSS: CKLM and CKAC were the two we listened to all the time. DAVEY: Did you get any impression that they felt the radio stations were sympathetic to them? CROSS: This is yery hard to say. that. I couldn't give a comment on The French language open-line shows. for one who lives as It is astonishing I do in the .Anglophone side Of Quebec in Montreal to hear the sort of hate that comes over from some of these people who ring up. 7 ^P^^A^ A^ You know people suggested that I ought to die because my ancestors might have fought in Quebec in 1759, and all this sort of thing. he is dead. And people talking of Laporte after An absolute lack of feeling for him. was a shock to me. This I've lived in Montreal for three years One assesses the pressures although I don't think this is hindsight I think that John will bear this out from the point of view of the papers that for 18 months we as observers of the Quebec scene have been worried about the political situation in Montreal, about the urban guerrilla. about violence o f _ t h i s s o r t and have been q u e s t i o n s of various people and I am afraid were not getting any answers. this kd. But we have been situation. coherent reporting and worrying about �SECRET - 10 - But we never, I never got down to the feeling of sheer hate that is existing now among _the.se .pjaoeple. .And a lot of them are ringing up who have been unemployed for three years, who have been laid-off, claiming that they have been sacked from their jobs begause they wouldn't speak English All this sort of classic hate things, it's there, terrifying to me_*_ it's �/<s RETURN TQ PPR mm m 9U Mi imuPml^mUm) OTTAWA ( ^ ) , January 5 , 1971 i*MP VtflK*** ^MBHyt - mm ws* 0im&. #f **a to «tit» MI $*R iS8 *!»«& t*» «x_«llfffgt MRU a,? MM T*lm*a* i f • r . fit*** Tn» H^pfr *»$*w** ««w» mm immmm rmiimt mm. m « H «a_i :, . ,p ..• • a Ui, ..7. - . . , J , P : -C *•.-*•>«• ..... .? p.. a • *^^^p^^ '.:• i -..-:..• w^^w^» „.i.a J P a -.a: VP^^*^ jar .. >('•* ^^ • ™^^" • " ' '• - y L XX ^*^^HP^PWIWWt * ^ : -.p., •:... .,.:, A ^P^^T^^^^^ A. '.--•: . .«~<^ a '*«•; •; A t/1.:. w^ •P^"**** •x , A - ..,«..,. ,..-.,-. .„P«3 . i "P: •.•••-.••-• J- P •«*f^» • •:-• ... 7 ^w^^^^^p ^ ^ ^ ^ ™ ^ ^ f f ^W^I^^^^P 7 :.,.,... ; / • , - a* ijlH—liHlil *faS I MiMI to Mgr kz*t »tetofU. S I . *i*ft fell i***t *&«&*«• Original « 3 n s : J " Original signe P- p E TRUDSAU •& i a . . - . r . . • , . - • J C i . . a , . - r : . - . , '#$ - 5 ^ : •:• A.4 r 1001784 Jj 3 �FILE NO. ACTION REQUEST FICHE DE SERVICE WI.7M jxU) LOCATION TION — ENDROIT ENDROIT \ » DOSSIER N ° °Jk&<?**A? / FROM — DE ACTION DONNER SUITE A. ON FILE CLASSER APPROVAL APPROBATION COMMENTS COMMENTAIRES SEE ME ME VOIR • DRAFT REPLY PROJET DE REPONSE SIGNATURE • MAKE FAIRE • NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER • NOTE & RETURN/OR FORWARD NOTER ET RETOURNER/OU FAIRE SUIVRE I COPIES 1 TRANSLATION TRADUCTION • Sfa.<& CGSB 6-GP-12B YOUR REQUEST A VOTRE DEMANDE 6dl785 C.G.S.S. 7540-21-562-B21G �V PPR/T.H.W, Read/cal •// _- , AC* % £ ~///(-/ A -y Er. F. M. Bild, PDM . Dossier Journal Circ. UNCLASSIFIED January 5» 1971 PPR Expenses re Mr« Cross* departure from Dorval, Attached for your attention is a bill that Jean-Marie D6ry received from the Manager of the Airport at Dorval. The bill is for $36.90 covering the cost of coffee and cakes served on December 5^to the group of Ministers, diplomats, officials and police gathered at the airport to ensure the safe departure of Mr. J. R, Cross. 2. The Ministers were the Honourable Bryce Mackasey, representing the Government of Canada and the Honourable Robert Choquette, representing the Government of Quebec. Diplomats included the British High Commissioner, Mr. Cross and his daughter, the British Regional Information Officer and the Acting Senior British Trade Representative in Montreal. The Officials included members of the Department such as the Head of Commonwealth Division, Mr. D£ry, myself and Mr. Chapman of the Prime Minister's Office and Mr. Turner of the Department of Transport, Some 10 or 15 members of the R.C.M.P., the Montreal Police and the Quebec Provincial Police were also on hand.. 3* In the discussions on December 4 when the arrangements for Mr, Cross* departure were developed under the leadership of Mr. Chapman of the Prime Minister Office, the question of "who will pay?" was canvassed and it was decided that the Federal Government might stand the cost of coffee. It was also considered that the Federal Government might stand the cost of hiring a limousine to convey Mr. Cross from the Jewish Hospital to Dorval airport, having in mind that this cost would be infinitesimal in comparison with the cost of using a Boeing 707 to transport Mr. Cross to London. I trust that both these decisions will be regarded as being correct but I am at a lost to know how to go about arranging for this account and the ... £ 001786 ^„ ~, �— 2 ** account for the limousine (when it is received) to be paid. Both would seem better chprged to the cost of the Task Force rather than to Government Hospitality or to Protocol Division's taxi hire budget. It may be that it would be in order simply to send this memorandum onto Finance Division with an action request. However, I leave this decision to you. T. R W. READ Protocol Division 001787 �f/ta/nj **£*- A^ZATA A7 -y PP " ygSlsZ^- syt7#42&<!ZyU>£A> 47%r&zs?-^dA%7 S**AA»~ S X A ^ ^ S ^ /Af/A6^ts? Ay&Z^&f^&J 5 ^ ^ �t SJ DRAFT Vfliat was the Taak Force? The Taak Force wae created within minutes of the kidnapping; it was an informal group of officiole which functioned in a very clastic manner in the Operationa Centre of the Department of External Affairs, The Operations Centre is designed for just this kind of "crisis management** function. Ita permanent staff and special facilities and equipment supported the Task Force operation in a variety of way®. The Task Force was interdepartmental. The Department of External Affairs provided the facilities, the head and a number of members of the group} but several other departments also participated—the Primo Minister1s office, the Privy Council, the Solicitor General*o office, the R.CJ.P., the National Defence Department, the Justice Department and the Transport Department. Its main function was to provide a base with ready access to all the information media and all decision-making centres involved in the crisis. By combining the receiving, distribution and analysis of all information on the crisis, it also became a useful centre for consulting with all the federal and provincial authorities who/played major roles in the crisis. Of course, it was not the only centre of concern and activity in this field. •.. �•;2 • 2. -_ . While the Task Force was interdepartmental, it also represented the particular interest of the Department of External Affairs in the matter because, of couroo, the kidnap victim was a foreign representative and, as things turned out, the essential safe conduct had to be arranged with a foreign government. As it was a diplomat who was kidnapped, our Department was immediately seised with the problea because of our international logal obligations under the various Conventions for tho protection and well-being of diplomats, ^/incidentally, our liaison with the British authorities was very close throughout. \ • At what point were ^he kidnappera* demand^ made, kftown and whet was the immediate reaction to them? A communique giving the kidnappers* docamds was received around mid-afternoon on the day of Hr. Cross* abduction. The demands in the order thoy put them in were: All police investigations to bo stopped. A manifesto of the FLQ to be published in the press and on television. The reloaso of 23 so-called political prisoners. Air transport to move the prisoners to Algeria or Cuba. Rehiring of the La Palras mail delivery workers in Montreal. A ransom of $500,000. And public disclosure of the identity of an alleged informer who the FLQ apparently believed had caused some problems for them. Th©se ttero the initial demands. • *« 3 001790 �3. On the surface, it didn't seem that all these demands were/of equal seriousness or importance. Part of the document was obviously propaganda. There was a series of Immediate consultations between Ottawa and Quebec at various levels, leading to the position announced by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the House of Commons on October 6. Mr. Sharp then confirmed receipt of the FLQ note, summarized the seven conditions which it contained, declared them a wholly unreasonable set of demands, and went on to say that he hoped the FLQ would communicate further with the authorities* At what point was work actually started on the aafe conduct as a contingency? It was felt from the start that a safe, conduct jf&tfFFAlfa d7\zMu££2 c\_, for the kidnappers themselves would/be aor/problems' It could have been arranged very quickly. But one must remember that the kidnappers were talking about the release and safe conduct of prisoners who had been condemned by normal legal processes not for their opinions but for crimes. Their release was certainly not in the cards. When planning for a safe conduct, what we were thinking about was the possibility of transport out of Canada for the kidnappers themselves. Soon after the initial communique became public knowledge, the Governments of Cuba and Algeria were adv!8%d • •. 4 �as a matter of courtesy, that their countries had been mentioned in these communiques; from that point onward we kept in *&$ds£$x4£mt' touch with the/two governments. At the outset we naturally concentrated our effort on what to make of the set of unacceptable demands which confronted us. Tho Governments of Canada and of Quebec, tried to decide to what extent these people could biT^i^^e^^wHot could be done to keep them from killing. Th© first stage was one where the main concern of the government was to keep a dialogue going. Hence the broadcast of the manifesto as requested by tho kidnappers, and tho offer of talks. On October 10, when Kr. Choquette outlined more fully the official position, he indicated among other things that the kidnappers would receive safe conduct in exchange for the release of $&% Cross. How were you able to feel the mood ot the kidnappers? There was a good deal oi effort made to analyze very closely everything that case from them. There wore signs in several of their communiques that the so-called liberation Cell** was in no rush to kill Mr, Cross. The governmont had already made certain gestures, such as broadcasting what the kidnappers called tho manifesto. Deadlines put on Mr. Cross* life passed without mishap and gradually one saw that these people might wish to take advantage of an opportunity to get out of the predicament •*• 5 001792 �they had created for themselves. Some of their conditions were soon toned down; for instanee they declared that they would not kill for the sake of dollars. There was sufficient difference between the various communiques to enable us to think that tho/cituatlon was still fluid and that tho kidnappers wore not necessarily as unyielding as they had made out in the beginning, Unfortunately, the situation wa© radically altered by th© subsequent kidnapping of Kr. Laporte and tho rigid attitude adopted by hio abductors. Can you fio into, some detail on the safe conduct, arrangements? Ifeo only discussion we ever had with the Cubans and Algerians concerned safe conduct arrangements for the abductors. There was never any question of thoir receiving prisoners* For various practical reasons (geographical S distance, presence of a Cuban Consulate in Montreal and of a resident Canadian mission in Havana), it was decided that those arrangements should be made with Cuba* We made a request that Cuba assist us for humanitarian reasons, and tho Cuban Government agreed. The safe conduct offer was then formulated In consultation with the Cubans. Planning and implementation of the safe conduct involved complex consultations and co-operation among Federaltand Quebec Government authorities, Cuban representatives, the police forces and also/the armed forces which / ni provided transport facilities* Tftore were rohoaiwal^to ensure that the procedure worked out for the safe conduct , *. 6 001793 �would unfold without incident. The thoroughness and intensity of these consgiltations/made it possiblo <for the safe conduct to be effected as smoothly ac it was. Although it is not necessary to repeat all the facts that are already publicyKnowledgo about thoso events, one should not forget the major role played by the lawyer Sobert Comers who, in consultation with all the authorities concerned, managed to secure the kidnappers acceptance of the safe conduct procedure. Safe conduct was offered in general terms on the 10th. The offor was repeated by Hr. Bourassa in his statement of Octobor 15tb, which included a opocific d e reference to Cuba, A detailed description of the safe conduct arrangements was broadcast repeatedly on the l?th, before tbe death of Ifar. laporte. Bvmn after tho death of Mr. laporte, Quebec sources promptly confirmed that the safe conduct was etill available to tho kidnappers of Kr, Cross. The objoct was to make sure that the kidnappers not only would know that this had been formally offered by the authorities, but that thoy would also bo aware of all the mechanics of it, so they could assoos tho fairness of tho proposal and know exactly how to procood. There is no doubt that the kidnappers received all this information immediately. They knew that the arrangements had been organised around the co-operation » In commenting on the offer on Octobor 16th, Prime Minister Trudeau said "By offering tho kidnappers * • • ? safe exit from Canada we removed from them & n y pofjoible a o U v a t ^ o n for murdering their hostages.n • x 001794 X �7. of the Cuban Governmont. The Queboc and Canadian authorities early decided that it was essential not sioply to make a vasu. orror of aata «on*»ct but to bo aaa, aaaarata/^ .ven dramatic| to hold out to tho kidnappers something which they could clearly visualise* Tho device of consular irumunity waa deliberately designed to provide for a kinct of nt^tral ground. The site of Expo 6? had been chosen for the extension of the Cuban Consulate to assuro those people also that they would be coning to a wide-open space, an area that was familiar to them. It ^as stated clearly right fro© the start that they could keep their weapon© and their hostages— in other words, maintaining thoir own bargaining power o*l tho way until thoy were in the hands of the Cuban representatives* A further guarantee was that the hostages would not b© turned over by them directly to tho Canadian authorities. They themselves would not surrender to the Canadian authorities but to the Cuban authorities. The hostages would not be released until the kidnappers had reached Cuba. ffaq, there ^contingency ojlanfor wl^t would happen to tfto ho^taftes j.f the/zdld nofr make It? ffere they told wh^t A would happen to Kr. Cross if they dldn*t reach Cuba? Xn other words, if they had been ooisod by the Canadian authorities, or something like that? »«* o �a. Their principal guarantee was that any such development would have caused an international scandal of major proportions. Tho Caaadian Government, in effect, w a s T p u ^ n g ^ ^ l f in a situation where any double-cross would havo boon quite an intolerable development. We had bullt/a situation, quite deliberately, where wo were compelled to stick to our bargain precisely because we Intended to do so. We had no other wish than to abide scrupulously by every detail of these arrangements. This is what happened* The aaechaniom for safe conduct la thio case was different, to ay knowledge, from anything that has happened anywhere else. There have been kidnappings elsewhere. People have boon released from prison and shipped abroad, and the victims subsequently released. That kind of operation is relatively simplerhecause the kidnappers themselves don*t feel trapped. They're not apprehended* Theejcontinue to hold their hostage* The local government in that type of situation merely trie© to protect itself from any double-crossing. For instance, It arranges for prisoners to be sent out of the country and put in the hands of an impartial third party, cay the government of X, Once the prisoners are there, they await the release of the hostage, tShea he is released the government of X proceeds to send the prisoners on to t, their final destination. If the hostage is not released, • • • 7 �9. the government of X presumably returns theoo pooplo to their country ot origin, in accordance with prior undertakings* In our case, w© had to dovioe a system whereby the kidnappers would torn forward of their own freo will and release their hostage before they hod attained safe haven abroad, It was quite tricky. fhe kidnappers obviously expected that the Canadian Qovornment would play/fair, The& «ay thoy behaved when they arrived at Torre dos Hommes, taey/way they behaved during tbe trip was not suspicious. The/ obviously thought the mechanism provided quite reasonable assurance. There was never any problem in the fact tbat Canadian pfficfolp HP,?*1** a ^ o m a y , them? Ho, because, first, they were accompanied by the Cuban representative who had received them at Kan and His */orl&, Secondly, they seemed to find it quite natural for Canadian officials to accompany thorn. Aftor oil, we had to satisfy ourselves that the arrangements woro complied with. There was no surprise, no resistance, Can you describe the, fliftht? Bid you talk with tho kidnappers during the trip? ' The fll$it itself was in a Canadian aircraft manned by Canadian personnel, Tho atmosphere was quite related, quiet, and subdued. There was no unpleasantness, He spoke with the kidnappers, who seemed to react quite ... 10 001797 �10. well to our presence. The Canadian Governmont had made available a doctor on tho flight—one of the woman was expecting a child at almost any moment. tftiat ls, th© status of tfto Ifosk Force now? It has been dissolved. One final point, There may be some misconception among people who have boon interested in the Oporations Centre fromwhere we carried out our activities. There aar bo 3 o«e »„ir4 1 * . . about/the electronic soar «e haa at our disposal* /SUsupsr electronic brain thinking out our whole policy*. In this caoejf^ss Contre functioned mainly as a mechanism for accelerating tho flow of Information, sorting it out, and enabling a group of people from various departments and agencies to consider situations methodically. In th© end all the thinking was done by people, in the same way that tho kidnapping and, unfortunately, th© killing had been done by people. �I MESSAGE FM/DE OTT DEPARTMENT ORIS. NO. MINISTERE N " D'ORIO. EXT IPDM-53 220 DATE TAD- TFF-/^r) SECURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER 2O-5-0L. -TFK- f JAN6/71 RESTR PRECEDENCE TO/A WSHDC(TO BE DELIVERED TO JOHNSTON RY 9.00 AM JAN7) 2 7 I'M INFO -\ U -n X DISTR. BSS. JOHNSTON-BILD TELECON JAN6 SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING TASK FORCE FOLLOWING IS TEXT FOR QUOTE CDA TODAY UNQUOTE ARTICLE SUBMITTED TO LALONDE(PMO) FOR APPROVAL. PLEASE HOLD UP PUBLICATION UNTIL CLEARANCE RECEIVED FROM PMO. (COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED.) \ DRAFTER/REDACTEUR SiG. •F;BI-LD/-jf- EXT 18/BIL (REV B/70I (*>l. {if DI V I S I O N / DI R E C T I O N PDM APPROVEO/WROUV TELEPHONE 6-2863 '&L SIG. 4 'fV'BiL 001799 os) �File^ Diary PDM/F.Bild/jf RESTRICTED Ottawa, January 8, 1971* NOTE FOR HR. CHRISTIE I am sending you the attached draft article at Mr. Bissonnette1s suggestion. The article is to appear in this month's issue of "Canada Today" published by our Bnbassy in Washington. As you will see, it contains a number of statements concerning the Government's thinking during the kidnap crisis. In view of the trial of the Laporte kidnappers now taking place in Montreal, we should be grateful if you could let us have your views as to whether any parts of the article entail the risk of being used in evidence during the trial. F. Biia, Executive Assistant to the Under-Secretary. r</.A3/^) J 001800 �PDM/C.ROQUET/lz EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES SECURITY Sicurile A PDM ( B i l d ) FROM Oe PDM (C.Roquet) DATE REFERENCE Reference le 13 janvier 1971. NUMBER Numiro SUBJECT Enlevements u,e de diplomates - Projet canadien eventuel de resolution & l'Union interparlementaire. CONFIDENTIEL MISSION ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION Dans un entretien d'un caractere personnel, M. Peter Dobell m'a donne certains renseignements sur le sujet precite et m'a demande quelles Etaient mes reactions. Je les lui ai donn6es mais j'aimerais pouvoir le renseigner un peu plus serieusement sur les idees du ministere dans ce domaine, si elles sont quelque peu fix^es. 2. M. Dobell m'a dit qu'un depute federal de 1'opposition, M. Saltsman du NDP, qui doit participer proehainement & une reunion de l'Union interparlementaire, s'interesse & y introduire un projet canadien de resolution qui encourage les gouvernements a ne pas ceder au chantage h. 1'occasion d'enlevements de diplomates. Du point de vue domestique, M. Dobell trouvait assez interessante la perspective qu'un depute de 1»opposition, et particulierement du NDP, mette ainsi de l'avant 1»experience canadienne et enterine la politique du gouvernement Trudeau. Evidemment, M. Saltsman est un des quelques membres du NDP qui ont appuye le gouvernement lors de la crise. Pour ma part, j'ai exprime certaines reserves, je me demandais s'il serait avantageux que le Canada cite son experience comme applicable automatiquement aux autres pays. Premierement, il n'itait pas impossible qu'un diplomate canadien en Amerique:! Latine soit un jour enleve. Les declarations canadiennes pronant une politique de fermete dans tous les pays et dans toutes les circonstances pourraient alors nous nuire dans nos efforts aupres du gouvernement responsable de la securite de notre representant. Deuxiemement, une raison majeure pour laquelle le gouvernement canadien a refuse de liberer des prisonniers au Canada fut notre conviction qu'il s'agissait la de prisonniers de droit* commun* condamnes & la prison par une justice liberale et integre. II n'en etait pas necessairement de meme dans tous les pays d'Amerique Latine. De notre position a ce sujet au Canada, on ne pouvait pas necessairement conclure qu'une meme position serait entierement justifiee ailleurs. ./2 Ext. 407A/BH. (Admin. Servicei Div.) 001801 « Vi �- 2 - CONFIDENTIEL 3. M. Dobell sembla convaincu par mes arguments mais me rappela plus tard suite a un entretien avec un diplomate peruvien aux Nations-Unies. Tout en reconnaissant que les circonstances variaient de pays en pays, le peruvien soulignait fortement 1'importance d'epauler les gouvernements d'Amerique Latine face au chantage par l'enlevement afin justement d'en diminuer la rentabilite et par consequent la frequence, M. Dobell trouvait 1'argument de taille et me demandait si le Canada devait vraiment rester silencieux dans un tel domaine. Je repondis que personnellement je doutais toujours que nous devions mener la danse en nous citant en exemple dans ce domaine. Cependant, si d'autres pays (qu'il s'agisse de debats interparlementaires et peut-etre meme de propositions officielles) soulevaient la question, le Canada s'interesserait sans doute au sujet et devrait pouvoir faire une contribution utile. Dans le cas present, a M. Saltsman evidemment de decider ce qu'il souhaiterait faire. J'avais 1»impression qu'on s'interessait en Amerique Latine et peutetre en Europe a certains projets de traite sur les enlevements de diplomates. II se pouvait done que la question soit soulevee par d'autres pays au sein de l'Union interparlementaire. M. Dobell observa que M. Saltsman pourrait peut-etre proposer 1'inscription du sujet a I'ordre du jour sans mettre de l'avant une resolution canadienne. II ne serait pas necessaire non plus qu'un debat a ce sujet se termine des la prochaine reunion par 1'adoption d'une attitude definie. 4. Je fis remarquer a M. Dobell que mes reactions personnelles, d'ailleurs rapides et peu informees, n'etaient peutetre pas un guide tres sur. Je verrais si le ministere avait certaines opinions arrStees dans ce domaine qui puissent etre utiles a M. Dobell meme si l'on ne pouvait evidemment s'attendre a ce que M. Saltsman les adopte. II dit qu'il serait heureux de savoir l'avis du ministere tout en ne l'evoquant pas formellement aupres du depute de 1'opposition. II me demanda, si possible,des precisions sur les attitudes des pays latinoamericains et europeens. 5. M. Dobell semble preferer que je ne repande pas au ministere les details qu'il m'a donnes sur les projets de M. Saltsman. Si vous le croyez essentiel, on pourrait peut-etre en informer quand meme les directions les plus interessees tout en leur demandant de ne pas evoquer l'affaire directement avec M. Dobell. Une autre possibilite serait d'obtenir les commentaires de la direction juridique sur les problemes evoques cihaut, sans entreF dans les details, et de me laisser le soin de reprendre le dialogue avec M. Dobell sur la base des commentaires et informations que pourrait me donner la direction juridique. QJF. CR. 001802 �h jQu^'^'j^^ ^AA6x 0n (i A 6M> dsi ,PDM/F.Bild/jf (A/ &**• CONFIDENTIAL I 0 c.c. Mr. C. Roquet I. January 15, 1971. MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RITCHIE - . „ I have discussed the contents of the attached f/~ xs~u*- « memorandum with Ted Lee of Legal Division who agrees A. SA Ai— that it would be unwise for Canada to take the kind of • " ™ * ^ ~ ^ ~ initiative contemplated by Mr. Saltsman. Legal Division «- 22*2^*20 had previously given some thought to this question in T^^AO&AS £',-dA connection with a number of initiatives of this type at present being discussed "dji various international contexts. C A? Lee and Beesley had also come to the conclusion that not 2- x . only would a Canadian initiative in this area have domestic implications, it would certainly risk tying us to a position which might be very inconvenient were we faced with the kidnapping of a Canadian diplomat in a country whose institutions and standards of justice were far more challengeable than our own. 2. Mr. Ouellet, Parliamentary Secretary to the USSEA, had suggested a similar initiative to Mr. Beaulne recently in proposing that Canada sponsor a U»N. convention on questions of diplomatic kidnapping and terrorism. Mr. Beaulne reacted by trying to discourage any initiative on our part in this field. 3. We might convey to Mr. Dobell the Department's position on this matter along the above lines and indicate to him: (a) the restrictions we have deliberately imposed on our representation to the OAS General Assembly which will consider kidnapping threats; (b) the fact that both the Council of Europe and NATO are considering draft conventions on the subject; (c) that Italy has been consulting Latin American countries with a view to holding a diplomatic conference on kidnapping and terrorism; and (d) the international activity that is thus already taking place on the question makes it unnecessary for us to consider the need for playing a vanguard role on the subject. FJ BT. 001803 �Pi AlTsly &ss~<- J^ ' -^**-^ (Lj-^^&Ly^ c\/ €JS- dXcA ^ \ \ /n M ^ c c . Mr. C. Roquet*V1 \ •«— ''"^CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL '&*' * MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RITCHIE s\y^etA^7uc. I/ (,' , January 15. 1071. „ ^y/^A^ Y A- ^^f— \j * vTttJL I have discussed the contents of the attached Aj2s**ez*A77^ memorandum with Ted Le© of Legal Division who agrees yu^^y^y-^ that it would be unwise for Canada to take the kind of A J' xAis. initiative contemplated by Mr. Saltsman. Legal Division had previously given some thought to this question in connection tilth a number of initiatives of this type at 2£ZJ> present being discussed in various international organizations. Lee and Beesley had also come to the conclusion that not only would a Canadian initiative in this area have domestic implications, it would certainly risk tying us to a position which might be very inconvonient were we faced with the kidnapping of a Canadian diplomat in a country whose institutions and standards of justice were far more challengeable than our own. 2, Mr. Ouellet, Parliamentary Secretary to the USSEA, had suggested a similar Initiative to Mr. Beaulne recently in proposing that Canada -p£3$^e"°fchat a U.N. convention be established on questions of kidnapping and terrorism. Mr. Beaulne apparently also reacted by trying to discourage any initiative on our part in this field. 3. We might convey to Mr. Dobell the Department's position on this matter along the above lines and indicate to him the restrictions we have deliverately imposed on our representation to the GAS General Assembly this month in this regard; the fact that both the Council of Europe and NATO are considering draft conventions on the subjectj and that Italy has been consulting Latin American countries with a view to holding a diplomatic conference on kidnapping and terrorism. The international activity that has thus already taken place on the question makes it quite unnecessary for us to consider the need for playing a vanguard role on this question. 2. B. 001804 �•Xo - - 2 - i . -TFK 7AA>A. - I 0?^L%v4zU4& C O N F I D E N T I A L sn 2 7 r All FM LDN 170 JAN19/71 A*JM )dfi^7^ -*Wr ^ <?*£*• /***4' TO OTT EXT FPR DISTR GCO ^ \ - '/etc ^ ^ ^ * * ^ Ad / ^ ^ / - — EX GRATIA TIA PAYMENT FOR JAMES CROSS ^ C .. UNDER HEADING QUOTE A 2 0 s 0 0 0 POUND GOLDEN SILENCE HANDOUT FOR Yi3 D NAP ENVOY UNQUOTE YESTERDAYS SUN NEWSPAPER REPORTED THAT MR CROSS HAS BEEN GIVEN QUOTE HUSH MONEY UNQUOTE BECAUSE OF QUOTE EXTREME MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HARDSHIPS AT THE HANDS OF THE TERRORISTS UNQUOTE AND QUOTE THE GOVT KNOWS THAT I F HE HAD CHOSEN TO TELL ALL HE COULD HAVE MADE SOME EMBARRASSING DISCLOSURES UNQUOTE. 2.REPORT SUGGESTS THAT ANOTHER REASON FOR EX GRATIA PAYMENT I S FACT THE CROSS TURNED DOWN NUMBER'OF OFFERS FROM NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES QUOTE INCLUDING ONE FROM A CDN NEWSPAPER FOR 4 0 , 0 0 0 POUNDS UNQUOTE (TORONTO STAR)QUOTE BECAUSE HIS POSITION AS A CIVIL SERVANT OBLIGED HIM TO REMAIN SILENT UNQUOTE. '3.SIMILAR STORY APPEARED IN YESTERDAYS DAILY MIRROR WHICH SUGGESTED THAT QUOTE FO MUST' HAVE BREATHED A SIGH OF RELIEF WHEN IT BECAME OBVIOUS CROSS INTENDED TO SAY NOTHING.FOR THERE WAS A LOT HE MIGHT HAVE INCLUDED IN H I S STORY I F HE HAD BEEN SO INCLINED.THE MAJOR CRITICISM AGAINST THE CDN GOVT WAS THAT THEY WERE USING CROSS AS A POLITICAL PAWN.THE ACCUSATION WAS THAT PM PIERRE TRUDEAU SAW THE KIDNAPPINGS AS AN EXCUSE TO CRUSH THE TERRORISTS ONCE AND FOR ALL. SO HE BROUGHT IN TROOPS AND LAUNCHED A MAJOR ANTI-TERRORIST DRIVE WITHOUT REALLY CARING ABOUT CROSS FATE* IT I S QUITE TRUE TO SAY THAT 001805 v �/ - PAGE TWO 170 CONFD AFTER ABOUT FIVE WEEKS THE ATMOSPHERE IN MTL WAS SUCH THAT THE FATE OF CROSS APPEARED SECONDARY TO THE AUTHORITIES EFFORTS TO STAMP OUT THE TERRORISTS UNQUOTE. 4.FCO ARE APPALLED BY THESE MISCHIEVOUS STORIES WHICH FORTUNATELY HAS NOT/NOT APPEARED IN OTHER LDN NEWSPAPERS.AS A RESULT OF STORIES NEWS DEPT FCO RECEIVED NUMBER OF ENQUIRIES ABOUT 2 0 , 0 0 0 EX GRATIA PAYMENT.THEY REPLIED THAT T H I S FIGURE WAS QUOTE GROSSLY EXAGGERATED UNQUOTE.WE WERE TOLD PRIVATELY THAT EX GRATIA PAYMENT OF APROX 5 0 0 0 POUNDS WAS MADE AS COMPENSATION FOR HARDSHIPS AND FINANCIAL LOSS CAUSED BY NATURE OF HIS AND WIFES DEPARTURE FROM POST.NEWS DEPT HAD NOT/NOT RECEIVED ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT NATURE OF SO-CALLED QUOTE HUSH MONEY UNQUOTE BUT WOULD DENY T H I S HOTLY IF QUESTION WERE P U T . RFT191751Z 001806 �V &JLu EXTERNAL AFFAIRS i2i-4tsM7& fiOvyd, AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES •iOcSmA TO POSTS MARGINALLY LISTED UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY Secunta A RjOtt U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , 0a OTTAWA. REFERENCE •' DATE J a n u a r y 2 2 , 1971. NUMBER No/nero POP-68 liMersitca OTTAWA SUBJECT L E T T E R OF, THANKS FROM MR. JAMES CROSS. SujCf 20-2. 2 ~TF=K. —I Jyk. ENCLOSURES Annexes The Operations Centre is circulating to all DiSTRIBUTION those members of the Department in Ottawa v/ho were members of, Havana Berne London washDC or assisted, the Task Force on the kidnappings, the attached copy of a message from the Under-Secretary, to which he attached a letter of thanks to him from Mr. James Cross. We thought Paris Tunis Bonn members of your mission v/ho were involved might also wish to have a copy. Boston Dublin ij/ts^sssa for xhe) Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs 001807 c/'.y.t, 'u. 7C �Ifieyartment af Tt s t e r n a l Kffaire (£an«6a From the Under-Secretary TO THE OPS CENTRE AND ALL ASSOCIATED WITH IT The handwriting in the attached note may look a little familiar. Your good work was appreciated. A > ^ w » w < * — • » < K * • - • * * ~ ± i " • ' » ' • to&s<4t. a**-£ 2 •'.' f6) 001808 �TO: PSI FROM: ACRU AFFAIRES EXTEmEUfifES EXTERNAL AFFAIRS J^ 29 ®R ft TO A The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa s£™r CONFIDENTIAL GEU V "DATE FROM Os The Canadian Embassy, Berne REFERENCE KSfirence January 25, 1971 NUMBER Numiro 20 FiUE SUBJECT Sujet Footnote to History - Farewell Visit of Jasper Cross DOSSIER 2-A>~22-TFJ7-/ Z>Q~0-2> JJL ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION PSI IA* On last Thursday, 21 January, I received a farewell visit from Jasper Cross, accompanied by Eric Midgley, the British Ambassador, on the eve of Cross' departure from Switzerland. 2. Cross has been here in Berne steadily since his brief return to London following his release. He has been very quiet and inconspicuous, sticking quite closely to the British Residence, resting and recovering from his dreadful ordeal. He is now returning to London where he will rejoin the Department of Trade and Industry, and he does not expect any more foreign postings during the balance of his career with the Department. He claims to have had enough foreign service. 3. On my own responsibility, I permitted Cross, in my office, to read the report of Orm Dier, "Operation Havana", the account of the trip from Montreal to Havana with the kidnappers. I felt that Jasper Cross was owed this final footnote to his release and I hope you agree. 4. I discovered, on Cross* arrival in Berne, that I had known him well during the years he served as U.K. Trade Commissioner in Winnipeg. My wife and I also shared Christmas dinner with the Midgleys and the Crosses. I think that Jasper Cross returns to normal life in a relaxed state of mind, which has been immeasurably aided by his own quiet sense of humour. Ori,igm&i Sig^a by •TAMES A P . o m n James A. Roberts Ambassador #M *A ^ Ui. 407C/BII. (Admin. Services Div.) 001809 76 "i- �a CONFIDENTIAL January 25, 1971. MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JoK&Arm-l RITgffe] The Kidnapping; Crisis and Claude Ryan Mr. Jim Davey of PMO told me last week that Claude Ryan, who had taken part in the recent interview with the Prime Minister of a Quebec group interested in human rights, had not been particularly aggressive on that occasion. He had been satisfied with the way the talks had gone. He had also indicated to the Prime Minister that he thought his^October 16 speech on the kidnappings was a masterpiece, although he would never say so in public. ZiC*^7 A^A 'sis hA cr» fF yxs 7 r' oA 6. R �PDM/A.E.RITCHIE/PS MR. ROWE (PSI) TO SEE & FILE ~ AD J^cFth A - A ^ 3 F, +* /fisQ^ <^ /lazcc. / I! _ PERSONAL AND SECHET FOR ADDRESSEE OIILY '77 Ottawa, January 27f ,1971. tf A * Dear John, As I mentioned to you When you were in the Office yesterday, I ara enclosing a "Note for File" recording Mr. Sharp's exchangee'vrith Kr, Choquette on October 10, You will appreciate the delicate nature of sor.o of tlie points reported in this memorandum. Accordingly, I should be grateful if you would regard it as for your own information - and perhaps you could return it to me when you have finished with it since I doubt that it is the sort of exchange which would be of much value on your file. Incidentally, I have not attached th-3 annexes because they apparently ar© on a different file and they seem in any event to be pretty fully summarised in the memorandum. If, of course, you wish to see those annexes, I should be happy to take then out for you. Pfl/v? -h On the mattca* of the log of events knotm to the Operations Centre, I find that the file copy {'aSiieh occupies tne vfhole file itself) is being \?orked on. As I suggested o/^ji/sL to you, if you wish to hav© or to refer to a copy, your office might get in touch v/ith Alan Rowe in Security and ' Intelligence Liaison. (%^*^A, - * C ^ C Best regards, fri/jts — <TJ (ss«~s i-jtourJA d ^ - alt! /&<?(? yMr. John K. Starnes, ATA. Director General, Yours sincerely, A. e. RITCHIBS A.E. R i t c h i e . Security and Intelligence, R.C.M. Police, 1200 AIta Vista Drive, OTTAWA. 001811 %1.1. if^/os) �PDM PARL.SEC. PDS/)MIN(Mr .Taylor) FPRr/MIN(Mr.Derksen) M E M O R A N D U M FROM THE OFFICE OF THE -i3t.TT=y-l SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO: PDM — .MR. BILD m ^^a^^^* ' January 28, 1971 '•• —^—^. Your attention is drawn to a question relating to this Department that has been asked in the House of Commons. This is Question: No. 750 asked by Orders of the Day No. ^1 M. Caouette Date January 25,1971 Page 63 For your ready reference a copy of the text is attached. 2. Please undertake the preparation of a reply on Form 7530-21-029-1168, in consultation with other Divisions or other Departments as necessary, and in accordance with Mr. McGill's memorandum of October 29, 1969. 3. 