https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c2082182b5051162df5df2b3a64314b3.pdf 2a444d7aec04b45c9e07df40b67e5383 PDF Text Text ': na Department of External Affairs mi CLASSIFIED U CO File No. I Subject: INTE.*;://L 1SK 20-22-TFK-l POLITICAL From OCT a/y/fl? To HM 21/M- 3ECW1TY - F0.-?,r»F ON K i n m P F I N S POLICY Vol. THftEE jimsras / ACCESS TO INFORMATION L'ACCtS A L'INFORMATION EXAMINED BY/ EXAMINE PAR DECLASSIFIED \ OLS ACCESSION NO. ^£00x121 DATE 1"tr ' H - %d References to Related Files Fib No, AfeftFRR TO INFORMATION L'AC CES A L'tNFORMATION INEO Byy EXAMINE PAR; FLACJ&UJAV&QJL A£S ^TJ: /-W/ ^ 000928 �MESSAGE DATE i>.Ad FM/DE f&i$ r t Ocr?7 EXTERNAL SECURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER OCHFID NO TP/A IDN WASHDC PARIS NATO PERMISNY CONGENNY HAVAN PRECEDENCE IMMED POP-364 (INFO RCMP) INFO KIDNAPPING - PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM. MRS. GROSS SWSW DURING EVENING OF OCT 2 6 , MRS. CROSS BROADCAST FOLLOWING PERSONAL MSG ON MONTREAL RADIO STATION. TEXT BEGINS: IT I S NOW MORE THAN A WEEK SINCE I H*VE HEkKD FRCM YOU. YOU ARE CONSTANTLY IN MY THOUGHTS AND YOU MUST KNOW HOW MUCH I LONG FOR YOUR SAFE RETURN. IT IC AGONISING TO E-rDU.p, THE LONG PERIOD OF WAITING BUT 1 AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU AxA, STILL ALIVE Ai® WELL. I T HAS B E E A GRcAT CONSOLATION TO ME TO HAVE BE N ABLE TO tJEAD YOUR LETT RS AND TO HAVE SCME EJEA OF WHAT YOUR THOUGHTS HAVE BEEN AT THIS TIME OF SEPARATION YOUR LETT RS HAVE MOVED ME TO HOPE THAT WE WILL SOON BP TOGETHER AGAIN. I DO HOx°E THE FLQ WILL CONTINUE TO ALLOW YOU TO WRITE TO ME. MEANWHH£, 2 SUSIE AND 1 ARE THINKING OF YOU EVERY WAKING MINUTE AND YOU KNOW YOU HAVE ALL MY LOVE ALWAYS. AUX GARUIENS DE MON MAKE, JE VEUX EXPRIMER MA CONFIANCE QUE GOME VICTIME DES CIRCONSTANCES I I SERA BIEN TRAITE. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE m olP T1rt _ n _ TASK F0KCE ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR A. ROWE EXT 18/BIL (REV B/«4) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) _ D L JE LES mam 3TRIBUTION ^F DIVISION POP PS f C&seAxi ) TELEPHONE 5-6435 fifty,- APPpgyEO/AUTORJ^E 8I0..../!ZLQ iVdr. 1000929 �- 2 - -IB DE LUI R^DRE LA LIBERTE SANS PLUS DE DELAI. 2. TEXT ENDS. SHOULD PRESS ENQUIRE, FOLLOWING ARE LINES TAKEN HERE BY BRITISH AUTHORITIES (AND OUR PRESS OFFICER) (A) WE CONFIRM IM1 TEXT AS BROADCAST (B) IT e/AS A PERSONAL MSG FROM MRS. CROSS (C) I F ASKED, THE AUTHORITIES HAD BEEN CONSULTED BY MRS .CROSS WHO NATURALLY WANTED TO MOW I F THERE, WAS ANY OBJECTION TO SENDING THE MSG TO HER HUSBAND AI© SHE HAD BEi^N TOLD THAT THERE WAS NONE, (D) I F FURTHER PRESSED AS TO WHETHER TEXT WAS QUOTE CLEARED IN ADVANCE WITH AUTHORITIES UNQUOTE, THE REPLY TO BE SIMPLY 'THAT THIS WAS A PERSONAL/PERSONAL MSG FRCM MRS. CROSS. EXT ISA (8/64) (COMM'S OIV)| 000930 �Cafkj /Av iP^zifi y a 2<..'« A e< i Lc ,. PA J - / V t lA. n rr 000931 �rV Aux gardiens de mon mari, je veux exprimer ma confiance que comme victime des circonstances il sera bien traite. Je les supplie de lui rendre la liberte1 sans plus de d£lai. . 000932 �MESSAGE TOP' COMC Exfcftf FM/DE FILE/DOSSIER DATE * OCT 27 1970 J7 4VTA CONFIB . NO POP-365 LDN TO/A RemP fs%^- INFO BEL SUB/SUJ SECURITY SECURITE PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE 3^« axt) OUR TEL POP364 OCT 2 7 / 7 0 KIDNAPPING - PERSONAL MSG FROM MRS. CROSS FOR YOUR INFO ONLY /JE WERE CLOSELY CONSULTED IN ADVANCE ON THE MESSAGE BROADCAST BY MRS. CROSS AND HAD AGREED. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE ORIGIN SIO PSi DIVISION (R&ctie) TELEPHONE 5-6435 EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 000933 �^ ' jk^fJ^J^ MESSAGE ro DATE FM/DE 90'** IDN TO/A INFO OCT 2 7 1970 EXTeJiNAL RQ^P fs* gj - TZT^i 1 CONFID. NO PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE POP-365 Se^^excf) BE£ OUR TEL PCP364 OCT 2 7 / 7 0 WP73W S N A P P I N G - PiiRSONAL MSG FECM MRS. CfiOSS - SECURITY SECURITE Flt.E/$QSSlER FOB YOUR INFO ONLY WE WERE CLOSELY CONSULTED IN ADVANCE ON THE MESSAGE BROADCAST BY MRS. CROSS AND HAD AGRE3). JLs DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE "Vtm ORKSINATOR/REDAi FUliLx. - . l - . m i u U ' i l u N DIVISION POP PSf 'StCegTT'€7-) TELEPHONE APPROVED/, 5-6435 EXT 18/BIL (REV 8 / 6 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) '000934 �.v>=w©- y i.-^. £ <. A^AA . AU u S S £ / 1 ^ / x *>xSi ( A . I'jh L AU . M _ c U£*~-A , I . ~7i^ c (D -d ^ ^I\JUC$ Xv *.u~v. -tC 727 f~ (U. cMtcUX CXXCA^AXL^ My^/'ttf ^y **>• A*A*~*L) (F) -ft_j yi^, x t^tx., ^/AOL </ (V) d7d yco -A~AA^ FOLLOWING I S PROPOSED TEXT OF LETTER TO lit SENT B 4 MRS. CROSS! cdld d P^^J l'\iJ^ A, ( | ^ ^ h -~r 'JASP1E DARLING I AM BREAKING MYT5SG STLTiFCT ~3FCAiJ5F IT WEEK SINCE I HAVE HEARD FROM YOU. T$~ fffcff TKftZ* TRAIT TT~nF(teii**A YOU ARE CONSTANTLY IN MY THOUGHTS AND YOU MUST KNOW HOW MUCH I LONG FOR YOUR SAFE RETURN. I f I S AGONISING T-J FNDURE THE LONG PFRIOD OF WAITING BUT I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU 2 i STILL ALIVE AND WELL. IT HAS BEEN A GREAT CONSOLATION TO ME TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO READ YOUR LETTERS AND TO HAVE SOME IDEA OK WHAT YOUh THOUGHTS HAVE BEEN AT THIS TIME OF SEPARATION. YOUR LETTERS HAVE rOVED ME TO HOPE THAT WE WILL SOON 3E TOGETHER AGAIV. PLEASE ASK The] F . L . Q . TO LET YOU WRITE AGAIN. MEANWHILE, SUSAN AN1} I ARE THINKING OF YOU EVERY WAKING K1KUTE AND YOU KNOW YOU HAVE ALL MY LOVE ALWAYS. AUX GARDIENS DE MON MARI J E VEUX EXPRIMER MA CONFIANCE QUE COiWE VICTI:1E DES CIRCONSTANCES IL SERA BIEN TRA11E JUSQU'AU MO.^ENT OU UNE SOLUTION SERA TROUVEE." NOTE I . OPTIONAL ADDITION AT END IN FRENCH COULD 3E A SENTENCE (TO 3E DRAFTED IN OTTAWA) SUGGESTING F . L . Q . ACCEPT OFFER OF SAFE PASSAGE TO CUBA, ETC. NOTE 2 . DUNRUSSLE AND PATTiEUW STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT LITTLE OR NO CHANGE BE MADE IE AT ALL. POSSIBLE Su THAI WE CAN PROCEED WITHOUT FURTHER RECHECK AT THIS END. REQUEST CONCURRENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH DRAFT OF ADDITIONAL SENTENCE I*-' IT I i CONSIDERED WISE. 12:44 HOURS s 2 AA7 A //J?4<^l PSE ACK KKK OTT TO >1TL 7 MESS ACK p e / y \ -„Ax7XX KK 000935 �FOLLOWING I S PROPOSED TEXT OF LETTER TO BE SENT BY MRS. CROSS: 'JASPIE DARLING _rAM BREAKING MY~LT)NG S T O T C l " B F C l O S E i r TS~UD?HORr"TfTA¥"ft~ ~~ WEEK SINCE I HAVE HEARD FROM YOU. YOU ARE CONSTANTLY IN MY THOUGHTS AND YOU MUST KNOW HOW MUCH I LONG FOR YOUR SAFE RETURN. IT I S AGONISING TO ENDURE THE LONG PERIOD OF WAITING BUT I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU ARE STILL ALIVE AND WELL. IT HAS BEEN A GREAT CONSOLATION TO ME TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO READ YOUR LETTERS AND TO HAVE SOME IDEA OF WHAT YOUR THOUGHTS HAVE BEEN AT THIS TIME OF SEPARATION. YOUR LETTERS HAVE MOVED ME TO HOPE THAT WE WILL SOON BE TOGETHER AGAIN. PLEASE ASK THE F . L . Q . TO LET YOU WRITE AGAIN. MEANWHILE, SUSAN AND I ARE THINKING OF YOU EVERY WAKING MINUTE AND YOU KNOW YOU HAVE ALL MY LOVE ALWAYS. / AUX GARDIENS DE MON MARI JE VEUX EXPRIMER MA CONFIANCE QUE / COMME VICTIME DES CIRCONSTANCES IL SERA BIEN TRAITE JUSQU'AU (^MOMENT OU UNE SOLUTION SERA TROUVEE." NOTE 1 . OPTIONAL ADDITION AT END IN FRENCH COULD BE A SENTENCE (TO BE DRAFTED IN OTTAWA) SUGGESTING F . L . Q . ACCEPT OFFER OF SAFE PASSAGE TO CUBA, ETC. NOTE 2 . DUNRUSSLE AND PATTEEUW STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT LITTLE OR NO CHANGE BE MADE I F AT ALL POSSIBLE SO THAT WE CAN PROCEED WITHOUT FURTHER RECHECK AT THIS END. REQUEST CONCURRENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH DRAFT OF ADDITIONAL SENTENCE IF IT I S CONSIDERED WISE. > J 1 2 : 4 4 HOURS PSE ACK KKK OTT TO MTL JT? <^? J-V MESS ACK KK ^ ^ ^ 000936 �FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER BY MRS. CROSS: "Jaspie darling, I am breaking ray long silence because it is now more than a week since I have heard from you. You are constantly in my thoughts and you must know how much I long for your safe return. It is agonising to endure the long period of waiting but I am confident that you are stiTl alive and well. It has been a great consolation to me to have been able to read your letters and to have some idea of what your thoughts have been at this time of separation. Your letters have moved me to hope that we will soon be together again. Please ask the F.L.Q. to let you write again. Meanwhile, Susan and I are thinking of you every waking minute and you know you have all my love always. Aux gardiens de mon mari, je veux exprimer ma confiance que comme victime des circonstances il sera bien traiteE Je les supplie de lui rendre la liberte" sans plus de delai. 000937 7* ii �SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO PRESS ENQUIRIES (a) We shall confirm the text once it has been broadcast. (b) We shall emphasise that it is a personal message from Mrs. Cross. (c) If we are pressed to say whether the authorities were consulted we shall saythat Mrs. Cross naturally wanted to know whether there was any objection to her sending a personal message to her husband and was told that there was none. If pressed to say whether the text was "cleared in advance" with the authorities we shall emphasise that this is a personal message from Mrs. Cross. 000938 �FOLLOWING I S PROPOSED TEXT OF LETTER TO BE SENT BY MRS. ' J A S P I E DARLING I AM BREAKING MY TUNS STL1FCE "BFCTSffSE: IT TS~8W HOtt ~1KMT WEEK SINCE I HAVE HEARD FROM YOU. YOU ARE CONSTANTLY IN MY THOUGHTS AND YOU MUST KNOW HOW MUCH I LONG FOR YOUR SAFE RETURN. IT I S AGONISING TO ENDURE THE LONG PERIOD OF WAITING BUT I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU ARE STILL ALIVE AND WELL. IT HAS BEEN A GREAT CONSOLATION TO ME TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO READ YOUR LETTERS AND TO HAVE SOME IDEA 07 WHAT YOUR THpUGHTS HAVE BEEN AT THIS TIME OF SEPARATION. YOUR LETTERS HAVE MOVED ME TO HOPE THAT WE WILL SOON BE TOGETHER AGAIN. PLEASE ASK THE F . L . Q . TO LET YOU WRITE AGAIN. MEANWHILE, SUSAN AND I ARE THINKING OF YOU EVERY WAKING MINUTE AND YOU KNOW YOU HAVE ALL MY LOVE ALWAYS. AUX GARDIE'JS DE MON MARI J E VEUX EXPRIMER MA CONFIANpE QUE ZOmi VICTIME DES CIRCONSTANCES IL SERA BIEN TRAITE JUSQU'AU MOMENT OU UNE SOLUTION SERA TROUVEE." NOTE 1. OPTIONAL ADDITION AT END IN FRENCH COULD BE A SENTENCE (TO 3E DRAFTED IN OTTAWA) SUGGESTING F . L . Q . ACCEPT OFFER OF SAFE PASSAGE TC CUBA, ETC. NOTE 2 . DUNRUSSLE AND PATTEEUW STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT,LITTLE OR NO CHANGE BE MADE I F AT ALL POSSIBLE SO THAT WE CAN PROCEED WITHOUT FURTHER RECHrpCn AT THIS END. REQUEST CONCURRENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH DRAFT OF ADDITIONAL SENTENCE IF IT I S CONSIDERED WISE. 12:44 HOURS Si / PSE ACK <. 7 KKK OTT TO MTL V y-. S, r > OJ A MESS ACK /f AA7A ^<f / | > J) A 2^,1 KK 000939 * * �FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED TEXT OF LETTER TO SE SENT BY MRS. CROSS: " J A S P I E DARLING i~AM "BREAKI N G " M Y ~ L " 9 N G ~ ^ T L 1 ; W C E " B F C 3 0 5 E I T WEEK SINCE I HAVE HEARD FROM YOU. IS" i m "fiCTRF "TH"A¥ ~& YOU ARE CONSTANTLY IN MY THOUGHTS AND YOU MUST KNOW HOW MUCH I LONG FOR *OUR SAFE RETURN. IT I S AGONISING TC ENDURE THE LONG PERIOD OF WAITING BUT I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU ARE STILL ALIVE AND WELL. IT HAS BEEN A GREAT CONSOLATION TO ME TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO READ YOUR LETTERS AND TO HAVE SOME IDEA OK WHAT YOUR THOUGHTS HAVE BEEN AT T H I S TIME OF SEPARATION. YOUR LETTERS HAVE MOVED ME TO HOPE THAT WE WILL SOON S E TOGETHER A G A H . PLEASE ASK THE F . L . Q . TO LET YOU WRITE AGAIN. .MEANWHILE, SUSAN AMD I ARE THINKING OF YOU EVERY WAKING .MINUTE AND YOU KNOW YOU HAVE ALL MY LOVE ALWAYS. AUX GARDIENS DE MON MARI J E VEUX EXPRIMER MA CONFIANCE QUE COMME VICTIME DES CIRCONSTANCES IL StRA BIEN TRAITE JUSQU'AU MOMENT OU UNE SOLUTION SERA TROUVEE." NOTE J . OPTIONAL ADDITION AT £Hu IN FRENCH COULD 3 £ A SENTENCE (TO BE DRAFTED IN OTTAWA) SUGGESTING F . L . Q . ACCEPT OFFER OF SAFE PASSAGE TC CUBA, ETC. NOTE 2 . DUNRUSSLE AND PATTEELW STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT LITTLE OR NO CHANGE SO MAUJI I ? AT ALL POSSIBLE SO THAT WE CAN PROCEED WITHOUT FURTHER RECHECK AT THIS cfiJ. RcQUEST CONCURRENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH DRAFT OF ADDITIONAL SENlENCt. IF IT I S CONSIDERED WISE. 12:4 4 HC'JRS A4„ 777^ PSE ACK " KKK OTT TO MTL MESS ACK '-"*"« <XA A ^.-p,XA7ZX KK 000940 �PtY^j<- 27^ s G*ri ? 0 P /R.G. S e a b o r n / sm s\f"A^> 0 AF r<> CONFIDENTIAL October 27, 1970 c <. MEMORANDUM TO HR.^fttiQUE UET FROM: R.G. SEABORN RE: Messages of sympathy, statements of support, etc, I have gone through the material on the clip boards on the files indicated in the subsequent heading*re messages of sympathy, statements of support, etc.; what I found is noted. I would suspect that either Protocol Division or Mr. Vincent would have a more complete list since according to a memorandum of October 23 Protocol is acknowledging such messages. KIDNAPPINGS - Background Germany - Message Brandt - P.M. October 19, in form of a note with an attached letter from German Ambassador. Ireland - Statement by Lynch October 18 - transmitted by Irish Embassy. KIDNAPPINGS - TELEGRAMS IN Spain Telegram 1130 of October 22 from Madrid. Messages of sympathy received at the Embassy. Argentina Telegram 782 of October 21 from Buenos Aires. Expression of regret on Laporte's death by President to Ambassador at the presentation of credentials. Denmark Telegram 1673 of October 21 from Permis New York. Reaction of Danish Foreign Minister to kidnappings and Laporte's death. South Africa - Telegram 470 of October 20 from Capetown. Reactions of P.M. and F.M. Ireland Telegram 294 of October 19 from Dublin. Statement by lynch (also received from Irish Embassy). France Telegram 318 of October 18 from Paris. Schumann to Ambassador. Expression of condolences on Laporte's death. F.M. also sent a message to Quebec Government. ...f2 000941 �- 2 - CONFIDENTIAL Britain - Telegram 651 of October 18 from London. Douglas-Home to SSEA. Personal and private message re Laporte's death. France - Telegram 3231 of October 21 from Paris. Press coverage of Pompidou's statement at a cabinet meeting of October 21. I.L.Q. - Telegram 3176 of October 18 from Geneva. Condolences on Laporte's death from the Director General of ILO. Britain - Telegram 3383 of October 9, 1970 from London. Douglas-Home thanking SSEA for an earlier message. Britain - Message Heath - P.M. Passed in note from Whitehead and was in reply to earlier message from P.M. KIDNAPPINGS - STATEMENTS - General correspondence No 1 Britain - Douglas-Home to SSEA. October 11 - Message in form of a letter from Mr. Whitehead to USSEA. KIDNAPPINGS - STATEMENTS - General correspondence No 2 U.S.A. - Nixon - Trudeau Telephone conversation (confidential) October 18. Memorandum on telephone conversation dated October 19 by T. Porteous. France - French Ambassador. October 18 - Report quoting the Ambassador on station CKCH. Britain - Whitehead - USSEA. October 18. Letter to which USSEA has replied. A s7 E Seaborn A �MESSAGE - D A T E EXIT FM/DE j m INFO EXTEROTT SECURITY SECURITE FIUE/PQS?IER wsOCT 23/70 kilt CONFD 16 IP/11 NO PRECEDENCE FLASH POP-366 LM. Cjl HAVANA PERMISNY CONGENY WASHDC PARIS CANDELNATO SUfi^SiW KIDNAPPINGS - OCT 27 FLQ COMMUNIQUE. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF FLQ COMMUNIQUE FOUND LAST NIGHT FOLLOWING CALL TO CKAC RADIO STATION. COMMUNIQUE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY PAGES TORN OUT OF AN EXPIRED PASSPORT IN NAME OF PAUL ROSE (INCLUDING PHOTOGRAPH PAGE). THERE WAS ALSO A PHOTOGRAPH OF JAMES CROSS AND FINGERPRINT! OF ROSE. AT POLICE REQUEST, THIS DOCU HAS NOT/NOT BEEN MADE PUBLIC. MEDIA REPORTED THAT IT HAS A PURELY POLITICAL CONTENTS APART FROM STATEMENT THAT LIBERATION CELL WILL NOT/NOT BE HEARD FROM UNLESS TEXT IS PUBLISHED. FOR TIME BEING THEREFORE YOU SHOUID CONSIDER TEXT CONFIDENTIAL. COPIES HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO UK HIGHCOM HERE. TEXT BEGINS Comcentre please copy attached document as indicat TEXT ENDS 72 DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE NO DISTR ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR SIO C...:ROQMt'/lz DIVISION POP APPRCVED/AUTORISE TELEPHONE 26467 S.0 Ojf}^^^. &,.JMlKt EXT 18/BIL (REV 8 / 6 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 000943 �v N - 2 - 2. CONFD ANOTHER ALLEGED COMMUNIQUE INDICATING WHERE CROSS* BODY COULD BE FOUND WAS DISCOVERED TO BE HOAX. / �Y< - \ MESSAGE DATE FM/D5 TO/A SECURITY SECURITE OCT 2S/70 "0 u EXTEROTT EXTERN OCT2B FILE DOSSIER. CONFD NO \%im PRECEDENCE FLaSH POP-367 LDN 7AA. INFO BEE OURTEL POP-366 OCT 28 SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPINGS - OCT 27 FLQ COMMUNIQUE. IN VIEW OF LAST PARA OF LATEST COMMUNIQUE, QUESTION MAY ARISE WHETHER PUBLICATION OF COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE ALLOWED. FOR YOUR INFO ONLY THERE IS NO/NO INTENTION HERE OF DOING SO. QUEBEC POLICE CHIEF HAS TOLD MEDIA THAT PUBLICATION WOULD IMPEDE POLICE ENQUIRIES. 2. FOR OUR PART WE NOTE THAT COMMUNIQUE DOES NOT/NOT UNDERTAKE TO SEND LETTER FROM CROSS IN EXCHANGE FOR PUBLICATION; THERE IS NO/NO REAL EVIDENCE THAT AUTHORS OF COMMUNIQUE ARE IN TOUCH WITH CROSS* KIDNAPPERS OR COULD INFLUENCE THEIR ACTIONS, EVEN IF THIS WERE SO, IT MIGHT BE UNWISE TO START AGAIN A BARGAINING PROCESS WITH CROSS* KIDNAPPERS. THIS MIGHT LEAD THEM TO ABANDON THEIR PRESENT POSITION (INDEFINITE DETENTION OF CROSS WITHOUT THREAT TO . ./2 DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE NO DISTR ORKS INATOR/ REDACTEUR SIO ::::::::.::.::':::£. FWQUXTILZ: DIVISION POP TELEPHONE 26467 APPROVED/AUTORISE SIO .C WiMl EXT 18/BIL (REV 6/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 2J 000945 �v N CONFD - 2- HIS LIFE UNLESS KIDNAPPERS ARE SURROUNDED AND ATTACKED) AND TO REVERT TO A POLICY OF DEMANDS BACKED UP BY THREATS AGAINST CROSS* LIFE. SUCH A PROCESS MIGHT HEEGHTEN RISK TO CROSS, QUITE APART FROM POLITICAL RISK INVOLVED IN APPEARING TO START BARGAINING ONCE MORE WITH KIDNAPPERS. IN ADDITION PUBLICATION OF COMMUNIQUE AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE WITH REGULATIONS UNDER WAR MEASURES ACT; IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO LET KIDNAPPERS BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE SUFFICIENT LEVERAGE TO FORCE GOVT TO IGNORE ACT. OUR 2Z>ou.fJTS Argosy QOJEGTIOMO TO?PUBLICATION ARISE FROM % COMPLEX OF REASONS GIVEN ABOVE RATHER THAN FROM rOJjllgQuL CONTENTS OF COMMUNIQUE. B. # l?|-TCHie �CONFIDENTIAL October 30, 1970 MEMORANDUM TO: Special Operations Centre PROM: Task Force, Operations Centre DAILY ANALYSIS OF MEDIA We are grateful to receive your daily analysis of the total impact of developments and of media, comments on the present crisis. We would recommend, however, that this material be classified. We recognize that its distribution may be very restricted, but it would nonetheless be most undesirable that a copy should fall into the hands of the press and be published. 2. I am glad to note that the analysis has become a little more explicit, particularly in No. 8. We have had some difficulty on occasion in understanding why a given development was considered to be positive or negative. One case in point is of direct interest to us: Why was it considered negative that a press series of October 27 should draw attention to the length of time since Mr. Cross has been heard from? V/e have assumed that every reminder to the public of Mr. Cross* continued captivity was a useful development. However it may be that we should be a little more discriminating in that respect and we would welcome your comments on this point. C. Roquet �PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVE 7), 2xA7X7s->~~*A CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM 7 Ay'' October 19, 1970. ;) , yyXP Ad Mr. P i t f i e l d Ed Ritchie came down to see me this morning to ask about coordinating our activities with his. I briefed him on what we were doing. He agrees fully and is deeply concerned about the government being tempted to overreact grossly. He feels that the reaction to date has been excessive. You might want to show the Prime Minister a note from Mr. Ritchie, that I have just received. He makes points which we would want to make, in another context. S"V\M' 2 A> ^'sj( \, f y 16 NOV 70 12: 45 000948 �A.E. Ritchie/PS RESTRICTED October 19, 1970. 2 .722 f f /A ((> ) Re: Re our interesting conversation with you about the strategy, I wonder if you shouldn't try to work in somewhere the two thoughts: (a) 70 b* jeesi Need/^for the Government to resist the temptation (and Jta.-JSa^ftr^to have resisted the temptation) to overdo the use of the great powers entrusted to it; and (b) Meed for the Government to keep and increase the support of the young which may be endangered by the inevitable identification of the Government with the police and the military (e.g. by continuing a liberal attitude to - non-criminal - activities at the universities; by adopting a policy on drugs which takes account of the current attitudes of the young; by increasing job opportunities and helping with accommodation for the transient young; and perhaps even by eventually attracting the young to the positive aspect of police and military careers for themselves). These are personal and not External observations. Ed Ritchie (dictated but not read) 000949 �October 26, 1970. WORK PROGRAMS AoAA-AAAAF) (A) Involving the Task Force only. 1. Study of kidnappings elsewhere.- Compare Canadian experience witn "Uruguayan, on which we now have a draft text. Get additional information from our posts as required; then formulate precise questions for PSI Division. - In addition the experiences in Guatemala and Brazil should be the object of a similar study. - Survey of literature and study centres dealing with such subjects (e.g. London School of Economics has a specialist; Institute of Strategic Studies?). Perhaps ask our missions in London and Washington to take an interest. - Survey of other techniques by terrorists. 2* Contingency for the worst.- How do we stand on a statement,messages, etc. 3« Draft statement ...for the Quebec government. - Appeal for public support and information with possible request that the people supports police efforts which are designed for their protection, etc. 4. Reward.- Outcome of Cabinet Committee discussions? Memorandum to Kinister (cc. PMO, PCO) on a discreet formula: reward without public announcement, publicized only through coveraT police channels. The amount should be in excess of $5,000. Perhaps the amount previously suggested should be reduced to a sum for keeping with ordinary levels of rewards offered through police channels for serious crimes. 5 • Ir i sh/human JLnt ere st angle. 72 000950 �- 2 - m asks with th nolle: 1. Related to i be r u np- on S DlO Xl A n n ene a J L J2dJ over J -.. . iO.i CO A -7 CA. (a) data cn ordinary police powers in other countries (USA, France, Germany, Japan, UK Third World; Mr. Ritchie also suggests Sweden) for purposes of comparison v/ith present extraordinary police powers in Canada* (b) information on devices abroad for general surveillance and control of the population (e.g. national registration passport control at hotels, immigration laws etc. ) v/hich do not exist in Canada. Object v/ould be to stress the degree of openness of the Canadian society. This material v/ould provide talking points to our posts and should he provided to SOC for possible use in general government statements, the}r v/ill have to be carefully handled. 2- De p_art me n t a 1_ _ co mme n t s _ to ^pC__and_ Jtist i c ^ J^J^?^menet__pn the~~'le^israj^pj^ to^^ Mes sures /• ct Legal'Division will study "the" que st ion. The "object will be to ensure that the new legislation does not create a new form of political crime and therefore political prisoners in Canada. Our decisions should be justified in terms of the international impact of such development although the internal impact is even more important, s • ASSj?S77y2S22'2F2?J' POJLj-ce^ action. - We might pass to SOC some comments on the impact of police effectiveness in a case like this. On this iajBS£ we could add comments (a) on the need for policies to ensure RCMP effectiveness (financial resources manpower including French Canadian personnel); (b) policies on the pooling of intelligence resources at the federal (RCMP, DND) and provincial levels; (c) policies to help the provincial and municipal police.Whether v/e v/ant to make any comments on the broader government policies relating to national security is also for consideration (e.g. implementation of the national security recommendations; problems relating to immigration, etc.). • ./3 000951 �- 3- 4. Point out to SOC the need for information on the arrests in Quebec. V/ill they yield any general information? Will they lead to charges ana of v/hat kind? If the whole operation has led to nothing, the government will have to be ready to face the resulting political problem (credibility gap, police inaptitude). Could there also be some legal problems, resulting e.g. from lav/suits against the Crown for unjustified arrests, loss of reputation, loss of income. 5.. Point out to SOC that someone in Ottawa should get all the facts on Mr. Laporte's death. If the theory i of accidental death spread or if it is used as a 1 defence by the killer, it is better that it be discredited beforehand by the publication of complete information as soon as possible. 6. _PpJLJL. — Does SOC see any advantage in a survey of Canadian opinion on political aspect of this affair. If so, it would be useful to know what the reactions are, mainly.in French Canada, to Cross7 continued detention and to the possibility of his being murdered C. R. 000952 �ie 20 octobre 1970 PROJET DE CCMMUIIQUE DU BUREAU DU PRggER IPIPllO'AZ DU C2JE3EC Dans l e out d ' a s s u r e r en t o u t temps l e PPUT-conduit aux r a v i s s e u r s de K. Cross t o u t en p e r m e t t a n t l e fonc'^iormement normal de l ' l l e S t e - e l e l e n e , Me Robert Demers communique, a l a ere.ite de c o n s u l t a t i o n s e n t r e l e s a u t o r i t e s gouvernementales e t i e gouvernement c u b a i n , ce q u i suit : (a) I ' a c c e s du p u b l i c a. l ' l l e Ste-Helene s e r a r e t a b l i ; (b) l e p e r s o n n e l d ' e n t r e t i e n des. p a v i l i o n s e t I P p e r s o n n e l d ' a d m i n i s t r a t i o n de Terre des Hommes a u r o n t accep a l ' l l e Motre-Dame: (c) y une p r o c e d u r e p r e c i s e e t r a p i d e d * e v a c u a t i o n des deux l i e s A e t e prevue a pour permettre dan: un delai tres bref de retablir ies mesures de securite necessaires a la mise en application iu sauf-conduit; (d) un avion derneurera pret 1 deccller aussitfit que requis ; (e) le personnel du Consulat Cubain a Rontrial sera pret en tout temps a se rendre au Pavilion du Canada pour accueillir les ravisseurs. 2. Ces dispositions seront mises er. vigueur 1 partir de 07:00 heures mercredi , le 2-3 octobre 1970. Till son. ..C.L1 - - - P i - yy 7 ' '7 j'/y " _ — .- 7 . . . uj. 7. ^ys •• s *y * * - suivante*: (a) (b) (c) FF (e) Cf) (g) 000953 r t �, Pop / r ) - PDVP.A.aiSSOKNRTTVdsta CONFIDENTIAL 7jf%.2)l% w j e 7oct ^7 o c t o b r e 1^70 &-l**T#J, K5M0IRB A L ' ^ U I P C SPECIALE A d a p t a t i o n du s a u f - c o n d u i t pour l e s r a v i s s e u r s do V. V o s s A uno p e r i o d e do s i x r o i s . Me Robert Demers convoquait vendredi soir uno reunion des services intoresaesT h la ilse en oeuvre du saufcond uit pour l^a ravisseurs do *. Cross. Cette reunion qui d sibuta A 19 heures r^unisaalt. Irs representants de la Silretu du Quebec, do la Poller de Montreal, de la Police dn Conseil des Ports natlonaux, d- la Gendarmerie royalo, des Forces ar*"os, do 1'Administration do Torre dea Honnos, du bureau daa Paaseports do Montreal et do deux repr '-sontants d'Ottawa, du Ministere dos Affaires ext?>riauras. A ?1 heures, la Consul do Cuba so ioi^nai*"- A la r 'union. 7. Inns son introduction, ;'e Dorors expliqua quo l'on devait prevoir le sauffconduit pour uno periode do six nois A un an. Tl 'ta5t impossible durant cette periode de refuser I'acces aux deux ll^s, i.o. l'tlo Ste-Hol^ne at l'lle NotreDa*T••",, qui coiprennent lo co"iplexe connu sous lo non do Terre ioa Hommes. Tl 'tai d'avis qu'on devait do nouveau permettre A ia population d'avoir a<~cks A l'lle Ste-H"l?»no sur laquelle ost situ* entre autres lo restaurant Hel&ne do Char plain. Sn co qui concerne l*il« Notra-Dama, los bureaux de l'ad^inistration do ^err^ dos Hommes y sont situs's, ot precisement dans I s loeaux du pavilion du Canada qui sont los bureaux 1'sign's cOTr>e les bureaux du Consulat do Cuba. L'ad^inistration do ^erre dos Hotamoa doit -vide--"ont se poursuivre. Alio epploie au pavilion du Canada rr.Sme une cinquantaine"* do personnes. Do plus, lo personnel d'eritretien des pavilions, qui comprend 700 personnes, doit do nouveau avoir ace&s ft l'lle Notre-Daro. 7n fait, la presence d'une 6quipe d'environ 300 ouvriers est aussi requise pour certains travaux qui pemettront aur pavilions, conme aux objets qui y aont exposes, do passer l'hlver sans dO""r.ar<:s. ? lomers fit aussi rcrarquer qu'il «*tait fSgalft^ent inconcevable qu'un avion ot qu'un holieopt&re des Forces armies puissent der-eurer dans un 6tat d'alorto tres l^v' pour un n periode de six -nois A un an. 3. La r "union raconnut d'erpbl'o que dos adaptations au v -odalit's du sauf-conduit 'talent necessaires ot qua d'ailleurs la population lo eoeprendrait sans difficult^. L'opinion se rallia rapidement an fait qu'il etait preferable d'adaptar los -odalit's du sauf-conduit plutdt que de changer lc lieu d'sl.fn' co-'-y Consulat de Cuba. 000954 �CONFI05NTTEL 2 - I*. La P o l i c e de Montreal a s s u r a l a r e u n i o n qu'on pouvait. *vacuer en l o i n s d ' u n e henr.e t o u t l e p e r s o n n e l qui se t r o u v o r a i t a u r l ' l l e Not.re-Dane. Comme l ' l l e Hotre-Dare e s t de t o u t e "aeon "or:.' P d u r a n t l ' h i v e r , ceux qui y ont a c c ^ s pour y t r a v a i l l e r d o i v e n t f a i r e p;ontre de l e u r p a s s e A l ' e n t r ' e de l ' l l e . Quant A l ' l l e S t e - H ^ l e n e , e l l e e s t peu f r ' q j o n t f e l ' h i v e r e t l a P o l i c e de M o n t r e a l 'etait conv a i n c u e q u ' o n p o u v a i t do nouveau 1'eSvacuer en l o i n s d ' u n e h e u r e . La P o l i c e de Montreal : t a i a u s s i convaincne q u ' u n e pr e r i o d e de t r o i s h e u r e s aprfes 1 ' e v a c u a t i o n d e s deux l i a s ' t a i t amplement s u ^ f i s a n t e pour s ' a s s u r e r que l e s l i e s e t a i e n t completeraent d o s e r t o s . 2n d ' a u t r e s n o t a , q u a t r e h e u r e s e t a i e n t n e c e s s a i r e s pour a s s u r o r l a s e c u r i t e de l ' l l e a p a r t i r du moment oft l e s r a v i s s e u r s i n f o r ^ a i a n t l a 3\lrete du Quebec q u ' i l s d ' s i r a i e n t se p r l v a l o i r du s a u f - c o n d u i t . 5. Quant au r e p r e s e n t a n t d e s Forces a m e © s , i l nous i n d i q u a i t que l ' e t a t d ' a l e r t e de s i x h e u r e s pour I ' h o l i c o p t ^ r e e t 1 ' a v i o n S t a i t un d o l a i n o r n a l qui l e u r p e r m e t t r a i t de donner rm^ ^ a r a n t i o r e l a t i v e qm l ' a v i o n s e r a i t d i s p o n i b l e . Comma c e t t e r*arantle n ' e t a i t pas a b a o l u e , nous avons denando r-nr * e r l t ( n o t r e l e t t r e du 26 o c t o b r e ) au Chef de I ' E t a t - m a j o r a d . l o i n t de oien v o u l o i r confirmer q\ie ce d e l a i de s i x h e u r e s l u i a p p a r a i s s a i t conme l a p e r i o d s maximum r e q u i s e pour que l ' a v i o n s o i t d i s p o n i b l e . Lo ^ r n o r a l Dare confirm* par t e l e p h o n e ce matin A F . R i t c h i e que t e l d t a i t l e c a s . Le Consul de Cuba fut - i s au c o u r a n t de c e s d e c i s i o n s l o r s q u ' i l r e j o l g n i t l a r e u n i o n A 21 h e u r e s . II c o n f i r m simplement que l e p a v i l i o n du Canada a p p a r a i s s a i t A sea a u t o r i t 6 s comme un bon e n d r o i t pour 1 ' e x e c u t i o n du saufc o n d u i t e t q u ' e l l e s 4 t a i e n t de nemo d ' a c c o r d A ce que l o p a v i l i o n s o i t d i s p o n i b l e dans un d o l a i d ' e n v i r o n cinq h e u r e s . I I aug£era q u ' o n h i s s e lo drapeau cubain d£s l o debut de 1 ' o p e r a t i o n . 3n d ' a u t r e s mots,11 n ' e t a i t pas n e c e s s a i r e quo l e p a v i l i o n cubain f l o t t o s u r l e p a v i l i o n du Canada sauf au moment p r e c i s ou l a n i s o en a p p l i c a t i o n du s a u f - c o n d u i t e n t r e r a i t >>n a c t i o n . I I e t a i t de ~^eme d ' a c c o r d avec n o t r e p l a n de c o n d u i r e l e s r a v i s s e u r s do T e r r e des Hommes A l ' a e > o ~ p o r t en h e i i e o p t & r e . 7. Los d e c i s i o n s de c e t t e r e u n i o n f u r o n t t r a n s c r i t o s — dans un communique ( c o p i e e l - j o i n t s ) qui fut 6 n i s du bureau du Premier n i n i s t r a du Quebec l e 7A o c t o b r e v e r s 5 h e u r e s . Anparavant le t e x t e de ce communique a v a i t e t e approuve p a r l e Gouvernement cubain A l a demands do 1'Ambassadeur de Cuba A Ottawa. Lo t e x t e du eo~ ,; eunique fut a u s s i p o r t e A I ' a t t e n t i o n du Haut-Commissaire b r i t a n n i q u e l o ?A au m a t i n . , . . . s 000955 �CONFIDENTIAL - 3 8. "'•', Robert Demers vovait dans la publication de ce communique une fa^on pour lo Gouvernement du Quebec de hi on indiquer aur ravisseurs que comma eux les autorites quebecoises 'talent determines A attendre longtemps *t*il le fallait, et sans concession, que cette ori se se d'noua. Cost pour cette raison aussi que H" Demers, dans uno conversation qui suivit, la reunion, ne croyait pas qu'il otait approprie A co stage do faire appal dans le co inunique aux sentiments d'humanltu des ravisseurs qu'il vovait plutdt comme un avou do faiblo.sse de la pa**t dos autorites nu'h'rolsos. II no pensait pas non plus qu'il 6tait nppropri '• h ee star;e d'indiquer dans lo communique que lea personnes A " h a T O des ravisseurs pouvaient lea accompagner A Cuba. II preferait garder cette carte an reserve et la jouer A la d e m i s e minute au moment oft los raviss^u^s etaient prftts A accepter le sauf-conduit. °. Los aspects suivants du sauf-conduit furent souleves ou bien pendant la reunion ou apres la reunion lors d'une conversation avec H« Robert Donors: a) Lors do la r'union i'ni demand6 A I'inspecteur ienoit qui est responsible de cette op'ration pour la 3Qreto du Qu4bec si la S&rete etait conscionte quo le sauf-conduit 'taip valablercfenosi la SQrote ddcouvralt I'endroit oft 5tait each' M. Cross. L'inspecteur ianolt me repondit quo les descentas do polioe so faisaient avec beaucoup de rapidit : - '. qu'on no pouvait Svtdemraent exclure la possibilite d'une fusillade immediate au moment de la deoouverte dos ravisseurs et do M, Cross. Cependant il fallait se rappeler que les policiers nn tiraient jamais los premiers et qu'ils no repondaient pas n 'cessairamont au tir par le tir mais parfois r\nr des gas. ?;° Demers rae tel?}phona le lendemaln pour me dire qu'il s»etait mis en rapport avec la Directeur do la SQroto du Quebec, !•'. St-Pierre, et quo celui-ci lui avait assn~; que la police etai' parfaitement consciente du fait quo le sauf-conduit otait valable au moment de la doeouverte des ravisseurs et qu'il devait si possible lour Stro offert on echanne de la liberation de M. Cross, b) "e Demers ~'a aussi informs quo l«s personnes qui seraient appoiees A Identifier M. Cross au moment do sa liberation Etaient Lo**d Dunnruss-1 ou 0'.. Ashforth, tous deux du bureau de M. Cross A Montreal. c) !'° Robert Doners etait on principe oppose A I'offre d'uno r coo"-ponso pour toute information qui pouvait conduire A la deeouverte des ravisseurs. II faisait remarquer, comme 000956 �C0NFIDSNTI3L - L - nous d ' a i l l e u r s , q u ' i l e t a i t pratiquement ipiposaible d'expliquor A la population pourquoi une recompense o t a i t offerto pour F. Cross t a n d i s q u ' o l l o n ' a v a i t pas ete offerto pour M. Laporte, mais i l a.loutait que la tochniquo de l a recompense pouvait a u s s i Cairo penser A la p%gre q u ' i l e t a i t valablo d'enl^ver des porsonnalit.'s pour obtonir de 1'arment. P> A . BlGrT.ONNir'i Y P.A.3, 000957 �X-y. MESSAGE Z0M "5AfT FM/DE OCT;* EXTERNAL fl FILE /DOSSIER J fl ^70 CONFIDL NO TO/A IDN ,NF0 HAVAN PRECEDENCE IMMH3 PCP-370 PERMISNY CONGEMNY SECURITY SECURITE WASHDC PARIS NATOBRU RCMP OUR TEL POP366 OCT 2 8 / 7 0 SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPINGS: OCT 27 FLQ COMMUNIQUE CONTRARY TO EARLIER POLICE REPORTS FRCM MONTREAL, THERE WAS NO/NO PHOTOGRAPH OF CROSS ENCLOSED WITH COMMUNIQUE AS REPORTED IN OUR REFTEL. IN FACT THERE IS NOTHING IN PRESMT COMMUNIQUE THAT CAN BE LINKED WITH CROSS KIDNAPPERS, IN SPITE OF FACT THAT COMMUNIQUE PURPORTS TO BE FRCM KIDNAPPERS OF BOTH CROSS AND LAPORTE AND ALLEGED THIRD CELL RESPONSIBLE FOR LATTERS MUEDER. WE HAVE NO/NO EVIDENCE TO DATE THAT CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS OF KIDNAPPERS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. EVIDENCE LINKS COMMUNIQUE ONLY WITH ABDUCTORS AND KILLERS OF LAPORTE. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE -4JASK FORCE L I S T 0RK3INAT0R/RE0ACTEUR 310 .a.,J^^ll^V^-#^^b" DIVISION TELEPHONE POP 5-6435 APPRCVED/AUTORISE 8I0 C. ROQUET EXT 18/BIL (REV/B/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 000958 �MESSAGE *'.- Ad-' t>P^Fo # EXT OTT FM/DE DATE Oo?! II » C ' !B .FILE/POKIER SECURITY SECURITE ^Lfts OCT 2 8 1V70 NO 'CP-371 LONDRES TO/A PRECEDENCE xagt^L INFO \| BEE SUB/SUJ CROSS - QUESTION EN CHAMBRE POUR VOTRE INFORMATION EN REPONSE A LA QUESTION SI LE PM ETAIT EN MESURE DE DIBE SI M. CROSS ETAIT TOUJOURS VIVANT SUIVANT LES RENSEIGNEMENTS DCNT IL PEUT DISPOSER M . TRUDEAU A REPONDU CIT JE NE SUIS PAS EN MESURE DE REPONDRE MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT FINCIT. SEEKS. ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR SIO ...._ -.a...SEABOBN/mak DIVISION _... POP TELEPHONE APPRWED/AUTORISE » jiFAA*~A~~ EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 000959 �EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES FILE A FROM De SECURITY S4curlti October 2 8 , 1970. DATE fe. Seaborn/R.B. Edmonds RESTRICTS! NUMBER Numero REFERENCE Reference DOSSIER SUBJECT Suj,l OTTAWA Senior Duty Officer Log - October 27-28 ENCLOSURES Annexes Oc1 2l/ 22:32 DISTRIBUTION Canadian Press News item received reporting that radio station in Montreal may have received note from FLQ. Seaborn called RCMP re above information - Inspector not present but RCMP was asieed to check it out. 22:41 Seaborn called Mr. Roquet. 22:45 RCMP called to say they had been informed by police in Montreal Lhat they were following up leads concerning tvro possible communiques: a) Cross etait mort - trouvera a l'lle Laval; b) letter by Paul Rose to CKAC. Montreal police had no indication of authenticity of either communique. 22:50 Listening post at Operations Centre reported CKAC as saying they hao a communique which included the expired passport of Paul iJose (invalid as of September 20, 3 970). 22:55 Seaborn informed Roquet of above. 23:20 Radio Canada made mention of "Cellule Chenier - il y a une heure". 23:25 Listening post Operating Centre reported that messages apparently in code had been broadcast over CKCH. The messages read as follows: 22:25 Ext. 407A/BU. (Admin. Services Div.) Un message pour la defense civile. volent bas ce soir." "Les elephants 22:40 "Les petaques..." 23:05 "Pour la menagere bien avisee. cuites." 23:26 "Message pour les couples amoureux: neuf mois plus tard." Les carottes sont 000960 • • • • *~ �- 2 - 23:30 Seaborn called Roquet. 23:35 Seaborn telephoned RCMP to see if there was anything new. 23:40 Edmonds came on duty. 23:45 Seaborn called RCMP and was advised someone was waiting for the communique which was being relayed by telex from Montreal. 23:59 AP called and said there were confused reports of a new communique from Montreal, one suggesting that body had been found. AP asked: "Any news? Have you heard from police?" Edmonds responded according to formula: "We are following developments, etc." When pressed, Edmonds added: ",/e are not authorized to say any more." 00:05 Seaborn called Roquet. 00:15 Air Commodore Boxer (British High Commission liaison officer) telephoned Edmonds and was given text over telephone of message from CKAC Montreal and was told that the assesament of Quebec Surete was that it was a message of purely political significance. 00:25 Seaborn called Roquet and latter advised that duty officer should rely on his judgement as to whether others sh.ould be alerted. 00:30 Department of Transport representative in Operations Centre reported that their man in .lontreal had also heard the rumour that Cross' body had been found in Laval, 00:40 RCMP duty Corporal read over telephone text of two communiques which have been received by telex from Montreal; communiques were taped in Operations Centre from telephone rendition. RCMP Corporal added that a plane was bringing the documents from Montreal for identification. 00:50 Telephone call received from Marc Lalonde of the P.M.'s office who reported that a telephone call from Premier Bourassa's office was expected in about 15 minutes. He reported that tire police were going to the site mentioned in the second communique at the ile Laval. Lalonde suggested that Operations Centre should review the procedures previously prepared for implementation in the case of Cross' death. 00:55 Seaborn telephoned Mr, Ritchie and advised him of the two communiques. USSEA authorized Operations Centre PO tell McConville of British High Commission, who had arrived in Operations Centre, of developments including the communique about Cross' reported death. This was done by Seaborn, �- 3 - 01:05 Barker informed by t e l e p h o n e ; s a i d t h a t he would come i n . 01:05 Roquet a r r i v e d in Operations Centre and confirmed e x i s t e n c e of a f o l d e r on C r o s s ' death (see M. Lalonde 1 s c a l l ) . 01:15 M. Lalonde telephoned again t o r e l a y messa, r e from Premier Boeirassa's o f f i c e sa7/ing t h a t r e s e a r c h had l e e r conducted on t h e i l e Laval - a "foot by foot s e a r c h " had y i e l d e d negative r e s u l t s . 01:16 Corporal Sawyer of RCMP telephoned t o confirm t h a t they had a c a l l from Montreal t o say t h a t t h e p o l i c e t h e r e had completed t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n and n o t h i n g lead been found i n the area i n d i c a t e d . 01:20 Mr. R i t c h i e informed of eeevelopments; he asked about R o s e ' s p a s s p o r t having been included with second communique ( i t developed t h a t i t had been included with f i r s t communique). Roquet informed USSEA t h a t i t was L a l o n d e ' s view t h a t P.M. need not be informed but Roquet i n speaking with Mr. Ritcriie was not so s u r e . 01:35 Edmonds t e l e p h o n e d Corooral Saevyer a t RCMP who oaid t h a t t h e t e l e x from Montreal of the two communiques was i n t r o d u c e d by t h e following message: "The following two documents were r e c e i v e d t h i s evening, one communique a p p a r e n t l y from Paul Rose was r e c e i v e d at t h e r a d i o s t a t i o n CKAC-M, t h e second communique was r e c e i v e d at t h e corner of Mullins and H-enri Bourassa, P o n t r e a l . " 01:40 McConville of t h e B r i t i s h High Commission was informed of t e x t s of communiques and t o l d t h a t t h e hunt for Cross' body had been f r u i t l e s s , McConville s a i d t h a t a " F l a s h " message was b e i n g s e n t t o London, 01:50 CKCH r a d i o r e p o r t said t h a t t h e Quebec p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c e considered t h e second communique ( C r o s s ' a l l e g e d d e a t h ) "to be a joke i n v e r y bad t a s t e " , 01:55 Esselmont of Operations Centre s t a f f telephoned DHD Operations Centre t o see whether the M 0 had any requirement for coded messages of t h e type broadcast by CKCH ( s e e item a t 23:25 a b o v e ) . DND Operations Centre said off hand t h a t t h e y did not b e l i e v e t h a t EM0 had any ^requirement of t h i s k i n d . ~i>Vl£> U»Aer c3-r\\irvA*et\ loi'J itvv0- 02:L0 Text of CKCH messages passed t o Corporal Sawyer of RCMP by seaborn (Seaborn had attempted t o p a s s t h i s message e a r l i e r a t 23:45 but a t t h a t p o i n t RCMP was busy r e c e i v i n g the t e l e x from Montreal with t h e t e x t s of t h e communiques). RCMP was i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e s e seemingly coded messages. Corporal Sawyer added t h a t communiques would be d e l i v e r e d t o t h e E x t e r n a l Ooerations Centre when r e c e i v e d . �- 4 - - J. 02:15 Seaborn off duty. 02:45 Edmonds checked with Corporal Sawyer of RCMP re communiques. Sawyer said that he had received copies of telex but documents themselves were not yet to hand. He added the documents would normally go first to the finger-orinting section and then to the laboratory. He said he would let Operations Centre of .External know when he received the original documents, -'/hen questioned, Sawyer added that he had heard a radio report that the Quebec oolice did not believe the second note was genuine - because the body had not been found. 03:15 McConville, still in Operations Centre, received a telephone call from the British High Ccmmisaonmer regarding communiques, the localities in which they hau ueen found, etc. 03:30 McConville advised Roquet that it was the view of his High Commissioner that the first (political) communique received from the FL1^ should be broadcast. . Roquet offered the personal view that this coulu not be done 'without a political decision by the Canadian government, as there were both political and tactical considerations involved. McConville said he would relay Roquet's personal view to his High Commissioner, 03 :40 Messrs. Roquet, Barker and xicConville left Operations Centre. 04:35 CP telephoned to ask if it had been authenticated that it was Rose's passport (allegedly invalidated September 2, 1970) which had been found. Reporter asked Edmonds whether he .had seen CP story about this. Edmonds acknowledged that he had seen report but co eld only say that we were continuing to follow developments. The reporter then asked whether Edmonds could confirm that the police "were doing the obvious" i.e. checking the authenticity of the passport. Edmonds merely added that he could not say whether or not we were doing the obvious. 04:40 Constable Sawyer of the RCMP told Edmonds that the laboratory was supposed to be checking this point,, i.e. the authenticity of the oassport, along with other matters, but he had not yet received the documents. He said he would call us when the original documents were received. 05:40 Constable Sawyer telephoned to report that RCMP laboratory could not find any prints or any kind of authentic identification on the doceiments. An old passport of Rose, which expired a couple of years ago, was seen. He said the documents were available at the main desk at the RCMP for pick up. &&&J V> >#4 05:45 Monitoring officer was sent out with Edmonds' car to pick up documents from RCMP's headquarters. 2 �- 5- 05:55 Mutual Radio Network telephoned from New York to ask whether we had any statement to make on the latest developments in the kidnapping case, eidmonds said merely that we were continuing to follow developments. Caller then asked whether Quebec Police would then be issuing any statement; Edmonds said he did not know whether Quebec Police would be issuing statement or not. 06:10 As requested on envelope marked "Secret", which had teen picked up at RCMP headquarters by Monitoring officer, Edmonds telephoned Constable Sawyer to report the receipt of the photostat copies of the telexed texts of the communiques. Sawyer said that we were supposed to have received photostats of the actual communiques (wliich he himself had seen). Edmonds said that Operations Centre had usually received Photostats of originals in the past. It was agreed that this matter would be straightened out in the morning during regular office hours, 07:15 Boxer of British High Commission telephoned to ask whether there were any developments subsequent to McConville's departure at 03:40. He was informed that the only "hard news" was that the RCMP laboratory had not been able to authenticate any documents and that Rose's passport had proved to be one that expired two .years ago. Boxer said he would brief his High Commissioner when he came in at 09:00 . 