https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ccbcd701f5f522f43dca948213e36b2e.pdf eb0e1a5484552292a917874e8677e0b3 PDF Text Text cc: 0/SSEA , PMO POP/C. ROQU£T/etm/blm ?ua> PDS PDF Task Force list S.O.C. FLE (Mr. Beasley) Log Officer Soard^' File ^O-X-A - JFK— I( SECflET November IC, 1V70 MEMO&ANDUM TO PRIVY COUHCIL OFFICE Kldnappinga — negotiating Poaition I understand that you asked for an indication of oar thinking on tha present status of offara made by tha federal and Quebec governments for tha safe ralaaaa of Mr. Croaa and Mr. Laporte. Here ia an analysis of the offara made, in consultation with Ottawa, by Mr. Choquatta on October 10 and by Hr. Boaraaaa on October 15. -e also outline our impression of tha present "negotiating poaition" of tha governments vis-S-vis tha kidnappers of Mr. Cross, following upon tha expiry of Mr. Boaraaaa'a October 15 ultimatum and tha aairder of Mr. Laporte. i. Hfr qrewwvyfifUfaSC1° sate 2. Tha October 10 statement by the Qnebee Minister of Justice (see attached text) waa, aa you will recall, the object of extensive if hasty discussions with aa. In brief, it offered tbe Croaa kidnappera, in exchange for hia safe releaset (a) aafe-conduct to a foreign country (unspecified); (b) or a trial in Canada with — a d — in view of tha Croaa releasej clemency by the Courts (c) clemency in trials of three terrorists charged but not yet tried, in the light of Croaa release "which should put an and to terrorism"j (d) there is a parole procedure which applies to all the "political prisoners"} it will be objectively followed. II. Mr. Boaraaaa's October 15 Offer 3. Tha Quebec Prime Minister covered the following ground: (a) for arrangements for the release of the hostages, Quebec suggests that the International Ked Croaa (or the Cuban Consulate in Montreal) serve aa an intermediary between the two sides; lb) safe-conduct abroad for tha two groups of kidnappera, with provision of a plane for transport to the country chosen (unspecified); �A - 2- gag (c) there waa no mention of clemency in a trial of the kidnappera in Canada. Presumably, it waa assumed they would not choose to submit to trial} (d) "a fine recommendation" (to whom waa not specified) by the Qnebee Government for parole for the five prisoners who have requested it. The Quebec government "haa already undertaken demarches te thia effect". — It waa our understanding that Mr. Trudeau had axpreaaed reservations to Mr. Boaraaaa about thia offer, bat that the latter insisted on it. Cm tbe face of it, it does net commit tbe Federal Government or tbe parole boards. we do not knew what "measures" tbe -uebec Government baa "already taken" in tola regard, beyond the October 15 public statement. III. Present Situation 4. Following Mr. Laporte'a murder aad tbe end of Mr. Boaraaaa1a deadline, tbe process of offera aad negotiation ia generally apeaking at an end. Nonetheless, soma variations are poaaibla and indeed have taken place. A certain amount of limited bargaining could arise if the Croaa kidnappers aaked for safe-conduct. fofo-conduct (a) it waa offered again to Mr. Croaa' kidnappera. Ihe offer ia periodically repeated} (b) it obviously ia not available to Mr. Laporte'a kidnappera or murderers. However, if tbe Croaa kidnappera come forward, there may be suspicion that some of them may also have been implicated in the Laporte affair. To date, despite reports to the contrary, there is no evidence of a link between tbe two groups. If some of tbe Cross kldnappere were already involved ia tbe Laporte case, lt would presumably be impossible to let them leave the country with the other kidnappera} (c) precise arrangements fbr tbe safe-conduct (including transport by plane) were announced after tbe October 15 bourassa statement and re-issued a few times with minor amendments. The country of destination ia now definitely Cuba; (d) a poaaibla role for tbe International had Croaa in tbe safe-conduct (and tbe related arrangementa for tbe release ef Mr. Croaa) ia no longer mentioned. Present arrangements revolve around the Cuban Consulate only. Presumably, if thia were an essential consideration far ...3 001084 �A ~ 3 - SECRET the Croaa kidnappers, wa snould not preclude Red Croaa involvement in principle, since lt waa part of tha October 15 offer. Any precise proposal on thia point, however, would have to be carefully assessed; (e) the Cross kidnappera may wonder if their families would be allowed (or financially able) to Join them in Cuba. Mfe have ascertained that the Cuban Government woald accept families and presumably would help support them, but thia haa not been announced. Ve have suggested to tbe Quebec negotiator, Mr. fiobert emers, that, in a future re-statement of the safe-conduct, he make it clear that families would of course be free (and indeed would be assisted) to travel to Cuba. Mr. Demers prefers to keep thia card for any last