11 copies in English markedTranslationand 11 copies in French marked Text are required in addition to copies for MIN, PDM, PDS, Parliamentary Secretary and FPR. (Do not show the distribution on copies for Tabling in the House). ).Derksen krtmental Assistant Room 274 East Block - 6-4140 001812 �/ I QUESTION NO. 750 TEXT fyd Est-ce que le gouvernement federal ou des organismes gouvernementaux ont accorde une certaine somme 1 d*argent aux ravisseurs de monsieur J.-R. Cross pour couvrir leurs depenses au cours des premiers jours de leur sejour a. Cuba et, dans 1*affirmative, quel en etait le montant et droxi provenait cette somme? / TRANSLATION \ Has the federal government or any governmental agency given money to the abductors of Mr. James Cross to cover expenses of their first days in Cuba and, if so, what was the amount and what was its source? <£"«f r A^cA 7*** *&* ^5£*C£-«-K-*-C- 001813 �Xl ^FA:\ IvC fef M t^S fpMiik ix r-'i la. val $7 t ' \ /•» W V \ t -i v "is-* /' •• I t • i^55 MI e MAIL \Jd'9AdtzJZ77.Ji ' 7 1 /S*«5s. ]jpLu/\ firly signs that kidn p-ers /•officials . "There have been kidnap- |® 6!% i s * U) By TERRANCE WILLS - : . The interview with Mr. Roquet and Mr. Rowe in Canada- pings elsewhere. People have been released from prison WASHINGTON - The CaToday stresses the- importand shipped abroad and the nadian Government detected ance that the task force- atvictim subsequently released. signs early in the kidnapping tached to reassuring the kidThat kind of operation is relaof James Cross that his cap-, nappers, that they v/ould have tively simple because the kidtors v/ere "in no rush" to kill safe conduct from the country nappers themselves do not him, the External Affairs De-' .if no harm came to Mr. feel trapped. They are not appartment officer who headed Cross. • . prehended. They continue to the task force to gain the Bri"The Quebec and, Canadian hold their hostage. tish Track: Commissioner's re-, authorities early decided that ' "The local government 'in if; was essential not simply to loose $uyn In u\i Interview. that typo of situation merely make a vagus offer of safeThe report is to be circu-. conduct but to be very con- • tries to protect itself from later! by the Canadian Emcrete and even dramatic—to: any double-crossing... bassy in Washington to in"In our case, we had to deJioid out- to the kidnappers fluential Americans. . . vise a system whereby the something v/hich they could "When. James Cross was . clearly visualize. .kidnappers would come forkidnapped by the Liberationof their own free will "The device of consular im-. ward cell of the Front de Liberation and release their hostage bemunity was deliberately dedu Quebec on. the early mornthey had attained safe signed to provide for a kind of " fore ing of Oct. 5, the whole Govhaven abroad. It was quite neutral • ground. The. site of . tricky." ernment was galvanized," Expo 67 had been chosen for The preamble to the intcrsays the introduction to thc the temporary extension of interview carried in Canada the Cuban Consultate to as-' t view says that the kidnapping and murder of Quebec Labor Today .d'Aujourd'hui—the new . sure these people also that Minister Pierre Laporte "is. propaganda magazine put out' they would be coming.to anot discussed in this interview by the information section of • wide open space, an area that because of the impending tha Canadian Embassy in was familiar to them." trial." Washington. Question: "Was there a conThe • reply to one question "Within hours, a task force : tingency plan for what would • says: "A detailed description was created which was to happen to the hostages (sic), of the safe conduct arrangebecome the central non-police if the' kidnappers did not' ments was broadcast repeatoperation in the crisis," says' • make it? Were they told what edly on the (Oct.) 17th, before * would happen to Mr. Cross if the death of Mr. Laporte. . the slim magazine, which will ; they did not reach Cuba?" "Even after the death of be mailed this week to U.S. Answer: "In other words, if . Mr Laporte, Quebec sources newspapers, universities, and they had been'seized by the leading people in industry,.' promptly confirmed that the Canadian authorities or some-. labor and Government. •' safe "conduct was still availa_ thing like that? Their princible to the kidnappers of Mr. The interview is with : ?pal guarantee was that any • Claude Roquet, special assist-, • such development would have • Cross. Question: ."How were.you aat to A. E. Ritchie, Under- ' caused an international scan-'' able to feel the mood of the secretary of State for Exter-' dal of major proportions. kidnappers?" . nai Affairs, and another de"The Canadian GovernAnswer: "There was a good \ partment officer. Allen Rowe! ment, in- effect, was putting deal of effort made to analyze % Mr. Roquet headed the task itself deliberately in a situavery closely everything that' force to free Mr. Cross. tion v/here any double-cross came from them. There were It'-is to be circulated only a would have been quite an in- , signs in several of their comfew days after 'an article ap--. tolerable development. muniques that the so-called peared in ths U.S. weekly ' "We had built a situation'' Liberation cell was in no rush magazine, The New Republic, where wo were compelled'to . to kill Mr. Cross' mymjK "tho uply wood jn thlji stick te our bargain, precisely i "Deadlines put on Mr previously tolerant country because we intended to do so. j Cross' .life, - passed without.-. went beyond McCarthvism. We, had nc other wish than to mishap and gradually, one and Agnewism, and. responsi- ; abide scrupulously by every i saw that, these people might -. ble leaders played on it." detail of these arrangements. wish to take advantage of an, The article, by.U.S. exile" This is what happened. opportunity to get out of the Roger Neville Williams, who., ' "The mechanism for safe predicament, .they had created says he opposes separatism,-, .conduct in' this case was diffor. themselves. Some of their is written from Montreal and ferent, to my knowledge from conditions were soon toned is entitled Strong-Arm Rule in '! anything that has happened in Caaada. ~ down; for instance, they-deany "other country, clared that they-would not kill for the sake of dollars." '' • • • G'ofeo arss Moi! Correspondent The preamble describes,Mr. Roquet,- ss-;."a man. little known outside the Canadian Goyernmcnt until he flew to Cuba v/ith the kidnappers cn Dec. 3." He- describes the . flight: "The .atmosphere .was quite relaxed, quiet and subdued. There 'Was no-unpleasantness. We. spoke with the kidnappers, who seemed to react quite well to our prpisencft.'' *c<r>rjg**tx STP. PMO/ %§£u£ PDE GAF CPDB lfc|) *t?E DOPS GEUE GEUW PGP M I N I S T E R E DES A F F A I R E S EXTERIEURES CENTRE D'OPERATIONS TEL. 5.6331 OMP OMD OMA OAD CENTRE ECP ECD ECL ECT DEPARTMENT AFP APP OF E X T E R N A ' - AFFAIRS �FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE FEBRUARY 15, 1971 2o'X>^- <- I fef HSill SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. SECRETAIRE D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES. NOTES FOR AN ADDRESS BY THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CANADA, MR. ANDRE OUELLET, M.P., NEW YORK STATE SOCIETY OF NEWSPAER EDITORS, NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 15, 1971. 001815 �Mr. Chairman: Canada enjoyed a brief spell of unusual publicity in the United States and the world in the last few months of last year. They say in sho\f business that all publicity is good publicity. I am not sure that the same holds true in the life of nations. If it was painful for Canadians to have the tragic events of last October front page news throughout the world, they did, at the same time, take pride in the steadfastness shown by their Government and in the orderly way the great mass of our citizens carried on their normal lives, even in the city of Montreal v/here the events had their focus. I am grateful for this opportunity to address this influential group and to try to shed some light in what Churchill called "the twilight between the full glare of newspaper publicity and the cold light of history". Above all, I should like to try to put the events of October into their proper perspective, to look at them as dispassionately as I can and to see where Canada is now and how the future appears. I would l i k e to make clear t h a t FLQ t e r r o r i s m did not b u r s t upon the scene l a s t October. What happened then was a sudden e s c a l a t i o n in t e r r o r i s t activity that had already a seven-year history. I t began with bombs in mailbaxes in 1963* increased through periods of • violence alternating with periods of relative inactivity, tobcrabing attacks on buildings belonging to the I^ei^andRxvincialGorven^nBnts and other i n s t i t u t i o n s ^ regarded as symbolic, such as the Montreal Stock Exchange. In the 1course of these bombings five people were k i l l e d , the l a s t l e s s t h a n a year ago, a middle-aged French-Canadian woman communicator at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. That so.few-lives were l o s t was due t o good fortune r a t h e r than to any p a r t i c u l a r care on the p a r t of the t e r r o r i s t s t o avoid murder. P r i o r t o the kidnapping of James Cross, the p o l i c e were able t o f o i l plans t o snatch two other diplomats. I t \-ras against t h i s background of e s c a l a t i o n of violence t h a t the Government had to evaluate the s i t u a t i o n and evaluate the t h r e a t s of further e s c a l a t i o n t h a t accompanied the kidnappings, including the t h r e a t of s e l e c t i v e a s s a s s i n a t i o n s . Before I discuss with you v/hat the Government did, I have t o make clear to you what I mean by my use of the general term "Government". I d o n ' t have t o t e l l you t h a t Canada i s a f e d e r a l s t a t e with powers shared between the f e d e r a l and t e n p r o v i n c i a l governments, and I w i l l c e r t a i n l y spare you a seminar on Canadian c o n s t i t u t i o n a l lav/. In criminal m a t t e r s , the lav/ i s made by the Federal Government and administered by the provinces. So in the case of kidnappings, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y v/as shared by the Federal Government and the Government of Quebec. a) • m A, 001816 �- 2 This could have led to added difficulty but did not, since from the beginning the two governments acted in close co-operation. When I use the term "Government" today I mean the Federal and Quebec Governments acting in concert, each v/ithin its own sphere of responsibility. Where it is necessary, I will identify the particular Government to which I refer. The kidnapping of James Cross, compounded by the kidnapping of Pierre Laporte, faced the Governments concerned with an agonizing dilemma. Two men, one with the privileged status of an envoy, the other a Minister in the Quebec Government, v/ere in the hands of terrorists known for their lack of regard for human life, v/ho were threatening to murder them if certain demands were not met. The Government was under the greatest possible obligation to secure their safety. But there v/as an equally grave obligation, to secure the safety of other diplomats, individual Canadian citizens, and of the state itself. The Government also realized that to accede to all of the terrorists' demands xrould be the first step upon a slippery slope upon v/hich it would become increasingly difficult to find a firm footing. The demands v/ere something new in the Canadian experience, the first challenge to the Government to act in contempt of its ov/n principles. There could be no compromise, the only time to stop the rot v/as v/hen it first appeared. The fact that Canada had been relatively free from violent civil disturbance v/as not, as has been said, just a matter of luck. It resulted from one hundred years of consistent and even-handed, but democratic and compassionate, enforcement of the country?s laws. The terrorists v/ere driven to the dramatic and highly-publicized acts of kidnapping by the failure of their earlier efforts: efforts frustrated by their total failure to attract any popular support and by the patient and unrelenting work of the police in bringing those responsible for acts of violence to the bar of justice. In their demands, the terrorists called for the freeing of 23 persons they chose to call "political prisoners", persons who, in fact, had been convicted in the normal course of justice of common crimes — murder, manslaughter, bombings and armed robbery. To meet this demand the Government would have had to turn its back upon a century of experience of how best to protect the freedom and safety of its people. This it v/as not prepared to do. I won't go over all the demands made by the terrorists. One v/as met: the reading on television and publication of a manifesto they had prepared. This could be done, since Canada has no fear of opinions and. indeed encourages the freest possible expression of everyone's point of view. One other thing the Government did v/as to offer safe-conduct to the abductors to any destination of their choice. This v/as done to protect the lives of the hostages ...3 001817 �-3 by removing from the terrorists any temptation to murder them to further their o\fn chances of escape. The kidnappers' ploy, which made some impression on a small proportion of even relatively moderate people in Canada, was to suggest that the Government v/as threatening the lives of the hostages by refusing to meet the terrorists'' demands. The lives of James Cross and Pierre Laporte v/ere threatened by the terrorists and no one else. For its part, the Government could only go so far in yielding to terrorist demands. Otherwise, by providing encouragement, manpower and funds to the terrorists, it would have invited new waves of violence which v/ould have put in jeopardy the lives of individuals in all walks of life. In the circumstances, the hazard to the lives of the hostages remained considerable. There also v/as a time factor of unknown v/eight. It was a time of crisis. Tvro men's lives hung in the balance. Threats of further kidnappings and violence v/ere multiplying. No one knew v/hether or not another group v/as ready to pounce. Thousands of pounds of stolen dynamite were unaccounted for in the Province of Quebec. The atmosphere in Montreal v/as volatile in the extreme. The City of Montreal and the Government of the Province of Quebec, so far unsuccessful in getting any real lead on the terrorists, fearing further kinds of violence and aware of the growing anxiety of their citizens, called upon the Federal Government to invoke the War Measures Act. This Act, as its title suggests, contains powers to v/hich no democratic government would have recourse except in situations of the gravest emergency. It was, hov/ever, the only statute to which the Government could turn. Given its peaceful past, Canada had no public order act, to have drafted such an act and put it through the legislative process would, have taken far too long. In introducing in Parliament, the regulations promulgated under the Act, the Government placed very precise limitations on the powers to be put into effect, and limited the period of effectiveness to six months. The Government also announced its intention to bring a more limited legislative measure before Parliament at the earliest possible date. The regulations promulgated under the War Measures Act made membership in the F.L.Q., or any other such organization undertaking specific acts of violence against the state, illegal and gave to the law enforcement authorities broader poxfers than those normal^ at their disposal, in two specific fields: - to enter upon premises, seize evidence and arrest persons without warrant; .. .4 001818 �- 4- to hold persons in custody v/ithout charge for periods longer than those provided for under the criminal law. With these two exceptions, the rights of all Canadians, including those arrested and detained under the Act, remained unimpaired. Due process, as you say in this country, v/as observed. Charges had to be laid in accordance with normal procedures, trial to be by jury in the established criminal courts. The right to representation by counsel in trials under long-established rules of evidence and jurisprudence v/as unimpaired. The Public Order (Temporary Measures) Act later adopted by Parliament is limited in application to the F.L.Q. crisis. It reduces the periods during vrhich persons can be detained v/ithout, charge and expires on April 1, 1971, unless specifically continued in force by Parliament. This then, is hox</ the Canadian Government met the threat to peace and order in Canada. As you know, the release of James Cross v/as secured. Pierre Laporte v/as murdered. Those charged, v/ith the crime are nov/ being tried in court. I am satisfied, and every evidence indicates tho vast majority of Canadians is satisfied, that the Government acted with courage, determination, skill and humanity. I v/ould nov/ like to deal very briefly with three common misapprehensions about v/hat happened that .have been given wide circulation. The first of these is that troops of the Canadian Armed Forces were deplo3red under the War Measures Act and were used to enforce its provisions. Not so, the troops, most of them French-speaking, v/ere deployed, at the request of the Government of Quebec, as part of their normal function in support of the civil authority before the Act was invoked and under the normal law of the land. Support of the civil authority, when requested, is a recognized duty of the armed forces in every country I know, including your ovm. Their duties were confined to the protection of prominent individuals, public buildings and essential installations. There v/as no single incident of a soldier harming a civilian. And, to the best of my knowledge, not even an unpleasant incident between troops and civilians. The fact that our troops have specific instruction, training and experience in pe-aoekeeplng operations, which necessarily involve close but non-:aggr..e,ssiye contact v/ith civilian populations, is a source <of .strength and re-assurance in circumstances like these. Any notion that Quebec v/as under military occupation is nonsense. �_ 5The second misapprehension is that Canadians, for a time at least, lived under martial lav/. I think that v/hat I have already said gives the lie to this idea. Martial law involves abrogating the. constitution even if o n ^ for a time, putting the whole apparatus of democracy into escrow and ruling by fiat, the use of summary courts-martial and.other like measures, none of v/hich Canadians would have stood for. The third misapprehension, one of special interest to this audience, was that there v/as some form of press censorship. No one v/ho lived through those days in Canada could support such a proposition. The F.L.Q. itself was able to use the media for its propaganda purposes and did so v/ith a modicum of skill compounded into a great success by the gullibility and predilection for sensationalism of the media itself. Their every vrord v/as amplified on the air and blazoned in the press. Attacks upon the Government and its policy were given the widest publicit3r and a few leading editorial writers, v/ho disagreed with the Government's policy, wrote their views freely and forcefully. The Government was aware that publicity was one of the F.L.Q.Ts main objectives and aware that the press, knov/ingly or not, v/as giving them the greatest assistance. The Attorney-General of Quebec publicly called upon the media to exercise more responsibility in their coverage of the crisis. As he might have foreseen, this resulted in loud complaints about censorship and absolutely no increase in responsibility. You will understand that I am referring only to certain elements of the media. In general, the press in Canada acted responsibly. The fact that reporting events in a crisis like this in accordance v/ith normal editorial judgement tends to play into the hands of the terrorists is something that should, I believe, concern us all, the ppess, Government and citizens alike. How does the future look for Canada? I don't think anyone is naive enough to imagine that v/e have heard the last of the F.L.Q., or that violence,that is a growing threat to society everywhere, will leave Canada unscathed. I think we have given notice to the F.L.Q., and any other groups of like mind, that the Government of Canada is not an eas}' mark, and that the Governments and people of Canada v/ill act together swiftly and firmly to deal with-terror wherever it appears, without at the same time allowing our democratic system to become warped in the process. We have been reminded in a tragic but unforgettable v/ay that freedom is written in the blood of those that down the centuries have resisted terror, that freedom does not issue from the muzzle of an assassin's gun. Terrorism in society is akin to a virus in the bloodstream. The virus must be identified and neutralized. At the same time, the weakness in the body that permitted the ... 6 001820 �- 6 virus to take hold must be diagnosed and the necessary measures taken to increase the body's immunity. The F.L.Q. terrorists do not represent the people of Quebec nor their aspirations. They are not so much Quebec separatists as extremists verging on anarchism. They are sometimes identified as neo-Marxist revolutionaries. I have no idea what that term really means, but I can tell 3>-ou that what v/e know about the aims of the F.L.Q. strongly suggests that they are rather short on ideology of an3r kind. They are determined to destroy the ordered society that is the underpinning of civilization as v/e know it, but they offer only vague generalities in its place. I have likened the F.L.Q. to a virus in the system and. implied that there are weaknesses in the Canadian body politic that have allowed the virus to take hold. Long before the crisis erupted, the Canadian Government had been dealing v/ith the very real problems in Canadian society. Some of these we share with the rest of the Western world, some are native to Canada. Western society everywhere has to come to grips v/ith the very real threats posed by partly-alienated groups — &hnic and racial minorities, the poor and underprivileged, the impatient young. Affluence and permissiveness, widespread though they may be, are not universal in our society. Poverty and frustration are still the common lot of millions. Our young people are not prepared, to be patient, not prepared to accept that intractable, embedded problems call for long-term, gradual solutions. Here is injustice, they say, remedy it. Our institutions are not yet sufficiently geared, to rapid advance, v/e lack the ansv/ers to many of the problems v/e face. Even v/hen v/e do know what to do, the right decisions made today vaay take months or even 3rears to show results. This is particularly true in the economic field. In the meantime, alienated, groups particularly among the young are questioning the adequacy and relevance of our institutions, the churches, the judicial system, even democracy itself. They are questioning the values our . institutions exist to protect. They are questioning the human worth of Western civilization, of the acquisitive, so-called "consumer" society. VJhat worth, they ask, has a system that cannot guarantee to all its people a decent life and reasonable chance of fulfillment? These are very pertinent questions. They have always been asked, the difference nov/ is that the explosion in communications brings the whole world together. The process of government is no longer arcane, it is patent. The comfort of the well-to-do is known to the poor, the sufferings of the poor are seen by the rich. I do not raise these matters to offer �- 7easy solutions but to remind you of the social background against which urban violence in all our societies should be seen. In Canada, the problems are compounded by two factors: - the strain imposed upon national unity by separatist sentiment in Quebec in particular and regional disparity of opportunity in general; - the current high rate of unemployment, particularly among the urban young. The Canadian Government is fighting these problems with determination and a sense of very real urgency. Quebec's quiet revolution which began in the sixties has brought dynamic and far-reaching.changes in Quebec society. The Frencn langaage has gained equal recognition with English. Only last week a Federal-Provincial Constitutional Conference of Prime Ministers and Premiers achieved a breakthrough that can lead to a renewal of our constitution to bring it into line vrith the reality of modern Canada. The Government is determined to achieve a Canada in which every Canadian, English,French or of other origin, can feel at home and make a decent life without feeling limited to one geographical area or one ethnic group. Canadian foreign policy is now a true expression of a bilingual and multi-cultural Canada. The present high level of unemployment will diminish., but a sustained effort has to be made to ensure that the unemplo3red young and nev/ arrivals on the labour market see ready opportunities for leading useful and fulfilling lives. None of this is eaS3Vbut all °f it v/ill have to be done, done quickly and done effectively. One thing v/e do not have is time. This is the background against v/hich the cruel and criminal acts took place. But it is not the cause. The F.L.Q. have no cause. Canada is an open societ3r, any individual or group can work openly and freely in pursuit of any political purpose. The F.L.Q. have chosen another route. They walk that route alone, despised equally by all Canadians. They have found that it leads only to darkness and death. For their sake, and for the sake of us all, I hope they have learned, their lesson well. - 30 - �UNCLASSIFIED March 1, 1971. ice-pared i n SCKsultation with (77*~ The Undersecretary s 7 From: (through: Mr. B, F. Bild Ref: Subject: 7fff7Ay\ Kidnapping Crrsis - Question in the House \ ^y AA. cs^P Mr. Roquet Referred for info to: The answer to part 1 of the attached reply is based on the following data obtained from divisions: a) Man hours (regular and overtime): - Task Force duty $112,830. - Increased telegraphic traffic $ 5.017. MIN $117,347. b) Communications operating expenses 2,800. c) Transportation 2,-W: d) Equipment and supplies 7,840. e) Protection of foreign diplomats in Canada 36,994. f) Protection of Canadian personnel and premises abroad TOTAL - /> 3 . & %A-^\A 3,735. $171,5917 /£*ca<*<*- s^. y^? y^xA-tx. ftf.fAi-^' M CO?YJA~ fx ^A22Aa£F3AmKa '"* x~*x*y -**-~i AJ~~~— °"- / p ^ -POM m^u*. ty/ix �20~3L-2.-TF/<- /- S~~ if^S^*^ ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA 2 gi< February 1 8 , 1971 S E C R E T h The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Room 200, Daly Building, Ottawa, Ontario. A t t e n t i o n : " Mr. Claude Ro/qjaet Dear Mr. Roquet: A You will no doubt find the attached report of an interview with lawyer Robert DEMERS quite interesting. During the OctoB'er 1970 crisis, you will recall, DEMERS acted as negotiator for the Government of the Province of Quebec to obtain the release of Messrs. Cross and Laporte. 2. We will keep you abreast of any additional,details which may come to light. .<- Yours s i ^ John Starnes Director General Security and Intelligence doydz-c: Defence and International Affairs/Defense et affairs internationales 1AZI, jUA^^txAPTTz, /r &*76/7, i&z 001824 �INTERVIEW,OF LAWYER ROBERT DEMERS S E C R E T y On January 21, 1971 Robert DEMERS volunteered to "supply the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Montreal, any details he could- recall'-^relative to negotiations he had with members of the Front de Liberation du Quebec (F.L.Q.) and their appointed representatives, v/ith a view to obtaining the release of kid.napped Quebec Labour Minister, Pierre LAPORTE and British Trade Commissioner, James R. CROSS. Upon his arrival at the R.C.M.P. offices DEMERS stated that he had no notes on the incidents and that at no time did'the Provincial Department of Justice or any other Provincial or Federal Government Department request a report from him. He was prepared to discuss his entire participation but stated that it would be from memory only and would endeavour to be as accurate as possible regarding details. 2. On October 12, 1970 DEMERS was appointed to act as negotiator by the Government of the Province of Quebec. On tfie same date he held a meeting with lawyer Robert LEIOEUX whom he did not,know personally previously, who was incarcerated in a Montreal \ 4 City Police jail cell. LEMIEUX was not yet aware that he had been appointed by the F.L.Q. to act as negotiator on their behalf and therefore, prior to entering into any discussions he requested he be supplied with a copy of the F.L.Q. communique which contained his appointment. Lawyer DEMERS requested copies of all F.L.Q. communiques from the Quebec Police Force which were supplied and promptly passed to LEMIEUX by DEMERS. It should be pointed out 2 SECRET �_2_ SECRET that although the Q.P.F. supplied the communiques they could, nonetheless, have been acquired from the M.C.P. Prior to handing them to LEMIEUX,'DEMERS did not peruse the communiques, however, he did notice that they also contained police reports and in particular, one emanating from the R.C.M.P. dealing with fingerprints. As a result, DEMERS was aware that LEMIEUX did in fact acquire some police reports dealing with the CROSS-LAPORTE affair, which likely prompted LEMIEUX's statement to the effect that this was a case of inefficiency on the part of the Police. A request by LEMIEUX that charges against him be dropped and seized documents be returned was immediately refused by DEMERS. 3. During their second meeting on the same day DEMERS found LEMIEUX to be weak of character and perplexed as to what he should do as a result of his being appointed F.L.Q. negotiator. As a press conference had already been organized by LEMIEUX, DEMERS told him to ask the F.L.Q. to explain his mandate more clearly. 2 4. ' On the morning of October 14, LEMIEUX appeared in court, A- was conditionally released, and afterwards held a meeting with DEMERS v/hich lasted 2^ hours. The first hour of the meeting centred around LEMIEUX's sexual conquests and marital problems, at which time it became clear to DEMERS that LEMIEUX was obsessed with sex. Other impressions gained by DEMERS at that time were that LEMIEUX lacked self-confidence, was not strong willed and contrary to his deportment in public, is'relatively calm in private discussions. LEMIEUX continually employs the terminology used by those with whom he associates, i.e. persons of an extreme left ideology. SECRET 001826 �/ t s * -35. SECRET During the remainder of the meeting, LEMIEUX admitted being sympathetic to the F.L.Q. but not a member of t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n . " I t appeared to DEMERS t h a t LEMIEUX wants to be used by the F.L.Q. and o t h e r s having extreme l e f t i s t ideas as he shares t h e i r b e l i e f s and f e e l s t h a t i t would be advantageous for the Province of Quebec to have a Maoist or Cuban type Government. He s t a t e s t h a t a r e v o l u t i o n i n Quebec would be a g r e a t f e a t i n t h a t i t v/ould be the i first to be carried out in'an industrial society. He does not appear to favour the Parti Quebecois although he foresees Quebec acquiring independence through their efforts, followed by a revolution by left wing extremists. In essence, LEMIEUX is not a separatist but supports 'this ca.use as it could^result in independence for Quebec. He doesn't believe the conflict to be one of race or language but one of capitalist and socialist systems. The discussion progressed to a point v/here LEMIEUX stated that only under Maoism could there be a Just Society, although he was unable to forecast the conditions which would:=exist after a.revolution in Quebec. DEMERS was given the impression that LEMIEUX is not too well indoctrinated in Maoism. Although LEMIEUX favoured the kidnappings, he stated being against the assassination of CROSS or LAPORTE because it would bring repressive measures but such measures would in the long run benefit the revolution in Quebec. LEMIEUX also indicated that he is anti-Russia. He is a socialist first and a separatist second* sharing the same beliefs as Quebec terrorist-Pierre VALLIERES. 6. • LEMIEUX claimed knowing all.the socialist types but was 4 • SECRET 'r 001827 �SECKET -44 not aware of who the kidnappers were, although he s t a t e d t h a t when t h e i r i d e n t i t y became known he would undoubtedly know them personally. According to DEMERS, LEMIEUX i s regarded i n j u d i c i a l c i r c l e s as a person who i s "epouse a. l a cause de ses c l i e n t s " t h a t i s , he does not only defend h i s c l i e n t s but shares t h e i r viewpoints as well as t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . LEMIEUX described the F.L.Q. t e r r o r i s t s presently i n j a i l (on October 14th) as r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , except for two or three who had been r e c r u i t e d w h i l s t i n c a r c e r a t e d . 7. I t was evident to DEMERS t h a t LEMIEUX was p u b l i c i t y hungry and following each meeting, he would always c a l l a press conference. DEMERS had advised LEMIEUX to be careful during these press conferences, however., there were three points t h e t were agreed 4 upon in private-which were completely reversed by LEMIEUX when released to the public. These three points were: (a) LEMIEUX was to request further explanation of his mandate by the F.L.Q. but instead stated that the negotiations v/ere over; *, (b) During a previous meeting with DEMERS, LEMIEUX agreed that a F.L.Q. communique he was given gave him "carte blanche" to negotiate and to arrive at a settlement but during the press conference LEMIEUX stated that he did not have "carte blanche". (c) Because of a cabinet meeting DEMERS was required to proceed to Quebec City and arrangements were made with LEMIEUX for him to accompany DEMERS, in order to continue negotiations. This v/as agreeable to LEMIEUX, however, at a press conference LEMIEUX stated that he would not go to Quebec City to continue negotiations. 5 i SECRET 001828 �AO~d -5- SECRET From these actions and his general observations, DEMERS does not consider LEMIEUX to be a leader but feels that the latter's decisions are actually made by his entourage. This appears to be the case in a list of questions submitted to the Quebec Provincial Government on October 14. DEMERS noted that two of the questions on this list contained specific wording which reappeared in an F.L.Q. communique the following day. One of those he recalled, was the question, "Qu'elle est la situation sur les fouilles, perquisitions et arrestations?" The words "la situation" veere used in the question and again in the same context in the communique. 8. On October 15, 1,970, LEMIEUX was advised of the Government's 4 decision regarding the F.L.Q. conditions to be met for the release of the kidnapped victims and again LEMIEUX called a press conference. 9. LEMIEUX was seen again by DEMERS between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. on October 17, after the proclamation of the War Measures Act. He was in jail again and at this time expressed his disappointment that the Montreal student population had not taken to the. streets for mass demonstrations as he believed they would have done on this occasion. DEMERS offered him the opportunity to review the conditions of safe-conduct to Cuba for the kidnappers and offered the assistance of Pierre VALLIERES and Charles GAGNON in this .venture. LEMIEUX was also asked to communicate with the F.L.Q. to secure the release of CROSS and LAPORTE but he refused both requests. LEMIEUX stated that he was disgusted with himself at that time because he had suffered a loss of prestige among the leftist element and was afraid. . to take any further action which might lov/er his image in their esteem. i e SECRET 001829 �-610. SECREi- Throughout the meetings that he had with LEMIEUX, . DEMERS gained the definite impression that LEMIEUX would be willing to drop all the F.L.Q. conditions for the release of the kidnap victims except for one, which called for the release of the political prisoners. At that time of course, there was no question of the kidnappers accepting a safe-conduct to Cuba as their identity was not known and same would have been safeguarded by the F.L.Q. 11. On December 3, 1970, DEMERS met lawyer Bernard MERGLER for the first time at the offices of the Quebec Police Force in Montreal. MERGLER struck DEMERS as being an introvert and he immediately made known the fact that he had no desire to be given any publicity regarding his appointment by the F.L.Q. as their negotiator. In fact, MERGLER appeared unhappy at having been so chosen and was physically afraid of approaching the kidnappers, one of the reasons being that his name was misspelled on their communique, indicating he was not too well known by them. Another reason,for his reticence was the fact that he feared being prosecuted for his complicity in- the negotiations after they had terminated. This fear was alleviated when DEMERS advised that it was he who .had requested MERGLER's- services on behalf of the F.L.Q. He finally consented to accept the task when informed that Jacques COSSETTE-TRUDEL and his wife had already been arrested by the Police. 12. From the Q.P.F. offices,' DEMERS and MERGLER proceeded to the Cuban Trade Office in Montreal where a short conversation was held with a Cuban, whom MERGLER suggested accompany them to see the 7 . — - -- ....._... . .. . .. 