07:30 CTV Morning News (Peter Stursberg) reported that Montreal police were studying two notes received last night. One was described by police as being primarily political containing "the same old bull" - and was found in a trash can in a pink envelope along with a page from Rose's passport and his finger-print. If this note proved authentic, it would be the first confirmed communique from the FLQ since the death of Mr. Laporte. The second note had proved to be a hoax - police had been sent scurrying to Laval to find Cross' body, but found nothing. 07:30 Listening post monitored newscast from CKAC Montreal •which ieientioned t h a t a note had been r e c e i v e d from t h e FLQ which, among o t h e r t h i n g s , contained a commentary on t h e Montreal c i v i c e l e c t i o n . Newscast a l s o mentioned t h a t t h e note said t h a t i f i t were not d i s s e m i n a t e d in i t s e n t i r e t y , t h i s would be t h e l a s t communique r e c e i v e d . 07:45 Edmonds phoned Roquet p r i m a r i l y t o t e l l him about CKAC n e w s c a s t , but a l s o t o mention t h a t t h e t h e RCMP had not been a b l e t o a u t h e n t i c a t e t h e documents. Roquet said t h a t B r i t i s h High Commission could be t o l d t h a t CKAC newscast had contained " b i t s and p i e c e s " of f i r s t n o t e . 07:50 Edmonds telephoned Sawyer of RCMP t o p a s s on news items from LTV and CKAC. 07:55 Edmonds telephoned Boxer of B r i t i s h High Commission t o a d v i s e him of CKAC newscast. 000964 �- 6 - 08:30 Transport Department Ops Centre: ohoned t o say t h a t t h e y had received information from t h e i r P a c i f i c r e g i o n t h a t t h e r e had been a l i t t l e bomb s c a r e i n Vancouver y e s t e r d a y . An anonymous phone c a l l was received a t Vancouver a i r o o r t a t 17:10 saying t h a t a bomb had been placed in t h e b u i l d i n g which would go off i n 30 m i n u t e s . Transport Department informed RCMP and search began a t 17:19 and was completed a t 17:30 . Transport Department F i r e Deoartment stood by but no bomb was found; the b u i l d i n g was o n l y p a r t i a l l y e v a c u a t e d . The " a l l c l e a r " was given a t 1 7 : 3 8 . 000965 �ApZ- 27 77- 7ft-I CV) OCTOBER 29, 1970. MEMORANDUM FOR Iffi. RITCHIE. PUBLIC HANDLING OF FLQ COeeMUNIQUES The Special Operations Centre has suggested that we establish a procedure for immediate response to further FLQ communiques similar to the last one. Assuming it is intended not to publish thea, there should bs each time an official statement indicating that a communique had been received and focussing attention on XX?. Cross. On the last one, for instance, we could have, said that the communique gave no information about iir. Cross, no evidence that he was alive, and no indication that the kidnappers intend to release him. To this we might have added that the rest is merely a tiresome repetition of FLQ propaganda, possibly with some hidden attempt to communicate with other FLQ groups through the public media. For this reason publication vrould not be in the public interest. 2. I believe this is a good line. Presumably Quebec would continue to malce the public statements on such matters. Siould we communicate with Mr. Choquette on this, or let Mr. Davey* s shop do so? I assume that our own spokesmen could reply to questions along the same lines in the future, without our issuing a statement in Ottawa. a C . ROQUET, 000966 �T W — U ^ e*~ y. f u ) y n THIS DOCUIISSr IS JHE I-ROrE.UT OF THS GOV"' I OF CANADA SECRET CasL^^C ii 30 October, j. lo *^x~~.aLt i7 REDUCTION OF MILUVR'f ASSISTAKC3 IN AID OF CIVIL FO"-;2R OBJECT [~\2 TAOI L2f A- r J2_ oJo^s C-rvOvl.' Q-s-^ie^cL^ ' The object of this paper is to outline the programme for the reduction of military assistance in aid of Federal and Quebec authorities October, 1970. 2. CURRENT SITUATION a. It is estimated that the Quebec Revolutionaries have reverted to stage one activities for a period of re-evaluation and reorganization. However, sufficient terrorist personnel, apparatus and logistics remain intact for continuation of terrorist activity, albeit at a reduced level. Small scale symbolic activities, some of which may be spectacular, could occur. Bombing may be resumed and targetting broadened to ir.clude economic and strategic public installations; even selective political assassination could occur in an attempt to "Raise the Political Consciousness of the lasses", Separate terrorist cells may well continue to enjoy independence of action. Individual cells, both nev; and old will be ir. various stages of preparation. It is estimated however that the revolutionaries will be unable to act in a fashion that would restore the Komsntum that had beer, schieved prior to the laporte murder. A return to the brink of stage tvro, the organization of the masses into broadly based action committees is not expected during the next few months, provided the provisions of public order regulations 1970 or li£e"fegulatior:s remain in force. b. DSrLOYM^T CF Mlr'JTp.Rf FCRCES (1) .1\.XJAZJ\J sr j2fz - &<?-TH-in} y k . ^raj MEMORANDUM TO C,3i::ET 1. :U^ -r Od itJjUiL.7 There are 7610 Armed Forces personnel deployed to protect 127 vulnerable points, 155 individuals and their residences. In addition they provide the elements of Conp.ar.d ar.d Control, immediate reaction force, operational reserve forces, the required administrative support, security, vehicles a.r.d aircraft. (2) OrTA'.V. REGION There are 1952 Armed Forces personnel deployed to protect 11 vulnerable points, 55 individuals and their residences. In addition they provide the elements of Command and Control, irrnediate reaction force, operational reserve forces, the required adninistrative support, security, vehicles and aircraft. h ...//. 000967 �SECRET 3, I*, FACTORS a. A degree of stability has been attained which permits withdrawal of military forces in aid of the civil power. b. To ensure the stability is not endangered tho withdrawal of military support should be a phased programme. c. Adequate locr-.liy basse forces vrill, throughout the period of reduction, remir. available to support the civil authorities. d. Adequate militery forces will on withdrawal remain on standby at appropriate military bases. These forces will be ready to augment the civil authorities. e. All action involved in the reduction and subsequent withdrawal of military forces will be coordinated with the Federal and Provincial civil authorities. CCCErT CF PTTHDRA'VAL The withdrawal of military forces will be undertaken in four phases: a. PHASE I (l) Reduction of the guarding of vital points and . public buildings. b. PHASE II (l) Gradual reduction of the forces committed to the guarding ar.d provision of protection to individuals. c. PHASE III (1) "withdrawal of the majority of military forces. (2) Retention of a mobile reserve of approximately 100 personnel and light operational vehicles ar.d a reaction force of approvimately 150 personnel locally based in both the Montreal ar.d Ottawa areas. (3) Provision of a Battalion Group standby force for both the Montreal ar.d Ottawa areas. The standby forces will be located at their home bases Valcartier and Petawawa on a quick reaction status. d. PHASE IV (1) Release of all military forces by the civil authorities. 5. TlMe.GS a. Phase I, II, ard 111 operations will commerce Wednesday, 4 Lover.bsr, 1970 zr.d be completed over a period of approximately seven days. b. Phase IV will be implemented after termination of the emergency by the civil authorities. .../3 000968 �SECRET 6. Public L.FPEATIOrl . It is recommended that a public statement be made which would imply that tlie cumulative action taken by the law enforcement agencies, assisted by the Canadian .>.rr.od Forces, has created a cli:.'L~te which permits sore-r reduction, phased o\p-r a poriod of time, ir. the number of Armed Forces personnel employed or. security and protective duties. The statement should include wording alone; the following lines: "It has been decided to reduce progressively the military contribution to security ard protective measures which are beir.g carried out by civil authorities in the province of Quebec and the Ottawa area. Military resources, however will continue to bo made available to law enforcement agencies as required". 7. RECO:ME::D:\TIO;:S It is recommended that the programme for the reduction of Military Assistance in Aid of the Civil Poerer be approved. AsLA. . ?OO^Al*1^6t^'^Ay£, K i n i s t e r of Rational Defence 000969 �CONFIDENTIAL October 30, 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER Public handling of FLQ communiques In connection with your Cabinet Committee meeting today, you may find useful some further comments on the above question. 2. The way in which the Quebec police, and later Mr. Choquette, refused to allow publication of the latest FLQ communique has led to a rather unfortunate presentation of the matter in the media. The impression has been created that there is something mysterious about the communique or that the governments are afraid of the political consequences of its publication. The bald statement that publication would impede police investigation does not carry conviction. 3. At the suggestion of the Special Operations Centre, we have examined the advantages of a procedure for immediate official response to further FLQ communiques similar to the last one. We feel that this would be both feasible and desirable. 4. Assuming that the governments intend to continue opposing publication (we believe this justified), we would recommend prompt issuance of an official statement each time a communique of this type is received. The statement would first focus attention on the fate of Mr. Cross. It could indicate for instance that the communique gave no information about Mr. Cross, no evidence that he was alive and no indication that the kidnappers intend to release him. To this might be added that the rest of the communique was merely a tiresome repetition of FLQ propaganda, possibly with some attempt to communicate with other FLQ groups through the public media. It was for this reason that pJublication was believed not to be in the public interest. • • • -— 000970 >> a/o J (uTx.ynrf �,- v - 2 5. I believe it would be advantageous to get this kind of approach on a government-wide basis. For this reason, you may wish to raise this point at the Cabinet Committee meeting. If this line is agreed, we should no doubt raise the matter with Quebec. I take it that the Quebec authorities would be the ones to issue such a statement, but any comments made in Ottawa would be along the same line. E. 'A. R. 000971 �Mr. Davey, Special Operations Centre. CONFIDENTIAL October 30, 1970, C. Roquet, Task Force, Operations Centre. Kidnappings - Discrediting the policies of the third force. Mr. Lalonde (PMO) Mr. Leblanc (PMO) \J,A — 2at+-lt^K~ c ' Q\ As you know there is an influential group in Quebec, centered on Mr. Ryan and Ren«5 Levesque, which accuses the Ottawa and Quebec governments of having shown excessive rigidity, then panic and now political paralysis in the current crisis. This propaganda line, reinforced by the widespread concern about civil rights, could be fairly effective in blurring the issues. It is in our interest to take action to provide public opinion with a framework in which such propaganda will be discredited. The latest press conference by Mr. Bourassa has been helpful in this respect, but perhaps additional federal efforts would be justified. 2. The accusations by Ryan, Levesque and others, on their own assumptions, may have a good deal of credibility in the eyes of many educated Quebeckers. Once the assumptions are examined, however, their whole argument collapses into nonsense. The main line of our argument would be that the governments were dead right to refuse to be blackmailed; dead right to resort to vigorous protective action against the FLQ; and that they are dead right now in not being panicked into self-accusation, as if the FLQ had suddenly revealed to us the deep corruption of our society and the total inaction of our governments. 3. Off-hand we would propose that a statement or better a television interview along these lines could be made by a senior French Canadian minister such as Mr. Pelle* tier. We would have to consider how to achieve maximum publicity here and abroad. . ./2 �- 2 - CONFIDENTIAL 4. In order to illustrate our thinking, we attach a draft speech In French along the above lines. It stresses the wisdom and resolution of the governments at each crucial point and exposes the illusions of those who think of themselves as a third force between the madness of the FLQ and the panic of the governments. It refers to the objectives of the FLQ and the hollowness of their claim to be concerned with the state of our society. We believe this approach would have a useful effect in the present Quebec climate, where Ryan and Levesque may have succeeded in producing an impression that there is a leadership vacuum, because the Quebec government will not be pushed into agonised self-condemnation and a frantic drive to achieve the millenium. C. Roquet. �1 I r - A » U«\» \J~\A. f A- r 270 77227 )avey, Special Operations Centre. SECURITY xCcurin 7.2227 DATE 0. j.ooiicw. l a sk Force, Operations Centre, s - Discrediting the policies of the ,.,_pp x o r c e ,„„„_. ... AAA •- 0 c t oh e r 3 C, '.'.970, NUMBcS Nvm6ro -yfo ~ 77£- I F A - / ......,_JC. . . -T.OOU.\C5 . .p, LOi , u c :?IP0) i (?IVI0) j As you know ther is roup IPP Quebec, centered on Kr. Ryan and Rene Levesque, which accuses the Ottawa and Quebec governments of having she panic and now political excessive rigidity, in the current crisis. This propaganda line, r e m r o r a by the widespread concern about civil rights, could be .•••«, eff ,o-~-Cective in blurring the issues. it I S in oe fairly interest to take action to provide public opinion witn * framework in vrhich such propaganda will be discredited. The latest press conference by Mr. Bourassa has been helpful in this respect, but perhaps additional federal efforts would be justified. 2. The accusations by Ryan, Levesque and other on their own assumptions, nay have a good deal of credibility in the eyes of many educated Quebeckers. u. l A e the assumptions are examined, hov/ever, their whole ar POX. ie a t collapses into nonsense. The main line oi our argume nee L# 0 would be that the governments were dead ri 1 o c t ve be blackmailed; dead right to resort to vigorous prot I nov action against the FLQ; and that they are dead in not being panicked into self-accusation, as if the F M had suddenly revealed to us the deep corruption of society and the total inaction of our governments. C 7?7 3. Off-hand we would propose that a s t a t e m e n t or better a television interview along these Lines could iPr. i 'ciiomade by a senior French Canadian minister such as J. - r. v» V/e would have to consider how to achieve maxima publicity here and abroad. 12 000974 �7^1 P^'\T "~> "~P '-,-, OUn•-'XLIixiLv . 4. in order to illustrate o u r thinking we a c "o a c. a arait speech an p r e n c n along tne aoove l i n e s , it s t r e s s e s t h e w i s d o m and r e s o l u t i o n o f the g o v e r n m e n t s at eacep crucial p o m e ana e x p o s e s one i l l u s i o n s Ox. tnoso v.v.o think o f t h e m s e l v e s a s a third force b e t w e e n the m a d n e s s of t h e F L Q and the panic o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t s . It refcp^p to the o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e F L Q and t h e holicvpness of ther'rr claim to b e concerned w i t h t h e state o f o u r society. r.p b e l i e v e t h i s a p p r o a c h vrould have a u s e f u l effect in the p r e s e n t Quebec c l i m a t e , w h e r e Ryan and Levesque m a y he.. . succeeded i n p r o d u c i n g a n i m p r e s s i o n that there i s a l e a d e r s h i p v a c u u m , b e c a u s e t h e Quebec government w i l l not be pushed into agonized s e l f - c o n d e m n a t i o n and a frantic d r i v e to a c h i e v e t h e m i l l e n i u m . CAIJU^^Z I C. Roquet. tjyy 1 n J V 000975 �•DVQrpPVT'lV J ' . - ' / i . <J ijA O fJALj.l une 17.-P J.. A . . e i e v i seep Dans notre presente P x A A v ix s Lecicncnec octobre par un enlevement et traversee le 17 par UP. meurtre, nous avons pait pace a aes CP.GIX angoissants. Jusqu'a ouel point fallait-il ceder au chantage? Juscu'a x . X C_> x quel point user U' autorite ? e^uolio orientaticPi aceprpar pretre travail dans le sillage de la violence et du meurtrp"? 2. Dans notre democraaie ,over et a O ij ti appele a formuler sa reponse ae ^ e i l e s q u e s t c, n A . F.ais c'est d'abord aux gouvernements Qu e b e c c o rapl-eA a .J • awa ou T il incombait de decider . x. s o nt ge. Ainsi que le rappelait Robert Bourassa, gouverner c choisir. lis ont fait de durs choix, fermes rapiaes. s v en remettent sans crainte, pour les juger, detu vera peuple canadien, notamment au Quebec. 3. On a su choisir. F.ais a-t-on bien P A LKJ JXxJ JU A— rai carrement qu'a chaque grand tournant de cette oris on a pris so_i_on moi aes decisions qui etaient vitales ea qui etaient les bonnes. Ceux qui ies contestent se trompent. En toute bonne foi, ils risquent de tromper le peuple canadien. Quels sont les faits? 4. Premier choix. Faut-il ceder au chantage? Jusqu'a quel point composer avec ies ravisseurs sans comprc i>— tre nos institutions et notre avenir? On pouvait s'-'aeco, oder de la diffusion d-un manifeste grassier, on pouvait offrir la clemence compatible avec ies lois, on pouvait offrii le sauf-conduit aux ravisseurs pour ne pas les pousser aa desespoir. Au-dela c'euait ia vie de chacun et l'inte national qui etaient menaces. Cette position, AA ..A 10 octobre par ie Ministre de la Justice du Quebec puis le Aj octoore avec touxe i'auaoriue ae I riufiu par x.. UOUPP.J..',.,., c'est aussi la notre. Meme pour sauver deux vies, il etai VJ. LJ /A �<-, n porni — A — dAAi. impossible de reporter indefiniment l'6ch£ance d'une te Uvjc^-S-Lon, sans ^.a-usser pourr-er graaueijjsmeno j_a vo onoo peuple et 1'autorite aes gouvernements. 5. Certains se sont aits, d'ailleurs avec siricer PjUPuj. ISJ—pait a'aoora a ccut prix sauver j_es aeux vies nacees par ies ravisseurs. Ainsi par exemple, l'editor U s e e au Devoir ie _^> ocoobre. —1 oatait pour uno te L formule tout en reconnaissent ses dangers: "II y a dan cue -L.es auteurs a* <pce.es ae uerrorisme se sentenu —ncp... devant la faiblesse des autorites, a multiplier leurs ,:. AA y a risque suss* cue S' a^. — P X P P P S S S i autorite ae x.-., et que se aeteriore le climat social. II y a risque pre que x.c. con.i.r,!S-LOPi s# ^nstaiie USP*S aes osar—^s \x^ que p.. - ..' paraisse enteriner aes choses auxcuelies il n'a consena que sous 1'empire ae ia necessite 5h Malgre tout, I'oai rialiste recommandait qu'on fasse a'aoorX 1'experience 7 ia soualesse 00 ajouuaier --z— IPO saur.aaa e^re questioiP pour I'avenir, que le reste au corps social se alio ara; gles empruntees par les terroristes". Pour 1'avenir. Nous serons fermes ... ia prochaine fois? Le mot est 1, un se rena cor.ipte que no^re peuppe ne peut acc-pobp ae suicider, mais on tente de reporter a demain les dures 7 ci sao. q m .j' JXTXL 0 0 AA^.X I, a u^j o u r P. - ..AA . u..,j x. ^._ A y.i—xio -r_e P.. .... — dit de I'Etat, i'objectiviee des lois, aurait-on eu rage ae se aeienare, a e m a m ? one 101s naoitue a 1'enlevement et au chantage, a ia confusion et a la faiblesse ae ses chefs, Ie Canada eut-il ete en mesure de faire face? Ceux qui veulent a tout prix compromettre aujourd'hui soront-iis fermes demain? hon, c'est la premiere decision qui engageait 1'avenir et il n'y en avait qu'une possible ?i7<--,+- 1 -i r-P'. r m - ' r ~ .,•- - y. p - ._-. 1 r-A cr ^-.ITI^-P- .j. v, r.i- 1 r, • ••• 6. Autrement nous nous serions reserves des ienaemains sanglants. Ce sont nos aeux ou trois prochaines annees dont ies gouvernements decidaient. Les ravisseurs, plus nombreux, mieux nantis, assures ae l'impunite pour I'avenir, n'auraient fait qu'accroitre leurs actip'iees. iout leur aurait ete permis, s1 lis pouvaienc compeer sur I'elargissement prochain de tout criminel eraprisonne, 7TCA. au chantage par l'enlevement. La menace presente n;eaa alors qu'un commencepient. On verrait ss repanare une pal: tique systematique contre ^.a securioe de ca.acun par i'er ...c sion, les bombes, Ies vols a main armee, l'enlevement oi nous le voyons maintenant, par I'assassinat au petit hasa: Ceci n'est pas une histoire lointaine de gouvernements et ./: 000977 �o.' j_ns"Gi"C*Uul-0ns • J.J_ sn Vet UO c-iccvui CO n o u s 0.xspGx*s3.xsn.*Cp xG^.rs ccr.n.-'SS un pou "o^roouo, c < u u Q U a i C A u t i n CciiniLori * t i n s c a i s s e poouj-cA.pre un e n t r e p o t , un c o l l e g e , un ars^ns:A , ^.^e p.apaspn j . AJ. - L . O U C O oei i i l U C iACi — C J . 1 ^ U-l Ci ..acun a * e... OPc **o^s, cP.. pouv v i c t i m e . Ceux q u i sont morts jusqu'ici iTi^-i cA-iS i e u r s COUPS eu, p i e s p a s s a n t s , de s i m p l e s c i t o y e n s . Leeur v i e a u s s i a sa v a l e u r . F a l l a i t - i l l a copepromottre'.' ^X.lt I. .sa a e c i s i o n occoore I U O un ac^e ae exceptionnel. C'etait responsaoilite. voici J* c o l / l ^ l c U X C t U O o P e U d . . J L J U A ' O O UT/ a A O- e LX x. X' .AXx— A .J x i^ J J . 7 _ ij.Xj . 1 -, ,. A J-Oc-. courage c ^ C j . i P o . . i G p 7 la voix rr TJJJIAC u e _L_ r j ^ L J U UJL. a... ._-, ce qu'en disait ae jou memo _^ e X . X-.. i'-u>2 o .1' e -P.. Bourassa ... temoigne de ' A'j.ua0i6S quaiices a nommo o sta'i en rssoant iermo sur ies ..\j..\jx,^ A xi A.x U J . 1 I U J . 7 J 1/UAxfiXj. _ ~.., isser une porte de sortie aux courant d'opinion qui, au nam a'arguments humanitaire monuronc o-avoraa-^es a uOUues —es concessions. * 8. On comprendra done cue je me sois re vol cex^oams laisseno en^enare que xe gouvernement au et ie gouvernement canadien partagent avec les me du FLC) la responsabilite de la mort ae M. Laporte tout differer avec nous sur 1*opportunity d'avoir : 7 chantage des ravisseurs et meurtriers. (Selon reoi - 1 serait agi d'une demission et non d'un compromis) il est infiniment maihonnete de vouioir fair AZLA'X. nous la moindre goutte du sang de M. Laporte chez nous n'a voulu jusqu'ici suggcrer que c : qu: laient ceder au chantage ont joue ie jeu des ineuip qu v iis les ont encourages a aller jusqu'au bout dons aoir ou'en fin de comote on blamerait les gouverneme: O •- A A ceux-ci ne cedaient aas. Le Monde n'en disait pas me au sujet aes partisans au compromis que, n--A.-: A A C.IAJ.-. A J. ex. au p o m e ae vue au 1'iiQ aans cette aramatuquo .mais 'ouve cui encouragent des exces qu'ils n'ont 0 -f A ?? repugnent a leur tepnperamerrt politique". Je prefers pas prendre ce jugement a mon compte car, pour ma par' trouve intolerable qu'entre cencitoyens on sa renvoie responsabilite d'une mort que d'autres ont froidement delibereinent choisie. C'est u n v i c e democratique, c' . L P * J : : • • : rv • *. ( U _ 7 /... 000978 �- 4 - UJ.1 O-j-gSc P.P ^TJ^.-^CUC q u o U<w XjA UiXXXx x; P.* u O i u i .^..A '^ ,j ix ._ vouloir trouver ae son prcpre cits la responsabilite ae crimes que a'autres ont comerris. _/0 sang ae Pierre sapor oe rfcjOorfiOe ooeru on^i^r sur cueiques criminals enivres aP_.7 U rr r\T-L ».r: J..LJ O ~, +• v_.U C ;UI I Y U J» ~< y AX {..-j. ^<^x. r- •-, T. J. P i^<xx C* o P^ ^*: . y\>" ^.. t n :XLr 10 ~P~ o .^c.7_> •c -'-*n ••• -'- •-- P 7^ ^ a .-s\ ju 7<™oJ;o. 7. seuxieme ceeoix. Quej_j.es .mesua^es prenare- ">our proteger les citoyensv En effet, I'Etat refusait la voie CPS x.' aoanaon. il poavait S' ctosa.CLre a oout ae cease PPP ont eu recours aux combes, aux assassinats ea reuse or^e^r a— ments. Ce groupe pouvait attacuer au hasard les citoyces et creer un climat a 'in ses cur it e , de confusion et peut-oerre r. 'X rr C ..AA r. 3 "»T~ n 1 ^ " AAX Oci-^iio H r± u c rl n 7Y1 — o c -', r. "^> u o - . - o o P O i j , p * " "i "T <~, "" JxU.^-X.AX-ij~J... - " r.J-J-r.-~r. ci^x/ ~n -N UJ. e • - -.-- "7 u n e X . x ... ..,-- Oee ci.' aooon^ats et a* escoj_osions, une uiste ae morts avant d'agir? Un choix s'imposait: on le fit. Ie Premier Finistre du Quebec s'assurait 1?appoint de srorces canadiennes pour souiager la po_ice ae tacnos purs-menu CIYS_OS ae PP—tection. II s'assurait, avec 1'accord du gouvernement canadien , les "oouvoirs escceationnej.s ae posico c.'ue roqupre.ienC/ le miniswere ae ia J U S ^ S C S GO la sureoe^ au e^ueoec -po.^x' ...PP.— tenir la menace. 10 p A ce sujet, quelques-uns parlent ae panioue. Qu'on dise plutot responsabilites. Lorsqu'un groupe de criminals adopte ia tactique du tueur qui abat un peu n'importe qui et auis se cache, on n'attena esas da comater combien ae v:' :;times ii peut atteindre avant d'intervenir. Certains semhlent crolre qu'on pouvait faire face aux dangers avec les mesures ae police qui suffisent au jour lo jour dans un aes pays, les plus paisibles et ies plus libres au monde. C'est d'une incroyable naivete. On reconnait la ia panique d'un libe'rolisme faible qui n'ose pas defendre la liberte. Ce ne seres pas les democraties fortes qui ouvrent la porte aux apprentisdictateurs, mais bien celles qui refusent dvassumer leurs responsabilites. j.X. i.roisj_ee.se C S O J - X . s u e sraire ma_j_nwens-"ic p AX >O.L.I— oiqae aes gouvoi'Tiepiento esu nette: msccre i m ausc P.P.,_.. r,..p^s/ s'assurer des instruments jsrridicues precisement adaptes aus: besoins, et enfin poursuivre sans se laisser distraire le travail de renovation deja vigoureusement engage chop nous. . . > . ^ . j j .r. - . . 12. II ne faut pas oublier en effet que I'agrees:'on de quelques-uns contre tous se poursuit. II est curieux comme certains, qui surveillent jalousement les gouveraaements » '/ s 000979 �'P. *\ _ "" r. r\.x J- -. . - _ .'' .... .y.- -. -- * - - . - "- - •' a. u e^ussoc cojimrcj a i uooav.a, n* Oi-C - —.en u a_ere su* J.A. IP.OJPU .^ on e,"jv7..sc6 PI. u r o s s ou s u r j_e g r o u p e q u i p o u r r a i t a ' .... a a v au.as"e, u y n a m i c o r ese n o s c o r ^ c i a o y e n s . i a a i s a e s c i t o * -...'...LSS go a vernemenu s n e p e u v e n t su perp.uuTjp-e a- c a s h i e r __u* •• ce. ioae^ ensePiiOj_e n o u s a e v o n ^ v o i r A ce oue s o i t CPTPISGJ: un g r o u p e a'nompsos q u i i o n t p a y e r a a s u r . s c o n c i t o y e n s pre t e r m e s de s a n g e t e e r u i n e s , l e u r p e t i t r o m a n t i s m e r J v o l e . oionnaire. j_a sraua a o n c e>our ue moment m a i n t e n i r a e s "~s ' \ •.: AP--, AxcApcuonne^_s, oa-^iues a ua j.sesu* A a e j_a jiiss.ap'u. o • eas . s^egret m a i s r e s o l u m e n c que _ e s s u s e r i u e s o n t eu. r e c o u r s ... ces pouvoirs. ^>esa, e u i o s s-u a r o p o s e s i c une u e g i s _ a s _ o r e mss.rs i s r g e que coia_e a a a q u e i u e , ap.a.s -ipurgesj.ee a u moment, err. au avoir recours. 13L e s r a v i s s e u r s e t l e s m e u r t r i e r s e s p e r a i e n t s« a o u o u , en or o vo a us,r J-J __ * JJ-^SJ; A aej-enci.^. e J.AP> o —usyuiio., .... e i o e r i • a a o p t i o n a e s ' s s s r i c ^ . i . o s . s L S O ^ e r s o - i . e s uu perman..j. ••• o ciusc a r o i o S a e j . nomrne, CPS^_ _perst.sps.isPu p o u r T^.- POP. i s .... canadienne. I I i i ' e n s e r a r i e n . Le g o u v e r n e m e n t q u e b e c o i s , u e s ausor_i_-/es canaaj-^.-nus n* on^ upuc i.x zou.x —PI ucj._»_7_>xose ..x. sour 1'oppression. La l o i ne s e r a que c e l l e d o n t un p a y s X.XUJ.A sxx J b O U i - i l ,JL>U-J. OC UClv.iU.7j i^-^/.xlrX LX u..i^J UCJ.iu^. 10 J. {XcXlx A ^J L. U de malfaiteurs publics. u4• Que i' on se preoccupe aes arolts ae 1 nommo, _..... bonne neurei rtien n.- est pj_e*s s,aun, rieii ne correspence a 1'esprit qui a inspire les grandes reformes recentes droit criminal canadien. Mais il serait infiniment las-., r que i*' on n'eieve pas en meme temps partout ia voix pose-' p L a— tester contre i* oucrage aux as^cs-pss ae i sesame saporte , ar. de oames eross, onieve, cs au citoyen au ^.yucsooc ou PJ.I_.-_....' PS qui serait la prochaine victime de nos amateui 15. Pour ce cui est des transformations et app r^r.... •-veau social auxquels travaiiient les gouvernements et I; arpuiacioai, au I^UGOSC comme aans cose „e pays, PLOUS C.A J... . :...— trons pas aux ravisseurs et aux assassins de nous en di. .PPSPs^e non plus. eertes, lis ue scu.psiuen.t oien. iSiees n- s ..• .: e" plus notre doctrinaire du chaos que des gouvernements cry. miques, jeunes et mcaernes, rssoaus a s* aoos.paex'* ae iace_. vrar cs^ete aux probler.ies du pays. Qu'un vaste effort soit en voi< pour i' egaiite linguisticue ec econorsicue, que aes pro^: . rei plus vigoureux encore s'annoncent, que le Quebec et la pays soient en train de se forger une vie nouvelle, voile: PX.... .aia] me notre homme. Car ce qu'il souhaite, c'est que 1'injustice ec ia aiscorae s* accroissen^" _u ressasse ae V-j-ciiues na. s.ss 000980 �il aspj.ro a aeciencner uns oppression gouvern.emos.csj-e ^ i ..I C i - j - o uc: vJxxX> , p d X -J'UO x. u _. A x. ^ ex •-, XJ -J.J_ tio^Tji C C.Ji.Se C - i e . _..c .. U — gres economique afin de pouvoir os:plGitoiv Xc. mis-ore qa-:A. aurait lui-meme favorisee. 16. Ox. XA luuut;, urs.rOiPC , aemoeraPJ.7.-prrej.sen^*. appOj. ct a e s cnesrs a e rprom: eiup*c e^J. SiiuOiPc.ssu aon ua n a t i o n un e l a n , u n e j u s t i c e e t une ps^osaersi'se noseve^. e n o s a m a t e u r s d e r e v o l u t i o n c r a i g n e n t (dde ne laser c c h a p p . . I e c h a o s oar i l s r e c h e r c h e n t . Ceci e x p l i q u e p e u t - e t r e l e s sGGej.iCcJ.os s o u a a i e p s , u* a s s a s s i n a t a o n ^ i u s v i e n n e n t Sv~. e., souilier. n a Qu'on ne vienne pas me aire que ces yea *... •... ... soucieno au progres. Tl lie song en o qu a c: •> • ";** "" .> *** ~« y~-. *• T* /"\ s-\ *"\ "V"*. <~> s^ •-"• **.> "• 1'esaoir de dieter a J- / • O t~v.*. J_ Oi' pr u C- u ,7^ ii<UUO ensemble avec les moyens du bord. are queuqucs ignos',aiPcjS voments ea l-assassinat recen x A j_ica uc._i.Ut; 1 /• V U - - _t_ . . . .1 J - . j U U-i. il est fatigant d'en'i xo - i O <xx> y» -7 veucnp P'O vCJ..Lxions c u i c-^^u^j.U . C.u'PUS. .J annees, pendant que ceus: esa preierent jouer avec p ,-*, [—• -\ <-i iiuloiilc, ••".1 r\ v~> *i •-*, -\*\ ~ 11 coo r", >->. -^ 1 t *-i — ( > J) c uixouci OU G^u C. k-.i ^ t i S U I e mai a auto—accusation, ps.rj.er -uiJ. X't? VC2 j_o. OXUXi ;' LjPcitiaci U'j..j...e 0 1 J.UUS ucUiCiU ii dviu.r. appris ni rien r a i t , s o c i e t e , g o u v e r n e m e n t s , l e Quebec i e p a y s t o u t e n t i e r s o n t b a n s u n s sees p e n o a e s a e s p l u s c r e a t r i c e s de l e u r h i s t o i r e . L e s bombes ne s o n t p a s l e u e u r miSis i e aeceset a e cev^c/O c r e a L > i v i u e . J 0x J-'P . Vl r: . . . -A . • x ~ ..^ . ies canaa: a art .3 Ui- O 1 c.U CJ suis neureux oue nous ayo.as rpui de l7 immense r. vec a e t o u s o o r d s , j_es c n o i x cp Ceo choix sont notre programme: rei'us Pin du chantage; aci,..•... 7./. . 1 ra cil: r> ' _;_ a T_J goureuse ae i-eiiort createur engage si courage! tous ies canaaiens. 19. Ce qu'il faut maintenant par aela ues coura; d'opinion et les reactions diverses qui sont le propre AiO-xli. notre democratic, c'est cue tous aoaorp.e.iu UcJ Ax a. ce travail constructif. Xous avons vecu des semaine:. e..~ goissantes, ies emotions et les convictions ae checun A'. ..yd. poussees au paroxisme. Democrates, hommes ae bonne,- vs..•srste , a nous de nous remettre enseseole a la renovation ae notre ^ society qui est deja une des plus priviiegiees et une aes s._us enviees du monde. 000981 �9FF212A2FIFL October 30, 1970. KIDNAPPINGS - RSWAPDS The question of a reward for information relating to the Laporte-Cross case remains open. A number of approaches have been studied. Here is a summary.and assessment of the various possibilities. 3- " jtewardr jpublicly announced 2. The approach generally envisaged to date has been a public an^jincement of a very substantial reward. 'If thisj v/ere agreed, we .believe the announcement of this police device should be left to the police, rather than to the two governments or the ministers responsible. This would seem somewhat more dignified and perhaps a little-less directly provocative with regard to the Cross kidnappers. 3. Another question here is whether the reward should be offered pjolvMjioncern ing Kr.j Lapor t e' s kidnapping and murder. It could be argued that a reward relating to Mr. Cross would involve a heightened risk cf his kidnappers killing him out of panic or defiance. However, the Pritish High Commission have given us the impression that such a risk v/ould be acceptable to them and indeed that they would find it difficult to understand if a reward applied only in connection'with Mr. Laporte. 4On the other hand, a reward r.ejlating^ tp^ both kidnappings appears to create difficulties for Quebec. The provincial authorities may be worried about any new move of this kind, now that Mr. Laporte is dead, since it• v/ould raise the question why it v/as not XOAQ before. They seem to feel an announcement now would appear mainly aimed ,at the release of Mr. Cross, with invidious comparison being made with the handling of the Laporte case. They may also be concerned that a reward offer v/ould be an implicit /2 000982 �- 2 - CONFIDENTIAL admission of police failure. We have tried to draft a police announcement designed to meet these various objections. It focuses mainly on Mr. Laporte, presents the reward as a measure complementary to continuing police action and assumes that the announcement v/ould be made by the Quebec Provincial Police. The text of this draft was passed last Friday to Mr. Chouinard for comments by the Quebec authorities, but these have not yet been received to our knowledge. The attached text incorporates some later retouches of a minor nature. 5. Another objection raised informally by Mr. Robert Demers (the Quebec Government negotiator who is nov/ in charge of the safe-conduct operation), is that the offer of a large reward might prompt undesirable reactions from the underworld. He seemed to imply that the latter might deliberately encourage kidnappings by criminals in order to turn them in deliberately afterwards and collect a reward. If this reasoning has some validity, the point should perhaps be met by reducing the amount of the proposed rev/ard. II - Reward without announcement 6. If v/e cannot reach agreement with the Quebec and Montreal authorities on announcement of a reward, it is for consideration whether pi~ovision for a rev/ard could not benade without any public announcement taking place. In effect, the police would rely on word of mouth for the news to get around, specially in criminal circles. When the news reached the press, the police could merely indicate that no new measures had been taken, that rewards were always a possibility when valuable information was provided and that previous policies in this respect simply remained in operation. This approach v/ould of course be less effective because the news would reach relatively few people ana the prospect of a reward would be less firm. Nor would we get the benefit of having made a vigorous public gesture to resolve the Laporte and Cross cases. On the other hand, it would meet most or all of the Quebec objections, including the question why rewards had not been resorted to before now. . ./3 �CONFIDENTIAL III - How to explain a rev/ard at this point 7. If a large rev/ard were openly announced, the main difficulty v/ould be to explain why governments withheld this action until now despite proposals made from the start to this effect. The truth is that, until Mr. Laporte's death, this device v/as thought too dangerous since it might have panicked the kidnappers into murder. It v/ill be remembered that all their communiques at the time clamoured for an end to police activity, under threat of "execution" of the hostages; police activity v/as maintained but rev/ards v/ere thought unduly provocative. Two developments have nov/ changed this situation. First, the hideous murder of Mr. Laporte makes it imperative that all means be deployed to apprehend his murderers. Second, the group holding Mr. Cross has changed its position. In its last communique, it indicated that Mr. Cross v/ould be in danger only if the police were to surround the group and attemot to overrun it by force. In the circumstances, and ^in order to supplement information currently being obtained by police investigations and interrogations, the announcement of a reward seems justified. In our view, this simple statement of fact is the best explanation available. $. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that, during the first wave of FLQ bombing activities in 19635 the Lesage government offered a $10,000. and then a $50,000. rev/ard for information leading to the apprehension of those responsible. It is not possible to establish whether this amount v/as ever used in that connection. 'Je understand however that reward money has in fact been discreetly paid out by Quebec police ever since, although the amounts are not known. It is believed that the present level of Quebec police reward funds is $60,000. 000984 �CONFIDENTIAL / Bulletin to be issued by the Police .' Two Rev/ards e# $100,000. -e-sefe.. The Quebec Provincial Police, because of the \ exceptional gravity with which it views the murder of Mr. Pierre Laporte and the resulting situation, has decided to take new measures to supplement the results of its current investigations and interrogations. Cd The Quebec Provincial Police, jointly with the RCMP and the Montreal City Police, offer a reward of up to £100,000. for information leading to the arrest of the kidnappers or murderers of Mr. Laporte. The offer of safe conduct can obviously not apply in any way to those responsible J a for the kidnapping and murder of the Quebec Minister. -- The Identity of any person providing such information will be fully protected and remain confidential. A Similar regard, on the same terms, i«e also offered 7" October 30, 1970. - x 000985 \ �• - 2- CONFIDENTIAL for information leading to the safe release of Mr. Cross or the arrest of his kidnappers. This offer will stand as long as the latter have not signified that they accepted safe conduct and are proceeding to the designated location at Man and His World. 000986 �Bulletin emis par la police c peux recompenses de _JplGO, 000._ _chacune En raison de la gravite exceptionnelle qu'elle attache au meurtre de M, Pierre Lapprte et a la situation qui en decoule„ la Surete du Quebec a decide de prendre des mesures nouvelles pour apporter un complement aux resultats des investigations et interrogate ires en coasts. La Surete du Quebec, conjointement avec ia Gendarmerie federale et la Police municipale de Montreal, offre une recompense jusqu'a concurrence de 3100,000. pour des renseignements qui conduiraient a I'arrestation des ravisseurs ou des meurtriers de K. Laporte. L'offre de sauf-conduit ne peut Evidemment s'appliquer d'aucune facon aux auteurs de 1*enlevement et du meurtre du ministre quebecois. L'identite de toute personne qui fera part de tels renseigneraents sera pleinement protegee et demeurera confidentielle. Une recompense semblable, aux memes conditions, le 30 octobre 1970. . ./2 �est aussi offerte pour des renseignements qui conduiraient a la liberation de M. Cross ou a I'arrestation de ses ravisseurs. Cette offre demeurera en vigueur tant que ceux- ci n'auront pas fait savoir qu'ils acceptent le saufconduit et se dirigent vers I'endroit designe a Terre des Hommes. �k u t - t . . . ..™.-w** CC PMO (,M. Lalonde) PMO (Mr.'Davey) Iresp, F e r r a r i s PSI ^ Kidnapping Rewards The attached drait is approved by Federal ministers for discussion with the Quebec authorities. 2. The Federal authorities are prepared to pay their appropriate share of the' rev/ards. 3. They would agree that Quebec police ^hief St-Pierre should acte: the suitable amount, of reward in. individual cases, in consultation v/ith the Montreal ^ity Police and the RCM? as may be required. 4. it is assumed that the Quebec Provincial Police will discuss th: v;hoie matter of rev.rard v/ith the Montreal City Police. 000989 �CONFIDENT: R&ccmosnsas - $100,000.00 la Surete du Quebec., conjointement avec la Gendarmerie federale j v,p ua : ouace municipals de S'loppsrea—.. cssi^e sees recompenses jusqu d concur— ipo-icc ae aj-uS-OuO. peur des renseigPicmepppu csi conauuraauips u *• PPPSP.SW^O. ces ravisseurs ou des meurtriers de si. Laporte. L'*offre de sauf-conduit ne peut evidemment s'appliquer dsaucune- facon aux auteurs de 1"*enlevement et du meurtre-du,, ministre quebecois. 2. Des recompenses sembiabies, aux memes conditions, sont aussi offertes pour des renseignements qui conduiraient a la liberation de h. Cross ou a I'arrestation de ses ravisseurs. Cette offre demeurera en vigueur, tant que ceux-ci n'auront pas fait savoir qu'ils acceptent Ie sauf-conduit et se dirigent vers I'endroit designe a Terre des Hornmes. 3. L'identite de sera pleinement protegee et demeurera confidentielle, Le 30 octobre 1V70. 000990 �CONF ID: bulletin to be issued by the Police Kidnapping Regards - $100,000 ..00 The Quebec Provincial Police,, jointly with the RCM? easu . jL. . .. OiiO ueonureai say aouuco, osxer revparas ore ere *so ^u^e'.Su^. _ror of .Mr. Laporte. The offer of safe conduct can obviously no's apply in any way to those responsible for the kidnapping and murder of the Quebec Minister. 2. Rewards, on the same ter-as, are also offered for information leading to the safe release of j.vIr. Cross or the arrest of his kidnappers. This offer will stand as long as the latter have nois signific: that they accepted safe conduct and are proceeding to the designated location at Man and His 'world. 3. The identity of any person providing information wiil.be fully protected and remain confidential. 000991 �POP/L.J. Wilder/mj !I EXTERNAL A AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES MEMORANDUM TO SECURITY A Mr. C. FROM Da , Chief of Task Force StairHi CONFIDENTIAL O c t . 3 1 , 1970 L.J. Wilder, Duty Officer NUMBER Numero REFERENCE Rifirence FILE SUBJECT Sujel Visit by British High Commission Officer ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION Mr. Barker POP Mr. Francis FPR Mr. McConville of the British High Commission called at the Operations Centre today at 12.25 to leave a copy of an article /which appeared in the Toronto Telegram on October 28 and about which Mr. Noakes had spoken to Mr. Francis, and also copies of telegrams received by the High Commission from London and Geneva about possible use of the I.C.R.C. as an intermediary between Mrs. Cross and the FLQ. Mr. McConville said that this latter matter had been discussed by his High Commissioner and Mr. Ritchie. I undertook to bring these papers to the attention of appropriate people. 2. I informed Messrs. Francis and Barker about the news story and, at Mr. Barker»s suggestion, I called the RCMP (Sgt. Peters**) to draw it to their attention and to explain that the British High Commission is concerned about the possible affects of such stories on those holding Mr. Cross. I explained that a report of the story would be sent to London by the High Commission and that it was their wish that they be able to include in the report an account of what the Canadian Authorities could or could not do to determine how the information on which the article was based became known to the Toronto Telegram. Sgt. Petersm called back later to say that we would be hearing from the RCMP further on this question. 3. I spoke to Mr. Roquet about the two telegrams regarding the I.C.R.C. and, at his suggestion, informed Mr. Ritchie that we had them. Mr. Ritchie told me that there was no need to take action on them today. Copies of the telegrams have been sent to Mr. Ritchie and to Mr. Roquet. L^o Ext. 407A/BU. (Admin. Services Div.) ' 000992 �MESSAGE DATE |N * FM/DE EXTE AFFEXTOTT TO/A PARIS INFO RCMP BEE SECURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER NOV 2/70 CONFD .2- i 9 M 7i) NO POP- PRECEDENCE m. IMMED QJl VOTRETEL 3 3 6 2 NOV 2 . SUB/SUJ MESURES D'URGENCE QUmlitSO . ARRETS DE TROIS VIETNAMIENS AU personal Information / renseignements personnels NOUS VOUS PROPOSONS DE FAIRE SAVOIR A L'UNION DES VIETNAMIENS EN FRANCE QU'AUCUN VIETNAMIEN N'EST A PRESENT SN PRISON.AUX TERMES DES MESURES D'URGENCE. 2 2. POUR VOTRE INFO SEULEMENT TROIS VIETNAMIENS SEHfiBffigT ONT ETE ARRETES/LE 16 OCT ET RELACHES LE 2 4 . IL S ' A G I T DE l | )E PLUS L'EPOUSE DE (UNE CDNNE FRANCAISE, PRENOM CLAUDETTE) A ETE ARRETEE EGALEMENT ET RELACHEE EN MEME TEMPS QUS LES TROIS VIETNAMIENS. 3. SI L'ON EVOQUE A NOUVEAU LA POSSIBILITE QUE DES VIETNAMIENS AIENT ETE REMIS AUX MAINS DU GOUVT VIETNAMIEN^ . ./2 DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE TASK FORCE L I S T ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR sio LyvL, Gv-R0QUE.T/1,2.~ PSI DIVISION POP SOC "pdtpscc? (OP XTtlC-iTM? APPRCVED/AUTORISE TELEPHONE 62467 'G<Ln£/i/r sio C C i\^V^±ZF7. ROQUET. EXT 18/BIL (REV 5/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 000993 �^ tm CONFD - 2- DANS LE CONTEXTE DES MESURES DE GUERRE, VOUS POURRIEZ REPONDRE QU'IL N'EN A JAMAIS ETE QUESTION. VOvSi p | 7 . p |1>J Oi n n j i j A\ C^>t? **<*><>vs ©U J Xco u 3 St?/HfSt_jLT A rJ 1 �$6 -x.Pt-TrA~/(x) 2.NOVEMBER.1970 .... ?p- ;CIAL BULLETIN \ WA,VU3MJO\ Ar^si d ^oO-oOv\o MORE FLQ VIOLENCE - AN EXECOTION Further to our NOTES of 3.OCTOBER.70, which told cf the kidnapping of the British Trade Commissioner (Mr. James Cross) from his Montreal home on 5.OCT., another kidnapping occurred on 10. OCT. , in ano.thei Montreal suburban area. The latter victim was M. Pierre Laporte, Minister of Labour for the Province of Quebec. Communiques from the Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ), apparently emanating from two cells, demanded release of 23 "political" prisoners and their safe passage to Cuba or Algeria, plus a number of other conditions. On 16.OCT. the War Measures Act was invoked by the Federal Cabinet and regulations thereunder were issued, outlawing the FLQ and giving police powers of arrest and search without warrant. A round-up of suspects commenced. The next day, as though in response to the joint Federal, Provincial and Municipal action, the FLQ sent word as to where the body of Pierre Laporte could be found, He had been strangled. On the 18th October, an FLQ communique claimed that James Cross was still alive and well. II Although the hunt for those responsible for the kidnappings and the execution has continued, the results have apparently not- been encouraging. Over 400 have been arrested, but so far only about 150 are being held. If the estimated strength of 3,000, given in the House of Commons by Jean Marchand, is considered reasonably accurate, there would seem to have been no serious impairment of the FLQ potential. The declaration of 2.JULY.70 that the FLQ was going over to guerrilla tactics must, in the light of subsequent events, be taken seriously. If security measures are ineffective, v/e must expect the FLQ to carry out some of its threats - robberies, kidnappings, executions and sabotage. More specifically, it has stated in communiques that plans to execute business ar.d political leaders and to attack air and rail transportation facilities are to become operative upon a breakdown of negotiations for the release of their 23 comrades. Since IS.OCT. there would seem to have been no significant acts by the FLQ. The fate of James Cross is unknown. Police action in Quebec, aided by the military, has continued at a reduced pace. Political controversy has filled the void, accusations and counter-accusations over the use of the War Measures Act has led to a polarization of public opinion. Government is on the defensive. Strangely enough, there is a current parallel for this in Uruguay where Mr. Mitrione, a U.S. adviser, was recently executed by the same kind of guerrillas, the Tupamaros. 