minute negotiation with tbe kidnappers} (f) more generally, the kidaappera may be concerned about their mesne of livelihood in Cuba. In fact,tiieCuban government haa implicitly accepted responsibility for their upkeep. This haa not been announced, bat it would be possible te reassure the kidnappers on thia count, if they raised the matter while seeking safe-eonduet. (g) the question whether a lawyer and journalists eould accompany tha kidnappera to Cuba baa implicitly been aettled, since the October 15 statement did not include it among damanda that could be legitimately met. It is aot foreseen under present safe-conduct arrangements. The same applies to tha FLQ damanda for publicity on departure (both these demands in any case referred to the "political priaonera" not to safe-conduct for the kidnappera). Meaning of the October 15 Ultimatum 5. Mr. Boaraaaa oa October 15 aaked the kidnappers for "a reply within six hours". He did not indicate that the offers would expire after that period. In fact, the Quebec Government's response to the expiry of the ultimatum was to move against the FIQ as a whole (Mar Measures powers and series of arrests). Its next move towards the kidnappera vac to re-offer safe-conduct. .-*e may presume that Quebec coaaidere ita October 15 offer still open, although tbe abaence of response gives the government a free hand in changing its position if it wishes. 6. Theoretically, tbe .uebec Government haa already taken steps to recommend these for five prisoners. Tbe situation eould be ...4 001085 �'4 - 3ECKKT changed only if tbe recommendation (or the public coanitment to recomaend) were withdrawn by Quebec. In fact, Mr. Choquette aaid in a November 6 press conference that the recommendations for parole still stood. The Federal Government of course can hardly withdrmw an offer which consists only in a recommendation by Quebec. We remain uncommitted and presumably need not ?. We would wish to ensure that we are aware in advance of any decision by parole boards. An announcement that parole had been refused (and for that matter granted) to any of tbe priaonera in question would have a signifleant effect on the public poaition of tbe governments and ef Quebec in particular. Me should therefore have a prior opportunity of studying tbe context in which auch an announcement would fall. This point haa been brought to the attention of tbe Solicitor General's representative on the Taak Force. Trial and Clemency for the Kidnappers 8. It ia not impossible that the Cross kidnappers will surrender him in due eourse, and yet not accept safe-conduct. One way would be for them (when the political usefulness of his captivity waa exhausted) to release him and to fade into the background. They could calculate this would underline their humane approach as well aa the powerlessness of the authorities and could dispel somewhat the effect of the laporte murder. If the kidnappera were later found, Quebec might feel that it wished to aak the Courts to exercise maximum clemency within the lam, in accordance with Kr. Choquette's October 10 poaition. A similar situation eould arise if the kidnappers, once surrounded, refused safe-conduct and eventually surrendered (without killing ita*. Croaa) ia the expectation that a sensational trial would serve their cause better than exile to Cuba. There ia no point now in evoking auch possibilities publicly. Trials of Charged Terrorists 9. This trial has been postponed by the Courts. It seems unlikely that it will now be affected directly by the Cross affair. However, in the improbable event that the kidnappers asked te negotiate the terns of Mr. Cross* release, thia element of the October 10 package may have to be looked at again. It was in any event a very vague and tenuous bargaining counter. It remains that Quebec might then tend to agree to recommend clemency for FLQ terroriste who have been .charged and not yet tried. There is no question, however, of m i s ing this subject in the present circumstances. �-5- SECRET Conclusion 10. Tou will appreciate that we do not advocate aay new process of negotiation or any broadening of the offers now being put forward publicly, which are eaeentially limited to safe-conduct with an odd mention of parolee. The above survey outlines, however, the range of issues which could arise if the kidnappers tried to bargain over Mr. Croee* release within the limits of the October 10 and October 15 offers. P. TREMBLAY P. Tremblay. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00059 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum to Privy Council Office Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 10-Nov-70 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy, RG25, vol. 25741, 20-22-TFK-1, part 3, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Kidnapping - Negotiating Position Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en