001830 �_7_ §ECR£T a i Kidnappers. MERGLER also asked a woman working at the Trade Office to accompany them because of the fact that she was a woman and spoke fluent French, however, from the tone of their conversation DEMERS feels MERGLER and the woman in question are more than just friends. The woman did not accompany them as authority would have been required from Cuba, which DEMERS felt would delay the proceedings for too long a period of time. DEMERS and MERGLER then proceeded to Des Recollets Street, Montreal where e MERGLER spoke with the kidnappers for f of an hour. Three conditions were derasnded of, DEMERS by the F.L.Q. through MERGLER. The first a two were accepted and the third was rejected by both negotiators. These conditions were: (1) That the wives and children of the kidnappers be allowed to proceed to Cuba. (2) That Jacques COSSETTE-TRUDEL and his wife also be allowed to accompany the kidnappers, presently holding CROSS, to Cuba. » (DEMERS mentioned that this condition had already been promised to the COSSETTE-TRUDELs during the early morning of December 3rd by a member of the Q.P.F. who was involved in the interrogation, ater having been instructed to do so by his superiors). (3) That Claude RYAN or Rene LEVESQUE proceed to the house • on Des Recollets Street to visit the kidnappers. A suggestion was also made that RYAN accompany the kidnappers to Cuba but this was discouraged by Julien CHOUINARD of the Quebec Provincial Government and 8 SECRET .001831 t j f ^ K «w^Jfi-*mii*««l'vaflicSK<!i..'£'-** I �;. . * -8- SECRET RYAN himself, who was contacted in this respect, did not wish to leave. All parties having agreed to the first two conditions, it then took 20 to 30 minutes to leave the house and proceed to the Man and His World Site. MERGLER stated at that time that he would arrange for Suzanne LANCTOT to be escorted to Man send His World for her flight to Cuba. One and one-half hours elapsed before MERGLER advised DEMERS thatvit would be his daughter Donna TARLO and another 'unidentified female who would be providing this escort. 13. Regarding Yves LANGLOIS, DEMERS feels MERGLER may have learned his identity from the Cubans as he himself was not made aware of this person's identity earlier in the discussions. 4 , j Although he could not definitely recall, DEMERS believes that he did. transmit this information to the Department of External Affairs I jd£ in Ottawa during his discussions on December 3rd. 14. I DEMERS criticized the availability of communications facilities to contact Government representatives, the only telephone being' s.t the observation post which hsd been secured a week earlier by the R;C,M.P. DEMERS was told that better arrangements could have been made but were not as the negotiators were supposed to use another dwelling on the same street for this purpose. DEMERS then recalled this suggestion having been made but for some unknown ^ reason, no use was made of it. N • 15. DEMERS would have appreciated having ifis associations ^ith LEMIEUX and MERGLER recorded, which he was told would be the case, but to his knowledge this was not done. The meetings in question were held at M.C.P.,and Q.P.F. cells and at an office in the Hydro Quebec Building. �7 ,. 16. ' _g_ SECRET At the commencement of the interview, we expressed to DEMERS our surprise that he had not been required to submit a. report to either Quebec Justice Minister, Jerome CHOQUETTE, or to the Q.P.F., since his association throughout the crisis was with that department, and in particular, with Inspector BENOIT. In view of the fact that he did not keep notes, it is believed s that DEMERS had not expected to be asked to supply a detailed account of the negotiations. 17. Surveillance confirmed the matter of Bernard MERGLER's daughter driving*Suzanne LANCTOT to the Man and His World site and DEMERS himself points out the fact that MERGLER was aware that Yves LANGLOIS used the alias, SEGUIN. 4 18. It is understood by DEMERS that in all probability we Will, wish to interview him further, at which time v/e will have copies of the F.L.Q. communiques and press clippings relating to his endeavours in order to assist his recollection of specific events. Clarification of any points covered in this interview which, may be forthcoming will be forwarded at a later date. *• SECRET SECRET 001833 �C 0 E F 1 1. E il T I E L DE OTT EXT FLA101 MARS1/71 A 'PARIS- / ~~rr^i/— I CX0 POUR LIVRAISQN 0 2 0 8 0 0 INFO JUSTICEOTT/CHH1ST IE BISTR FCO PMO PBF GEO FPR FAl'PBM REF NOTRE TEL 92 FEV25 —"CDA BAUJOURBHUI VOICI TEXTE REMAN IE PAR SUITE DES OBSERVATIONS DU MINISTERE BE JUSTICEoVU ELEMENTS JURIBIQUESDELICATS,NOUS VOUS RECOMMANDONS LA PLUS GRANGE PRUDENCE S I VOUS RETOUCHEZ CE TEXTE* lolEBUT TEXTEJEN OCT BERNIER P LE GOVT BU CBA ET LE GOVT i U QUEBEC ONT EU A RESOUDRE LES PROBLEMES S I F F I C I L E S QUE LEUR POSAIENT LES ACTES I E VIOLENCE EWTREPRIS PAR LE FRONT DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC CM-JAMES CROSS,CHEF I E LA MISSION COMMERCIALE BRIT A MTL A ETE ENLEVE LE 50CTfIL A ETE SEQUESTRE JUSQUAU 3BEC;M PIERRE LAPORTE, MIN QUEBECOIS DU TRAVAIL ET BE LA MAIN-BOEUVRE ET MIN DE LIMMIG A ETE ENLEVE LE 10OCT ET ASSASSINE LE 17),QUELLES ETAIENT AU JUSTE LA NATURE ET LAMPLEUR BES BIFFICULTES A SURMONTER SUR LE PLAN JUR18IQUE.POURSUIVRE CEUX QUI SE SONT RENSUS COUPABLES DACTES CRIMINELS CU •BELICTUEUX,CEST LA MISSION BE LA JUSTICE ET DE LA POLICEeCELLES-CI NAVAIENT EN REVANCHE AUCUN MOYEN BE POURSUIVRE DIRECTEMENT UNE ASSN NON/NON RECONNUE QUI PRECONISE OU PRENB A SON C.OKPTE' ©ES ACTES CRIMINELS,EN EFFET,SEULS LES INPIVIBUS ET LES CORPS CONST IT UES SONT OBJETS SU BROIT CRIMINEL -CBH;UNE ASSN QUI NA 001834 / �PAGE IEUX FLA 101 CONF© PAS-LEGALISE SON EXISTENCE NE T0M8E BO^IC PAS SOUS LEM.PIRE SU BROIT •CRIMINEL.EN PLUS,LE 0ELIT BOPINIQN EST UNE NOTION ETRANGERE AU DROIT PENAL CiNcLES OPINIONS POLITIQUES SEXPRIMENT LIBREMENT NOTAMMENT PAR LES PARTIS POLITIQUES AU NIVEAU FEDERAL-OU PROVINCIAL, QUILS SOIENT CONSERVATEUR. OU .COMMUNISTE,SOCIALISTE OU LIBERAL, SEPARATISTE OU CREDITISTE*CELA EST CONFORME AUX PRINCIPES DE'LIBERIE INSIVISUELLE SI FORTEMENT ANCRES BANS LES TRADITIONS POLITIQUES, JU1ICIAIRES ET PARLEMENTAIRES CBN ET REFLETES ©ANS LA BECLARATION DES IRQ ITS ©E LHOMME AiOPTEE EN 1960 PAR LE PARLEMENT BU CBAoLES - CBNS-SONT EXTREMEMENT SENSIBLES SUR LE CHAPITRE BES LIBERTES FONfAMENTALESsNOMBRE BENTRE EUX AVANTE DE SETABLIR AU CBA ONT ETE VICTIMES I E : PERSECUTIONS DORDRE POLITIQUE.RELISIEUX OU RACIAL ET BEAUCOUP ONT GRANB.I PANS LE SOUVENIR PES PERSECUTIONS BONT LEURS ASCENDANTS ONT ETE VICTIMES.LE DROIT DASSN.LA LIBERTE DE PRESSE ET ©E LINFO EN GEN,LA LIBERTE DEXPRESSION ONT UN CARACTERE QUASI SACREo '2.CERTAINES CARACTERISTIQUES 0U BROIT PENAL CSN CONTRIBUENT 6RANBEMENT A LA PROTECTION SES LIBERTES INBIVIBUELLES.AINSI t LINBIVIDU MIS EN ACCUSATION EST PRESUME INNOCENT JUSQUA PREUVE PU CONTRAIRE J IL INCOMBE A LA POURSUITE DETABLIR HORS DE TOUT DOUTE RAISONNABLE QUE LACCUSE A VRAIMENT COMMIS LE CRIME QUI LUI EST REPROCHEeCE PRINCIPE PEUT PARFOIS LAISSER QUELQUES CRIMINELS IMPUNIS,MAIS IL PROTEGE ADEQUATEMENT LINNOCENT CONTRE LERREUR JUDICIAIRE.AUSSI,TOUS LES CRIMES 10NT PEUT ETRE ACCUSE UU INBIVIBU iOIVENT ETRE PREVUS • © * «5 001835 �PAGE TROIS FLA 101 CONFD BANS I E DROIT CRIMINEL ;IIN ACTE,TOUT REPREHENSIBLE SOIT-IL,NE PEUT BONC EIRE CONSIBERE CRIMINEL A LA DISCRETION ©UNE COUR DE-JUSTICE,. ENFIN ,LE COBE CRIMINEL LIMITE LAUTORITE BES FORCES BE LORDRE POUR ARRETER ET iETENIR LES INBIVIDUS$EVIDEMMENT,UN POLICIER OU MEME UN SIMPLE CITOYEN PEUT ARRETER UN INBIVIBU SURPRIS EN TRAIN BE COMMETTRE UNE INFRACTION CRIMINELLE.IL EXISTE AUSSI CERTAINS CAS OU UN POLICIER EST AUTORISE A ARRETER UN INBIVIBU SANS MANDAT$MAIS CETTE AOT OR ITE EST CLAIREMENT ©EFINIE PAR LE COM CRIMINEL AU POINT QUE LE POLICIER QUI EN ABUSE PEUT DEVENIR LOBJET BUNE POURSUITE EN BOMMAGES-INTERET INTENTEE PAR LA PERSONNE QUI A SUBI UN PREJUDICE INJUSTIFIEe 3 e B AILLEURS, NON SEULEMENT LARRESTATIQM EST-ELLE ETROITEMENT RE6LEMENTEE MAIS EGALEMENT LA BETENTIQN EST STRICTEMENT LIMITEE ©ANS SA BUREEgLE COBE CRIMINEL COMMANBE IMPERATIVE?^NT AU POLICIER GU AUTRE PERSONNE QUI A CHARGE BUNE PERSONNE ARRETEE BE CONBUIRE CETTE PERSONNE BEVANT UN JUGE BE PAIX AVANT LEXPIRATION BUN DELAI' BE 24 HRES SUIVANT LARRESTATIONoLE JUGE BE PAIX PEUT ALORS BECIBER SIL Y A LIEU BORBCNNER LA ©ETENTION OU LA LIBERATION SOUS CAUTION EN • ATTENDANT-LE PROCES. CETTE PROCEDURE SERA PROCHAINEMENT REVISEE S I LE PARLEMENT CBN ABOPTE UN PROJET DE LOI ACTUELLEMENT A LETUBE. LE PROJET BE LOI ENCOURAGERAIT BAVANTAGE LA LIBERATION BES PREVENUS EN ATTENDANT LEUR PROCES-.EN PLUSIEURS CAS.LARRESTATION ELLE-MEME SERAIT REMPLACEE PAR UNE SIMPLE CITATION A COMPARAITRE. .4 .AUTRE EXEMPLE BE LIBERTE INlIVIBUELLElLE PARLEMENT CBN NA PAS/PAS �PAGE QUATRE FLA10I.CONFD JUGE NECESSAIRE JUSQUICI BE RENBRE OBLIGATOIRE UNE CARTE ©IDENTITE ' NATL MALGRE CERTAINES PRESSIONS BES AUTORITES RESPONSABLES BE LAPPLICATION BES L O I S . 5 .ON COMPRENB QUUN GOVT PROVINCIAL,RESPONSABLE BE LORDRE PUBLIC$ SOUCIEUX BE RESPECTER SCRUPULEUSEMENT LES TRADITIONS BE LIBERTE BEMOCRATIQUEjSE TROUVE BEM UN I SIL BOIT FAIRE FACE A UNE TENTATIVE I E COUP BE FORCE OU A UNE VAGUE BE VIOLENCE QUI MENACE LA. SECURITE DU CITOYEN ET LA VIE BE SES INSTITUTIONS. 6.T0UT AU PLUS PEUT-IL REQUERIR IU GOVT FEDERAL LE SECOURS BE LA GENDARMERIE NATL ET BE LARMEE DANS BES TACHES BE PROTECTION CIVILE, MAIS CELA NE CHANGE RIEN AUX LIMITES LEGALES DE SON ACT ION.LE FAIT BEMEURE QUE,LA MAIN DE LA JUSTICE NE TOUCHE QUE LES INDIVIDUS ET LES ASSNS LEGALEMENT CONST ITUEES;AUCUNE AUTORITE CDNNE CON DISTINGUE BEUXNIVEAUX BE GOVT ,LE FEDERAL ET LE PROVINCIAL,AGISSANT CHACUN AU CDA DANS LEUR SPHERE DACTIVITES PROPRES) NE PEUT INTERVENIR DIRECTEMENT,SOUS LAUTORITE BES LOIS COURANTES,CONTRE UNE ASSN QUI IGNORE LES REGLES BE JEU BU SYSTEME DEMOCRATIQUE,PRECONISE LA VIOLENCE CONTRE LE GOVT ET REPANi LA TERREUR;TOUTE-FOIS,LA LOI SUR LES MESURES BE"GUERRE,LORSQUE PROCLAMEE?PERMET AU GOVT DABOPTER BES'REGLEMENTS SPECIAUX POUR FAIRE FACE A BES SITUATIONS ©URGENCE TEL UN DANGER-BIHSURRECTIONoSE PREVALANT DE CETTE LOI QUI LUI ACCORBE UN POUVOIR BE REGLEMENT TRES ETENBU,LE GOVT FEDERAL,SUR LA DEMANBE ECRITE BU PREMIER MINISTRE BU QUEBEC ET BU MAIRE BE MTL PROCLAMA LA 001837 �PAGE CINQ FLA 101 CONFS LOI BES MESURES BE GUERRE LE 160CT BERNIER ET ADOPTA AUSSITOT BES CIT REGLEMENTS PREVOYANT BES POUVOIRS BURGENCE POUR LE MAINTIEN BE LORBRE PUBLIC FINCIT cLE PARLEMENT ACCORBA AUSSITOT SON APPUI A CETTE MESURE GOVTL,PAR UN VOTE BE 2 9 0 VOIX CONTRE 16.SEL0N LES TERMES BE LA LOI BES MESURES BE GUERRE,LE GOVT A LE POUVOIR DE FAIRE LES ARRETES ET REGLEMENTS QUIL PEUT JUGER NECESSAIRES OU OPPORTUNS POUR LA SECURITE,LA 1EFENSE,LA PAIX,L0RBRE ET LE BIEN-ETRE BU CBAfSES POUVOIRS SETENBENT A LARRESTATIQN ,LA BETENTION LEXPULSION, LE CONTROLE BES TRANSPQRTS.DU COMMERCE AUSSI BIEN QUA LA CENSURE, LA SUPPRESSION BES PUBLICATIQNS,LE CONTROLE BES COMMUNICATIONS, LA PRISE BE POSSESSION ET LA CONFISCATION BES B I E N S , E T C . . . 7-.EN OCT BERNIER,LORSQUIL SE TOURNA VERS CETTE LOI POUR LUTTER CONTRE LA MENACE BU-FLQ,IE GOVT NUTILISA QUUNE FRACTION BES POUVOIRS 1ISPOBIBLES.LA VIE NORMALE BU PAYS NEN FUT GUERE AFFECTEE., SEUL LE FLQ SE TROUVA VRAIMENT CONTRE PAR LES REGLEMENTS QUABOPTA ALORS LE GOVT EN VERTU BE LA LOI BES MESURES BE GUERRE.LORGANISATION FUT BECLAREE ILLEGALEflL FUT INTERS IT BE LAIBER EN QUOI QUE CE SO IT.TOUT AGENT BE LA PAIX FUT AUTORISE A ARRETER SANS MANSAT LES PERSONNES SOUPCQNNEES BEN ETRE MEMBRES OU BE LAIBER BANS SES BESSEINS.LES ACTES FAVORISANT LINSURRECTION ETAIENT PASSIBLES BAMENBE POUVANT ATTEINBRE BLRS 5 B 000(FRANCS 27,000>DAMEN0E ET ©UN MAXIMUM BE CINQ ANS BE PRISON.(497 PERSONNES ONT ETE ARRETEES EN VERTU BE LA LOI SUR LES MESURES BE GUERREJ435 BESTRE ELLES ONT ETE • e• 6 �PAGE SIX FLA 101 CONFB RELACHEES ET 62 ONT ETE TRABUITES BEVANT LES TRIBUNAUX.)ON VOIT BONG LE CONTRASTE ENTRE LES POUVOIRS DISPONIBLES EN PRINCIPE ET CEUX,LIMITES,QUE LE GOVT SE PRGCURA.• So SUR LA PROPOSITION BU MINISTRE FEBERAL I E LA JUSTICE,LA CHAMBRE I E S COMMUNES A AB0PTE,LE 2BEC BERNIER,PAR 174 VOIX CONTRE 31,UNE LOI PREVOYANT BES POUVOIRS BURGENCE PROVISOIRESCLOI BE 1970 SUR LORBRE PUBLIOQUI ETAIT APPELEE A REMPLACER LES REGLEMENTS PRECEBEMMENT ABOPTES SOUS LA LOI SUR LES MESURES BE GUERRE.LA LOI SUR LORBRE PUBLIC QUI TEMPERA IT LA RIGUEUR BES BISPOSITIONS BES REGLEMENTS, NOTAMMENT EN CE QUI CONCERNE LES CRITERES BE LAPPARTENANCE A LASSN ILLEGALE ET LA BUREE BE LA BETENTION SANS MANBAT QUI PASSAIT BUN MAXIMUM BE VINGT-ET-UN JOURS A UN MAXIMUM BE SEPT JOURS.LA LOI ETAIT APPLICABLE JUSQUAU 30AVR.SA BUREE ©APPLICATION POUVAIT ETRE REiUITE PAR UNE PROCLAMATION BU GOVT FEBERAL(NOTAMMENT A LA BEMANDE BU GOVT BU QUEBEC) MA IS ELLE NE POUVAIT ETRE PROLGNGEE QUE PAR UN VOTE BU PARLEMENT FEBERAL. 9 . INCIBEMMENT,CERTAINES FAUSSES CONCEPTIONS QUI ©NT CIRCULE SUR LA PERIOBE BAPPLICATION BE CETTE LOI GAGNERAIENT A ETRE CORRIGEES. 10.ON A BIT QUE LES TROUPES BES FORCES ARMEES CBNNES ONT ETE BEPLOYEES EN VERTU BE LA LOI DES MESURES BE GUERRE ET UTILISEES POUR FAIRE RESPECTER CETTE LOI.EN F A I T , I L FAUT NOTER QUE LES TROUPES,EN MAJORITE BE LANGUE FRANCAISE,ONE ETE BEPLOYEES A LA SEMANBE BU GOVT DU QUEBEC ET EN APPUI A LAUTORITE CIVILE AVANT MEME QUE LA LOI I E S MESURES 001839 �PAGE SEPT FLA 101 CONFB BE GUERRE SOIT INVOQUEE ET SIMPLEMENT EN VERTU DES LOIS ORBINAIRES I U PAYS.CES TROUPES FURENT AFFECTES A LA PROTECTION BE PERSONNES, BEBIFIGES PUBLICS ET ©INSTALLATIONS,VITALES ET AUX AUTRES BESOINS BU GOVT BU QUEBEC.LEXPERIEHCE BES FORCES ARMEES CBNNES BANS LES OPERATIONS BU MAINTIEN BE LA PAIX LES AVAIT BA.ILLEURS BIEN PREPAREES POUR UN TEL ROLE.GN NA RAPPORTE AUCUN INCIDENT OU UN SOLBAT AURAIT MALHEHE UN C I V I L I A N S BE TELLES CONDITIONS,PARLER DUNE OCCUPATION MILITAIRE BU QUEBEC RELEVERAIT BE LA PLUS HAUTE FANTAISIE. 1LBAUTRE PART,CERTAINS ONT CRU QUE LES CDNS SE TRGUVAIENT SOUS LA LOI MARTIALE.CETTE IDEE EST CONTRAIRE AUX FAITS ET RESULTE BUNE C0NFUSI8B ENTRE LOI MARTIALE ET LOI BES MESURES DE GUERRE.LA LOI x MARTIALE,AURAIT EfJTRAlNE LA SUSPENSION BE LOIS REGULIERES ET REMIS LA POUVOIR AUX MAINS BES MILITAIRES.RIEN BE TEL NE SAIT PRODUIT AU COURS BES EVENEMENTS ©OCT. 12.PARA SUR PEINE CAPITALE SAJQUTER QUOTE TRAHISON,PIRATERIE,."..UNQUOTE APRES GARBIENS BE PRISQN*AUCUN AUTRE CHANGEMENT. 012358Z 001840 �hfpRxty^ 0 tkt ssu) \&$/ OFLIZIS -faT NOT U%BT) Ottawa, March 4 , 1971 Z?o- &-W-1 Chief, Parliamentary Siquiries and Co-ordination Division, Office of th© President of the Privy Council, Room 1710, 130 Albert Street,' Ottawa. Via enclose ten copies in English and ten in French of the Department of External •Affairs'reply to Question No. 36I asked by Mr. Fortin in the House of Coaanona on December 7 last. Tours sincerely, J. D. Derksen Departmental Assistant 001841 �OX', yd'' b a. PDM. ., P A R L . S E C . A ' A ' F - P - '* . • ; . . . ' a- PDS a - ' M I N ( M r . T a y l o r ) '•;•'•' -••''•; ...• F P R bKLN(Mr.Vincent) . M E M O R A N D U M .V •i'.; ;: FROM TKE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS . ' TO: PDM (Mr.Bild) "; December 9, 1970 (shared). Your attention is drawn to a question relating to this Department that has been asked in the House of Commons.'. This is Question: ,'p '•'•'- " No. 3°1 asked by Orders of the Day No. Fl M. Fortin Date W ^ [ Dec.7 ,;,\b Page k-9 For your ready reference a copy of the text is attached. 20 Please undertake the preparation of a reply on Form 7530-21-029-1168, in consultation with other Divisions or other Departments as necessary, and in accordance with Mr. McGillvs •' . memorandum of October 29, 1969. JL_ copies in English marked Translation 5 copies in French marked Text are required in addition to copies for MIN,'PDM, PDS, Parliamentary Secretary and FPR.b (Do not show the distribution on copies for Tabling in the House).-. A. G. Vincent Departmental Assistant Room 274 East Block - 6-L140 001842 �QUESTION NO. 361 J1. Quel a 6te le cout des mesures prises a l^occasion de b'b 1»enlevement du ministre Laporte et du diplomate Cross? b 2. A-t-cn analyse les repercussions economiques de ces evenements et, dans l'affirmative, quelles sont-elles? . 3. Quelles mesures Ie gouvernement entend-il prendre pour eviter que des evenements semblables no se reproduisent? TRANSLATION X 7 1. Vrnat was the cost of measures taken when Messrs. Laporte and Cross were kidnapped? ''•'•..,. , •. -e '".;'•. 2. Has there been an analysis of the economic effects of. ; ; b those-> events and, if so, what are they? bj ; 3. 'What measures is the government considering to avoid '._,.'. .••; a repetition of events of this nature? : • ' •"'. "2- • ••' .' i j i i f 001843 �u V.P FPR INQUIRY OF MIN DEMANDE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS AU GOUVERNEMENT mmSi • A^£XX> CANADA PREPARE 10 COPIES IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH MARKED " T E X T " ANL< "TRANSLATION" PREPARER 10 COPIES EN ANGLAIS ET FRANCAIS INSCRIVANT " T E X T E " ET "TRADUCTION" QUESTION NO. BY - MIN (Mr.Derk3en 361 DE Mr. F o r t i n ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS ft OROEJRS OF T rl f£ D A V NO F E U I L L E T O N CT O S O O E DU J O U R N ° SUBJECT T SUJET DATE AX. PAGE L9 December 7, 1970 R E P L Y BY T H E S E C R E T A R Y OF S T A T E F O R E X T E R N A L A F F A I R S REPONSE PAR LE S E C R E T A I R E D ' E T A T - A U X A F F A I R E S E X T E K I E U R E ORIGINAL • SIGN! PAR1. r MITCHELL SHARP. SIGNATURE M I N I S T E R OR P A R L I A M E N T A R Y S E C R E T A R Y M I N I S T R E OU S E C R E T A I R E P A R L E M E N T A I R E QUESTION 1. What was the cost of measures taken when Messrs. Laporte and Cross were kidnapped? Has there been an analysis of the economic effects of those events and, if so, what are they? What measures is the government considering to avoid a repetition of events of this nature? A* R E P L Y -RESPONSE TEXT, r - j TFXTE 1X..J TRANSLATION f"""| TRADUCTION I In so far as the Department of External Affairs is concerned, the reply is as follows: .( • 1. The measures taken at the time of the kidnapping of Messrs. Cross and Laporte entailed expenses estimated at $171,869. 2. N/A 3. The protection of foreign diplomats is one of the Government's responsibilities under international law. In carrying out this responsibility, a continuous effort is made to ensure that tho protective measures taken are effective. The means available to the Government are under constant review in the light of any probable threats to which foreign diplomats might be exposed. Whatever measures are taken, they rely essentially on an efficient system of law enforcement which enjoys the general support of the public. 7538-21-029-1168 At r 001844 J �x'7UU\J FPR ' *©LteiDerk 3 en INQUIRY OF MINISTRY ^mm-u DEMANDE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS AU GOUVERNEMENT •'PRfP-AR.E PREPARER QUESTION NO. 10 COPiTS IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH MARKED " T E X T " AND " T R A N S L A T I O N " 10 COPIES EN ANGLAIS ET. FRANC.AIS INSCRIVANT . " T E X T E " ET " T R A D U C T I O N " 361 . : "BY"~FE : it.._ Torlin.... OATE ' R O U T I N E P HOC Ef.Ll I N '.", 5 6 O R D E R S C F J M ' I . tt t.r. <IQf FEUILLlJTO'J £T.ORO U'SUBJECT "JU JOUR N" - . SUJET : I 1 -4..L. |PAGE JLe_7_dAxiBmbre_137oJ —49R E P L V B Y T H E S t C R f T AR v F ST AT E F OR E X T E R N A L 0 REPONSE PAR LE SFCRETA R f O ' E T A T ORIGINAL SIGNE PART > AUX A F F A I R E S A F FA IRS EXTERIEURE! MSICHEU. SHARP- i SIGNATURE M I N I S T E R OR P A R L / M £ f , T * R Y S E C R E T A R Y M I N I S T R E OU S E C R E T A I R E P AR L E M E N T Al R E QUESTION 1. Quel a ete le cout des. mesures prises & I'occasion de *lf enlevement du. ministre Laporte et du diplomate. Cross? 2. A-t-on analyse les repercussions economiques.de ces evenements et, dans 1•affirmative, quelles sont-elles? . 3. Quelles mesures le gouvernement entend-il prendre pour eviter que des evenements semblables. ne se reproduisent? REPLY - REPONSE TE»T TE*TE I 1 L.J...I . .TRANSLATION TRADUCTION En ce qui concerne le Ministere des Affaires ext6rieures, la reponse "est la suivante: 1. Les mesures prises a I'occasion des enlevements de MM. Cro33 et Laporte ont entraine des depenses eyalu6es a $171,869. 2. N.A. , • A . x . l , 3. ' < - • 2 . -• • L'a protection des diplomates etrangers est une des responsabilites du gouvernement selon le droit international. Dans l'ex^cution de cette responsabilite, il y a un effort continuel d'assurer que soient prises des mesures de protection qui sont efficaces. Les moyens a la portee du gouvernement font 1»objet d'un reexaraen constant, tenant compte de toutes menaces probables auxquelles les diplomates au Canada pourraient dtre exposes. Quelles que soient les mesures prises, elles reposent essentiellement sur un systhme d'ordre public efficace qui a l'appui de .la population en general. ' .!• t—f L™ �R E S T R I C T E D cc J,-W-TF^fff FM LDN 1125 APR2/71 TO OTT EXT PSI DISTR FPR FCP — -ROLE OF PRESS AND BROADCASTING % IN FLQ C R I S I S H SOREF,CONSERVATIVE BACK BENCH MP WISHES TO KNOW WHETHER AND IN WHAT FORM,VOLUNTARY OR OTHERWISE,RESTRAINT WAS URGED OR IMPOSED UPON PRESS,RADIO AND TV IN THEIR REPORTING OF FLQ CRISIS.THERE IS TO. BE DEBATE ON BROADCAST ING' IN H OF C LATER IN MONTH AND .'.1GS OF PARLIAMENTARY CTTEE ON BROADCASTING OF WHICH SOREF IS MEMBER. GRATEFUL FOR ANY INFO WHICH WE CAN PASS TO SOREF EITHER AS ORAL BACKGROUND OR IN WRITTEN FORM. 021534Z 001846 * I �PSI/P.A.E. Johnston/cmd H EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES A MEMORANDUM SECURITY TO A CONFIDENTIAL Securile ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION PDS PDF FCP GWU X'l DATE A March 1 1 , 1971. NUMBER Numerot REFERENCE Reference SUBJECT Sujef .11 ^ ' FROM De a PSI- ^.. V^ AL) ri Paul Rose's Alleged Statement We have some comments from, the RCMP on the statement attributed to Rose by the prosecution and published in the March 9 issue of The Gazette. 2. The RCMP confirm that they had not been made aware of the contents of the statement until it was read into the record at the trial on March 8. Their comment was that the statement was "held close to the chest by Homicide as evidence". They added that the reference in the statement to the "American James Le Cou" or de Cou (Consul in Montreal) was the first indication they had seen of any FLQ intention to kidnap de Cou. 3. I have given the above information to the US Embassy. 4. I have also discussed with the RCMP the remark in the statement that "We were going (to Texas) to pick up funds for the FLQ". Inspector Ferraris is reasonably confident that the trip to Texas was primarily for the purpose of buying arms, which Rose evidently felt was easier to do in Dallas than anywhere else. Ferraris said that by tracing the issue of travellers cheques used by the group the RCMP have been able to get a fairly clear idea of the group's itinerary through the US and of the money they had available. He informed me that on the conclusion of the trip, and after the purchase of an M-l rifle, the group had no money left. Ferraris feels fairly safe in concluding that the group got no money in the US, although they may have had a vague intention of obtaining some by robbery or a hold-up. 5. Ferraris expressed the belief that at least parts of the statement attributed to Rose were deliberately misleading and he was reluctant to speculate, on the basis of the statement, about the possibility that CosetteTrudel, or Seguin, had played a more importaiytr>onj!p than we had hitherto thought. E.R. Rettie, ity and Intelligence Liaison Division. Ext. 407A/BH. 001847 13 . 3'JO/JS\ �PSI/P.A.E. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS * TO A ^*f** fe V L, Lu, 1 Ji,w * £ « ( • / ^ J j g ^ 4 - S E c u R (/ V (FA I T Y RESTRICTED S6curile DATE JAJ/J/9 0 / yflx/Ll fMVfScW f f W l J PSI REFERENCE Reference AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES MEMORANDUM FCPJFPR FROM De Johnston/cmd April 5, 1971. NUMBER /? Attached copy of London telegram 1125 of April 2 FSI _ ^ ^ - /X 7J DOSSIER "qmwA SUBJECT Su/'ef Role of Press and broadcasting in FLQ Crisis. 7 ENCLOSURES Annexes cc QL&- Ja-lTk'- fd iy we have your advice please on the nature of the - 1 DISTRIBUTION /MISSION reply to be jfade to London*s telegram of April 2. ttie, .R d Intelligence curity Liais >n Division. ^TtiALXe^ALd- 7*~ u*wU-v fl-vL,>^4v*%*. . cr- , A J / « I Cxe-ft^vC^^SC /r( , • o^ yu-AAL - • - - * ^ * / ' &-v-i""""" T ^ r y/L*y«,-<Z<^-i«- «-3 I—W \^_«. ( A ^ ^ C |^-J>. C Ext. Wh-Ax«7sLj? feuvt /\*^O >{J * ^/W<r&^l*„ , . / ^ o Gk*--l^ 407A/BH. <001848 �I GLA/O.W. D i e r / r e MEMORANDUM RESTRICTED PPR December 17, 1970 GLA Cuban Trade Office, Mantreal'- Attempted Police Seareh PDM (fiFTTSld) Havana As you are aware, the Cuban Ambassador, Dr. Jose" Fernandess de Cossio, was called in by the Under-Secretary during the afternoon of December 16 as a result of the Ambassador's report earlier in the day that two police officers had entered the office of the Cuban .e Trade Commissioner in Montreal with the stated intent of searching the premises. Mr. Ritchie expressed regrets that this incident had occurred, but drew to the attention of the Ambassador the fact that a general search was being carried out in that area of Montreal by Montreal City Police and Quebee Provincial Police. The Cuban trade Commissioner's office, located at 3737 boulevard Metropolitain, Suite 1200, Ville St-Michel, is situated in an office building and therefore the officers concerned apparently were merely carrying out their instructions to investigate all offices. 2. The Ambassador confirmed that the report he had reeeived indicated that the two officers, one from each of the forces involved, did not proceed into the office past the public counter. He also confirmed that they were polite and that their conduct waa in no way offensive. When asked to identify themselves, they did so readily and sought information from higher authority. When this was reeeived, they departed without further discussion. Ambassador de Cossio said he fully understood the circumstances and normally would not have made an approach to the Dspartment over such a minor incident. However, in the light of recent events, he thought he should bring this to our attention and expressed his deep appreciation for the fact that the Under-Secretary had called him in eo pron$>tly to explain the matter in full. 3. For the record, it should be mentioned that during the same call Mr. Ritchie handed over the original of Prime Minister Trudeau's letter to Prime Minister Castro expressing the Canadian Government's appreciation for Cuba's co-operation during the Cross affair. Ambassador de Cossio was obviously pleased that this channel of communication had been chosen* ©RMdko w. $£& 0. ¥. Dier, Latin American Division. 001849 �•7--V*t,y-«i»MEW>*- P '£. 3 % ^ ^f2z^ / « 1\ \ "' ACTION COPY yF./AA xA S E C R E T ^^ z f AT? ^27^. AXAAFA^ ^ _ _ ^ ^ ^ L A^AfAFF y ^ FM HAVAN 343 A PR 6 / 7 1 ^ ^ y ^ A " ~ ' 7 &~~&. tAA^ ^~,A ^ ^ - Z ^ -F/F p ft C TO OTT EXT P S I IMMED _ ^ £v^. ^ ^ L / <*T cTyF^A ?fc * INFO WSHDC TT BERN LDN RCMPOTT<SAND1)DE OTT </^ & ^-~*~A. &^ ' 0, A F /) epFAisidPZFTjg A , c si \ REF OURTEL 319 KAR2 9 /A, ^ ' 7AV/ i k , <bZ0~ 2^-TFK-l - — FLQ KIDNAPPERS ^ y^7 *%f7 THERE I S SOME SUGGESTION THAT ONE OR MORE OF KIDNAPPERS MAY LEAVE TOMORROW WED APR7 ON AEROFLOT FLT TO ALGIERS.WE WILL ATTEMPT TO 77 CONFIRM. 061930Z A yj «i tzT un{i~ f*. A S'A^'' JA /? f ry barf sc xZZ^ rp « 7A-*\£/ys w Afe fAA a;'. r <r Vd A. i 001850 �file Diary c^_ © I T , diary K<A / *• Ovesrs / m CONFIDENTIAL H*&» (lop&fcteome lo 11 fevrier 1971. Ravisssors de Croaa - Depart de Cuba. Voiol quelques qoaaideVations juridiques en reponse aux questions eoulevees por le depart pmstenda dos ravisseurs de M. Cross de Gobs poor l'Alg&riei A) & & Bn carojet d'entente pour l'acoaeil des raviaaeors do CSross a 4%i envoys' I notre ambasaade do lc Havane, l e 16 octobre 1970, ( t e l . FLE1473 ei-Joint). Co texte ae fut jamais remis aux autorites eubainea» En f a i t , I'anbassadeur, agissant sur instructions, avait d^ja traits oe sujet verbaleaeat aveo lo Ministere d@3 Affaires etra^erea) & oo {assent, son interlooutear avait pria des notes do la conversation. Ces notes stablest avoir 6t& aocoptee par le ministre des Affaires etrangeres ot copie en fbt remise & 1'ambassadeur* Cos notes const!- i tuent dono la seule base do notre entente avee Cute (oopie cl-Joint) | Voua noteres quo oette"entente "eontlent une reserve quant aux aotlvltes politiques des ravisseurs a Cute (art. 3) mala aucune restriction quant a lears d^plaoemento futurss elles n'exdueat pas noa plus la possibility d'ano demande d'extradition oa de poursuites or!-* nlnelles an Canada. Poor lo Bonoat, et toutes considerations politiques mises do c£t£, i l appart que l e Oouvernenent canadien a ohaxtp libra pour rtSolsmer l*extradltlon dee ravisseurs* soit do Oaba ou de tout astro pays avee leqsal lo Canada a ua traits d'extradition. foam avons on traite d»extradition aveo Cuba, asoorti cependant d'ano clause d'exeeptloa pour d^llt politique. Aa eas oft les ravisseurs so troaveraient on se rendreient en Algerie,^ la question de 1—acLeaetradltlon se pose. Jfous n*avons pas do trait* d'extradition avee I'Algerie. 21 reste done & savoir s i notre traits avee la Franco s'etend a I'Algerie. La reponse eat son. '=^~ • . . / 2 001851 �- a Alors qpe la plupart des nouveaux Stats ont aeeept£ une certaine eoeare de eueeeselen sax tralt^a de la pulssanee ooloniaatrioe, I'Algerie a, en ooopagnie d'Xerael et la Ifaute-Volta, rejete la theorie de succession. I'Algerie a fondtf son attitude ear l'iUieite' de l'occupation militaire frangaise. Toutofoie, pour eertains traltea de naturetaunanltaireou d'interSt general, I'Algerie a snoopta* la eucoeseionj dans ees oaa, elle a 6ais une declaration partioullere de continuity, Et B&O si l'on voulalt considerer I'Algerie auooesseur de la Frartee, notre traite* dtextmditlon avee la Franee serait sans effet. L'Alg&rie et&it, avant een independence, an departenent francais, et non una oolonlet Inn traltea francais as s'y e'tendaient paa eens une stipulation expressa, a^ne s i le terri* toire faisait effiniellenent partie de la France a^tropolitaine. Sur cn point, la pratique frangsise differs de la pratique britannique <pi ^tendalt les trail s 4m l'etat annexant a l'etat anaex6« o) tinman fmm^iwxa tX u'exiate paa d'engageaent eerlt ou m§m verbal assurant aax ravisseurs am insanity de poursuite. A Ls Ooavernsnent oanadien a dono aains libres pour les aettre en oosasatloa, lee tra&ire en justice s'ils rentrent eu Canada ou redaner leur extradition d'an paya 114 aa Canada par traite". D) gntBrMten <to aiim Xes arises d'enleVeaent eu de sequestration, de sedition, ne sont pas pros* orlptibles. far contro, la tranison (recours a* la violence pour operer un ehaagenent de goovernenent) dolt ftre pourauivi dana — les trois ans de l 1 Infraction (art* 48, Code oriainol). ** KB autant que je saebe, aucune eeeusation n'a enoore et£ portee devant les j trlbumnx eanadiens contre lea ravisseurs. I S) ^W n^^if*- (see page 3) JettalBllAfi tee ravisseurs FLQ peuvent etre mis en accusation en n'laporte quel tenps per le prooureur general de la Provlnee de Qs^bee (lieu des erlaee). 9ns deaande d'extradition est plus difficile soit puree que none ne possedons pea de traits avee le pays ooneernd, soit pares que, dans la plupart dee eas, lea traltes d'extradition aeatiennent ans olause d'exception peur d«Sl i t politique qae peat luvoquer le Qouverneaent qui regoit la reqnSte d'extradition* 8a autant que les raviaeeura demeurent tranquillesent a 1'etranger et one le Oouvernoeent oanadien ne reeherehe pas leur extradition, una alee en aeouaation aa Canada ne servirait auoune fin jurldlqua. 3a Deeera 001852 �#»• . ' *••>'*' "- '*> xJi-*y m. J <• It appears that the tern "political offence" can be used to describe aay erlainal aet eosaaittod to serve a political purpose, the neaning can be mads narrower by liai^dCing it to offences arising out of political disturbances ratber than enaoapaosing all acts against tbe state suoh as assassination of a leader* However, there is general reluctance to impose any limitation on the right of the state being requested to extradite to interprete the word "political* as it sees fit. 2. According to Laforost (1), to fall within the tora political offence, the aot charged aust have been eosaltted as an incident or in furtherance ef a political end. Zhere is only one Canadian case on tho subjectt in Be Federeako (1910-20 Nanltoba law Report, p. 222), in vhioh the Court denied that the Border of a tsarlet policeman by a revolutionary was a political offence beeause lt did not occur in the circusstaneea of an uprising. Inforest seeas to think this decision was not justified. 3* Lauterpacht (2) reports four categories of political offences» a) those ooaaitted f*oa a political motive) b ) all those ecewitted for a political purpose) e) those oojaaitted both froxa a politio.91 aotive and at the aaae time for a political purpose} d) certain offences against the state only, such as high treason, lose* najaatl, and the like* Be reports a ease (3) where extradition was granted when a surder was an aet of revenge, possibly arising out of a political motive but not eottiaittod with a VTIOW to achieve a political object. This latter distinction appears to be about the only ground on which the interpretation of political offence eight be contested* (2) Ofpenheias, International Law, 8th Ed. Vol. 1, p. 707. 0) Qppenheina, International law, dth Ed. Vol. 1, p. 707 footnote 2. 001853 �3ECRLT File: 20-22-TJK-7-CUBA 1. - At this moment, it is impossible to foretell the results of the 'J.il offer made by the Prime Minister of Quebec and of the negotiations which are made with the representative of the FLQ. Nevertheless, the matter is being dealt with with the Cuban authorities so that they may be prepared in the event thnt the kidnappers quickly agree to the demand . 2. - In the negotiations with the kidnappers, a safe-con du ct would involve the following points: 1° the.,,Government of Canada, would submit to the Government of Cuba all the information which it possesses with respect to the kidnappers either directly or through Interpol. There would be approximately 25 kidnappers with some of the wives and children of the kidnappers. Would the Cuban authorities see any problem in the number of kidnappers? Would they see any problem in receiving their wives and children? (Note - There is a "No" opposite both questions.) 2° The Government of Canada would publish the agreement to be reached with the kidnappers and the arrangements made. . . . The ' 2 �- 2 - Government of Canada would propose that the kidnappers, accompanied by their hostages, proceed to the Cuban Consulate in Montreal. The police would supervise tree access to the offi- ces. Would the Cuban Government be in agreement with these proposals? In this case, would they inform their representa- tives in Montreal of the role which probably they will have to play in this matter? It is possible that some of these measures may be carried out by the Feed Cross. In the event that the Cuban offices are not used, it is possible that location can be used at the airport. The Government of Canada would prefer to use the local of the Cuban Consulate because this would simplify and expedite the process. 3° The Government of Canada suggests that upon arrival at the offices of the Cuban Consulate in Montreal, the kidnappers deliver Mr. Cross and Mr. Laporte to the Cuban representative, leaving them under his custody. The kidnappers also would deliver their arms to the Cuban representatives. The wives and children would also go to the Cuban Consulate. Would the Cuban Government be in agreement with these propositions? 4° The Government of Canada would propose that the kidnappers and their families proceed from the Cuban Consulate to the airport in Canadian military vehicles. Once there, they would be carried to an airplane which would proceed to Cubs. The Government of Canada proposes that a minimum of Canadian officials and probably a representative of Cuba accompany the kidnappers and their families to Cuba. 001855 �- 3 - Everyone in the airplane would be disarmed with the exception of the Canadian security officials who would be charged with maintaining order. This latter point would be essential from the point of view of the Canadian Government. 5° The aircraft to be used would be Canadian. 6° Upon the arrival of the kidnappers to Cuba, the Cuban Government would authorize its representative in Montreal to hand over Mr. Cross and Mr. Laporte to the Canadian authorities and would permit the aircraft and its crew to return to Canada. Would the Cuban Governnent accept these propositions? 7° The group would be issued a collective travel certificate with photograph of every person. The families would receive ordinary Canadian passports. 