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At the moment,'little more needbe said of the FLQ guerrilla campaign. As it obviously is followjj^the pattern laid dov/n in the manuals reported in POLARIS Issues #Tl> and #13, it is only necessary to refer to these to determine its intentions which are made quite clear. While the War Measures Act, or similar legislation, may deter these terrorists, the fact is they are still among us and recent history reveals that far stricter measures taken by some other countries have failed to eliminate the guerrilla. There are two major factors contributing to this situation, namely, international ramifications and internal support. As the guerrilla manuals outline the intentions, so do they outline their critical inherent weakness, this being the lack of internal support. It is therefore understandable why it is absolutely necessary for the guerrillas to align themselves with a popular cause*, - in Quebec, it is the cause of Separatism. The support the FLQ hope for and require, is contained largely within the Parti Quebecois, and it is quite evident success has bean achieved. Eliminate both the passive and active support and the FLQ guerrillas would perish. But with it, they will continue in spite of any law that a society such as ours could direct against them. It follows that before we can rid ourselves of these guerrillas, their support must somehow be withdrawn. Unfortunately, sterner measures will likely be interpreted by this segment of Quebec society as repression against independence and not particularly against the terrorist activities of the FLQ. Ir. disguise, this may prove to be a victory for the latter organization, as re could just solidify their support. The wisdom of the FLQ aligning with the cause for Quebec independence is apparent. Some separatists, such as Rene Levesque RJ! ft 0 [rTl IT OA " ^ 0 1 If \X17 U III LPi Lb 001004 �- y have been consistently giving comfort to the FLQ, and since the kidnapping, have spoken of the 23 convicts whose release 'was demanded by the terrorists as 'political prisoners', which means no less than they were convicted for their ideas, not their actions. How many other separatists, and others, are mistaken in their belief that those prisoners are in gaol for their political ideology? The International Aspects Ho one for a moment should accept the theories that the violent revolutionary movement is merely a Quebec problem brought about by a 10% unemployment figure and other aspects of discontent. There is absolutely no doubt but that it is the result of a well-organized and executed plan by outside influence, which is exploiting the situation. There have been a-few remarks of outside influences by tne occasional member of Parliament, but the absence of specific identification seems not to be without significance. However, on October 19th, the President of the United States, Richard Nixon, when speaking to students at Kent State University, stated that the FLQ and the violent revolutionaries in the U.S. had international ramifications and that these organizations attached themselves to a popular cause in each target country. In January, 1966, at the First Tricontinental congress held at Havana and attended by 72 communist countries and their allies, including the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, it was agreed that Havana was to serve as the COMMAND POST for the 'national liberation movement', which was for the purpose of liberating the free world from capitalist influence and the political neutralization and economic cripp.Iing of North America and Western Europe. The role of the Command Post is to promote armed revolutionary movements to influence extremism and provoke intense local hostility to the U.S. Quebec, like many other areas in the Western Hemisphere, was certainly selected as a target before 1966, therefore it can only be concluded that the joint communist powers decided co-ordinated leadership was needed for various liberation groups. Who mans the Command Post is not revealed, but it can be assumed the Cubans play only a minor role. .'.On April 15, 1969, the Canadian Tribune stated: "Today, the Soviet Union, a mighty industrial power, is playing a major role in assisting the national liberation movements". Uniquely, Quebec presented a set of conditions which could be skilfully 001005 �- 3 manipulated by these foreign planners. impact. We are now beginning to feel the Quebec is merely a pawn in this game of international chess. The guerrilla operations in Latin America and Quebec are undoubtedly excellent examples of encircling the U.S. with "Cuoas". The question is, how much of this will the U.S. tolerate? Soma of our other Violent Revolutionaries While Quebec and the FLQ hold the spotlight, it should not be forgotten that the revolutionary movement is not confined to that Province. Across Canada we have the Maoists, disciples of Peking, and who morally support the FLQ. These traitors to our society will support any and all violence for the revolutionary cause. The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) are in Canada, and according to a recent article in the Toronto Telegram, which claims, access to a highly confidential government document, quotes this about the SDS: "Like the FLQ, members are trained locally and abroad in para-military activity and are considered responsible for civil bombing incidents currently sweeping the U.S. The local membership is organized into ceil units, much like the FLQ, and their membership is estimated to number 300 or more in Montreal". SDS in Canada. POLARIS has already reported the presence of the Recently a vague and unconfirmed report suggested that the Weathermen faction of the SDS, which is its most violent segment, is forming in Canada. The newspaper article quotes further extracts: "Student AntiPolutionists - Membership is comprised of local university students with a leadership now known as politically motivated and of extreme views. It is a branch of an organization in the U.S. which has undertaken violent demonstrations and sabotage against industry and government establishments. The membership locally (apparently Quebec, ED. note), is estimated at 1000 or more students with some 100 being hard-core revolutionaries". Mention is also made of the Front du Liberation des Taxis which has joined with other groups to demonstrate on broader issues than the airport taxi problem. The Trotskyists, who have no international backing like the FLQ and the Maoists, nonetheless is another left-wing organization of extreme views. They are 4 �directing their activity to the campus Zj vio.y of their youth organizai, o 1 \J i I . tne Young Socialists, and they themselves, the.League for Socialist Action, appear .to be concentrating on both industry and the intellectual community. This organization is yet another which advocates change by violence. CAN CANADA COPE WITH VIOLENT REVOLUTION? When the BNA Act was drafted, giving the responsibility of law enforcement to the Provinces, it was obviously never envisaged that one 22rea. years later we would be faced with international revolutionary forces on our doorstep. However, now we find ourselves in that VAAJ position, with the Attorneys- General of each Province being responsible to combat this serious element, when logically it should be a national responsibility. only in the position of offering assistance. The Federal Government is How sound is this policy today unless we are assured that each Province with its independent municipal police forces (and in Ontario and Quebec with the independent Provincial police) is capable of correctly dealing with the situation? The involvement, of course, is far greater than maintaining law and order in spite of the valuable assistance local police force's can offer. Apart from any political or economic corrective measures, security intelligence cn a national scale with external liaison is the sole solution for us. The basis of security intelligence is research cut of which emerges operational action. One without the other is useless. To equip our local police forces accordingly would not only be entirely out of the question, but woulc be utterly impracticable. Actually the Federal Government should be rightfully responsible and the necessary assistance should come from the Provinces. In spite of the fact that the security service operates on a national scale, the reverse stand which is practised today, makes it impossible to effectively cope with the situation. What seems to be required is some form of legis- lation such as a national security act, in which this and other subversive activity comes under federal jurisdiction. The Royal Commission on Security (1959), remarking on Quebec, had this to say: "However, if there is any evidence of an intention to engage in subversive or seditious activities, or if there is any suggestion of foreign influence, it seems inescapable that the Federal government has a clear duty.to take such security measures as are necessary to protect the integrity of the federation. At the \'&rx 001007 �P -5- least it must take adequate steps to inform itself of any such threats . . (underlining added). The BNA Act would seemingly prevent the former, and the latter is explained by the Prime Minister himself when he admitted the government have been na'ive in the past. Insofar as the RCMP is concerned, the same Royal Comimission notes this: "There is, however, no explicit statutory authority for the security role" Surely, if our Federal Government is at last awakening itself, it should undertake whatever steps are necessary to become primarily responsible, and at the same time, provide its security service with something better than the last quote above. �jfr-pz-TEt-lfe) Di ON MATTERS LAKI3 CONCERNING CANADA '5 INTERNAL SECURITY "DEFENCE AGAINST THREATS TO SECURITY ISA DUTY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE COMPARABLE IN MEANING AND RELEVANCE V7ITH DEFENCE AGAINST ARMED ATTACK AND INSURRECTION''. Royal Commission on Security (1969) Supplement to Issue No. 13 October 1970 RURAL GUERRILLA WARFARE FOR ALL CANADA? On the 14th instant, a dispatch from Reuters in Paris reported that the French press had received a statement from the European delegation of the FLQ, threatening that action will be taken against Canada's air and rail communications. In the weeks to come, it will "begin delivering blows all over Canada". The statement also called for Quebec independence. While the presence of members of the FLQ in France should not be discounted, there are no means of determining if the statement is genuine, nor is it possible to evaluate the threatened action. In POLARIS Issue No. 12, under "Sabotage", it is mentioned that transportation is one of many targets of the urban guerrilla. However, in the same Issue, under "War of Nerves", the threat could be a psychological attack, timed to co-incide with their present campaign. Should the announcement be genuine, it is only possible to examine the past threats of the FLQ, the majority of which have been carried out. In view of what has been said of Separation in this Issue, the call for Quebec independence-.requires no further elaboration, 001009 _/a es, c_n ca_ �POLARIS * 7 . . ON MATTERS _ CONCERNING CANADA \S INTERNAL SECURITY "DEFENCE AGAINST THREATS TO SECURITY ISA DUTY AAD RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE COMPARABLE LA MEANING AND RELEVANCE WITH DEFENCE AGAINST ARMED ATTACK AND INSURRECTION". Royal Commission on Security (I9b9j Issue No. 13 October 14, 1970 RURAL GUERRILLA WARFARE - ITS MEANING While separatism in Quebec is advocated by the FLQ, they neither originated the idea, nor is it their ultimate goal. The sole purpose o f this terrorist organization is to bring about social change by violence, replacing it with a system patterned after Marx and Lenin. At the moment, we are witnessing the embryonic stages of urban guerrilla warfare which is the forerunner of violent revolution. However, small cells, limited in numbers, could never achieve such a revolution by themselves without greater support. There is little doubt but that the FLQ leadership fully realize this_and are well aware that the only effective means which could rally the required support is to align themselves with a reasonably popular cause, in this case the cause of separatism. No matter what gyrations the Parti Quebecois adopt, , it will be unable to shake off the lamprey-type attachment by the FLQ. "One of the permanent concerns of the urban guerrilla is his identification with popular causes to win public support". (Polaris Issue No. 12, page 5) In Polaris Issue No. 5, June 1, 1970, mention was made that the Parti Quebecois stated the younger elements of the Parti were prey to extreme leftist agitators. It is this young element that could be induced to provide the support required by the FLQ to expand their operations which are absolutely essential to furthering their cause. required.) (The majority of the masses is not If and when support is obtained, the next step is to convert it from that of sympathy to activism in the form of rural guerrilla warfare. Ther-majority of the recruits would undoubtedly come from the younger element of the Parti Quebecois, many of whom would likely be unconscious of the true role of the FLQ. As the manual on urban guerrilla warfare states, the emergence of rural guerrilla warfare is destined to play the decisive role • in the revolutionary cause. (Polaris Issue No. 12, page 2 (c). Underlining added). = OeiFIIElTDI" 2 001010 �- 2Rural guerrilla warfare has been practiced in many areas of the world and the term 'rural' is sufficiently flexible to be aaapted to specific areas. Thus rural guerrilla warfare could be undertaken in Quebec, yet in a .different form to that employed in Cuba, Vietnam, Yugoslavia during World War II, or the Middle East today. 'General'Alberto Bayo, who was instrumental in organizing Castro's guerrillas, was undoubtedly an authority on this type of warfare. He had employed their strategy and tactics in capturing the Balearic Islands in 1936. In addition he had been authorized to establish a guerrilla school in Barcelona, Spain, to operate against Franco. Later he returned to Cuba but set off for Mexico, teaching at the Mexican School of Aviation, and while there, expounded guerrilla warfare. On one occasion he was quoted as saying: "Too many intellectual cowards could not understand how a few men using guerrilla tactics could successfully oppose a regular army with modern equipment, and defeat them". In 1955 he came to the attention of Castro and was given the task of training guerrillas to fight Batista. As one observer put it: "It was strictly a professional operation, one which Lenin or Mao Tse-Tung would have been proud of. The trainees were taught everything there is to know about guerrilla warfare". On the style of Lenin, Bayo answered a number of questions, the more important being quoted below: Q. What is the first and most important condition that has to be met for a- guerrilla war to succeed? A. It is necessary to be on the side of the oppressed masses in their struggle against foreign invasion, the imposition of a vile dictatorship, etc. If this prerequisite is not met, the guerrilla will always be defeated. Anosoever starts an uprising against,the will of the masses or against a popular regime will fail. (Ed. note: This is undoubtedly the reason why the FLQ support separatism) Q. Vlho should form a guerrilla band? A. Only those idealistic youths who have proved Aneir spirit sacrifice, personal bravery and unlimited patriotism. of Q. Ifnat other prerequisite is required for one who wishes to join our guerrilla band? A. He must fill out a detailed questionnaire, A summary of his politiaali activity end affiliations will also DQ inalvxied. �Q. If the applicant ^s an informer, what should A. He will be judged by a summary court-martial the revolution. we do with him? as a traitor to Q. If an informer should infiltrate our ranks, w'r.at should we do with, him? A. He will be judged by a Council of War, and without any mercy whatsoever, he will be condemned to death. Q. What is the most efficient size A. The ideal guerrilla unit should smaller the number, the greater of a guerrilla unit? have from 10 to 20 men. the mobility. Q. Ano should be the captain of the band? A. The captain, is chosen by the band for his qualities of his character, intelligence, caution, and his enthusiasm Q. Should the guerrilla know the succession of command? A. Yes, he should know and respect it. There should be no over who exercises the direction of the unit and whoever command should be respected by all. The leadership, for Ane war. arguments is in Q. What fighting equipment should the guerrilla carry? A. All the guerrillas of the unit should carry the sane caliber of firearms so as to reduce ammunition supply problems. A light machine gun is carried as it will always be necessary in our operations. Q. What is the organizational structure of a guerrilla band? A. Like an army unit, the guerrilla band has its general staff. There, is a division of duties and responsibilities. This prevents all ihe work from falling on the shoulders of a single individual. Usually, the group will be composed of ihe following sections: INFORMATION, OPERATIONS, SABOTAGE, RECRUITMENT, WEAPONS, INSTRUCTION, SUPPLY, HEADQUARTERS, HEALTH, and PROPAGANDA. Q. What are the duties of each of these sections? A. INFORMATION: This section will gather all information possible on ihe sector assigned to the guerrilla group such as facts about Xne inhabitants of the area - both enemy and neutral. It will determine the location of a water supply, springs and rivers, roads, highways and short cuts, bridges and conduits. It will keep records on the conduct of the members of the group. It will carry a list of the sympathizers who wish to join the movement as well as a black list of "chivatos" (informers). At the same time, it will map the principal objectives of the sector. This section will handle espionage and counter-espionage. It will maintain Ane service records of all the members of the guerrilla, recording ihe part played by each member in all war activities, great or small. It will establish a coding center, which will code and decode messages. It will keep the records of court martials, etc. The information section should be led by' ihe second in command of the band. He should be intelligent, experienced, and completely trustworthy. A 001012 �• OPERATIONS SECTION will determine ihe operations and other actions which the guerrilla unit is to perform. The outcome of said operations will then be evaluated by ihe sajr.e office. It will consult with responsible, comrades on the operations which are to be undertaken. When the data has been collected, a plan will be formulated and- submitted to the caotain of the qroup who will arxorove or disapprove it. If the captain has been rendered hors de combat by wounds, death, illness, or absence, the command of the group will be taken over '.by the Operations Section. This section will also file facts about proposed operations. Maps in different scales will also be filed for future use. SABOTAGE SECTION is- the most important of ihe 10 sections which make up our general staff. It will be headed by an officer who is active, extraordinarily dynamic, energetic and who has a searching and fluid imagination. This man must have a true calling for his duties. All the many various types of sabotage activity must be given maximum attention. RECRUITMENT SECTION is in charge of recruiting personnel to enlarge our guerrilla unit. Said section will list -The volunteers and separate them into three categories. In the first list, they will place the most talented ones who will replace OVPT casualties. The second group will consist of those who will serve as "macheteros-bombarderos". The third group will consist of those who will be used only for fortification improvement and similar tasks. The officer in charge of the INSTRUCTION SECTION will supervise the schools responsible for the teaching of ihe manual of arms and close order drill. He will also be responsible for teaching the illiterate to read and write. He will handle all other cultural problems of the guerrilla unit. MUNITIONS SECTION will be in charge of ammunition procurement and distribution. It will direct the civilians who are ammo carriers and also maintain stores of replacement parts and ammunition in secret caches. HEADQUARTERS.SECTION will be in charge of the most important responsibility. It will be charged with seeing thai our- troops never lack food and that the available food is rationed intelligently. It will be responsible for requisitions, requests and purchasing of supplies. The HEALTH SECTION need not necessarily be headed by a doctor 'or male nurse although it would be more desirable if it were. This section will maintain and stock the medical supplies that our unit needs. It will also keep on hand the names and addresses of nurses, doctors, and other medical personnel to be found in OVPT secvor. If the aforementioned personnel do not volunteer their services, they will be forced to serve us. The PROPAGANDA SECTION will be in charge of publicizing our feats of arms in newspapers and magazines, both national and foreign, ylf this is not possible, we will use letters or mimeographed bulletins, etc. In any case, thp Propaganda section will do the best it can io spread the accounts of our action among the people by whatever means ai hand oo the morale of our supporters will be raised and our enemies discouraged. �^ . When should we fight the enemy? A. This is the main question of guerrilla warfare. One must memorize and practice the rule that the perfect guerrilla never invites the enemy io fight nor fights on the enemy's terms. Every good guerrilla must rely on surprise, the skirmish, the ambush and always attack when ihe enemy is confident and does not expect attack. When the enemy begins to counterattack, we must disappear from sight and withdraw to a safer place. Naturally, during these maneuvers, we must inflict casualties upon the enemy. Q. What is the organizational structure of a guerrilla company? A. /it the head of a tactical unit of ninety-nine men there is a captain. Such a unit is designated a company. The company has four lieutenants, each of whom commands a section of 24 men except the fourth section which has only 23 men'assigned to it inasmuch as the captain is also nominally assigned to' the fourth section. Q. What is the organizational structure of a battalion? A. A battalion has five companies. The Bih company will include all those cooks, aides, mechanics, barbers, tailors, shoe-repair men, office personnel, and others who are primarily concerned with training or support activities. Of course, the organization of such a large group of men will take place only when the guerrilla action has taken on the aspects of a full scale civil war. In any other ciraumstances the fifth company will be a combat unit. Q. Is ii necessary that all guerrilla companies follow this type of arganizavion? A. It is absolutely necessary that the central command has a correct and complete control over all the units. Q. How is a secret society (underground) formed? A. A.n underground is composed of "cells" of three people each. Experience has indicated that three people can operate easily and efficiently. What is more, should we have the misfortune - as we once did - to be infiltrated by a spy, he will be able to inform only on two other persons. This minimizes the possibility of our whole organization being compromised. Cells that have 8 or 10 members and whose members are at the same time chiefs of other units of eight or ten should be Abolished. Q. How will the sabotage section operate? A. A cell will never be assigned more than one duty baptized with a name. (Ed. Note: Each cell will On the question of sympathizers, Bayo has this to say: "Our sympathizers will form mobs - mountains of human flesh - which will push, will disorganize, will surround, will flood like gigantic waves against the dictator's police. If an opportunity arises, they will scream and shout curses". be �- o - , Q. What do we do after we have conquered an area? A. We will form small units to patrol the area we have taken. The INFORMATION section will organize and evaluate such data as is necessary. OPERATIONS section-will question the citizenry about bridges and overpasses and have them marked on their maps. The SABOTAGE section will . instruct and form new cells. The RECRUITMENT section will enlist new . volunteers. The INSTRUCTION section will sei up a training camp. The ARMAMENT section will check all arms and repair those that need it. The MUNITIONS section will select sites for ammo dumps and places to hide weapons. The SUPPLY section can concentrate on replenishing whatever materials are in short supply. Q. What is the greatest danger that we must face after our victory over dictatorship? A. The greatest danger that we face is the nullification of our victory. The forces of Evil, the legions of reaction never accept defeat. When our boot is on the poisonous neck of the snake, it wallows, moves and twists to gather strength to jump on us again. It never accepts defeat, but fights always to give us trouble. Guard and administer your own victory I If the FLQ plays according to the rules of urban guerrilla warfare, it must be assumed that more far-reaching activities confront the people before rural guerrilla warfare becomes a reality. With its thrusts, it holds the initiative, while authority parries as if blindfolded. as long as the FLQ is on the offensive. This situation will surely continue While the FLQ or FLP come under the jurisdiction of the Province of Quebec, possibly the Federal Government should consider 'the best method of defence is offence' and attack these organizations with at least psychological warfare, aimed at informing both French and English speaking Canadians, just what these organizations are, their true motives and the means and methods they intend to employ to achieve their ends. The Government must surely have the ammunition to fire. Current articles appearing in the press media indicate the majority of writers are under the illusion that the objective of the FLQ is to rid Quebec of the English speaking Canadians and create separatism based on the principles of the Parti Quebecois. For example, Peter Silverman, lecturer of history, University of Toronto, had this to say in an article in the Toronto Star: "But within the Quebec environment the terrorists may, Aj offer of power or careful manipulation, lower the morale of the police until they are willing to change alliances. For if the security forces feel they are defending 7 001015 �- 7 - a lost cause which they cannot readily identify, like federalism, thus they may shift their loyalty. With the police almost all French Canadian to a man, with the military a French brigade group, one can ask how long the police will get killed (sic) or accept the risks involved with protecting the properties and lives of English Canadians against French Canadians". (End of quote). The FLQ has amply demonstrated by word and action, the fallacy of this kind of thinking. it, not their goal, but other rrer.ch Not only is separatism as we understand Canadians will suffer equally with their English Canadian neighbours. The kidnapping of the Quebec Minister of Labour is sufficient proof. The goal of the FLQ. is change of the social system by violence, replacing it with a Marxist-Leninist form of society. warfare, using the cover of separatism. Tne means is Aj way of guerrilla �MESSAGE FILE /DOSSIER DATE F M / D E INFO NOV 2/70 t FilRh EXTEROTT 3 flfl GENEVA TO/A LDN. 3 ^ 7 ? A / c TASK FORCE LIST SUB/SUJ SECURITY SECURITE CONFD NO PRECEDENCE hm.3K IMMED FAFIS PSI SOC KIDNAPPINGS APPROACH TO THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS BY QUOTE FRANCOIS SAUVAGE UNQUOTE. DURING A CALL ON MR. RITCHIE ON OCT 30, BRIT HIGH COMMISSIONER INDICATED TH-AT HIS GOVT HAD HEARD OF A MR. QUOTE FRANCOIS SAUVAGE UNQUOTE WHO CLAIMED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH FLQ AND WHO INDICATED THAT SOME SOLUTION TO CROSS KIDNAPPING MIGHT BE WORKED OUT IF INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS WAS USED. ABOUT THIS MAN. HIGHCOM ASKED IF V/E KNEW ANYTHING Vffi TOLD HCO THAT ONLY SIMILAR NAME WE WERE AWARE OF WAS JACQUES SAUVAGEAU OR SAUVAGEOT, ONE OF LEADERS OF FRENCH STUDENTS DURING M/iY/6S EVENTS. LATTER MIGHT HAVE HAD SOME CONTACTS WITH FLQ BUT THERE WAS NO/NO REASON TO BELIEVE HE WAS IMPLICATED WITH IT. IT MAY BE OF COURSE THAT FRANCOIS SAUVAGE IS AN ASSUMED NAME. WE ALSO REMINDED UK HCO THAT INTERNATIONAL RED OHOOQ IIPD DEEM MENTIONED DY Wm RfflTRflftfifl TN HTfi OPT L5 \ DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE . . ./2 ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR SIG vzwmm. DIVISION POP TELEPHONE 62467 z AgPR^ED/j^fTQBIS SIO. G?K9gU EXTI8/BIL (REV 8/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) '• 001017 �v- y CONFD - 2- STATEMENT, BUT THAT IT WAS IN CONTEXT OF SAFE CONDUCT FOR KIDNAPPERS, NOT/NOT OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THEM. 2. BRIT HIGHCOM*S OFFICE HAVE LEFT WITH US COPIES OF FIVE TELS CONCERNING THIS MATTER. (COPIES ARE BEING REPEATED TO YOU SEPARATELY). 3. IF HE IS NOT/NOT A CRANK, IT MAY BE THAT SAUVAGE*S INTENTION IS TO INVOLVE JCRC IN CDN SITUATION WITH yi. .-•C t *J-n~AZO. i +JsY.A_^ HOPE THAT THIS WOULD SECURE FARTHER PUBLICmjFOR FLQ «i» *-r>—fXy~ C^r. tAtttxn-lXr~£A> < L CDN TON GOVT TO ENTER INTO ANOTHER ROUND OF BARGAINING ^COMPEL WITH KIDNAPPERS. IT IS ALSO CONCEIVABLE THAT GESTURE IS NOT/NOT PARTICULARLY ILL-INTENTIONED. C^-Ue-rJ] IN THAT CASE HOWEVER ^A vC-~«_ HIS APPROACH IC OF MD/N9/SIGNIFICANCE TO DATE SINCE 12A^*J7 JJAJ-^O fl-Pvw. 2-r-jfJL~e^-*j^£~22A< fe> THE !IOT OLAIMFD TO mm liNY MANDATE FROI^FLQ ANBin IIMi ?0 TO GIVE ON CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH KIDNAPPERS M?WIT RELEASE 4. CROSS. WE SUGGEST YOU GET IN TOUCH WITH UK MISSION IN C-£ ftJBi/A Tiirmin TO OBTAIN ANY FURTHER INFO THEY MAY HAVE, YOU MIGHT A THEN SPEAK ON A PERSONAL/PERSONAL BASIS WITH PERSONS WHO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED V/ITH QUOTE SAUVAGE UNQUOTE IN ICRC. YOU MIGHT INDICATE THAT YOU HAVE NO /NO FRANCOIS SAUVAGE UNQUOTE. HAVE USED A FALSE NAME. trv-d&LI^O KNOWLEDGE OF A ^UOTE MAN IN QUESTION MIGHT OF COURSE ASSUMING HE IS NEITHER A C R A N K N C O £*^*^Orf_ZL ZZ AsiZ*^x*^*i*^2ir^ Z^ISMTZFAST^ *\ OUT FOR MONEy (IT'TS DISTURBING THAT HIS FIRST REQUEST TO ICRC WAS FOR FUNDS), HE MIGHT MERELY BE ATTEMPTING TO INVOLVE ICRC IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PRODUCE FAVOURABLE PUBLICITY FOR FLQ • ./3 �CONFD - 3 - AND TO GENERATE PRESSURE ON CDN GOVT TO YIELD TO UNREASONABLE DEMANDS OF KIDNAPPERS. HOWEVER IN ORDER TO EXPLORE ALL POSSIBLE AVENUES FOR RELEASE OF MR. CROSS, YOUT^INK J T :^~2£A*S rc*~^~Xl7£iJxz^ uA^t. U~-».¥4~*^ A £P/&A ' /WOULD BE HELPFUL IF ICRC PERSONNEL IN QUESTION COULD SEEK TO OBTAIN FROM SAUVAGE ON PERSONAL BASIS (ASSUMING HE CALLS THEM AGAIN) ANY INFO HE CAN GIVE ON GIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH CTJZ KIDNAPPERS WOULD RELEASE MR. CROSS^'JJ IF HE HAS NOTHING TO CONTRIBUTE ON THIS POINT AND GIVEN FACT THAT HIS BONA FIDE ^ NOT/NOT ESTABLISHED, WE WOULD SEE LITTLE INTEREST IN FURTHER CONTACT WITH HIM. OFF-HAND WE EXPECT NO/NO RESULT FROM THIS CONTACT. FOR ONE THING GOVTS HERE HAVE ALREADY STATED HOW FAR THEY COULD GO TO MEET KIDNAPPERS DEMANDS. LATTER CAN EASILY RESPOND THROUGH TYPE OF COMMUNICATIONS THEY HAVE USED TO DATE, OR ELSE MAKE USE OF SAFE CONDUCT OFFER. WE DO NOT/NOT SEE V/HAT NEW ELEMENT A THIRD PARTY COULD BRING, ESPECIALLY AS HE DOES NOT/NOT SEEM TO HAVE ANY PARTICULAR MANDATE. 6. V/E HAVE INFORMED BRIT HICOM HERE OF INSTRUCTIONS Vffi -ARE SENDING YOU. WE ARE NOT/NOT GETTING IN TOUCH IN ANY WAY WITH MR. HARRISON, WHO IS APPARENTLY A JUNIOR BBC PRODUCE HE HAS BEEN CREDITABLY DISCREET ABOUT THIS WHOLE MATTER TO DATE, BUT MAY NOT/NOT REMAIN So(* 2J*JA^a~*^ 7 %^Jt7^ AUJ ^ ^^) IA^ A ^ CwWv^rwv-^ A-&2FA^ *%A&L^^ l l V W ^ U ^ ^ aSJ& /k±±< ^L-^yM7 A\2-^A^-SJL2A^ cz T^S*ALJJ^C^ f^** ^AM - -/© &^JL *2f (sJsA* * d y1 ,r �tt E S S A G E nErv.rsTf.-crJT OKI «.• HO. POP FM/OE E . A. TO/A PRMNY INFO CNGNY RCMPOTT DISTR. TASK FORCE LIST \ POP- 3?7 NOV ::i 2/70 no, 2 2 r T m r RESTRICTED rnuc"''1 IS AGREEABLE / \| RECEIVE JOHN CAREY FOR INTERVIEW. N TELS P0P357 AND P0P30V IN ANSWERING CAREY'S QUESTIONS STRESS SHOUID BE IN ADDITION TO USING GUIDi PLACiD CM NEW LEGISLATION GIVEN FIRST READING IN HOUSE TCDAY AND PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY DEPT OF JUSTICE AT TIME OF TABLING LEGISLATION. \ / s SS IN OUR 2 X y \A / / \ \ \ : OCT 28 AGREE EITHER YOUf OR MR. GORDON BLAIR M.P. , IF HE B \ . 'Ct • ; i I V WEIDMAN/GLOVER TELCON NOV 2 \ \ I K I' YOURTii 178V •Hl^Ji—. •J h tko'KIT e IMttfcD \ \ KILH/DOSBIEN ' H ? O'Oflia. MINUTWE y s A \s {,COPIES |i \ fZece/A' \ FEce/fA \ OF A.F>coe ynxir s /ouc sv/o«^»P> >?*>/,/* c fj <-o& I ) A^BAcze 2 s / / J/ / \z A A s££"*J$c / i \ / /' | WILL FOLLOW BY SHfieSfflffiSG TELEGRAMS) A / / / / / x / \ / V \ X A A / V A y . / V s \l \ 1 J A \ A/ \ \l / / / \ A \ I / o n A F T v.Ml R i i e r S c T E U n Axfj\r.Y&&dlt.P: Ol VI SI O li / Di I < E C T I ON TELEPHONE | P P « U V .: UI A T I ';;•' J'V 5-6435 J. PUDDINGTQN A F$^ POP I:XT t n / n i L i n u v R/70) 001020 �<Sl POElMIN PDM(RJTCIIIE) PDM(P.OQUET) FMO(ROBERTS) PGO(WALLS) PPR(READ) FLE(DF MKRS ) PSI(BRETT) *\. FtfO(STANSFIELD) GCO(PUDDINGTON) DEPT OF JUSTICE(CHRISTIE) SOLICITOR GEN(H , •: IEN (HOFLEY) "i • LU •.;• 7 C O N F I D E N T I A L FM PARIS 3 3 6 1 NOV2/70 TO OTT EXT POP INFO LDN RCMPLDN TT WSHDC SAIGN RCMPOTT(INSP F£RRARIS)CIBOTT(OUIMET)DE OTT EMERGENCY MEASURES!ALLEGED ARREST OF THREE VIETNAMESE IN QUEBEC UE HAVE RECEIVED A LET FROM THE UNION DES VIETNAMIENS IN FRANCE PROTESTING AGAINST THE ARREST OF THREE OF THEIR COMPATRIOTS RESIDENT IN QUEBEC ON OCT 16 .THE LET EXPRESSES SURPRISE AND INDIGNATION AT THESE ARBITRARY MEASURES AGAINST THREE MEMBERS OF THEIR ASSN WHO TO THEIR KNOWLEDGE HAD DONE NOTHING TC INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CDA .OUR CORRESPONDENT ASSUMES THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS MUST HAVE BEEN MOTIVATED BY THE ATTITUDE OF THE THREE VIETNAMESE CONCERNED TOWARDS THE AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTHVIETNAM.WE ARE ASKED TO INTERVENE FOR THE RELEASE OF THESE PEOPLE AND A WARNING IS ADDED THAT THE CDN GOVT SHOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WELFARE OF THESE THREE RESIDENTS IN THE EVENT THAT THEY ARE HANDED OVER TO THE ADMIN IN SAIGN.FULL TEXT OF LET FOLLOWS IN SEPARATE TELCOTT ONLY). 2.THE ABOVE-MENTIONED LET DOES NOT/NOT MENTION THE NAMES OF THE THREE VIETNAMESE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN ARRESTED.PERHAPS THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES IN QUEBEC COULD LET YOU KNOW WHETHER THERE ARE ANY VIETNAMESE STILL BEING HELD.IF NOT/NOT WE COULD REPLY ALONG THESE LINES.IF THERE ARE VIETNAMESE STILL BEING HELD COULD WE HAVE THEIR NAMES AND LINE WE SHOULD TAKE IN REPLY. RFT 021429Z 001021 �K- J7AUA2 A* F47AA t MEMORANDUM TO: FROM: SECRET 2d 222 "7.2A I CNovember 2, 1970. Task Force, Operations Centre, Attention: Mr. Roquet Special Operations Centre DAILY ANALYSIS OF MEDIA BY C.R.T.C. In response to your memorandum of October 30, 1970, we have taken steps to classify the daily CRTC analysis as SECRET information and to restrict the circulation as follows: Special Operations Centre — 1 PMO (Ann Jamieson) - 1 Strategic Centre - 1 Task Force Operations Centre (Mr. Roquet) ~ 1 You should note that the copy made available to the Special Operations Centre will be seen by the eight members of the centre only and will not leave the premises. The copy to Ann Jamieson is to be seen only by her and is for her use in respect of special analyses she is doing for the Specii Operations Centre. The copy to the Strategic Centre is for V the personal use of Fernand Fontaine in the briefing room. It is recommended, in view of the sensitivity of the informa— Akx^J tion, that use of the CRTC analysis be restricted within the A 7r. .2. Task Force to Mr. Roquet and one other designated person. CRTC will no longer keep a file copy. A r "22 77P With regard to your query concerning the negative vs positive aspects of continued press attention to the length W)^\h y^AXof time since Mr. Cross has been heard from, it is considered ts^A' that this aspect of the crisis is negative, in that, for the public, it implies that to date the police/military operations have been inefficient; it underlines the ability of the FLQ kidnappers to remain at large despite the actions and intensive search by the authorities and it encourages false FLQ communiques. On the other hand, official statements by the Quebec Government to the effect that the channel is still open for Mr. Cross* abductors to receive free passage to Cuba are considered positive. Special Operations Centre. 001022 �ep""p.J • r ORIO. t w ^ j . PLA-r. MINIRT him. i.i'-i.f ; FM/DE i r i L B / C OSStkrH IJ/I 1 B ii L.C v/ * »t ( V T i.CUntTK M° o'omft," iW^ l?< EXT BTT p Nov 3 BD TO/A GENEVA IMFO RCMPOTT; LDN, BERN, PARIS EMB, •yyyyy TASKjFORCE LIST j^PSI^ SOC CONFD NOV 2 FnFCf" r ""'"~ rr . M T £AL>T7A/& • „ \ \ N"' \ 7 \ X N ~ ^ \ J J J / ' kxnt KIDNAPPING 1 FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF FIVE TEIS FROM BRIT HIGHCOMS OFFICE: \ \l \ \ \ \ \ \ N •. \ \ \ \ I ! \ \ \A A 1/ / (Comcentre please copy attached text) I x\\! J A s I/ / / p 2 y r! / / / X •• TEXT ENDS ! NO 3 • 7 2 A NO 2 TEXT BEGINS x 2 // I/ TEXT ENDS. \ i 2 \J (Comcentre please copy attached text. •I \ 2 V/ A V i \! \ A 2 VA // x/ NO I TEXT BEGINS •. A / yj A ! \ \ POP378 NOV 2 BI X \. \ \ OURTEL TcmWl TEXT BEGINS / / \J i / (Comcentre please copy attached text). / TEXT ENDS I \ \I NO 4 •' y A TEXT BEGINS \ / is (Comcentre please copy attached text) y s f TEXT ENDS \ A / A As > X (Comcentre please copy attached text). D n A i•••• r i. f i/1 i r: D A c r eu n M. Amyot/dg__ r XT i r . / r . H . IrtEV M / J O I r / , / NO 5 TEXT BEGINS \ / A DIVISION/DIRECTION POP / TEXT ENDS. Tt LtPHOtiE APPHOVL f l / A I ' P l A l..l VI 2-JALW 001023 / �I EH CLAIR I TO OTTAWA PRIORITY FOREIGN AND <^H«y£ALTH OFFICE |^,EqRA!4 mmmm -••••• 7- 1 - : 2 NOVEMBER 1970 • * »*• ... UNOUSslfl^O 021200Z • •. • T HY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING, TELEQRAN r• . • .'• ~~~ ntf «r,jo tTFM FOLLOWING * IS TEXT OF MNEWS ITEM IN IN TODAYS TODAi O DAILY UA.U EXPRESS* W»T • i, L \ \ • \ BEGINS ; BRITON *IN CROSS KIDNAP PLOT' • ' - ' P. • PHILIP' FINN MONTREAL, SUNDAY* £ ENGLISHMAN HAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED «N THE ?M • | j i TO KIDNAP BRITISH DIPLOHAT JAHES CROSS. IT WAS REVEALED TODAY. 7- ».- 7 7 •- MR. CROSS, BRITISH TRADE COMMISSIONER IN MON "REAL, W/3 SNATCHED BY F.L.Q. TERRORISTS A MONTH AQO - AND THERE HAS SEEN NO WORD OF [J HIM SINCE OCTOBER 18. I' NOU THE CANADIAN POLICE HAVE ASKED INTERPOL TO HELP. ia * r. - P THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE NAMES OF SIX SUSPECTS INVOLVED IN Th I * KIDNAPPING OF MR. CROSS AND THE MURDER OF QUEBE LABOUR MINISTER PIERRE LAPORTEo THE SIX SUSPECTS ARE THOUGHT TO HAVE ALREADY FLED CANADA WITH THE HELP OF AN UNDERGROUND GROUP CALLED THE INTERNATIONALISTS. J MRS. BARBARA CROSS, 46-YEAR-OLD WIFE OF THE MlSSINQ DIPLOMAT, % HAS TOLD POLICE THAT ONE OF THE HEN SPOKE ENGLISH QUOTE WlTrt^l • - 2 ^nii A TRACE OF ACCENT. UNQUOTE X r * • • .H».M.t<rtjrc HA* I UNDERSTAND, BEEN A SPECIAL REPORT BY CANADIAN AUTHORITIES HAS, } UNI*K X SENT TO SCOTLAND TARD. • ENDS • i 2. -rOXi 001024 �X>A c.c. FPR (M. Beaubien) 2-^2 - "7 '' ' November 2, 1970 MEMORANDUM TO: MR. C. ROQUET At 1010 hours November 2 Mr. Coleman of the British High Commission telephoned to tell us of a story that appeared in this morning*s edition of the London Daily Express with a Montreal dateline written by a Mr. Phillip Finn. According to the article, there is supposed to be an Englishman involved In the kidnapping of Mr. Cross and that the Canadian authorities had requested assistance from Interpol. Ihe story quotes Mrs. Cross in saying that one of her husband's kidnappers spoke English without a trace of an accent. Attached is a copy of a telegram from the FCO giving the text of the artiele. Should the British High Commission here receive press enquiries about this article they will offer "no copsuent" and if really pressed indicate that only Canadian authorities would be able to comment on such a story. Mr. Coleman indicated he would be contacting our Press Office concerning the handling of press enquiries. 2. According to a further report from the FCO in London, Canada House, in commenting on this story, is saying that there are many French Canadians who speak English without a trace of an accent. The FCO is not making any comment. J. D. P. �A .*, r-1 o ' ^ p -'•A2 7F"7 wv, p 'iVn^T^ P^CdA^JTFX-A n •7 _. y.~sAi. p • Qrpi x-'—v-J - / Ui^O^i \ Lii\ j_iiPi V ui'lUixM x TP — u i 1 P' ipeb Ui*. AA 'I ^/Ai xJlL/i-AAit. PI Ax. X . ... l^lJxJXJAilJ \Tfp P P " ' p p T ' T O p T p VP'~ , "?V r ; i Q JU-.- _^'^-»7-' ee,^_ji\!QjjjXLii^i-Ji^iirjP:i.o x A^/X. A.A~J 7-XXJUXIXXIXXJXIO OJ-pDO p~' '''' XJXj U l l i J ~J XJ .-. . pLlOC'O UJ.UuU Xj± .....-, \ \ \ \ \ \\ \ \ \ \\ \ \ \ \ TPQ 1 AxJXl.-.Xj P'PPPiTTP --I-i X xlU * T"Pr ..U.A. rp-ps- ne1'?"" pec -^' -LJ_ / 1 -^ 1 '_< 7 J - 7_ ^ J ^ J_ ^ u ^ . . . L--.e e/ii Ax _. Q-f T ,' r,--"? ~rr-r rr ;• • . _.—. . X.X'. AJ- J_(--L i'.XJ P T > J p'.r> IXJ TPQ T^^/JJU w'J.7 J^i-7-^ - * 7- • P'prppp';"-pvn cjppp.rTPpp rrTP ~P'Q - ~ XJ.: . xi^t. ..- U —. _ _ — xJ C W 7w x x . .—J..,.'. . pPRrP'P's P' A-ixJ..xX OxjX.xixj ..PAX. _ P T T i p n T T Q r p • T.TpTPQ A JLiuO P-V ^ - - Li'. AX.JJ . -r-i TrpT\777 \ ' •' "' e.r.V i O O P U - ' P P P r > ' r " p T p 7 <, T t p i p pTj ApjTT? ""'i " p v ^ " ---jji-.i. J--lj-L \ 7^ -Jj'-> — •' QT^QPVO^'T" J O O P J . -.P \ X P.P-JJ,0 J.7.J-J 7 ^ V - 7 . ' _ _ n? p-OTj-ypp A7 X APxx AAO X T j ^ J ^ - W ^ . ^ . A.-JA. p n ..?.'"'P7PPTp\7e^c \ A. \ vUXLil -x.~ ^.^j*-^..^ --Pi.^i.--iPji'i.ejj — e i_P.i\; . 'PP^T11-1 .-.x AP.XXJ \ . iP_i .7. --.P LJJTJ TpQ p*/p-p-ivr- HJ'T'T1 yr-' j^jio v-j vj .j e x o p.j x nVQ --irr* (--rr-rrr;r:..r Z'~'. Z- UAi^> loXiAAX.x pr.fW,pnT77? : iivJvOi.iUlj TPQ Ijiii^ ^ ^-_ . W-',..J1.J JUiii— w_ -,- --;.- p, « p p p - D T P A - X/X .' x\Ax^ --ijjjj. p^jjps y.APXi -•-A-.'-JA 7/P / . . x j \ epueppis^u^jiP ^i.:~t~>i^ p •Ti'TqqpT7'oQ ii.-.i I J O J J U - U . -'•'' AX\ -prp i. jtjv - A ^-l.J — . _ P A A x . ..Xi .•—xx' .^o -J. C l ! / 1'iLJ.D ACTL^U i i _ . . . v ^ r ' W - / p i - •Z!-,^'"7-TT''T«'r'"/T V i- . .-A:! A i / L> . XIUL-^UXJ X / I Z . \- . . . . / C ^ j .'T o 001026 �\ \ \ / \ \ jA.X.: y'LJA ..•\....A.r. \ '•" ' ..J., A.-.Xr^j \j~jxj :-i •;••-•-.x Pill- TP P i_i.ejO ~>. . x pr;i>pi?Q LJX.iA.xiO V Xi 1 V-7 . .7 O" •_•_ X , P A S / ? A S PRENDRiii LI \ \ X- . pp.T ~ p ' TRAVAIL Di \ . w ' o ~j .x>~. A ' . P \ \ . "^ —iT-:t v . - ^ , , -r rn LJ^iX.iPx.AAAx \ ; \ A ' i\ . X _L J. SX/xj T~JpT — r ,-.-. X \J Xj -L A _ - J 11. . . : J X J X A 7-J ee x . . - A , L X J ' . • , - J p . i> x . A .XX "t?p "\1?C'p i p p — j - . \ rrryrr.-^rrn AX X A>.'.- . . - . .-,-, ,^i- -7.7-ri p c :• rnrp~rrr\7rr~yr7- p" 1 '' 7 . . . 7 7 V j XJ. 7 '.'. X \ TT\T UiY . - • T - J O O . J L . ' J - J pT?pT 'Ij •' """ . A LJ Xr ^ j . x^iuit -.x L..-.. x . — j i x.'.yxxj ii XJ/ P.—' . _ X \ 7 V.. ^ , 1 7 \ V;, 02 XL AXS FOiiCLS POLpCljiii ~j..j - • -r-.--.jrp - , - - , o» T?}y-a ,, p p t > p. ? ppTY . .... . . . X _J-_i A XjXLx . U L i l i L A je.UA • rr 7.... x U J .7-: . 1.1; J. U I ; o -- v rr—..j--, . \..it -;-..-. A XJ nr-.q ^JJJU U -. O i P J - -i ~ ,-. . A ..x.ij A . . 7. V \ .-Pu.io \ UP. 1 V'TJO-JU OAX: x:Ax,iJA-. . \ O \ / - j ; P'eer_j ^.ej A'I JAAX.X AL^AAXJ P U T *^ Pjeiii--^AV 1 - . _ P " i i l — > . J ' l-7 . . P \ Si PiU COl j;0 u JJLJ. -_iAp.ePPrijj/iM i i-ij_ieii A>P)0 XJA-J A PJPO rPjjj.-.ui-.i.,..o ij ^ IJ V J \ I~,/...A \ \ XA\hQl]xjKO)Ao vous A: • \. / V \ -7 / \ \ / / A\ \ •: / \ / \ 001027 �MESSAGE ^^i LIEU DEPARTMENT ORIS. NO. MINISTERE N ° O'ORia. Ott F*S*DE POP bCW DATE SECURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER NOV3/70 RESTR PRECEDENCE TO/A VIENNA j/>1/>1trl> A^^A INFO D.STR. £CmP 7/ OTT TASK F o - € C e FIS,G!W,FCO , LIAJF YOURTELS-916 AND 931 0CT30 AND N0V2 SUB/SUJ L KIDMAPPING: SPEECH TO KIWANIS CLUB WE HAVE SERIOUS MISGIVINGS ABOUT A TALK ON SUGGESTED TOPIC. TITLE APPEARS TO BE POORLY CHOSEN IMPLYING CONFUSION IN YOUR HOSTS MINDS BETWEEN FLQ AND SEPARATIST GROUPS. AS YOU KNOW MAIN OBJECT OF FLQ IS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION WITH SEPARA1\mfmSii^ IN. ALSO TOPIC WOULD LIKELY COMPEL YOU TO MAKE COMMENTS ABOUT ONE OF THE ACTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES IN QUEBEC AND THEREBY IMPINGE UPON INTERNAL CDN POLITICAL AFFAIRS. 2. PRESUMABLY KIWANIS ARE INTERESTED IN LEARNING ABOUT CURRENT PROBLEMS IN CDA RELATING TO DEVELOPMENT OF CDN SOCIETY INCLUDING WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED A FRENCH CDN RENSISSANCE OVER LAST 10 YEARS. (FLQ IS IN THAT CONTEXT A MARGINAL PHENOMENON, WHICH APES WORLDWIDE CURRENTS QUITE AS MUCH AS IT REFLECTS ASPECTS OF OUR SOCIETY.) THEREFORE IF THEY AGREE SUGGEST YOU GIVE A TALK ON EVOLVING CDN NATIONHOOD AND CREATIVE APPROACHES ADOPTED BY GOVT IN RENEWING AND EXPANDING ORIGINAL CDN EXPERINT IN BILINGUALISM. FEDERALISM AND EQUALIZATION OF DRAFTER/REDACTEUR s: G DI V I S I O N / D I R E C T I O N TELEPHONE APPROVED/AWIROUUE ./A bjArJ.>YY^h7^j... chie EXT IS/BIL. (REV S/701 001028 �2 - M OPPORTUNITY, IN SUCH A TALK YOU MAY WISH TO INCLUDE COMMENTS ON (A) RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCES (B) MEASURES AND LEGISLATION LEADING TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PROGRESS (C) DEVELOPMENT OF BILINGUAL AND BICULTHRAL CHARACTER OF CDA AND ITS EXTENSION ABROAD. BY THESE MEANS IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID SOME OF THE MORE SERIOUS PITFALLS OF ORIGINAL TOPIC, WHILE COVERING A GOOD DEAL OF GROUND RELEVANT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEPARA- TISM. 3. SHOULD^DURING A QUESTION PERIOD YOU BE SPECIFICALLY ASKED ABOUT PRESENT SITUATION IN QUEBEC, WE WOULD SUGGEST YOU CONFISB YOURSELF TO BRIEF FACTUAL ANSWERS USING GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN TELS POP309 OCT16; POP352 0CT20 AND POP357 0CT21, BEARING IN MIND IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED INAPPROPRIATE^ FOR A PUBLIC OFFICIAL TO MAKE EVEN SUBSTAWPIVE COMMENTS ON POLITICAL PARTIES IN HIS COUNTRY. 4. IF KIWANIS INSIST ON MAINTAINING EXCLUSIVELY AND EXPLICITLY ORIGINAL TOPIC, YOU SHOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO REFUSE, HAVING MADE A REASONABLE COUNTER PROPOSAL. "^ - \^<f*J<2> �I < O i., *s *• s ; (f „• pF'.AJ MfVNrrP'R]?AT, .i A-7yA...r y r7 ^""V'V '7'" ^"7 ^"r-' f0-2?2Z~TPJ-( C^ / Uj-T~<Aw P 3 November, 197C v y"i P C 0 K P / -. -7/ -" u y\ • ,x -, , - £' ^P~~*.-.^. '^'-V ' Discussion wixn loop Following clearance with, you yesterday, and with inonsieur Cnoque P S , tne Queoec limistsr oi Justice; wi un wuom i spoke cn tne telephone VIPP Quebec City) xasT mgnt, I attended a meeting in Monsieur ST. Pierre's office This morning. M. S T . Pierre is Director General oi Quebec Police force. He had with him MA St. Aubin, who is Director of the Montreal Police, and Assistant Commissioner Dube, the local head of The R.C.M.P. Mr. Ashford accompanied me. 2. . Invited to make an opening statement, I made it clear that we had not come to interfere with existing links with Ottawa, to offer criticism or advice of Police efforts, or TO discuss policy. I said That we well appreciated that they had a very difficult problem on their hands as regards the retrieval of Mr. Cross, and we hoped That The very strenuous efforts they were making would be continued until a successful result was obtained. 3. However, as more than four weeks had now elapsed it seemed reasonable that certain practical contingencies snouio. Dc discussed oecause some oi up.8 asbumpTions \,c.g. Mr. Cross's own health, if alive) might cause us TO revise our intended arrangements. V/e might have to act quickly, and together, at very short notice, and if we could discuss what was in oue ano oner s mines now IT might save delay anc comusioi when we least wanted it. 4. This premis- was accepted oy those present, anc ou that base we decided to discuss the practical points aT issue. 5. The first of these was retrieval cf Mr. Cross alive. Originally we had hoped, aped the evidence of ETs letTers would supporx tins, that ne would oe aOj_e TO emerge ir a lairiy buoyant condition. However, it seemed now prudent to make provision against the likelihood that a long period of mental STrain, lack of physical exercise, probable poor1 nutrition, and lack of proper medical care, might mean that Mr. Cross's condition would have deteriorated. Added to This There was the possibility of some accident,if a violent confrontation between T he kidnappers and the authorities should take olace /2 U J? n.. ij. M-t.^ Tin 4- 7 7 w j'uP. .re u e r " U P ...v. -- v. n.a.y mcA., r\ - r r, u .x.. A . , British High Commissioner, OTTAWA. r\ ,r r\ u .v. u ., T.ft ~D A* IVI.JD.XIJ., - v^ CONFIDENTIAL 001030 �;CPFIPFNAIA: - 2 - 6. In the discussion thai followed it was agreed that a plan should be set up for immediate access to a suitable hospital, preferably with helicopter access, and I'undertook to explore this initially with Mr. Cross's doctor in Montreal and then with Assistant Commissioner Dub6, who would ensure That whatever plan was agreed on was communicated to the others present. -i. KJ 7. M. St. Pierre asked if Mr. Cross would be available for interrogation. I said that we would v/ish This to be possiblt but it would have tc be consistent with his mental and physical condition. There v/ould be an opportunity before he departed irom Montreal, and if They wished TO asr-p nim further Questions in the United Kingdojm aT a later date this could always be arranged through the official channel. If they wished to send one of their investigators subsequently TO see Mr. Cross in England, .this again could probably be arranged, but M. St. Pier: acknowledged that in a period of convalescence they would wish TO respect Mr. Cross's desire to forget the whole thing at least for a time. 3. . If Mr. Cross v/as originally received in a hospital, the Police undertook to arrange immediate security which would include a complete screening from the press. d. In response TO an enquiry aoout onward travel to the U.K., I said that discussion was taking place in Ottawa with a view to returning Mr. Cress to the U.K. either by A.A.?. ci~ R.C.A.F. aircraft. The Felice, said that they would be glad to arrange Mr. Cross's transport to St. Hubert airfield for this purpose and would use a helicopter if this should prove to be more advantageous. 10. In discussion of the possibility of Mr. Cross being wounded in a confrontation with the kidnappers, M. St. Pierre echoed what had been said to me on the previous evening XPT X... cnoquette, tnao every care would oe tureen to avoid tPiis. A. A 11. V/e then turned to the possibility that Mr. Cross might not survive and that his body mi gut oe found. As witn the identification of Mr. Cross when alive, Mr. Ashford would be asked to identify the body, and Mr. Imray was in reserve if Mr. Ashford was at any time unavailable. The first notification in either event would come to me from the two membei A X the anti-terrorist squad, who had been nominated to convey this information and with whom we are in close almost daily touch. : : Ax CONFIDENTIAL 001031 �Monsieur St. Fie: •re sat i't v/ould 12. under Quebec law ior ohe oocy to go to une Police Headquarters where an autopsy would be carried out and a public statement made, as was the case with s vvouj-d ucpes aoou.1 i j a o o ^ o cJ , two days.. •pi o -r- r: o .-. 13. I n r e s p o n s e t o a n e n q u i r y a b o u t 1 ] y-» -r, eeere a g a i n t r a n s p o r t t o m e u .11. c i cue 00 a y oy K.A.1 1 . 01" ix. 0. a i r c r a f t was u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n O t t a w a and t h a t a f i r m p l a t o m i s e i i e c t was i m e l y t o emerge s c c i i . A g a i n , teie x O I - C P -paid t h a t t h e y w o u l d a r r a n g e a n y n e c e s s a r y t r a n s p o r t i n a s u i Pa P I y d i g n i J. 1 e d mame. c r uO XJ a. PP. oe r u a i r f i e l d . It will be noted that in either eventuality there is kely to be some two days in which the Service authorities can ke the necessary transport arrangements, and I suggest that . McConville, together v/ith a member1 of the ; . D . L . . S . , A \~r CA.J- t_. to co-orair .up U UX b . 11 tins 11 O u ijci, con a l 1. e a ay, wi t h. 4-V, Canacian authori"ties in Ottawa. There is a cle ^ u ^ e . . ^ _ether eventuality when the Service authorities can r a k e o v e r uP-C Oiii ufiG ^. O i l C 6 * I informed t h e m e e t i n g of our p l a n s f o r Mrs. X xj ,: cP_ P.± J J. on ; i n o r d e r t o p r o t e c t h e r ffomAMrhe~~unweAPcome" m lc i r we m e p r e s s t n e s e w o u i d oe ep" e n t i r e s e c r e t , ' cnoug w o u l d oe p u t t i n g o u t a n o t i c e a l t e r t n e e v e n t m a i n l y v/i tete e to m c e i i u i o n O_L r e — a s s u r i n g evir. CU'OJJ^S unau h i s v / i f e h a c d e v e l o p •^ w i t h m ente. f r i e n d s and would be k e e p i n g i n c l o s e Xuu^i ° r el "'he Police thought that our e xpla: a.ns v/ere r e a s o n a c jne ways open TO U S OI --ceepp c r o s s . X2ey t o u c h w i t h Mi s a i d a t o n c e t h a t t h e y w o u l d be g l a d t c h e l p i n a n y way, e i t h e : uO O T ^ C C I V C uiic o r e s s a s uO n o r p.o\ r emer.oS o r uC O P O V P U G t x ' cFx 1 £5 f.J vj . a n d v/e h a v e a g r e e d t o c o n s u l t f u r t h e r w i t h t l i e m e m b e r s 0 f t h e a n t i - t e r r o r i s t s q u a d , who a r e t o a c c o m p a n y M r s . C r o s s i o n l a t t e r , 01 wnorr. j . C J C dxx c are both well-known s 1 0 Pi e r Y/e t h e n h a d . 0 . some >re eneral discussion aoout t n e Cas d e s c r i b e ' a s a ' ^ c a u t i o u s optTmism 'was in v/hich what 0_i_ i 2 , c o C f ^ j "Oiloii a * ne b a s e d Oil a advanced. This .XlAXi.ijA Cross v/as nov/ out of c ont.a^ likelihood that the ceil holding M it, who were probably a.PjOll; with those who originally controll thor held in iail^' Sooner r later m e - P o l i c e w e r e c o n ^ K e u t they would get a break in what had be e n s o f a r a l o n g a n d unrewarding investigation y were n o t g o i n g to g i v e they making. Another cause e 110 r t s ae very strenuoi this c e l l , u n l i k e M optimism was the fact M. L a p o r t e ' s c; were much mor a n d s0me a 0 l e a s t , rrrucPr or educated. V/e all agre e d t h a t t h e y s e e m e d -to h a v e b e e n t a k e r _. .back oy Laporte's CK^~i hz~su^ yf LXACXJX. anc 1 .Js . O—l^'N-^ adverse L 7-. \ . it e i i e c o S on t n e 1 , L . Q . ^-i t p, -AT -n 001032 �i n t h e P r o v i n c e . There was, t h e r e f o r e , POP .c more oi une group migir e PC .., uie por a urio A AA, P f. bjjfcje;ially i f t h e - r e w a r d money now peace t h e i r po£ precarious. i.j. x. i . A v_.ui-.C-i-deieLX oy biicii-i'j-ing m. o e * P..cp J. o XPP* , ~ Alx Jjjv/ x A tiie d i s c u s s i o n , and chose p r e s e n t saici "mat i t .pad ceen ope va.i co .ppem ap.so . J. s a i d t n a t we re...ai.eiea r e a c v t o coipsip. U bucLi. d o a "u i J. e y w i bi i e o. o n A S ; on o o -1 *.. j r u r t n e r wr meanvvnij.e we were very satisiiea w i t n FJOF.3 way m vvmcri t i n two nominated members of the ant; UO -L* - A,. \J Ai-li d \J. d>0> 0/O & A. O v i ^ ' ^ ^ O » _u U.. a not think it necessary ace uiiau we vvouicij oi cc j . r i o 6 ; U M . o i r c i y rcs*0GC ^ O O i j . 1 -i- Q L-J... 'W C X 2 --L*_ . - p ' v ' V - ' v, : U : r O s t ^ i J r i ryiYT"P T-J-; 'JT'pp'Ti 7' A " 001033 �t Qr-f- jc...7A-77JJ(?) GEU - Mr. J.G.H. Halstead only. SECRET November 3, 1970. PDM External Affairs representative in the Special Operations Centre. Cabinet has set up a "Special Operations Centre" with responsibilities relating to the overall government's strategy in all aspects of the present crisis. It is a very important body in which PMO, PCO, the RCMP, Parliament, Montreal Police are represented and which keeps liaison with Quebec. It analyses significant trends in Canada and abroad (our own Operations Centre keeps it fully informed). It formulates proposals, through ministers responsible,in all relevant fields for action by departments, ministers, MPs, etc. In particular, it is responsible for monitoring the implementation of Cabinet decisions relating in any way to the crisis. 2. The SOC's general approach seems to me sound. On instructions from the government, it is monitoring a de-escalation of the present tension arising from the crisis, at the same time as it takes an Interest in long term measures to meet the FLQ threat. It is very much in our interest that our department should make a major contribution to the S O C 8 activities and should be within it. In connection with the present crisis, our posts abroad can play a major role in the government's strategy by their reporting, their special information activities, and also in dealing with the FLQ presence abroad. It is not only that opinion abroad tends in return to affect domestic opinion. We have also to take into account that the FLQ has connections among extremists in other countries and will try sooner or later to gain international standing and recognition. Our work in international organisations is also relevant to the SOC preoccupations. We will have . ./2 �- 2 - SECRET to defend our records on human rights. Indeed, because of international considerations, our department may wish to exert maximum influence on the formulation of permanent emergency legislation in Canada. Finally, for the long run, the SOC may turn into a permanent body to suggest and monitor overall government strategy. We have a chance of getting in now. We should take lt. 3. All this leads me to ask you whether, to meet the immediate need, you would be willing to lend us the services of Jacques Montpetit to be our representative in the SOC. I would suggest a two week trial, during which he could explore for us the activities of the SOC, assess their importance, effectiveness and relevance to us and determine whether part time or full attendance would be required. It may be that part time attendance would be adequate, e.g. at daily policy meetings early in the morning and in mid-afternoon. Possibly full time presence will be needed. 4. M. Montpetit is now fully familiar with the POP operation. He has the kind of political background which would be required in SOC. I do not think that anyone better suited can be found. Accordingly, I would ask for your cooperation in making him available for SOC purposes, subject to our reviewing the situation together in two weeks* time. •A. E. XX. l -GHfE �ACT :: 2 2 N F 1 D E N T I AL ro jrfitru PM cu; NOV3/70 icj/ca3 Mrtifx/70! TO IT OTT EXT POP IMMED DE PARIS 0£-vi^ INFO PARIS TT LDN BERN IMMED DE PARIS T^AOX' DISTR TASK FORCE LIST PSI SOC REF YOURTEL POP378 N0V2 £<? KDNAPPIH — (yvU-< (1 r CVA7 AyUX^^Cs J-+J / ]^A fd o '*~ffi ^ soc , i ( r-cv V v ) - ^ =h LAPQINTE SAW EVANS WRIT CONSUL REN GENEV AMD BORFINGER "OF ICRC "' I THIS WORKING »KUCH OF WHAT WAS SAID SI3PLY COUP222.2 7270 (722227 AVAILABLE TO YOU FROM TEXTS OF 5 TELS YOU OBTAINED FROM BR XT KIQHCOwS OFFICE IN OTT .FOLLOWING INFO KAY COMPLETE PICTURE AS WE SEE IT FROa THIS VANTAGE POINT. 2.B0RSINGER INDICATED THAT KE RAD RECEIVED IMPRESSION THAT QUOTE FRANCOIS SAUVAGE UNQUOTE UAS PERSON UFO i'AU DEFINITE KNOWLEDGE Oi" FLQ MOVEMENT AND FLQ MEMBERS ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY HE DID NOT/NOT INDICATE WHICH MEMBERS HE KNEW .SAUVAGE ALSO APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN GENUINELY SHOCKED BY MINISTER LAPORTES MURDER AND ALTHOUGH IN SYMPATHY WITH FLO MOTIVES "HE CONDEMNED THEIR MOST EXTREME ACTION AND WANTED TO DO SOMETHING TQ AVOID SAME FATS FOR CROSS.SAUVAGE INDICATED TO ICRC PERS INVOLVED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN PRISON AT SOME 1 IHt li"I CDA FOLLOWING WHICH HE EXILED HIMSELF TO EUROPE 72 ALSO CLAIMED THAT 12 HAD SOME NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN BLOOD WHICH MIGHT POSSIBLY EXPLAIN HIS ASSUMPTION OF NAME QUOTE SAUVAGE Ui QUOTE SINCE IN FRENCH CDN PARLANCE QUOTE LES SAUVAGES UNQUOTE UAS NAME GIVEN TO TIIE LOCAL INDIANSoBORSINGER ALSO SAID THAT SAUVAGE UAS ABOVE AVERAGE INTELLIGENT PERSON AND THAT AT NO/NO TIME DID HE THY • .. i- 2. 001036 �PAGE TWO 200 w CGNHJ TO BEAT ABOUT BUSH.HIS REPLIES HERE GLUATG DIRECT AND FOR INSTANCE HE NEVER OPCE CLAIMED TO HAVE 2... '•.P'O- PREPARED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH SOME BAP. . BY FLQ.HE SIMPLY 7P2. ' 0 PLC, C( APPARENTLY THOUGHT THAT WITH HELP OF ICRC i AT CRLP NTS AND HE I [NING F-RC ES! AIMING RELEASE GOULD EE I'M'J i fED THROUSE HIM.ON THj POIN'i '• • SINGER CLAIMS Ti'.AT HE MADE 2P QUITE CL Ai TO SAUVAGE THAI ICRC WOULD NOT/HOT ENTER INTO BARGAINING. ICRC UO! • ONE') CCHSID1 . PLAYING PART IF IT HAD AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTIES CO MO LP'NED IN LINE WITH THEIR OFFICIAL PUBLIC POSITION AG REPORTED IN PARAU OF BRIT CONSULTATE GEN GENEV TEL SB OF 0CT31 .SAUVAGE APPARENTLY HAS CLEAH UNDER! , DING OF IGBG POSITION AMD !;: DOES NOT/NOT EXPECT ANY INITIATIVE P PART OF ICRC, 3.ACCORD ING TO BORSINGER SAUVAGi BAP'' B: ', LISHED CCLTACT WITH ICRC THROES!: B'PGBBP P..BB i R. E ] .P'.P.: 127; BAT GGBGPrUB THEN CAME TO GENEV AND VISITED ICRC ON 'AGES BUD BED OCTP.7 AND 2- AND MADE HIS LAST PHONE CALL FROM PLACE QUOTE OUTSIDE SUITE UNG ROTE ON . LAST OCIoUBORSINGER HAS APPARENTLY ONE PHONE HUMBER WHERE HE COULD PERHAPS GET IN TOUCH WITH SAUVAG! BUT BI CIRCUMSTANCES J( DOES NOT/NOT INI END TO CON 'ACT PIN, 4 .BORSINGER CLAIMS THAT AT Hep 0 TIME DID SAUVAGE GIVE HIM ANY PRECISE INDICATION G; WHAT HE COULD DO OK WOULD J C S A U V A G E CLAII THAT HE KNEW TJ.'AT CROSS GAP S T A G ALIVE AND WELL TREATED BUI HE OFFERED ABSOLUTELY NO/NO PR' iF OF IT,WHILE SAUVAGE MAY BG..B .' ACCORDING TO BORSINGER IT IS TO BE DOUBTED THAT HE HAG IN FAC] AT HIS DISPOSAL PHYSICAL MEAL OF GET; Ni IN TOUCH WITH FLQ CULL WHICH DETAINS CROSS.FOR THE. RECORD IT SHOULD BE SAID THAT REP TO HIS REQUEST BOB MONEY WAG OHLY MADi ACCORDJiH TO " p 5 .A CON: ! Gi 001037 �PAGE THREE I960 CONFD IN RESPECT OF LOGISTICS OF SITUATION .APPARENTLY SAUVAGE MIGHT NOT/ NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FINANCIAL MEANS TO BE ABLE TO MAKE FREQUENT PHONE CALLS TO CDA OR ELSEWHERE OR FOR TRAVEL BACK TO CDA .BUT HE DID NOT/NOT DIRECTLY ASK FOR MONEY FROM ICRC, 5.TO SUM UP ICRC DOES NOT/NOT REALLY BELIEVE THAT SAUVAGE IS IN POSITION TO DO SOMETHING POSITIVE AND THEY DO NOT/NOT ENVISAGE TAKING ANY INITIATIVE AT THIS STAGE .SHOULD SAUVAGE CONTACT THEM AGAIN THEY WILL LET US KNOW WHETHER ANYTHING OP INTEREST COMES UP, THEY ARE SOMEWHAT RELUCTANT TO GIVE A DETAILED PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF SAUVAGE AS THEY SEEM TO THINK IT IS NOT/HOT FOR THEM TO INFORM US IN THIS RESPECT AND THEY GENERALLY APPEAR TO BE IGNORANT OF SAUVAGES WHEREABOUTS.HE APPARENTLY MOVES AROUND A GREAT DEAL. 6.FINALLY LAPOINTE HADE CLEAR TO BORSINGER POSITION OF CBN AUTHORITIES IE THAT THERE WAS NO/HO QUESTION OF BARGAINING WITH KIDNAPPERS AND THAT ONLY BASIS FOR AGREEMENT WAS RELEASE OF CROSS IN EXCHANGE FOR SAFE CONDUCT OF KIDNAPPERS TO CUBA.ICRC ATTN WAS ALSO DRAWN TO DANGER OF SAUVAGE ATTEMPTING TO PRODUCE PUBLICITY FOR FLQ THROUGH ICRC .GEN IMPRESSION IS THAT NOTHING MUCH IS LIKELY TO COME OUT OF THIS CONTACT. RFT 031141Z 001038 �POP/J. D. Puddingt on/ink } d - >x - TTK - / * A Memorandum for Mr. C. Roquet CONFIDENTIAL November 3, 1970 In the Canadian section of the November 2 issue of Time magazine it was reported that the police had established that there was a link between the kidnappers of Mr. Cross and those of Mr. Laporte. Apparently the fingerprints of Mr. Jacques Lanctot. a 25 year old taxi driver whose picture Mrs. Cross identified as being one of her husbandfs abductors, were found in the house where Mr. Pierre Laporte was believed to have been heljd captive. Mr. Cameron of the Deputy Solicitor General's office confirmed that the above information was indeed correct. Therefore, In the operation of the Task Force it will now be necessary to consider the poesibility that the actions of the two groups of abductors may in some way be coordinated, and that Jacques Lanctot is involved with the murderers of Mr. Laporte. J. D. Puddington. cc: Ifr. A. E. Ritchie Task Force List Mr. P. A. Bissonnette (PDF) 3 NOV 7t 18* 0> 001039 �fif* ;.. AI . E -. •A','rit' ' ' * '•• •' • . - *rH- ' •'. •• X P A , . •OUVKMNKMCNT DU OUtftUC P . • MINtSTtRE DCS AFFAIRES INTCW-QUVERN£l*E*r*l£$ *2 SP/2M/70 i PiG i £ ' AG Le ministdre des Affaires lntergouverneaientales (Service du Protocole) prfisente ses compliments au Cbnsulat Gfcn£ral de la RSpublique F6d6rale d'Allemagne 3 Montreal et a I'honneur dc se rftfArer ft 1'information parue dans La Presce du 21 octobro 1970, relative Si un message de sympathie qu'aurrifc adress3 Son Excellence le Chance:lier de la Fdpublique Ffiddrale d'Allemagne, monsieur Willie Branr'.t, au Premier Ministre du Canada, monsieur PierreElliott Trudeau. Le ministfi.ee des Affaires interqouvernp.mer:tales (Service du Protocole) no permet de signaler au Consulat GSndral de la RSpublique FfidCralo rt'Al*lomagne 3 Montrdal que le regrettfi ministres dc 1'Immigration et miniitrrt du Travail et de la Y.ain-d'Oeuvre du Quebec, mOiisieur Pierre Laporte,fttai.tmembre du Gouvernement qu6b£cois dont lo chef eat monsieur nr»n**T"T' nniiT*«*«»^ , • T H I I U H I >»iiiisrf(» tin .mfiitiw • J I J I'.U L t * ment concern^ par cette mort Gragiquc. •.- Le ministfire des Af fa.ir< s int^rgouv •.•vric 'on • tales (Service du Protocole) saisit cette .-v.casJop pour renouveler au Consulat G6nfiral e'e la KSpubiiqvc F6d6rale d'Allemagne & Montreal 1'assurance de sa haute consideration. Quebec, le 27 octobre 197C ( ;T ) (TV-VA-X^ S-"•- Consulat G6n6rol de l a R6publique F€d£rale d ' M l e m a g n e 1501, avenue McGregor Montreal.lOf, Qu€. (001040 . . >• -m �^^^^™ 'l|jfn** FCO/D .STANSFIELD/jad i EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO PDF FROM 0* FCO « AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES \j .-uo Co (. 27 SSST UNCLASSIFIED DATE November 3 , 1970 NUMBER Numero REFERENCE Mfirtne, SUBJECT Suht QUEI SAGE U ^ f c z C l i OTTAWA OF SYMPATHY RE HON. PIERRE LAPORTE ORTE r\ CQ.A^Ft ENCLOSURES Ann.x.t DISTRIBUTION MIN PMO(Lalonde) PDM PDS |GEU 'PPR A- /u 4~ K. ~A L-V- k g . 30-9 X) w L^-U-o ^<GA- -fc a ; H£Z \ •Atie attached message from the protocol section r |^_fw of Intergovernmental Affairs in Quebec was sent simultaneJj A ously to the German Consulate General in Montreal and (in * an imperfect photocopy, from v/hich the attached was copied) to the German Embassy here. It was brought to the Department yesterday by the German Counsellor, Herr Fabricius. 2. The Embassy had apparently considered suggesting to Bonn that Herr Brandt's message be amended to include an appropriate reference to the Quebec government. This course was decided against, however, on the grounds that it would entail delay, and that it was unlikely in any case that anyone would suspect Germany of not understanding the fundamentals of the federal, system. 3. Apart from being a little shocked at the depths of bad taste to which Quebec officials could be brought by their particular political monomania (I stressed to Herr Fabricius that it was most unlikely any Quebec Minister had authorized this "note" or even knew of its existence), the Germans do not seem particularly distressed by the incident. The Embassy had immediately instructed the Consulate General not tc reply Lc the note or to acknowledge its existence in any way. Coordin ion JAI Ext. 4 0 7 A Bit. 001041 �DRAFT/MEMORAND UM POP/A.D.Rowe/mk , M TO: FCO ( M r . Stansfield) ^ ^ ^ RESTRICTED REF: Your memorandum of November 3, 1970 November k, SUB: ^ W Quebec Protocol Section (Intergovernmental Affairs) "Note" t o W. German Consulate J cc: MIN dJ Gr6 \kn§^jfe'^771^y ixJZji Jt> flh oAxAMX t— ^ r ^ / FCO PDM GEU PPR &- JffiCCFyLs Wfyf>#iyAXX ( uf''n7^ A 2j[ .A / ^ cJld^suuA n J^TLTCFZ*' FZ / PMO (Lalonde) /h JtX m-**.TF*r-< A "2^, While we agree that this action on the part of the Quebec authorities may have been ill-advised and perhaps should be brought to the attention of a provincial minister, we would healtale tfi_rBC©HJB©ud such action at this time when federal-Quebec relations are at a high point of solidarity and co-operation, Ct.nUfe-*Al'tfii . U/* «MSy.«*-i 2. On the other hand, we wonder whether such messages of sympathy as the German one have been brought to the attention of the Quebec authorities on a regular basis- as they were received. We suggest, therefore, that such messages^, received by the federal authorities^, might/be copied for the attention of the Quebec authorities with a covering letter stating that (a) they have been acknowledged and (b) they are being passed to Quebec in order that the authorities there, and Mme. Laporte, are aware of the deep and sincere sympathy which has been expressed by many f.U I w K i " ^ H 1 fc»v-i.«( b< <A»~~i J->*-i— Avi • Sdf^MX aiisKji. to /*•»- /S%-w»* «-»»«..' j d ^ u -r\i t^jrt~. d "dtst. i—'tc, .v-r-t-. „ s*^~.&Jl prominent international dignitaries./In this manner, we would be seen as idlers, •s*Ai*~<^t being courteous, ,3m* at the same time making note of the fact that such messages, addressed to the federal government, were being acknowledged in the d.\eA ti /ft 'x /Ui yvw^+*.ciA^ e-Asu cxjL\j yu iU^ vi ef 2^tj^ A.—AHG *~«f- /*_„ t72tZ f t (J7v d-^ 2Lxt. ~K**— U, Ui.2(~™y. l i t you agree, your Division and PPR might prepare a 3. c o l l e c t i o n of such messages received and draft a covering l e t t e r which could be finalized and signed i n t h e PMO. ML. h~ 0/,<(dfl -h> 14ms£ CA~ j J ~AyL*>J2.AL n~~7dZXi II si~ZtZX^AL f7L *-»- Ji*. *fit<s <7 ^ QztfT. cA^~io( l» i<^2C^^i^n Claude Roquet Task Force. P'V, *sCo *, / 001042 �( '• Ay A PDM TO i FROM' GEU A. AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES ik^.2 XAO REFERENCE Your memor andum of GSU/J.G.H. Halstead/fmc A p A (• r y EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (7)\!x. ^ y A SECRET SECURITY S6curit6 •'" ri November 4 , : 1970. NUMBER NutrPro November 3 Reference DOSSIER » 11 i: External Affairs r e p r e s e n t a t i v e in the (-""»'^ Special Operations Centre. • ENCLOSURES Annsxftj DISTRIBUTION PDS I have given very careful consideration to your memorandum under reference, bearing in mind the importance which the Government attaches to the SOC and which you attach to our Department's contributing to its activities. Under the circumstances, I feel there is no alternative but to accede to your request that we lend you the services of Jacques Montpetit to meet the immediate need. By this I assume you mean on a parttime basis for a two-week trial period only. 2. For the longer term, however, I hope that, when the situation is reviewed in two week s' time, you will take into account two considerations that a re particularly important from this Division's point of view. T'he first is that we could not possibly "cover off" Jacques Mont petit's desk with our existing personnel for more than a couple of weeks without falling seriously short of our commitments, The second is that our relations with France, for which Montpetit is desk officer, are themselves high on the list of the Governmen t's priorities, bearing as they do on the question of national un ity. 3. It is therefore a little like robbing Peter to pay Paul if you take an officer of this calibre and experience from the France desk and put him on the SOC. If this is the solution that is adopted after the two-week trial period, we will be obliged to seek an officer of similar grade and ability to replace him because without the full-time services of such an officer it will simply not be possible to deal adequately on a continuing basis with our relations with France. 'U<j£is•A Ext. 407A/B1I. [Admin. Service* Div.) European Division- 001043 / • / / P 3 , / ^ �I 2 72c TL x - TFK - / o c.c. Mr. Ritchie Task Porce Members Mr. Bissonnette (PDF) CONFIDENTIAL November 4, 1970. MEMORANDUM TO; MR. ROQUET In checking the Tine Magazine story of November 2 that there was proof of a link between the abductors of Mr. Cross and those of Mr. Laporte because the finger prints of Mr. Jacques Lanctdt, earlier identified by Mrs. Cross as one of her husband's abductors, were found in the house where Mr. Laporte was held captive, the R.C.M.P. indicated this was not the case. Only the finger prints of Messrs. Simard, Lortie and Paul Rose were found. Therefore, contrary to the .information contained In my memorandum of November 3 on this subject there is as yet no proof that the abductors of Mr. Cross are in contact with those of Mr. Laporte. J. D. Puddington �• ?0~te-TFk<-\ THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVBfcNMENT OF CANADA 72 27-7772 th) S E C R E T A meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence will be held at 2:30 p.m., Friday, November 6. 1970. in Room 340-S. Centre Block. JA'Mh A G E N D A I. II. Situation Report (a) Investigations and Court Proceedings. (b) De-escalation of Military Measures (c) Debate on Emergency Legislation. Appreciation of Recent Events in Quebec (Document attached) III. Other Related Matters. ~AU FtcqM (Ah w^_ dFFU. . D.F. W a l l , /? A .. S e c r e t a r y . ' * ^ v * - ^ /~J2-i-Xi_^* . ^ fSJ^ 1 f^ Privy Council Office, November 4, 19 70. oft-JA-TFIC-n# SECRET AM. yCA&»>$A~Td &&*4> 23J1// ({FF 001045 s\y ^< �O t t a w a , October 2 0 , 1970 Deai-. M r . M i n i s t e r : I have been asked tc convey to y o u the following m e s s a g e from the Secretary of S t a t e ; "Dear M i t c h e l l : T wani you to know o f my sincere sympathy for you «nd your Government during these trying t i m e s . The loss cf Quebec Minister Laporte is a profound tragedy which strikes at the' conscience o f all men and institutions of a free and lawful society. You are very .much in our thoughts'. Bill R o g e r s " s" R il Charg td ii The 2 mit \ V Affain enrr Honorable Mitchell S h a r p , E.G. , Secretary of State for External Ottawa. Affairs, �1 ' — I •— gg ff; PMO ADS ( w i t h 1— • i •X .--};- - PPVR.UDOUCERA.H.READ/3b. . 2AP~7AA-J.rK PAM, SIC -J •Vf Od m s^^z Pls-^r^L^- */,/<?'*$• • Ai- .During your absence the Gharge d*Affaires mm good enough to send on te ae fron your Secretary of State, a neeeage Of condelonces oa tho death of Mr. Laporte. I would appreciate lt if you would oo* transmit the following reply* "Dear Bill, I am aoot grateful for tho thoughtful condolences yon hare offeree1 en tho occasion of tho death of the Honourable Pierre laporte. In the face ef this national tragedy, oo hove real need of words of sympathy ftoo our friends. lours have boon particularly appreciated. With Mitchell Shaip." Yours sincerely. OOSW* * * f f l J k NiTCHBX SHAW • • • Adolph N . Scheldt, oooaeosiinr of the United States of Aa* rica, Ottawa. V 7 001047 �1 -) A GGariP Lnf ..,,..... P.U A'L l xlxi.. L. LiPL. 0 9 277A7~ I f^ P j l i . J 7 , , P Jl.! P AU Pijiit ... ..,<'., —pvjv-t *.e Ji iP.7.e ^ . . . p r . . J p.* :'.,...-p. yj.uiVi.iiu C"ctawa, November A, P-9/G Gear Mr. Perodeau, I am writing to thank you for the very helpful co-operation of Air Canada in unforeseen and difficult circumstances on the evening of October 17. It v/as found necessary to have Mr. T.H.W. Read of this Department travel unexpectedly to Montreal on urgent government business. He was booked on Flight 928 at 10:10 p.m. and when it became evident that he could not reach the airport on time Mr. Cowan, in charge of your passenger operations at Ottawa Airport, kindly arranged to hold the flight for several minutes permitting Mr. Read to make the trip. * The assistance provided by Air Canada and by Mr. Cowan is greatly appreciated. Yours sincerely, E.A. RITCHIE Under-Secretary. Mr. G.R. Perodeau District Manager Air Canada 355 River Road Ottawa 7, Ontario 001048 �POP/j.R.Barker/mk r ..' •• • 6 mm]a EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES • MEMORANDUM TO PDM^through Mr. Roquet) FROM Do ST" DATE POP ^classified November 5 , 1970 NUMBER Numiro REFERENCE FILE OTTAWA SUBJECT DOSSIER L e t t e r of Thanks t o Air Canada MISSION ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION Mr. Roquet OAD (Mr. Campbell]) You remember the night of October 17 when Tom Read, on short notice, had to go to Montreal by Air Canada. He was late getting away and Don Campbell arranged with Ai,r Canada to hold the aircraft for about 10 minutes. 2. It would be appropriate, and useful to us, looking to the future, to recognize Air Canada's co-operation by a formal letter of thanks. Don Campbell has drafted the attached for your signature, if you agree. J. R. Barker Operations Centre 001049 �November 5, 1970 - 17:00 NOTE.FOR.FILE (_^_J c, is , „/ ( Fr 2 Task, .Force^ope.rat_iqn^. On Kr. Ritchie's instructions, I called Kr. Davey at the SOC to propose that Kr. Kontpetit take part in their operation for a week or two on an experimental basis. This assumed of course that Kr. Davey v/ould consider this strongly desirable, since our personnel resources were slim. 2. I-.r. Davey said Kontpetit could attend the policy meetings, which now take place only in the morning If we agree , he could also help with substantive work. I agreed with him. I said I hoped Kontpetit could keep us better and faster informed of developments in 30C as well as contribute to it. After a week or two, v/e could discuss whether continued presence by an External Affairs officer v/ould be mutually beneficial. (id C. R. 001050 �C. Roquet/blm V FOR •y FILE Und CUpboard) P>" S dff«?2 CONFIDENTIAL November 5, 1970 1700 hours C. Roquat Kidnappings: Publication of November 4 FLQ Message and Photograph This matter was discussed in Cabinet this morning. -•ir. Taylor lO/SG&A) tolls mc that the Prime Minister was firmly opposed to publication. The Minister expected to discuss this matter vdth him again tonight* C a Roquet. 001051 �POP MI',* (VINCENT) PDM (ROCQUET) PMO (ROBERTS) PCO (WALLS) PPR O T ^ m • n p P T D ^ D n ^ r ' S I ( 5 H E T T ) ™ (STANSFIELD) GCO (PUDDINGTON) ' DEPf OF JUSTICE(CHRISTIE) SOLICITOR GEN(HOFLEY) / ^V7li?:§8NF I D E N T I A L ACTION COPY FM PRMNY 1958 NOV5/70 fidf TO OTT EXT POP INFO CNGNY TT RCMPOTT DE OTT C ^. I & 0^ A 1 A ~>!" ^ *~ p7- • DISTR TASK FORCE LIST r REF YOURTEL P0P379 N0V2 EMERGENCY MEASURES i\ i •( • . . . \ \ ' GORDON BLAIR MP RECEIVED N0V3 JOHN CAREY CHAIRMAN BOARD OF A^A DIRECTORS OF INNATL LEAGUE FOR RIGHTS OF MAN TOGETHER WITH HERSCHEL HALBERT EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF LEAGUE.CAREY WHO IS LAWYER AND FORMER DISTRICT ATTORNEY EXPLAINED LEAGUES CONCERN AS RELATING NOT/NOT SO MUCH TO CDN SITUATION BUT RATHER TO EXTENT "fo WHICH MEASURES TAKEN IN CDA MIGHT BE EMULATED IN OTHER COUNTRIES FACED WITH TERRORISM VIOLENCE AND INSURRECTION. HE PARTICULARLY WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FOR(A)ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT;(3)SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT;AND(C)KOLDING SUSPECTS FOR 21 DAYS WITHOUT CHARGE.HE WONDERED WHETHER POLICE COULD NOT/NO'T HAVE OBTAINED WARRANTS, AND IF CRIMINAL CHARGES COULD NOT/NOT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT,IN NORMAL MANNER. 2.MR BLAIR EXPLAINED QUEBEC APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN FACED WITH CONSPIRACY AGAINST LEGAL AUTHORITY WHICH COULD NOT/MOT HAVE BEEN DEALT WITH ADEQUATELY UNDER SEDITION AND TREASON PARAS OF CRIMINAL CODE.FURTHERMORE THEORY OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY WAS LESS WELL DEVELOPED IN CDA THAN IN USA .ACCORDINGLY CDN GOVT HAD . ..2 001052 �PAGE TWO 1958 CONFD TO CREATE NEW OFFENSES SUCH AS RENDERING FLQ UNLAWFUL.MR BLAIR ALSO EXPLAINED THERE WAS NO/NO ONGOING PROVISIONS OF CDN LAW PROSCRIBING MEMBERS OF ANY ORGANIZATION AS EXISTED IN USA UNDER SMITH ACT .MR BLAIR ALSO POINTED OUT PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE WHO WERE FLQ MEMBERS.HE NOTED FEDERAL GOVT HAD ACTED AT REQUEST OF MTL AND QUEBEC AUTHORITIES WHO HAD STATED THAT CONSTRAINTS OF ORDINARY CRIMINAL PROCEDURES WERE SUCH THAT EXTRAORDINARY POWERS WERE REQUIRED. 3.CAREY ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUESTION THAT SITUATION IN CDA WAS SUCH THAT EXTRAORDINARY POWERS WERE REQUIRED.HE WAS WILLING TO CONCEDE THAT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS NECESSARY FOR AUTHORITIES TO HOLD SUSPECTS FOR PERIODS LONGER THAN USUAL WITHOUT CHARGING THEM .BUT IT WAS NOT/NOT POSSIBLE TO CONVINCE CAREY THAT AUTHORITIES COULD NOT/NOT HAVE SOUGHT USUAL WARRANTS BEFORE ARRESTING OR SEARCHING .EVEN SO HE AND MR HALBERT WENT AWAY WITH BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF DIFFICULTIES CDA HAD FACED.MR CAREY WAS GIVEN COPY OF PUBLIC ORDER(TEMPORARY MEASURES)ACT 1970 AND OF DEPT OF JUSTICES PRESS REPLEA3E N0V2. 4.CAREY SAID HE WOULD SUBMIT HIS REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF LEAGUE WHICH WOULD IN TURN REPORT TO THEIR CDN AFFILIATE CDN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSN.CAREY SHOWED US BRIEFLY LET FROM CDN ASSN TO AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSN SIGNED BY ITS COUNSEL A BOROVY OF TOR AND APPARENTLY WRITTEN ABOUT FORTNIGHT AGO.WE WERE NOT/NOT GIVEN TIME TO READ LET BUT CERTAINLY CDN ASSN �• PAGE THREE 1958 CONFD EXPRESSED GRAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT PUBLIC ORDER REGS AND MENTIONED INTER ALIA ALLEGED ABUSES OF THESE REGS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ONTARIO. RFT 0S2004Z �POP MIN (VINCENT) PDM (ROCQUET) PMOCBOBERTS) PCO (WALLS) PPRC^AD) FLE (DEMERS) PSK5RETT) FCO ( S T A N G F & L D ) G CO (PUDDINGTON ) DEPT OF JUSTICE(CHRISTIE) SOLICIT® GEN(HOFLEY) ' K_ VJ) C O N F I D E N T I A L foi FM LDN 3703 NOV6/70 A TO OTT EXT POP DISTR TASK FORCE REF OURTEL 3 6 8 7 NOV5 ^ ^ lb pA"y%^ r .•,//>* /GT< L J*^ V IT? V^ , i ^ , /vw ^ 6 ADHOC CTTEE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH QUE AND CDA PROTEST DEMONSTRATION ORGANIZED BY CTTEE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH QUE AND CDA BEGAN TO ASSEMBLE OUTSIDE CDA HOUSE ABOUT 1300HRS.GROUP TOTALLED NO/NO MORE THAN THIRTYFIVE AND CARRIED PLACARDS WITH SUCH SLOGANS AS QUOTE VIVE LE CDA LIBRE UNQUOTE,QUOTE DOWN WITH NAPOLEON TRUDEAU UNQUOTE, QUOTE REPEAL WAR MEASURES ACT UNQUOTE,QUOTE LIBERATION FOR CDAS PEOPLE UNQUOTE GROUP SEEMED ALMOST ENTIRGLY CDN.TWO UNIFORMED POLICEMEN STOOD NEAR AT HAND AND BUSLOAD OF POLICEMEN WERE OUT OF SIGHT NEARBY.THIS WAS A PRECAUTION THOUGHT DESIRABLE BY POLICE WHO CONSIDERED POSSIBILITY THAT MILITANT MAOIST ELEMENT MIGHT JOIN DEMONSTRATION AS ON OCT25. 2.GROUP REP ASKED US FOR PERMISSION TO USE CDA HOUSE STEPS TO DO PANTO MINE OF EVENTS IN CDA.WE EXPLAINED THAT STEPS MUST BE KEPT CLEAR BUT THAT IF POLICE DID NOT/NOT OBJECT,PANTOMIME COULD BE PERFORMED ON PAVEMENT.THIS WAS DONE IN DISJOINTED AND LARGELY INCOMPREHENSIBLE MANNER.BY THIS POINT CBC TV CREWCBOTH FRENCH AND ENGLISH NETWORK),ONE BRIT TV GROUP APPARENTLY BBC AND SOME OTHER PRESS REPS INCLUDING CDN PRESS AND PEOPLE NEWSPAPER HAD APPEA^D. . • «2, �PAGE TWO 3 708 CONFD AT 1 3 : 2 0 HRS A GROUP OF FOUR LED BY PHIL LYONS WERE RECEIVED BY PRESS COUNSELLOR IN HIS OFF I C E . THEY PRESENT QUOTE NOTE OF PROTEST AGAINST THE INVOCATION OF WAR MEASURES ACT AND PROPOSED PUBLIC ORDER (TEMPORARY MEASURES ACT)UNQUOTE,QUOTE THE PLATFORM FOR SOLIDARITY WITH QUE AND CDA UNQUOTEUN FRENCH AND ENGLISH)AND SET OF FIVE QUEST IONS.LATTER WERE READ OUT TO PRESS COUNSELLOR. IT WAS EXPLAINED TO GROUP THAT THEY WERE WELCOME TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS,THAT THEIR QUESTIONS AND STATEMENTS WOULD BE STUDIED AND WHERE APPROPRIATE WE WOULD ENDEAVOUR TO GIVE THEM REPLIES TO S P E C I F I C QUESTIONS. IT V/AS ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT REPLY COULD NOT/NOT BE GIVEN ON THE SPOT. HOWEVER WE DID PROVIDE TEXT OF JUSTICE PRESS RELEASE OF N0V2. 3.FRENCH SPEAKING STUDENT COMPLAINED THAT RECEPTION PERSONNEL IN CDA HOUSE WERE NOT/NOT SUFFICIENTLY BILINGUAL. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT MOST OF OUR RECEPTIONISTS WERE ABLE TO DEAL WITH NORMAL INQUIRIES IN FRENCH AND THAT IT WAS OUR FIRM POLICY TO IMPROVE T H I S CAPACITY. 4.GROUP INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD LIKE A REPLY WITHIN TWO WEEKS AND SAID THAT ABSENCE OF REPLY IN THAT TIME WOULD INDICATE THAT GOVT QUOTE WAS STALLING UNQUOTE.LATER OUTSIDE CDA HOUSE AFTER READING SET OF QUESTIONS FOR BENEFIT OF PRESS AND DEMONSTRATORS THEY SAID I F NO/NO ANSWER WAS RECEIVED WITHIN TWO WEEKS THEY WOULD QUOTE TAKE FURTHER ACTION UNQUOTE.MTG WIT!! PRESS COUNSELLOR LASTED ABOUT TWENTY MINUTES AND WAS NOT/NOT UNFRIENDLY. e e e O 001056 �PAGE THREE 3 7 0 8 CONFD 5.AFTER READING STATEMENTS AND QUESTIONS OUTSIDE CDA HOUSE AND DELIVERY OF SOMEWHAT RAMBLING SPEECH,GROUP SET OFF FOR QUE HOUSE AND ARRIVED THERE AT 1 4 ? 3 0 HRS.PANTONINE WAS NOT/NOT STAGED OUTSIDE QUE HOUSE AND GROUP HAD SHRUNK.LYONS AND TWO FRENCH SPEAKING STUDENTS WERE RECEIVED BY GUY ROBERGE.THEY REMAINED WITH HIM FOR ABOUT FIFTEEN MINUTES. 6..PR0TESTS AT BOTH CDA HOUSE AND QUE HOUSE PASSED OFF PEACEABLY. POLICE BEHAVED DISCREETLY AND VERY RESPONSIBLY. SPECIAL BRANCH HAS INFORMED US THAT SO FAR AS THEY WERE AWARE NO/NO MAOIST ELEMENTS TOOK PART IN PROTEST.THE MAOISTS ARE APPARENTLY CONSERVING ENERGY FOR MTG TONIGHT IN WHICH CDN SITUATION MAY A R I S E . 7.WE ARE SENDING BY SEPARATE TEL QUESTIONS AND SUMMARY OF OTHER STATEMENTS. RFT061802Z 001057 �COMCENTRE: NO/NO CIRCULATION THIS TEL. DISTRIBUTION WILL BE MADE BY PCP, MESSAGE PUAC« DEPARTMENT OHIO. NO. LIEU MINISTERE N ° D'OBIO, OTT FM/DE EXTERNL POP-3V8 SECURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER DATE fip g g -JTMF' j NOV6/70 SECRET PRECEDENCE OP< LDN ^FOR HIGH COMMISSIONER ONLY) TO/A wn<ET> sTi^Ls^ &72z/Zt77^CArY)&. INFO ComccdvdTZ's: Off mme& QAJ^V) pi-g ^hjsutEe TJH^S<FBZSLA&HT To 77TF/A Of^ HA-AAbS o f POSI -)g-V—CTfOO (Zce/-)i- rl/yitx) A/o V, ^ JAxT^ sn^cs DISTR. -k_u SUB/SUJ MRS CROSS'* DEPARTURE FROM CANADA FOR YOUR INFO ONLY MRS CROSS WILL DEPART MONTREAL TODAY INCOGNITO FORG SWITZERLAND ACCCMPMIED BY DAUGHTER MRS SUSAN VERTES, BRITISH OFFICIAL USHFORD), BRITISH WIFE AND ONE « S GUARD. UPON PAFE ARRIVAL BERNE Lccfiu, AkSJ UKHC HERE WILL BE INFORMED IMMEDIATELY MD WILL ISSUE THE FOLLOWING PRESS \J7_ ft&CtAT /OOO CTTfrMA Time A/Ov/ ,r7% RELEASE:A TEXT BEGINS MRS CROSS HAS DECIDED TO MME A SHORT VISIT TO y CLOSE FRIENDS OF THE FAMILY IN l.iLTROPE AND LEFT MONTREAL YESTERDAY FOR THIS PURPOSE ACCGMPANTED BY HER DAUGHTER SUSAN. SHE CONTINUES TO AWAIT ANXIOUSLY THE RESULTS OF ALL THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO FIND HER HUSBAND \ M D WILL BE KEPT IN THE CLOSJEST TOUCH WITH ALL DEVELOPMENTS. MRS CROSS WISHES IT, AT THE SAME TIME, TO BE KNOWN HOW VERY GRATEFUL SHE IS FOR ALL THE LETTERS M D TELEGRAMS SHE HAS RECEIVED Al© WHICH ARE GREATLY HELPING HER uURING THIS PERIOD OF WAITING. TEXT ENDS. 2. WE AND THS QUEBEC AUTHORITIES WERE CONSULTED ON THIS MATTER M D SHOULD PRESS ENQUIRIES BE DIRECTED TO US 'WE SHALL NOT/NOT DiPART FROM THE BRITISH \ PRESS STATEMENT &0KEA) ABOVE. DRA TEU Ol V I S I O N / D I R E C T I O N APPROVED/AJJfROUVE Ai- TELEPHONE 772F42 fl^hlm.. EXT l a / B I L (REV B/701 £.,/s. F¥ (VA) POP 5-6435 SIG... y?'^''''JeVAc>*ft7 . > 001058 �V - 2 - SECRET 3. IF PRESSED UKHC WILL STATE THAT HER STAY WITH FRIENDS IS A PRIVATE %E. RITCHIE / EXTI8A(fl/64) (OOMM'S OIV) �dP. ) 007070 07772.7) 'rpp.yPO '••AAAP ...7.0) 701002X2) 700X0277071ELG DEPT 0?" J U S T I C E ( C H R I S T I E ) ' " S O L I C I T O R /-* r\ T.* I D E N T .2077 0 ) ! 772 CAM.OO ) ) G GO ( P U D D I N G T O N ) GENCHOFLEY) 2P17 IAL FM LDN 3 704 NOVG/70 TC OTT EXT FOP FLASH 727 YOURTEL P0P395 NOVS REUTERS HAS PICKED UP APPARENTLY FROM GAZETTE SUBSTANTIALLY ACCURATE INFO ABOUT COMMUNIQUE AND PHOTO OF CROSS RECEIVED NOVS . J_.P p • • " • _. \, X> P . _..".. P "•"." f P c n o VSTT .. .. P'_, D i .; i-J. »' — J J.'\ 1. U A. raAAA A x.'.. A i 1-XLi J ±A UJiUilHILI oU - P * !^ o .. .J .<o e- 001060 �MESSAGE m FM/P6 OTT DATE g^-^-rrv-y NOV 6 / 7 0 EXT Hut 6 I SECURITY SECURITE HUE DOSSIER i em? CONFD NO PRECEDENCE FLASH POP-397 TD/A LDN INFO DEPT JUSTICE(CHRISTIE) DIST: I-HN(VINCMT) PDH(ROQUET) PMO(ROBERTS) PCO(WALLS) PPR(READ) FLE(DEMERS ) SOLICITOR GEN(HOFLEY) PSI(BRETT) FCO(STMSFISLD) GCO(PUDDINGTON) FPR (FRANCIS) POP(BARKER) YOURTEL 3 7 0 4 NOV 6 ?U6/?VV KIDNAPPING JR CROSS GUIDMCE WILL BE SENT AS SOON AS RESPONSE AGREED. IN MEANTIME YOU SHOULD DECLINE COMMENT. x DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE DIVISION ORIGINATOR/ zxir^m^/m'"" EXT 18/BIL (REV 6 / 6 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) POP EP/AU30RISE TELEPHONE 2-6694 S|6 ^ \U) 001061 �c.c. -\ask Force Log Officer Diary File POP/C. Roquet/etm November 7, 1970 November 7, 1970 - 1^50 Hours Kidnappings — Current Developments The Minister called Operations Centre from Toronto. He had just read the Toronto Star report of Lortie's testimony. He asked if we knew more. I said I assumed the police knew a good deal more than what had come out at the inquest, but that we had no more details than was available in the media. 2. The Minister said that Mr. Cross' picture (the one received in the USA) had been published in the Toronto Star, along with the comments which accompanied the picture. I told him that a long communique had also been received in the USA, as well as found in Montreal this morning. It had not been made public tojda^^ CP haa* the text but was still withholding it. CPO. C. Roquet. 001062 �MESSAGE "5ATT FILE/DOSSIER SECURITY SECURITE Nov 3/70 FM/DE pcp SECRET External Ott NO Ldn TO/A PRECEDENCE POP-4tx) Termed late INFO \) REF OURTEL POP-39V NOV 7 SUB/SUJ FLQ KIDNAPPINGS ASSOCIATED PRESS IN NT REPORTED TODAY THAT IT HAD RECEIVED A PHOTOGRAPH OF CROSS ACCOMPANIED BT FOUR-PAGE FLQ PROPAGANDA COMMUNIQUE AND SAID THAT FOLLOWING MESSAGE WRITTEN ON BACK OF PHOTOGRAPH QUOTE HERE IS MS. CROSS SMILING AND CONTENTED AT BEING t'OLD THAT ROBERT 30URRASSA CAN NOT REPEAT NOT BE AS INHUMAN AS HE SEEKS UNQUOTE. 2. NUMBER OF COPIES OF BARE COMMUNIQUE ALSO FOUND IN MONTREAL SUB-WAY STATION. COMMUNIQUE ITSELF DOES NOT REPEAT NOT REFER TO CROSS CASE. 3. COPY OF SAGE COMMUNIQUE WAS R&C&IV&D BT MONTREAL NEWSPAPER THIS AFTERNOON UNDER COVER OF NOTE DATED NOV 7. FOLLOWING MESSAGE APPEARED IN NOTE IN BLOCK CAPITALS: QUOTE J. CROSS NS PEUT CQHPRENDEE LE NON INHUMAIN DE TRUDEAU ET CHOQUETTE. C'EST TOUT A FAIT CHOCKING. UNQUOTE. 4. UNDER MESSAGE APPEARED WHAT IS BELIEVED TO BE DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE Ko Standard ORIG INATOR/ REDACTEUR sio ....flalxffiU/ftfcm... DIVISION , POP TELEPHONE 5-6435 APPROVED/AUTORISE SIG 0*1*0.1* EXT 18/BIL (REV 6 / 6 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 001063 �f v N - 2 - SECRET AUTHENTIC 3IGNATURE OF CROSS. 5. EXTI8A(B/«4) (COMM'S OIV) BRIT HIGH COM OTT HAS BEEN ADVISED. 001064 / / / �POP/C.Roquet/lz/mk CC: PMO PCO SOC Task Force list OOMFIDBiTIAL November 9, 1970. MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER The success of the kidnappers in getting photographs of Mr. Cross and same of their communiques* contents published may affect prospects for his release* First, the Gazette published a photo and the brief comment accompanying it. Over the week-end, Quebec-Presse and the Journal de Montreal (both left-wing and of separatist tendencies) published three different photographs and in the case of Quebec-Presse, excerpts of communique 11. They were no doubt encouraged to do so by the respectable cover provided them by the Gazette's action. 2. There can be only one purpose to the FLQ's continued detention of Mr. Cross. They hope to maintain an atmosphere of crisis, continue to perturb Canadian political life, and to this end obtain maximum publicity. To deprive them of publicity is to remove much of the rationale for Mr. Cross to be held. We know that the British High Commissioner's office agrees with this assessment. 3. We think every encouragement should be given to Mr. Choquette in pursuing the present policy of starving the FLQ of publicity over the Cross kidnapping. We have a direct interest in the matter, since it relates to Mr. Cross' fate. 4. As Mr. Choquette has/really stated in public the full case for a responsible attitude by the media, it would be useful if you pointed out to him, in addition to considerations relating to police work, the argument against publication that can be adduced from humanitarian concern for Mr. Cross. This might most efficiently be done in writing. Me attach for your signature, If you agree, the text of a telex to Mr. Choquette on this question. E TREMBLAY P. T. �2- *L.O •:* r-ft-nT^TVn " "'" ~'Ar- - • . _ ' - . . i. JU* f i a* p.rrT A i w i l i J V-P >*i.i^iJ* <7.7'.' ft W C 1 V " '' f V V V p * 7 li ; *J w 0*i-iJ-i. 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' " | ..—..J *J. .. x. .._... . -* ^ T U T J Li^xt^s AM'. » X.\y. "ri ? ,-—.-r i.—r-r-. t>TTTf1TT:TTT>Q *'" T f V A " ' r •"'> "•" ' flnftCO ""'"•"'•> •»-—"-—-> ---•..i.'..-.x.s.x.L-i:'XJ . ... "7- « "-."- ..... 7. ~- - •.-. AJj."i ^J«». O O .G....v.,*C* . /GP»• . ' ! . ; ".% I|M. 1 . ll T^TCfP A T T 1 H i t . I 1 .1". A. t' . .t C" ~'i''*'-'':"T'-'~,-''-~C(",i -- —.1 •••-, p-E'Tj" "f Z*-AAA"> 7*"> /~pVGi T ""* •!—•'-• 001066 �- r - n v ; •~'w f "» " G " 4 "» - F J AT' *-? O * n i. e TT** j - " i W-. • — J * v 1 O T ^ A 7 ft T ,*• i*4,J.VXj O O * ' " D V J > « w ' J J ~ . r ''"d}r"j,dOrd,'0^ „ . . . _ , . - . U J « - i - > /* * v " ii^J * D T ** U < l i 4. i u i '* " O T i t s _ ' i 1 f. y,T* ~ Q ~ '•' XJ-Xi : j * ' • J j U l J - / ^ - '"'•""• " w ; . ^ . J'\JJu* H •• — • »J *~o . 1 >':-•*-— U . U « - . J u p2r* - i t r j « ^ * . a J ! ? < ? X j t i J t O • - - A T « x * . ' •;-> -G*' 4 * J \ 2 Z ' i w * PM ^ / ^ x'-wi'^i *^-JXj-***ft. V - J I J A U i i w i i v iiJ-Xj -^*J JJ;-. i g Oi'v—i ""*•. j J — ' ^ - . . . . . — *.„s..-„; **?"*"?" O ilw."i V T\^ ™»""V i . W . ^ — < V ^ " v p - , U X i t * * " } " T'- * " " ^ X A i L ' i - J « . J •• . n - •-; L G — - G - - — . . . . . T . ftV ii;j; ••>_/ L J Z U J \ J A • u ^ ^ ' ^ JLDLi* AI-J . . * . « ' * * . ;iJ J _ I _ . ' ~ . O ^ * . . . ..--•.. wj."ij* t *. w w.— w-j^. v— - .. . . *-'- A, , - D T v ; ! r.-;''-'"'"'"<2 J-JUWA'-O n ^ PT>AT?'D'PO "D ftp T T ^ T T * * iriil<L VUJ.JJ T.7T * P 7 .' r TT P'J?p"'T,f?:T,];,T.Vr? TD ' ' " ' *^„J*-* •%W 'i 'T,T T"",", '" "* *.TtTl Q *r*."' T">T ,*' "O7T10T " r A " T ' T - U.wJUi»-mU^i —-^o. - ' j ., •.. • iy-iii i f j ^ U XJ LJ i X la A W ' v .' J a i j l U i . « - *.** i^XO ftii x0.«'<^ ft"Owi'i * L/J.*.W^v-* -U^J Jii.—^iWmAx'\JjL <u-li -Lv-i-Xi-t—ii*.*t x I L/Xja.Vi^i toWOINAU .-) * / ' » u yJ J i.JLjXi. « X*"-' U C W U - J J ' ; ^ ; ^ J ^ G S I G N E D ii v^ . .Lv.^-J;.-.^ *^- ftJ« J J; LJ - O - J L -.—i ^__-J W u*v: L>%. -'vUi^-J»'- X/*-aMi^ *-.->-^ X * « U ^— WJ XL - t . > , » - —^- - 3 Y MITCHELL SHARP 001067 �POP/D.P.Cole/me N»* dZ-ypoO A*f J7APA REFERENCE TO "CENSORSHIP" IN HOUSE OF COMMONS # BT MINISTER OF JUSTICE, MR. TURNS*, ^ - 2 2 - T7=/< -/ NOVEMBER 9. 1970 Paragraphs for possible inclusion in telegrams to Paris, London and other missions: Censorship The Minister of Justice stated in Committee of the House on November 9 during discussion of bill C-181 (to provide temporary emergency powers for the Preservation of Public Order in Canada) that in the opinion of the law officers of the Department of Justice "there is nothing under the regulations currently in force pursuant to the proclamation of the War Measures Act that provides in any way for censorship". This opinion which was relayed to the CBC, Mr. Turner continued, Indicated "that the regulations do not prohibit broadcasts in the course of ordinary news or public affairs coverage of statements which, when originally made, could have been made on behalf of the FLQ for that matter... Only when the news media allows itself to be used as a propaganda vehicle of the FLQ and communicates statements of the FLQ will there be an offence. The key words are 'on behalf o f , which are meant to establish an agency, expressed or implied". Replying later to a remark by Mr. Diefenbaker, Mr. Turner referred to his earlier statement saying "I said that there was nothing in the regulations or in the terms of the present bill which In this respect duplicate the regulations to authorize censor, hip". (2 & . 7t < <i D.P.C. 001068 �a^,7tAx.r)k^c nj ^ Ac. ^j_i-t. Locj *JL?0» 9 1000 COMMONS DERATES NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY POWERS—STUDY PY LAW REFORM COMMISSION Mr. J o h n G i l b e r t ( B r o a d v i e w ) : I should like to direct a question to the .Minister of Justice. H a v e t h e c h a i r m a n r.nd t h e m e m b e r s of the Lav.' Reform Commission been a p p o i n t e d ? Jt so. wo:..IP the minister refer to t h e m the study of the e m e r g e n c y p o w e r s for the p r e s e r v a t i o n of public order ' ' ' C a n a d a so that we ma;, have t h e i r report, prior to the p i ' s P o g of p e r m a n e n t legislation by this Hon. J o h n PT. T u r n e r (Minister of J u s t i c e ) : Xo. Mr, S p e a k e r , they h a v e not been appointed. If Pie subject is dealt with p e r h a p s P should be c'eali with by P i s House. GRAIN PRODUCTION AND RF.CIvIPTS POLICY —FARM CONSOLIDATION PROG I? A v. Mr. Don M a z a n k o w s k i (VegroviP.c): Mr. Speaker, my question is directed to the Minister of A g r i c u l t u r e rnt\ a.i'ises out of tin.' recent c r a m policy p-oposa 1 tallied by P s colleague which prnposes a p r o j p a m of a d j u s t m e n t aimed a c r e a t i n g cotrplidatioti of e x P i n g f a r m s into m o r e cificient sizes, p a n the m i n i s t e r indicate to t h e House when such a p r o g r a m wii; be ; ntrjjriucod and w h e t h e r it will be in the form of a proposal or legislation.'