8° The Government of Canada would suggest to the Government of Cuba that the kidnappers be received on the basis of a "humanitarian act requested by the Government of Canada". Taking into account the good relations which exist between Canada and Cuba, the I Governnent of Canada would expect to receive guarantees with relation to the political activities of the kidnappers with a view to prevent actions which would result prejudicial to the relations between Canada and Cuba. 001856 �FLA / J . Demers / mm A f^ EXTERNAL AFFAIRS T )x AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES SiTY K^DF.GWL.GAP.FCF.FCP.PSI.BERNE.HAVANA *FLA CONFIDENTIEL Le 8 a v r i l 1971. Q *)to a NUMBER Numero ™ » E Memoire PSI-1306 du 8 avril 1971. FILE SUBJECT Su/e ' a Ravisseuis du FLQ Depart de Cuba. DOSSIER OTTAWA MISSION ENCLOSURES Annexes AO-ATL-TFA-J DISTRIBUTION Nous vous transmettons ci-joint une etude preparee dans notre Direction en prevision de 1'eventualite qui semble actuellement se realiser, le depart pour Alger des ravisseurs du FLQ. Nous croyons avoir couvert la plupart des questions d1ordre juridique que cette nouvelle situation est susceptible de soulever. FLP ion des Consultati juridiques A A< FFA 7<yAA p Ext. 407A/BII. \ 27s^ >"> f/Q01857 Ad-Jo/X �f FLA / J . Demers / mm EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO A PDM FROM Oe FLA REFERENCE KSfirance SUBJECT Sujel A (M. B i l d ) AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES i% SECURITY StcurM SANS COTE DATE Le 21 avril 1971. •NUMBER Numiro Telegramme de Londres 1125 du 2 avril 1971 & memoire PSI-1275 du 15 avril 1971. DOSSIER OTTAWA Role de la presse et de la radio dans la crise FLQ MISSIONl c&- ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION aa-TFK~i cTZo -A*L2TFK-~jd Aux f i n s de votre reponse au telegramme en rubrique, nous avons consulte l e Ministere de l a J u s t i c e ; i l appert que l e s Reglements sur I ' o r d r e public (1970) e t a b l i s en vertu de l a Loi sur l e s mesures de guerre et l a Loi sur I ' o r d r e public (mesures temporaires) 1970 ont eu un c e r t a i n effet de contrainte sur l e s media d'information. 2. Ainsi, les Reglements stipulaient a 1'article W* "Une personne qui communique des declarations pour le compte de l'association illegale ou a titre de representant reel ou declare de celle-ci, est coupable d'un acte criminel et passible d'un emprisonnement de cinq ans ou plus." FCP FPR PSI L'application de 1'article U aux media d'information (journaux, presse, T.V. decoule des definitions suivantes que donnent les Reglements pour les termes "communiquer" et "declarations" (art. 2 ) : Communiquer: "comprend l'action de communiquer par telephone, radiodiffusion ou autres moyens de communication visuelle ou sonore;" Declaration: "Comprend les mots paries ou ecrits enregistres par des moyens electroniques ou electromagnetiques ou autrement, et les gestes, les signes ou autres representations visibles;" 3. Ia loi sur I'ordre public (1970) contient des dispositions identiques qui se retrouvent a 1'article 4- c) et 2, respectivement. Direction des Consultations juridiques. Ext. 407A/BU. (Admin. Services Div.) 001858 * / • ¥• H/os) �FLA / J . Demers / mm GA (As EXTERNAL AFFAIRS Jf P#M PDF GWL GAP FCF FCP P S I BERNE FROM De FLA E f Notre memoire du 8 a v r i l 1971. AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES SECURITY Sieurlti SECRET DATE Le 16 avril 1971. NUMBER Numiro PILE OTTAWA S!fECT DOSSIER $ZF7 Ravisseurs du FLQ - Depart de Cuba ISSIOIfc^ ENCLOSURES Annexes '^0^-A77-[ DISTRIBUTION Pour f a i r e suite au memoire en rubrique, v e u i l l e z trouver c i - j o i n t une traduction des notes d'entente avec Cuba mentionnees dans l e deuxieme paragraphe de I ' e t u d e que nous vous transmettions l e 8 a v r i l . Direction des Consultations juridiques Vf3 Ext. 407A/Bil. (Admin. Services Div.) 001859 d.f. A-AAS) �L<x f 4£ PLACE DEPARTMENT ORIG. NO. LIEU MINISTERE N ° O'ORIO. 1 EXT OTT FM/DE '- C5 A ESSAGE PDM-/f/ DATE APR26/7 L /! SECURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER \k2o-22-TrkA~ ec- Ab-M-dfWd> 1 RESTRICTED ^ PRECEDENCE ) LDN TO/A {JfFs \ SO INFO CO fTI Ci ~,o O -i •v tr o JS. PST DISTR. p» o 3? ,— .'!», P FPR FOP FLA YOURTEL 1125;'APR2/71 ROLE OF PRESS AND BROADCASTING IN FLQ CRISIS SUB/SUJ IN REPLY TO SOREF YOU MAY WISH TO POINT OUT THERE EXISTS IN CDA NO/NO QUOTE D UNQUOTE NOTICE SYSTEM SIMILAR TO THAT IN BRIT. PUBLIC ORDER REGULATIONS (1970) ENACTED UNDER WAR MEASURES ACT (AND SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC ORDER ACT) PROVIDED \ UNDER ARTICLE 4 AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE A PERSON WHO COMMUNICATES STATEMENTS ON BEHALF OF OR AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR PROFESSED REP OF THE UNLAWFUL ASSOCIATION IS GUILTY OF AN INDICTABLE OFFENCE AND LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT FOR A TERM NOT/NOT EXCEEDING FIVE YEARS UNQUOTE. 2. \ UNDER ARTICLE 2 QUOTE COMMUNICATE UNQUOTE WAS DEFINED AS INCLUDING QUOTE THE ACT OF COMMUNICATING BY TELEPHONE, BROADCASTING OR OTHER AUDIBLE OR VISUAL MEANS; UNQUOTE. QUOTE STATEMENTS UNQUOTE WAS DEFINED AS INCLUDING QUOTE WORDS SPOKEN OR WRITTEN OR RECORDED ELECTRONICALLY OR \ ELECTROMAGNETICALLY §R OTHERWISE AND GESTURES, SIGNS DRAFTER/REDACTEUR Ol VISION/DIRECTION CENTRAL STAFF F . BILD/rb EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/701 6-2363 • * •*2. APPROVED/APPROUVE TELEPHONE SIG 001860 �- 2— RESTRICTED OR OTHER VISIBLE REPRESENTATIONS; UNQUOTE. THESE DEFINI- TIONS WERE OBVIOUSLY MEANT TO INDICATE TYPE OF RESTRAINT TO BE EXERCISED ON FLQ PROPAGANDA. IT CAN BE INFERRED THEREFORE THAT THESE REGULATIONS (IDENTICAL UNDER WAR MEASURES ACT AND PUBLIC ORDER ACT) HAD A CERTAIN RESTRAINING EFFECT UPON MASS MEDIA. �AFP/W.M. A(mS/eh EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO X AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES Central Staff - Mr. J.H. Taylor FROM De S T * CONFIDENTIAL DATE April 27, 1971 AFP - Finance & Administration Branch Numero REFERENCE RSfirance DOSSIER SUBJECT sujei Cost of protection of missions abroad during the crisis of October 1970. ENCLOSURES Annexei MISSION A@£ As a result of the October 1970 crisis, this Bureau DISTRIBUTION authorized expenditures at posts abroad, for the hiring of guards in London, New York and Geneva totalling $3,735. The use of these guards was discontinued towards the end of December 1970. We are not aware in this Bureau of any other expenditure directed related to the October crisis. Wrfr; /Agnes Area Comptroller Ext. 407A/BU. (Admin. Services Div.) 001862 j �AFP/W.M. AgnesAg EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES TO A Mr. Taylor - MIN FROM De AFP - Bureau of Finance and Administration Branch kfftrence REFERENCE °^T memorandum o f A p r i l 2 7 , 1 9 7 1 SUBJECT Cost of p e r s o n n e l p r o t e c t i o n SECURITY SScurile CONFIDENTIAL DATE April 27, 1971 NUMBER Numero FTAWA Sujel ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION Although they are not directly related to the October, 1970 crisis, the following figures might be of interest to the UnderSecretary. As you will see they cover the cost of protection of Canadian personnel in various countries against mugging, theft, burglaries mostly in South and Central America, in Africa and in Southeast Asia. The expenditures were incurred for the hiring of guards and watchmen, the installation of protective devices such as locks, bars and grills or intercom systems in staff accommodation and official residences. 2. in 1970/71, the total expenditures for this purpose was $85,000, while post budgets for 1971/72 include a total of $127,445 under this heading. 3. The following breakdown gives an indication of the cost by geographical areas: - Caribbean Africa & Middle East Asia & Pacific Europe Latin & Central America United States TOTAL $ 56,090. $ 26,366. 1 18,605. 1 17,965. $ 7,994. f 425. $127,445. 4. Finally, there is the special case of protection of personnel against threats of abduction for political motives. Following the assassination of Ambassador Von Spretti in April 1970, special measures were taken by the Department for the protection of Heads of post in Rio, Guatemala and later in Addis Ababa. These included the hiring of guards and the supply of special equipment such as two-way radio equipment, intrusion detection systems, armour-plating of official vehicles, special mirrors a.nd tires, bullet-proof jackets as well as reinforcement of physical defences at official residences (fencing, grills and extra lighting). The total expended to date on these special projects is just over $12,000. .2/ 07A/BM. 001863 �5. These figures reflect the increasing concern of the Department and of Heads of posts for the protection of Canadian personnel serving abroad. A comprehensive study of the nature and extent of the threat to personnel and of the protective measures which should be taken in now underway to enable the Department to formulate a policy and to take action as necessary. 4 I �FLC/EHGilmour/WHF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES % PfiM TMr. B±Td) TO SECRET SECURITY Sieurile FROM De FLC OAF ACQ. May 3 , 1971 DATE NUMBER Numiro REFERENCE Reference FILE SUBJECT Sujel FLQ Kidnappers DOSSIER t&2&o-z»-TFK-i ENCLOSURES Annexes FLA passed on to this Division for reply the enquiry which you had written by hand on PSI's memorandum of April 22 (copy attached). 2. It is not correct, as some press reports have alleged, that the issuing of warrants for the arrest of the Cross kidnappers will entail denial of all Canadian Embassy services to those concerned. It is, however, true that the eight individuals who were taken to Havana travel on a group travel document, do not have Canadian passports and were placed on Passport Control List No. 116 whereby notification was given to all posts that they could not be granted Canadian passports without prior authority from Ottawa. 3. It is to be observed that they would not be eligible for financial assistance for purposes of repatriation without authority from this Department and could not, in any event, be financially assisted to travel anywhere else. Those concerned would, however, be eligible for other consular services on their merits as Canadian citizens and the fact that there was a warrant out for their arrest would have no direct bearing on the matter. For instance, if any of them wished to register the birth of a Canadian child abroad, to have a document authenticated or to obtain advice concerning the procedure to be followed in such varied subjects as applying for a Certificate of Canadian Citizenship or dealing with problems relating to the death of a Canadian citiaen abroad, the Canadian Embassy in Havana should be ready to assist them in the same way as they would assist any other Canadian citizen abroad. UI Consular Division 001865 t, jf. {Tt f ^ / o v f ) �ACTION CO S E C R E T DE HAVAN 472 MA 16/71 " * ' "" ~"* A OTT EXT PSI |...c^^L.7*.-S^_rT ":^"" INFO TT RCMPOTTCSANDI) DE OTT j AA^ \ ^ ° ^ - \ \ if /\V DISTR GWL GWP FCP REF NOTRETEL 3 8 6 AVR5 - - - F L Q ? RAVISSEURS^ DE CROSS . A v ^ RGALLICE A l l TP.F DE nR LAMB ! AMR DE HP FRANCE NOUS A INFORME QUE TROIS INDIVIDUS ••••» — ••••^f H.HilWII I'** REPONDANT AU SIGNALEMENT DE LANCTOT,COSSETTE-TRUDEL ET SEGUIN SE SONT PRESENTES A LA CHANCELLERIE DE FRANCE POUR LIRE LE JOURNAL LE MONDE. 2.GALLICE NOUS A DIT QUE LES INDIVIDUS SE SONT PRESENTES COMME ETANT CIT DES ANGLAIS POUVANT SEXPRIMER EN FRANCAIS FINCIT.IL A AJOUTE QUIL AVAIT ETE SURPRIS CAR IL CROYAIT QUE LES RAVISSEURS AVAIENT QUITTE CUBA. 061635Z AtTdAy— Vi7~\ _ Ji l ^F 001866" �y - M*\ •77 ZJ CONF IDE NT IAL * ( \ FM OTT EXT FL0357 WAYll/71 TO HAVAN INFO JUSTICEOTT/SPRAGUE Copy to RCMR DISTR PSI FCO GWL REF YOURTEL 484 MAY10 OURTELS FL0347 MAY10 FL0342 MAY5 ;._ O P -^X-TFfc-/ \ -—TAKING OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE IN CUBA *;_^\TTU-TZ1--41 A PHONE REQUEST FROM LANDRYCFEDERAL DEPT OF JUSTICE REP MTL)PROMPTED OUR QUERY.LANDRY REQUESTED THIS INFO IN ORDER FOR CROWN TO USE AS ARGUMENT AGAINST DEFENCE LAWYERS REQUEST TO EXAMINE WITNESSES IN CUBAoJUDGE DECIDED IT WAS UP TO LAWYERS MAKING REQUEST TO PROVE THAT CUBAN AUTHORITIES WOULD CONSENT TO EXAMINING WITNESSES IN CUBA* 2..FOLLOWING FOR YOUR INFO IS MEMO TO SSEA OF MAYS! ON THIS MATTERS QUOTE MEMO FOR THE MINISTER REQUEST FOR INTERVENTION BY THE DEPT OF EXTER AFFAIRS IN CRIMINAL CASE RELATING TO CUBAN KIDNAPPERS DURING THE HEARING LAST FRI IN THE CASE OF THE CROWN-V-MORENCY, LANCTOT AND ROY WHICH IS BEING HEARD BEFORE MR JUSTICE ANTONIO LAMER IN MTL,THE DEFENCE COUNSEL,MESSRS ROBERT LEMIEUX AND BERNARD MERGLER,SOUGHT APPROVAL FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A- ROGATORY COMMISSION CONSISTING OF ONE CDN JUDGE AS COMMISSIONER AND LAWYERS FOR THE CROWN AND DEFENCE TO INTERVIEW IN CUBA MESSRS LANCTOT AND CARBONNEAU', TWO OF THE KIDNAPPERS OF'MR-CROSS.MR JUSTICE LAMER INFORMED MR MERGLER THAT HE WOULD ONLY GRANT THE REQUEST FOR A ROGATORY COMMISSION IF THE DEFENCE COUNSEL COULD PROVE(A)THAT THE CUBAN e»* 2 001867 �" "'' jt. PAGE TWO F L 0 3 5 7 CONFD e }A>^J • JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES WOULD ACCEPT THE CDN COURT ORDER ESTABLISHING THE COMMISSION,AND(B)THE CUBAN AUTHORITIES WOULD PERMIT THE CDN COMMISSIONER AND LAWYERS TO PERSONALLY PUT QUESTIONS TO THE WITNESSES.THE JUDGE FURTHERMORE REQUESTED ASSURANCES FROM THE CUBAN GOVTCWE UNDERSTAND THAT EITHER THE JUDGE OR MERGLER INDICATED VIA THE CDN DEPT OF EXTERN AFFAIRS)THAT THE CDN COMMISSION BE ACCORDED QUOTE FULL COOPERATION AND COURTESIES,SO THAT IT COULD ACCOMPLISH ITS WORK ACCORDING TO CDN PROCEDURES UNQUOTE.THIS LAST REQUEST WAS PUT TO MR EG LEE,DIRECTOR OF LEGAL OPERATIONS DIV,BY PHONE T H I S MORNING BY MR MERGLER$WHO EXPLAINED THAT THE JUDGE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE TWO WITNESSES MIGHT ATTEMPT TO INSULT THE COMMISSION AND THAT THE COMMISSIONER WOULD NOT/NOT BE -ABLE TO CITE THEM FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT BECAUSE HE WOULD HAVE. NO/NO AUTHORITY TO DO SO IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY.MR MERGLER HAS ALREADY CONTACTED THE CUBAN EMB, WHO HAVE ASKED THE CUBAN AUTHORITIES WHETHER THE ROGATORY COMMISSION WOULD BE ACCEPTED.IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JUDGES DIRECTION HOWEVER,HE WAS ALSO REQUESTING THE DEPT OF EXTER AFFAIRS TO SEEK THE ASSURANCES OF FULL COOPERATION WHICH THE JUDGE REQUIRED BEFORE HE WOULD GRANT THE ROGATORY COMMISSION. 2.MR MERGLER WAS INFORMED THAT THE DEPT HAD NO/NO INFO CONCERNING THE CASE EXCEPT WHAT HAS APPEARED IN THE PRESS,AND THAT IT WOULD SEEM ADVISABLE BEFORE CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN TO ANY ACTION THE DEPT MIGHT PROPERLY TAKE.,TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT/NOT THE CUBAN AUTHORITIES WOULD ACCEPT THE ROGATORY COMMISSION.SINCE THIS a a a A �ACTION REQUEST- FICHE DE SERVICE ^ . ^ O V E H N M E H T OF CANADA •"'flLE NO.—DOSSjfR.No GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA , DATE' Confidentxel .v^l2 nov.71 TO—A -i»4efis-ie FROM—D£ D 4M-I-N-) PLEASE CALL PRIERE D'APPEIER TEL. N O . — N » TEL EXTENSION—POSTE WANTS TO SEE Y O U DESIRE VOUS VOIR DATE TIME—HEURE • WILL CALL A G A I N DO/T RAPPELER • ACTION DONNER SUITE • APPROVAL APPROBATION • COMMENTS COMMENTAIRES • DRAFT REPLY PROJET DE REPONSE • MAKE FAIRE • NOTE A N D FILE NOTER ET CLASSER • NOTE 8. RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER COPIES I—I NOTE & FORWARD I I NOTER ET FAIRE SUIVRE ,L.e....g.^11eral.. Wrjpnch.de.. la..Crpi.x-Ro.uge canadienne m'a telephone ce matin -a-ce-su-jetv tl— aimera±t""3awir"Te plus.. tot _ .pp.s.s i bl e.. .ce _ _ q.ue.. nous.. entend faire. Pcmr--8a--part-;"-il"-s^""doi"t"""de "transmettre .c.ett.e..requete...a..la...Croix-Rouge-i^ter---— nationale. CALL RECEIVED BY MESSAGE RECU PAR CGSS STANDARD FORM 12C 7S40.21-OZ9.OS76 TIME HEURE ^001 869 { �,. a *• PAGE THREE FL0357 CONFD QUESTION HAD ALREADY BEEN PUT TO THE CUBANS BY MERGLER IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO AWAIT THE REPLY RECEIVED FROM THAT SOURCEoMERGLER CLAIMED THAT THE JUDGE HAD PROMISED TO RAISE THIS MATTER WITH QUOTE THE MINISTER UNQUOTE.SINCE WE OBVIOUSLY HAD NOT/NOT YEARD FROM JUDGE,MERGLER SAID HE WOULD ASK THE JUDGE WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN TO ABOUT OBTAINING ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES FROM THE CUBAN AUTHORITIES.THE CONVERSATION WITH MERGLER TERMINATED INCONCLUSIVELY AT THAT STAGE. 3.WE HAVE CONSULTED MR D CHRISTIE,DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEN IN DEPT OF JUSTICE,AND MR LANDRY,DEPT OF JUSTICE REP IN MTL,BOTH OF WHOM AGREE WITH THE POSITION WE HAVE TAKEN SO FAR CONCERNING MERGLERS REQUEST, SUBJ TO YOUR AGREEMENT,WE RECOMMEND THAT' IF* EIS}§R MERGLER OR JUDGE TJ d$dW$-,'i, SHOULD ASK US TO APPROACH CUBAN GOVT ABOUP THlgfffjSl-WE SHOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT ANY APPROACHES TO CUBAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH THE CUBAN EMB RATHER THAN INVOLVING THE CDN GOVT IN ANY WAY*, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE INITIAL APPROACH TO THE CUBANS HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE THROUGH THE CUBAN EMB«IT WOULD SEEM PREFERABLE THAT THE CDN GOVT NOT/NOT BE IMPLICATED IN THIS CASE IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE ADVERSE PUBLICITY WHICH MAY BE CREATED BY EITHER THE WITNESSES OR THE DEFENCE COUNSEL,AND IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT CDN AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN CAREFUL EVER SINCE THE KIDNAPPERS WENT TO CUBA TO HAVE NO/NO CONTACT WITH THEM OR WITH THE CUBAN GOVT ABOUT THEM.DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS PROPOSED POSITION7UNQUOTE 1I2207Z �DE SERVICE ON REQUEST A. To:" CABINET DU SEAE - OFFICE OF THE SSEA _FCE Dc: From: (MLJloquetJ .JYLIfcL... -= Robert D£cary/jm . l e r j u i n / 7 1 au PM 1154 002 ^ • M. M. P i e r r e Jasmin ""'PL' La Ligue A _.en_.rapport avec l e s d e c l a r a t i o n19(4? ^ 5 est, du PM k 1 ' e m i s s i o n Weekend Montreal Lettre on date du Letter dated Sujet Subject Action requise : — Action required : POUR INFORMATION Reponse pour la signature du Premier Ministre Reply for Prime Minlster'u signature pour avis rt re'.ourn for advice and ret Reponse pour le signature du Ministre Reply for Minister's signature noter et retourner note and return Reponse au nom du P.M./ou Ministre "Reply on behalf of PM/or SSEA Reponse pour la signature de Reply for signature of: Commentaires: Comments: imme homm 7x traduction for translation HftJuMtr Porter a I'attention des archives du SEAE le_ B.F. to Minister's registry on Commentaires par D.C.O.: D.C.O.'s comments: 001871 �001872 �ViraRi M. Sharp Hen. J. Turner Hon. G. pelletier Hon. J. Marchand M. .R.G. Robertson M. M. Lalonde . M. R.A. Leblanc P R I M E MM. Mongeau/Dufault \-L : 4cm. COPY ' i COPIE CANADA Ml N I S T E R PREMIER MINISTRE JUL 1 3 W7t Monsieur, J'ai en main votre lettre du ler juin. Vous y citez - en rapport avec nes declarations £ 1* Amission Weekend du 7 mai dernier - le sixiehne paragraphe de la declaration du 19 octobre de la Ligue des Droits de 1'Homme. Vous nera'apprenesrien en T>Q citant ce texte; il m'a 5t6 co7nmuniqu6 par la Ligue en octobre 1970 (mon Bureau en a d'ailleurs accuse reception le 29 du aene nois) et je l'ai lu tr&s attentivemant a ce moment la. Or, je vour. invite a lire le septiame paragraphe de la meme declaration: V ' A la rigueur, et en prenant pour acquis que les gouvernenents du Qu6b ec et du Canada, ainsi que 1'administration rauni cipale da Montreal, possSdent des renseigneoents d'une nature si grave qu'il serait dangereux de les rendre publics pour 1'instant, en prenan t pour acquis figaleoent que la necessaire action de la police et de l'arnee contre le F.L.Q. exig eait de procSder rapidement, la Ligue des Droits de L'Hoiaice adtnet que le gouvernement federal a agftjdans I'interet des citoyens en utilisant, a la 'deoande du gouverne- Monsieur Pierre Jasmin Directeur General La Ligue des Droits de 1'Homme 45 est, rue Jarry Montreal 351 Quebec Ad 001873 �. ment provincial et des autoritSs municipales de Montreal, la seule loi existante, cette Loi des mesures de guerre qui permet au gouvernement de supprlmer toutes les libertes des citoyens. " Dans le paragraphe que je viens de citer, la Ligue fait etat des circonstances dont les gouvernements ont du justement tenir compte en rapport avec la decision de proclainer la Loi sur les Mesures de Guerre: que les autorites devaient proceder immediateir.ent contre le F.L.Q. dans I'interet des citoyens et qu'il n'y avait pas d'autre Loi a-laqvielle le gouvernement pouv&it avoir recours. Dans ce meme paragraphe, la Ligue - comme beaucoup d'autres *- emet aussi 1'hypothSse que des renseignements a l'appui des faits connus auraient ete 5 la disposition des gouvernements et qu'ils n'auraient pas ete rendus publics'a ce moment la .pour raisons d'Etat. Or je vous rappelle que le gouvernement federal a toujours dit et insiste sur, , le fait que la Loi sur les Mesures de Guerre avaient)' ete proclamee en vertu des faits connus et qu'il n*j avait pas, qu'il n'y avait jamais eu de "renseignements secrets". Que le gouvernement ait ete plus a meme que d'autres de juger de l'ampleur des faits connus, c'est une hypothSse que je veux bien envisager bien que je n'en sois pas convaincu. Dans sa declaration, la Ligue envisage d'ailleurs une telle eventuality - celle de la capacite (a laquelle je rajouterais, en ce qui concerne les gouvernements, le devoir) de juger des faits connus par rapport a la divulgation ou la non-divulgation de renseignements - puisque, au huitieme.paragraphe de la declaration du 19 octobre, elle dit: " Quels que pulssent etre les renseignements encore secrete que pouvaient po'sseder les gouvernements et qui justifient peut-etre leur decision, il est certain que le moyen employe pour prSvenir une hypothetique insurrection jStait infiniment trop puissant. " �- 3 - Et la Ligue rajoute: "La seule excuse des gouvernements serait qu'il n'y en avait pas d'autre.". Or c'est exactement ce que le gouvernement a toujours dit. D'ou j'en conclus que la Ligue a reconnu la necessite de la Loi sur les Mesures de Guerre procla mee S la demande du Gouvernement du Quebec et des autorites municipales de Montreal. •# Si vous m'aviez dit ou si vous deviez me dire que c'est a contrecoeur que la Ligue a accorde son appui au gouvernement, je vous repond ra is qu'il rSpugnait aussi au gouvernement federal de devoir proclamer cette Loi le 16 octobre 1970; mes declarations de ce mois IS et des mois suivants font d'ailleurs etat de ces sentiments. Rappellez-vous aussi que c'est afin de disposer d'un outil a la mesure des circonstances que le gouvernement a fait adopter la Loi de 1970 sur 1*Ordre public (mesures proviso!res) et qu'il a demande au S6nat et a la Chambre des communes, en avril dernier, de faire des recommandations au gouvernement quant a la nature des mesures legislatives a prendre afin de paier S toute eventualite da meme ordre. (Je note .3, cet egard qu'au neuyielme paragraphe de sa declaration, la Ligue affirme que "... rien n'empeche maintenant le gouvernement fSdgral de presenter des amendements au code criminel et de se faire donner par le Parlement tous les pouvoirs extraordinaires dont il auttait besoin pour assurer la securite des citoyens, dgmanteler les mouvements sSditieux et maintenir I'ordre dans le pays."; puis-je me permettre S mon tour de demander a la Ligue des Droits de 1'Homme de nous aider a definir la nature de ces mesures dont nous reconnaissons tous les deux la necessite?) II n'y a done pas, comme le demandait votre lettre, de rectifications a faire et, au ... f �- 4 - c o n t r a i r e , j e puis affirmer avec raison que l a Ligue des Droits de l'Horame a appuye l e gouvernement dans sa decision de proclamer l a Loi s u r l e s Mesures de Guerre. meilleurs. • Recevez l ' a s s u r a n e e de mes sentiments l e s Original signi par Original signed by P. £ TRUDEAU JUL 19 197M?/ �» X COPY 1154 002 COPIE OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER • CABINET DU PREMIER MINISTRE O t t a w a (K1A OA2) ' l e 4 j u i n 1971 OTTAWA K1A 0A2 Monsieur Pierre Jasmin Directeur General La Ligue des droits de l'homme 45 est, rue Jarry Montreal 351 Quebec Monsieur, Au nom du Premier ministre, j'accuse reception de votre lettre en date du ler juin. Voudriez-vous avoir l'obligeance de noter que votre lettre sera portee a I'attention personnelle de M. Trudeau, ceci sans faute. Veuillez agreez, Monsieur, 1*expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs. Le secretaire, HAL/my c.c. Henri Alain Lawless, M. H.A-w Lawless (original) 001877 �1154 002 LIGUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION RECOMMANDEE Montreal, l e l e r j u i n 1971 Hon. Pierre E l l i o t t Trudeau, Premier Ministre du Canada, Edifices du Parlement, Ottawa, Ontario Monsieur le Premier M i n i s t r e , La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme a appris avec un c e r t a i n £tonnement que,.suivant les d e c l a r a t i o n s que vous avez f a i t e s l o r s d'une erttrevue a l'£mission Week-End,enregistree le 7 mai d e r n i e r , e l l e a u r a i t appuye la Loi des Mesures de Guerre. En r e l i s a n t lc texte de notre p r i s e de position du 19 octobre 1970, vous pourrez vous rendre compte que la Ligue n'a jamais donne de t e l appui mais que, bien au cont r a i r e , e l l e a denonce la mise en vigueur de c e t t e l o i en ces termes: "La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, dont le premier r o l e est la defense des l i b e r t e s fondamentales, d o i t comb a t t r e toute mesure des gouvernements tendant a limit e r ces liberties. Elle ne peut accepter, a aucun p r i x , 1 ' u t i l i s a t i o n de la Loi des Mesures de Guerre pour f a i re face a la s i t u a t i o n qui e x i s t e dans le Quebec et dont e l l e reconnait 1'extreme graviteb" De p l u s , le 27-novembre 1970, la Ligue f a i s a i t connaitre son opposition a plusieurs d i s p o s i t i o n s du projet de l o i C-1S1, notamment: c u l p a b i l i t e par association,, a r r e s t a t i o n sans mandat, perquis i t i o n sans mandat, detention sans cautionnement et r e t r o a c t i v i t e de 1'incrimination. Enfin, le l e r a v r i l 1971, dans une d e c l a r a t i o n ou e l l e s'opposait a la creation d'une l o i d'urgence permanente, la Ligue avait f a i t . 6tat du t r i s t e bilan que la Loi sur les Mesures de Guerre avait l a i s s e d e r r i e r e e l l e . Elle avait de plus rappele q u ' e l l e avait dte un des ...Fl 2r7 I 45E.. JARRY, MONTREAL 351, CANADA, TELEPHONE 387-2486 -J ^001878 �LIGUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ...n premiers organismes a mettre en doute publiquement, des le 20 octobre 1970, 1'opportunity de. l'utilisation'de la Loi sur les Mesures de Guerre et regrettait que le Gouvernement ait juge bon de ne pas rendre ses motifs publics. A la lumiere de ce qui precede, nous esperons que vous verrez a etablir les rectifications qui s'imposent. Veuillez agreer, monsieur le Premier Ministre, I'expression de nos sentiments distingues. LA LIGUE DES DROITS DE L'H0>31E par: PJ/mr xOA'iX //>Uv—- PIERRE JASMIN, D i r e c t e u r General 45E.. JARRY, MONTREAL 351, CANADA, T E L E P H O N E 387-2486 001879 �FL0/M.J. CASKET/jb EXTERNAL AFFAtRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES •"x. JB©RAHDUM TO FIIE ROM 0* FLO SECURITY SicurHe RESTRICTED DATE November 22, 1571 NUMBER Num<ro REFERENCE mil , SUBJECT S«fe. DOSSIER International Red Cross: Request by Republican Party of Quebec t o i n v e s t i g a t e conditions in Canadian prision i n s t i t u t i o n s . OTTAWA A2o - aa- -mc-1 MISSION cc QM'IZ- TFIA^^r-l ENaoSURES DOTBBUTION Mr. Dreary (MIN) Mr„_lild (PDM) Mr. Miller (FLO) General Wrinch of the Canadian Red Cross approached t h i s department about a request he had received from the "Republican Party" of Quebec to be forewarded to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva requesting them to i n v e s t i g a t e the "inhuman conditions" of prisions in Canada. Attached i s a copy of the request along with a copy of i n s t r u c t i o n s General Wrinch had sent to his Divisional Commissioners regarding similar requests made in October 1970. 2. I spoke with Mrs. Watson, of General Wrinch's office today to t e l l her t h a t while we understood t h a t General Wrinch would f e e l an o b l i gation to foreward t h i s request to the ICRC, i t should also be pointed out to them t h a t within Canada the administration of prisions came under two j u r i s d i c t i o n s i . e . the Federal prisions administered by the S o l i c i t o r General of Canada and the p r o v i n c i a l p r i s i o n s administered by t h e various Attorneys-General of the provinces. The ICRC should therefore inform the "Republican Party" t h a t they could not act without the authorization of the government of Canada, and t h a t there e x i s i t e d two channels of communication with^Canada t h a t they (the "Republican Party") should f i r s t approach to a i r t h e i r complaints. This was apparently t h e type of i n s t r u c t i o n sent t o the ICRC r e g a r d i n g the e a r l i e r requests for them to inspect Canadian p r i s i o n s . Mrs. Wilson w i l l draft a l e t t e r to the ICRC and send a copy to u s . Legal Operations Division d. Ext. 407A/BII. (Admin. Sarvlcei Div.) 001880 �A7. r;:;&:.pW7iZir'Z .&:j^J^Vjfe<: (A^/XAAP $$£4, V Montreal ler Novembre 1971 a 7 rhmwMMi ji 1 11 iiniijii i.iiwir "i—"X. ...,,,-. -,, „„.... Mr. Le President de la Croix Rouge Canadienne. Mr. Pa.ul Vaillancourt. ' 2170 Blvd Dorchester Ouest Montreal •'••••• bV'e ; b^^fp^ikeefefl •• ^7oA7W2^!7 A> c ea* Ea Milice de la Republique du Quebec, avec l'appui du;Parti.'•••••/ Republicain du Quebec demande immediatement, 1'intervention de la•Croix 77 Rouge Internationale, pour visiter nos prisons et rapporter objectivement ; les conditions de detentions parfois inhumaines, a deplorer dans plusieurs institutions. . P, . . • 7 Signe: General b 4 /JyF^Hl -^ 2fy ! 2 •22*/. 7'2/''AAX7^JF7A A ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ d ^ F 7 C 01 OH e 1 i/A Jjy €• &12A FypA*' V Chef du P a r t i R epublicaiTif-j~r^^^ £/b -A V - ZZZA&WC- •UXS' '.•".-.'• ^kiL^AZieAiS Sx,277 7.7&fr££ti. " **r?7c?.<dis^'jLat,^£ " -x 77 ft> e I C/1, F'/luA) 001881 �QCfje C Mm KINDLY ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONER Eeb Crosa { Dttetp 95 WELLESLEY STREET EAST T O R O N T O S. CANADA PHONE 9 2 3 - 6 6 9 2 TELEX NO. 0 2 - 2 3 9 2 N REPLY PLEASE QUOTE FILE NO.. October 22, 1970 TO: DHISIONa.L COMMISSIONERS Mr. Rochefort has reported receiving a couple cf enquiries about what Red Cross proposed to«do to ensure that "political prisoners" in Quebec are properly treated. We have received no calls of exactly that type but on October 21st Kr. Robert Fulford, editor of SATURDAY NIGHT, requested the telephone and telex nuinbers of the ICRC for the purpose of proposing that the ICRC send a delegate to inspect Quebec jails. During his call to Mrs. Watson, Mr. Fulford also informed her that a group with which he is associated had approached, or was about to approach, the Prime Minister with a request that the federal government invite the ICRC to make such an inspection. The so-called "political prisoners" constitute two separate categories and are under two separate jurisdictions. The twenty-three persons whose release is demanded by the kidnappers are in federal penitentiaries and any Canadian wishing to visit them should make application directly to the Solicitor General in Ottawa. The larger group, detained since the War Measures Act was invoked, are held in Quebec jails and a Canadian interested in visiting them should apply to Quebec provincial authorities. We understand that if such an application were rejected by Quebec authorities the person could then apply to the Solicitor General (Federal Government). All the above is given for your personal information and it would be preferable not to divulge it, particularly the part which concerns Mr. Fulford's proposals, except of course to your Officers. No one can foretell the types of calls which you might receive, but the following guidelines may be helpful: 1. It seems unlikely that any division, with the possible exception of Quebec, will be asked to assist an individual to visit a prisoner. If such a request should be received, we feel that the person should be asked to place the request in writing with details of relationship to detainee, and a promise given by you that the application will be transferred to the appropriate authorities. .r._ ,001882 �Y^J»-J| To Divisional Commissioners - Oct. 22, 1970 2. - 2 It would appear more likely that a caller may demand that Red Cross look into conditions in the jails. It should be explained to any such caller that the International Committee of the Red Cross is the Red Cross body that has acted in somewhat similar circumstances but that it can only act if authorised by the government of the country concerned. The caller should be advised to write to this office, requesting an inspection by the ICRC, and a promise can be given that we shall forward such letter to the ICRC with copy to the federal governnent. Please keep us informed if there are any occurrences in your Division. National Commissioner cc: External Affairs (Mr. Church) ICRC (Mr. Borsinger) National Officers 001883 �DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CROSS REFERENCE SHEET .t Security ACRU SECRET 20-22-TFK-l 1 I Letter fm RCMP „ _ . to Dei Type of Document No >.... Date ... RCMP with enclosures - summary of Cross/Laporte Kidnappings From To Mr. Hart, S&H, Div. .. Subject: Cross/Laporte Kidnappings 7-1-6-1 psiR Original on File No Copies on File No Other Cross Reference Sheets on Prepared by EXT 308/Eng. (6/69) ... . t ^ ^ ^ ^ t ^ : . nmRR4 J *»* " �mi n f in i W^nCJaWrtftil'ii > ff • A • I'II' * n w r w r "Hf WJJTW|-»ri(lll i i Q w i f c r r r , • - f , h f i r T V - T T - il' iTTiliTf •i*1""frTTTrV PDM) PDST FPR PARL.SEC. v & . PAG FAI MIN/far .Taylor MIN/Mr.Finn INQUIRY OF MINISTRY DEMANDE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS AU GOUVERNEMENT CANADA / / -I A, PREPARE 10 COPIES IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH MARKED "TEXT" AND '•/RANSLATION" « £ p PREPARER 10 COPIES EN ANGLAIS ET FRANCAIS IN5CRIVANT "TEXTE'^eV , TRADUCTION"( QUESTION NO. 2113 ^/P^>2?> - J J ^ T J T ^ - ^ Mr. Deakon V o f E S AND "PROCEEDINGS NO. - PROCtS-VE«8A JX. FASCICULE N ° " 2V7 teceiroer SUBJECT - SUJET 72S6- PAGE 62 ?Cy 71 3EPLY BY THE SECRgJAffY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS . R&»©liK£_£Aa-tTe-5ttrRETAlRE D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES FLQ Kidnappers of James <"rcas ORIGINAL SIGNED IV " MITCHELL SHARP. SIGNATURE MINISTER OR PARLIAMENT AR T SECRETARY MINISTRB OU SECRETAIRE PAS I. EMENTA IRE QUESTION 1. V/as there any financial agreement entered into between Canoe's anc Cuba with reference to tbe maintenance and suprort cf thr. exiled kidnappers of James -ross and, if so, what was Canada's commitment? REPLY - REPONSE TEXT TEXTE 1. TRANSLATION TRADUCTION • No, t h e r e was no such fin.Tncial agreement o r arrangement,. 7530-21-029-1168 001885 ] JO"*' �li-^liW-Wtt.. Ai •il»M '| »-F»*nli»' *>B^WS>a^ ^»^i^«^*J6*W*M-,'-^t^-J!4.i«*ih^^fc*» j INQUIRY OF MINISTRY DEMANDE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS AU GOUVERNEMENT PREPARE 10 COPIES IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH MARKED " T E X T " AND "TRANSLATiON" PREPARER 10 COPIES EN ANGLAIS ET FRANCAIS INSCRIVANT " T E X T E " ET "TRADUCTION" QUESTION NO. 2113 BY - DE Nonsieur Deakon VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS NO."- PROcfes-VKRBAUX, FASCICULE N° DATE 235 SUBJECT - SUJET 62 December 20/71 REPLY BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFA IRS REPONSE PAR LE SECRETAIRE D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES Ravisseurs felcuistes de M. James Cros ORIGINAL SIGNED B¥ MITCHELL SHARP. SIGNATURE MINISTER OR PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY MINISTftE OU SECRETAIRE PARLEMENTAIRE QUESTION 1. Le Canada et Cuba c n t - i l s conclu un accord financier concernant I'ent.retien des auteurs de l'enlevement de M. James Cross exiles a Cuba et., dans 1 ' a f f j r m i i v e , a quoi le Can.-ida s ' e s t - j l yngace? REPLY - REPONSE TEXT I TEXTE 1 1. 1 I TRANSLATION TRADUCTION I I jJ J Non, i l n ' e x i s t e aucun accord n i disposition financiere a ce s u j e t . 7530-21-029-1168 001886 �...*• ixs*^.;.**?..^.^tx».~~~.^.xj,i»...Hxj.....jimesr^.sSM.r—xr^i^ati^iS^,t.'«AXr.^j.-.-i^^.-.^r.f,rriMiXx£-iS&*trti&L^iL^£*jma*w..tr.-HiiX.-xri-J . PDML ?BSj FPR f o- 'PS 7 &...J vKk.. -W:.->.-X-^ilJ^^-fX.4^»-rsX-i.'^itii!jrX.t^rj^S£^X. PAG FAI MIN/Mr.Taylor INQUIRY OF MINISTRY PARL * SEC ' m ^' Finn DEMANDE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS AU GOUVERNEMENT • < ! PREPARE 10 COPIES IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH MARKED " T E X T " A N t v f TRANSLATION" PREPARER 10 COPIES EN ANGLAIS ET FRANCAIS INSCRIVANT " T E X T B / ET " T R A D U C T I O N " QUESTION NO. 3Y - DE ?218 ^^iJo _ 2, , ££„ T~F(A~ / Mr. F o r t i n VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS NO. - PROCES-VERBAUX, FASCICULE N* PAGE 6? December SUBJECT - SUJET .REPLY BY THE SECRETA*rY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 3 ON5E PAR Lg_Sec6€TAIRE D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES FLQ Kidnappers of. James Cross ORIGINAL SIGNED BY MITCHELL SHARP SIGNATURE MINISTER OR PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY MINISTRE OU SECRETAIRE PAR LEMENT AIRE QUESTION 1. lias t h e Covernment made any e x p e n d i t u r e s on t b e FLQ kidnappers deported t o Cuba, snd i f s o , what amount? 2. Does t h e government pay compensation to <"'uba in r e s p e c t of t h e s e p e o p l e , and, i f s o , what i s t h e annual amount? REPLY - REPONSE 1. TEXT pjT TEXTE U i TRANSLATION TRADUCTION | I 1 I No, t h e Canadian Government has not made any e x p e n d i t u r e s on t h e FT/) k i d n a p n e r s . Uo, tiee Canadian CoveriP'enl dees not pay compensation t o the Government of Cuba i n t h i s m a t t e r . 