.' Also, will t h e details be m a d e a v a i l a b l e in good time so t h a t ' h e whole m a t t e r of ihe grains policy can he d p e e s s e d in unison with trie policy ee consolidation, of farm units? Hon. H. A. Oison (Minister of A g r i c u l t u r e ) : Mr. S p e a k er, the hon. m e m b e r has raised far too large area for m e to r e p l v d u r i n g t h e question peril..1 I. Mr. S p e a k e r : O r d e r s of tbe daw QOV7jP"VE"VTT y^-^dAOA) P U B L I C ORDER ' T E M P O R A R Y M E A S U R E S ) ACT. 1970 PROVISION OF EMERGENCY POWERS FOP PRESERVATION OI'' PUBLIC ORDER T h e House r e s u m e d from F r i d a y , N o v e m b e r p consideration in eommPnee of Bill P - P P . to p - u p d e t e m p o r a r y e m e r g e n c y poevcrs for the P r e s e r v a t i o n "f Public O r d e r in C a n a d a — M r . T u r n e r • <Ottawa-Carie ! or, •—Mr. H o n e y in the Chair. T h e C h a i r m e n : When t h e committee ro-.'' on F r i d a y , .\ T o\'eu ber (', 1970, clause 2 of foe bill w a s u n d e r consideration with cerfjiin a m e n d m e n t s . Shall clause P c a r p ? On clause 'a November 9. ] 970 2—Definitions. 13:00 a.m.) Mr. Woolliams: Mr. C h a i r m a n , m a y I raise a point of order. It m a y s h o r t e n t h e d e b a t e on one of the m a i n clauses of the bill. 1 w o n d e r if the Minister of J: 'ice would a n s w e r a question. 1 did r.o* wish to take un t! e time of the House with it d u r i n g the question period. Can the Minister of J u s t i c e say categorically '.hat t h e r e h. not been any censorship, either u n d e r the War Measure. Act or u n d e r any o t h e r a u t h o r i t y , with respect I" 'P: n e w s media in the P r o v i n c " of Q u e b e c " Mr. T u r n e r (Ollav.-a-Carleton): Mr. Chan-man, ! .! ink the ues;, way I can h a n d l e that question is by savin. 1 : tha' in tlie opinion of t h e law officers w h o report io me, and according to the opinion which they gave to the Canadi an B r o a d c a s t i n g Corporation which r e c e h e s its 'eg ' advice from the D e p a r t m e n t of J u s t i c e , i b o i e : s not! •'•. u n d e r tlie r e g u l a t i o n s c u r r e n t l y in P r c e p u i P u o U to p f 'proclamation of t h e W a r M e a s u r e s Act th/,i p'-ovPe-- 1: any way for censorship. I had t h e opinion e>;pies.' to m e which was. relayed in t u r n , on my instructions C a n a d i a n B r o a d c a s t i n g Corporat : o.n, that t h e rt ^ulaPi- n: do not prohibit b r o a d c a s t s in the course of ordi.mn'Y Mi or public affairs coverage of s t a t e m e n t s which, '.she originally m a d e , could have h e m marie on behalf ••'' :'-,<. F l . Q or by the F L Q for that m a t t e s . In tin e e r on o • ' a w o|P:eers, only wh.cn the news media JIPOV.S ,':•'.'. tn (....• used as a p r o p a g a n d a vehicle for the FLQ ane c o m m u n i cates s t a t e m e n t s of the F l . Q would t h e r e be .an offence. T h e key w o r d s are, "on behalf of", which are mean', m establish an agency, e x p r e s s or implied. So, '' e a n s w e r is that '.here is no such provision within the r e g u i a ' i ' " c '•' wittnn the |ji[] c u r r e n t l y before the House, Mr. W o o l l i a m s : Mr. C h a i r m a n , m a y I ask. the m i n i s ' e r one further question, and it, may shorten t h e d e b a ' e in view of t h e minister's a n s w e r i... thc> law. will ' h e m :<!-•tor tape the c o m m i t t e e p ' i o his confidence J •' s o . that t h e r e lias not been, in fact, any direct:on by any .',• partmen! of Pie federal g o v e r n m e n t or of Pie Q u e b e c government v. ifh respect to censoring p.c radio, the .television or any o t h e r n e w s media'' Mr. T u r n e r ( C i l a w a - C a r l c f c n l : Mr. f i w i u i t a i i . '.'•••-. is no* u h a t tlie hon. gentlom.an asked me. He asked me what, t h e position is u n d e r t h e regulations, and i P.: •••• a n , wered that. Mr. Woolliams: Mr. C h a i r m a n . T should The C h a i r m a n : O r d e r , pie like— T h e hon. m e m b e r 'or Mr. B u r i o n : Mr. C h a i r m a n , I sli c o m m e n t s on this bi". as we begin cteta: le. Fir?! oi ' clause bv clause in c o m m i t t e e P ' he a t t e n t i o n of M". Cha : man, I should like to d.ra.v the c o m m i t t e e t h e fact that we have had e m e r g e n c y s i t u s t o n s m C a n a d a before nov/. 1 say that as a m e m b e r frou 'Pr- province of S a s k a t c h e w a n w h e r e we had •''•;•', wa known in Camidian history as t h e P a P t a i c h o w j u rebel lion in 13?a, 'JPiat, of course, p r e d a t e s a goo;' :..-..'. •<'. ' • !Mr. M'.mro.J 001069 �9 ~r-r~-T: p m r iW i"\ P.. <:r-. u±\ -."-r x> XJlLLiA. 1£ O -.-. XF. beir.g in effect a r e not in effect. I w i s h to m a k e Piis clear i m m e d i a t e l y . A question w a s asked concerning w h e t n e r t h e r e w a s any censorship of r a d i o a n d television, and P.e a n s w e r given by t h e m i n i s t e r w a s t h a t t h e r e was not w i t h i n t h e t e r m s of e i t h e r t h e r e g u l a t i o n s or tip. p r e s e n t oil! before t h e House. u UilJiii U.rn.) Mr. T u r n e r ( G i i a w a - C a r i e i o n ) : With tiie- indulge;.ce of tiie r i g h t ho;., g e n t l e m a n m a y i. t h r o u g h you, Plr. Chairman, m a k e s u r e m a t we u n d e r s t a n d each other, i sax: Lhat t h e r e w a s n o t h i n g in tiie r e g u l a t i o n s tjr in the t e r m s of tiie p r e s e n t bjjf, w h i c h in th.s respect i p i i c a t e LIT. r e g u l a t i o n s , to a u t h o r i z e censorship. Mr. D i e f e n b a k e r : Xo, t h e r e i s . n o m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g at all; w e a r e clearly m a g r e e m e n t on ii.;,- point. H o w e v e r , t h e r e is censorship today, and t h e r e f o r e it is censorship t h a i is being illegally applied. Across tlie c o u n t r y v a r i o u s r.idio stations, or at least their r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , 'nave been advised, informed, m a d e a w a r e , t h a t :;.o p u b . . c a t i o n of c e r t a i n m a t e r i a l would not be in t h e p u b l i c interest. Indeed, as far as certain u n i v e r s i t i e s a r e concerned, the student bodies who edit u n i v e r s i t y p a p e r s h a v e been given to u n d e r s t a n d t h a t they a r e subject lo censorship, ami that c e n s o r s h i p applies today despite the fact Pi... live m i n i s t e r stated clearly, unequiv eeally a n a properly that legally it could not be applied. T h i s is the most d a n g e r o u s form (if censorship, tiie s u b t l e k i n d t h a t d e t e r m i n e s what 1 shall reach what ! siu.ll see, win.l I shall near, Without there h. ,1.;, .any i.-,,i.i justification for such censorship. T i e minister used P e s o w o r d s — a n d I give h i m t h e o p p o r t u n i t y of saying' w h e t h e r or not iie actuaily used them, lie said liun t h e r e was no censorship of tlie n e w s as far as radio or television stations and the like w e r e concerned. U o P - . . they w e r e be'ng used as p r o p a g a n d a agencies, l:y saic.. these won.n lie no i n t e r f e r e n c e t should like to k n o w w h o (U !e.'mines v, b e t h c r they .ire being used as p r o p a g a n d a agencies. Is not tha! the essence of c e n s o r s h i p — t u r n . e m e b o d y tteiei'.mhios for rue what J.-, piopaganria and what is not p r o p a g a n d a ? On this b.asis, certain m i n i s t e r s of tho ci'Ov.n suiuib: h a v e Kept their m o u t h s shut, for s o m e ol ten1 stati merits m a d e by them indicate au irresponsibility ih.'P is iu.l in keeping with m e m b e r s h i p on ihe go\'ei'nment bench.•:.. eir. T u r n e r ( O i i a w a - C a r l e J o n ) : On a puint of order, Mr. e r h a i r m a n , a n a a p . n W7i.i1 tiie incinfuence of tiie :'•:;. hon. g e n t l e m a n , may I clarify what i s;ed. Piu- ci'i.ciai w o r d s ui i h e rejjuil.'itions, wlncli a r e rvy..- itcd .n tiie bill. a r e if the s t a t e m e n t is m a d e "ou noh.df o p ' ; ami then t h e r e aia' tlie w o r d s "as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e or professed r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of tin unlawful association". This m e n u s tr.at tiie crucial e l e m e n t in d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between tiie valid r e p o r t i n g of n e w s and fair comment on t h e one. n a n a , .uni its being used as a p r o p a g r n u a Vehicle on the other n a n a , is the idea of agency, is t h e j07.n1.7iis! allowing himself tii lie used as an a g e n t " November 8, M r . A.C'i-x.-.xii,-. er: I n a t is w h a t 1 u k e a i p n t a cleoa tiiis H o u s e , Mr. Chairman, with opinions ... n e x c h a n g e d . I am r.X.P to h a v e lhat .stausuo.it from ... minister, because accepting ins View we P a r e censer:.' in C a n a d a , it is censorship not legally i p ... . 1 into . if ... but r a t h e r ieft lo certain individuals J . , . , ee:.e:'.':i:.i wiieliier a r a d i o or Iv station or lite pres.-. P e l f cui .. within t.70 definition of the words just • iiuieiaP-d '.j. :.. minister, i suggost tins is a dangerou.-; pi'upui-V. .en ~y .. tne essence of the imposition of c e n s o r s h i p W.,... , accepting trie responsib.i.t.y of h a v i n g p.7-.,ui,.;.: pm effect i,7j7cr by 1P1 'liafr.ent 07', us . i u d . r die ',.;, regulations, by ordej- in council. P puss on n o w to Pie n e x t -phas.-. For several cia h a v e been t r y i n g to get some information r e g a r d i n g . tarn individuals who w e r e aliened tu oe \ . i . . . .'....... .'".'.. .. u a — n e w s b r o a d c a s t e r s , c o m m e n t a t o r s as... the i,,.e. PP..; w e r e t h r e e or four of these people. Tins ,.. not ;. m . . P picked out of the air;, l a t h e r it comes from the eoufu...-. . tiie mind of the Minister of Hogioi.al rlcom-mic F.xp.i. sion. Ou m a n y occasions ,,e stated mat .-. '.'eral p c veere in\'Oived, and in ..-eery p h a s e One began 'or '., m i n i s t e r s of t h e c r o w n , even at p a r l i a m e n t a r y :-• cj'elar, and M e m b e r s of P a r l i a m e n t . He said that trie u a n g e n p e r m e a t i o n of this philosophy t h r o u g h th.e various sir... of society had u n d e r m i n e d every!.'.ing. As a m.ui fact, the .iunister used some very be iiguri • in iit.m. Pie m i n i s t e r slated Oe thought th-' PP.'.,' aad .puei) r.".t hers. When tne m in is ler a p p e a r e d UJ. . i 11 \ .:..u."i pr P.",rn w i t h J.7CX W e b e s t c r , lie w a s repoi'icu to n a v e : iP.jit .!.;.' figure w a s twenty-five to fifty thousand. PP m m . . i e r spoke of t h o u s a n d s of ve..uui.s .. . ."i;.s..-s i.i.i iiiifiiilr Tiien lie went on: "We can't te.! p , •-.-• . thing oecause ,f we did tiie sccur.iv of ti..: state Woulc; '. T h e n , the m i n i s t e r of lnct.au afiairs joinejl iu, a n d d r e w a hm rid picture ....' fear ana d a n g e r , il.- -•aid: " cau'l tell you. We k n o w , b u t if w e w e r e eve,- to efi would bring into focu.- men ingi. in public .u'e, ami \ can't do lhat". Tins is all nonsense, C'hairrr.ui.. LiXo . . . :• m e m o , r of ihe House, f have been foi low '.,;,., the eviaei.c, given a' !he inquest ios; S a t u r d a y .:. tiie e.'.y of M .... I'-c.ii. If you :e;.d t.u- e v i d e n c e given by tiie 1 ;n i.01 -.:<-, 17- Pie niost infantile- e x a m p l e of a r u a l e u r i s m tr.a; con iiav'e hei n put together. 'Pile gov o r u m e n ... u .:.e '...•-• wei'e professional w r o n g d o e r s . P. my view, the; 1; !.-.' tie's evidence is accepted, their whole co-.ihi; iidiui' '.i.e." 'Cere a b u n c h oi novices. To r e t u r n to tiie people employed ;..;- ihidio i.'..-r... arcoi'PPug io one minister, 1.71a bv infe: -.:. .1.. •.'.. • these pi- ipfe w e r e actually 'up.ii.ei; P. us,up; a j-rue iu die purpose of passing on information 10 P.P.. :; omb'-r. vvi.P... p r e t e n d i n g to lie giving th-- new.-. Tiie.. u. "i'poi .1 i-i c e r t a i n s i u t e m e n t s , (observations or left-, s n. one wa or aji'.ither icito their re])Oi ts. T h r e e or four 77. ' •-:• pi ipfe -.-.ere picked up, and t h a t is w h a t should P.. . Jiapp. n e t to them. Hov/ever, 1 h a v e bee:; t r y i n g to find ou; what P . h a p p e n e d to these g e n t l e m e n . T!t7- Sccreluiy of r.-y... y... iiau several d a y s to find out. Can you una,..... a t e cob..- [Mr. Diofenbakcr.] 001070 �u A § • .j iLe < tir" -<1 r z o I -^ o 'TASK r ^ s K i . / 7,-2 c 3 si E zz dx Qt^rcd Mr^ 1% °° jyi^.^. 'G/ 7 o O/S SPAA I- t- < z < Q —fu^, fs^-j-uAr. o < z < < z < o (Os-cuds^-A FHyy . {.OL^A^ 111 £~fLxt~. [A7 \° tsAlZ "4 3 7 / 4[AA3 4 NL RA AX-PA py F^i %7,F77\ OL. A ,<^o ct&TjJdA f a A /VT^. %-C\.-iy, . •A. <V~ ^ 4-L, eJUcA CAOX -V-C T S (CASLA v-> \f2_j_ CPT MONTREAL QUE 5 iV ITCHELL o u. o -^APP CO < a. ^ ' _>- PARLEMENT OTTAWA o z < a < z < o hN9Q a UJ M M | o ^r - -^, • ^^J -1 < z o VOICI LE TEXTE D'UNE DECLARATION CONJOINTE PUBLIEE AUJOURD'HUI PAH LE CONSEIL D ' ADMINISTRATION DE LA CEQ, PRESIDE PAR 7. YVON CHARBONNEAU, PAR LE BUREAU DE LA FTQ, PRESIDE PAR M. LOUIS LABERGE gg S 2 ET PAR LE COMITE EXECUTIF DE LA CSN, PRESIDE PAR M. MARCEL PEPIN CD CD l» 1 CONCERNANT LE PROJET DE LOI TURNER PRESENTE AU PARLEMENT D'OTTAWA Uj Jj * 5 LE LUNDI 2 NOVEMBRE EN REMPLACEMENT DE LA LOI DES MESUFES D^" —J 1 ' J -5 ^f— ^^^ GUERRE: «| LE PROJET DE LOI VISANT A REMPLACER LA LOI DES MESURES DE GUERPE Ui o tA=. f-tf < a. NE CHANGE RIEN D'ESSENTIEL A CELLE-CI. S'IL Y « DEUX OU T.ROIS AMELIORATIONS, C'EST SUR DES POINTS SECONDAIRES. ft <nat z < 5 < S r KBS i < z < o 3 D < Z •M •H *uJ A < z BB u *^ V- W*P < z z < o CONDUISE A DES DIFFICULTES POLITIQUES PLUS GRANDES ENCORE OUE CELLES • < QU'IL PRETEND VOULOIR EVITER, NOUS SUGGERONS INSTAMMENT AU GOU- z o H s 2 Z < •• UI <\ £ 2? H* S o < z < o °<z o\ CEPENDANT, POUR EVITER QUE CETTE ATTITUDE DU GOUVERNEMENT NE VERNEMENT D'INTRODUIRE DANS SON PROJET DE LOI DES MODIFICATIONS IMPORTANTES QUI SONT LES SUIVANTES: - SUE LE GOUVERNEMENT S'ENGAGE A INDEMNISER LES PERSONNES DETENUES PUIS RELACHEES SANS ACCUSATION NI CONDAMNATION ET QU'IL V^ILLF A LEUR SECURITE D'EMPLOI ET A LEUR REHABILITATION 111 o a \J*k D Ou. p? < u. < 0. ss < 5 < z < o • -J < z o - OUE bOIT PRECISEE, A L'ARTICLE 3, L'EXPRESSION TROP GENERALE D. z 111 ~ i ''TOUT GROUPE OU TOUTE ASSOCIATION'' ET QUE L ' ILLEGALITE D'UN D P- E AUTRE GROUPE QUE LE FLQ SOIT DECLAREE PAR LE PARLEMENT ET NON < u • SEULEMENT PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT -J < z o mt^— 1- h- < B—* z z < a < z < «-» < Z < z z LJ a < z - QUE SCIT RETIREE DE L'ARTICLE 8 TOUTE DISPOSITION AYANT UN EFFET RETROACTIF < 1 *-• - QUE SOIENT RESTREINTS LES POUVOIRS PREVUS AUX ARTICLES 10 ET 11 DE PERQUISITIONNER ET D'ARRETER SANS MANDAT, ET CELUI DE DETENIR UNE PERSONNE SANS QUE DES ACCUSATIONS SOIENT PORTEES Ol t> IL, u (•^a z < J < Q. 111 £ < «£ < o a < z < ^•i • < z o - QUE SOIENT APPLIQUEES DES SANCTIONS CONTRE LES AUTORITES ADMI- ^*« o N I S T R A T E S ET POLICIERES QUI, DANS L'APPLICATION DE CETTE »«2 LOI, DEPASSERONT LEUR JURIDICTION OU ENFREINDRONT LA LOI DES s •B -j CONTRE ELLE •H B^ DROITS DE L'HOMME (EXEMPLE: PRIVER UN DETENU DE COMMUNICATIONS OU DE RECOURS) - QUE SOIT EXPLICITEMENT INTERDITE L'UTILISATION, S*NS PERMISSION EXPRESSE DES AUTORITES CIVILES COMPETENTES, DE L'ECCUTE SECRETE DES COMMUNICATIONS PRIVEES ENTRE CITOYENS 1 ->u1 U1 u. 1 O" u, O 5< EL z < -1 < 7 < O p-" < a. z - QUE SCIT PREVUE L'INSTITUTION D'UNE COMMISSION IMPARTIALE CHARGEE DE VEILLER AUX DROITS DES PERSONNES ARRETEES ET DE LEUR IU a < z < • • _i < L -= _ l X. 7 < o Lr^* O H 1< r^^ < z z z z111 < Q a < < -T z < < o 1° VENIR EN AIDE. CETTE COMMISSION, DOTEE DE POUVOIRS REELS, AURAIT ACCES A LA LISTE DES DETENUS, POURRAIT RECLAME:; LA LIBERATION SUR LE CHAMP DES PERSONNES ARRETEES P^R ERREUR, SURVEILLERAIT L'APPLICATION DE LA LOI, LE TRAITEMENT DES PRISONNIERS DE L'INDEMNISATION DES DETENUS RELACHES SANS ACCUSATION. CETTE COMMISSION FERAIT RAPPORT AU PARLEMENT - SUP LE POUVOIR DE RENDRE LA LIBERTE SOUS CAUTION SOIT RENDU O | Ui u. o< a. z a w^ ms* M A tmm < •ma n < AU POUVOIR JUDICI.AIRE 3 £->l• JL £ <. O r^ - SUE LA DECLARATION CANADIENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME PREVALE SUR LA LOI SPECIALE EN CE QUI TOUCHE, ENTRE AUTRES CHOSES, LES ARRESTATIONS ET LA DETENTION AR3ITRAIRES % —i •m < »^3 z •n o •s t- « K < z z < If a < z - QUE L'ON EN REVIENNE AUX LOIS PENALES ORDINAIRES EN VIGUEUR DANS TOUT LE PAYS, ET CE DANS UN DELAI PLUS BREF QUE CELUI INDIQUE DANS LA LOI. < o1 CONSEIL D'ADMINISTRATION CEQ, FTQ, CSN. 001071 �• " ( (/L//n 11 0 il J A POP/D.P.Cole/ms A oi-M-TF*~, REFERENCE TO "CENSORSHIP" IN HOUSE OF COMMONS BY MINISTER OF JUSTICE, MR. TURNER, CC^/dAdy NOVEMBER 9, 1970 <P^^- 2 .^Paragraphs for possible inclusion in telegrams to Paris, London and other missions Censorship - i The Minister of Justice stated in Committee of the House on November 9 during discussion of bill C-181 (to provide temporary emergency powers for the Preservation of Public Order in Canada) that in the opinion of the law officers of the Department of Justice "there is nothing under the regulations currently in force pursuant to the proclamation of the War Measures Act that provides in any way for censorship". This opinion which was relayed to the CBC, Mr. Turner continued, indicated "that the regulations do not prohibit broadcasts in the course of ordinary news or public affairs coverage of statements which, when originally made, could have been made on behalf of the FLQ for that matter... Only when the news media allows itself to be used as a propaganda vehicle of the FLQ and communicates statements of the FLQ will there be an offence. The key words are •on behalf o f , which are meant to establish an agency, expressed or implied". Replying later to a remark by Mr. Diefenbaker, Mr. Turner referred to his earlier statement saying "I said that there was nothing in the regulations or in the terms of the present bill which in this respect duplicate the regulations^ to authorize censorship". D.P.C. ) « •• 001072 �lA /-XIXJACA G&l/J. Kontpetit/amb % PDM (K. Roquet) i£CRST >... /-,, „\ T J. aont pet it (.arU) le 10 novembre 1970 " 1'ravaux du Centre Special d'Operations (CSO) Le Centre ~>p£cial depurations ceerche a assembler une image aussi precise que possible du e'LQ a partir des documents saisis jusqu'a maintenant par les autorites policieres et ce tout autre renseignement que le Centre pourra obtenir de quelque source que ce soit. 2. Cette t"che est 'ofinie comme suit: a. A large numoer of it x** documents have been collected by the Quebec police an- the RCM? an-n are now being a-ealyzed in aetail. b. To supplement the type of information which tie police will obtain from this analysis, SOC must obtain information sucn as t:iat reported by Jules Allard in "Le FLQ et la Guerilla Judlclaire" with respect to FLQ manipulation and infiltration of: (i) (ii) (iii) iv) (v) (vi) Quebec Jeacrjers CLC-EPs Un vers'ties I'ratie Unions '.edical ^uebec Public >ervice c. Assistance from a D A Management Consultant may be required to construct a "Company Model" of the t*'LQ, ba.«jed on information known; i.e. cash flow, publicity, training involved, acts committed, etc. 3. Le CUC nous saurait gr^ de tout ren;eei,-jnement au^si fragmentaire soit-11, qui pourrait contribuer a 1'^tade definie cihaut. 001073 �- 2 - SECRLT k-, Parall^lement a cette etude, qui semble etre la tache de base du CSO, le Centre etudie egalement les contre-mesures qu'il y aurait lieu d*adopter sur le plan int^rieur pour contrecarrer l'action et 1'influence du FLQ, L'^tude du FLQ et des contremesures sont des projets a "moyen terme" (de 3 a 6 mois). 5. Pour ce qui est de la contribution que les Affaires exterieures pourraient apporter au travail du CSO, Jim Davey aimerait que nous lui prepariom; 3 papier?e portant sur les -ujets suivants: 1) Activites du FLQ a 1'etranger (passers, presentes et possibles a l'avenir: par example en France, aux flations-Unles, etc.). 2) Mesures I prendre pour tenter d'empecher le FLQ de faire publier ses communiques et autres documents par le canal de la presse ^tran^ere (aijences de presse et Journaux) comme c'est arrive1 au cours de la fin de semaine derniere avec l'agence Associated Press pour les photos de ii. Cross. Jim uavey m'a dit avoir discute brievement de ce probleme avec Ross Francis hier soir. 3) Un tableau concis mais aussi complet que possible des mouveraents revolutionnaires a 1*etranger (leur origine, leurs structures, leurs methodes d'operations). 6. Vous trouverez ci-joint pour votre propre information seulement copie du .. itrep n° 6 du COO et du document prepare par M. Jules A Hard iatitule "le FLQ et la guerilla judicialre". 7. Vous trouverez egalement ci-joint un exemplaire du document (sans cote) intitule "race a la Violence" qui a ete prepari a 1'intention des deputes. 1 'J • — • J. Kontpetit �I L_* A - •—; <—•- •< - < l L * i. _ c O * 4. W * J , r\ •-.'*• -^.*^ '.-1 77» . -. AAA. .J •.. ..... -. .p y . .AC. . i'. « AL\ ,-. x j . A; _ i p ^ r-\ -r .....Ai. AA,. . P ... vx X.LX'.'i'-PA ,'• ' : _ w .— *-> - •A .. . ^ ..^ x .. b,-;u VL . _ . .... .. . ^ . 7 , 7 J . W . . ^f 7 . ~. ,-•-- '^,- i.7>W PAX At b. . - ••',' d P .: U .'- A~ P P. AI V 001075 , ;- ; i i ; i .i Linus :.•'-•• r. •• �- . ^ ,-» \j . J « # , - • . . w ; - . 0 J, W . . .„ *. +* ^ , ^j U .'. , . _> „ -., . W ,'ii .' '•.•' Ljfi'» j' j. i'v *-< ^ - /.„-•. • **>* ^'i * -> .••„ . W*-« Q*.w .« .". * - i . - , — <• .'. U i\ , . w * .'» ~ . *J • -• - - i/ ._ »_ , . . ^ . , w w i . u> ' H W w O t'ni^ i . i, ^ O i'g .. • ;•. - -. ^J *.'• — - ->" — - , V^™, i h . U A • w • > w o v - p - - . . M i - . ' t j i J i i . Q L . S > <w • % > * . . ' - l J . • . . . i •«.*w v -^ ti ,.^ Uu i - A '\J u.~*l\ X , k w o ^« — r« * - w •-."i«— — „« wo >-wu^ ;• <o... ; : „ . - . _ •>,•%»'« O O*. ij 2 x.s ,' > w • W W , «_/ , 001076 �c J.CPCP/U quo M. oPioquotte a prononce a sa Conference de Presse Samedi, le IC octobre 1570 -17#30 h. 1. L'esprit qui anime celui qui va vous parler est celui de la reconciliation sociale, de I'acceptation du changement, de la dispersion et . . . des Equivoques et de l a m<$fiancefldu r a l l i e m e n t de tous l e s Quebecois maigr6 no3 divergences autour d'un, ideal commun. Le problSme se - pose dramatiquement / . a a 1'occasion de 1'enlevement d'un homme, It, Cross, mais il nous • "2 implique tous. 2. Aucune societe ne peut accepter que les'decisions de ses institutions gouvernementales et judiciaires soient remises en question ou e"cartees par • le moyen: du chantage exerceS par un groupe, car. cola signifie la fin de tout ordre social, ce qui est justement ia negation de la liberte des individus et des groupes, car cette liberty ne peut s'exprimer qu'i I'interieur d'un cadre d'institutions qui-arbitrent les conflits et les interets des groupes on cause. 3. Je comprends queoce soit une certaine conception de la;societe qui a • inspire les auteurs de l'enlevement. Mais ces conceptions, ils no peuvent los imposer a la majorite de leurs concitoyens par la violence ou par un meurtre qui ne ferait que discreditor iX jamais cos conceptions. •' ,• » 4 4. Sans nous rencLrt-. a des press ions que--^^usajgonrsM^?oS& excessively. * memes dangereuses, les "autorites en place"', comme vous le dites, ne sont pas sans se rendre compte des malaises et des injustices qui existent dans notre societe . 5. Je pense que les ravisseurs de V.. Cross sont assez adultes et murs pour admettre tout d'abord que dans ce domaine il peut y avoir divergence de vue. Leurs opinions, ils ont toute la liberty de les traduire r>ar , • i 001077 �2. la parole et l'action, tant qu'ils n'ont pas recours a lei violence ou 3, la mort d'un innocent. 3ien plutot, ces opinions peuver.t s'inserer dans un 6change et Pine discussion franche et ouverte entre les diff6rents elements de la societe, afin de contribuer *a -erne solution constructive et positive do nos problemes. 6. Le Gouvernement du Quebec est un Gouvernement de reformes. II se preoccupe profondement de la justice sociale, du' sort de tous les citoyens, surtout des plus demunis. y7 7. . Par consequent, -laeeseul-e^ouverture que nous pouvons vous faire dans les conditions actuelles, est de vous demander de prendre acte do notre bonne foi et de notre desir dTexaminer objectivement ces injustices qui existent chez nous. Quels mecanismes, quelles institutions doivent Ctre mis sur pied pour le faire? 8. Le Gouvernement s'efforce intens6ment d'etre 3. l'6coute de tous les groupes sociaux. L'importance et I'interet qu'il accorde a, ces groupements comrne les comites de citoyens, et il teryoignent de son souci profond en : a donne la preuve, de reforme de notre societe. II entend examiner avec tous ceux qui sont conscientc Pees reformes souhaitables, 1'amelioration de nos structures pour que soient entendues les revendications des citoyens et des groupes afin d'ordonter ainsi l'action de I'Etat pour qu'elles concordent avec I'-'.evolution sociale. 9. Ce serait la negation de ces efforts que de prendre des mesures / qui iraient dans le sens de la destruction ce I'ordre social quo noussommes a "BStir. C'est pourquoi il nous est interdit de passer I'eponge sur le cas �•) -I • des personnes qu'on a designe comme dec prisonniers politiques. II existe dejii unv. prccode^pc do liberation conditionnelle qui s'applique dans tous ces cas et qui sera suivi. objectivement. 10. Ceci wsveut^pas dire egalement que les causes qui sont actu- ellement mues devant.les Tribunaux quant a certains accuses ivs devront pas- §tre jugees car le contraire serait la, encore une fois, la destruction de I'ordre social que nous avons a BStir, mais nous les considererons avec la clemence qui s'impose vu votre geste qui devrait metpre un terme au terrorisme. 11. A titre de concession ultimo, pour sauver la vie de M. Cross, le Gouvernement federal m'informs qu'il est cispose a. vous^offrir le saufconduit vers un pays etranger. Si,d'autre part, vous ohoisissez de refu- ser le sauf-conduit, je puis vous assurer que vous b^n^ficierez devant les Tribunaux de toute la clemence qu'ils pcorront exercer on prenant acte de tout geste' humanitaire que vous pourriez poser en vue d'epargner la vie de K. Cros3. 12. Ceci je puis vous 1*assurer. Je vous demande done un geste d'absolue bonne foi: relacher M. Cross immediatement.£u-dela de toutes les contingences individuelles ' fl et des cas particuliers. -Ax nous faut b£tir une society qui tienne compte ^y , de la justice et ce la liberte. "Cessieurs, vous avez votre part a jouer dans cette entreprise si vous le choisissez. �-.. - ., . T c ' .' rrj.— rrr r~, r rr • r-rj'.r~. r nrrr A j • rr —V > -7-»- -r .. rr-—. r .-rr\. i-r-rrri~- r.. .AX. »r.c pppnpe. '.a'.acn arparra.L-L..j PJPC one vrero W P - L 1 s p e a K is o n e oi ijociu- recoP.cXJ-X^.P^y.j P . e.cce-ijPwe.PL OJ. Clarke, aasperprpon oi amoiguity and cistre-pt ar.d of rallying all the Quebeckers despite our aa.. i. erfencesOP QPXX.XQT. aropata a commo.p. paea^.. . posoa aramatpca_^ppr oy tree rapt oi ./PP. ^X-OSX .-• o oOcae^y can accerp^ v.paa v.Pc aoc-.L.po».p c J^P Tne proo_Lem xs> v/e are a_i.x rae.p-j-acated. ^es u^Yer.uprep.t aaa OP. ats law cap. oo cuejatpor.ea OP"* can se eracea oy use ox Oj.ac.-emap^. CO'LT^S OX exercased ^y a group secause L/P.PS sagp.piaeo tne end oi aj_a socaa^. oraer which is the negation of freedom of individuals and groups because tnis Preeaoee. car. ccxy PXAXAXS at^7~-a. watir.an tne p. ram^worK — ^ae anstaPutaonax. ircaieeworK we.r^cr. arsatrcites tne corea-i-acts and the divergence; interests of groups involved. I understand that it, is in the name of a certain conception of society that the offers of the rapt of Mr. Cross have acted. But this conception they cannot impose on the majority of their citizens by violence or by murder which would in effect discredit for always this conception. Without acceding to undue pressure, even dangerous pressure, the • authorities, as you say, are not without realizing that there are areas of discontent in our society, and that injustice exists. I think the persons involved in this matter are adult enough to admit first that in this field there is room for divergence of opinion: their opinion, they have all the freedoms to translate it in speeches and in action ....... . .. as long as they have no recourse/to violence or to murder of an innocej person. . • 001080 . > i �- 2 On the contrary, these opinions can insert themselves in an exchange, in a discussion v/hich would be frank and open between all the elements of society to contribute to a constructive and positive solution of our problems. reform. The Government of Quebec is a Government dedicated to It is profoundly preoccupied by social justice and by ail its citizens, especially those v/ho are the poorest. Therefore, the overture that I can make in the present conditions is to ask you to take account of our good faith and of our desire to examine objectively these injustices of our society. V/hat mechanism, what instituions should be set up? 'Xhit Govern- ment is iiraking ar. intense effort to listen to ail the social groups. The importance and the ar.aerest v/hich it gives to Citizens' Committees is a proof of its preoccupation with the reform of our society. It intends , to examine with ail these who are conscious of this necessity of reform the I betterment of our structures so that the revindications of citizens be heard and that groups may also express themselves to orient by this way the action I of the State so that at be ir. acccra._riCo with social evolution. It would be the negation of those efforts to take pr^asures which would go against the social order which v/e are building. This is why we cannot accept to forget about those crimes which nave bean c>a.apLtted by persons called political prisoners | Tn.ere exists a parole proeeaure which applies to all cases and it will be followed I i objectively. This does not mean also that the cases which are presently before the courts dealing with certain accused can be forgotten, can be erased, i , oecause the contrary there again, would evidence, would be the proof of the f ( i I construction of cur social order v/hich we must build;, but we will consider with clemency, with the clemency which is opportvuae in the circumstances, I i 001081 �your gesture which should end terrorism here. As an ultimate concession to save the life of Xr. Cross, the Federal Government has instructed me that at is aispoiieu to offer you safe conauct towarc^ a foreign country. If on the other hand you choose to refuse such safe conduct, I can assure you that you will benefit before our courts of all the clemency which ccarts can grant in view of a humanitarian gesture to avoid the .death of Xr. Cross. This I can assure you. I therefore ask you a gesture of absolute good faith; release Xr. Cross immedlately. Beyond all the individual cases involved we must bulla a society v/hich deals effectively . with justice and liberty. Gontiem.er., you have your part to play in this enterprise if you so choose. , 001082 �cc: 0/SSEA , PMO POP/C. ROQU£T/etm/blm ?ua> PDS PDF Task Force list S.O.C. FLE (Mr. Beasley) Log Officer Soard^' File ^O-X-A - JFK— I( SECflET November IC, 1V70 MEMO&ANDUM TO PRIVY COUHCIL OFFICE Kldnappinga — negotiating Poaition I understand that you asked for an indication of oar thinking on tha present status of offara made by tha federal and Quebec governments for tha safe ralaaaa of Mr. Croaa and Mr. Laporte. Here ia an analysis of the offara made, in consultation with Ottawa, by Mr. Choquatta on October 10 and by Hr. Boaraaaa on October 15. -e also outline our impression of tha present "negotiating poaition" of tha governments vis-S-vis tha kidnappers of Mr. Cross, following upon tha expiry of Mr. Boaraaaa'a October 15 ultimatum and tha aairder of Mr. Laporte. i. Hfr qrewwvyfifUfaSC1° sate 2. Tha October 10 statement by the Qnebee Minister of Justice (see attached text) waa, aa you will recall, the object of extensive if hasty discussions with aa. In brief, it offered tbe Croaa kidnappera, in exchange for hia safe releaset (a) aafe-conduct to a foreign country (unspecified); (b) or a trial in Canada with — a d — in view of tha Croaa releasej clemency by the Courts (c) clemency in trials of three terrorists charged but not yet tried, in the light of Croaa release "which should put an and to terrorism"j (d) there is a parole procedure which applies to all the "political prisoners"} it will be objectively followed. II. Mr. Boaraaaa's October 15 Offer 3. Tha Quebec Prime Minister covered the following ground: (a) for arrangements for the release of the hostages, Quebec suggests that the International Ked Croaa (or the Cuban Consulate in Montreal) serve aa an intermediary between the two sides; lb) safe-conduct abroad for tha two groups of kidnappera, with provision of a plane for transport to the country chosen (unspecified); �A - 2- gag (c) there waa no mention of clemency in a trial of the kidnappera in Canada. Presumably, it waa assumed they would not choose to submit to trial} (d) "a fine recommendation" (to whom waa not specified) by the Qnebee Government for parole for the five prisoners who have requested it. The Quebec government "haa already undertaken demarches te thia effect". — It waa our understanding that Mr. Trudeau had axpreaaed reservations to Mr. Boaraaaa about thia offer, bat that the latter insisted on it. Cm tbe face of it, it does net commit tbe Federal Government or tbe parole boards. we do not knew what "measures" tbe -uebec Government baa "already taken" in tola regard, beyond the October 15 public statement. III. Present Situation 4. Following Mr. Laporte'a murder aad tbe end of Mr. Boaraaaa1a deadline, tbe process of offera aad negotiation ia generally apeaking at an end. Nonetheless, soma variations are poaaibla and indeed have taken place. A certain amount of limited bargaining could arise if the Croaa kidnappers aaked for safe-conduct. fofo-conduct (a) it waa offered again to Mr. Croaa' kidnappera. Ihe offer ia periodically repeated} (b) it obviously ia not available to Mr. Laporte'a kidnappera or murderers. However, if tbe Croaa kidnappera come forward, there may be suspicion that some of them may also have been implicated in the Laporte affair. To date, despite reports to the contrary, there is no evidence of a link between tbe two groups. If some of tbe Cross kldnappere were already involved ia tbe Laporte case, lt would presumably be impossible to let them leave the country with the other kidnappera} (c) precise arrangements fbr tbe safe-conduct (including transport by plane) were announced after tbe October 15 bourassa statement and re-issued a few times with minor amendments. The country of destination ia now definitely Cuba; (d) a poaaibla role for tbe International had Croaa in tbe safe-conduct (and tbe related arrangementa for tbe release ef Mr. Croaa) ia no longer mentioned. Present arrangements revolve around the Cuban Consulate only. Presumably, if thia were an essential consideration far ...3 001084 �A ~ 3 - SECRET the Croaa kidnappers, wa snould not preclude Red Croaa involvement in principle, since lt waa part of tha October 15 offer. Any precise proposal on thia point, however, would have to be carefully assessed; (e) the Cross kidnappera may wonder if their families would be allowed (or financially able) to Join them in Cuba. Mfe have ascertained that the Cuban Government woald accept families and presumably would help support them, but thia haa not been announced. Ve have suggested to tbe Quebec negotiator, Mr. fiobert emers, that, in a future re-statement of the safe-conduct, he make it clear that families would of course be free (and indeed would be assisted) to travel to Cuba. Mr. Demers prefers to keep thia card for any last minute negotiation with tbe kidnappers} (f) more generally, the kidaappera may be concerned about their mesne of livelihood in Cuba. In fact,tiieCuban government haa implicitly accepted responsibility for their upkeep. This haa not been announced, bat it would be possible te reassure the kidnappers on thia count, if they raised the matter while seeking safe-eonduet. (g) the question whether a lawyer and journalists eould accompany tha kidnappera to Cuba baa implicitly been aettled, since the October 15 statement did not include it among damanda that could be legitimately met. It is aot foreseen under present safe-conduct arrangements. The same applies to tha FLQ damanda for publicity on departure (both these demands in any case referred to the "political priaonera" not to safe-conduct for the kidnappera). Meaning of the October 15 Ultimatum 5. Mr. Boaraaaa oa October 15 aaked the kidnappers for "a reply within six hours". He did not indicate that the offers would expire after that period. In fact, the Quebec Government's response to the expiry of the ultimatum was to move against the FIQ as a whole (Mar Measures powers and series of arrests). Its next move towards the kidnappera vac to re-offer safe-conduct. .-*e may presume that Quebec coaaidere ita October 15 offer still open, although tbe abaence of response gives the government a free hand in changing its position if it wishes. 6. Theoretically, tbe .uebec Government haa already taken steps to recommend these for five prisoners. Tbe situation eould be ...4 001085 �'4 - 3ECKKT changed only if tbe recommendation (or the public coanitment to recomaend) were withdrawn by Quebec. In fact, Mr. Choquette aaid in a November 6 press conference that the recommendations for parole still stood. The Federal Government of course can hardly withdrmw an offer which consists only in a recommendation by Quebec. We remain uncommitted and presumably need not ?. We would wish to ensure that we are aware in advance of any decision by parole boards. An announcement that parole had been refused (and for that matter granted) to any of tbe priaonera in question would have a signifleant effect on the public poaition of tbe governments and ef Quebec in particular. Me should therefore have a prior opportunity of studying tbe context in which auch an announcement would fall. This point haa been brought to the attention of tbe Solicitor General's representative on the Taak Force. Trial and Clemency for the Kidnappers 8. It ia not impossible that the Cross kidnappers will surrender him in due eourse, and yet not accept safe-conduct. One way would be for them (when the political usefulness of his captivity waa exhausted) to release him and to fade into the background. They could calculate this would underline their humane approach as well aa the powerlessness of the authorities and could dispel somewhat the effect of the laporte murder. If the kidnappera were later found, Quebec might feel that it wished to aak the Courts to exercise maximum clemency within the lam, in accordance with Kr. Choquette's October 10 poaition. A similar situation eould arise if the kidnappers, once surrounded, refused safe-conduct and eventually surrendered (without killing ita*. Croaa) ia the expectation that a sensational trial would serve their cause better than exile to Cuba. There ia no point now in evoking auch possibilities publicly. Trials of Charged Terrorists 9. This trial has been postponed by the Courts. It seems unlikely that it will now be affected directly by the Cross affair. However, in the improbable event that the kidnappers asked te negotiate the terns of Mr. Cross* release, thia element of the October 10 package may have to be looked at again. It was in any event a very vague and tenuous bargaining counter. It remains that Quebec might then tend to agree to recommend clemency for FLQ terroriste who have been .charged and not yet tried. There is no question, however, of m i s ing this subject in the present circumstances. �-5- SECRET Conclusion 10. Tou will appreciate that we do not advocate aay new process of negotiation or any broadening of the offers now being put forward publicly, which are eaeentially limited to safe-conduct with an odd mention of parolee. The above survey outlines, however, the range of issues which could arise if the kidnappers tried to bargain over Mr. Croee* release within the limits of the October 10 and October 15 offers. P. TREMBLAY P. Tremblay. �! AdjX. CA tXoc^ ",, r 'P y \ •* .• i CU~£— (2~-c -h-i • <--*&. • '• t-CxA-i-.XA-A.;. 1 . j MONTREAL, P.Q. 3 November, 1970 £y\^yA.r.Ax^P-^~y J CONFIDENTIA: (FAAF I^SA'FL S-x C . iZcXXSr- I S.A-1', \7V\ . (%' U - ^ ' t L FxPy /' (-H I i . / J:- J : C* ' j - A . Discussion with local Police Following clearance with you yesterday, and with Monsieur Choquette, the Quebec Minister of Justice, with whom I spoke on the telephone (in Quebec City) last night, I attended a meeting in Monsieur St. Pierre's office this morning. M. St. Pierre is Director General of Quebec Police Force. He had with him M. St. Aubin, who is Director of the Montreal Police, and Assistant Commissioner Dube, the local head of the R.C.M.P. Mr. Ashford accompanied me. 2. . Invited o make an opening statement, I made it clear that we ha not come to interfere with existing links with Ottawa, to offer criticism cr advice of Police efforts, or to discuss policy. I said that v/e well appreciated that they had a,very difficult problem on their hands as regards the retrieval of Mr. Cross, and we hoped that-the very strenuous efforts they were making would be continued until a successful result was obtained. 3. However, as more than four weeks had now elapsed it seemed reasonable that certain practical contingencies should be discussed because some cf the assumptions (e.g. Mr. Cross's own health, if alive) might cause us to revise our intended arrangements. We might have to act quickly, and together, at very short notice, ana if we could discuss v/hat was in one another' s minds nov/ it might save delay and confusion when we least wanxed it. This premis^'was accepted by those present, and cn that base we decided to discuss the practical points at issue. 5. The first of these was retrieval cf Mr. Cross alive. Originally v/e had hoped, and the eVrdence of~Tiis le~tTers would support this, that he v/ould be able to emerge in a fairly buoyant condition. Hov/ever, it seemed now prudent to make provision against the likelihood that a long period of mental strain, lack cf physical exercise, probable poor nutrition, and lack of proper medical care, might mean that Mr. Cross's condition would have deteriorated. Added to this there was the possibility of seme accident,if a violent confrontation between the kidnappers and the authorities should take place. /2 H.E. Mr. Peter Hayman, C.M.G., C.V.O., M.B.E., British High Commissioner, OTTAWA. CONFIDENTIAL • JJ. 001088 ; �co?:Fi r _ o _ 6. In the discussion that followed it v/as agreed that a plan should be set up for immediate access to a suitable hospital, preferably with helicopter access, and I undertook to explore this initially with Mr. Cross's doctor in Montreal and then with Assistant Commissioner Dube, who would ensure that whatever plan was agreed on v/as communicated to the others present. 7. M. St. Pierre asked if Mr. Cress v/ould be available for interrogation. I said that we would wish this to be possible, but it would have to be- consistent with his mental and physical condition. There would be an opportunity before he departed from Montreal, and if they wished to ask him further questions in the United Kingdom ap a later date this could always be arranged through the official channel. If they wished to send one of their investigators subsequently to see Mr. Cross in England, .this again could probably be arranged, but M. St. Pierre acknowledged that in a period of convalescence thoy would v/ish xo respect Mr. Cross's desire to forget xhe whole thing ax least for a time. 8. . If Mr. Cross was originally received in a hospital, the Police undertook to arrange immediate security which would include a complete screening from the press. 9. In response xo an enquiry about onward travel to the U.K. , I said that discussion was 'taking place in Ottawa with a view to returning Mr. Cross to tlie U.K. either by R.A.F. or R.C.A.F. aircraft. 2x.e Police said that they v/ould be glad to arrange Mr. Cross's transport xo Sx. Hubert airfield for this purpose and would use a helicopter if this should prove to be more advantageous. 10. In discussion of the possibility of Mr. Cross being wounded in a confrontation with the kidnappers, M. Sx. Pierre echoed what had been said xo me on the previous evening by M. Choquette, that every care would be taken xo avoid this. 11. We then turned to the possibility that Mr. Cross might not survive and that his body night be found.. As v/ith the identification of Mr. Cross when alive, Mr. Ashford would be asked to identify the body, and Mr. Imray was in reserve if Mr. Ashford was at any time unavailable. The first notification in either event would come tc me from the two members of the anti-terrorist squad, who had been nominated to convey this information and with whom we are in close almost daily touch. /3 ... �CONF: 12. Monsieur St. Pierre said xhax ix would be rounder Quebec law for the body xo go xo xhe Police Headquarters where an autopsy v/ould be carried oux and a public statement made, as was the case with M. Laporte. This would xake about two days.. 13In response to an enquiry about our plans, I said xr.^x here again transporx to xhe U.K. of xhe body by R.A.F. or R.C.A.F. aircraft was under consideration in Ottawa and xhax a firm plan to this effect was likely xo emerge soon. Again, the Police said that they would arrange any reccsjprv xe^ansporx in a suitably dignified manner tc Sx. Hubert airfield. 14. It will be noted that m either eventuality there is likely'to be some two days in v/hich xhe Service authorities can make the necessary transporx arrangements, and I suggest that Mr. McConville, together v/ith a member of xhe B.D.L.S., may care to co-ordinate this, if this is not being done already, with the Canadian authorities in Ottawa. There is a clear point in either eventuality when the Service auxhorities can xake over from xhe Police. 15. I informed the meeting of our plans fcr Mrs.- Cross and said that in order tc protect X.ctr fro...""xhc""un'v/ercome"_atxenxiTon of the press these v/ould be kept entirely secret,' though v/e would be putting oux a notice afxer xhe event mainly wiih the intention of re-assuring Mr. Cross that his wife had gone xo friends and would be keeping in close touch with developmenxs. The Police thought that cur plans were reasonable, and I explained the ways open xo us of keeping ir. touch with Mrs. Cross. They said at once that they would be glad to help in any way, either to deceive the press as to her movements or to provide transport, and we have agreed tc consult further with the members of xhe anti-terrorist squad, who are to accompany Mrs. Cross^on this point. The latter, of whom there are two, are both well-known to her. 16. Y/e then had some mere general diseus_sjio:p about the cas_e, in v/hich what one might describe as a~'~cautious optimism/'was'" advanced. This was based on a number of faexors, such as the likelihood that the cell holding Mr. Cross was now cut of contact with those who originally controlled ix, who v/ere probably among those held in jail^ Sooner or later xhe Police were confident they would get a break in what had been so far a long and unrewarding investigation, and they were not going Xo give up the very strenuous efforts they were making. Another cause for optimism was the fact that this cell, unlike M. Laporte's ceil, were much more politically aware, and some at least, much better educated. Y/e all agreed that they seemed to have been taken aback by M. Laporte's death and its adverse effects on the F.L.Q. <UV t . ft^-j hr*^. trf c<rw-i,^'u-^'\ COMF11 -* i^<rvo <^ > w # Ae. A^—"_ // �V.- 'v.. 7 cause in the Province. Thera was, xh one or more of the group might settle for a x n p xo Cuba, especially if the-reward money now made their posixion more precarious. 17. I concluded by thanking M. Sx. Pierre for the discussion, and those oresenx Peer I that it had boeer of value to them also. I s,p.ici Xepax we remained ready to consul u further with them, at any time if they wished this, but xhax meanwhile we were very satisfied with xhe way in which xhe Xwo nominated members of xhe an ti-terrorist squad v/ere keeping us informed as Xo progress. I did not think it necessary Xo add that we would, of course, t U j - u i c l / V ^ U i ^ f J C U u b i ^ t J . 1 xJ 0 1 *_L -. ^A ;. y • -ry ... . X) ^.. .X 7-S^v-V -A. ., .„ _ _• -i "\ iJ -J xj XJ. J CONFID VJ\, 001091 i I �PSI/J.K. Bartleman/cmd DhlH-!JjNS-» EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ^"ep-y^, AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES MEMORANDUM TO ' FROM Oo PSI J L< / ' ° f) 7 (Lk^*- A/L, k^*~$A rv^ (*• w.^/ r o^ > V ° ^ 6 ^ REFERENCE J /> CONFIDENTIAL DATE November 10, 197C NUMBER Numero psi- A A Brazil - Possibility of Kidnap Attempt against Canadian Ambassador. SUBJECT Sui'of r^ SECURITY sAJAc DOSSIER c?0-A.3-Trly'- / MISSION. ~ \PJ(- - P ENCLOSURES Annexes -y.* -,.--rr;2i N - * / s- '-•'\ r _ ^\ D'STP.IBUTION 2-r I should like to draw your attention in the context of contingency planning on the possible effects which the FLQfs terrorist activities might have on decision making by counterpart organizations in Brazil, the possibility that our Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, Mr. C. Hardy, may be considered as a possible [ kidnap victim. j - / * * ,/s iS-' *JT 2 2^' /'J IJ. U/ V 2. V7e believe that terrorist organizations in Brazil still have the capacity to carry out further kidnappings of foreign officials or diplomats despite recent effective counter-terrorist actions by the Brazilian military authorities. In addition, there is reason to believe that Brazilian terrorist organizations would sympathize with the aims of the FLQ because of affinities in stated or inferred goals, organization and operating procedures. On this basis alone there would appear to be a heightened risk that if the Brazilian terrorist organizations were planning another kidnap attempt against a diplomat, it is conceivable that a Canadian could be selected to show solidarity with their Canadian FLQ comrades, and to assist the FLQ in their efforts in Canada. 3» In addition we have noted that in previous kidnap cases in Brazil, the victims selected have had some connection with either the exchanged political prisoner or has represented an ideological enerry of the terrorist group. For example the kidnapped US Ambassador Elbrick represented "US imperialist capitalist interests" - an ideological target. In the case of the kidnapping of the Jap.anese Consul General Sao Paulo, the terrorists obtained the release of a Brazilian of Japanese origin. The choice of FDR Ambassador von Holleben may have been related to the economic importance held by the German colony in Brazil. Since at the present time the Brazilian authorities are .../2 001092 �- 2 - holding a Canadian citizen, Tanya Dawn Chao, as a suspected terrorist, it is possible that the Canadian Ambassador would be selected as a potential kidnap victim in order to free her as well as other prisoners. 4. In the event that a diplomat is kidnapped in Brazil, v/e believe that the Brazilian Government will adopt a hard line and possibly not ransom him. If the kidnap victim v/ere a Canadian, the Brazilians would be able to use the argument that they v/ere utilizing an approach similar to that taken by the Canadian Government toward the Cross-Laporte kidnappings. / / j ** / s-j-d E.R. Ret Security and Intelligence Liaison Division. 001093 �PDM PDS PDF FCO GAF GRF ECP PMO(Mr. Lalonde) PCO(Mr. Robertson) Sol.Gen.(Mr. Ernest Cote) PDE/J.C.Langley/jf CONFIDENTIAL November 12, 1970. Task \F^^U^t\J^ Yf) PLC A_> MEMORANDUM FOR MR. C. ROQUET Canada-Algeria Economic Discussions Vr, Djesairl, head of the Algerian delegation, told me at lunch today that he had been called to an unprecedented interview with the President of Algeria before leaving for the current Canada-Algeria economic talks. I do not know whether he had been instructed by the President to say anything to us, but Mr. Djesairl went on to say that the President had told him that the fact that our economic talks wi?,re proceeding at a time of some internal difficulty in Canada should be regarded as confirmation that th* Algerian Government had no hesitation about its relations and dealings with the Government of Canada. (Mr. Djesairi was clearly trying to convey the fact that his presence in Canada signified support for the legitimate authorities of Canada in the face of the FLQ challenge.) IJ.C L A N O L E Y ) J.C. Langley PbE 001094 �• •' POP/C.Roquet/mk t. PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL Ottawa, November 12, 1970 c7o - Jfl - TFK- ) ... I attach for your information a copy of a communication to the British High Commissioner here from one of his officers in Montreal who has been in close touch with the local police authorities (and also with Mrs. Cross) since the beginning of the kidnapping crisis. This communication, an account of a discussion with the Quebec and Montreal police, illustrates the degree of co-operation which the latter have extended to the British here. Incidentally, we have stressed to the Quebec authorities, in the event that the Cross kidnappers were found and surrounded, that primary consideration should be given to Mr. Cross* safety. The Minister has written to the Quebec Justice Minister on this point and has obtained satisfactory assurance. Ihe High Commissioner's office here is aware that we have acted on this point. Mr. Sharp has also encouraged Mr. Choquette to seek the voluntary co-operation of media in depriving the FLQ kidnappers of publicity. Our reasoning, which is shared by the British High Commissioner, is that there is little point to the indefinite detention of Mr. Cross if the kidnappers cannot vise it for publicity so as to maintain Quebec and the country in a state of abnormal disturbance. Deprival of publicity should help convince the kidnappers that the kidnapping would yield no more results and should be brought to an end. "A, Ma, B T O i H " A. E. R. Mr. C.S.A. Ritchie, High Commissioner for Canada, Office of the High Commissioner, LONDON, England. 001095 �Board *£jS. Log Officer File POP/C. ROQUET/lz/blm R E T U R N T O OIV1SIONAU OPERATIONS CENTRE November SECSETAWf PLANNING 12, 1970 AulObJ&Ukl TO Hit. UMaiQH fiOB£ftT30N Transport to [ ritain for Hr. croee The Britiah High Coamieaioner's office here haa been taking an active interest ia contingency planning for the transport ef Mr. Croes to the United Kingdom in the event be la released or found dead. For both eventualities, they foresaw the Britiah government might with to provide an aircraft. Indeed I understand that present Britiah plana are to provide aa ..AF hospital aircraft for his return to Britain in caee of his release. 2. I have pointed out ta the British High Commissioner that there should be consultation between the two governments on both these points. I had in mind that the oanadiaa government itself mi^ht wish to make an aircraft available in oae or either of these eventualities. I attach a copy of a contingency memorandum, drawn up before Mr. Laporte's death, ia which the question ef providing aa aircraft for the return of Mr. Cross* body to ...ngland waa raised. A copy of this memorandum was forwarded to the Prime Minister's office at Mr. Marchand'• request oa the night when Mr. Laporte's body was found. I would assume that, if Mr. Cress were to be killed, there would be very strong reasons for the Canadian government making extraordinary gestures te underline ite regret and manifest particular respect towards the British diplomat'a body. This would appropriately include, in my view, the provision ef sn aircraft aad of a suitable ministerial escort* 3. There are two possibilities open te ust one would be merely to make appropriate contingency planning with the armed forces to determine whether a suitable aircraft could be made available on adequate notice. Another and perhaps more satisfactory approach would be to obtain now a decision la principle from the Prime Minleter. This would enable us to tell the British that, if the worst came to the worst, we would undoubtedly wish to provide an aircraft for the transport of Mr. Cross' body. ...2 �- 2 - COaTlDeJJlIAL 4* I would also see some advantages Is not leaving for the last moment a decision on the mode ef return for Mr. Cross if he Is found alive. If we eould provide a suitable aircraft for his return to Britain, we would for one thing have greater control over the time of his departure. This eould be helpful la allowing police authorities to de-brief Mr. Cross immediate-* ly if his health permits. In addition, it would be an elegant gesture which eould oaks a favourable Impression cn the British diplomat himself, .a should keep in mind that he may feel rather jaundiced, after a long detention, about the Canadian government's unwillingness to meet some of the kidnappera' major demands tor his release. 5. Please let me know whether you think the Prime Minister woald be willing to consider this matter now or would expect a decision to be taken at the last moment. The difficulty in postponing the decision is that, in the meantime, the British authorities have an aircraft on stand-by and that, if the case broke one way or the other, we would be subjected to Immediate pressure for us to agree that this aircraft proceed to Canadat any delay to enable the Canadian government to decide ea ite own position oould be very ill-received in the circumstances • A. E. RIT A.EJt. cc: General Dare �\,,ct i»jt*»/ ^0/v'l;l0if/v'( KI>AX>±X^»X> ;_.'.-» i\jxx.'ixx/ *..* LAiAA.. ix~.A.Aj.x,...lxi Ux-lAi x^.i jL&aV*A i r^ I— iXxyv±Xw.:x/ ,..?•< K&.tx .... i 1. 1'eppp-pp (a) frea Governor General to tho Queen (Personal); (b) Priieo i^Lnistcr to tho Queen through Cc^cis^ioat Houoo chaanolj • (c) from Priao i£icisica? to Priuo i-iniotor; (d) flroa SSEA. to ixrd Kczaoj (e) personal ieeeca^oo to VAx.. Croes frcra above. nts to the Frrao. „..,- -*• .-•-•>< .-> U I ...,• g w , J?"!' i. y (2) Cecioicn on whether Pea.ee deeper flag should bo at half Eastj ( i) ca date death is discoveredj ( ii) cn date of departed cf body frora Cenadaj (iii) cn dey of ffcnoralj ( iv) full period that body ia Conada. dii « *** - • • '• - - ••-• -wi > e (a) Decision whether to prose for en autcpsyj ineluding provision cf hearses a^i iLseoesinos. o o . . «C 001098 �* ~ £CJ rv i-tt>tAnJ i it* L 'anperperits (cont r d) (c) Decision whether transportation of body to place of burial (Ireland?) should be cost of Canadian Government: ( i) be by corrr.:ercial airline,, if so, Canadian or British; ( ii) be by charterea axrera.. (iii) 5. be by' Canadian Forces aircraft, either 707 op" Yukon (type of aircraft used night be determined by arrival time desired) (d) Decision whether expenses of trans-Atlantic trip of Mrs. Cross and- xa.TTPi.ly snou_.o. ce met oy Carreac— gan uovern.Pio.px.; \e j P O C P S i o n as oo wneteper xys. oross SPOUJ_O oe accopppppp.rr.ee. oy a Kinister or senior official; (f) If Mrs. Cross wishes to be accompanied by British Officials are their expenses to be borne by Canadian Government. - Ceremonial Arrangements• (which must be, discussed with Quebec authorities, and which would oe subject to Mrs. Cross's wishes). (a) Question of whether there will be a lying in state in Montreal and if so, where; ( i) Provision of guard of honour; (ii) Attendance by Federal Ministers or senior officials: (b) Question: If Mrs. Cross wishes funeral service and burial in Montreal - attendance at service of Federal Ministers or senior officials: (c) Departure of body from Montreal airport: ( i) Guard of honour; military band? (ii) Attendance of Federal Ministers and Officials. �C o /J r t D c f / v / / / ' * £ - A* A*. •>^f.^'..'-.-s.9 ^ "J / y^-i- y+r^u.,—,,*,,..^ r* /, ^U/ VJ-^I-W^^«*,„i i . V^h.» -r-t*A"*-J.-di<-.*l W* A h~'w U \*».r--i•.-*'*•*,*. •• «^W * U v W t f ....,- U-.,***, 0.*^, . ,.,. .> W —. ._ ^ . . . ^ **~*s* k"^U 'I1 .* •' *Mf." * (c) Decision required: Ivhathcy Cassiian Geve^>ean..rit would want t s ce'gani^o a rrpreerial service in Ottawa; \^. J X.J. .... ......... iXXXxi -..A,,.. ........^ .......... XXJ.-.X Ou.. ..-. '..^* 4i - Nii'ii if fJ wiii .- -. . w *J.^* A *^u©3txcn Ow £^svc«.^,..vpj. roprawsati»w*.A.cei ^-j''* ( i) Governor General; / U O V^r,,],.i.,..v. . V. J.J+XI.J x. _jj_te.' v v - - > ( iv) Officials; ( v) Hinistcro and officials of tho Coveraaeat of Quebec aed lontreal. J . Puddiir;tcn. 072&&, Cotober 10, 1970. 001100 �•fConfd f i l e ) LOG CR. SECRET November 1 3 , 1970 - 1 5 : 1 5 . OF OAF- ThF7 NOTE FOR FILE Study of the FLQ External Affairs representative in Mr. Ernest CfttS's group Mr. Ernest Cdt£ called me about the establishment of a group to study the FLQ, following upon the security panel meeting of November 10. He aaid his main assistant would be Jack Paisley, sovietologist in DND, who would coordinate the study. There would also be ¥.r. J.N.D. Gibson of Operational Research in DRB, Mr. Tardif who is coming from Quebec {apparently he knows well the Montreal university milieu), Inspector Ferraris, full time, and someone from External. What Kr. Cdt4 really required was an economic expert. He had heard of Mr. Belanger in our SRB and asked if he could have him. 2. I sail I would pass bis request to the UnderSecretary. Off-hand I thought SRB was rather divorced from the current External Affairs work. For that reason I had rather thought Kr. Rowe would be more aware of the Task Force operation and departmental policies. Kr. Cdt£ insisted that he needed an economist. Thereupon I phoned the Under-Secretary who agreed to phone the director of SRB. If Kr. Belanger could be made available, he might be detached to the Task Force and from there passed on to Kr. Cot^s shop, on the understanding that he should keep in close touch with me and get an initial briefing in the Task Force. C. R. fO �~k w, a. I ^ ^ j •>, TrK- i px J • SECRET le 13 novembre 1970. MEMOIRE POUR M./RITCHIE ET DOSSIER FsxTdAFyyAp (UdU Comity special du Panel sur la securite Reunion du 10 novembre Ci-joint copie du memoire sur la base duquel eut lieu la discussion. Voici les decisions prises a ce sujet: 1. Distribution des responsabilites: (a) K. Ernest Cote serait responsable de produire, d'ici un mois ou deux, une etude approfondie du phenomene FLQ et du contexte dans lequel il s'insere (i.e. jusqu'a quel point est-il endemique, jusqu'a quel point purement quebecois, etc.). Cette etude devrait eclairer le gouvernement sur les mesures a prendre dans toutes sortes de domaines. M. Cote fera appel aux ressources analytiques requises et disponibles un peu partout au gouvernement; (b) a court terme, on pourrait renforcer la capacite d'analyse de la Gendarmerie Royale (e.g. cinq experts); (c) la Gendarmerie et DSI poursuivraient leur tache specialises tout en se souciant de fournir a M. Cote le plus possible drelements d'information, a l'etat brut ou analyse; (d) le SOC continuerait a s'occuper essentiellement de la projection des politiques gouvernementales. Le Centre d'Operations des Affaires exterieures garderait ses responsabilites presentes relatives aux enlevements, Nous avons decrit le travail qu'accomplit presentement le ministere en general: etude de mouvements terroristes a 1*echelle internationale; possibilites d'action a 1'6tranger par le FLQ; etude des aspects juridiques internationaux, etc. M. Gordon Robertson demanda que nous fassions un sommaire de l'etat de 1'opinion a 1'etranger; .12 IA 11.77/^ 001102 �SECRET - 2 (e) on evoqua plusieurs aspects du travail du Comity interministeriel sur I'ordre public (law and order). Je soulignai que, en ce qui concerne l'eventuelle legislation permanente sur I'ordre public, on devrait £tudier et soumettre aux ministres tout un eventail de possibilites, y compris celle d'une legislation qui ne mettrait pas le FLQ ni ses publications hors la loi en tant que tels mais viserait plutot la violence et l'incitation a la violence. Cette suggestion fut bien regue. (f) il fut agr6e que le panel devait etre re-activ£ et formuler des propositions de politique pour le gouvernement. Strategie de la police vis-a-vis le FLQ. On tomba d'accord que la Gendarmerie et les forces armees feraient les etudes recommandees au paragraphe 2. (a) Protection des personnes ^t_des_J?_iens. Les forces armees formuleront un plan precis de d£-escalation. Apres verification aupres du Premier ministre par K. Robertson, les forces armies mettraient de toute fagon immediatement en voie certaines mesures mentionn£es a la derniere reunion du Comite du Cabinet. (c) Protection des diplomates au Canada. K. Bissonnette donna un expose de nos propositions. Elles furent agreees mais M. Robertson signala qu'en principe le gritere pour la protection des diplomates devrait etre celites que nous offrons a nos ministres. Le General Dare souleva le probleme financier. De plus il indiqua que le remplacement par l'armee des gardes prives presentement employes dependrait du niveau des demandes nouvelles faites par les diplomates. Activites internationales possibles du FLQ. Notre document a ce sujet avait ete distribue aux membres. Nous avons signaie qu'une etude plus approfondie etait deja amorcee a notre ministere. ./3 001103 �SECRET - 3 5. Cooperation federale-prpvincialg. On etudia longuement les contraintes inevitables qui limitaient l'obtention de renseignements par le gouvernement federal aupres des autorites de la justice et de la police au Quebec. On envisage de proposer qu'un representant federal soit situe aupres des autorites de la justice du Quebec pour fins de liaison. 6. Mecanismes pour une strategie a long terme. On convint qu'il suffisait la fagon d'engager I'etude fiee a M. Ernest Cote. On emergerait des conclusions qui pourraient etre requis de s'entendre pour le moment sur fondamentale de quelques mois conesperait que de cette etude il sur les mecanismes de strategie a long terme. C. R. . De plus le panel decida d'etudier les conclusions d'un memoire du 3 novembre de M. Ernest Cote au Premier ministre sur le FLQ. Ce memoire, avec de nombreuses annexes, avait ete soumis a une reunion du Comite du Cabinet sur la securite et 1'intelligence a 14 h 30 le 6 novembre. Le Comite du Cabinet ne s'etant pas prononce a son sujet, M. Cote voulait l'avis du panel. II fit lecture des pages 10 et 11 (conclusions) de son memoire, qui furent grosso modo agreees par le panel. �THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA SECRET November 10th, 1970. MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE SECURITY PANEL Security Measures in Relation to Current Crisis At a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence on November 6, 1970, it was agreed that the Security Panel, or a committee thereof, be asked to examine a number of matters in relation tc the current crisis with a view to preparing for the Cabinet Committee a series of recommendations upon which decisions might be taken by Ministers. The questions for consideration are: 1. Allocation of Rosponsibility The Prime Minister has directed that the Panel consider as a matter of urgency how best to use the total resources available to the government, without being limited by normal departmental or institutional structures, to see that everything possible is learned, analyzed and handled in relation to the FLQ and the present problems in Quebec in a coherent and well coordinated program. Because of possible confusion and duplication of effort, it is desirable that a clear allocation of responsibility be made as among the following: 2• (a) action by the RCMP in the police aspects of the matter and by the Directorate of Security and Intelligence in the analysis of intelligence relating to the FLQ and similar organizations; (b) special tasks to be performed by the Deputy Solicitor General; (c) the most effective role of the Armed Forces and service intelligence in relation to (a) and (b); (d) the functions of the Special Operations Centre, PMO/PCO and the Communications Centre, External Affairs; • (e) the Interdepartmental Committee on Law and Order; and (f') The Security Panel and the Panel Secretariat. Police Strategy in Relation to the FLQ The Prime Minister made it clear in the meeting of the Cabinet Committee that he wishes to have a paper prepared setting out the R.C.M. Police strategy in countering the activities of the FLQ and similar organizations in such a way as to provide guidance to SECRET ... 2 001105 �2. SECRET Ministers concerning the timing of a possible return to the use of the Criminal Code rather than the present emergency legislation. The paper would include information on the following subjects: 3. 4• (a) an estimate of the length of time it will take to analyse information seized in recent raids; (b) an estimate of the time required for prosecution of those charged; (c) a statistical analysis of the total number of arrests made, the total numbers charged and with what kinds of offences, the numbers previously known and/or convicted, the numbers previously not known, the numbers of FLQ "leaders" who were captured or who escaped, the numbers still being sought, and an explanation of the apparent variation in lists of persons to be arrested; (d) an assessment of the nature and organization of the leadership of the FLQ; (e) a forecast of a possible future re-grouping if the current FLQ has been seriously disrupted. Protection of Persons and Property (a) Current plans for de-escalation of protective measures; (b) plans for rapid re-institution of protective measures in the event of further major incidents; (c) current and foreseeable problems in the protection of diplomatic representatives in Canada; (d) protection of Ministers and other public figures at public meetings; (e) provision of policy guidance on bomb threats in relation to government buildings; (f) coordination of protective measures as among Canadian Armed Forces, RCMP and other police forces. Possible International Activity by FLQ A discussion paper on this subject is being preparcen Ay che De-par czuen t or ijxperipai niedirs ior distribution. 5. Federal-Provincial Cooperation It is clear that many of the delays and frustrations experienced over the past few weeks have resulted from the fact that under the Constitution the primary responsibility for dealing with criminal acts rests with the Government of the Province of Quebec and with the administration of the Citv of Montreal. SECRET 001106 �3. SECRET Despite the best efforts to cooperate at all levels, the machinery is extremely ungainly in dealing with a crisis situation. It is therefore for consideration what mechanism or mechanisms may be devised to ameliorate this central difficulty. 6. Devising a Long-term Strategy On the basis of information presently at hand and of current information emerging from interrogations, the analysis of seized documents and current and forthcoming court procedures, it will be necessary to devise machinery through which a long-term strategy can be mounted. This may require the re-apportionment of certain functions as among the Departments and Agencies presently concerned. R.G. Robertson, Chairman, Security Panel SECRET �PSI/ X.U, ROUE/deta mm A/O~ DHAft 5E/^ ( y f-Ccj£ f* c&-ak-TFK-l i m ;c:bJi BgM .-P6H 3>"fii ;g g §g A) Kidnapping of Mr. Cross - Fbrther Government Action regarding the Broadcast of the FL] M M U U l e . vfLth CoryUtiP^Sf I suggest consideration of the following line of action in view of tbe lack of adequate response from the FLQ to our various statements; a) That you ahd your colleagues agree that the FLQ manifestoioopy attached) be broadcast on Radio-Canada (radicO this evening at prime time - 10 p.m. - and that this reading cf^Hemanifesto h* by a Radio-Ganada announcer be ^receded and concluded with a further o f f i o i a l (Federal and iuebee) Government statement with regard yAlC&sU to ^nriitl, These ^JwosrcTxAfr rjpxjh'i 0 pamight brntd^Ji^ <& : itive assurances, within 12 hours, that Mr. Cross is safe A and s o u n d f ^ v ^ ^ o~ '^uj-^dl 7& f O y 0\sc2 yfs~0J*4*~eJ^Afatf (J / -have-been and s t i l l are f u l l y prepared to - 7 representative to meet.with • npokeffTVin (\ fee tin P B % at a time and place of mutual convenience, to A JL^~ : negotiate the early release of Kr. Cross. \7 Cn this last point a Covernment spokesiaan has made two statements since your last announcement (copies attacned). 2. It can be argued that our agreement to broadcast the manifesto ox&.'JALAP (AtJ C i s an erosion of the Cabinet's decision of October 6--(WH i'ofad In tha <£jtjJju*jirf~Abb ^TJS 7^.<^ti^y <Jz'x\y yAh^ .xzAzZFCeFs. that all seven points ning)u the afthlnoi had decided th by you that eveningju w* (including publicity for the manifesto) were "wholly nnreasonable demands and their authors could not have expected them t o be acoepted. I need hart 001108 �- 2 - t say that t h i s set of demands w i l l not be met' 1 ./ I auj;fest your statement of October 7 i ade a olaar distinction between non aooeptanoe of the seven original demauds and bPo&dcastlug "a certain manifesto or usaiuniqu^f ea wmvLm sad TV aver Rae£o*qn»iMr«> Yea aaaa nf/t hat "we are prepared to arrange for the broadcast . . . but we oust have assuranoes that without the imposition of unacceptable conditions, Mr. Cross w i l l be delivered safe and sound". Unless you and your colleagues f e e l strongly that broadcasting the manifesto w i l l be Interpreted as a retreat from the f i r s t decision made, we may be in a good position at t h i s time to show an element of f l e x i b i l i t y . I^sjeejaej 1 P we MMIUIIL iw fgiy ueumrsttert— s&sjpj din lrl,n dlil eatead fchtejejdllae wsfcU nHMght, IHIIIIFH, »)»y ere ?* swfaei ii'iiim1 I w£ mamjiat=mmm pnnitinn f i«t j j j a i asaea*. 3. I f t h i s suggestion for a broadcast fyr radio ( and not TV) i s acceptable to you and your colleagues as a reasonable approach at t h i s juncture in the a f f a i r , I w i l l have a ftill broadcast text prepared for your approval. This text I envisage would occupy 15 minutes of time on ft&dio- Canada with the following format: i) Introductory remarks by an announcer to tha effect that the following i s an o f f i c i a l broadcast on behalf of the Government of "anada and Quebec; ii) ffotAr+~^<£& jJtr^J^*^ LL UMUI bj ~ whiuh A brief but e x p l i c i t explanation of the (mmmaW t&ondltionuibj"whiuh bha fchi — t f •e e t e i i i ) A reading of the manifesto by another announcer, and iv) A short closing statement reiterating briefly the reasons and conditions for the broadcast. 001109 �PxA HHH £ CANADIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY/ LA SOCIETE CANADIENNE DE LA CROIX s.^or\ OUAJ PAA ?2'T"Y7Fx ijpy IAN S JOHNSTON President • President J. R. M. WILSON irman Executive Committee • President du Comiti Exicutif MAJ. GEN. A E. WRINCH Notional Qefrimisstpner • Commissaire Notional \SJ\s~-c7. '..^2 y Tu c.-y o_^. Cp^ 0-*~ *~ tr-~ (r> L. S. C l a r k , Esq November 13, 1970. s^o-M-TFy7 Legal Division, A-LA. v, AL „ ,^> Department of External Affairs, ~~* Fj'L Ottawa, Ontario. Dear Lome: l^'-Tk iXxiytzXJUl. fA /W ~ ^ jL I ^2 c ,<--• 2te-TFK-l) VlA^^-A _ Yc^cUc.y dAr J^^L^—fty I should have replied sooner to your letter of November 3 about the recent visit of Claude Pilloud to this office. He spent the best part of a day with Margaret Wilson and me discussing in the main events in Quebec and my phone calls with Henrik Beer of the League and Courvoisier of ICRC on the evening of October 15. I had reported on them in some detail to Mr. Sharp that evening at about 9.30. I attach a copy of a file memo of October 27 covering the Pilloud visit. From it you will notice that he was of the opinion that there was some misunderstanding on the evening of October 15. This may have been so because of the urgency of affairs that evening. I do know, however, that Henrik was completely briefed and quite clear on what was wanted and the conditions under which any appeal to International Red Cross would be made. I would be somewhat surprised if he did not put the matter to ICRC with reasonable clarity. However, the urgency was such that long conversations were impossible and it was between 1 and 2 a.m., October 16, Geneva time. , We spoke also about the coming meetings of governmental experts in Geneva in May/June 1971. You will already have had notice of this through Mr. Naville's letter to Mr. Sharp of October 22. ICRC places great emphasis on the importance of this meeting and also of Canadian governmental participation at that time. They have called a preliminary meeting of Red Cross experts to consider the same subject in The Hague, March 1 - 6 , and have invited CRCS to send representation to it. We have not yet come to a conclusion as to attendance but will let you know later of any decision. It seemed impossible to arrange for Mr. Pilloud to meet with you in Ottawa when he came up from New York. It was for that reason ii<n n Address all replies to the National Commissioner • Toute communication est 6 adresser au Commissairp National 001110 95 WELLESLEY STRFFT FAST TORONTO S CANADA /OARIPrAMrPO^TOPOMTO/ TFIPPHOMP. „ ^ n . ^ P P e v n o ^ �•HHi - 2 - that we ensured that External knew of his visit to us in Toronto so that a telephone conference could be set up if one was necessary. With kind regards, Yours very sincerely, Lffi National Commissioner. AEW:cr Encl. 001111 �MEMORANDUM TO TIIE FILE October 27, 1970 Mr. Claude Pilloud visited t h i s office today and General Wrinch and I had a long session with him. V/e discussed i n d e t a i l a l l the events i n connection with the kidnappings as they had affected or might a f f e c t the ICRC. With resoect to the events of OctobeE_J^Ui, Mr. Pilloud came t o the conclusion t h a t Mr. Courvoisier had misunderstood the telephoned request which Gen.oral Wrinch had made on behalf of the Canadian government. Mr. P i l l o u d s-Eatedthat on t h a t occasion the ICRTTfiad~Uie impression tha^TTrhey were being asked to f a c i l i t a t e the departure of the kidnappers for Cuba and did not r e a l i s e t h a t the main point of the exercise was to f a c i l i t a t e the r e l e a s e of Mr. Cross. After discussing t h i s subject a t g r e a t length we gave Mr. Pilloud a clipping from t h i s morning's Globe and VSs.il which outlined procedures for Mr. Cross's r e l e a s e which i r e s t i l l i n e f f e c t . Mr. Pilloud s t a t e d t h a t t h i s put i quite d i f f e r e n t complexion on the proposal which he could see was i n some respects analogous to the r o l e which the ICRC had played in connection with the highjacked p l a n e s . He s t a t e d t h a t i f the kidnappers should request tiie intermediary of the ICRC r a t h e r than the Cuban authori t i e s we should immediately get in touch with him i n New York or in h i s absence with Mr. A. D. Micheli and they would immediately request permission to a c t . We also discussed in some d e t a i l the question of inspecting prisons in Quebec. He s t a t e d t h a t the ICRC had already discussed t h i s subject and decided Trfrat a t present circumstances were not such t h a t the ICRC should take any i n i t i a t i v e . If individuals request such -<n inspection t h i s i s the reply which the ICRC w i l l make. However, i f the Canadian government should request such an inspection he f e l t sure the ICRC would accede to the request. Mr. Pilloud w i l l r e m i n in New York u n t i l about the middle of November but within the next tvro weeks w i l l make a t l e a s t one t r i p to Washington. He keeps i n touch with the ICRC and took d e t a i l e d notes of our discussions p a r t i c u l a r l y of the points which been misunderstood by the ICRC. OU/JAi/tAFsljAlA^ Margaret E. Wilson Director for General 'Iffairs MBH/tp 001112 �. ._.., Tj.pPyPPdTX Ppr> »«pp; . ........ AT'-pxy,' :rp ..uul-ttt..-.iw-tHiivin.ivm-.lrtUrtv.• .-.iv.,iv-n.W-uitt"tV"J• • •-7ivm-1 A"« -i-.»•'-V-•• '• -IUiu,U W,anl»tii W.'.UV ,lln,, ^,. _. t-i1'-.'' 'V.„, ,. . - , .1-' - J--., 'ft, £ „ ,\\, njju&wj^ w * ^ ' C t?V. . . . 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J ' . ^JJ' -7 . ^ \ . ,.. , y iiiiii V . P P -p'pi-vi v.r„,"j,.,. J-> ,,7.;P i J'PPVPJVJP. « 001113 �*•. fj~**,JJ -, ^~ -r\^. '"1 *••* *^ I— "•• -J-V- * •. ~- l--~L A rW ,- -- r— '" - * •" .', ' -K S-. r-* „-V- .1. *. ,• 7 Z. —' V r-. ^>. • «. you wculd wish source™ t o £ive t&o (T:;/.v;\cX c o^.:t:.:;^/.:*r>* v-vr-/1 iA*Lfc*i ^'j'*,*"i Vl^N''i* Tv**«> *i*.^>..-*».wJ 4f^»,*Ttr? \**^--.-.t.AAx "•""' •'""' r'JU V P1-^ •»-.—•J'.-•.— /*""«7 >*• -j 1 • ••• •'. •' -J--.V* !*•«**' -'-•*'• '^\i W w U n i i W ^ U .-.-• ,-1 v-i.t-.v-krt WwwvU* V ^ u t o you in f u l l end t h a t ycerp' rce.ptp.pei would v-prlcubtcprly bo conveyed t o h i a vcrry s h o r t l y . PPPPPP:P i n CP-1.P.- t o P.P.P..PP t h a t tho General should not cntcr-telii -AXAATCJ high hopco, i t , . . . . , - <»t-Xxi , . , . . ' , . - r - ~ . . , i . A S..-....iJ~J~.xX..~. ; - UV , j p , * X.Xx-. . < . „ ' . i...~,^ t . ' - . k n -w. .-~> - ' i , .'.......... * : - ' i ...~P - i ' ..... ^> • • • • ' - • - «--..*. • - " . ' • ' - «. 7. ^jx- i d e a of ncdiation in t h e i r f i f t h CCPP oaaiqae. , - > y - 2 - J ^ .J^. ' • - T ... ..- Mention waa Caap/ia oa October 8 ao a dovolopacat \2XAA n i g h t affect tho ,A *~\ *'"• *™v t-OrJ ''-• **(•»,T**a A.i^.^-J I"* •*• / K i" - l •J^\~~l i"!'* f** (*** '-j *™t'"J U^^vwi. t-.i * " . " . ~i «' i ~^ •*••" " — . • • • - . -i • *r, ^i*W tii>*i'W«-^-,^X-w.-i VYr. nrJ"i-lir 1 -tn r^r"^^"! h-^-^.- —-< P--!•••"' * —•»J\Jr UvVUXlrMli J-ii <^»—* *—wr»t;# U U W U ^ V . i <*•"«. .' ».**,iv - ..-* j •' i -. •> V.-...-W « ••, -j es> T-. — •'• *.• r~.-<-1 i — - i .--• * • w*JU»J <i.^w^*v.«, n~H '-N^.*- -^-r v, ......^ k»»J.^*\j *._.«^-rf V-- • • ••:< ^m-+<* W-V. . '-^. U W x V»"W^,Z-LQ. c u ' * ^ C 3 c^ "c.*««3C«.oiro v+i-c^i/ ^*cti src-. ^v^T'O \--«^O LiCiiojrc.**, &3 v o .P - - ...,-,.-. .. \ .-v-A *T »-,#"• -5 -~.-\ ->-'' <*.-^-< — y*^. - ^\ ^»***, 1 "| >-.!• !«•!?'-'. ?-—' -- - «' *•• r' •'- " .- " U«.i"w ^.-P. v. .,-*.... - ' J u v U l . U v 4 . W . * UJ. widU L w . ^ ; u l wX^;Wau UWw»-j ^—VJ C-.-.^>'>J C^-'.i j , v w <iXt?»i^ u*'.v\J i-w—- •„.-*..^ i * * v j j —^- j w u w«.^4.«irf ..._•* ^i.^-AV*»# -"^ ^, 001114 �Voir BOURASSA en page A 6 r • 'r ... I vI Pl par Lucien R1VARD The text/image of this article/letter is not reproduced because of copyright restrictions. Le texte/l'image de cet(te) article/lettre ne figure pas a cause des restrictions de droits d'auteur. Voir LAPORTE en pag* A 6 •A Les policiers auraient passe des heures a quelques pas de Simard et des f reres Roi 001115 �PDM PDS PDF FCO GAF GRF ECP PMO (Mr. Lalonde) PCO(Mr. Robertson) Sol.Geo.(Mr. Ernest Cote) Z.c - 1 x. - fa Task Force List KAX / A'/C^i CC bU^A&2^ KEK--HJ CONFIDENTIAL November 13, 1970 Note to Mr. Q-> Reference: ifgaet Rocquet/Skrabec Telecon November 13 Subject: Enquiry by Ar. E. Davies, British high Commission, November 13 At 9:30 p.m. this evening Mr. Davies rang to enquire whether we were aware of an article in La Pressmen the front page of today's issue (.copy attached) which alleged the local police failed to apprehend the Rose brothers and Francois Simard during their arrest of Bernard Lortie. Hr. Davies stated that he had been informed of a rauio report on the 6:30 p.m. CBC English network which claimed that the ,!police" had confirmed the veracity of the article. He asked whether we had any information on the patter which might enable him to advise London of the facts. I informed Mr. Davies that we had monitored the 6:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. radio and TV news stations in the Ottawa area and did not notice any reference to the article in question, however, we would look into the matter and call him back. After ten minutes of fruitledS searching for today's La, Press*; I called Mr. Puddington at 9:40 p.m. in trie hopes he might know where a copy might be found here. The Parliamentary ^Library was not open, but a copy was obtained from the Chateau Laurier. I spoke to Constable Berthelet of the RCMP who confirmed that he had seen the article in question and read it to me. lie was unable to comment on the alleged police confirmation Mr. Davies mentioned to me. You recall that I spoKe to you shortly after and you agreed that I should discuss the matter with the .RCMP.. I spoke to Constable Berthelet again who indicated that he was 'unable either to confirm or comment on the substance of the article, but suggested I might, if I wished, speak to Inspector Ferraris who assured me that his office's position was as outlined, i.e. they couia not confirm or comment. Inspector Ferraris was not prepared to pursue the matter with the Quebec police agencies and I rang you back. *Ve agreed that I would speak to Mr. Davies along the following lines: Neither we nor the RCMP were aware of a 6:30 p.m. radio news report alledging police confirmation of the La Pressearticle; That tlie Quebec police authorities had not apparently been in touch with the RCMP; That the RCMP, considering their advisory capacity and the nature of the article, were not proposing to seek comment from Quebec police agencies and that we would continue to monitor media reports in the event the storv was rebroadcast in this area. ..2 001116 �ff - 2 - When I telephoned Mr. Davies he spoke to sojneone hear him and said that the report had been seen on CBMT television on cablevision from Montreal at 6:30 p.m. on a programme called "Hour Glass". I regretted that we were not in a position to monitor the Montreal stations, but spoke to him as outlined above, he seemed to understand the position and indicated ne would be watching the 11:00 p.m. news on CBOFT, Channel 9, Ottawa. You may know that CBO, Channel 4, and the CTV station on Channel 13 carried reports (attached) apparently drawn from the La Press article; similar references were/heard on CBOFT, Channel 9. (E. A.(Skrabec 001117 �EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES MEMOIRE TO M. Claud eBoquet A FROM Oe SS3T SECRET CA-Z^.O DATE M. Delano Boily 15 novembre 1970 NUMBER Numiro REFERENCE BtUranr. FILE OTTAWA SUBJECT Sulel Les f r e r e s Rose et Simard echappent a l a p o l i c e . DOSSIER , c2*-£3L-TFfJ~\ MISSION ENCLOSURES Anncxei VjQx*»iJt-+ i DISTRIBUTION M. Bissonnette a obtenu de Maitre Robert-Duui'ajjja Tonfirmation de la veracite de 1'affirmation du communique No 2 de la cellule Viger a. I'effet que les freres Rose et Francis Simard etaient dans cette maison ou Jacques Lortie a ete arrete et qu'ils ne s'en sont echappe que plus tard. 2. M. Bissonnette a ulterieurement communique avec M. Ritchie qui lui a dit que cette information devait etre consideree tres secrete et ne devait pas etre communique aux Britanniques. D.B. Ext. 407A/BU. (Admin. Services Div.) 001118 �POP/Dacre P. Cole/etm EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES KMORANDUM CANADIAN EYES ONLY TO FSUST CONFIDENTIAL FILE A DATE FROM De Dacre P. Cole REFERENCE Reference November 15, 1970 NUMBER Numiro OTTAWA SUBJECT Sw/ *' Inquiries from U.K. High Commission re Press Reports AA 20-22-TJE8 ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION utyOfficjir^ Log Officer No. 2 Receipt of Information Communique/from "Viger" FLQ Information Cell provided by RCMP at 1730 November 14 again raised the question of the extent of detailed information on the progress of general operations which we are obliged to provide to the U.K. High Commission. 2. On Saturday, November 14, Mr. McConville repeated the earlier inquiry of Mr. Davies (November 13) concerning confirmation of press reports of the failure of Montreal Police to apprehend the ROSE brothers and SIMARD who were allegedly also hiding in the apartment when B. LORTIE was arrested. 3. According to Mr. McConville,"sensational" reports such as these are not usually passed on to London unless confirmed by External Affairs. 4. Receipt by the Journal de Montreal of the latest communique dealing with the incident referred to by the Press, and broadcast of the information contained in the communique by CKAC at 0400 November 15, has made it necessary to decide on the appropriate reply to further British inquiries. 5. Mr. Roquet confirmed (see CF Log No.1^9 of November 14) that the UK High Commission should be notified of the receipt of the above communique "during the night", provided with a copy "omitting" time of receipt and informed that the contents had not been confirmed. Since such information concerns suspects involved in the Laporte and not the Cross kidnapping and as this is a sensitive subject which the RCMP could obviously not be expected to raise with Quebec Police authorities, our response will be confined to providing a copy of the communique itself. 6. If further inquiries are received from the British High Commission, our reply should be confined to a promise to "look into the matter". If the inquirer is persistent and not satisfied with this reply he should be referred to Mr. Roquet. 7U7FLA Ext. 407A/BU. (Admin. Services Div.) f-CjT- Dacre P. Co!Le 001119 �y hJO-dL&L- I v— \ rv— eyx.' . -•>. —rp<pr~7 y — .- / - /r<£r CONFIDENTIAL \ ( i Ll ) November 16, 1970. 7 1/ NOTE FOR MR. fc./ROQUET Mr. Langley left for Washington on Saturday, November 14 and expects to return to Ottawa on November 13 or 19. He asked me to tell you that the subject of a possible press announcement concerning the recent Canada-Algeria economic meetings was discussed with members of the Canadian 4 \ •', »• A- , •7 >•'-' -7 >u ' (• delegation. He said that you might like to have a/ j, ('".:••:.. V.-y •-' A word with Mr. R. Roy, Deputy Head of Commercial j !-,„;-. '"^A J \ Policy Division, about this. . . •*' l y ''•'• 7- ' I fl)lS^) A r\ y -if HA . y •• PA' ' \.'S ) ^ Xp / • - - . :L ZZ-o ,vj;,...--A-s-o^ l .,->- '-•' •rfi \ 0/PDE > 2. I i ,i •Hi. V 001120 �POP/AJ).RoojoM log board MEMORAHDUM FPR (Mr. R o s s RESTRICTED Francis) 16, 1970 POP ( K r . A. 3 . Howe Federal Government Press Officer in Montreal • — 20-22-WE-l ce: 20-22-TFK-9 •17 On at least two occasions, we have noted in telegrams and letterj that tha prsseuce of a iedejral government press officer in Montreal might have assisted foreign Journalists in balancing their reports on the AL.. crisis. Should, harevar, a new and dramatic development in the subject occur (release or death of Hr. Croee, new arrests, etc.), the presence of a federal information source in Montreal might be very useful* 2. It would be appreciated if you eould informally discuss tht natter with Reiaeo Leblaae. (It may well be that consideration had been given to this natter some time age, and we ware not aware of consultations on the subject.) 3. If it Is felt that the idea has merit, re feel that someone from the PMD would be a logical choice to speak in Montreal to the foreign press .since that individual would be able to touch on many points of domes tic polities which a spokesman from our Department, for axaaple, aieftt not be in a position to do. 4. tfhen he asked me to consult yen on this, Kr. Roquet felt that your approach to Hr. Leblanc should be informal and exploratory in nature. If we hear from you to the aTfiroat*.ve, then the matter could be taken up more formally, say by Mr. Ritchie. F@6 A. D. Bows 0011 �POP/C .Roquet/mk EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO A NOTE FOR FILE FROM Mr. Roquet AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES SECURITY Sfcurffe Unclassified DATE November 16, 1970 11:45 a.m. NUMBER Numiro Oe REFERENCE Reference OTTAWA SUBJECT Sul»l Press Agency Rumours of British Interrogators in Canada ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION UPI phoned Mr. Francis about a report that 21 British interrogators were arriving in Canada to reinforce the police effort in the kidnappings affair. UPI seemed to doubt its own story: they thought perhaps they were 21 Interpol interrogators coming from Britain. 2. Mr. Francis thought this was probably nonsense, but intended to check the story with Inspector Ferraris and the British HCO. 271 C. Roquet Ext. 407A/BU. (Admin. Services Div.) 001122 �A.Rowe/PS RESTRICTED November 16, 1970. MR. RITCHIE FROM A.D. ROWE (POP) 2.45 pm h- 262&~TFK-\ &-33- J- ACTrJ "Tour request fcr Statement Allegedly Made by Director General 3t-Pierre Assistant Commissioner Parent, RCMP, telephoned to state that they were not aware that St-Pierre had made a statement and were reluctant to press the Montreal Police authorities for a text since: (a) the Lortie arrest was done by the Montreal Police without RCMP assistance, and (b) it was related to the Laporte and not Cross kidnapping. He promised, however, that if they received information as to what M. St-?-_orre may have told the press, they would relay it to us immediately. I realize that this will not be helpful in your discussions this afternoon with the British High Commissioner at 4 pm but tbe RCMP feel they have no right to '^intervene" in Montreal Police matters even to request a text." P.S. 001123 �A.Rowe/PS RESTRICTED November 16, 1970. 2.45 pm 777 AAAI-TKA FROM A.D. RO,;E (POP) \ i "Your request for Statement Allegedly Made by Director General St-Pierre Assistant Commissioner Parent, RCMP, telephoned to state that they v/ere not aware that St-Pierre had made a statement and were reluctant to press the Montreal Police authorities for a text since: (a) the Lortie arrest eras done by the Montreal Police without RCMP assistance, and (b) it was related to the Laporte and not Cross kidnapping. He promised, hov/ever, that if they received information as to v/hat M. St-Pierre may have told the press, they would relay it to us immediately. I realize that this will not be helpful in your discussions this afternoon with the British High Commissioner at 4 pm but the RCMP feel they have no right to "intervene'1' in lontreal Police matters even to request a text.if 17 NOV 70 9 8 0 6 P.S 001124 �RETURN TO D,v, S ,ONAU "•i°"'S S E C MESSAGE R E T A R Y <=ENTRE PLANNING PATE FM/DE TO/A fafg ,?fl EXTOTT « IV1.6/70 FUE/PPSSIER 20-22-TF#-l SECURITY SECURITE CONF 20~22-TFj^-FLC|-2 NO LONDON P0P^Q3 PRECEDENCE OPIMMED INFO Vo-~K fdrece" J)(±T \ | BEE. SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING - LATEST COIMJNIQUE ON N0V24 THE QUOTE VIGER CELL IN COLLABORATION WITH THE CHENIER CELL UNQUOTE RELEASED A COMMUNIQUE. IT WAS PUBLISHED IN MTL. 2. COMMUNIQUE PURPORTS TO QUOTE CLARIFY THE EVENTS WHICH SURROUNDED THE ARREST (NOV6) OF BERNARD LORTIE UNQUOTE AND DETAILS AS QUOTE FACTS UNQUOTE THE FOLLOWING: (A) WHEN POLICE ENTERED APT ALL FOUR/FOUR WANTED MEN WERE PRESENT (B) LORTIE WAS IN APT PROPER WHILE THREE OTHERS (ROSE BROTHERS AND SIMARD) WIRE HIDDEN IN A PREVIOUSLY CONSTRUCTED CUBICLE BUILT INTO A CLOTHES-CLOSET (C) THEY REMAINED HIDDEN FOR 24 HOURS (D) THE NEXT NIGHT TWO POLICEMEN LEFT THE APARTMENT, AND THEIR GUNS, TO GO OUT TO DINNER AND (E) THE THREE MEN ESCAPED BY A REAR EXIT LEAVING THE DOOR TO THEIR HIDING PLACE OPEN, WITH FINGERPRINTS ALL OEER TO PROVE THEY HAD BEEN THERE. PURPOSE OF THIS FINAL ACTION AND THE COMMUNIQUE WAS TO PROVE THAT LORTIE WAS NOT A TRAITOR AS HE HAD BEEN DEPICTED • • • «<DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE ORIGIN CTSUft DIVISION '^UTORISE TELEPHONE sio. SIO H t *A-» JJ«» EXT 18/BIL (REV 5/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) POP 5-6435 ' ' 001125 �- 2 - * CONF ~ ~ TO QUOTE BREAK THE PUBLIC SYMPATHY FOR THE FLQ UNQUOTE. 3. AUTHENTICITY OF COMMUNIQUE I S STILL BEING INVESTIGATED. PRIOR TO ITS PUBLICATION THERE HAD AIREADY BEEN PRESS STORIES ALONG LINES OF COMMUNIQUE»S CONTENTS. OBC 4. WE UNDERSTAND FROM^RADIO THAT THERE WAS A QUEBEC POLICE OFFICIAL STATEMENT TODAY AND WILL SEND YOU TEXT AS SOON AS RECEIVED. MEANWHILE WE HAVE TOLD BRITISH HERE THAT WE WERE NOT/NOT IN POSITION TO COMMENT ON THIS DEVELOPMENT UNTIL WE HAD OFFICIAL INFORMATION FROM QUEBEC AUTHORITIES. �xcv<. >-.. , - y MEK0RA1TDUM FOR MR. Under . s e c r e t a r y OJ External .Affairs . pce J.U Pi 7 .-' X J. L. .-.. 1 spoke t o t h e Prim about your memorandum o t x^overeieper . t r a n s p o r t t o B r i t a i n f o r Mr. C r o s s jpr.. v ^ r o r:. -i.CJX t l —. s. y. Pi ci A re re e c The Prime Minister pgrees that r woula .oe pies pr a.Dj-e tnat we snould underaaxe uo provide tr to Britain for Mr. Cross in eitber contingency - 7 . J J C . .. — s xi ne J.s Killed and it PP a maucer OP transoo p p cie. P I S body or if he is found alive and it is a matter op appropricjirp transportaulon aa wnatever PS tere right time., The Prime Minister agrees thea the Brpe can be advised of this decisicp. so that there is no need for them tc keep an aircraft on standby. In reply tc a question I told ane Prime Minister LiPa e i aia P O L ur*cep*o carpa apj.au aepis commit— prent on our part would necessarily mean that ere vrould have to have an aircraft on standby, While ane point eras not specific in the memorandum, I assumed that ve could probably provide an aircraft in a sufficiently short space of time that it would seem appropriate arpa reasonable. I hope that is the case. I did no_t raise with the ?rirr.e Minister the question of a Ministerial escort in case Mr. Cross is Killed. -.ou mignt want to ccnsp_aer wnetner tnis would, in fact, be necessary„ I suppose it vrould be required or expected if it were a Meaa of Mission who is involved but I cannot help wondering whether people would no u find it a ait oaa to nave a ^uppister going to the United Kingdom in this actual case. If the matter is not fully thought out perhaps it would not be too difficult to settle if and when tnat contingency uiTiSPS • 001127 �OFFICE^OF THE « HAUT-COMMISSARIAT DU CANADA, MAISON DU CANADA, LONDRES, S-O.l. M COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, C A N A D A HOUSE, * LONDON, S.W.I. PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL November 17, 1970. (ZAJ4 ILA} Thank you so much for sending me a copy of the communication to the British High Commissioner in Ottawa from one of his officers in Montreal, under cover of your letter of November 12, It is very helpful to be kept in touch in this way and to realize the extent of co-operation which the Quebec and Montreal police have been extending to the British. C.S.A. Ritchie. . A. E. Ritchie, Esq., Under-Secretary of State for External A f f a i r s , O t t a w a . . "001128 •* T ^ J f J l h A �POP/C.Roquet/ras n MEMO FOR FILE A7 ^O-M'TfK" C.Roquet I REACTED rfovember 17, 1970 Mr. Choquette*s November 13 Speech in the Quebec National Assembly - References to Foreign countries. Attached is the full text of the above speech. It touches incidentally on some External Affairs aspects, which interested Divisions may wish to be aware of : MIN (Mr.Taylor) OU GAF GEUE FC 0 GRF GCO FIS (Mr.Francis) -i V r\ -^~v. . .