7630-21-029-1168 .SA. A 001887 �INQUIRY Of MINISTRY DEMANDE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS AU GOUVERNEMENT (-A.NAOA PREPARE 10 COPIES IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH MARKEO " T E X T " AND " T R A N S L A T I O N " PREPARER 10 COPIES EN ANGLAIS ET FRANgAIS 1NSCRIVANT " T E X T E " ET " T R A D U C T I O N " QUESTION NO. 2215 BY - DE Monsieur Fortin VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS NO. - PROCfcS-VERBAUX. FASCICULE N° 235 IDATE . SUBJECT - SUJET PAGE December 20/71 REPLY BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPONSE PAR L t SECRETAIRE D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES ORIGINAL SIGNED B? Ravisseurs f e l c u i s t e s de M. James Cross MITCHELL SHARP SIGNATURE MINISTER Oft PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY MINISTRE OU SECRETAIRE PARLEMENTAIRE QUESTION 1.. Le gouvernement a - t - i l f a i t des depenses r e l a t i v e m e n t aux r a v i s s e u r s f e i a u i s t e s d e p o r t e s a Cuba e t , dans l ' a f f i r m a t i v e , combien a - t - i l depense a ce t i t r e ? 2.. Le gouvernement d o i t - i i v e r s e r des compensations I Cuba en ce q u i concerne c e s personnes e t , dans l ' a f f i r m a t i v e , combien d o i t - i l v e r s e r .annuel]ement a ce t i t r e ? REPLY - REPONSE TEXT j TEXTE I 1 I TRANSLATION TRADUCTION f^V I " 1.. Non, le gouvernement canadien n'a fait aucune depense relativement aux ravisseurs felnuistes. 2.. Non, le gouvernement canadien ne verse a ce titre aucune compensation au Gouvernement cubain. 7530-21-029-1168 sr001888 ° �PPR/T.H.W. READ/6-4039/ls EXTERNAL AFFAIRS • AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES c20- 3-2- ~TF/7~ 1CS') TO FAH FROM Oe PPR - T. H. W. Read REFERENCE Reference SECURITY Sicurile CONFIDENTIAL DATE November 5 , 1973 NUMBER Numiro FILE OTTAWA SUBJECT DOSSIER Task Force on the Cross/Laporte Kidnappings Sujet MISSION ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION Claude Roquet thinks that I should send to you for eventual dispatch to PSI Registry the attached two unused memos which may contribute something to the history of the Cross and Laporte kidnappings. The memos were "not sent" because of my inability to free myself from my immediate preoccupations for long enough to revise and prepare for final typing drafts which were available on January 6, 1971, the date the memos now bear. Although it is not evident from the memos themselves, my contribution lacks one important comment. This is the word of praise which should be recorded for Wilf Courchesne and his colleague in the Montreal Passport Office, Bourgeois. I did not envy these two their duty of being on hand at the Cuban consulate and having to subject a group of armed, angry and extremely' nervous people to the annoyance of bureaucratic procedures. The tension in the atmosphere as the passports were prepared must have been palpable. With this in mind, it should be considered a demonstration of courage and determination on the part of Courchesne and Bourgeois to have persevered with their part in the drama, a part that was essential to its successful completion. T. H. W. Read 7gb Ext. 407A/BH. 001889 1 �A s OTT cc: PSI i \ y © fl rff CT rsww tsnmf. ~GAF - OTT /&» / •ZEE TO 9^ o- 1r FROM: ACRL 1 m 8 1872 / AC %/p. 225 ALGER 4&TT'N/J^ OAJUTT'N/./X...^FfAiL.. t MI ALGER / QA a /Uw* \ c /.... a , 1 • J t - & - T Char Monsieur Desjardins J*accuse reception de votre lettre du 23 fevrier 1972* Tel que vous vous en doutiez, je na puis repondre que de faoon assez generale aux questions que vousreapoaez. A la suite de la parution de votre article dans "Le iioleil" le 28 decembre dernier, nous avons souleve avec les autorites alg^riennes certaines questions relatives a la reconnaissance possible par I'Algerie du Front de Liberation du Quebec. Les autorites alg£riennes nous ont assures- comma par le passe que ni le Gouvernement algerien, ni le Front de Liberation National, ne reconnaissait le FLQ et qua dea membres du FLQ admis en Algerie a titre particulier n*auraient pas le droit d'y engager une activite politique quelconque afin d'eviter toute entrave possible aux bonnes relations qui existent•. entre le Canada at I'Algerie. Suite a 1'investigation qu'elles ont faite| les autorites algeriennes nous ont informes qu'il n'existait pas de buweau du FLQ a Alger. Veuillez agreer, dher Monsieur Desjardins, les assurances da ma consideration distingue©. L.A. Delvoie, Premier Secretaire. Monsieur Lionel Desjardins CP. 1164 Quebec 4, P.Q. CANADA & m, ^ *> F 1 I �Quebec, le 2? fevrier 1972 M. Louis Delvoie, Premier secretaire, Ambassade du Canada, Alger, Cher Monsieur, Mon article sur le FLQ en Algerie ne vous a pas cause trop de problemes, j'espere. Je n'ai pps ete tres surpris du dementi officiel mais je .su s curieux de savoir comment Alger a pu expliquer l'ouverture du bureau de la rue Dirah. Selon les informations fournie.*; p?r Ottawa, --ucune demande de reconnaissance officielle n'a ete faite pr>r le FLO au FLK, Ma source an m'nnnoncjant ls reconnoissance du FLQ m'affirmait que cette demande avait ete faite il y r plusieurs mois et que d'etroits contacts avaient.6te etablie avec certains membres du parti gouvernemental. Toujours selon Ottawa, "deux ou trois felquistes" recevr-ient une allocation de subsistance sans toutefois avoir le droit de s'adonner k une activite d'ordre politique. Coprentalors expliquer la publication depuis plusieurs mois d'un feuillet d'information et une allocation permettant l'ouverture de ce que je qualifie de bureau? Je sais que votre position ne vous permet pes de me doriner des inform.-itions non officielles mais pourriez-vous m'ecl.-^irer un peu sur ce qui a peutetre ete une meprise de ma p-rt. Permettez-moi, d'autre part, de vous reraercier pour votre co'11'aboratior. lors de nos passage .* Alger. Maiheureusement, pour diverses raisons, aucun article n'a ete publie sur la cooperation canado-nlgerie.me. Je con-, serve neammoins mes notes pour realiser un article plus comr.let sur les projets d'aide canadiens .*! l'Afrique fracophone. '•/euille?: agreer, Monsieur, 1'assurance de ma consideration la plus djp.tiriguee. S A t-t-'L-u. k=a- Lionel Desjari^ins C F . HOU Quebec U , a.anada c �PPR/T.H.W.Read/cal/6-4039/lj \ EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES PDM TO A FROM De P P R - T . H . W . Read REFERENCE Memoranda by O . W. Dier of December 7 ,1970 and J Rifirence SECURITY Securite CONF IDENT IA DATE January 6 , 19v 1 NUMBER Numiro ' by C . Roquet of December 15, 1970 SUBJECT Sujet DOSSIER Operation Cuban Consulate ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION A PMO / (Mr . J . D a v e / ) MIN / POP/ PSI/ FPR HAVANA LONDON WASHING. sfco RCMP Al"//Direct A Ferraris) Attached i s my r e p o r t on the final act i r r t h e extension of the Cuban Consulate in M o n t r e a l to the two Islands of T e r r e des Hommes. 2. In an e a r l i e r r e p o r t 1 questioned/as did M e Robert Demers and General Brown, w h e t h e r the .c'hoice of T e r r e des Hommes as the fulcrum for the safeconduct p r o c e d u r e was a good one. 3. If the b l i z z a r d that clogged M o n t r e a l ' s s t r e e t s at 2 o'clock on the morning of December 4- had r e a c h e d its peak 6 h o u r s e a r l i e r , the doubts e x p r e s s e d might have been justified. F o r t u n a t e l y the snow s t a r t e d late and in its a b s e n c e , the s i t e proved to have g r e a t a d v a n t a g e s . Aside from/its isolation and r e a s o n a b l e s e c u r i t y , the accommodation it provided in the form of Canadian pavilion proved to be almost i d e a l . S e p a r a t i o n of k i d n a p p e r s and kidnapped became possible with the f i r s t heiiig given a c c e s s to the more w o r k - a - d a y section to the west of the e n t r a n c e hall w h e r e t h e r e was p r i v a c y for them and work s p a c e for the p a s s p o r t i s s u i n g p r o c e s s , as well as w a s h r o o m s . M r . C r o s s was given a c c e s s to the executive offices to the east of the e n t r a n c e h a l l , w h e r e t h e r e w e r e t h r e e handsomely appointed rooms/offering quiet and p r i v a c y , comfortable s e a t i n g and a p r i v a t e washroom. F o r t u n a t e l y , the pavilion was b l e s s e d with a l a r g e number of telephone lines to facilitate communication between the c o n s u l a r officers and the a m b a s s a d o r , and the Canadian government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and t h e t a s k force in Ottawa. F i n a l l y , an advantage worth ar l e a s t p a s s i n g mention was the fact t h a t , by a change of administration, the i s l a n d s ' s e c u r i t y had become the normal c h a r g e of Captain M a r q u i s , of t h e M o n t r e a l P o l i c e . Someone may yet w r i t e an a r t i c l e for R e a d e r ' s Digest to r e c o r d Captain M a r q u i s as the "Most nforgettable C h a r a c t e r I Have E v e r M e t " . C e r t a i n l y , this officer w a r r a n t s commendation for the e n e r g y , t a c t , intelligence and good humour that he put at t h e s e r v i c e of the C u b a n s , of M r . C r o s s and of the Government of C a n a d a . He may have done so at the cost of his next A ? Ext. 407A/BH. 7530-21-029-5331 001892 �- 2 - CONFIDENTIAL promotion since it was on the evening of December 3 that he was due to sit his examination for his next higher grade. It is to be hoped that the Montreal Police offer him another chance. 4-. The untimely withdrawal of Ramirez to take his vacation in Cuba and his replacement by Escartin from the Embassy in Ottawa seemed at one time'to suggest that the rules of the game had been changed considerably. This was particularly apparent in Escartin's reluctance to allow M e s s r s . Roquet and Dier to enter the Consular area even when it was quite apparent that the final decisions in the negotiations between M e Demers and the kidnappers were about to be taken. It was also apparent in his desire to reduce the passport issuing force to one person. Ramirez could have been under no misapprehension that at least Mr. Courchesne and Mr. Bourgeois would be on hand - he had met both of these at the initial meeting on the night of October 17. Unfortunately my memory does not serve to confirm that photographing was a requirement expressed to him. It may not have been. The original collective certificate allowed no space for photographs, and 1 can recall discussions at the helicopter pad early on the morning of the 19th of October about the dodges the R . C . M . P . would have to think up in order to get photographs of the kidnappers for identification purposes. I can also recall my own reaction of surprise at Inspector Walsh's suggestion on December 3 that he had two "photographers" ready and suitably dressed to accompany the passport officers onto the island. Whether or not the point had been adequately covered, Escartin's reaction was as stubborn and uncooperative as he had the right to make it. It would seem an exageration however, to suggest that the minor problems he created were anything more than the doubts of someone finding himself in a key role without having benefited from r e h e a r s a l s . 5. If I were to point out suggested improvements in the mechanism that was drawn up, I would make one major recommendation: that in the same circumstances, if the history is repeated, the safeconduct offer make it quite clear to the kidnappers that, in accepting the offer, they are guaranteeing their bona fides and voluntarily submitting them for examination. 6. I share Mr. Roquet's dismay at finding himself thrust into the position of having to determine whether Seguin was in fact Simard, a position which I was later asked to occupy myself. 7. In this connection, I would note that identification for passport purposes was discussed at the series of meetings in Montreal in October and that Me Demers expressed concern that the kidnappers taken out of Canada should be properly identified, so that they would 001893 �- 3- CONFIDENTIAL not be able to return to Canada. However, none of these discussions focussed on the problem of choosing between selfdeclared kidnappers. The original tacit assumption that all kidnappers would go to Havana was not disturbed by the later declaration that the offer would not extend to the kidnappers of M. Laporte. 8. With the wisdom of hindsight, it is apparent that the safeconduct offer was defective. It was designed to be accepted voluntarily by kidnappers not under direct p r e s s u r e . It was not fully appropriate for a group of people in a situation where their armament still gave them bargaining power. Yet the alteration required to bring it into line with the situation that came to exist would not have been a large one - merely the requirement recommended above, that in submitting themselves to the requirements of the safeconduct offer, the kidnappers submit also to a demand that they prove they qualify for the provisions of that offer. frisky Protocol Division v �PPR/T.H.W.Read-6-4039/lj EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO PDM A FROM De PPR REFERENCE Rifirence M r . D i e r ' s Memorandum of December 7 and M r . Roquet's Memorandum of December 15 SUBJECT Sujet Operation Cuban Consulate AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES SECURITY Securile CONFIDENTIAL DATE January 6 / 1 9 7 1 NUMBER Numiro FILE DOSSIER MISSION/ ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION In r e p o r t i n g on the events of D e c e i h b e i / 3 / 5 , I am fortunate in being able to r e l y upon the accounts already/submitted in r e g a r d to the events as s e e n by the E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s / t e a m in M o n t r e a l until M e s s r s . D i e r and Roquet left the hotel for/tne second time at about 2:15 p.m. 2. It is p o s s i b l e to quibble with/one o r two details in the r e p o r t s , for i n s t a n c e M r . D i e r ' s r e f e r e n c e to the a i r c r a f t that took us to M o n t r e a l as a "Cosmos" instead of as a "Cosmopolitain". In addition, to r e f e r to the helpful attitude of the R . C . M . P . , I would note that it was an R . C . M . P . e a r that took us from Dorval to the Queen Elizabeth Hotel. 1 could note also that in M r . Roquet's r e p o r t t h e r e is a slight i n a c c u r a c y / i n p a r a g r a p h 4- and 1 would comment with r e f e r e n c e to p a r a g r a p h SAiat Captain M a r q u i s not only gained admission to the Cuban Pavilion but at times during the evening seemed to be running the operation for the Cuban h o s t s . With r e g a r d to M r . Roquet's r e f e r e n c e to the p r e s e n c e of M r . William S . Ashford, the " R e p r e s e n t a n t B r i t a n n i q u e " , it should be noted that M r . Ashford had to be in the Pavilion from the f i r s t moment so that the Cubans could be a s s u r e d that/it was indeed M r . C r o s s that was p r e s e n t e d to them as the hostagea 3. T h e s e minor points being made, I would suggest t h a t , in r e g a r d to my r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the extension of the Cuban C o n s u l a r office,/the important actions taken in the P O P / M o n t r e a l were/ To inform E s c a r t i n and the P a s s p o r t Office of the a r r i v a l of the E x t e r n a l Affairs' p a r t y with a view to s e c u r i n g e a r l y a c c e s s to the C o n s u l a r a r e a ; s. £ Ext. 4 0 7 A / B H . 7530-21-02 9-5331 b) To endeavour (unsuccessfully) to include the two R . C . M . P , " p h o t o g r a p h e r s " in the p a s s p o r t i s s u i n g p a r t y ; O001895 �CONFIDENTIAL January 6, 1971 c) To endeavour to arrange with the Montreal Police for easy access to T e r r e des Hommes for the passport officers and M e s s r s . Dier and Roquet. This effort was not entirely successful despite the goodwill of Captain Marquis. d) Incidentally, to secure some assurance that no problem would be created for M e s s r s . Roquet and Dier by their failure to have valid travel documents on their arrival in Cuba. 4-. Once the kidnappers were on their way to the Consulate, no further developments of importance to my responsibilities occurred until after 4- p.m. when Mr. Dier called to report the Cuban request that I join the party in the Pavilion and remain there until the release of M r . C r o s s . In due course, the R . C . M . P . provided a car which took me to the "Concorde" bridge whence Captain Marquis conveyed me to the Pavilion in his c a r , a vehicle designed to convey p r i s o n e r s , judging by the absence of door and window handles in the back doors. 5. Sometime after my arrival, the question of the identity of " P i e r r e Seguin" was brought to my attention. The passport work had been completed shortly after I reached the Pavilion and I had had the doubtful pleasure of taking delivery from the kidnappers of the M - l riffles and sticks of dynamite which they had carried to T e r r e des Hommes, presumably to retaliate for deception by the authorities,(these I gave to Captain Marquis in case there was a further fingerprinting requirement). Courchene and Bourgeois were aware of the need to get the copies of the passport photographs into the hands of the R . . C . M . P . without delay. However, on instructions 1 called Courchene 1 s office and, after a few abortive attempts, caught Bourgeois on his arrival at the office and was able to urge him to arrange that Inspector Walsh should receive the photograph of "Seguin" as a matter of the utmost urgency. 6. The relaxation that was produced by the departure of the Havana party for the helicopter lasted only minutes before the Minister of Justice of Quebec and his entourage arrived and were admitted. In an earlier telephone call Robert Demers had told me that Mr. Choquette was on his way, and had asked me to see that no photographs: were taken. It was beyond my powers to interfere in this matter, and Demers later seemed to accept that fact. The photographer, who was introduced as an official of the government of • •• 3 001896 �- 3 - CONFIDENTIAL January 6, 1971 Quebec, proved later to have been introduced by arrangement with the British Regional Information Office (who was present on the island throughout) and his work was distributed without charge to all interested news s e r v i c e s . 7. 1 missed Mr. Choquette's departure, but I was on hand again with Rubido to welcome the Premier on his arrival, with Robert Demers. The Premier also had a photographer, described to Ashford as "official". Later, to Ashford's d i s t r e s s , it transpired that "official" meant "Canadian P r e s s " , which, in terms of the interest of the international p r e s s services, was not the same thing. 8. After the departure of the Premier, the evening should have been productive of information concerning Mr. C r o s s ' s captivity. It did not turn out to be that. Cross was talkative indeed but, when in company with the Sergeant of the Montreal Police who had headed the investigation, he started to tell his story I was caught up in a series of telephone calls which had me jumping in and out of the room like a jumping jack. I gave up. Rubido was also quite unconsciously an unmitigated nuisance, dropping in and having to be withdrawn diplomatically from conversations with Ashford and Dunrossil. Consequently I learned very little of C r o s s ' s story. 9. The second last important development of the evening was the arrival, about 10:4-5 p.m. of Susan V e r t e s , the Cross daughter. Thereafter Cross was closeted with h e r . The real waiting period began with this arrival, with the pavilion gradually becoming peopled with the police of various forces responsible for security on the island, and for ensuring Cross' delivery to the Jewish General Hospital. An incidental addition was Colonel Gauthier, who had had some sort of responsibility on behalf of the Armed Forces thrust upon him according to the original plan he should been in command of the army security guards on Cite du Havre and the Bridge. It was by my intervention that Rubido allowed him entry to the pavilion. 10. Colonel Gauthier paid for his admission by being the first to hear the news of the arrival in Havana, of which he was able to inform us at about 01:10 hours. There followed a brief wait of ten minutes or so before the official release of Mr. Cross could be announced, after which the evacuation of the pavilion could begin. ... 4 �- 4 - CONFIDENTIAL January 6, 1971 11. In transporting Mr. Cross from T e r r e des Hommes to the Montreal Jewish Hospital, the police had to contend with two major factors: 1) the possibility that some other cell of the FLQ might kidnap Mr. Cross for a second time, and 2) the weather. The small convoy of three or four cars wound its way around T e r r e des Hommes and found the ramp to the Jacques-Cartier Bridge in the middle of a blinding snowstorm. Fortunately, traffic was light since it was quite impossible from time to time for the lead cars to take a chance of stopping for a red light without bringing about a four-car pile-up. To a person unfamiliar with Montreal, it was an incredible and hairraising t r i p , the circumstances of which were not. helped by the element of claustrophobia contributed by Captain Marquis' police c a r . It was a matter of profound relief to arrive at the hospital and, somewhat l a t e r , en route for the Queen Elizabeth Hotel, to hear on the police radio the words: "Accouchement sans douleur", the code chosen to indicate that Mr. Cross was safely esconced in his hospital bed. By this time it must have been close to three o'clock. 12. The remainder of the Cross story belongs to Jean-Marie Dery, who accompanied Mr. Cross across the Atlantic to London. However, I might comment with full approbation on the part played by Mr. Vic Chapman, of the Prime Minister's Office, who came to Montreal on December 4-th to line up the arrangements for M r . Cross' departure. This he did by presiding a meeting of 20 or so persons in the VIP room at Dorval Airport during the late afternoon. With these arrangements in effect Mr. Cross left at 09:00 on December 5th in a Canadian Armed Forces Boeing 707, having been received in the VIP room by Mr. Mackasey representing the Federal Government, by representatives of the Government of Quebec and having held a press conference in the cafeteria that adjoined the VIP room. Following the departure of the Boeing, I joined Mr. Chapman in a Jetstar and returned to Ottawa, arriving at 10:15 a.m. IjZXxsJrCe^-y*^-' Protocol Division �• X f> CONFIDENTIAL A R P * V 5 R J J E R NO.: 18989- • ^ DAHC15 73 C 0 1 8 1 6Gl0 Tactical Techno! OL; Office' - - QQ'-IJJ-'AF7 WN-9304-DOS/ARPA January 1976 THE CRQSS _-^!lLy£ORIEJ<IDNAPPINGS, MONTREAL, OCTOBER 1970 (U) Eleanor S. Wainstein Lxr ' c.-y y A WORKING NOTE prepared for the DEPARTMENT OF STATE/ DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY DD 254 dated 7/19/74 classified hy f o r Contract DAHC15-73-C-0181 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION This Note is a privileged communication, intended only to transmit preliminary research results to a Rand sponsor. Views or conclusions expressed herein may be tentative and do not represent the official opinion of the sponsoring agency. This Note may not be distributed without the approval of the sponsoring agency. SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY DECLASSIFY nN ' ° ^ January 2006 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions. In addition to security requirements which apply to this document and must be met, it may be further distributed by the holder O N L Y with specific prior approval of A R P A / T I O and DOS. SANTA MONICA, CA. 9040fc 001899 �UNCLASSIFIED PREFACE This Working Note is one of a number of case studies on international hostage situations, sponsored jointly by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Department of State. These analyses of past events are the basis for a series of Rand papers on the evolution of current U.S. policy and recommendations for the future. The series of Rand papers dealing with policy in hostage situations include Brian Jenkins, The Evolution of U.S. Policy on Kidnapping Assessment Secret, WN-8842-DOS/ARPA; Brian Jenkins and Ralph Strauch, of Current U.S. Policy on the Kidnapping of Diplomats (U), (U), Confidential, WN-8934-DOS/ARPA; Brian Jenkins, Janera Johnson, and David Ronfeldt, Numbered Lives: Hostage Some Statistical Episodes, Observations from 77 International . WN-9006-l-DOS/ARPA; and Brian Jenkins, David Ronfeldt, and Ralph Strauch, Policy for Dealing with Hostage Incidents (U), Confi- dential, WN-9140-DOS/ARPA. Other case studies include Edward Gonzales, Political Argentina: The Urban Guerrillas Companies, and the U.S. Krahenbuhl, Political versus Government, Kidnappings the Argentine Extortion Regime, Foreign WN-8833-DOS/ARPA; Margaret in Turkey, 1971-1972 (U), Confidential, WN-9212-ARPA; and S. W. Purnell and E. S. Wainstein, Case Studies Management of Hostage Situations: Crowley in Dominican Republic in Kidnapping of Lt. Col. Donald for J. (U), Secret, WN-8604-DOS/ARPA. For comments on the experience of hostages, see Brian Jenkins, Hostage Survival: Some Preliminary Observations, WN(L)-9077-DOS/ARPA. A complete list of all international incidents of terrorism may be found in Brian Jenkins and Janera Johnson, International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974, Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974 R-1597-DOS/ARPA, and International (Supplement), WN-9276-ARPA. 001900 �UNCLASSIFIED v SUMMARY On October 5, 1970, four young men of the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) kidnapped James R. Cross, the British Trade Commissioner, from his Montreal residence and set in motion a major crisis for Canada. The captors' seven demands of the government in return for Cross's release included the cessation of police searches, the publicizing of an FLQ manifesto, $500,000 in gold, and the liberation of 23 "political" prisoners and their safe passage abroad. During the ensuing five days, the Quebec and Canadian authorities and the FLQ cell to which the kidnappers belonged, communicating through notes, the media, and an intermediary, slowly worked toward a settlement. Negotiations were suddenly shattered by a second FLQ kidnapping on Saturday, October 10. Four men from another FLQ cell had seized Pierre Laporte, the Labor Minister of Quebec Province, at gunpoint, also in Montreal. They announced that Laporte would be killed unless the original seven demands of the Cross kidnappers were met. The domestic crisis escalated dramatically with Laporte's seizure, on both the local and the national level. By October 14, threats of disorder and of further FLQ outrages had so overburdened police forces in Montreal that federal troops were called in. That evening, Quebec Premier Bourassa offered the FLQ parole for five of the 23 prisoners and safe conduct for the kidnappers and their families to Cuba in return for the release of both hostages. Tension rose when the kidnappers failed to reply. The next day, at the request of Montreal and Quebec Province officials, the Canadian government invoked the War Measures Act, enabling them to outlaw the FLQ and giving the police extraordinary powers. The evening of October 17, one week after Pierre Laporte was kidnapped, his body was found in the trunk of an abandoned car. Canadian security forces began a massive manhunt, and on December 2, police found the hideout where Cross was being held. Following further negotiations, Cross was released unharmed when his four kidnappers and three of their relatives were flown to asylum in Cuba. abductors had been arrested in early November. One of Laporte's Police found the other three on December 28, hiding in a tunnel beneath a farmhouse 20 miles from Montreal. They and their accomplices were brought to trial and sei00190 �UNCLASSIFIED vii' CONTENTS PREFACE . iii V SUMMARY Section I. II. III. IV. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT 1 GOVERNMENT POLICIES 4 NEGOTIATING THE HOSTAGES' RELEASE THE TERRORISTS V. THE HOSTAGES VI. ,. 7 26 36 COMMUNICATIONS, MEDIA, AND PUBLIC OPINION 45 LOCAL SECURITY 50 AFTERMATH 55 IX. CONCLUSIONS 60 X. CHRONOLOGY 62 VII. VIII. REFERENCES 67 001902 �CONFIDENTIAL (This page is Unclassified) l I. The Front de Liberat%on THE POLITICAL CONTEXT du Quebec (FLQ) culminated its seven years of violent struggle in the name of independence for Quebec with the kidnapping of James Cross and the abduction and murder of Pierre Laporte. These acts, committed by a few dedicated revolutionaries, had critical political consequences at every level of the Canadian government and plunged the nation into its "October Crisis" of 1970. To understand the raison d'etre of the FLQ, it is necessary to review the special status of French Canada, which gave rise to the separatist movement. French Canadians, while constituting 28 percent of Canada's population, in Quebec account for 80 percent. But even in their own prov- ince, the French Canadians as a group occupy the lower rungs of the economic ladder. Their average incomes are lower and unemployment rates higher than those of the Anglo population, while approximately 80 percent of the industry is controlled by non-French Canadians. The Quebecois have tended to blame their economic and social ills on the Anglo community, and many see separation from English Canada and independence for Quebec as the solution to their problems. Their movement is formalized in the Parti Quebecois (PQ), which made a strong showing in the April 1970 Quebec provincial elections, winning 23 percent of the total vote (but only 7 out of 108 seats). Restless elements among the young Quebecois, however, impatient with the legal means of gaining the independence of French Quebec, polarized in 1963 in the clandestine FLQ. The first FLQ statement, in March of that year, included the words: "Quebec's independence is only possible through social revolution ... students, workers, peasants, form your clandestine groups against Anglo-American colonialism." _ James Stewart, The FLQ, Special Report by the Montreal 1970, p. 10. Star, 001903 �UNCLASSIFIED 2 The basis of FLQ violence was the rationalization that.,the people of Quebec were exploited, colonized, and alienated, but were not fully aware of this, and that the FLQ therefore had to serve as their conscience. Drawing inspiration from the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria, the Cuban revolution, Marx, Marcuse, the Black Panthers, and other revolutionary< groups and writers, the FLQ attracted radical young French Canadians. Because of its cellular organization and also because of frequent arrests, the FLQ lacked a permanent active leadership. A reliable government observer estimated that in 1970 the FLQ consisted of: a nucleus of 40 to 100 extremists ready to commit violent acts; a limited group, removed from the action, constituting the editorial and propagandist element; some 200 to 300 active sympathizers and supporters; and 2000 to 3000 passive sympathizers, or armchair cells. As one reviews the record of the FLQ acts of outrage in Quebec, the escalation preceding October 1970 is evident. Between 1963 and 1967, FLQ extremists planted about 35 bombs, most of them small, and carried out 8 holdups. In the following three years they took credit for 50 to 60 bombings of noticeably higher power and 25 holdups. Their actions and those of other activist groups by 1969 had begun to alarm the Montreal authorities. In November 1969, Lucien Saulnier, Chairman of the Executive Committee of Montreal, brought evidence of an organized subversive movement and planned armed insurrection to the attention of Ottawa. Linking the struggle for independence in Quebec with a fight for the destruction of the capitalist system, his report described a three-phase program starting with bombings and demonstrations and leading to military action, as in Vietnam. Gerard Pelletier, The October Crisis (translated by Joyce Marshall), McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., Toronto, 1971, p. 47. ** I b i d . , p. 51. *** I b i d . , pp. 67-70. >V*AA Stewart, p. 50. 001904 �UNCLASSIFIED 3 On February 26, 1970, the Montreal police had their first indications that the FLQ was planning diplomatic kidnappings when they stopped a rented panel truck and found two men, arms, and a document indicating the FLQ's intent to kidnap the Israeli consul in Montreal. A raid on a cottage in the Laurentians on June 21 turned up a cache of firearms, dynamite, and a draft of a ransom demand for the proposed kidnapping of Harrison Burgess, the U.S. Consul in.Montreal. The conditions set forth were almost iden- tical to those of the subsequent Cross kidnapping demands. Three days later, the FLQ took credit for a bomb explosion that killed two and wounded two others at Defense Headquarters in Ottawa. In July, police defused 150 pounds of dynamite planted in a car outside the Bank of Montreal. During August and September, more than 3000 sticks were re- ported stolen in a wave of dynamite thefts. Although the discovery of FLQ plans to kidnap two foreign diplomats alerted the Montreal foreign diplomatic community to take routine precautions to avert abductions, no drastic measures were taken. The U.S. Consul General, John Topping, for example, was completely unaware of the fact that the FLQ followed him frequently that summer. Despite the warn- ings of Saulnier's report, the consensus was that in Canada the possibility of such violent actions was extremely remote. Quebec Premier Bourassa's liberal regime saw the warnings, but pressed on with its healing measures of economic and social betterment for the Quebecois. 001905 �UNCLASSIFIED 4 II. GOVERNMENT POLICIES Throughout the period that Cross was held hostage, the British government publicly and privately expressed full confidence in the Canadian government. The British said repeatedly that their primary concern was the safe return of Gross; at no point did they put pressure on the Canadian government. Cross's replacement in Montreal, sent from the Embassy in Ottawa, maintained close ties between British and Canadian authorities. Sir Alec Douglas-Home replied to a question in the British House of Commons in mid-November, half-way through Cross's ordeal, with typical reserve: Since Mr. Cross was kidnapped on October 5, we have been in the closest touch with the Canadian Government, who have kept us fully informed of the measures they are taking to try to secure that Mr. Cross is released unharmed. I know all MP's will join me in expressing the hope that these efforts will prove successful, and in extending profound sympathy to Mr. Cross and his family in their ordeal. Canada's historically close ties with the British influenced the kidnappers' perceptions of both the public and government reaction to the kidnapping. The FLQ cell that seized Cross had initially targeted the American Consul General, but switched to the British Consul at the last moment because his abduction would cause more of a stir in a society already divided between Anglo and French Canadians. The avowed purpose of FLQ terrorism was to frighten the Anglophones, who had subjected Quebecois to humiliation and hate for 200 years, "to make them go home to their mother country, to AA Ontario, or Great Britain or the United States." The Canadian government had no announced policy concerning diplomatic kidnappings before Cross was taken and have had none since. Their stand throughout the October crisis to pay no ransom and to release no The Times_ (London), November 17, 1970. AA Kidnappers' tapes quoted in John Saywell, Quebec 70, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1971, p. 134. 001906 �UNCLASSIFIED 5 prisoners remained firm, but neither the federal nor provincial authorities ruled out negotiation. On the contrary, they showed their willing- ness to deal with the kidnappers early in the crisis by publicizing the FLQ manifesto as requested in the original list of demands. They made every effort to maintain a dialogue with the terrorists and to keep their options open at all times. The Cross kidnappers did not expect the government to remain firm and forceful in the face of their demands, estimating that perhaps "...in four or five days, a week at the outside, the government will agree to negotiate." The slow negotiations during the first week might well have ended in accommodation, had the second kidnapping not hardened each side's stand. The Cross kidnappers found varied reasons for their misjudgment of government policy. Reflecting on the events of the crisis, they said that the FLQ had been double-crossed by the Trudeau government. "The federal government stirred up the city much more than we thought they could..." and they attributed this to Trudeau's hard line, imposed upon him by the Anglo community. To compensate for being a French Canadian, Prime Minister Trudeau, they reasoned, had to cater to the Anglo powers in Ottawa by taking a hard stand on the dissenting Quebecois. "If it had been Pearson or Stanfield ... or another government chief ... anybody else but Trudeau ... you could say he would probably have accepted negotiations and liberation of the prisoners. I I * * The U.S. Government's role in. this crisis was one of anxious observer. Although there were rumors of U.S. troop movements, John Topping, the Consul General in Montreal, denied the existence of any official reaction to the kidnapping crisis. In 1973, the Toronto Star reported that a former Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) intelligence officer claimed that there had been a large-scale CIA infiltration of Montreal during the crisis and a buildup of American tanks and Ibid., p. 129. AA Ibid., p. 130. 001907 �UNCLASSIFIED 6 equipment just south of the border. No official credence was given to A these reports. The United States complied with a Canadian request for close border surveillance and added protection for Canadian diplo*A matic and consular personnel throughout the United States. Toronto Star, September 22, 1973, p. 1. AA Department of State, internal letter, October 20, 1970. 