—- --\ (a) "Soviet Oppression" - Mr. Choquette deplored that the FLQ manifesto says "not one word about Soviet oppression in Czechoslovakia, not a word about Hungary, not a word about Poland" (p. 4); (b) Cuban and Alegerian Internal Situation - After alluding to the situation in which post-revolutionary countries find themselves, Mr. Choquette said that "our people must not accept another form of systematic and organized underdevelopment, within some kind of Cuban or Algerian state" (p. 4 ) ; (c) Algerian Press Reaction - Mr. Choquette quotes a newspaper in Algiers as the only one abroad not to have expressed disapproval of terrorist action in Quebec. He commends Rude Pravo for having condemned it (p. 11); (d) British Attitude - Mr. Choquette notes that even lord Home has expressed his approval of the actions of the Canadian and Quebec governments, even though James Cross is a British diplomat (p. 11); (e) Internal Situation in Brazil and Argentina • The Quebec Justice Minister said that "there is no common measure between the situation in Quebec and that in Brazil or Argentina or some other South American country, where military juntas too often replace democratically elected governments; where the poverty of the mass is extreme and contrasts in a striking manner with the opulence of the rich" (p. 32); (f) Situation in Jordan and in French Algeria - "There is no common measure either between our situation and that of Jordan, or that of Algeria when it was under the domination of France" (p. 13); .../2 001129 �- 2 MEMO FOR FILE (cont'd) RESTRICTED (g) Foreign Intervention - Mr. Choquette alludes cryptically to possible foreign interventions in case of a power vacuum in Quebect "To institute a regime -through violence and force (when existing institutions guarantee Individual and collective freedom) is to open the way directly and immediately to the totalitarian state or (if such a state does not materialize) to reasons for foreign Interventions" (p. 12). CR. �I )X2 7'2 2x0(77-7:2.7) I X7.7ir.mK7Z,) I rA.F-AAPOA) I }70A2AAPO)2.10.0A022X)_\ )XPx{7X2A) __ i>i;b(i)kEi:slij^^ 7Z7J727A.WAF] C O ' N F I D E N T I A L TRANSMETTRE AUX HONORABLES TRUDEAU SHARP TURNER 70 IL3RAITH DEBUT TEXTE GOUVERNEMENT DU QUEBEC MINISTERS DE LA JUSTICE CABINET DU MINISTRE LA MORT DE PIERRE LAPORTE, AMI, COLLEGUE PARLEXENTAIRE , PERE ET EPOUX EXEMPLAIRE, ET LENLEVEMENT DUN DIPLOMATS ANGLAIS, JAMES CROSS, QUE NOUS NE CONNAISS IONS PAS MAIS QUE NOUS AVONS APPRIS A CONNAITRE PAR SES LETTRES ET SES PHOTOGRAPHIES QUI EN DISENT LONG SUR SA FORCE DE CARACTERE, ONT POSE EN TERMES DENJEU HUMAIN TOUTE LA QUESTION DES VALEURS QUI DOIVENT PRIMER DANS NOTRE CIVILISATION, EN EFFET, LENLEVEMENT ET LE MEURTRE POUR DES MOTIFS POLITIQUES NOUS METTENT FACE A FACE DEVANT LA MORT COMME RESULTAT DE LACTION POLITIQUE. NOUS ETIONS BIEN LOIN DE CROIRE ICI, IL Y A ENCORE PEU DE TEMPS, QUE CERTAINES PERSONNES POUVAINT UTILISER DANS LEUR STRATEGIE POLITIQUE LA CONSPIRATION ET LEXECUflON DES CRIMES LES PLUS SORDIDES POUR LAVANCEMENT DE LEUR CAUSE« MAIS TELLE EST LA REALITE DAUJOURDHUI. LE MATERIALISMS A ATTEINT DE TELLES PROPORTIONS QUE LETRE HUMAIN NE COMPTE PLUS. AUSSI, SI COMME LE DEPUTE PE 50URGET, LON FAIT LE PROCES DE CEUX QU] ONT AJ .. i LES VALEURS HUM A] Ni LANAECHIX, OM MO IT RECOMM.AlTRE lA.Px.77tA. OU:. ! 1LLC.:> I ,A FRESERV'TION DE LA VIE ET LE RESPECT 001131 �• PAGE DEUX PARLQUE CONFD DE LA PERSONNE SON! DES VALEURS QUI NE LEUR APPARTIENNENT RAS MAIS AUAU CONTRAIRE NOUS AVANS LE DROIT DE LES REVENDIQUER. DANS LIDEOLOGIE REVOLUTIONNAIRE DE CEUX QUI ONT PERPETRE CES CRIMES LE RESPECT CE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE N'IMPORTE PAS, LEURS ACTES LE PROUVENT QUAND MEME ILS SE RECLAMERAINT DE QUELQUE FRATERNITE HUMAINE, LA CONSCIENCE DE NOTRE PEUPLE ET DE TOUTE LHUMANITE SINSURGE CONTRE CETTE DUEETE A LEGARD DE LHOMME, A LEGARD DE DEUX HOMMESc AUSSI EST-CE RENVERSER LES VALEURS QUE DAFFIRMER QUE LA VIOLENCE SE JUSTIFIE DUNE FACON QUELCONQUE DANS UNE SOCIETE QUI, MALGRE SES FA1BLESSES ET SES PASTES, EST FONDEE SUR LE RESPECT DE LINDIVIDU, ALORS QUE NOUS POSSEDONS LES MOYENS DE LADAPTER, DE LA TRANSFORMER PAR UNE ACTION INDIVIDUALS ET COLLECTIVE QUI PERMETTE DENTREVOIR UN ETAT CONFORME A NOS ASPIRATIONS VERS LA FRATERNITE ET LA PAlK. CETTE IDEE NE SE RETROUSE PAS UNIQUEMENT DANS QUELQUES TEXTES CONST IT'JTIONNELS MAIS SINSCRIT AU COEUR MEME DE FACTION DU GOUVERNEMENT ACTUEL, JE PENSE EN PARTICULIER A LA LOI D [.ASSURANCE -MAL. AN IE ET AU PROJET DE LOI SUR LA PROTECTION DU CONSOMMATEUR. MAIS LEEEEUVE CUE NOUS AVONS TRAVERSES ET QUE NOUS TRAVERSONS TOUS COLLECT ]VEMENT AURA EU AU MOINS LE MERITS DE NOUS IMPOSER DRAMATXQMEMENT UNE REFLEXION SUR LA SOCIETE DANS LAQUELLE NOUS VOULONS VIVRE ET DE NOUS IMPOSER EGALEMENT LA VOLONTE DE C0M3ATTRE ET DE TRIOMPHSR. LIDEAL REVOLUTIONNAIRE QUI AG IT A PERTIR DUN INSTINCT 001132 �• PAGE TROIS PARLQUE CONFD DS DESTRUCTION ST FAIT CROIRE A UN ETAT PARADISIAOUE OU LHOMME SERA LE FRERE DE LHOMME EST FONDAMENTALEMENT VICIE A LORIGINE. IL SE PRESENTE ALORS COMME UN MESSIANISME ALORS QUE NOTRE EXPERIENCE VECUE, NOTRE CONNAISSANCE DE LA VIE ET DES STRES HUMAINS NOUS SNSEIGNENT QUE CET IDEAL REVOLITIONNAIRE CONDUIT FATALEMENT A DES SOLUTIONS TOTALIT A IRES , ECRASANTES ET HUMILIANTES POUR LHOMME EN LE REDUISANT AU RANG DOUTIL DANS LES MAINS DE QUELQUE "MANIRULATEUH".' ( S I C ) LA DUPLICITE DE CERTAINES PERSONNES QUI TROUVENT DANS LACTION REVOLUTIONNAIRE REGENTS DES EXCUSES POUR LES RAVISSEURS OU DES RAISONS DS 3LAMSR CEUX QUI AVAIENT LA RESPONSABILITE IMMEDIATE DE DECIDER EST DSMONTREE PAR LA POSITION DU DEPUTE DS BOURGET: I , FAIRE UN COMPROMIS OPPORTUNISTS DANS LS TEMPS EN CEDANT SUR LESSENTIEL DSS REVENDICATIONS DU F . L . Q , ST EN JETANT PAR DESSUS BORD TOUS LES PRINCIPES DE NOTRE SOCIETE DEMOCRATIQUE SONDES SUR LA VOLONTE POPULAIRE ET LE RESPECT DES DECISIONS I M P E R T I A K L E S DE NOS TRIBUNAUX, ET PAR LA SUITE APPLIQUES LES SOLUTIONS RIG I D E S , CE QUI EST LA CONTRADICTION MEMS; 2. EN RAISON DES ENLEVEMENTS DE M3SSIEURS CROSS ET LAPORTE ACCEPTER DE SUSPENDRE TEMPORAIREMENT LA PRIMAUTE DU DROIT, SEUL GARANT DE LA LIBERTE IMDIVIPUELLE ET COLLECT IVE, PAR UN RESPECT MENSONGER ET DQCCASION POUR LA VIE HUMAINE. MAIS CES APOTRES DE LA NONVIOLENCE XE SERAINT-IL PAS EN FAIT DES EPERVIERS SOUS LE PLUMAGE r * 11 A 001133 �• PAGE QUATRE PARLQUE CONED TROP COMMODE DE COLONSES? N Y A-T-IL PAS DERRIERE CES ECMAPPATOIRES PAR TOP FACILES DU PARTI QUEBECOIS ET DE SON CHEF EN PARTICULIER UN CALCUL POLITIQUE VISANT A SAFER LES INSTITUTIONS DEMOCRATIQUES ACTUELLES? CELA MAPPARAIT EVIDENT. MAINS CE DONT ON NE SE RAND PAS COMPTE CHEZ LES MILITANTS DU PARTI QUEBECOIS, CEST QUE DANS L H Y P O T H E S S REVOLUTIONNAIRE CE tip SONT PAS EUX QUI EXERCERONT EFFICACEMENT ST REELLEMENT LE POUVOIR, MAIS BIEN PLUTOT DAUTRES CHEZ QUI LASPIRATION A LINDEPENDANCE NEST QUE SECONDAIRE PAR RAPPORT A LEUR DESIR EFFRENE DE DESTRUCTION ET DE OONQUETE DU POUVOIR, CAR LES ARMES VSR3Al.ES DE L 'EX-DEPUTE DE LAURIER, SOUDA1NBNENT ET HYPOTETIQUEMSNT DEVENU LE MODERATUER, SERAINT VITE BALAYEES PAR DES PERSONNES BEAUCOU 0 PLUS APTES QUE LUI A DISGIPLINER LES MASSES. DANS LE MANIFESTE DU FLQ, JAI ETE FRAPPE PAR LENUMERA.T ION DES INJUSTICES DE CERTAINS GOUVERNEMENTS, MAIS PAS UN MOT DE L0PPRSS3I0N SOVIETIQUE DE LA T CHSCOSLO VAQU IE, PAS UN MOT DE LA HONGRIS, PAS UN MOT DE LA POLOGNE; LES PRETENDUS CHEFS DE LOPINION PUBLIQUE CUEBECOISE AURONT-ILS LA LUCIDITE ET LE COURAGE DE REVELER SN TOUT" HONNETETE CE QUEST LA SITUATION DUNE SOCIETE POST-REVOLUTTONNAIRE. Ar,EES AVOIR ACCEPTE DES SIECLES DE SOUS-DEVELOPPEMENT, NOTRE PEUPLE NE DOIT PAS ACCEPTER UNE AUTRE FORME DE SOUS-DEVELOPPEMENT SYSTEMATISE ET ORGANISE A LINTERIEUR DUN CUELCON^U7 ETAT CUBAIN OU 001134 �• PAGE CINQ PARLQUE CONED ALGERIEN. NOUS MACCEPTONS PAS CE NOUVEAU CONEORMISME QUI SE REPAND AU NIVEAU SCOLAIRE, UN I VERSITAIRE ET SYNDICAL, ST QUI MENACE DEMPRISONNER LES FORCES VIVES DE NOTRE PEUPLE. AU COURS DE CE DE3ATS AT A DAUTRES OCCASIONS, ON MA INTERPOSE SUR LA POSITION QUE JAVAIS PRISE AU NOM DES DEUX GOUVERNEMENTS LE 10 OCTOBRE AU MOMENT DE LEXPIRATION DU DELAI FIXE POUR LEXECUTION DE M. CROSS. JS TIENS A DIRE QUE LA POSITION QUE JAI EXPRIME A ETE ELA30REE CONJOINTEMSNT PAR LES GOUVERNEMENTS DE QUEBEC £T DOTTAle'A. LE PREMIER MINISTRE ET MOI AVONS ETE CONSTAMMENT EN COMMUNICATION, IL SAGISSAIT LA DUNE RESPONSABILITE PARTAGE ENTRE LES DEUX GOUVERNEMENTS. DE LA COMPETENCE CONSTITUTIONNELLE EBDE_RALE, RELEVANT CEUX QUI AVAIENT DEJA ETE CONDAMNES. DE NOTRE CBTE, NOUS AVIONS A DECIDER DU SORT DE CEUX QUI ETAIENT A CE MOMENT DEVANT NOS . TRIBUNAUX. LOTAGE ETAIT UN DIPLOMATS ETRANGER ET LE SAUF-CONDUIT DONT IL SAGISSAIT VERS UN PAYS STRANGER, A LA DEMANDS DU K: Q, DANS SON PREMIER COMMUNIQUE INCOMBAIT AU GOUVERNENENT FEDERAL. LS PRINCIPE QUI Y A PRECEDE A ETE CELUI DS SAUVEGARDER LESSEN'! IEL DS NOTRE SOCIETE DEMOCRATIQUE ET DE NOS INSTITUTIONS JUDICIAIRES, TOUT SN OPERANT LE MAXIMUM SUR LE PLAN DES ASSOUPEISSEMENTS 1." S RAISONS QUI ONT MOTIVE CETTE PRISE DE POSITION ETAIENT LES SUIVANTES: 1. IL NE SAGISSAIT PAS DE PRISONNIERS POLITIQUES, CAR TOUS AVAIENT ETE CONDAMNES Q!! ETAIENT ACCUSES V'N VF^TM D>! P P P T Y PPYVHV ...6 001135 �PAGE SIX PARLQUE CONED ?... CEDER SUM LE FOND CETAIT ACCEPTER LE SYSTEME DU KIDNAPPING Oil DE LENLEVEMENT POUR FAIRS ECHEC A UNE JUSTICE QUI. EST PARMI LES PLUS IMPART I ALES AU MONDE, MALGRE TOUT CE QUE LON PEUT EN DIRE 3. LES MOYENS DE CONTESTATIONS QUI EXISTENT EN SOCIETE DEMOCRATIQUE EXCLUENT NECESSAIEEMENT LA VIOLENCE COMME MOYEN DE PRESSION, SUIT SUR LES DECISIONS DES ELUS, SOIT SUR LES DECISIONS JUDICIAIRES 4. LA VIOLENCE ENGENDER LA VIOLENCE ET, PAR CONSEQUENT. LANARCHIE. CE NEST PLUS ALORS LA LOI ET LES DECISIONS DES TRIBUNAUX QUI DETERMINENT LE JUSTS ET LINJUSTE, MAIS LA FORCE ET LA VIOLENCE 5. PERMETTRE UN CHANTAGE ODIEUX SANS SAUVEGARDER LE PRINCIPE DE LORDRE QUI EST LE FONDEMENT DE LSXERCICE DE LA LIBERTE, CETAIT INTRODUIRS POUR LAVENIR LA GENERALISATION DE CE SYSTEME 6. FINALEMENT, COMMENT DECEMMENT PROCEDER DANS DAUTRES CAUSES ULTERIEURES EN VERTU DE NOS LOIS CONTRE LES TERRORISTES OU CONTRE DAUTRES OUI AURAIENT VOULU UTILISES CETTE FACON DE REGLER DES P-;,OBLENES OU DES SITUATIONS CONTESTESS. MAIS NOUS AVONS PROPOSE CERTAINS ASSOUPLISSEMENTS POUR DES CONSIDERATIONS SUIVANTES: 1. DABORD , POUR SAUVER LA VIE DE M. CROSS 2. POUR PACIFIER LE CLIMAT CREE PAR PACTION TERRORIST-:, SI MAL FONDEE r J IT-ELLE 5. POUR DEMONTRER UN HUMANISMS COMSATHLS AVEC LE RESPECT DU A LA VOLONTE DEMOCRATISM" �• PAGE SEPT PARLQUE CONED CES REVOLUTIONNAIRES? QUELLES ETAIENT LEURS INTENTIONS? JUSQUO'J DEVAIENT-ELLES LES PERTER? AVAIENT-ILS COMPLETEMENT ARRETS? LEUR PROJET? LEXPRESSION DUNE ATTITUDE COMPREHENSIVE DANS LEXXRCISE DE NOTRE RESPONSABILITE POUVAIT PEUT-ETRE REJOINDRE CSUX-LA QUI NOUS ETAIENT 1NCONNUS SIL SAGISSAIT DIDSALISTES SCARES, NOUS LEUR TENSIONS LA PERCKE POUR SE SAUVER ET PEUT-ETRE AINSI RSDUIRE OU SLIMINSR LE TERRORISMS DANS LAVENIR. MEMS SIL SAGISSAIT DUNS ESCALADE P L A N I F I E E , COMPORTANT LENLEVEMENT ET DES DSVELOPPEMENTS ULTERIEURS SUR LE PLAN DE LAGITATION SOCIALE OU DE LASSASSINAT, CE NETAIT PAS MON AVIS QUILS PASSERAIENT DIATEMENT AU MEUTRE DE JAMES CROSS. A CE SUJET, IMME- PLUSIEURS DELAIS ANTERIEURS AVAIENT ETE CONSENT I S . JE COMPTAIS AUSSI Pri3. SUR LAPPUI DSS LEADERS DE LOPINION QUI NE VINT IL ME SEMBLE ELEMENTAIRS QUE LACCEPTATION DES CONDITIONS POSEES S I G N I F I A I T UN GLISSSMENT VERS LANARCHIE. JE COMPTAIS AUSSI QUE LON NS SERAIT PAS DE LA POLITIQUE OU DU SPORT AVEC UNE CHOSE AUSSI SERIEUSE QUS LS RESPECT DES INSTITUTIONS DEMOCRATIQUES ET LA VIE DUN HOMME. J M ' Q I S SURESTIME LA CAPACITE DS COMPREHENSION DE NOS LEADERS DOPINIONS ET UN FAIT DEVAIT SE PRODUIRE QUASI INSTANTANEMENT ET DE FACON INPREVI3IBLE : LENLEVEMENT DE PIERRE LAPORTE. .. . 8 001137 �PAGE HUIT PARLQUE CONFD DANS LSS JOURS QUI 3UIVIRENT, PLUSIEURS EVENEMENTS SE PRODUISIREMT DONT CELUI DE LASSEMBLEE All CENTRE PAUL SAUVE, CETTE ASSEMBLES OOMME DAUTRES GROUPES, DONNA SON APPUI AU FLQ. IL Y EUT, ENTRE AUTRES, LES EXPRESSIONS DOPINION DU FRAP, DU CONSEIL CENTRAL DE LA CSN. ON DISTRIBUA DES TRACTS DANS DIVERSES UNIVERSITES ET CEGEP. I.JN MOT DORDRE EUT DONNE: DESCENDRE DANS LA RUE. MAIS JE SUS VIVSMENT INPRESSIOMNE PAR LE COMMUNIQUE NO 0 DE LA CELLULE CHENIER, LE IB OCTOBRE, A 3 HEURES P AP. QUI SXPRIMAIT LES IDEES SUIVANTES: DEUX CONDITIONS A REALISES POUR LA LIBERATION DP M. CROSS ET SIX POUR CELLS DE M. LAPORTE, AUTREMENT CETAIT LEXECUTION POUR LUN ET POUR LAUTRE SUIVANT LE NOMBRE BEXIGENCES AUXQUELLSS NOUS SERIONS PRETS A ACCEDER, DEVANT LENORMITE DES EXIGENCES, DEVANT LES DIFFERENTES CONDITIONS QUE LON IMP05AIT POUR LA LIBERATION DE JAMES CROSS ET DE PIERRE LPPORTE, DEVANT TOUTES LES AUTRES CIRCONSTANCES AUXQUELLSS JAI DEJA FAIT ALLUSION, ACCEPTATION DU CHANTAGE, ENCOURAGEMENT AU TERRORISMS ULTERIEUR, PREUVE DE FAIBLESCS DU GOUVERNEMENT ET, FINALEMENT , ABDITION DES INSTITUTION'S DEMOCRATIQUES ET JUDICIAIRES DEVANT LS CRIME, NOUS NE POUVIONS PAIRS UNE AUTRE QFERE QUE CELLE QjE JAVAIS PRECEDEMMESNT FORMULEE, SN Y AJOUTANT UNT PROFESS RECOMMANDER LA LIBERATION IM l E D l A T E DS S I X P R I S O N N I E R S A C ELIGIBLES 2027 dA'dXA Pl LA LIBERATION C O N D I T I O N N E L L E . PPi.dc IA. > 02 rppjPUJ p'rr 1 I'P e. i A ! !Re Od 1 Pr: i PEA i LJ .\ EJL'lAL:. . ..9 001138 �PAGE NEUF PARLQUE CONED LA PAS3AVITE IMPOSEE AU GOUVERNEMENT PAR LA PRISE DOTAGES CAUSA IT UN VACUUM QUANT A LACTION DS LAUTORITE PUBLIQUE ST LSS CITOYENS COMMENCAIENT A SS RENDRE COMPTE QUE LES APBUIS DONNES AU MANIFESTS DU ELQ PAR CERTAINS MOUVEMENTS TELS QUE LE SRAP ET LA CONSEIL CENTRAL DS MONTREAL DE LA CSN ASSORT IS DUNE REPROBATION BEAUCOUP MONNS ENERGIQUS DE LACTION VIOLENTE DU FLQ, AINSI QUS CERTAINES ANNONCES DASSZM3LF.ES DANS LES UNIVERSITES, LAISSAIENT ENTREVOIR UNE SYMPATHIE QUI POUVANT FACILEMENT DEVENIR ACTIVE SN FAVEUR DU FLQ. DANS CES CONDITIONS, MEME SI LSS MEMBRES ACTIFS DU FLQ NETAISNT PAS TELLEMENT NOMBREUX, LA POSSIBILITE SERIEUSES EXISTAIT QUE DES SYMPATHISANTS 3ASCULENT DANS LACTIVISME OU SOUS LE COUVERT DAPPUI AU MANIFESTE SE LAISSSNT ALLER A DES MOUVEMENTS INC0NTR0LE5, OU ENCORE QUE DANS LE LABYRINTHS DES VRAIS ET DES FAUX COMMUNIQUES DU FLQ ON ELEVE LA TEMPERATURE AU POINT OU LA SOCIETE EN SOIT SERIEUSEMENT AESSCTES DANS SA CONFIANCE ENVSRS SON GOUVERNEMNST 6i QUAINSI UN DESORDRE GENERAL SINSTAUEE. IE FALLAIT DONC A CE MOMENT QUE LE GOUVERNENENT ASSUME PLEINEMENT SES RESPONSABILITES ET EMPECHE LA SITUATION DE DEGENERER SANS EMo'pT QUE LETAT DE CONFUSION QUI EXISTAIT NE CONSTITUAIT PAS UNE GARANT IE POUR LA VIE DE MESSIEURS CROSS ST LAEADRTE ,QAM ON SE SOUVIENDRA, A J MOINS QUANT A M. CROSS, QUAERES SAMEDI, LS IS OCTOBRE, LON NA EU AUCUNE NOUVELLE DE LA CELLULE DE LIBERAT IO ET QUE CE NEST QUAERES l.APPLICATION DES MESURES DUEv 1 (A �• PAGE DIX PARLQUE CONED MORT DE M. LAPORTE, QUE LON A DONNE LA PREUVE QUIL ETAIT TOUJOURS VIVANT. PAR CONSEQUENT, EN NOUS SITUANT EXCLUSIVEMENT AU PLAN DE LESCALADE DUE A LINTERVENTION DE LA CELLULE CHENIER, LAQUELLE ETAIT MANIFESTEMENT BEAUCOUP MOINS BIEN ORGANISES QUE LA CELLULE LIBERATION - LA CELLULE CHENIER A PROVOQUE UNE SITUATION DUNE AMBIGUITE EXTREME, SUSCITE LIMPRESSION DUNE STRATEGIE, QUE JE NEXCLL1S PAS COMPLETEMENT A LHEUEE ACTUELLE - STRATEGIE EN VERTU DE LAQUELLE LETAT MAVAIT AUCUN AUTRE CHOIX QUE DE EE.QG1E DE LA FACON LA PLUS RADIALE POSSIBLE CAR TOUT LAISSAIT PRESAGES UN EFFORT CONCERTS ET PLAN1FIE DS LA PART DES MEMBRES DU EEC POUR AMENER LAGITATION AU PAROXYSMS CREE£ UN DESORDRE QUI POUVAIT ETRE EXPLOSIP ET SUSCITER LA DESORGANISATION DE LETAT, LE GOUVERNEMENT DEVAIT DONC PRENDRE LES MESURES APPROPR I EsPOUR PREVENIR UNE SITUATION QUI POUVAIT METTRE EN DANGER LORDRE PUBLIC LAPRIVEE DSS EORCES ASSESS PLUS TOT DANS LA JOURNEE DU 10 OCTOBRE A PERMIS PALLEGEE LE FARDEAU DES CORPS POLICIERS DE LA VILLE DE MONTREAL ET DS LA SURETE DU QUEBEC EN LES DECHASGEANT DU TRAVAIL DE BARDIENS POUR LEUR PERMETTRE DEPFBCTUER LEUR REAL TRAVAIL DE POLICIER;,. CETTE MESURE, A LAQUELLE SEST AJOUTEE LENTREE SN V I GL1E.IR LE \C OCTOBRE DES REGLEMENTS CONCERNANT LORPRE PUBLIC 1070, ST LA DETENTION DE PLUSIEURS BEUYANTS 5YEPATHISA.NTS PU FLQ, EUT PLUSIEURS RE DUET ATS « c c• t> I 1 001140 �PAGE ONZE PARLQUE CONED I. LA DISLOCATION DU PLAN OU DE LA STRATEGIE IMPROVISES SN PARTIE SI LON VEUT, DE .PROPAGANDE, DES MANIFESTATIONS ET DU MOT DORDRE DE DESORGANISATION DE LA SOCIETE ET DE LETAT 2. LE FAIT DE RENDRE NECESSAIRE POUR LSS TERRORISTES DE SISOLSR DANS LA CLANDEST1NITE 3c DE CALMER TEMPORAIREMENT LARDEUR DES ETUDIANTS ET DES AUTRES MOUVEMENTS SYMPATHIQUES AU MANIFESTS PARCE QUE LE ELQ ETAIT DEVSNU ILLEGAL A. DE SAISIR UNE CERTAINE QUANTITE PARSES A FEU ET DE DYNAMITE 5. DE TROUVER DES PREUVES DACTES DE SEDITION ET DE TERRORISMS TOUT AUTANT QUS L03TENTI0N DE RENSEIGNEMENTS SUR LES ACTIVITES TERRORISTES, LON APPRIT SAMEDI SOIR LS 17 OCTOBRE LE MEUTRE DE PIERRE LAPORTE LS COMMUNIQUE NO 6 DS LA CELLULE CHENIER ANNONCAIT QUE LEXECUTION &VAIT EU LIEU PAR LA CELLULE DIEPPE. PAR LA SUITE, DAUTRES COMMUNIQUES ANNONCERSNT LENTREE EN SCENE DE DAUTRES CELLULES DU ELQ. PRESQUE TOUS LES JOURNAUX DU MONDE ONT APPUYE LA POSITION ADOPTEE PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT. MEMS UN JOURNAL COMME LE "RUDE PRAVO", DE PRAGUE, A REEROUVE LACTION TERRORISTS AU QUEBEC, LES SEULES EXCEPTIONS ON ETE UN JOURNAL DALGER ET LE DEVOIR, MEMS LORD HOME. MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES DU GOUVERNEMENT BRITANNIQUE A EXPRIME SON APPROBATION DE LATTITUDE DES GOUVERNEMENTS CANADIEN ET QUEBECOIS ET POURTANT JAMES CROSS EST UN DIPLOMATE ANGLAIS. ... IB 001141 �PASP DOUSE PARLOUS CONED LS KIDNAPPING POLITIQUE ET LA VIOLENCE, SII.S DEVAIENT SE GENERALISES, CE QUI EST LOIN DETRE EXCLU EN 1SBSENCE DUNE POSITION FERME DE LA PART DU GOUVERNEMENT, ENTRAINERA ISN'T NECESSAIREMENT UNS SITUATION DANARCHIE QUI PRELUPERAIT A LA DECONBITURE DU POUVOIR POLITIQUE INSTITUER UN REGIME A PARTIR DE LA VIOLENCE ST DE LA FORCE, ALORS CUE LSS INSTITUTIONS SXISTANTES GARANT1SSSNT LA LIBERTE ET COLLECTIVE, INDIVIDUSLLS CEST PREPARER DIRECTEMENT ET IMMEDIATEMENT LA VOIE A LETAT TOTALITA1RE OU, S I CELUI-CE NE SE REALISE PAS, A DES R A I - SONS DINTERVENE IONS ETRANGERES, CAR LE VIDE DE LAUSORITE EST RAPIDEMENT C0M3LE PAR UNE SORCS DAUTANT PLUS REPRESSIVE QUE LA CONFUSION EST' PRO SONDE. DANS UN REGIME DEMOCRATIQUE GOMES LE NOTRE OU LA LIBERTE DEXPEESSION ET DS VOTE EST CONSACREE, ET OU MORALEMENT TOUS RECONNAISSENT LE PRINCIPE DE LAUTO --DETERS I NAT ION DU PEUPLE QUEBECOIS, LETAT NE PEUT' ACCEPTER DE SE DEVALUES ET LAISSER A UNE MINORITE I E DROIT DE D1CTER A LA MAJORITE SES OPTIONS MAI -RE TOUT CE QUE L ON PEUT D I R E , POLITIQUES IL M Y A PAS DE COMMUNE MESSRS ENTRE LA SITUATION PU QUEBEC ET CESSES DU 3RESIL OU DE L ARGENTINE, OU DE QUELQU AUTRE PAYS SUD-AMERICAIN, OU LES JUNTES MILITAIRES RSMPLACENT TROP SOUVENT LES GOUVERNEMENTS ELUS DEMOCRAT IQUEMSNT , O'J LA PAUVRETE DSS MASSES EST EXTREME ET CONTRASTS, D UNE FACON SATSISBANTE AVEC 1. OPULENCE DES RICHES, IE N Y A NOM PLUS AUCUNE MESURE ENTRE NOTRE SITUATION ET CESSE PE PA < c e I O 001142 �PAGE TREISE PARLQUE CONED JORDANIE OU DE L ALGERIE LORSQU ELLS ETAIT SOUS LA COUSS DE LA FRANCS LE MOUVEMENT FLQ N A JAMAIS PRETENDU QU IL Y AIT EU ERREUR JUDICIAIRE DANS LE CAS DES PRETENDUS PRISONNIERS POLITIQUES. IL S EST EXCLUSIVEMENT SONDE SUR LA THEORIE DE LA FORCE ET DS LA VIOLENCE DEBOUCHANT SUR LA REVOLUTION, CE QUI EST L EXTREME POINTS DU NIHILISMS AVEC TOUTES SES CONSEQUENCES ULTERIEURES PREVISIBLSS, C EST-A-DIRE LA DESTRUCTION DE L ORDRE EXISTANT ET SON REMPLACSMSNT PAR UN ORDRE SONDE EXCLUSIVEMENT SUR LA FORCE. LA PRISE D OTAGES EST UNE THEORIE QUI CONSISTS A UTILISEE LES VALEURS HUMAINES DS NOTRE CIVILISATION (RESPECT DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE) ST A RETOURNER CETTE V.AELEUR CONTRE NOUS ALORS QUS LE MOUVEMENT REVOLUTIONNAIRE NE DONNE AUCUN PRIX A LA VIS HUMAINE INDIVIDUSLLE.ON EST BIEN NAIF DANS CERTAINS MILIEUX DE LIMITER LS PROBLEME A UNE SIMPLE QUESTION D ECHANSES DE PRISONNIERS POLITICUES CONTRE DEUX OTAGES OU ENCORE A UN MOUVEMENT A BASE DS REVENDICATIONS SOCIALES JUSTISIESS ET ATTRI3UA3LE A NOTRE SITUATION ECONOMIQUE, CAR LE MOUVEMENT ELQ A DE TOUTS EVIDENCE POUR BUT D INTIMIDER LA SOCIETE ET LE GOUVERNEMENT ET, EN SECOND LIEU, DS DRAMATISES A L EXCES CERTAINES REVENDICATIONS QUI PEUVENT" EIRE JUSTES MAIS CUI NE SERONT PAS REGSESS PAR LA SOCIETE PRETENDUMENT EGALITAISE ST CONFUSE QUE NOUS LAISSE ENTSEVOIS SON ACTION. AU CONTRAIRE, CSS JUSTES REVENDICATIONS DOIVENT ET NE PEUVENT ... \A 001143 �PAGE QUATORZE PARLOUS CONED ETRE RSSOSUES OVA. PAR UNE ACTION DEMOCRATIQUE SCSAIREE ET HUMANISTS QUI SS SONDE SUR LA MATURITE POPULAIRE, LA MATURITE 5YNDICALS, LA MATURITE DES INTELLEGTUELS ST DSS ETUDIANTS, LA MATURITE DE LA PRESSE, ST UNE VOLONTE INE3RANLABLE D ACTION DE LA PART DPS CHOIS POLITIQUES DS NOTRE NATION. QUANT A CEUX QUI PRECONISENT A LA SOTS DSS SOLUTIONS MOLLES POUR TOUT DE SUITE ET DURES POUR E AVENIR, QU ILS MENTENT,'ET EN CE FAISANT I S DEVRAIENT SAVOIR SE REVERENT TEES QU ILS 0070, C EST- A-DIRE DS EISEEES OPPORTUNISTES. LA DEMOCRAT IS OCCIDENTALS A STE UNE LONQUE CONSULTS DE L HUMANITS QU IS NE FAUT PAS TRAHIR AU PREMIER CHANTAGE. L ELABORATION DE DECISIONS POLITIQUES PAR LA NON VIOLENCE MERITE QUE NOUS Y CROYONS ET QUE NOUS SOYONS PRETS A LA DEFENDRE D UNS FACON IN3SANLABLS, 001144 �AJ&o. ft cA*^. U V ^ 6 <^- — A y k i - c i 7>,o«,^ * ^ > 7 /V/ i ^ ^ ^ ^ - ^ Ai^^t^ji i) I 97-/ iQnjLrtx^- rA^ds JMS^- 7L ' 7A ^KXU- ^^' CAJ^ <P~O b^J—L ^P^W f& ~ /WZkeru-, ^ - / A?.7A.^CZ^A ~^/~~y 3 / s^ JFIU - ^ ^ - « ^ t ^ Y ~~pf*~** ouJ*<^> . 001145 �FORM 1 9 6 1 •v '1wU.E - U.S. DOLLARS OTTAWA BRANCH OTTAWA, ONT. TYPE OF TRANSACTION Booked 0c fj/ho DATE / Future Deliveries Sundry CUSTOMER'S NAME (BOOKED TRANSACTIONS ONLY) c R E D I T CANADIAN EQUIVALENT (U. S. F ^ f i t i o n ) ACCPUNT .' G/L ACCT. OT-.-, • • RATE 3 INITIALS -eTL- U.S. AMOUNT 217/2 7X2_ CANADIAN EQUIVALENT J2-OGC • 001146 �OCTOBER 2 3 , 1970. Shown "below is photostat cory re $2,000 cheque issued to Mr. A.E, Ritchie for Emergency Fund to he held in Operations Centre, and custody of said US $ to be • Transferred from J.R. Barker to Senior Task Force Officer.on duty 0800-1600 hours shift, October 23, whose signature apr-ears below. 7x7 7? FT-AC-QCPAFFZL A-277)FI^, (Miss) Elizabeth Weiss. SALE - U. S. DOLLARS \ 7 I TYPE OF TRANSACTION ;TTAWA ... BRANCH ^AAlTpo OTTAWA.ONT. ! Booked DATE / f u t j r e Df-livpr',._-\ Sundry -. I.. CU";TONERS NAME 18OOKED TRANSACTIONS O N P Y " ^A3- C R E D I T CA^4/lA-f^-£.^l/ L1 S AMOUNT ALE NT UNT /fj/\7sr_ CANADIAN EQUIVALENT 'y. I / ^ 000 001147 �faf • 35KKATIONS CENTRE \s^ October 23, 1970. MEMORANDUM FOR TASK FORCE SENIOR DUTY OFFICER: EMERGENCY CASH The U.S. equivalent of Cdn $2000.00 is in a sealed envelope in a small safe in Office No. 3 of Operations Centre. The funds can be drawn 24 hours a day during the present kidnapping crisis, on the authority of the USSEA, Associate USSEA, an Assistant USSEA,, Mr - Roquet, the Ops Centre 'Director or Senior Task Force Officer on duty in the Ops Centre. 2. The combination of the safe is This memo should be held on the person of the Task Force Senior Officer during his.8-hour tour of duty, and transferred to his successor against signature, date and time. .r\ r . SICNATURE: •- DATE: TIM! 001148 �, •• A 7 22•..--•• - . . A A / A I. I -• I J , A - / A ' / A ~ L . I A i Ar f I . ; / 2 7P. /; 7 ' "?> 7 '• ~ 0X72 7\W- 7) -v , / A • 7A- • I I f- I Fl . , /o / > ', \ 7 , 7 C 2Z e_ 2. i—o 7 ^ ^ '•—'A I up l, AijAS^-x. -A'i^ ' p -Ayy X\_'t-x. AF ..,r il -7\d i >.IS.• A' A /-, A-ACL L- I A'' { / \> x.AV ' ''"ft'- ' A\ -2 i 22 7 I i Ai' '-'A I /: A-A.y '• ' > ^ —f /TiLU-LsLo A- Kr / C , 7\ -N- / 0 /If— -y LSU ^C'SA Vw sj ) / / : i. • 2 y x A - 7) IS! PS/jC' J -—' ' - V, V f Ar y\Z A- ' •7 7 y 001149 �sT-.t. a A\:*\~.sJ _>\, . . . . i i N A L *2j\'. ili\*2.±->.\~.\Ji >A V .J_T6 ^ * KCURiTV S6cjrlli iiOOUCD DATE e..op. Da J iMoven' ber —'-p -7/U NUMDER Numiro .\j.xi'x:xQ MiSSION 7 LS 0, x.'.x'-Xrji,,\X P...„i,xJ-i • .,.... PijIXOP. Ar. Rooert Denvers called at 9:00 p.m. T.G inquire about his request last week for advice from Xr. Bissonnette as to what he should, do in the event that the Rose brothers and Simard seek to take advantage ox the safe conduct offer. Vxc. Bissonnette was supposed to call him cn Sunday about this matter but did not. Demers would like either Mr. Ritchie or Kr. Roquet to telephone him tomorrow preferably in the morning with an. answer. r- \7( ' 7 I I. 407A/BU. -P-rvJccj P.vP ! 001150 �(Jo P ACTION COP 19 C O N F I D E N T I A L <^.cl.cy~rj ±^AFj FM WSHDC 32 64 NOV 1 8 / 7 0 0~HA^.ZJ I CCjdF 2l - Ard - TI k7~ I TO OTT EXT POP cc ^d77-TFJ'U(AT3 BAG BAIRS DE OTT DISTR GLA GUS REF OURTELS 3 0 4 2 0CT2 8 AND 32 5 3 NOV 18 URUGUAY-KIDNAPPINGS-POSSIBLE CDN ACTION DURING OUR CONVERSATION WITH MARASCUILO,ACTING DIRECTOR FOR ARGENTINA/URUGUAY/PARAGUAY,HE NOTED THAT THE URUGUAYANS HAVE OFTEN CITED CDN POLICY IN DEALING WITH THE FLQ BY WAY OF BUTTRESSING THEIR REFUSAL TO PUBLISH THE TERRORISTS MANIFESTO IN ORDER TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF FLY.THEY HAVE CLAIMED,SO MARASCUILO S A I D , THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN A POSITION VERY SIMILAR TO OUR OWN IN REFUSING TO RELEASE THEIR PRISONERS AND IN THEIR GEN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE KIDNAPPERS.THIS I S NOT/NOT THE CASE OF COURSE SINCE AMONGST OTHER THINGS,THE CDN GOVT DID NOT/NOT OPPOSE THE PUBLICATION OF THE FLQ MANIFESTO AND WE OFFERED THE KIDNAPPERS SAFE CONDUCT TO CU3A IF THEY WOULD RELEASE MESSRS LAPORTE AND CROSS. 2.MARASCUILO THEREFORE WONDERED WHETHER WE COULD ADD FURTHER SUBSTANCE TO USA PLEAS FOR THE PUBLICATION OF THE TUPAMAROS MANIFESTO AND THE RELEASE OF FLY BY SPEAKING TO THE URUGUAYANS. COULD I FOR EXAMPLE SPEAK TO L U I S I , T H E URUGUAYAN AMBASSADOR HERE fit i r - r- n •. >.i ,-. n TTV f" ". P O s , ! , « 5 HIT f'T/"' M A V TT TP P ""> A 9 '•• i T I""*! t'P P UV n ' l l MOT/ J.IV ILI.X) OHI H l / i i I il .J H.lDrt iJ^ii AAXi— xJ^X.JXXi il'S, 1 £. IO L- lJ.-. ( ,-. A i P.i J LM . i JJ- '-' I A \ .- • • NOT SPECIFY WHAT WE MIGHT SAY PRESUMABLY HE HAD IN MIND A DISCUSSION OF OUR OWN EXPERIENCE IN CDA AND THE GOVTS HANDLING OF FLO DEMANDS o 001151 �PAGE TWO 3264 CONFD WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS AS APPROPRIATE ON THE QUESTION OF THE MANIFESTO. 2.AS IT SO HAPPENED,I HAD LUNCH WITH LUISI LAST WEEKAT HIS INVITATION.MOST 07 THE CONVERSATION WAS DEVOTED TO THE KIDNAPPINGS IN URUGUAY AND CDA WITH LUISI COMPLAINING ABOUT THE PRESSURE THAT THE USA IS BRINGING ON URUGUAY TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF FLY. HE MENTIONED THAT THE FLY FAMILY AND THEIR FRIENDS WERE. VERY ACTIVE VIS-A-VIS THE ADMIN AND CONGRESS AND THAT OF COURSE HE HIMSELF HAD HAD TO RECEIVE A GOOD MANY PEOPLE CLAIMING AN INTEREST IN THE CASE. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE STATE DEPT HAD OFFICIALLY BEEN RELATIVELY RESTRAINED IN THE PRESSURE THAT THEY HAVE EXERTED BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE BEHIND A GOOD DEAL OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE FLY FAMILY.THIS MAY NOT/NOT BE ENTIRELY THE CASE SINCE WE KNOW FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH THE STATE DEPT THAT FLYS SUPPORTERS HAVE ACTED ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE IN SOME INSTANCES BUT WHETHER IT IS SO OR NOT/NOT,THE URUGUAYAN AMBASSADOR INDICATED THAT HIS GOVT WAS BECOMING A LITTLE IRRITATED WITH THE NUMBER OF DEMARCHES MADE TO THEM FROM ONE QUARTER TO ANOTHER. 3.1 MENTION THIS POINT BECAUSE IT WOULD SEEM APPARENT THAT IF WE ARE TO TAKE ANY USEFUL ACT ION,WE MUST TRY TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT/NOT ACTING AT THE BEHEST OF THE STATE DEPT.IF URUGUAYANS BECAME CONVINCED THAT WE WERE,OUR APPROACHES COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. 4.THIS SAID5IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE ARE FOUR ALTERNATIVES THAT 001152 �PAGE FOUR 32 64 CONFD WEIGHT. 6.THIRDLY,LUISI INDICATED TO ME THAT HE IS INTERESTED IN GOING TO CDA TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS.IF DATE COULD BE SET FAIRLY PROMPTLY,THIS WOULD GIVE YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS KIDNAPPINGS WITH HIM AND PRESUMABLY ON HIS RETURN TO WSHDC HE WOULD REPORT YOUR VIEWS. 7.FOURTHLY,IF BISSONNET IS ON THE POINT OF PRESENTING HIS CREDENTIALS IN MVDEO,PERHAPS HE COULD TAKE UP THE MATERIAL AT THAT TIME WITH THE URUGUAYAN AUTHORITIES.THIS WOULD ENSURE THAT OUR VIEWS WERE REGISTERED WITH THEM IN THE MANNER WE DESIRED ALTHOUGH ON THE OTHER HAND IT MIGHT GIVE OUR INITIATIVE MORE PROMINENCE THAN OUR LOCUS STANDI WOULD JUSTIFY. 8.OF THESE FOUR ALTERNATIVES YOU MIGHT CONSIDER THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO BEGIN WITH THE FIRST BUT AT THE SAME TIME YOU MIGHT WISH TO GIVE THOUGHT TO THE SECOND AND SET AN EARLY DATE FOR LUISI TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS.THIS HAS TO BE DONE IN ANY CASE AND PERHAPS YOU MIGHT THINK IT PREFERABLE TO DO IT SOONER THAN LATER. 9.ALTHOUGH I COULD OF COURSE SEND LUISI THE SUMMARY OF EVENTS I MENTIONED WITHOUT FURTHER CONSULTATION WfTH THE STATE DEPT IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO SOUND OUT OFFICIALS MORE SENIOR THAN MARASCUILO ABOUT A MORE SUBSTANTIVE DEMARCHE.ON BALANCE HIS IDEA IS NOT/NOT UNACCEPTABLE.IF WE WENT ALONG WITH IT WE COULD BE HELPING USA OVER A MATTER OF SOME CONCERN TO THEM AS WELL AS POSSIBLY SERVING OUR OWN INTEREST VIS-A-VIS CROSS.ADMITTEDLY OUR RELATIONS WITH URUGUAY MAY 001153 �PAGE THREE 32 64 CONFD YOU MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER I F YOU THOUGHT WE SHOULD RESPOND TO U 0 REQUEST*IN ALL 0 ? THEM WE COULD BEGIN BY EXPRESSING OUR DESIRE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON A MUTUAL PROBLEM AND THEN,AS I MENTIONED ABOVE, CENTER TO SOME EXTENT ON MANIFESTO QUESTION.BY WAY OF INDICATING OUR INTEREST IN FLY CASE,WE COULD SUGGEST THAT HIS RELEASE MIGHT BE ANOTHER FACTOR THAT WOULD WEIGH IN FLQS MIND ABOUT RELEASING CROSS. THIS MAY BE LONG SHOT BUT WITHIN REALM OF P O S S I B I L I T Y . F I R S T ALTERNATIVE,AS MARASCUILO SUGGESTED,WOULD BE FOR ME TO GET IN TOUCH WITH LUISI.HOWEVER,AS I HAVE JUST SEEN HIM IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE WISE TO TACKLE HIM AGAIN ON SUBJ WITHOUT RAISING HIS SUSPICION ABOUT STATE DEPT PROMPTING MY APPROACH.I COULD HOWEVER SEND HIM AS FOLLOW-UP TO OUR EARLIER CONVERSATIONS MATERIAL FOR HIS GOVTS INFO OUTLINING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN SEIZURE OF LAPORTE AND CROSS AND INDICATING WHAT ACTION OR DECISIONS GOVT HAS TAKEN AT VARIOUS POINTS,FOR EXAMFLE NEGOTIATIONS WITH FLQ,PUBLICATION OF MANIFESTO, OFFER ABOUT SAFE-CONDUCT TO CUBA,ETC.(ONLY MATERIAL THAT WE HAVE OF T H I S PARTICULAR NATURE I S SERIES OF ARTICLES FROM TOR STAR LAST OF WHICH WAS DATED 0 C T 1 9 . T H I S HOWEVER WOULD NOT/NOT BE SUFFICIENTLY AUTHORITATIVE AND BESIDES IT I S NOT/NOT UP TO DATE.)COULD YOU ASSEMBLE AND SEND TO ME SUCH MATERTAL?PERHAPS IF L U I S I WAS SUFFICIENTLY INTERESTED IN IT HE MIGHT TAKE INITIATIVE IN CONTACTING HE AGAIN AT WHICH TIME I COULD MAKE ABOVE POINTS. 5.SECONDLY,YOU COULD CALL IN URUGUAYAN CHARGE AND GO OVER GROUND WITH H I M . I DOUBT HOWEVER THAT T H I S WOULD BE VERY EFFECTIVE.EVEN IF HE REPORTED YOUR CONVERSATION BY TEL PERHAPS HE MAY NOT/NOT BE SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN IN MVDEO FOR HIS REPORT TO CARRY MUCH c t .4 0011 �PAGE FIVE 32 64 CONFD NOT/NOT BE AS CLOSE AS THEY WERE WITH THE CLOSING OF OUR MISSION BUT EVEN IF IT DOES NOT/NOT GIVE MUCH WEIGHT TO OUR VIEWS WE MAY NOT/NOT LOSE VERY MUCH IN THE PROCESS PROVIDED THATlJtfE HANDLE THE QUESTION CAREFULLY AND MINIMIZE THE CONNECTION WITH USA. 1 0 . 1 LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VIEWS AND IF YOU WISH ME TO ACT TO THE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AND DECISIONS THAT I MENTIONED CADIEUX RFT 192255Z 001155 �! ! POP. :•.-J. r > L.PPP.;3.3 . Mep(\p!PpKi:T) ; ptMTCHjf 0 P M ( K L O I ? ™ 7.20\(772AW\^^17KUATTF?7(?F7J) - bP C O N F I D E N T I A L FM WSHDC 3 2 5 0 NOV 1.3/70 TO OTT EXT POP FX- ,2A.i-TFXt BAG BAIRS DE OTT DISTR GLA GUS REF OURTEL 3042 0CT2S URUGUAY-KIDNAPPINGS LATE YESTERDAY,MARASCUILO,ACTING DIRECTOR FOR ARGENTINA/URUGUAY/ PARAGUAY,TOLD US THAT ICRC REP WORKING THROUGH URUGUAYAN LAWYERS HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH TUPAMAROS AND I S CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL RELEASE FLY,USA AGRONOMIST,IF THEIR'MANIFESTO I S PUBLISHED IN THE MANNER THEY D E S I R E . T H I S CLARIFIES THE SITUATION SLIGHTLY INASMUCH AS EARLIER THEY HAD REFUSED TO SPECIFY WHETHER THEY WOULD RELEASE FLY OR GOMIDE,THE BRAZILIAN DIPLOMAT.NEVERTHELESS THE URUGUAYAN GOVT REMAINS OBDURATE AND SO FAR WILL NOT/NOT ALLOW ITS PUBLICATION BY THE REQUIRED SEVEN NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO AND TV. (PREVIOUSLY SOME RELATIVELY MINOR DAILIES HAD RELEASED EMPHASIZE ITS OPPOSITION IT).TO IT HAS IMPOSED A DEGREE OF CENSORSHIP ON THE PRESS ESSENTIALLY TO PREVENT ANY NEWSPAPERS TAKING THE INITIATIVE AND PUBLISHING THE DOCU.SOME OF THEM ADMITTEDLY SUPPORT THE GOVT AND CLAIM THEY WILL NOT/NOT CARRY IT IN ANY CASE. IN THE HOPE OF CHANGING THEIR MIND AS WELL. AS BRINGING ADDED PRESSURE ON THE URUGUAYAN GOVT CERTAIN USA NEWSPAPERS PROBABLY AT SUGGESTION OF D I A T E DEPT HAVE SENT MSGS URGING ITS PUBLICATION. 2.MARASCUILO MADE CLEAR THAT ICRC WAS ONLY ACTING ON BEHALF OF FLY. 6 «i C £4 001156 �PAGE TWO 3250 CONFD AFTER SOME INITIAL HESITATION THE BRAZILIANS SAID THAT THEY DID NOT/ NOT WANT THEM TO REPRESENT GOMIDES INTERESTS APPARENTLY BECAUSE OF ICRC ATTITUDE OVER THE ISSUE OF BRAZILIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS. AS WE MENTIONED IN REFTEL,URUGUAYAN ARE CONCERNED THAT IF THEY AGREE TO PAY THE PRICE DEMANDED FOR FLYS RELEASE MODEST AS IT MAY BE BRAZILIAN PRESSURE ON THEM TO SECURE GOMIDES RELEASE WILL INCREASE. TUPAMAROS WILL THUS DEMAND A VERY HIGH PRICE FOR HIM, 3.MEANWHILE,MARASCUILO TOLD US THAT U THANT RELEASED A STATEMENT YESTERDAY ADDRESSED TO QUOTE ALL CONCERNED UNQUOTE CALLING FOR THE RELEASE OF FLY.IT SAID THAT HE WAS ACTING AT THE REQUEST OF THE FLY FAMILY AND IN RECOGNITION OF FLYS ASSN IN THE PAST WITH FAO AND UNDP. 4.MARASCUILO ALSO TOLD US THAT CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN TO RECOMMENDING TO SECTY ROGERS THAT HE CALL. IN URUGUAYAN AMBASSADOR TO ASK THAT THE MANIFESTO BE PUBLISHED. RFT 192255Z 001157 �POP/A J) .Rowe/ak fil"B~~ 1# g extra MEMORANDUM Mr. Roquet and file (XMFIDEMTIAL Kr. Rowe 19, 1970 0930 hour* Reports that Mr. Crooo hold ia Lortie Apartment PSI cc. 20-22-TnWPLQ 20-22-TFK-l Montreal Gazette of November 19, ao well ao CBC National News (8x00 a.m.), carried a story to tho effect that Mr* Crooo may hare boon hidden ia the apartment where the police had arrested Lortie on November 6, and where the Rose brothers and Simard had also hidden. According to the press, polioe are investigating reports that two aon were seen carrying a heavy steamer trunk from tho bunding on October 16. 2. Mr. Ritchie aaked at 9:15 a.m. whether we had any information on this. I noted that a good number of reports emanating from Quebec of late had aot been verified officially and that the R.C.M.P. had remarked that they were aot boiag kept completely in the picture by their Quebec police colleagues. I agreed with Mr. Ritchie that we should touch base with the R.C.M.P. oa this particular story, since it would be a subject of considerable intereet to the Britiah, whoa we could be sure would aak uo for our comments. 3. I phoned the R.C.M.P. "I" Directorate, reported what we had noted ia tho news aodia and aaked if they would keep ua Infomort on an urgent basis ao to what they aight learn in the course of today. The officer suggested that, since the police force had never been able to obtain aa authentic eet of Mr. Crooo' fingerprints, it would bo most difficult for the Montreal authorities to determine if Croee had been held la the apartment at aay tiao. Thoy would have to rely on other forms of evidence, if indeed any existed other than hearsay reports, which would appear to be those noted ia today's press. 4* I ouggoot that if the British call uo today on thia natter we take the U a e that, "Of course we had noted the press reports and have enquired ao to the facte". Wo aight add, parenthetically, that tho absence of a set of Mr. Crooo* fingerprints will aako lt most difficult for the police to determine if Mr* Crooo had over been held ia the apartment, should the news story have any basis. A. D. Rowe 001158 �A w: : ; " J !VJU ^ u~# L.,J •' f • \ 1 ' •' • \ >v V \.^Z ^J.f'-"\ "•i f* 7-7 C 4• i t < C kJ T, a iPi u x i g te \i2 d -LJ ci ^ x.,\jx I; .. LT, 118 fr^i ^ <*^ u L> u V ^ . DG C Jt 3T0VILK Cr„ P.... .& $• «r ^ p</ ke% 0 v0 :o> ^i> Px--:./ A?22A) 72:772 .ppif/ <A5g2 GFE (fop: PGP "pPR .".INiJ, T U R t ; DLJS AF7~AiREJ5 x X T r.1. I tj U R ES GEU GEUE GEUW CENTRE ECP ECD OMP .---', ": Ui\l ij'J J Co.v.-S} n 7 * /. U.V.A GAD D'OPERATIONS CENTRE FCN • .:-A •l( / D l K*y/7 P ECL ECT AF? APP APG PAG J E P A f l T M U N T OF 6.XJ T E L . 5-6331 001159 �POP/AD Rowe/bm f EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES SECURITY SfcvrfM TO k November 1 9 , 1970. DATE FROM D. CONFIDENTIAL POP (A.D. Rowe) NUMBER Numiro REFERENCE Rifiranc, /.'FILE DOSSIER 17 OTTAWA f"^ECT United Kingdom High Commissioner's request to call on you this afternoon - November 19. CJjU 20-22-TFK-l -"""MISSION/ 1 AAlCx ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION Mr. McConville of the UK High Comnission called on me at noon today to advise us as to the type of subject "which the High Commissioner wished to raise with you this afternoon. 2 In view of the apparent differences expressed by the SolicitorGeneral and the Quebec authorities regarding Federal-Provincial police cooperation, and 'confusing" press reports concerning police activities in Montreal, the "igh Conmissioner wishes to obtain from you, if possible, an official clarification of this problem. Mr. McConville emphasized that the British enquiry should in no way be construed as a criticism of police activities nor of our Department's cooperation wth them; but rather they sought our aid in "obtaining what facts were available in order to assist them in reporting to London. 4iey anticipate that there will be questions in the British House, based on numerous British press reports on recent police activities in Montreal and, as we would well understand, the FCO would find it difficult to advise Ministers. 3. Mr. McConville and other officers of the British High Commission are well aware of both the domestic political situation in Canada prior to, andlduring, the present crisis, and the difficulties encountered in the mounting of any massive police operation which involves federal, provincial and municipal forces. Indeed, we understand that you pointed this out to the High Commissioner on a previous occasion, noting the jurisdictional difficulties, and we have done so in several conversations we have had with other officers of the High Commission since that time. As much as we might wish to assist the British in their present quandary, since we are as well somewhat out of touch with immediate developments in ^uebec, it has been and may continue to be difficult to keep the British "officially informed". At the same time, as Mr. i-icConville pointed out, the British interest in the fate of James Uross is paramount; an interest which I emphasized we shared equally. 0 •.. s. Ext. 40?A/Bil. (Admin. Services Div.) It, ((71(1/227 001160 �- 2 - 4. As you are aware, we have been under increasing pressure from the B r i t i s h High Commission to provide them with " o f f i c i a l versions" of statements and events related to police a c t i v i t y in Quebec. This, as you know, we have been unable to provide, with the exception of copies of recent communiques made available to us by the HCMP. rfe therefore suspected t h a t at some p o i n t , given t h i s i n t e n s i f i e d B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t , the British High Commissioner would appear on your doorstep. 2 (yC07 A.D. ROWE Operations Centre. �.-..:-,..->.' ,f • S.-..J.L. \ I.1 \i~X J. • . xi.'W^.O. 0 ...i'tU'xj I A . d 'rx'/jPo 'xOL N u V 70 CT f * r. ,.• %•( ••• •—•;• /••,-, • -. ATOP1 TO 2377-10"/ SON TRENTON / • / ZEN/BASEQPS TRENTON /. .-•""-' ^ ;-..• 0 /ioo', 0/z.Ax £.nNAL A" r AlriS u i 1 Aw A n J~- " - I T / * * / ^... ..• 7 - - . ^ n A ^ U . - - > r\ .••-..- _•'•- I— C O N F I D E N T I A L 077.0 SOOPS 012 NON DNOV/CNOC 1 P p, A 7 P f Cf A V f A M IP f" T> 5" i.i SEALL EE UTILIZED PAKISTAN AIRLIFT 7 'ir \ _ c A 2/2 JF/ C:(7/ .2 1 4 , . - L . ^ / ^ — V -X • - ' ^ J ' ' - - _ • • s . / A y Uv^'-<•' < A'S d. p,yi •>-;• A - ' - f : / '/ p N y / l y • 2 D I A • ; * > A J J A A y s / // ; ..y x , , ' .// ) I y 7 /, . A ^'-^} OL) /UPf/OV^ ' A <J •V— v. ""/' 71 y,<: •,/,,'- . ^ y , • 2 7Z.7 -y *- y p.----^-~ • -,— r • i_•>' JI \ ^- - rP-P sis v. t. 'J I AL. yj^-'J- 22irSl c72 I • y- / i rs-, -Ai'7 •\j J T F ^ A I L /"'"-'" -y x '.'r.- lAls'l 7 l 'I-" < I /A AS*- • /y IA/X/-^ 001162 �% O/SSEA O/USSEA PARL SEC FPR FIS PMO(Lalonde) PCO(Robertson SOL.GEN. (Cot<§ PSI(Rettie) Diary (2) _Fiie-^- POP/C.Roquet/rak 20-22-TFK-l <30 20-22-TFK-7 RET November 20, 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER Contingency Planning in the Event that the Cross and Laporte Cells Join Forces The Quebec police authorities have asked for guidance in the event these two cells should merge, while still holding Mr. Cross. Mr. Robert Demers, who is still handling safe conduct arrangements on behalf of the Quebec Government, has asked us urgently for our views on this point. He has indicated that Lortie, the captured member of the Laporte cell, claims that the cells are under instruction to merge if pressed by the police. 2. Such a development would, of eourse, put us in a most difficult situation. Two main contingencies can be envisaged. First, the members of both cells might take the initiative in seeking to take advantage together of the safe conduct arrangements, in exchange for Mr. Cross' safety. (They might even simply appear at Man and His World in a body and ask to be allowed out under threat of immediate murder of Mr. Cross.) The other main possibility would be for the two cells to be surrounded by the police and to request safe conduct for all. 3. We must first take into account that in such circumstances we could come under very heavy pressures in favour of compliance. As soon as the situation became known, the British authorities might find it very difficult not to urge upon us acceptance of the cells' conditions. They might even do so publicly. Similarly a vocal section of opinion both in French and English Canada might argue that the conditions should be met in order to save a life, all the more so slnee this would represent quite a come down from the original FLQ demands. Should we incline towards a negative position, there would be advantages therefore to our having already made the required decisions and having secured the agreement of the Quebec authorities to them. Thus there would be no period of uncertainty during which pressures could develop. In addition, there is the obvious need for the police to know in advance how they should handle the situation. ./2 001163 �S E C R E T - 2 4. To our knowledge there has been no direct public statement to the effect that the safe conduct no longer applied to the Laporte kidnappers or murderers. This was implicit, however, in the fact that the Quebec government extended a safe conduct offer to both sets of kidnappers on October 15 and in the detailed arrangements Issued on October 17, but merely said on October 19 snd later that the arrangements "still apply to the kidnappers of Mr. Cross". It had been intended, when announcing rewards, to indicate that the safe conduct remained open to the Cross kidnappers but "can obviously not apply in any way to those responsible for the kidnapping and murder of the Quebec minister". The latter section (which had been approved by federal ministers and provides a clue to their thinking) was dropped at the request of QPP Director StPierre and MCP Director S. Aubin because of: "(a) the difficulty, if not the impossibility of determining at the time of applying for safe conduct re Cross that the applicants were the kidnappers or murderers of Minister Laporte; (b) the conflict between that sentence and the offer of safe conduct which is still outstanding, if it should turn out that the persons presenting themselves as the kidnappers of Cross should also have been the kidnappers or murderers of Laporte". In other words, how do you make sure that the group of self-confessed "Cross kidnappers" does not contain someone who, unknown to the police, has in fact been involved in the Laporte case? If someone has been involved in both kidnappings, is he or not entitled to safe conduct? This illustrates the difficulty of the problem. 5. One approach would be for the government to allow both cells out of the country and to make no effort to bring back to Canadian justice the murderers of Mr. Laporte. Conceivably the Cubans might accept this if we ask them to do so on humanitarian grounds and if we made this decision public. From the Canadian viewpoint, however, such a decision seems practically out of the question. It could be argued that, in allowing both cells safe conduct, we were following the logic outlined by the Prime Minister in his October lo speech: to remove any reason the captors of Mr. Cross might have for killing him. On the other hand, we would appear in contradiction with the basic principles of our position. Tou will recall that, even for the sake of saving the hostages, the Canadian and Quebec governments refused to subvert their legal system; they would not release prisoners; they spoke of parole only in terms of "firm recommendation" and of an "objective" process; they were unwilling to refrain from bringing to trial FLQ members .../3 �» . SECRET # - 3 accused of crimes. The latter is precisely what we would do if we allowed presumed murderers to leave the coun trywit h no advance indication that we intended to seek their extradition. In practical terms, this approach would also ensure practical immunity in the future to kidnappers who even murder their hostage. It would tend to encourage further kidnappings even more than would the safe conduct for kidnappers who safely release their captives. Finally, from the point of view of Quebec public opinion, we would be seen to make concessions (i.e. exemption from punishment of persons identified by the police as probable criminals), for the sake of Mr. Cross, that we did not make to save Mr. Laporte. We could be open to criticism both by the advocates of firmness who would condemn a concession in the present case, and by the advocates of negotiation at all cost who would blame the government for not having saved Laporte. 