001908 �UNCLASSIFIED 7 III., NEGOTIATING THE HOSTAGES' RELEASE MONDAY, OCTOBER 5 At 8:15 a.m. on Monday, October 5, 1970, a maid at the Cross residence in Montreal admitted two young men delivering a wrapped "birthday" gift for the British Trade Commissioner. Once inside, the delivery men pro- duced a submachine gun from the gift package and forced the diplomat to leave with them. The maid called the police, but by the time they arrived there was no trace of Cross. Witnesses — Mrs. Cross, the maid, and a gardener across the street — could report only that four men had kidnapped him in a LaSalle taxi. Within a few hours, the FLQ claimed credit for the abduction in an anonymous call to radio station CKAC in Montreal. The caller said that documents relating to Cross had been left at the Lafontaine Pavillion of the University of Quebec. found communique No. 1 There police and reporters from the FLQ Liberation cell — a wordy, propagandist message containing the kidnappers' demands. The author- ities were told to: 1. Cease all police activities relating to the kidnapping; 2. Publish full text of the FLQ manifesto in newspapers, on radio, and on television; 3. Release the 23 "political" prisoners whose names were listed; 4. Provide aircraft for their flight to Cuba or Algeria; 5. Reinstate the Lapalme postal drivers who had lost jobs when a government contract was changed; 6. Give the released prisoners $500,000 in gold bars; and 7. Identify the informer who had helped police apprehend members of another FLQ cell. . A The texts of the communiques are given In English in Saywell, op. cit.; for communique No. 1, see p. 35. 001909 TTAir'T AgQTmnn �UNCLASSIFIED 8 Furthermore, the demands were to be met within 48'hours, that is, by noon on Wednesday, October 7. Detailed instructions accompanied the demands, along with assertions of support for liberation movements throughout the world. The note was almost identical to the one pre- pared for the kidnapping of an American consul and discovered the previous June in a police raid. Quebec Justice Jerome Choquette summarized the kidnappers' intentions in a public statement that afternoon, and Mrs. Cross appealed to the kidnappers to consider her husband's health and to administer two daily doses of a certain drug to counter high blood pressure. Also that day, Robert Lemieux, a Montreal lawyer who was sympathetic to the FLQ and who represented many of the FLQ members when they were later tried, said that the kidnapping could have been avoided had the Quebec government granted the amnesty he had previously demanded for A what he called political prisoners. The Quebec cabinet met in emergency session for three hours that evening. A spokesman would say only that the provincial government was working closely with the federal authorities. Because Cross was a foreign diplomat under the protection of the Canadian government and because most of the kidnappers' demands concerned the federal government, Ottawa moved directly into the Cross affair. In the Department of External Affairs, a task force headquarters was established with a network of direct communication with the Prime Minister, Quebec and Montreal authorities, and commercial news services. Mitchell Sharp, Minister of External Affairs, had announced the kidnapping in Commons that first afternoon and assured added protection to diplomatic and consular personnel in Canada. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6 A second communique from the Liberation cell, enclosing a letter from Cross to his wife, was delivered through radio station CKAC on Tuesday, October 6. It called upon the media to make all communiques _ Stewart, p. 59. 001910 �UNCLASSIFIED 9 public and to break "the wail of silence that the fascist police have erected around the liberation operation," The text contained assurances of Cross's good health and warned the authorities to take the FLQ demands seriously because "when the time limit has passed we will not hesitate at all to liquidate J. Cross ... because the life and liberty of the political prisoners and of the Lapalme guys are well worth hundreds of. diplomats serving only the financial interest of the Anglo-Saxon and American big bosses. The present authorities A alone will be truly responsible for his death." Both the Quebec and federal cabinets met to discuss the emergency. After consultation with Bourassa and British Prime Minister Heath, the Trudeau government announced its position in a statement to Commons by Mr. Sharp. Calling the demands, such as the 48-hour deadline, unreasonable, Sharp added: "I need hardly say that this set of demands will not be met ... we have the double responsibility to do our best to safeguard Mr. Cross and at the same time to preserve the rule of law in our country. The House can be sure that everything possible is being AA done...." Although he refused the FLQ demands, by limiting his state- ment to "this set of demands," he left the door open for government negotiations. In Quebec Bourassa endorsed the stand taken in Ottawa. That evening Robert Lemieux complained to the press that the authorities were not allowing him to see some of his jailed clients who were on the list of 23 prisoners to be freed. He claimed also that neither he nor his clients had contact with the kidnappers. WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 7 As tlie noon deadline approached, Justice Minister Choquette told a press conference that the government was ready to seek a solution. Declaring himself available by telephone at any hour, Choquette appealed to the abductors to allow their respect for human life to prevail over their political aspirations. *Saywell, p. In Ottawa, the Prime Minister 39. AA Ibid. 001911 �UNCLASSIFIED 10 told the morning sitting of Parliament that a minority could not be A allowed to impose its view on the majority by violence. The noon deadline passed; at about 1:30, a cabbie delivered to AA station CKLM communique No. 4 which was to his wife. and two letters from Cross, one of The Liberation cell had extended the dead- line 24 hours, within which time the authorities had to meet two preliminary demands: (1) to broadcast the FLQ manifesto on the state network and (2) immediately to halt all police searches, seizures, and AAA arrests. 1. The letter, signed J. Cross, was as follows: I ask the authorities to respond favourably to the demands of the FLQ. 2. It will be faster and easier for everyone if all the FLQ communiques are published in full,. 3. Please be assured that I am well and receiving the medicaments for my blood pressure. 4. I am being well treated but the FLQ are determined to achieve their demands. In Montreal, Lemieux called on the authorities to stop making vague declarations and appoint a neutral intermediary. Toward the same end, Sharp, in Ottawa, read a statement asking the kidnappers to name someone with whom the authorities could deal with confidence. The statement, although it again referred to the demands as unreasonable, expressed official willingness to broadcast the FLQ manifesto. THURSDAY, OCTOBER 8 The second noon deadline again passed without a communication, but at about 2:30 p.m., a tip to Pierre Pascau, a CKLM disc jockey, led to A Stewart, p. 62. AA No. 3 had apparently been delivered to the Cross house and was not made public. Saywell, p. 41. AAA Saywell, p. 41. 001912 �UNCLASSIFIED 11 a message in a telephone booth. Repeating that the two demands of the previous day must be met, the Liberation cell asked the authorities to specify exactly what they meant by unreasonable demands. Communique No. 5 ended with the note: "We reject the idea of a mediator; we will continue to establish our communications in our own way, avoiding the A traps set by the fascist police." Nevertheless, Lemieux, still aspiring to be a mediator, appeared to be speaking to the FLQ when he said that evening before a television camera that the government "claims it wants to negotiate...." Then he hinted that the government wanted to negotiate *A to gain time for the police to find the hostage. In the meantime, the police rounded up a number of suspects, and the Royal 22d Regiment, the famed French Canadian regular unit, moved 250 men to the Montreal area. Rumors indicated (correctly) that Mrs. Cross and her maid had identified one of the kidnappers from pictures as Jacques Lanctot, who had been arrested in February on charges of conspiracy to kidnap the Israeli trade commissioner and subsequently jumped bail, but there was no official confirmation. The government met one.of the FLQ demands at 10:30 that evening, when the French network of Radio-Canada broadcast the FLQ manifesto. A lengthy Marxist diatribe against both Canadian and Quebecois institutions and government leaders, it called on the workers of Quebec to revolt, naming as the real oppressors "the big bosses" compared to whom "Bourassa and Trudeau, the fairy, are peanuts." The manifesto ended with the warning: "You cannot hold an awakening people in misery and AAA contempt indefinitely. Long Live Free Quebec." FRIDAY, OCTOBER 9 The FLQ responded the next morning to the government move with communique No. 6, setting forth the two final conditions for Cross's A Saywell, p. 45. AA Ibid., p. 46. AAA Saywell, pp. 50-51, 001913 -r-rik-r^-a-w- ts, *-**-*e-w-a » IITN �UNCLASSIFIED 12 release. The message, addressed to Pierre Pascau of CKLM, went astray and was sent again at 6 p.m., along with a later message (No. 7), accusing the authorities of trying to gain time by not releasing the earlier communique. Meanwhile, Choquette asked the kidnappers through Pascau to postpone any decision on Cross and to supply proof that he was alive and well. The confirmation was to be in the form of a specially worded, handwritten note from Cross. Such a note was delivered, along with the kidnappers' two notes, at 6 p.m. The FLQ's two conditions for Cross's safe release were (1) the liberation of "consenting" political prisoners and their transportation, along with their wives and families, if they so desired, to Cuba or Algeria, as set out in the first communique, and (2) immediate suspension of all "searches, raids, arrests and tortures on the part of A the fascist police forces." According to communique No. 6, Cross would be released within 24 hours following the return of observers who were to accompany the political prisoners. The FLQ added the warning that, if the police interfered before Cross's release, "be sure that we will defend our lives dearly and that J. Cross would be executed at once. And we have enough dynamite to feel 'safe.'" The 6 p.m. message stated that it was "the last communique in the event the ruling authorities do not free the political prisoners between now and 6 AA o'clock" (the evening of October 10). SATURDAY, OCTOBER 10 Lemieux spoke twice to the press, once accusing Cross of using his letters to reveal his whereabouts and later offering to accompany the prisoners to Cuba or Algeria. He also said that a vigilante group had AAA warned that they would kill him if Cross were killed. Since Canada appeared quite normal that Friday, Bourassa flew to New York as previously planned to meet investment dealers and government officials. "What will they say if I don't go? They will say Quebec is A Saywell, p. 51. AA Ibid., p. 52. AAA S a y w e l l , p . 52. 001914 �UNCLASSIFIED 13 A not a safe place to invest because the Premier is afraid to leave." He returned the following afternoon before the 6 p.m. deadline. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 10 Choquette answered the kidnappers at 5:30 p.m., an hour before the deadline. ' He emphasized the dedication of the Quebec government to social reform and their desire to correct injustices. Describing the Cross kidnappers as "mature and adult enough" to see that there was need for differences of opinion on these issues, he called on them to understand the government's position and to contribute to a constructive solution of society's problems. The government, the Justice Minister added, was prepared to parole prisoners by normal procedures and to show clemency toward all prisoners. As a final concession, it was prepared to offer safe conduct for the kidnappers to a foreign country. In exchange, it asked for Cross's release. ' Reviewing the negotiations from Monday to Saturday between the government and the Liberation cell, it is evident that both sides were compromising to work out a settlement. The original conditions had eroded, as had the original 48-hour deadline. The government had ful- filled the demand of publicizing the FLQ manifesto and, although still rejecting the release of prisoners, was willing to grant safe conduct to the kidnappers. The Liberation cell had waived the ransom of $500,000 and the demands concerning the Lapalme postal drivers and the police informers, and by Saturday were insisting on only two of the original seven demands: the release of prisoners and cessation of police action. At 6:18 p.m., after Choquette broadcast the government's counterproposal, four members of another FLQ cell thoroughly undermined the negotiations for Cross's release by kidnapping Pierre Laporte, Minister of Labor and Immigration of Quebec Province, as a second hostage. All Canada was stunned. "In a single moment of Pierre Laporte's kidnapping, the crisis escalated a thousandfold. In the week after the A | Toronto Globe and Mail, April 4, 1972. 001915 -r-r-»,T*-«-w m. r-*r*-wniw • IT>, �UNCLASSIFIED 14 Cross kidnapping, the negotiations with the kidnappers had been carried out as a cool, dispassionate diplomatic exercise.... The kidnapping of Cross at first seemed a single criminal incident, but a second kidnapping carried the implicit threat of a third. The crisis was now A greater than the sum of its parts." Police activity Immediately accelerated as guards were assigned to the homes of all cabinet ministers and other public figures. Bourassa moved into heavily guarded quarters in the Queen Elizabeth Hotel in Montreal. Messages were reported to have been sent from Ottawa to prominent Quebec businessmen warning them that the government could not AA be responsible for their personal safety. SUNDAY, OCTOBER 11 Laporte's kidnappers did not hesitate to announce their aim. Early Sunday morning, Daniel McGinniss of CKAC was informed of an envelope near a subway station. By 9 a.m., he had located communique No. 1. Signed by the Chenier financial cell and accompanied by Laporte's National Assembly identification card, it announced that the cell had kidnapped the minister and set 10 p.m. that evening as the deadline for his execution unless all seven of the Liberation cell's demands were fully complied with. "Any partial acceptance will be considered as a refusal." At one that afternoon, CKAC received communication No. 2, claiming to be its last, from the Chenier cell.^ It repeated the demands and enclosed a note from Laporte to his wife saying that he was well, but that the "main thing is that the authorities take action." Throughout the day, Bourassa met with his cabinet and consulted with the government in Ottawa and with members of the opposition party. Robert Lemieux was arrested that morning and held without bail on the charge of impeding police agents in their duties relating to the Cross kidnapping. By 5 p.m., CKAC had another communique from the Chenier cell containing Laporte's credit cards and a letter from Laporte to Bourassa. Laporte warned of more kidnappings if the authorities refused to A Ron Haggart and Aubrey E. Golden, Rumours of War, New Press, Toronto, 1971, p. 15. AA Ibid. TIN™ • A^re?™™-* 001916 �UNCLASSIFIED 15 release prisoners, adding "one might as well act now and avoid a bloodA bath.... The letter also contained a personal appeal concerning his family responsibilities (Section V). At 9.55 p.m., five minutes before the deadline set by Laporte's abductors, Bourassa broadcast an appeal to the FLQ for a mechanism by which to negotiate and for some assurance that the release of the political prisoners would result in the release of the hostages. It was a delib- erately ambiguous statement: Bourassa hinted that the government would consider freeing what, in an obvious concession, he called "political" prisoners. The two FLQ cells responded separately to the government's apparently softer stand, but each interpreted it as indicating a different degree of concession. A few hours after Bourassa's address, Cross's kidnappers sent a note to CKLM. Repeating demands for the release of consenting political prisoners and their safe conduct to Cuba or Algeria and for a halt to police searches, it stated that Robert Lemieux should serve as intermediary between the two cells and the authorities. No time limit was imposed, and a letter from Cross to Bourassa was enclosed as proof that Cross was alive. This step toward negotiation after Bourassa's apparent acceptance of negotiating on the prisoner issue indicated progress toward a compromise solution. MONDAY, OCTOBER 12 Before noon on Monday, the Chenier cell, still uncompromising, responded to Bourassa's message as if it had been the government's acceptance of the FLQ demands. They accepted Lemieux as the intermediary, agreeing that "Each of his decisions will be final. He and we are as one." But they refused to negotiate on the six remaining conditions, insisting that Laporte would be freed only after all of the demands had been fulfilled. An accompanying letter from Laporte to Bourassa also assumed that the authorities would meet the original FLQ demands. _ Saywell, p. 61. 001917 �UNCLASSIFIED 16 Laporte's note instructed the government to release the prisoners that evening or the next morning and suggested ways to employ the Lapalme A drivers. A second communique from the Chenier cell, sent through Pierre Pascau of station CKLM that afternoon, summed up the FLQ position: Cross would be freed when (1) the prisoners were freed and (2) police repression was halted; Laporte's release depended on the complete fulfillment of all the original FLQ conditions. It was to be the last communication from the Chenier cell before execution or liberation of Pierre Laporte. Troops were seen taking up positions around Montreal, but the Canadian Army denied that this had any connection with the crisis. Another vigilante group threatened a 3 to 1 reprisal against families of AA political prisoners if Cross or Laporte were killed. In Ottawa, after senior ministers called for preservation of the security of the federal capital, troops were moved in to guard public buildings and prominent public figures. At 7:15 p.m., after meeting with cabinet and opposition leaders, Bourassa named Robert Demers, a Montreal lawyer, to represent the Quebec authorities in negotiations with Lemieux. Later that evening, Demers and Lemieux met in Lemieux's prison cell. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13 Lemieux, released on his own recognizance, met twice during the day with Demers. The government's position was that there would be no discussion of FLQ demands until the initial question — and Laporte — the safety of Cross had been settled. Lemieux suggested that the released 2> prisoners and the ransom be held by the authorities in Cuba or Algeria until the Canadian government reported Cross and Laporte safe. Demers countered with the suggestion that one member from each of the cells be held hostage by the government until prisoners were freed, after which they would be allowed to join their colleagues. 'ibid., p. 67. AA Saywell, p. 69. 001918 �UNCLASSIFIED 17 Lemieux declared at a press conference that evening that he could not meet with Demers again without a new mandate from the FLQ. He said that Demers had given him the impression that the government was buying A time, and that he would not be used. Lemieux s statements could be understood as indicating intransigence on the part of either side; they also could be interpreted as a plea for guidance or a mandate from the FLQ. Apparently, his method of communicating with his clients was through the media, and he was using the press conference to let them know that the authorities would negotiate and to ask them how far he could go. The FLQ did not respond that day. The cabinet met in Ottawa to discuss messages about the crisis from Montreal and Quebec and the possible use of the War Measures Act (WMA). That afternoon, the Prime Minister, questioned by two reporters as he entered Commons, revealed a harder line on negotiation with the kidnappers than Bourassa's. Asked about the seven FLQ demands, he replied, "My position is that you don't give in to any of them." He took the press to task for calling the 23 outlaws political prisoners and said in answer to a question about civil liberties: I think society must take every means at its disposal to defend itself against the emergence of a parallel power which defies the elected power in this country and I think Jsnat goes' to^. any distance. So long as there is a power in here which is challenging the elected representative of the people, I think that power must be stopped and I think it's only, I repeat, weakkneed bleeding hearts who are afraid to take measures. WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 14 The two cells of the FLQ issued a joint communique, again through CKLM, answering Lemieux as follows: (1) They refused to turn over a member of each cell as guarantees, but accepted Lemieux's suggestion to have the political prisoners held in Cuba or Algeria until Cross and Laporte were to be released. (2) They questioned the goodwill of _ Saywell, p. 70. AA Ibid., p. 73. 001919 �UNCLASSIFIED 18 the authorities, because of continued police searches, raids, and other activities. to negotiate. (3) They renewed Lemieux's mandate, giving him carte blanche (4) They asked Lemieux to make public the results of fur- ther negotiations, after which they would communicate their decision. During the afternoon Lemieux met again with Demers for an hour. "Total war" was how Ontario Prime Minister John Robarts, in Toronto, described the Quebec situation to the press. Indeed, troops continued to move to Camp Bouchard, 25 miles from Montreal. Meanwhile, the harassed Premier of Quebec hinted to (among others) two prominent Quebecois, Rene Levesque, leader of the Parti Quebecois, and Claude Ryan, influential editor of Le Devoir, that the government might take a small step toward A toughness. Bourassa denied repeatedly, however, that the Quebec governAA ment was being driven by a hard line from Ottawa, and that evening announced that his government had not yet taken a final stand on the terms to be negotiated. Levesque, who had earlier urged the govern- ment to comply with FLQ demands and suggested that federal authorities leave the negotiation to Quebec, and Ryan decided on joint action. After meeting that evening with 14 other prominent Quebecois, they issued a statement calling for negotiation to save the lives of the hostages, criticizing the influence of Ottawa and the attitude of the Ontario Prime Minister on what they considered a Quebec affair, and offering to support Bourassa on his earlier stand favoring negotiation. In Ottawa, Stanfield, the leader of the opposition, pressed Trudeau for an assurance that his government, even if it had the authority in law, would not declare emergency powers without seeking the approval of Parliament. Trudeau replied that "if such action were ever contemplated it would certainly be discussed in the House of Commons. Whether it would be immediately before or immediately after would depend, of course...." Later that evening the cabinet discussed every possible way in which the government of Canada, in conjunction with Quebec, could meet the crisis, AAA including by invoking the War Measures Act. _ Haggart and Golden, p. 29. AA Saywell, p. 76. AAA Ibid., p. 79. 001920 �UNCLASSIFIED 19 THURSDAY, OCTOBER 15 Thursday was a tense and decisive day in Montreal and Ottawa. Trudeau canceled his trip to the Soviet Union, which was to begin on Sunday. University students in Montreal boycotted classes to study the FLQ manifesto and planned a mass evening rally at the Paul Sauve Arena, after which the organizers intended to march through the streets to the City Hall and Palace of Justice. Faced with these demonstrations, numerous bomb threats, and an increasing number of calls for assistance, the Montreal police requested outside help. The Quebec Provincial Police, also taxed to the limit, did the same. Consequently, at 3:07 p.m., Bourassa called on the Canadian Army, which sent more than one thousand soldiers, who took up positions in and around major public buildings in Montreal, Quebec City, and other points in the province. Lemieux, meanwhile, told the FLQ in a television appearance that he had information that the police had found the Chenier cell and were only waiting to find the Liberation cell before attacking both. He demanded an answer from the government. After consultation with Ottawa, Quebec officials worked out their next key reply to the FLQ which Bourassa announced at 9 p.m. First, he asked that the International Red Cross or the Consulate of Cuba in Montreal act as intermediary for release of the two hostages. His government, refused freedom for the 23 prisoners, but recommended the parole of five who had requested it; promised safe passage for the kidnappers to the country of their choice; rejected the other demands; and demanded a reply from the FLQ within six hours. Indeed, this was a considerably more hardened stand than Bourassa had hinted at on Monday. Lemieux reacted immediately, calling the offer to free five prisoners who should have been paroled a long time ago a mockery of the people of Quebec. Asked if he were walking out of the negotiations, A Lemieux replied that he had been thrown out. That night at the Paul Sauve Arena, students, activists, radicals, FLQ supporters, among Ibid., p. 82. 001921 �UNCLASSIFIED 20 them Lemieux, cheered for the FLQ and the liberation of Quebec. Claude Ryan, deploring the day's events, compared the two hostages to pawns on a much bigger chessboard. "When confronted with the appeal made in the streets by Mr. Lemieux and his friends, the Quebec government, with the experience of the past few years in mind, judged it necessary to call in the armed forces. And quite rightly so...." He added that he hoped the crisis would go no farther, for to move the Canadian government to invoke the'War Measures Act would allow political authority and initiative to pass to the central government. "We must at all costs avoid the downfall of Quebec into civil war and its subjugation A to martial law." FRIDAY, OCTOBER 16 The Quebec authorities, however, saw a further deteriorating situation. At 3 a.m. on Friday, the deadline which Bourassa had set for the FLQ, letters arrived in Ottawa from the City of Montreal and the Province of Quebec requesting emergency measures to deal with a state of apprehended insurrection. The federal government, already prepared to act, invoked the War Measures Act at 4 a.m. The act had been on the books since World War I, but had never before been invoked in peacetime. Using the new powers granted them by the act, the government outlawed the FLQ and granted the police extraordinary powers of arrest and detention. At 5:15 a.m., when the public announcement was made, the police started arrests throughout the province; by nightfall they had picked up 250 suspects, including Lemieux. That day in Commons, Trudeau defended the government's action, although he sympathized with those who were concerned about the suspension of civil liberties. The opponents were few but vocal; according to one, "The government ... is using a sledgehammer to crack a AA peanut." Later, on television, Trudeau appealed for understanding, admitting that he found the strong powers distasteful and promising Ibid., pp. 83-84. Ibid., p. 91. 001922 �UNCLASSIFIED 21 the government would revoke them as soon as possible. He said that the government "is acting to prevent fear from spreading,,.. It is acting to make clear to kidnappers, revolutionaries and assassins that in this country laws are made and changed by the elected representatives of all Canadians not by a handful of self-styled dictators. i * In Quebec, Premier Bourassa took complete responsibility for the decision to invoke the War Measures Act. He explained that the FLQ plan, which began with bombings and demonstrations, had progressed to kidnappings; the next stage, he said, would include selected assasinations and the risks of anarchy; thus, he concluded, the state had ** to act firmly. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 17 The FLQ had not been heard from since Wednesday. Finally on Saturday morning, the Liberation cell sent out its tenth communique, along with a letter from Cross to his wife. The communique announced that Cross's death sentence had been revoked and that he would be executed only if the police discovered them. It said also that the Chenier cell was studying Laporte's case and would make known its decision shortly. Jacques Lanctot, one of the Cross kidnappers, later told Bernard Mergler, the lawyer who negotiated Cross's release, that the Liberation cell had intended this communique as a signal to the Chenier cell that Laporte should be kept alive. But because the police did not allow the message to be released to the media, the Chenier cell did not receive the signal. The Chenier cell was silent until 7 p.m., when an anonymous caller to station CKAC said that a package could be found in an abandoned car near the St. Hubert airfield. Thinking it a hoax because many anonymous calls were being received, the station employees did nothing. After the third call, a reporter retrieved, at a theater, a note containing Ibid., p. 93. Ibid., p. 92. 001923 �UNCLASSIFIED 22 the message: ''Pierre Laporte, Minister of Unemployment and Assimilation, was executed at 6:18 tonight,... You will find the body in the trunk of the green Chevrolet (9J-2420) at the St. Hubert Base, We shall overcome. FLQ." The reporter found the car locked, and called the police, who came with the bomb squad. At 12:20, when the police pried open the trunk, they found the body.of Pierre Laporte. Premier Bourassa, unaware that the body had been found, broadcast an appeal to the kidnappers for the release of Cross and Laporte. He proposed an exchange involving representatives of the Cuban government a neutral location, on the Expo-1967 site, and adequate protection against a double cross. SUNDAY, OCTOBER 18 The news of Laporte's murder reached Ottawa early Sunday morning. Commons was in session. At 3 a.m., Trudeau spoke briefly to the nation of Pierre Laporte, who "was so cowardly assassinated by a band of murderers." Some TV and radio stations reported the death of Cross as well; the suspense continued until 1 p.m., when CKLM received a message from him reassuring all that he was well. He had seen his death reported on television, he wrote, and "this must have been terrifying for my wife." He suggested that the Red Cross or the Cuban consulate could act as intermediaries for his release in exchange for that of the political prisoners. The police issued a nationwide warrant for the arrest of two suspects in the kidnapping: Paul Rose, an ex-schoolteacher, and Marc Carbonneau,.37, a taxi driver. A published picture of Paul Rose led to his identification by residents of Armstrong Street in the suburb of St. Hubert. Police investigated the house where he had lived for the past six months and found blood matching Laporte's, fingerprints of known FLQ members, and other evidence, leaving no doubt that it was the hideout where Laporte had been held for a week and killed. Pierre Laporte's body lay in state in the Montreal Courthouse from Sunday evening until Tuesday. Thousands of people paid their respects, among them the Prime Minister. Sunday night, Trudeau 001924 �UNCLASSIFIED 23 appeared on both the English and French television networks to speak eloquently of Laporte, of the FLQ and their terrorism, violence, and murder, and of the will of the Canadians to resist the FLQ. "These loveless creatures who have tried to divide us through tragedy have today caused us to unite together in a common purpose." Bourassa also spoke that day on television, promising that his government would not buckle under FLQ pressure. He repeated the offer of safe conduct to the Cross kidnappers if they released their hostage unharmed. MONDAY, OCTOBER 19 Commons approved the government's action under the War Measures Act by a vote of 190 to 16 after the government announced that within a month the WMA would be replaced by new legislation. The public over- whelmingly supported the government's action, as did the opposition, united behind the government by Laporte's murder. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 20 Pierre Laporte's funeral was attended by prominent Canadian and Quebecois government officials under heavy security. Not until the day after Laporte's burial was the manner of his death revealed by the coroner in a brief autopsy report: He had been choked to death with the chain of a religious medal he wore around his neck. The kidnappers continued to communicate after Laporte's death. On October 27, Laporte's kidnappers sent Paul Rose's passport, which was not made public, despite the threat that if it were not, the Chenier cell would cease communications. On November 6, police raided the Montreal apart- ment where the four Laporte kidnappers had been hiding since the murder; one of the suspects was captured, but the other three eluded police. Later, they sent their last communique, describing their escape and mocking the police for allowing them to do so. They remained at large until late December. Saywell, p. 105. 001925 �UNCLASSIFIED 24 On November 4, Canadian newspapers received a photograph of Cross sitting on a case labeled explosives, playing cards. The Associated Press in New York also received a photograph and a communique which made no mention of Cross's release. On the 21st, the Quebec Press received the last communique from Cross's kidnappers, enclosing a letter from him. The communique complained of government torture, searches, arrests,, and censorship, and called on the U.N. to mediate with the Canadian government to release the political prisoners. Cross's note assured all interested, "if there are still some," that he was well treated and in good health. "They consider me a political prisoner [sic] and they will keep me in captivity as long as the A authorities do not accept their demands." Quiet and exhaustive police work finally led to the apartment where Cross was being held. The hideout had been under surveillance for about a week when police arrested Jacques and Louise CosetteTrudel as they emerged on the afternoon of December 2. When the police closed in at midnight and turned off the electricity, the kidnappers tossed out a note: "If you try anything at all (gas, gunfire, etc.), M. J. Cross will be the first to die. We have several sticks of 'detonated' dynamite (powerfrac). us a reporter from the Quebec Press If you want to negotiate send or the Devoir plus Mr. B. Mergler. We shall overcome. FLQ." By morning security forces had cordoned off and evacuated the area. The authorities, taking seriously the warnings of the Liberation cell that if they discovered the hideout before Cross's release he would be the first to die, moved with extreme caution. Bernard Mergler, a lawyer, agreed to negotiate and at 11 a.m. entered the apartment to find Cross and three terrorists: Marc Carbonneau, Jacques Lanctot, and Yves Langlois. The Canadian authorities had alerted the Cuban Embassy and arranged for a Canadian military aircraft to fly the kidnappers out of Canada. Mergler explained the details of the transfer and safe conduct to Cuba and extended the offer to the Cosette-Trudels _ Saywell, p. 124. 001926 �UNCLASSIFIED 25 and to Jacques Lanctot's wife and child. Surrounded by hundreds of heavily armed police and troops, the kidnappers agreed to accept the government's terms, and Cross was released unharmed. 001927 �UNCLASSIFIED 26 IV. THE TERRORISTS i The eight terrorists responsible for the two kidnappings in Montreal were young French Canadian revolutionaries and members of the FLQ. They had been active in earlier disruptive FLQ activities previously, a few of them even jailed for short periods. Their cause concerned their own people — freedom for French Canada — but they felt themselves part of a worldwide terrorist movement. They compared their struggle to that of the NLF in Algeria and the Black Panthers in the United States and studied the writings of Brazil's Carlos Marighela and Cuba's Che Guevara. But, although they specified that the released prisoners be sent to Algeria or Cuba, they had no direct connection with terrorist groups abroad in carrying out the Cross and Laporte kidnappings. The FLQ had no formal structure or hierarchy. formed by any group at will for their revolution: A cell could be The Liberation cell, for example, was formed to kidnap Cross; the Chenier financial cell, which was responsible for Laporte's abduction, had originally been constituted to raise funds for the FLQ. The Liberation cell comprised four young men, assisted by the wife of one: (1) Marc Carbonneau, a former Montreal taxi driver, who had been involved during the previous summer in a group taxi-driver protest in Montreal. (2) Jacques Lanctot, who had been arrested in February, charged with possession of a sawed-off rifle, and jumped bail. The van in which he had been riding contained the press releases announcing the kidnapping (which did not take place) of the Israeli consul; his brother Francois had been arrested in June in possession of notes announcing the kidnapping (also not carried out) of the American consul. (3) Jacques Cosette-Trudel, 23, who had been a high-school teacher in Montreal and a summer guide at CBC, but said he found no satisfaction in working while other French Canadians suffered from discrimination, and had begun participating in FLQ activities. Sharing his FLQ sympathies and joining him and the kidnappers in the hideout was liis wife, Louise, who was Lanctot's sister and a former librarian. (4) Yves Langlois, 25, alias Pierre Seguin, who had once been a stenographer for the Superior Court and the Quebec Police Commission001928 �UNCLASSIFIED 27 After spending a year in England, he had returned to Canada in January 1970 and encouraged his FLQ friends in kidnapping activity. During the summer of 1970, the young men worked out the plan to kidnap some prominent person in Montreal. Driving around the wealthier sections of Montreal in either Lanetot's old car or Carbonneau's taxi with the dome light removed, they followed and discussed abducting several people, among them U.S. Consul General John Topping, an official of the International Air Traffic Association, and James Cross, all of whom lived in the same area. The day before the planned kidnapping, they chose Cross over Topping, because "we figured the English in Quebec would never identify with an American, but if we took the Englishman we thought it would stir more hostility from the English in the province A and across Canada...." The Cross kidnapping was well planned and went off without major problems. The kidnappers stole a taxi from a LaSalle taxi garage, used it for the kidnapping, changed to their own car, and returned the taxi before the owners knew it was missing. This ruse explains why the kid- AA nap vehicle was never found. The terrorists made one error of for- getting to don their hoods; as a result, Mrs. Cross and her maid were able to identify Jacques Lanctot from a police photograph, and the security forces got their first important lead in the case. They used the hoods in the hideout so that the hostage never saw their faces. The flat where Cross was held in the suburb of Montreal North had been rented by the Cosette-Trudel couple under an assumed name the month previous to the kidnapping, and it proved ideal. The flat had a garage entrance concealed from the street. Cross remained in the back bedroom with curtains drawn, except when he used the bathroom immediately adjacent. Two other bedrooms were occupied by the Cosette-Trudels and the three other jailers. The modest, working-class neighbors noticed nothing amiss in the comings and goings of the group. Cross reported that his captors were neither warm nor hostile and looked upon him as a symbol. Among themselves they maintained a formal .Weekend Magazine 22, 1974, p. 2. (supplement of Toronto Globe and Mail), January AA Mergler interview in Toronto Daily Star, March 9, 1971. 001929 �28 courtesy, calling each other "monsieur" even through the most tense periods. Although he could not see them, during the first week of his captivity, he carried on amicable conversations with them concerning their political objectives in the kidnapping. Their answers were full of political rhetoric about establishing a revolutionary state in Quebec, and their minds generally closed on political matters. Cross's impression was that they were capable of violence and would be A prepared to go to any ends, including their deaths, for their cause. Their early communiques confirmed such intentions, warning that they would kill Cross if the hideout were discovered before the terms -were settled. However, after the unexpected complications introduced by the Laporte affair and the long waiting period for Cross's discovery, they faced the choice of a violent end or bargaining for Cross's life and their safe conduct, and they chose the latter. The Liberation cell left behind in the hideout some revealing taped conversations in which they discussed their accomplishments and expectations. They expected the government to agree to their demands within four or five days or a week; their expectations were, in fact, borne out when, in answer to the Liberation cell's "last" communique, Choquette offered safe conduct for the kidnappers and clemency toward prisoners in exchange for Cross's release. Cross had the impression, as he and his jailers watched Choquette together, that they would accept the compromise. When he asked what they would do with him, they answered that they would hold him for a few days to taunt the police and then let him go. Lanctot, whom the police were hunting, could avail himself of the offer of safe conduct, but the others might not need it, inasmuch as they could not be identified, even by Cross, AA because of the elaborate precautions they had taken not to be seen. The Laporte kidnapping, following immediately the Choquette speech, was a complete surprise to the Liberation cell. Cross, who viewed the television reports of the second kidnapping with his captors and heard their reactions, verified the fact that they had no joint Haggart and Golden, p. 231. AA Ibid., pp. 231-232. TT7STflTiAggTi3tTTir»T^ �29 plans or connections with the Chenier cell during the early stages of -• his captivity. Initially, his captors approved the Laporte kidnapping and because of it changed their minds about going along with the comA promise as outlined by Choquette. In the second week of the confinement, some hostility replaced the cool but friendly dialogue between Cross and his jailers because of speculations on the part of the media that he might be sending coded messages about their location in his dictated communications. When days passed and they were not discovered, their fears subsided, as did their hostility. Then shock of Laporte's death interrupted the police dialogue, and it was never resumed; the kidnappers and their hostage remained in separate worlds as they waited out their discovery. On December 2, the police arrested and questioned the CosetteTrudel couple. The following morning, Bernard Mergler came to the flat with the government's offer of safe conduct for the kidnappers and their families in return for Cross's release unharmed. The three terrorists tried to extract concessions on freeing other prisoners, but the government held firm. They were concerned that the police would not keep their word and would fire on them. As they prepared to leave, they kept machine guns and dynamite ready to use if the security forces or gathering crowds interfered. They were allowed to drive their own car to the Expo site, where the Cuban representatives awaited them. To allay their fears of police ambush, Mergler and Cross rode with them. At the Expo site, Jacques Lanctot's wife and 20-month-old son and the Cosette-Trudels joined them for exile. They went off to their new life with only a few personal possessions, among them the television set that Cross had watched during his captivity. When one of them remarked that it would be bourgeois to bring it to Cuba, another suggested that perhaps they could donate it to a children's home. After Ibid., p. 233. 001931 �UNCLASSIFIED 30 their brief attempt failed to pry open the jammed lock of the car trunk, which held most of their possessions, they gave up and left their belongings behind. As the four cell members and the wives of two of them left for the airport, Cross said sadly to Mergler, "It was a case of six kids A trying to make a revolution." The young revolutionaries who made up the Chenier cell were a tougher breed. In March 1970, the leader, Paul Rose, 27, a former teacher, had rented the house at 5630 Armstrong Street in St. Hubert where Laporte was held. There he lived with his girl friend as Mr. and Mrs. Paul Blais; the other three members of the cell also lived there at times during that summer, planning FLQ activities, including kidnapping. They were: his brother, Jacques Rose, 23, a former mechanic, Francis Simard, 23; and Bernard Lortie, 19, a student. The group had lived together in the Gaspe during the previous summer in a "hippie" household, organizing demonA* strations against private, American-owned fishing lodges there. In late September 1970, the Rose brothers, with $600 between them, along with their mother, sister, and Francis Simard, drove to the United States. According to Rose, their purpose was to raise funds and buy weapons for FLQ activities, although his mother thought they were going to get jobs. Driving through Texas on October 5, they learned from the car radio that James Cross had been kidnapped by the FLQ in Montreal. Deciding that the FLQ needed another hostage because the government would never give in for Cross, they immediately headed back to Montreal, arriving four days later. The three men bought weapons in a pawn shop and stayed for a day in a motel while Simard went to the house on Armstrong Street to see if it had been under surveillance. On October 9, they returned to the house to plan tlie kidnapping. Deciding on Laporte, a fellow French Canadian, because he lived within a 10-minute drive of their house, they observed his house and movements, bought disguises, and plotted the abduction. Toronto Daily Star, March 9, 1971. AA 1971. Haggart and Golden, p. 36; Toronto Globe and Mail, February 20, 001932 �UNCLASSIFIED 31 As their fourth man, they picked Bernard Lortie, who had discussed kidnappings with them previously and was willing to cooperate. After listening to Choquette's October 10 broadcast, which appeared to be about to succeed in bringing about Cross's release and an end to the crisis, the four Chenier cell members, carrying two M-l rifles and a sawed-off shotgun, left for Laporte's house in Rose's Chevrolet. They stopped at a restaurant along the way to call Laporte and learned from his wife that he was outside. Finding him on the lawn, Paul Rose and Lortie, wearing masks, ordered Laporte into the car at gunpoint. He was blindfolded and made to lie on the floor between the back and front seats, under a trenchcoat. These men imposed much harsher conditions on their hostage than did the Liberation cell members on theirs. They kept Laporte blindfolded and handcuffed to his bed during the whole week of his captivity. The captors set up 8-hour watches, with two on duty at all times, one in the front of the house and one in the rear. They had a radio to keep them informed of the bargaining and other events related to the crisis. During the week that they held Laporte, the kidnappers evidently were in and out a good deal. Paul Rose used taxis and buses to get around the city to make anonymous calls from phone booths and to deposit communiques. On Tuesday, he noticed that he was being fol- lowed in Montreal; instead of returning to the hideout, he spent most of that evening at a friend's house while the police watched outside. He managed to leave in his friend's car without being seen by the police, but left behind his overcoat. That week the police raided a house on Armstrong Street, near the hideout; both Laporte and his jailers were apprehensive that they had been discovered. Paul Rose felt increasingly pressed after the two brushes with the police. Public tension was also mounting as the government held firm in its determination not to capitulate to the FLQ. Rose was later reported to have said that when he met with Jacques CosetteTrudel of the Liberation cell on Wednesday 001933 �UNCLASSIFIED 32 it was clearly decided that if the government did not accept our demands, that is, the liberation of the political prisoners, the FLQ would not intercede in favor of the minister, Pierre Laporte, in the death sentence imposed on him by the present authorities, and that Mr. Cross from that moment on would be A considered as a permanent political prisoner. On Friday, a week after he was abducted, as the kidnappers were listening to the radio, Laporte attempted to escape by throwing himself through a window and was seriously cut in the move, Lortie bandaged the cuts and later met Rose in Montreal to tell him of the attempted escape. Rose sent Lortie to hide with FLQ friends in Montreal, and himself returned to St. Hubert. He later gave the following account of what happened afterward: On Saturday, October 17, 1970, we talked about the War Measures Act, the speech by Bourassa the night before, the airlift at the St. Hubert air base, and we also discussed the mechanics of Laporte's execution and the measures to take to complete the operation, that is, the disposal of the body. All three of us were in the house at 5630 Armstrong when Laporte was executed. Two of us were holding him while the third tightened the chain that he wore around his neck. Later we placed Laporte's body in the trunk of the 1968 Chevrolet. After killing Laporte, the three men joined Lortie at the FLQ apartment in Montreal. place. They built a wall within a large closet to make a hiding When the police came, only three had time to conceal themselves. Bernard Lortie was arrested; the other three remained in the closet for over 24 hours, until the police left the next evening for dinner, and then slipped out free. A taunting communique followed to embarrass the police. A Toronto Daily Star, March 9, 1971. This is part of a long statement Rose is alleged to have made when arrested, 2-1/2 months after Laporte's kidnapping. It differs only in minor details from Lortie's testimony taken at the Laporte inquest on November 7. Rose later denied the statement, but because police officers swore to its authenticity under oath, the court accepted it as evidence in Rose's trial. AA Ibid. 001934 �UNCLASSIFIED 33 The three fugitives took refuge in a farmhouse twenty miles outside Montreal. They dug a tunnel under the basement floor and hid until the police finally closed in on December 27. Even then they threatened a shootout, rather than surrendering quietly. The police agreed to nego- tiate, but the kidnappers still insisted that the prisoners be released. The government went so far as to agree that bail for those in jail would no longer be automatically opposed, but would be determined by the courts. At that the fugitives surrendered. Two questions were of major concern to the authorities throughout the crisis: What were the objectives of the kidnappers? tion between the two cells? Was there any connec- Answers to both questions were related to the larger concern of whether the kidnappings were part of an insurrection movement in Quebec. The kidnappers' communiques had warned of further action, suggesting cooperation with other FLQ groups. The Chenier cell also signed its communications as the Vigier cell, Dieppe cell, and so on to confuse the authorities and make it appear that a multiplicity of cells were involved. The authorities and the public were aware that large amounts of dynamite had been stolen by the FLQ in the months prior to the kidnapping, and they feared that a campaign of bombings and terrorism was the next step. Only after the crisis was over was it known that the kidnappings were the work of but two four-men groups. Their aim was to shake the established government, disturb public order, and force the government to take extreme measures, and in that they succeeded beyond their dreams. They had no plans to follow up the kidnappings by seizing power in Quebec A or carrying out an insurrection. The question of cooperation between the two cells has been debated at length. According to Cross, his captors had no prior knowledge of the Laporte kidnapping. During the week that followed, however, he had the feeling, but no solid evidence, that there was communication between the two cells. Communiques stated that the two cells had agreed to the conditions for release of the hostages. And Rose talked of meeting Cosette-Trudel A Pelletier, p. 53. 001935 �UNCLASSIFIED 34 Montreal Wednesday. From the kidnappers' reactions as they viewed tele- vision together, Cross felt that his cell knew of the Laporte killing beA fore it was announced, Rose's statements revealed that during the summer of 1970 Liberation cell and other young FLQ members had visited his house and discussed kidnapping. Reporters investigating the possibility of coordination between the cells have uncovered evidence of association among the members of the two cells during the months previous to the kidnappings, indicating that they knew each other and had cooperated in other FLQ activities. But there is no evidence that the two cells coordinated plans for the two kidnappings, either as nn end in themselves or as a prelude to an insurrection. What motivated these eight men to act as they did? Numerous studies and speculations have been made on the Quebec terrorists. Observers have pointed out that despite the fact that they claimed to be fighting for the Quebec working class, only one of their demands concerned the workers — the reinstatement of Lapalme drivers — a demand that the Liberation cell was willing to give up in a compromise. All other demands related to the survival of the organization. A Canadian psychologist, Dr. Gustave Morf, called the terrorists young, impatient idealists — ex-teachers — a student, a taxi driver, two struggling against authority, living in a world of ideas rather than in reality. "They all revolted against the inferiority complex which in the past had made the church-led Canadian so submissive.,.** They were products, not of poverty, as were some of the South American revolutionaries, but of a comparatively affluent, permissive society. Yet the specific romantic-criminal terrorism of the FLQ would have burned itself out long ago if it were not for the fact that its militants operated ... in a highly emotional, demanding and rebellious adolescent culture, and in a self-indulgent, permissive society which produces a rapidly increasingly number of people who refuse to grow up and who believe in taking the law into their own hands.*** *~ Haggart and Colden, p. 235. ** . . , Gustave Morf, Terror %n Quebef, Toronto, 1970, p. 168. AAA Clarke, Irwin and Company, Ltd., . Ibid., pre I ace. 001936 TTAJfTT. A Q O T m n ^ �?•-•- UNCLASSIFIED 35 The members of the Liberation cell seem to have conformed to this description. Bourassa was quoted as having said of them, "Those kids ... are from our own neck of the woods and basically they aren't bad, they A won't kill." Cross had referred to the four Liberation cell members and the wives of two of them as six kids trying to make a revolution. The authorities gambled on the assumption that they were not killers — and in the case of the Cross kidnappers won. Morf points out that up to the time of the Laporte kidnapping and murder, political assassination was never seriously contemplated by the FLQ, despite wild threats in their writings. But the Rose brothers and their friends in the Chenier cell were a more hardened breed and had been active in FLQ terrorist activities for a longer time. Violence, in their case, got out of hand. Whether it was instigated by the conduct of the hostage, or done under the influence of drugs, or a ritual the dedicated revolutionaries felt compelled to perform remains a question. A H a g g a r t and G o l d e n , p . 28, 001937 �UNCLASSIFIED 36 V. THE HOSTAGES JAMES R. CROSS James Richard Cross, 49, senior British Trade Commissioner and head of the British government office in Montreal, had no specific warning of his abduction. Twice during 1970, police had uncovered FLQ kidnap plots which should have alerted the diplomatic community in Montreal to the possibility of further attempts. Nevertheless, when it happened, the Cross kidnapping was a surprise to all concerned. The morning of October 5, two of the kidnappers entered the Cross home, forced Cross to dress at gunpoint, handcuffed him, and led him out of the house; a third armed man waited on the driveway and a fourth behind the wheel of a taxi. As the group sped away, Cross was made to don a blacked-out gas mask and lie on the floor of the car. After being taken into the rear bedroom of the hideout flat, he was fitted with a cloth hood, which had a slit at the mouth enabling him to breathe, and made to lie on a mattress on the floor, still handcuffed. The room, containing the mattress, a chair, table, and television set, was heavily curtained, so that he could not see the sunlight. Except for trips to the bathroom next door, Cross stayed in that room for two months. Not seeing his captors, Cross was never sure of how many there were. When he sat up to watch television or write letters, he was told not to turn his head toward them, and as an extra precaution he adjusted his hood to serve as blinders. When he went to the bathroom his captors donned hoods. His ignorance of his captors and of his location helped to insure not only the life of his captors, but his life as well. By Thursday, Cross was allowed to sit up in the chair and view television, still handcuffed, but after two weeks the handcuffs were removed during the daytime. His two meals a day consisted of a breakfast of toast, cheese, and peanut butter, and dinner usually of spaghetti, soup, or sausage. varied the menu. Occasionally, Chinese food from a carry-out restaurant During his two months of captivity, Cross lost 22 pounds, but emerged in good health. When his wife announced through the media that he had high blood pressure and should receive certain medicine, the 001938 �UNCLASSIFIED 37 A kidnappers arranged to have it for him. Early in November, a Montreal newspaper reported that a kidnapping suspect, Marc Carbonneau, had purchased a 6-month supply of blood-pressure pills a few days after Cross's AA kidnapping. Cross's relations with his captors remained amicable. They did not maltreat^him and showed him respect, though sometimes grudgingly. a symbol to them. He was He never felt they would kill him, despite the fact that he heard their threats to do so broadcast in the communiques. Conversation with them was difficult, both because he was not fluent in French and because he could not see the individuals with whom he talked. Nevertheless, throughout the first week, he carried on a dialogue about AAA political motives. The second week of his confinement, when Laporte was being held hostage, was tense and uncertain for him. He had the television to follow his and Laporte's drama, but felt helpless. One matter that caused him and his jailers great concern was speculation in the media that he had sent coded messages within his letters. Lemieux at one point also accused Cross of doing so. He was made to rewrite letters to his wife to insure against any coded message. After release, Cross said of hostages, "... people have a responsibility to the chap in there; he's the loneliest man in the world. And speculation about what he's trying AAAA to do may cost him his life." The week was one of mounting tensions all around them, but Cross and his captors in their isolation could have been a thousand miles away. Cross suffered under the strain, reaching the climax in what he later described as the worst night of his life when the television news revealed Laporte's death and he heard a report that his body had also been found. The horror of his wife's hearing the news tortured him. He was eventually to find out that she had slept through Montreal Star, December 4 and 9, 1970. the broadcast. AA Situation Report No. 6, American Embassy, Ottawa, November 6, 1970. AAA H a g g a r t and G o l d e n , p . 2 3 3 . AAAA Ibid., p. 234. 001939 �UNCLASSIFIED 38 After Laporte's death, Cross drew into himself and talked very seldom with his captors. "We lived in two solitudes; mine, me in my little chair, and them in the rest of the house...." They occasionally discussed the communiques or something on television, but Cross spent most of his time A watching innumerable French movies and thinking over his past. He was permitted to write a letter to his wife after six weeks of imprisonment, in which he assured her that he was in good health, but that time dragged heavily. Cross assessed his position shortly after his capture and decided that escape was impossible. Nevertheless, he continued daily to think about escaping, but never attempted it. Nor did he attempt to bribe or deceive his captors. He decided that the only practical alternative was to cooperate as much as possible and to try to survive each 24-hour day as it AA arrived. He felt despair, but never gave in to it. Once his death penalty was lifted after Laporte's death, he and the kidnappers settled into their long quiet wait for discovery. Upon his release in December, Cross immediately joined his wife in London and did not return to further duty in Montreal. In February, his daughter reported that he suffered some damage to his eyes as a result of AAA the restricted vision of his hood. In recognition of his services, the Queen invested him as a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. AAAA George. The British government later awarded him L5000 as compensation AAAAA for his enforced captivity. Acquaintances report that he talks readily and without bitterness of his experience. PIERRE LAPORTE Pierre Laporte, 49, Minister of Labor and Immigration in the Quebec government, native of Montreal, lawyer, journalist, who like his friend A Ibid., p. 237. AA Ibid., p. 229. AAA Toronto Globe and Mail, February 15, 1971. AAAA Ibid., February 24, 1971. *****77/p Times (London), November 11, 1971. 001940 TIlVrCT.ASfiTreTPirE �UNCLASSIFIED 39 Prime Minister Trudeau had turned to politics, was an important figure -* in his own right and as a member of the Bourassa administration. His prominence in Quebec was the reason that the Chenier cell of the FLQ chose him as a victim; they wanted to shock the authorities into action, which they thought was not being done with the kidnapping of the British diplomat. The fact that his house was conveniently located within a ten-minute drive of the kidnappers' in St. Hubert also influenced their choice. Laporte had no' warning that he was the kidnappers' target. Cross's abduction and the FLQ rhetoric that followed were warnings to all public figures and diplomats in Montreal, but the swiftness and efficiency with which Laporte was taken surprised all Canada. That Saturday evening, after listening to Choquette's television message to the Cross kidnappers, Laporte strolled out on his lawn and tossed a football with his nephew while he waited for his wife to finish dressing for dinner. Four men drove up in a car, and two with masks and a submachine gun emerged and forced Laporte into the back seat. As they sped away, the nephew got the license number, then ran into the house; he and Mrs. Laporte telephoned the police. Within minutes, the alarm was out and there were police blocks on all main thoroughfares, but no trace of the car was found. Laporte was forced down on the floor of the car and blindfolded. Rose later reported that he was quite calm during the trip to the hideout. They quickly drove into the garage of the bungalow in St. Hubert and closed the doors, entering the house by a hole cut through the wall. The car was to remain there, out of sight of police, until it carried Laporte's body out. The conditions under which Laporte was held were much more severe than those imposed on Cross. He was kept in a rear bedroom, in bed and blindfolded during the entire week, except for brief periods when he ate, exercised, or wrote letters. One set of handcuffs bound his wrists, another secured him to the bed. In the next room he could hear a radio which the kidnappers kept tuned to news of the mounting crisis, answers to their communiques, etc. Feeding of the hostage was sporadic at best, from fragmentary evidence gathered. The first morning he had a ham sandwich and tea. Lortie reported that he asked for tea frequently, but he ate very little because 001941 �UNCLASSIFIED 40 there was nothing to give him. Lortie said there was nothing in the house A but bread the second day. (However, when the house was searched after Laporte's death, police found untouched carry-out meals.) When Laporte was captured he had $60, which he gave to his captors. Some of that went for food, but Paul Rose used most of it for taxi rides to plant his communiques. Two days after he was seized, Laporte wrote to his wife, "I have started on a little voluntary diet which I am sure will do me AA good." Laporte could communicate readily with his jailers. Paul Rose said in his statement that on Sunday evening he, Jacques, and Francis Simard were with Laporte listening to "Boubou" Bourassa. They spent half an hour talking over the Bourassa statement, and Jacques, Rose, Simard, and Laporte all agreed that Bourassa was ready to negotiate. He seemed to be seeking negotiation, and for the first time, referred to "political" prisoners. Laporte asked that he be allowed to write a letter to Bourassa, and they allowed him to do so. Laporte wrote four letters during his confinement: and two to Premier Bourassa. two to his wife The first to his wife, written the day after capture, was a short note in which he assured her he was in good health and asked her to accept things. The second, written on Monday after two days of captivity, but not made public until the following February, was an attempt to keep up her spirits and make light of his condition. He assured her that he didn't worry about her or the family and then continued: T am in good health and very calm. Having had absolutely nothing to do for days I have at least been able to fulfill, in spite of myself, your wish to see me get some rest. A rest is a rest, after all. Then he told her of his "voluntary diet" and ended up urging her to take things philosophically and never lose hope. A Montreal Toronto Gazette, November 9, 1970. Globe, and Mail, February 25, 1971. 001942 �UNCLASSIFIED 41 Laporte's two letters to Bourassa were also written on the Sunday and Monday after he was taken. The first one, addressed "Mon cher Robert," was subjected to numerous interpretations. He began, "I feel I am writing the most important letter of my life. At the moment I am in perfect health. I am well treated, even with courtesy." He insisted that police searches be stopped to avoid a shoot-out, which would be a death warrant for him, and then continued: In other words, you have the power to dispose of my life. If this were the only question and if this sacrifice were to produce good results, one could entertain it, but we are facing a well-organized escalation which will only end with the release of the "political prisoners." After me, there will be a third one, then a fourth, and a twentieth. If all political men are protected, they will strike elsewhere, in other classes of society. One might as well act now and avoid a bloodbath and an altogether unnecessary panic. You know my own case, which should be borne in mind. I had two brothers. They are dead, both of them. I remain alone as head of a large family which includes my mother, my sister, my own wife, and my children as well as the children of Roland, whose guardian I am. My departure would mean an irreparable loss. For you know the closeness which unites the members of my family. I am no longer the only one whose fate is at stake, but a dozen people are involved — all women and young children. I think you understand! If the departure of the "political prisoners" is organized and carried out satisfactorily, I am certain that my personal security as well as that of those who would follow will be absolute. This could be done rapidly, as I cannot see why, in taking more time, they should continue to make me die little by little where I am presently detained. Decide ... on my life or on my death. I rely on you and thank you. Friendly greetings, Pierre Laporte P.S. I repeat: have the searches stopped and don't let the police carry them on without your knowledge. The success of such a search would mean a death warrant for me. A Saywell, p. 61. �UNCLASSIFIED 42 Laporte's second letter to Bourassa was written after Bourassa's conciliatory speech and showed his eagerness to believe that the authorities were willing to negotiate on the prisoner issue. He also gave some hint of his anxieties. "My dear Robert, I have just heard your speech. Thanks, I was expecting as much from you.... While eating very frugally this evening, I sometimes had the impressions of having my last meal." Then he continued with particulars of fulfilling the FLQ demands. He assured Bourassa that he accepted the word of the kidnappers and that he hoped Bourassa would do the same. He thanked him for the "reasonable decision which you announced with strength and dignity," and said he hoped to be free within 24 hours. Bourassa, however, had announced no decision, but only asked for assurance before even discussing demands that the safe release of the hostages would result. Laporte — imprisoned, restrained, blindfolded, in touch only with his jailers and the radio — was desperately anticipating the solution that would effect his release. That he feared for his own safety was evidenced by the repetition of the admonition to call off searches that could result in his own death. Indeed, when police raided a house in the neighborhood, his captors reported that Laporte, and they too, were frightened at the prospect of discovery. As the week progressed and the hopes for negotiations on his release dimmed, Laporte made an attempt to escape. Friday, after having been restrained for six days, he prevailed upon his jailers to loosen the handcuffs that held him to the bed. That was the first day under the War Measures Act, and undoubtedly the radio was reporting the details of the arrival of troops and the numerous arrests in Montreal. From the hideout, Laporte and his captors could observe helicopters landing troops at the nearby St. Hubert airport. Laporte slipped out of his handcuffs and, shielding his body with a pillow, threw himself half way through the window. Jacques Rose and Lortie heard the window break and pulled him back in. He was badly cut, bleeding heavily, and wanted A to go to the hospital; instead, Lortie bound his wounds. His left wrist A Montreal Gaze.ttc, November 9, 1970. 001944 UNCLASSIFIED �UNCLASSIFIED was slashed deeply enough to cut several tendons and leave his middle JL. finger paralyzed. They watched him closely that night. The next evening they killed him. Laporte's state of mind his last few days is not known; undoubtedly it was one of desperation at being blindfolded, tied, and made to listen to reports of mounting crisis with diminishing hopes of a settlement that would free him. Rose said, after his arrest, that the captors had discussed in the hideout how Laporte should be killed, and Laporte must have heard them as he lay there. The question of why Laporte was killed and Cross survived may depend not only on the personalities of the terrorists who held them, but also on the personalities of the two hostages. Laporte's captors were ready for action and violence, and Laporte may have responded to this. to escape, whereas Cross accepted his imprisonment. He did try With traditional British reserve, Cross kept his own counsel. Laporte was a French Canadian who was working to bring about changes for Quebec through the political system and was confronted with terrorists who were throwing Quebec into chaos. dialogue. It would have been natural for him to carry on a spirited That his arguments might have provoked his volatile jailers to carry out their threat to kill him is a possibility that should be taken into account. A further clue to Laporte's death may be some rather dubious connections he reportedly had with racketeers in Montreal. Recent inves- tigations into Montreal underworld figures revealed that during the 1970 AA provincial elections Laporte met with two known underworld figures." An American diplomat in Montreal at the time answered the question as to why Cross lived and Laporte was killed with the answer that Cross was the traditional controlled Englishman to the core, who would bear up under the ordeal. Laporte, however, according to the American, was no innocent in politics, and his captors might have had something on _ Pathologist s report, Montreal Gazette, March 3, 1971. Montreal Star, January 26, 1974. 001945 �UNCLASSIFIED 44 him; there were probably arguments and insults, he said, that ended in his death. It should be added that the statement allegedly made by Paul Rose gives no hint of such an explanation. 001946 �UNCLASSIFIED 45 VI. COMMUNICATIONS, MEDIA, AND PUBLIC OPINION The Quebec crisis was the biggest domestic news story Canada had ever experienced. Not only did the media pursue their role of seeking out, publicizing, and criticizing every angle of the story, but in addition took on that of principal communications channel. In the opinion of many, the media also served to escalate the crisis and on that account received severe criticism. The kidnappers from the beginning used two Montreal radio stations to communicate their messages, insisting on full publicity for all their pronouncements and demands. Their usual method was to place an anonymous call from a public telephone booth to radio station CKLM or CKAC, with directions to specific locations — trash can — a theatre, a telephone booth, a where a written communique was to be found. A less fre- quently used method was to have a taxi driver deliver an envelope, or to leave a message in his cab, addressed to one of the radio stations. CKLM was the favored station of the Liberation cell, so its downtown studios on St. Catherine Street became a communication center in the Cross drama. Pierre Pascau, the disc jockey, who was neutral in the A case, established a special line for the use of the FLQ. The government also used the media to communicate with the kidnappers. Spokesmen scheduled speeches or press conferences to announce bargaining positions to the kidnappers, and on occasion the authorities called Pascau at CKLM with a message for the terrorists. For instance, on October 9, they asked the kidnappers to let them know that James Cross was still alive by having him write a message using certain words. The words came back in a letter from Cross before the day was out. The federal government set up a task force in the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa to serve as the main nonpolice communications and information center throughout the crisis. Lines were established from there to the Prime Minister, the Quebec and Montreal authorities, and the media to accelerate the flow of information. Toronto Globe and Mail, October 10, 1970. 001947 TTTVTfTT A Q g T l T T ^ r > �UNCLASSIFIED 46 The media served also as links between the kidnappers and their intermediary, Robert Lemieux. Lemieux sought the microphones at every oppor- tunity, blasting police and authorities and commenting on the "political" prisoners whom he visited at the prisons. He ended early Interviews with the press with a French expression meaning "hang on, boys," evidently A aimed at the kidnappers. There is no evidence that the FLQ cells communicated directly with him; they answered him in their publicized communiques. The hostages kept in touch with the negotiations and the mounting crisis through the media — Cross by the television set in his room, Laporte by the radio to which his jailers listened constantly. The two men were allowed to send written messages only, and in the case of Cross, these were dictated or revised by his captors because of their fear that he was sending secret messages. His only trick was misspelling, which he later said was to indicate that the letters were dictated. Laporte's two letters to his wife and two to Premier Bourassa were written by him under the eye of his jailors. The two FLQ cells communicated with each other only once during the crisis and later issued a joint communique. In the aftermath, members of the Liberation cell claimed that their communique No. 10, released just before Laporte was killed, was a signal to the Chenier cell to spare Laporte's life. In it, the Liberation cell suspended Cross's death sentence and said that the Chenier cell was studying Laporte's case and would soon make known his fate. The message was not made public either because it was not found immediately or because of the WMA prohibition on communicating FLQ statements. The Liberation cell thus reasoned that the authorities, by suppressing their message, were responsible for Laporte's death. Initially, the kidnappers' communications hit their mark and were widely publicized. As the crisis escalated, however, the stations began to receive hoax calls, and employees stopped responding to each one. - _ __ ___ Toronto Globe and Mail, October 9, 1970. 001948 �UNCLASSIFIED t 47 I For this reason, an anonymous call telling Norman Maltais at CKAC that the body of Laporte could be found in an abandoned car near the St. Hubert airfield went unheeded. Only when the call came the third time did he investigate and follow up. On a few other occasions communica- tions were lost or not located. There were no secret negotiations connected with the Cross and Laporte kidnappings." The second communique from the Liberation cell, sent the day after Cross's abduction, contained an appeal to the media anticipating suppression of the news: "We call upon your cooperation as media agents to break the wall of silence that the fascist police have erected around the liberation operation by systematically stealing all the communiques and our manifesto which were destined to the various information media." The FLQ wanted maximum publicity for their kidnappings, and they were given this in all the media. Radio and television broadcast full details and were quick to publicize the communiques and the frequent statements by Lemieux and his friends. Within two days, the newspapers were advising the government on handling the case, and they continued to do so. Special editions were put out on the October 12 holiday to help satisfy the public demand for news. Three days after Cross was taken, the FLQ manifesto was read on radio and television to meet one of the demands. Reaction to it was mixed, but as one critic said, "For the first time many English Canadians, and perhaps many Quebecois as well, realize that the FLQ were A something other than separatists in a hurry." The authorities were disturbed by what they considered to be excessive coverage by the media during the first week. Although polls showed only 1 percent of Montrealers totally approving the kidnappings and a large majority disapproving, the media gave widespread coverage to the vocal sympathizers of the FLQ. The Prime Minister suggested that the press use restraint in reporting on the FLQ. It was a mis- take, he said, to give the FLQ the publicity they wanted, and to use A Saywell, p. 51. 001949 �UNCLASSIFIED 48 the term political prisoners for criminals. counter that: The media were quick to (1) communication was coming through the media in both directions, (2) the manifesto was read at government request, and (3) Bourassa had referred to political prisoners in his radio broadA cast. In invoking the WMA, the government did not call for press censorship, but made the communication of statements from the FLQ illegal. The media'then turned FLQ communiques over to the police. After the weekend of frantic coverage of Laporte's death and the false report that Cross had been killed, the media backed off to some extent. George Davidson, CBC President, asked producers to exercise a greater degree of restraint in reporting on the kidnapping crisis, but not to the point of cutting off discussion. He said there had been irresponsible speculation and inaccurate reporting and that AA the time had come to cool the publicity. Some voluntary restraint followed. The most serious among the many questions debated in the Canadian press were: (1) negotiation for the exchange of prisoners in return for the lives of the hostages, (2) subjection of the Quebec government to the federal government in Ottawa, (3) division of opinion and weaknesses within the Quebec government, and (4) infringement of civil liberties under the War Measures Act. The debate on some aspects of these still goes on. To the extent that they pertained to government actions or policies and were critical of the authorities, press comments often elicited strong responses from members of the government. Prime Minister Trudeau's remarks referred to above were extremely critical. Premier Bourassa, in a Quebec National Assembly debate a month after the crisis, said that "the government's leaders were treated like dogs by the newspapers." He suggested that it might be time "to reexamine equally the inherent dangers of verbal violence in the analysis AAA of and the search for solutions and the elaboration of solutions." _ _ Toronto Globe and Mail, October 14, 1970. Ibid., October 16, 1970. AAA Quoted in American Consul Quebec, Airgram A-60, November 25, 1970. 001950 TTTVTnT A C*CtT-CTT-nrv �CONFIDENTIAL (This Page is Unclassified) 49 j The American consul general in Montreal judged that the Canadian press as a whole was even-handed in its treatment of the crisis. He thought the press was guilty of exaggerating the threat at the time, as were members of the government; one encouraged the other to excesses. The orgy of press comment was the price paid for a free press. Public opinion in Montreal, as throughout Canada, was more solidly behind the government approach than one would have judged from the media. A poll by the Information Collection Institute, published October 19, showed that 78 percent of Montrealers totally disapproved of the kidnappings and only 1 percent totally approved. A majority believed that maintaining law and order was more important than saving two A lives. A poll taken by the Canadian Institute of Public Affairs the day after the WMA was invoked, but before Pierre Laporte's death, tallied 32 percent of Quebecois as believing the government was not tough enough and 54 percent that government policy was about right. AA For all Canada the corresponding percentages were 37 and 51. In other words, 86 to 88 percent of Canadians approved of the War Measures Act or the government's firm reaction at the time. A poll taken on November 15 by Omnifacts for CTV suggested that about 85 percent in Quebec supported the government. Another poll on November 27 showed the percentage eroding to 73 percent, indicating some citizens were AAA having second thoughts about the crisis once fears had subsided. The public also showed its approval in the voting booth of the men most closely allied to the October crisis. Montrealers reelected Mayor Drapeau on October 25, before the crisis subsided. Premier Bourassa was reelected in 1974 by a healthy majority, and Prime Minister Trudeau continues to preside in Ottawa. Saywell, p. 61. AA Ibid., pp. 93-94. Ibid., p. 118. 001951 �CONFIDENTIAL 50 VII. LOCAL SECURITY (U) Three police forces operate in Montreal: the Montreal Police Service, about 3800 in number, including specialists and backup office staffs; the Quebec Provincial Police (QPP), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. An estimated 300 men of the three services make up a specialized antiterrorist squad, organized during the 1960s to com* bat the growing FLQ terrorism. Inevitably, there were complaints of lack of coordination and rivalry among the three services in the October 1970 crisis. According to reports from Americans who had worked with the antiterrorist squad, however, relations among the men of the three services assigned to that group were good, and the squad itself performed well. (C) Shortcomings within the security forces should be noted. The Montreal Police had been severely limited in their effectiveness after a reorganization in 1966. At that time, an advisory group from Scotland Yard advised doing away with a network of paid informers who were infiltrating terrorist groups. Thus, when the crisis came in 1970, the police did not have sufficient sources of information to assess the threat. The Quebec Provincial Police, according to informers, had been infiltrated by the FLQ; knowing this, the RCMP had refused QPP requests AA to examine RCMP dossiers. (C) The RCMP represented the federal government in Quebec, and their activities were frequently unpopular there just because they were considered the arm of the Anglophone federal establishment. In turn, the RCMP were unhappy with control from Ottawa and with instructions to avoid getting too involved in Quebec, and therefore they tended to tell Ottawa less than they should have about undercover activities. Because RCMP undercover activities on college campuses had been forbidden since _ (U) Toronto Globe and Mail, October 13, 1970. AA (U) American Consulate General Montreal, Memorandum of Conversation, November 3, 1970, Confidential. �CONFIDENTIAL 51 Pearson's time as Prime Minister, efforts to keep abreast of extremist plans were hindered. In addition, Canada had no counterparts of the A CIA or the FBI to assist the police forces with their expertise. (U) The first demand of the FLQ when it kidnapped Cross was that the "repressive police forces" not be allowed to conduct searches, investigations, raids, etc., which would jeopardize the success of the kidnapping operation. The demand went unheeded; not only did the authorities not curtail their police work but, on the contrary, put police forces on the alert and made an all-out effort to find Cross's kidnappers, and at the same time, they gave diplomats in Montreal added protection. The antiterrorist squad raided homes and hangouts of sus- pected FLQ activists and questioned many. They were instructed, how- ever, to avoid any act that might panic the abductors. (U) Thorough police work, aided by a combination of tips and shadowing, paid off with the discovery of the Cross hideout. Their caution in evacuating neighbors, cordoning off the block, and securing the route to the Expo site indicate the police had a healthy respect for FLQ threats to use guns and dynamite. (C) The security role of the British government was passive throughout; at no time did they take issue with Canadian tactics or urge a different course of action. A British security expert from Washington visited Canada briefly, and a senior diplomat from British High Commission in Ottawa remained in Montreal throughout the crisis. The British were kept informed, but no other assistance was offered or reAA quested. (U) The kidnapping of Laporte escalated police activity to the maximum possible in Montreal and vicinity. Police cancelled all leaves and put some members on double shifts. The antiterrorist squad carried out scores of raids across the province within 24 hours after the kidnapping. Lemieux and other FLQ sympathizers were jailed. Police set (U) Ibid. AA (U) American Embassy Ottawa, Airgram 102326, December 10, 1970, Confidential. 001953 �CONFIDENTIAL (This Page is Unclassified) 52 up tight security for Bourassa and other government officials in Quebec, while in Ottawa federal troops did the job. A reliable Toronto newspaper reported that by October 12, the costs of extra police work were up to $672,000, or $84,000 for each of the eight days since Cross had been A taken. (U) As the crisis escalated the police were more and more harassed by bomb threats, rumors, false leads, and increased demands for protection. On October 15, after a bomb threat forced the evacuation of the Palais de Justice, and numerous other pressures, and with the prospect of a march and rally that evening by FLQ supporters, Premier Bourassa and Mayor Drapeau called on the armed forces for help. More than 1000 soldiers took up positions at the strategic buildings in Montreal that day. The Bourassa government passed an order-in-council that placed all police and army personnel under the command of the director of the Quebec Provincial Police. Troops were to perform police duties only and to carry AA nothing but small arms. (U) During the following night, the Quebec and Montreal authorities formally asked the federal government for emergency powers. A letter from Maurice St. Pierre, Director of the Quebec Provincial Police, accompanied the requests by Bourassa and Drapeau explaining the situation in Quebec: The recent kidnappings of a foreign diplomat and a Crown Minister of the province have signalled the launching by this movement of their seditious projects and acts leading directly to the insurrection and the overthrow of the state. Under these circumstances, the investigation which the police authorities must undertake must necessarily delve into all aspects of the activities of the networks of this seditious movement, and should not be restricted to simply searching for the individuals who perpetrated the odious kidnapping of the two people who are still prisoners — for this would mean failure. Toronto Globe and Mail, October 13, 1970. Saywell, pp. 79-81. 001954 �CONFIDENTIAL 53 The efforts to investigate the "manifold tiny cells, each impervious to the others" were proving too much under ordinary procedures. The authorA ities should have additional means appropriate to protect society. (U) Under the War Measures Act, the number of federal troops on ' A duty in the province at the peak of the crisis reached about 7500. The regiment sent to Montreal was the French Canadian Royal 22d, which had a good reputation with the people in Montreal. The government was careful to say that the province was not under martial law, but that troops were in Quebec only to assist police. (U) Security forces under the WMA had the right to arrest without warrant suspected FLQ members or those promoting insurrection. They could enter and search and seize property as evidence without warrant. They took over no other extraordinary powers or controls. (C) On November 2, the governments of Canada and Quebec offered a joint reward of $150,000 for information leading to the arrest of the kidnappers. The offer included assurances that the payment would be kept confidential. Police evaluation of the reward offer was that it did not assist them in the investigation. Although they received hundreds of AAA calls, none proved useful. (U) The police were criticized by the press and the public throughout the crisis, as were other arms of the government. made them vulnerable to such criticism: Two incidents (1) Three days before Laporte's death, the police had had Paul Rose under surveillance as he traveled around Montreal and visited a friend; that night, after dark, Rose left the friend's house with the family, in their car; the police tail did not spot him and he was able to return to the hideout unnoticed. (2) A few weeks later, Rose slipped through their net a second time when he and his accomplices were hiding out in the apartment of three young women on Queen Mary Road. The kidnappers had built a partition (U) Ibid., pp. 85-86. AA (U) Ibid., p. 128. AAA (U) American Embassy Ottawa, Airgram 102326, December 10, 1970, Confidential. 001955 �CONFIDENTIAL (This Page is Unclassified) 54 within a large closet behind which they could hide when the police came. The antiterrorist squad found the apartment by tracing a telephone number found in the house where Laporte had been held. When they knocked on the apartment door on November 6, the Rose brothers and Simard hid in the closet. The squad searched the apartment, arrested Lortie and the women, and continued to guard the apartment. The three kidnappers remained motionless for 24 hours; when their guards left for dinner the following evening, the kidnappers walked out free. They issued a communique thanking the police for the weapons they had left behind. Although the police claimed that none was missing, they were severely criticized for and humiliated by the incident. 001956 �UNCLASSIFIED 55 VIII. AFTERMATH The outcome of the Cross kidnapping was successful from the point of view of both the Canadian and British authorities. The hostage was released unharmed, and no deaths or injuries were sustained by others involved in the case.. Of the seven original demands made by the FLQ when Cross was kidnapped, only one was fulfilled by the government: the reading over the media of the FLQ manifesto. The government neither paid ransom nor released the 23 prisoners as demanded. It failed, how- ever, to bring the kidnappers to justice; instead, they were given safe conduct to Cuba in return for Cross's freedom. Arrangements for safe conduct of the kidnappers were begun by the Foreign Office with the governments of Cuba and Algeria soon after the initial communique mentioned the two countries. Cuba was selected and details were worked out for the actual transfer of the kidnappers and hostage to Cuban diplomats on the site of Expo 67. These details were made known to the kidnappers even before the death of Pierre Laporte and repeated afterward so that Cross's captors would know how to proceed. Claude Roquet, head of the External Affairs Department Task Force established to negotiate Cross's release, and Allen Rowe, an officer in the department, explained the planning for the safe conduct as follows: The object was to make sure that the kidnappers not only would know that this had been formally offered by the authorities, but that they would also be aware of all the mechanics of it, so they could assess the fairness of the proposal and know exactly how to proceed. There is no doubt that the kidnappers received all this information immediately. They knew that the arrangements had been organized around the cooperation of the Cuban government. The Quebec and Canadian authorities early decided that It was essential not simply to make a vague offer of safe conduct but to be very concrete and even dramatic — to hold out to the kidnappers something which they could clearly visualize. The device of consular immunity was deliberately designed to provide for a kind of neutral ground. The site of Expo 67 had been chosen for the 001957 �UNCLASSIFIED 56 temporary extension of the Cuban Consulate to assure these people also that they would be coming to a wide-open space, an area that was familiar to them. The arrangements for clearing and protecting the site were made known. The fact that aircraft were standing by was publicized for several weeks. It was obvious that everything was ready if only the kidnappers would come forward. Roquet accompanied t>he prisoners to Cuba in a Canadian aircraft and described the atmosphere as relaxed, quiet, and Subdued. In April 1971, the Quebec Justice Department issued warrants for the arrest of Lanctot, Carbonneau, Langlois, and the Cosette-Trudels on 33 charges relating to the Cross kidnapping. The exiles will face AA prosecution if they return to Canada; none has returned so far. They lived quietly for 3-1/2 years in a Havana hotel as guests of the Cuban government. The men worked occasionally on such jobs as translating, teaching French, harvesting cane, or mechanical jobs. A good part of their time was spent in meetings and seminars with members of other AAA revolutionary groups and other FLQ people in Havana. In late June 1974, three of the Cross kidnappers, Jean Carbonneau, Jacques Lanctot, and Yves Langlois, along with Lanctot's wife, left Cuba for Paris, via Prague. They slipped in with Cuban papers, un- noticed by French security. Prime Minister Trudeau, when asked whether his government would request extradition, replied that Canada did not want them. French officials said privately that any request for extradition of the FLQ members would be denied, because France does AAAA not extradite to their home countries people wanted in political cases. The remaining two members of the cell, Jacques and Louise CosetteTrudel, arrived in Paris in August. They told police that they played only a minor role in the kidnapping of James Cross, just renting the flat where he was held and furnishing the car. They did not like life Canada Today, Vol. II, No. 1, January 1971. AA Toronto Star, August 2, 1971, p. 7. AAA . Weekend Magazine 22, 1972. (supplement of Toronto Globe and Mail) . January AAAA Montreal Star, June 25, 1974; Toronto Globe and Mail, June 26, 1974. 001958 Trrvrrvr A OOT-CTTTTIT^ �UNCLASSIFIED 57 in Cuba and came to France ."where life was. easier than in a socialist A nation." Their ultimate goal is to return to Montreal. The outcome of the Laporte kidnapping was a tragedy in all respects. Laporte's abductors were offered the same terms as those finally accepted by the Cross kidnappers, but they ignored any compromise. Bernard Lortie, captured by police in the Montreal apartment where the other three kidnappers were hiding, appeared on November 7 at the coroner's inquest, at which the details df Laporte's death were first revealed to the public. Lortie admitted openly his involvement in the kidnapping and named his accomplices. He was found guilty of kidnapping; his sentence was moder- ated to 20 years, because he had been the one to bandage Laporte's wounds AA after his abortive escape attempt. After a seven-week trial during which he was removed from the court three times for contempt, Paul Rose was sentenced March 14, 1971, to life imprisonment for the murder of Laporte. Although at the trial AAA Rose did not admit to the kidnapping, 'And I m proud of it, denied the murder charge. he His earlier statement describing Laporte's kidnapping, imprisonment, and murder was admitted as evidence, despite the fact that Rose claimed during the trial that it was false. The policemen who were present when he allegedly made and recorded the statement testified under oath to its authenticity.** The jury deliberated 25 minutes and found Rose guilty of murder. them for their long hours of deliberation. Rose thanked He was later convicted for his part in the kidnapping and received another life sentence, which he is serving concurrently. Francis Simard is serving a life term for murder and has not yet Toronto Globe and. Mail, been AA tried for kidnapping. Montreal Star August 7, 1974. News and Review, March 3, 1973. ' ibid., March 15, 1971. AAA* Montreal Gazette, March 9, 1971. 001 TTT>Jr?T. A qoTCTxnT^ �UNCLASSIFIED 58 Jacques Rose was tried twice for his part in the kidnapping; the first trial ended in a hung jury and the second in acquittal. Evidence of his involvement in the kidnapping was only circumstantial. His hand- writing was not on the communiques, as were those of Paul Rose and Simard, and his fingerprints found in the St. Hubert house and the automobile could have been from an earlier time. His murder trial also resulted in acquittal, but he was tried again in June-July 1973 — almost three years after the kidnapping — and found guilty of being an acces- sory after the fact to the kidnapping of Pierre Laporte by assisting his brother to escape. At that same trial, Robert Lemieux, the defense lawyer and onetime intermediary between the FLQ and the government, A was sentenced to 2-1/2 years for contempt of court. Others convicted on charges involving complicity in the Laporte kidnapping were those who assisted in hiding and transporting the fugitives. They received sentences ranging from six months to eight AA years. By mid-November 1970 some of the 7500 federal troops began to leave the province; all were out by early January. The War Measures Act was in force until December 3, at which time it was supplanted by the Public Order Act until the end of April 1971. During this period, the police retained emergency powers to search and arrest or detain on suspicion. The FLQ was outlawed under both measures; suspects could be held without charge for 21 days under the WMA and 7 days under the less stringent law. By the end of 1970, police had conducted 5000 raids and arrested 468, of whom 408 were released without charge and 41 held. Prosecutors had trouble pressing charges under the WMA. They found juries reluctant to convict on such charges as seditious offenses and membership or support of the FLQ. In mid-August 1971, the Quebec Justice A Toronto Globe and Mail, July 18, 1973. AA Ibid., July 26, 1973. 001960 TTTVTr-T A g Q T O T P n �UNCLASSIFIED 59 Department suspended action on 32 awaiting trial. This action re* suited in the release of Lemieux and other prominent FLQ supporters. The FLQ never recovered from the October crisis and the WMA. Pierre Vallieres, author of the manual of the revolutionary movement in Quebec, White Niggers of America, and more than any other the symbol of the FLQ, disassociated himself from the movement in December 1971, recommending that all other members do likewise and support the electoral process to gain independence for Quebec. He allied himself with the Parti Quebecois as the agent for liberation, attributing this switch to the lessons learned from the October crisis: In October 1970, he said, the FLQ brought about just what it claimed to be fighting — the repression of the people and of organizations fighting to make Quebec independent. He gave a "categorical no" to any continuation AA of the course of violence that the FLQ had followed since 1963. The Canadian government extended the protection of diplomats in Quebec, took other steps to increase security, and there have been no further kidnapping incidents in Canada. But the debate continues. On the fifth anniversary of the crisis a series of articles in the press and a 2-1/2-hour documentary over the English network of Radio-Canada exposed the wounds once again, and Trudeau and Bourassa were called upon by the press to defend their stand on the War Measures Act. One historian of the crisis sums up the long-term reaction this way: The crisis was over, but the debate was not — and perhaps never would be. The major issues around which political and public controversy centered were the unwillingness of the government to negotiate the freedom of the twenty-three criminals; tlie alleged subordination of Quebec to Ottawa; the reasons for the use of the army and the War Measures Act; and the intermediate and long term effects of the crisis on both the governments and the society of Quebec and Canada and their future relations. A ~ Ibid. AA Pierre Vallieres, Choose!, translated by Penelope Williams, New Press, Toronto, 1972. AAA Saywell, p. 136. 001961 �\ • U N C L A S S I F I E D 60 IX. CONCLUSIONS The crisis of October 1970 touched the raw nerve of the problem of two Canadas and made Canadian government authorities reluctant to discuss the Cross and Laporte kidnappings with an outsider. Although Rand's interest here involved only the government handling of the actual kidnappings — not Canadian separatism, during the author's visit to Ottawa, officials in the Department of External Affairs limited the discussion to government policy and to aspects of the case already made public; Rand researchers were requested not to interview involved parties in Quebec. Despite limitations on the access to information, however, some conclusions can be drawn. Federal and provincial authorities handled the Cross kidnapping extremely well, striking the correct balance between firmness and flexibility. They allowed the Liberation cell to understand that the government would negotiate, but they were firm on the ransom and prisoner issues. By the sixth day, the cell was ready to accept an accommodation on reduced terms, including the cffer of asylum. The kidnapping of Pierre Laporte by the more intransigent cell escalated the crisis, but not the bargaining power of the FLQ: The government had committed it- self not to make concessions for the life of a British diplomat; it could not but do the same for the life of a Quebec minister. Both cells had miscalculated the degree of firmness that the government would show. The task force at the Department of External Affairs did an excellent job of working out the Cuba alternative for the kidnappers. This "Montreal Solution" has served as an alternative in subsequent kidnapping cases, notably in Bangkok in December 1972. The Canadian authorities announced the alternative to the FLQ within the first week and continued to propose it at frequent intervals until Cross was found. Why the terrorists did not come forth and accept asylum, but instead waited two months to be found, remains a question. Careful planning of every detail and cooperation of the Cuban government made the transfer 001962 TTTNiriT.AggTTTT^n �UNCLASSIFIED 61 on the neutral Expo site acceptable to the terrorists. The life of the hostage was the main concern and extreme care was taken for his protecrtion during the transfer. Canada responded to the tragedy of Pierre Laporte with a national soul-searching into the reasons for his death and into the larger question of how a major national crisis was precipitated by just two independent FLQ cells of four men each. Reasons for invoking the War Measures Act were found in the government's overestimation of the size of the FLQ and its following and the overreaction of the public, the police, and the media. 001963 �UNCLASSIFIED 62 X. October 5 8:15 a.m. 11:45 a.m. October 6 CHRONOLOGY James R. Cross kidnapped by four armed men from home. Communique No. 1, containing seven demands, received. 2:40 p.m. External Affairs Minister Sharp makes statement about kidnapping in Commons. 3:00 p.m. Quebec Justice Minister Choquette makes public demands. a.m. Prime Minister Trudeau confers with Quebec Premier Bourassa and with cabinet on Cross kidnapping. 6:00 p.m. Communique No. 2, written at noon, received. Sharp speech in Commons calls FLQ demands unreasonable, but asks for dialogue. Bourassa endorses Ottawa government stand. October 7 11:15 a.m. 1:30 p.m. Choquette at press conference before noon deadline appeals to humanitarianism of kidnappers. Communique No. 4 from Liberation cell extends deadline another 24 hours. Letter from Cross enclosed. Robert Lemieux requests a neutral mediator. 10:00 p.m. October 8 Sharp reads official statement. Asks assurance of Cross release if demands are met. 2:30 p.m. Communique No. 5 rejects mediator as trap. Demands manifesto be read and police activity halted or Cross will be killed. 6:00 p.m. Lemieux on TV says authorities stalling for time in order to find Cross. FLQ Manifesto read over radio and TV. October 9 a.m. Communique No. 6 goes astray. Sets more limited conditions for release of Cross. 3:00 p.m. 6:00 p.m. Bourassa flies to New York on business. Choquette asks kidnappers for proof Cross is alive. Communique No. 7 released with copy of No. 6 and letter from Cross answering Choquette's request. Sets deadline of 6 p.m. on 10th for release of prisoners. 001964 ITNCLASSTFTED �n UNCLASSIFIED 63 October 10 10:00 a.m. Lemieux says Cross using letters to reveal his whereabouts. 3:00 p.m. Lemieux offers to accompany prisoners abroad. 5:30 p.m. Choquette on TV makes counteroffer to FLQ. Proposes safe passage to Cuba for kidnappers in return for Cross. 6:18 p.m. Four men kidnap Pierre Laporte from Montreal home. Police and military accelerate activity. October 11 a -m. Robert Lemieux arrested. 9:00 a.m. Communique No. 1 from Chenier cell saying Laporte will be executed if seven demands for exchange of Cross are not met. 1:00 p.m. Communique No. 2 from Chenier cell repeats demands and sets 10:00 p.m. deadline. FRAP meets and endorses objectives of FLQ manifesto. October 12 4:45 p.m. Communique from Chenier cell. to Bourassa and to wife. Letters from Laporte 9:55 p.m. Bourassa reads statement asking for mechanism for conducting negotiations and guaranteeing release of hostages. 1:45 a.m. Communique from Cross kidnappers with reduced demands. Vigilantes threaten reprisals against families of political prisoners. 10:50 a.m. October 13 Communique from Chenier cell assuming government will negotiate prisoner issue. Appoints Lemieux as mediator. 4:30 p.m. Communique from Chenier cell summing up situation. 7:15 p.m. Bourassa announces appointment of Robert Demers as government negotiator. Lemieux and Demers meet. a.m. Troops guard public figures in Ottawa. noon Robert Lemieux arraigned, refuses to plead and is released. 3:00 p.m. Lemieux and Demers meet. 6:00 p.m. Lemieux meets press; calls off negotiations until FLQ gives him more of a mandate. Trudeau in CBC interview stresses government hard line. Cabinet meets and hears urgent message from Montreal. 001965 �UNCLASSIFIED 64 October 14 October 15 5:00 a.m Message from Liberation cell gives Lemieux approval to negotiate. 2:00 p.m Lemieux and Demers meet for 1 hour. 9:00 p.m Sixteen prominent Quebecois issue statement calling for negotiation on prisoner issue. p.m. University rallies and sit-ins support FLQ. a.m. In Ottawa cabinet meets for 3 hours to discuss crisis. Trudeau cancels visit scheduled for Sunday to Soviet Union. 2:00 p.m. Quebec Government calls for Canadian Army troops to aid police. Troops take up position. 9:00 p.m. Bourassa rejects FLQ demands and offers safe passage to kidnappers and normal parole of prisoners. Sets 3:00 a.m. deadline. FLQ rally at Paul Sauve Arena; sympathizers hear Lemieux and Vallieres call for liberation of Quebec. October 16 3:00 a.m. Deadline for reply from FLQ. Letters from Quebec and Montreal arrive Ottawa requesting emergency measures. 4:00 a.m. Cabinet invokes War Measures Act. 5:15 a.m. Public announcement of WMA. 11:00 a.m. Predawn raids. Debate starts in Commons on WMA. Laporte makes escape attempt, is badly cut. October 17 p.m. Bourassa at press conference takes responsibility for WMA decision. Trudeau appears on TV appealing for understanding and support. 6:18 a.m. Kidnappers strangle Laporte with chain of religious medal around neck. 7:00 p.m. Anonymous call to CKAC saying that a package had been left at St. Hubert airfield. 8:15 a.m. Repeat of message. 9:30 p.m. Call to CKAC saying note left at theatre. Note picked up saying body of Laporte in trunk of car. 11:30 p.m. Bourassa, unaware of note, appeals for release of hostages and outlines arrangements for safe passage of kidnappers to Cuba. 001966 �UNCLASSIFIED 65 October 18 October 19 12:25 a.m. Police open trunk of car and find body of Laporte. TV and radio announce Laporte murder. False report of Cross death. 1:00 p.m. Message from Cross received that he was alive and well. 6:00 p.m. Laporte's body lies in state. 11:00 p.m. Trudeau on TV says FLQ will not shake Canada. 1:00 a.m. Police find Chenier cell hideout where Laporte held. In Ottawa Commons votes 190-16 to approve WMA. October 27 Communique from Chenier cell. November 4 Press receives photograph of Cross showing him playing cards on a case of dynamite. November 6 November 7 Lortie, one of Laporte's kidnappers, arrested in Montreal flat while three other kidnappers evade police. AP in New York receives Cross photograph and a communique commenting on events. Lortie testifies at Laporte inquest. November 14 Communique from Laporte's kidnappers gloating over their escape. November 21 Communique from Liberation cell and letter from Cross. December 2 Cross kidnapper Cosette-Trudel and wife arrested. Police close in on apartment where Cross is held. December 3 Cross released after kidnappers flown to Cuba. December 28 Police find three remaining Laporte kidnappers in tunnel hideout beneath farmhouse 20 miles from Montreal. 001967 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00101 Title A name given to the resource Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy - Part 6 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 16-Dec-70 to 01-Jan-76 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy, RG25, vol. 25741, 20-22-TFK-1, part 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Entire File Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en