6. A more nuanced approach would be for the Canadian government to allow both cells out of the country while making it clear both to the public and to the Cubans that we would immediately initiate extradition proceedings against the murder suspects. This would presumably save Mr. Cross and would be less open to accusation of bending principles. The Cubans might of course refuse to receive the Laporte murderers under such conditions. Even if they accept it, they might be unwilling to give any commitment that the extradition treaty would be allowed to apply. (They eould claim that the crime had a political character.) They might even make it clear publicly from the start that they would return nobody they accepted to receive at the Canadian government's request. Such a development would render less credible any statement on our part that the Canadian government would take effective measures to bring the murderers to justice. It would amount, except in the most formal sense, to full compliance with the safe conduct demands of the Laporte killers. This underlines the fact that, If this approach is to be attempted at all, it would be desirable to determine In advance the reaction of the Cuban authorities. Unfortunately, if we do so, word might very well come back to the FLQ and thus might actually encourage the two cells to merge. A J / 7. A third approach would be to refuse flatly to allow the Laporte murderers out of the country, while making no direct attack against the two cells holding Mr. Cross. If they were surrounded, the police would lay siege and would Inform the Cross kidnappers that they could have safe conduct In exchange for their hostage, but that the Laporte cell (or at least those in the cell ...A 001165 �S E C R E T - 4who had been involved in the murder) eould not. We would then have to rely on the faint hope that the Cross kidnappers would force the Laporte cell to accept this arrangement, or that both cells would come to the conclusion that, in terms of the political objectives of the FLQ, the second murder was not advisable. If both cells appeared at Man and His World, the police would presumably have to take the same position. It if for consideration however whether the cells could be allowed to go back (and be followed) to their hideout in order to reach a decision under less immediate pressure or whether the issue would be forced to a head at Man and His World. 3. In the light of the police remarks quoted at the end of paragraph 4, perhaps we should consider some variations on the third approach outlined in paragraph 7: (a) we eould decide to exclude from the safe conduct only those members of the Laporte cell who have been Identified in public, i.e. the Rose brothers and Simard; (b) alternatively",' wo eould exclude from the safe conduct the presumed .murderers of Mr* Laporte, but not necessarily the kidnappers against whom there was no strong presumption of involvement in the murder. In practice this distinction between presumed murderers and kidnappers may be impossible to make. Perhaps the refusal of safe conduct to the Rose brothers and to Simard only would be more practical, although we might thus allow out some other individual just as likely to be guilty of murder. If such an individual proclaimed his guilt upon arrival in Cuba, we would be highly vulnerable to criticism - unless we had agreed in advance with the Cubans that we would seek extradition of any self-confessed murderer. 9* We could, of course, rely on a trick or at least on ambiguity. The police might allow both cells to surrender to the Cuban Consular authorities and, ones they were disarmed, capture the Laporte cell and allow out the Cross kidnappers te whom only the safe conduct is now being offered. It is most likely, however, that the cells would first insist on an explicit commitment that they both bo allowed out. We could not give such a commitment and renege without undermining our ability to make deals in any further kidnappings. 10. We should be grateful for your comments on these various approaches. We should seek to formulate a position as soon as possible in Ottawa, ma Hr, Demers is pressing us for an answer and since the situation in question might arise at any time. A. E. « n w „ p A.E.R. �PDM/F. Bild/anik' SECRET ^J&> - A A " ^^^~ f November 19, 1970. <r, Jo'JJ-~JJ-7 Mr . Riwnie For what it is worth: While I agree with the approach outlined in para. 6, I think one should bear in mind that it is possible that some members of the Laporte Cell have already merged with the Cross Cell. To attempt to differentiate between the treatment to be given them if they surrendered themselves would then, in effect, be reneguing on our promise of safe conduct for the Cross kidnappers. Do the police know the identity of each one of the Cross kidnappers? If not, anyone participating in the Cross kidnapping, whether from the outset or afterwards, must be considered as entitled to the safe conduct offer. I think it is quite likely that some members of the Laporte Cell might try to take advantage of the offer that has been made regarding the Cross kidnapping. However, in the absence of an accident which might solve the problem for us, it strikes me as extremely dangerous to try to apply different treatment to these two sets of criminals before they have released Cross. It would even be more dangerous' if any word of such intent leaked out to them before they appeared at Man and his World; particularly if some of the members of the Laporte Cell had already managed to join up with the Cross kidnappers. F.B. 001167 �POP/A.D.Rowe/mk EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO Mr. fttpquet FROM Da Mr. Rowe SECURITY Stcurllt CONFIDENTIAL November 20, 1970 o^:* NUMBER Numiro REFERENCE Refirence SUBJECT Sujel AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES c DOSSIER Ai For our Attention Monday, November 23 TZ^ZF - 7 MISSION ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION A. The Ministerfs Trip to London, November 26 Mr. Ritchie suggested to me to-day that the Minister must be thoroughly briefed on all developments which will be of interest to the British officials he meets. The USSEA feels that Mr. Sharp should be as "forthcoming as possible with Sir Alec Douglas Home", especially in such areas as jurisdiction in the kidnappings investigations and, if possible, the "efficiency" of the various police forces. Mr. Ritchie added that the latter was, of course, a delicate subject but perhaps some line could be worked out for the Minister in consultation with whatever other Canadian officials who might have a view on this aspect. He suggested as well that the Minister might wish to hand over to Sir Alec copies of documents on the reward, safe conduct, public statements, speeches, etc. I assume that the British will already have ensured that their Ministers have copies of such documents, but I suspect Mr. Ritchie meant that Mr. Sharp should provide something "official" at the time of his discussions. 26. jQxS^v/.L<-r\j iisiAF ,L.70T7'-<. AZSACCA J". OPAc' 7/7^ ex. ^ f 2 _ -k, B. A® ^fFrzL~j^ ^•x^(0J^r £'W ^JJ s*Jc AA (A-f^ b^AJ> ~kl (*r- [7-C^UO.-/ ^ju(^° to. Mr. Cadieux* Suggestions Contained in his Nov.18 Telegrams From Washington We have received responses from Mr. Langley, Mr. Rettie and Mr. Ritchie, which I am holding. You agreed that we would put together these comments, add the views of GLA and Mr. Collins (if Mr. Langley*s reply was not in lieu of one by Mr. Collins) and prepare (a) a telegram to Mr. Cadieux for Mr. Ritchie»s signature; and (b) begin assembling the documentation which Mr. Cadieux would hand over to the Uruguayan Ambassador, Mr. Luisi, when and if he met him. I am not sure whether in this particular aspect you and Mr. Ritchie may wish to acquaint ./2 Ext. 4 0 7 A / B U . (Admin. Services Div.) | 001168 �CONFIDENTIAL - 2 - the Minister with our agreed line of action and seek his concurrence, C. Information Programmes I have done some preliminary work, as you are aware, of providing copies of Hansard clippings to posts and would like to continue this operation so that (a) all posts decided upon should receive complete extractions from October 5 to the present date; and (b) that the process of continuing to supply them be put into semi-automatic operation so that we do not have to be constantly concerned with this aspect of informing J posts. ^dC/Lu D. 4AJ<7 t^ I / \ j * - ~ ~ ~~f*^ FLQ Office - Algeria We should examine this aspect of the work, especially Tunis telegram 1093 of November 19 which suggests a visit to Algeria and requests detailed instructions. ) S- 4o IAL- Vv"F^ic-^xd j c-^x J. Lk^. (U, k*~*t * — New 2 I ..A3 �CONFIDENTIAL - 3E. Possible FLQ Action Outside of Canada With reference to our memorandum of November 9 to OUN, FLE, GAF, GLE, GEU, GLA, PSI, we have had several replies to the questions posed. We will have to follow-up on this and set up a "deadline" at which time a revised memorandum to the Minister will require drafting. F. Our Infonnation Programme Abroad Mr. Calkin, FIS, spent all day November 20 examining our files on reactions abroad to the present crisis, including several letters which contained specific recommendations from posts as to how they might improve their relations with the press. We should ensure that the preliminary as well as the final results of this survey are known to us. G. PSI Contributions to International Terrorism Comparisons I have been told by my division that they are working on several aspects of this subject and would be forwarding more documents as soon as possible. ...Ik 001170 �CONFIDENTIAL - 4 H. Staffing of Task Force Registry, etc. Mr. Touchette, APO, told me on November 19 that he was examining the possibility of assigning Delano Boilly to our task force group to handle the log, and other assigned tasks. Mr. Touchette was going to speak to Andre Couvrette (FAC) and advise us further. Miss Basset will be coming in Monday, November 23, to introduce a registry clerk to us who will serve in our registry for at lease an hour a day to ensure that the task force records are kept in tact, and according to correct Records Management procedures. Mr. Charette (Head, ACR) had agreed to this because he appreciates the importance of our records, not only to this Department, but in the later studies which we will be doing in collaboration with PCO and PMO. I. Liaison with the British for our the (b) Our memo to Mr. Ritchie will be typed up in final form the record November 23 and at the same time we might wish to review relationship with UK HC in order to a) ensure that all officers in Operations Centre were aware of the general line we were taking; and that careful records be kept of contacts with UK HC. J. Undoubtedly a number of other subjects will come to mind on which we can consult as to the apportionment of the work load. A. D. Rowe 001171 �POP/A.D.Rowe/mk EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES MEMORANDUM PDM (Mr. Ritchie) ^ ^ O TO A rLroJ/A^^ CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY Stcurlfi November 20, 1970 DATE FROM De POP (Task Force - Mr. Rowe) Numiro REFERENCE kifiranc. WA f"#ECT Proposal from Mrs. Cross 2Q = 22=IE1U12CU22-TFK-1-2 ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION Mr. McConville called on me at 3:30 Friday, November 20 and left a copy of the attached personal telegram. The proposal suggested by Mrs. Cross nad been made through Dunrossil to the Montreal police some weeks ago, when she was still in Canada, but there apparently had been no reaction. 2. Mr. McConville asked us to consider Mrs. Cross' proposal and to acquaint them with our reaction, if possible, by Monday or Tuesday next. He emphasized that they were in no way pressing us to take a positive position, but rather that since Mrs. Cross wished her proposal to be thoroughly examined, the British would appreciate our views. If you agree, we propose to advise the British that: 3. a) a public offer using the kind of language proposed by Mrs. Cross would raise major difficulties in that it would seem to offer the kidnappers as a group both immunity and reward. We do not think this could be agreed between the authorities concerned here; b) in fact, however, nothing in the reward offer precludes one or more of the kidnappers coming forward with information leading to Mr. Cross' release; c) it would be up to the police to apply the reward offer in a specific case. A. D. Rowe NOTE: Mr. Ritchie consulted at 1715. He agreed and as SSEA called, he was able to secure Mr. Sharp's concurrence for this line. Mr. Davies (UKHC) informed by phone (as he had no objection to this method) at 1800 hours. A.D.R. Ext. 407A/BU. (Admin. Services Div.) 001172 �y -•'i-^^ t \ V* *,»^—• •7-r. /.U ir-y-i •••",» JP -. . n p'P~ OTTAWA PRIORITY BERNE TO OTTAWA TELNO 10 2C NOVEMBER 1370 CONFIDENTIAL. 20/0330Z ADDRESSED.TO OTTAWA TELNO 10 OF 20 NOVEMBER R F 1 TO F C 0 CFOR WJQQSfO PERSONAL FOR KEQK COMMISSIONER THANK YOU FOR TOUR TELNO 1383 BEFORE SHE LEFT MONTREAL HRS CROSS ASKED FOR SOKE TVOUQHT TO BE GIVEN TO.THE POSSIBILITY OF DECLARING THE REWARDS / OPEN TO THE KIDNAPPERS THEMSELVES IF THEY COME FORWARD VOLUNTARILY, !T WOULD 3E HELPFUL TO KNOW WHAT CONS I DER AT I ON '9 IF AfoY, WAS Q1VEN TO THIS SUGGESTION AHD WHETHER IT SEEMS TO HAVE ANY MERIT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. CPS 60A ft-lVft^A^.Vo IV-fi. . r "" Fx'A- SENT 20/1326Z P'X %* ,7.- : NTS' u6»^Pi5>fi^"tv K'C 001173 �FPR/j.R.Francis/rrv EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES MEMORANDUM TO A POP FROM Da REFERENCE Reference FPR S T RESTRICTED DATE Ilovember 20, 1970 NUMBER Numero UNN Your Memorandum of November 16,1970 A c7o - J7- f V - « OTTAWA SUBJECT Su/cf F e d e r a l Government P r e s s O f f i c e r Montreal. in ec AC - d/i- I FA- ENCLOSURES Annexej DISTRIBUTION I As requested, I spoke to Mr. LeBlanc about the possible merit of havinp- a federal government press officer in Montreal to assist foreign journalists in coverinp the FLQ crisis. Mr. Le Blanc agreed that it would have been useful at tbe peal: of the crisis and would be again should some fresh event once again draw large numbers of foreign journalists who might come to Lontreal"but not to Ottawa. 2. Mr. LeBlanc raised two problems: a) In the absence of an Information Canada Centre in Montreal we would have to send someone down from Ottawa. This would inevitably attract attention among the Montreal press, and might give the impression that we were trying to take over from or compete with the provincial government in this field. Xn view of the sensitivity of the relationship including the need to prevent Mr. Bourassa being seen as a puppet of the federal government,. this could be dangerous. b) To function effectively the press officer vrould have to be someone who was very close to operations here and who also had some press experience. He thought this would virtually limit the choice to members of the Internal Affairs /: Ext. 407A/BII. 001174 �-\ - 2 - RESTRICTED or Prime Minister's press office, who could not easily be spared. 3. He did not really come to a firm conclusion but the weight of his remarks suggested that sorp.eone from Prime Minister Bourassa's office might better be able to fill the information gap in Montreal. 07L > J.R.Francis Press Office 001175 �GCO/D.I . Cornett^fT POP - Task f o r c e - . . r . Claude R o q u e t Ui»vJ LA 'A 2s/ s i t u a t i o n in (/ ^ —I Z 'A*-<y November " 2 4 , 1970 T <uebec 3> v / / , r 1 1 a t t a c n a pnotocopy o i irorr* Jim j ^ c o a r d l e i n e u b i i n . - l e t t e r of ..ov rub r 20 Oould you l e t me Know w n a t , i i a n y , m a t e r i a l .-imon^st r e c e n t s t a t e m e n t s by L.-e J pi me . - i n i K t e r or o t n e r s nii^ht be u s e f u l inL his r e q u e s t . in meet- na:-, any c o n s i d e r a t i o n even ueen i v e n i o <*-XJ xslrit up t n e kind oi' C P P I C l e x t ol' wnich • v. m c C a r d l e syrtaks •or/ ,onwea l t h i v i s i on 001176 �1 > CANADIAN EMBASSY AMBASSADE DU CANADA fy-W- r^Al 10 Clyde Road DUBLIN if November 20, 1970 Dear Don, I wonder if you could give me some assistance on what is best said publicly on the problems of French Canada. Does there exist in the Department, for example, any basic text for public use which could perhaps be modified to suit a variety of audiences? If such a text does not exist, has any thought been given to developing one In Ottawa where the best facilities exist for what I have in mind? The kidnappings have given rise to greater interest in the subject in Dublin than was formerly the case. I believe I have been able to handle reasonably well essentially private discussion of the subject with Government officials and other influential members of the community. A somewhat different problem, however, is presented by the odd request from university societies for what in effect amounts to a public lecture. I am somewhat reluctant to take on thes^Ri^signments given the-' jnature of the societies in question, which have a long tradition /of active and at times uncontrolled debate on topics of current [interest. It has become almost standard practice I am afraid as well that university group discussion of "burning" topics should be interrupted and at times taken over by a small hardcore group of Maoists who at least find their main base of action in the universities. I have refused two such invitations recently on the grounds of my certainty that a public lecture on the subject of French Canada, which would be advertised at least within the universities, would be bound to attract these extremists because of the added interest in the subject which arises out of the kidnappings. On the other hand, I would like to take some suitable opportunity to put forward the Federal Government's view on the subject and I would feel a good deal happier to do so if I had available the kind of basic text I referred to above. Conceivably other Heads of Mission would ...2 Mr. D.M. Cornett, Head Commonwealth Division Department of External Affairs OTTAWA $2$ 001177 �J - k - 2 - be glad to have the same kind of assistance. If there is anything you can do to help us out, I should be most grateful. Yours sincerely, /Tjy^k?Cardle usoador - 001178 �FCi. T /:.P. C o l e / j r EXTERNAL AFFAIRS * MEMORANDUM ,JT. TO AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES rjqtfuet A*' Task Force Duty Officer FROM 0* REFERENCE Reference SUBJECT Sujel Communications Lelays yd' At • ! _ ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION Duty Officer Log Mr.J. Barker T} ^ xl u SECURITY Securite f" x November 7.2, 1970 DATE NUMBER umero DOSSIER \\tf* Z*-2<*' (F£-l _ On Saturday evening, November 21, a Volkswagen containing three passengers was fired on by Armed Forces guards when it failed to stop at a road-block in the vicinity of the Gross residence, ./bile this incident was apparently unrelated to the kidnapping, it provides a useful example of the actual delay involved in transmitting information through regular channels. 2. This incident was brought to our attentiori s' ortly after 1900 hours on Saturday by Kir. McConville of tbe U.K. High Commission following a conversation which he had with Lord Dunrossil in Ibntreal on the subject of the recent FLQ communique and accompanying Cross letters. I passed this information on to the RCMP Operations Centre, Alta Vista Headquarters shortly after 7.00 p.m. and after checking this morning with the Duty Officer learned that they had not received official notification (by telephone) until 2215. The DT© batch Officer informed me that his log indicated receipt of this message at 2210. I also checked with DND since fire was opened on the vehicle by a military guard and 1 therefore assumed that DND would be eeore likely to receive early notification of the incident. The second experience in "local" communications involved the transmission of the text of communique bo. 3 from the Viger Cell,the recovery of which RCMF Headquarters, Ottawa had informed us at 1905, following notification by telephone from Montreal. It appears that Montreal Irolice were called by the newspapers concerned at approximately 1530, Saturday, November 21. The LCI A Operations Centre BBfeaaffljfotani/xj> -flfj? -fcxk at 1930. Shortly after 2030 the RCMP Corporal on duty telephoned to say that a telexed text of the communique and i-ir. Cross' letters would be transmitted directly to our East Block Comcentre on the K 7 link. I had suggested that we would send over a messenger to pick up the text but RCMF Cpl. Hirst, although willing to send it over with a duty driver, implied that this would not be necessary because of direct transmission facilities with our Comcentre. The text was not, in fact, received until 2320, November 2\ nearly four hours after receipt of telexed message from Ibntreal by RCMP Headquarters, Ottawa, 3. Ext. 407A/BH. 001179 �- 2 - SECRET 4« While neither of the above cases created any problems, a future situation might be envisaged (e.g. the discoveiyof the locution of Hr. Cross' whereabouts), which would make it desirable for a speedier channel, of communication if the security aspect veere considered less important than speed in transmission. It should be of practical value to .he duty task force officer to be aware that it may well be quicker in certain circumstances to send a messenger for printed belex messages rather than reply on direct "transmission". 5. The general question of communication may have some additional significance in light of recent discussions in the House of Commons on the subject of cooperation between federal, provincial and municipal police authorities in the handling of the Cross case, .er. E.A. Cote (Solicitor General's department) to whom I mentioned the Piatter referred to in paragraph 3, when he visited the Operations Centre on Saturday, expressed the view that in the present circumstances it was particularly important now to ensure that no delays occur in communication between federal government departments and agencies. n 6. Another aspect which might be considered,in consultation with personnel,is that of alleviating the staffing problem without placing an increasing burden on divisional resources. The Operations Centre has made possible a valuable and opportune departmental contribution to effective two-way communication, facilitating consultation and coordination between various levels of government, interested departments and agencies. The functioning of the Task Force vrould undoubtedly have been a much more complicated operation had Operations Centre facilities not been available. Might it not perhaps be desirable to take advantage of the current situation,when the government is allocating considerable budgetary resources and directing every federal department to bring forward projects with a view to providing additional employment opportunities, (Ottawa Citizen headline November 18, 1970);to attempt to compensate for some of the heavy losses in our- establishment by putting forward the Operations Centre, which in fact can provide services for numerous government departments, as an extra budgetary project for which additional personnel could be authorized. f^ Dacre P. Cole. 001180 �POP/Delano Boily/etm EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ro File no** Delano Boily (through Mr. Roquet) AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES Mcutmr RESTRICTED DAT* November 22, 1970 NUMUR ta UWttNCt i 2AA*£ZJLL&4 DOSSIER OTTAWA SUBJECT Suf.1 U Thant's Statement relative to Cross Kidnapping -20*22-TFK-FLQ-2 MISSION <-- > ENCLOSURES Aaaaaa* _, --} ATrfFTG-FL'i' I I checked with Michel Beaubien from Permis New York the authenticity of the reference made by CP Press a few days back to a statement by U Thant relative to the Cross kidnapping and referred to in the last FLQ communique dated November 21. DISTRIBUTION OC/A/ 2. SOC The sequence of events seem to be the following: (a) On Wednesday, November 18, the United Nations Press Office issued a statement by Secretary General U Thant making an appeal £o Claude Fryfs kidnappers"for his safe and speedy release" (press release attached). HA psl 772 ^4Jf}A^ f^AZA7^ (Jj) 7 J1 I . *> (b) On the following day, November 19, at the daily W Press briefing Mr. Rhamaee Nassif, Secretary-General's spokesman, was asked by newsmen if the above-mentioned statement also applied to the Brazilian diplomat Gouride. The reply was in the affirmative. (c) Mr. Steven Scott, Canadian press reporter, attending the briefing then asked if the statement also extended to Mr. Cross to which Mr. Nassif more or less replied the following: "I am sure the Secretary General will extend the same statement to all concerned. I aa sure he will extend the same hope for safe and speedy release." 3. Mr. Beaubien will try to check the exact verbatim of the IK spokesman'^wMi6!?^Cross * release as soon as possible tomorrow. I asked him to keep us informed of any developments in New York re para, k of the last FLQ communique. Delano Boily. Ext. 407A/BU. lata. Sanriea* Div.) 001181 �MESSAGE P L. A r; G O C f A R I :,'.r-: l . C X >*i '1 ^ PIUe./t>09»IEM .P.L-r.i , i; MINISTERS N" come 20-22-TFK-l FM/DE OTT TO/A PERMISNY IKFO LDN PARIS CONGENNY HAVANA WASHDC CANDEDJATO BERNE BONN EXT P0P-4H NOV23/70 cc: ^ T ~ CONFD r n r r r —-•"• 20-22-TFK-9 V)J"~) /VoolT fcyo CTA IMMED QdiC FFTFo- M-illlMTF fr.* IS* dCsriP^TF GO SOC TASK FORCE LIST FPR OUN F I S "'Z/&~ 12X7. 9UB/S1.IJ / / / CROSS KIDNAPPING - UN SECGEN , / YOU MAY RECEIVE PRESS INQUIRIES FOLLOWING THE REF IN THE U T E S T FLQ COMMUNIQUE / / A (NO. 3 FROM VIGER CELL) TO A POSSIBLE INTERVENTION OF THE UN SECGEL TO SECURE A THE RELEASE OF MR CROSS. / 2.FOR YOUR INFO ONLY, THE FLQ COMMUNIQUE PROVIDES NO/NO SERIOUS BASIS FOR A i / SOLUTION OF THE CROSS CASE. I T INVITES U THANT TO SEEK THE RELEASE OF MR CROSS; \z IN EXCHANGE FOR TWENTY-FOUR QUOTE POUTICAL PRISONERS UNQUOTE, WHICH WOULD BE { / / [A A x UNACCEPTABLE TO THE AUTHORITIES CONCERNED IN CDA. I T AISO INVITES THE SECOJ0J / / i/\j f p ^ c k i ' Y p / f TO UNDERWRITE THE REVOLUTIONARY CAUSE IN ASIA, AFRICA AND LATAM, WHICH PREA SUMABLY WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO HIM. WE ASSUME THEREFORE THAT THE KIDNAPPERS'!/ / A • 7 Z / REF TO UTHANT WAS INTENDED ONLY AS PROPAGANDA AND NOT/NOT AS A SERIOUS PROy x POSAL. \ X 3 . I N REPDrT TO PRESS INQUIRY, YOU SHOULD ADOPT THE FOLLOWING LINE WHICH WE ARE i SA / A / ' A X / PROPOSING TO THE MIN FOR POSSIBLE USE IN THE HOUSE.K I F ASKED WHETHER THE CDN, Z A , (J/, J/. / A •A / GOVT I S CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME INVOLVEMENT BY THE UN SECGEN TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF MR CROSS HE 'WOULD REPLY: QUOTE THE LANGUAGE AND SUB- .STANCE SS. -THE. LATEST MSG,..ISSUED -ON,..BEH4LL.OF THE..KIMAPPEH:a..mOVIDE NO/NO D R A K i [ l i / K C D A C l UIJI! D! V I S I G N / D I R E C T I O N TL'UEPHOKE C XT l o / n u . IUI- V B//01 POP / . . . / 2 . •;.'. .. p A P H f i O V E D / Al'P'ii 0 OA CROQUET/mk ( /' x A / ll V cities 5001182 �*N ?AGE TWO NOV23 CONFD POP^ll SERIOUS GROUND FOR ANY SUCH INVOLVEMENT. IN ANY EVMT I T I S PERFECTLY OPEN TO THE KIDNAPPERS TO RELEASE MR CROSS AT ANY TIME AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SAFE CONDUCT OFFER MADE TO THEM. I T I S REGRETTABLE THAT TO DATE THEY HAVE CHOSEN TO PURSUE THEIR CALLOUS EXPLOITATION OF THE THREAT TO A MAN'S LIFE, FOR THE SAKE OF EXTREMIST OBJECTIVES WHICH CAN ONLY BE DISCREDITED BY SUCH METHODS UNQUOTE. / �MESSAGE C E P A m -:.: :: Liru MIHIBTFM E 1- ILc'./ DOSSH E H u o'orr r , 20-22-lFK-l : r M/&a OTT TO/A LDN IHFO _ X M PARIS POP-412 EXTER CONGENNY / y PERMISNY JJAVANA_ '-'C<- i BM - S - 3 '*° 20-22-TFK -G6RFB- n» i iii—iiM II 11 • I ' m i ' i f WASHDC CANDELNATO BERN '---"'•—• G1 I M#\tAb FPR OUN FIS i n n I I II i i • 'ii TPrfi—TTJiiii r n r n i — i T m I'I -• t n OURTEL P 0 P 4 1 1 N0V23/70 *Jj .22 O O CROSS KIDNAPPING - UN SECGEN FOR YOUR INFO FOLLOWING I S TEXT MKXSmXR OF THE N0V18 STATEMENT ISSUED BY (COMCENTRE PLEASE COPY ATTACHED) A J / / / / ' A / / / THE UN SECGEN APPEALING FOR THE RELEASE OF KIDNAP VICTIM- CLAUDE F^Y. TEXT BEGINS pp7 7 TASK FORCE LIST -PM&^-Pee SOC •rvsr' . cc: IMMED BONN [3!STR N0V23/70 / v/ z TEXT ENDS. 2.ON N0V19, AT THE DAILT UN PRESS BRIEFING, THE SECGEN'S SPOKESMAN WAS ASKED i I i/ / s IF THE STATEMENT ALSO APPLIED TO THE- KIDNAPPED BRAZILIAN DIPLOMAT. HE REPLIED V ' 2 X // X IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. A CDN PRESS REPORTER ATTENDING THE BRIEFING THEN ASKED I F TliE STATEMENT AISO EXTENDED TO MR CROSS. ; FOLLOWING REPLY: y zy X / VA A 2 TO ALL CONCERNED. I AM SURE HE WILL EXTEND THE SAME HOPE FOR SAFE AND SPEEDY I / I \ RELEASE UNQUOTE. THIS GAVE RISE TO A CP REPORT WHICH NO/NO DOUBT TRIGGERED \ "S \ x \x QUOTE I AM SURE THE SECGEN WILL EXTEND THE SAME STATEMENT \! A \ THE SPOKESMAN GAVE ROUGHLY THE RTTT / / I ./ i TliE FLQ'S REF TO UTHANT IN I T S LATEST COMMUNIQUE. / / x \ ! \\l / ( / X X ; N \\l \\l / / / / 2 - r..: _:> - •.-.'.. :r: f.— _ AHPROVI" P ,'.' H I . , . - ; ' vi-- o n A »' r r_ u/ it7. v. A C T EU R CAr C .ROQUEl/fflk. X T ' i l / m i _ I H E V OAjOl 5-6435 5-6435 iaL C_,R0QUE1 001184 �PRZSS RELEASE SG/SN/1377 United Nations, New York Statement by Secretary Cenerai U. Thant Claude Fly, an outstanding soil scientist and agronomist, who had served in several countries on behalf of the Food and Agriculture Organization (.FAO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), was kidnapped on 7 August 1970 in Montivedeo, Uruguay and is still in secret custody. I have been in touch with his son,, John Fly, since 30 October and have discussed witn him how best it might be possible for me to use my good offices in this matter. Apart, from my humanitarian interest, I have a further rearson to take an interest in Claude Fly's safe release. He has served in a purely professional capacity for the benefit of developing countries in several parts of the world and his work has been entirely humanitarian and non-political. I appeal to all concerned for his safe and speedy release so that he may return to his peaceful and humanitarian work. Ref: SCA/18 November, lV70/l40v EST. 001185 �MESSAGE DEPARTMENT MINISTERE LIEU EXT FM/DE TO/A ORIS. NO. N° DORIO. POP-414 jUU NOV. 2yy>l^FVF }\ \ Fll_E/00«tlER ^ , SECURITY "ECURITE m-22SvY\-L7>7- CONFIDENTIEL ' '' 20-&-TFK-FLQ-3 winni #nr PRECEDENCE WASHINGTON 7lA 0,2/ TV f/is^ INFO DISTR. BUENOS AIRES &/1G GLA, GUS, P S I , TASK FORCE PER SUB/SUJ VOS TELS. 3 2 5 0 ET 3 2 6 4 DU 1 8 NOV. URUGUAY - ENLEVEMENTS NOUS VOUS REMERCIONS DE L<ANALYSE ET DES SUGGESTIONS QUE CONTIENNENT VOS TELEGRAMMES MENTIONNES EN REFERENCE. 2. NOUS SOMMES D'ACCORD QU'IL FAUDRAIT EVITER ,51 POSSIBLE DE DONNER UNE REPONSE PUREMENT NEGATIVE A LA SUGGESTION DE MARASCUHDt, D'AUTANT PLUS QUE L'ELARGISSEMENT DE FLY POURRAIT AVOIR UN CERTAIN EFFET SUR LA SITUATION DE CROSS. CCMME 7CU3, NOUS CROYONS QUE GET EFFET POURRAIT ETRE PLUTOT DISTANT ET ATTENUE. DE PLUS, CCMME NOUS NOUS TROUVONS (ET NOUS TROUVERCNS PEUT-ETRE A NOUVEAU A L'AVENIR) DANS LA MEME SITUATION QUE LES URUGUAYENS, I L POURRAIT ETRE DANGEREUX POUR NOUS DE SEMBLER NOUS PAIKE LES AVOCATS DES CONCESSIONS QUANT I L S'AGIT DES AUTRES GOUVERNM5NTS. 3. NOUS SCMMES DONC D'ACCORD AVEC VOUS.-QUE TOUTE ACTION DE NOTRE PART EN VERS L'URUGUAY DANS CETTE AFFAIRE^ NE DOIT PAS lfflHifrlNSPIRSE PAR LiiS ETATS-UNIS NI FgaBWBB CONSTITUER UNE PRESSION INDUE. I I DEVRAIT CJPENDANT ETRE POSSIBLE DE TRANSMETTRE AUX URUGUAYENS UN^ DOCUMENTATION SUR L'EXPERIENCE CANADIENNL', SUITE AUX ENLEVEMENTS, Y COMPKIS LES POLITIQUES QUE NOUS AVONS ADOPTEES^ NOTAMMENT EN RAPPORT AVEC LE MANIFESTE FLQ, S M S POURTANT PARAITRE LEUR FAIRE LA LECON. TOUT CECI S' INSERETuA.IT NQBMAL1MENT DANS LES ECHANGES DEQUES ET D' INFORMATIONS ENTRE LES DEUX GOUVEENEMMTS DANS DES SITUATIONS COMPARABLES. I L ^ 3 B B £ E R A I T DANGEREUX CEPENDANT DE SOULIGNER TROP FORTEMENT L'ASFECT RELATIF AU MANIFESTE. I L FAUDRAIT DRAFTER/REDACTEUR ...C..EQQUET/r.£ CPR EXT In/OIL. ( R E V a/701 Ol V I S I O N / D I R E C T I ON POP TELEPHONE j 2 APPROUVE SIG 001186 a ^- n, (.9/iz.^ ) �CONFIDENTIEL -2- LAISSER LES URUGUAYENS TIRER LEURS PROPRES CONCLUSIONS A CE SUJET. 4. IL SERAW PROBABLEMENT POSSIBLE DE FAIRE LES ARRANGEMENTS ASSEZ BIENTOT POUR LA PRESENTATION DES LETTRES DE CREANCE DE L«AMBASSADEUR URUGUAYEN A OTTAWA. S I CECI SE CONFIRME, NOUS POURRONS AMORCER LE DIALOGUE AVEP LUI A CE SUJET ET LUI DONNER LA DOCUMENTATION QUE NOUS AVONS L>INTENTI DE FREPARER, ET DONT NOUS VOUS FERONS^ J E TOUTE* FACON*,, TENIR COPIE. D'AUTRE PART, S I L 1 AMBASSADEUR NE PEUT SE PRESENTER BIENTOT, NOUS VOUS DEMANDERIONS DE LUI FAIRE TENIR: VOUS-MEME LA DOCUMENTATION ET DE PROCEDER SELON LA PREMIERE POSSIBILITE DECRITE DANS VOTRE TEL 3 2 6 4 PARA 4 . A . E . RITCHIE �KIN PDM Pari.Sec. FPR PMO Task Force List SOC OUN FLE FIS LOG CR. LE November 2 3 , 1970. RSSTRICTSD KEftQRA3DUK FOR THE g H B g t t (%AC fe*Afu~) The Cro&s kidnapping M i U n H 8m«llsmtXJittttm- Aa you know, the latest FLQ cocaouaiquS refers to a possible intervention ia the Cross ease by the UN Secretary General. The eoranraiqu6 has been published on Sunday in a few Montreal newspapers including the "Sunday Express", which headlined: *FZ£ demands UN intervention". Because of the intrinsic Interest of the matter and since lt aay lead to questions in the House, you may find useful the following; i &ck£.rouad information. 2. On Wednesday. November 13, Mr. U Thaat issued a statement in Sew York in favour of the speedy release of Claude Fly, a USA scientist held by the Uruguayan terrorists (a copy of this statement is attached). The Secretary General pointed eut thatftr.Fly bad served ia several countries as aa FAO aad UNDP expert aad that his work had been entirely humanitarian and non-political. On November 19, at a UN press briefing, the Secretary General's spokesman was asked if this statement applied equally to the Brazilian diplomat also kidnapped ia Uruguay. The reply was in the affirmative. Whereupon 7T. Seott. a Canadian press reporter attending the briefing, inquired if the statement also extended to Kr. Cross. The UN spokesman gave roughly the following reply: "I ast sure the Secretary General will extend the asms statement to all concerned. I a*a sure he will extend the sane hope for safe aad speedy release". This gave rise to a CP report that Iir. U Thaat had appealed for the release of three hostages including Mr. Cross. ./2 001188 J �aSSTRICTSD - 2 - 3. The Cross kidnappers were no doubt pleased to attract the attention of such aa important international personality. It is aot surprising that they referred to hla in their latest coir-mmique. Housver they do aot seem to have mads a serious effort to iaterest the Secretary General or the Canadian government la a poaalble Intervention by Mr* U Thaat la the Cross ease. The appeal to U Thaat haa rather aggressive overtones. It urges hla to support ths revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Quebec, Latin America, Africa aad Asia aad to secure the liberation of Kr. Cross and of 24 FLQ "political prisoners". It ia obvious that neither ths Secretary General nor the Canadian government would consider this a serious basis for aa intervention by U Thant ia favour of Kr. Cross* release. Ia the event the matter ia raised in the House, the attached surrested reply to anticipated questions on the subject of the Cross kidnapping and the UN Secretary General may be useful. A it Me. lj AsA «£>. ti. \ 001189 �% SUGGESTED REPLIES TO QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE •VJ !3VP*7 fliigjllfiSaiiJ^ijit** lull' IH! 1 ••' n I M\\[ iBMMsllWsfl gy.. H?L.%scret|^jn^uj>|^g^ - Question: "Would the M s confirm whether ths UN Secretary General has appealed ia favour af the release of Kr. Cross, as suggested ia a recant C? report aad ia the latest FLQ eorasuniqud?" - Suggested reply: "The UN Secretary General Issued a statemeat on November IS ia favour of the release of Kr* Claude Fly, aa outstanding US scientist and agronomist, who has served In several countries on behalf of UN organisations. In addition, a spokesman for the Secretary General reportedly Indicated oa the following day, ia answer to questions, that the Secretary General would no doubt wish his statemeat to apply to other hostages such as a Brasillan diplomat aad Kr. Cross. It is obvious that all men of goodwill la this country share Kr. U Thant*s concern far the release of Kr* Crass who has shown such remarkable courage durlnr his ordeal." • Possible supplementary question: "Would the Canadian government or the Secretary General consider the possibility of some involvement by Rr* U Thant to secure the release of Mr. Cross?" • Suggested reply: "The language and substance of the latest message issued on behalf of the kidnappers provide no serious ground for any sueh involvement. Ia any event, it is perfectly open to the kidnappers to release Kr. Cross at aay time and to take advantage of the safe conduct offer made to thea. It ia regrettable that to date they have chosen to pursue their callous exploitation of the threat to a man's life, for the sake of extremist objectives which can only be discredited by such methods** . a/2 001190 �- 2 - • Possible 9supplementary question: "Has the SSZk noted Mr. Cross oovious feelings, in hia latest letter to the authorities, that they show little interest in his fate and appear to do little to secure his release <n Suggested reply: "Without going into the interpretation of letters written under conditions of duress, 1 must stress the deep aad continuing, concern of the Canadian government for the safety aad release of Mr* Cross** �p}css dooxfx:. SG/SN/1377 United Nations, New York otateirre.it bp eep-eeary General . .iude Fly, ae. cui.standing soil scier.e,ist ana agronomist, who haa served in several countries on oenalf of the Feed and Agriculture Organization {Vt>Oj and tne United Nations Development l-rogramjuie 020x2j3 was kionapped on 7 Au»;ust V--00 in iioritivedeo, Uruguay ana J.S still xr. secret custody, i nave be«n ir. Loucn witn his son, John Fly, since jd ^.ctouer and have discussed witn nim hove best it might ce possible for rae to use my good offices xn thib matter. *part from my r.uma.iitariar. interest, I nave a further reason to ta.:e ar. interest in Clauuc Fly'3 Safe release. He has served in a purely professional capacity for the benefit of developing countries in several parts of tne world anc nis work nas been entirely humanitarian and non-p-.Jit.icai. I appeal to ail c-jheerned for his safe and speedy release so tnat ne may return to his peaceful and humanitarian work. Kef: SCA/'le ..cver.oer, Iv?..'. 20/ EST, �O/PDI:/PS *•* 3V November 23, 1970. 7 pm UET DE IB. RITCHIE $a^3i -AAA- I If the French language radio or TV stations in Montreal or newspapers are carrying the story about the so-called FLQ person who killed himself ir. a British jail, it v/ould he very desirable to make certain that they receive the British denial that he v/as not being held or questioned on anything having to do with the FLQ. Otherwise, the FLQ may take their revenge on Cross. ' P.S. R. RITCBIE Z I drew the Scotland Yard statement to the attention of our Press Office after speaking to Philip Noakes of UKHC. He confirmed that beginning last evening both lie and Mr. Ashford in Montreal, had issued an informal oral statement to press friends to the effect that Bros* death was in no way connected with political activities but ifhat he had been arrested on a simple assault case, be felt 7 2T that this may have helped for LE DEVOIR'S favourable 2' . A ^ story this morning. This action, plus the British [• dissemination of the Scotland Yard announcement ,y was.*in the British opinion, effective. At his request, ' I asked the Press Office to ensure that Bess Francis touched upon tire Scotland Yard statement in his conversations with the press this afternoon. Return 001193 �I - f PJk.BISSr ' 0 A - ^ W -pyfjj-- -"j/jstt .*»**«• 23. 1970 &--V-TFV-I ftBMOR/ :---'.r- TO TFB TASr gggCg -?B . ••t»os»ntati,ons by Cuban Aribass-sidor In tha absence of tha Under-Secretary, the Cuban Ambassador asked to sec me ursanoly this afternoon* I saw hir at 2.30 p. . 2, Ke said that on instructions free his Government he wished to bring oc •-y attention tho following: (a) Accord in*; to the Ottawa Ciciaen of November 19, an Air Canada spokesman said that a series of five charter flights to Cuba fro:; Montreal and Toronto were cancelled in October b»acausa of tha political climate in iuabec following the two AVi kidnappings (clipping attached). This statement, according to the Ambassador, ir-plied a relationship between iuba and th*? uabac situation. (b) Tha Embassador reminded tne that at one of our meetings at the tirea we wero negotiating tha safa conduct ha had told -ia that tha apart-pants of two Cuban cattle .in who wore* in "ontreal in connection with tha purchase of Canadian eattla for Cuba had been searched by tha fcebee Frovincial Poliea. He explained that ha did not think it appropriate to raise lt officially with ea than because ha thought that tha searches had been the result of over-sealous pollcemen» which ha thou normal in the situation St the fciae* I acknowled that ha had Indeed mentioned that inet.lent to .-a, 3. He than went on to say that tha hones of six Cuban na.?oriels aonaacted ri h tha 2'-.'rada Offiea In wttresl had been searched on tha 2uth and 21st of November. Here is tha list: Miguel J';o.rei 7345, boul, Lacordaira Apt., 3 ; 7 - Montreal ia) cc: f PP.! pBi •001194 �- 2 - (b) Andras Maclas sV>5) J aan Mi cola t Apt. 17 - St-Laurent, Montreal (Cattle iraa with tha Cuban Trade Office) (c) Jose Bataacourt 4250 Metropolitan LUvd. Apt. 7 - 3t-Lat«rant, Montreal (3attl« aan with the >aban Trado Office) (d) Angal Hernanda2 7050 viau S t , - Montreal (Perir-anent o f f i c i a l with the Cuban Trade Mission) (e) Hugo Che Gil 7050 Viau St, - Lontreal {Panaanent official with the Cuban Trade Mission) (f) Sergio Peresa - no address given fPermanent official with the Cuban Trade Mission). 4. The Arbassador explained that in one case tha search had bean carried out when there was nobody in the house. In one other case tha search had taken aere than two hours. Binally, in the case of Mr. Betancourt tha two police'ran had knocked at tha door and had entered the house without being asked to do so. '7. The Ambassador took chis opportunity to tell me also that ha had received instructions fron his Kinister to the affect that Cuba had ajreed to start negotiations on a hijacking bilateral agreement. You iaay recall that wa ware supposed to go to Cuba last February to negotiate this agreement and that tha negotiations n&ver took place allegedly because Castro could not be reached to give his approval. 6. On tha first point, I confirmed with SGT that the Air Canada announcaraont had been rrade without our knowledge. On tha second point, Mr. Rowe has already contacted Inspector Ferraris who is Braking urgent enquiry and would hope to have a full report tomorrow morning. Inspector Ferraris felt that the Commissioner himself would be r»ost interested in what has happened vis-a-vis thr* Cubans* 7. The Ambassador concluded his representations by saying that his Government had been surprised at these incidents and wished tha Government of Canada to give soma clarification* Ha asked ma whether I could give assurances that no more Cuban ... 3 001195 �houses would ba searched in 1 ontveal, J replied that thase incidents ware no douot irritating and annoying, particularly at a tine when we ware grateful for tha cooperation that the Cuban Gtovarnment had shc^m in this delicate pattar of tha (duct of the 1 idnappera to Cuba. I propiised tha -sasador that I would investigate tha facts and would call hire either tonight or early tomorrow morning* i . . JE . �f*2p$! AD/n J FJ \£ flu. %U HOUSE OF C O M M O N S C H A M B R E DES C O M M U N E S CANADA "f 6-r-> 7 (ki- CONVERSATION TELEPHONIQUE ENTRE LE DEPUTE ANDRE OUELLET ET MONSIEUR PIERRE PASCAU A J,'EMISSION "PIERRE PASCAU" DU 23 NOVEMBRE 1970 AU POSTE DE RADIO CKLM DE MONTREAL. P.P. "Le dernier communique du FLQ publie hier dans les journaux, demande que M. Thant serve de mediateur entre le FLQ et les autorites pour la liberation de M. Cross. Nous avons voulu savoir ce que l'Association canadionne H P S Watipng-Unies pensait faire ou ce qu'elle pensait de cette affaire. Nous avons telephone a 1'Association qui nous a suggere de nous adresser a Monsieur Andre Ouellet pour nous donner 1'avis de 1 'Association. Monsieur Ouellet est depute liberal eie Papineau et Secretaire parlementaire du ministre des Affaires exterieures. Nous 1'avons maintenant au bout du fil: "Bonjour monsieur Ouellet! " A.O. "Bonjour."' P.P. "Pourriez-vous nous donner l'opinion de 1'Association canadienne des Nations-Unies a propos de cette requete du FLQ?" ,\.0. "Bien, je peux difficilement parler au nom de 1'Association canadienne des Nations-Unies. C'est un organisme independant qui n'a rien a faire avec le Gouvernement comme tel. «Je pense que lorsque vous avez communique avec cet organisme, on vous a plutot ciirige vers un representant du Gouvernement que vers quelqu'un qui pouvait parler en leur nom. Enfin, je peux vous dire, moi, ce que j ' en pense personnellement, mais je ne peux parler au nom de cet organisme." P.P. "Dans ce cas-la, pouvez-vous nous donner l'opinion du ministre des Affaires exterieures?" A.O. I "Je pense que le ton et le contenu de ce dernier message emis au nom des ravisseurs ne justifient aucunement une intervention de U Thant. Je crois que les ravisseurs ont parfaite. ment la liberte de relacher M. Cross en tout temps et de se prevaloir de I'offre gouvernementale d'un sauf-conduit; ,,:a c'est notre position gouvernementale. Qu'ils acceptent I'offre que nous leur avons faite Oi' un sauf-conduit. C'est la leur voie. Je trouve qu'il est tout a fait regrettable qu'ils aient plutot choisi de poursuivre leur tactique inqualifiable de chantage, parce qu'au fond il y a la vie d'un homme qui est en jeu et ils se servent de ce chantage au profit de leur fin extremiste. Done, le Gouvernement du Canada nc prendra pas cette requete au serieux, mais son offre de sauf-conduit tient toujours. Je pense qu'on a mentionne dans certains journaux, dans Le Devoir de ce matin entre autre,que le Secretaire general des NationsUnies a deja stigmatise a 1'epoque l'enlevement de Monsieur Cross. Cette requete pour qu'elle soit acceptee par le Secretaire des Nations-Unies devrait etre differente de celle qui a ete formulee. On ne demande pas a un type? qu'on veut. comme mediateur de prendre position en faveur de la cause que l'on defend. C'est ce que dicte la logique meme." P.P. "Maintenant, Monsieur Ouellet, il y avait un autre sujet que vous aviez discute ce matin avec Pierre Charbonneau a pro>^.~x rnrnmrt -Ij r\ n 1 J c: p o s.- .La du t4- r*-a->v. va-. i-il 1 q/ .un er , nT-7or. ui l so ff a73i-isrr,-. o nri sC2 comme o 1u1 rV nn a.TI l1 i1sct feOsQ jr Ian s c r*e (^11i ef" a f f a i r e , v o u s n ' e t i e z p a s s a t i s f a . i t . E s t - c e que v o u s p o u r r i e z n o u s r e p e t e r vos g r i e f s ? " 001197 �- 1 - "Mais oui, certainement. Je pense que tous Les journalistes, et surtout les journalistes de la presse par lee, eieve aient, face a res ev4nements, avoir un sens tres aigu de 1'information objective et prendre leurs responsabilites. Je trouve que l'attitude prise par vous et par votre poste eie radio qui fait en quc.l.orue__£OjrJpe la propaqande au f'jBQ HTTTP teres mauvaise. Vous devriez avoir a~~coeur la vie d'un homme: qui est presentement. menacee. Par 1 ' information continuelle que vous faites, vou;e aidez justement le FLQ a continue: a detenir M. Cross. Deuxiemement, il y a un aspect qui est aussi tres serieux et c'est. 1 ' aspect complicity. Vous permettez v.n quelque sorte aux membres du FLQ de communiquer entre eux et d'autre part, vous compliquez singulLerement la tache des lor ces policieres . " "Mais que faites-vous de notre devoir de renseigner nos auditeurs." "Mais qu'est-ce que vous dites au nom de 1'INFORMATION!!1 Vous elites, que vous voulez renseigner la population! Mais je vous pose la question, ne pourriez-vous pas avoir un peu plus de sens des responsabilites? Ne pourriez-vous pas de vous-memes vous freiner dans vos propos et elans la teneur dtp; informations, que vous donnez a votre audi toire." "Ecoutez, nous faisons exactement ce que font tons leer autres media d' information, que? ce soit Radio Canada..." "Mais oui, c'est tres facile de dire que les autres le font. Je vous suggere, vous, d'etre un peu plus calme elans vos remarques au sujet de toute cette histoire qui est tres malheureu.se et qui. met een elangor la vie:- d'un homme." "Et pourquoi me le suggerez-vous a moi en particulier?" "Parce que vous avez communique avec moi, vous m'avez demande mon opinion au sujet d'un communique recent du FLQ, et je profite de cette occasion qui m'est offerte pour vous iaire part de mon point, de vue. C'est mon point de vue personnel que je vous donne. Je trouve que vous avez tort; vejus pouvez faire- ee que vous voulez, mais je suis persuade que vous avez tort de continuer a faire le jeu du Front de Liberation du Quebec en diffusant continuellement toutes les informations, tous les communiques que ces gens la peuvent emettre. Vous jouez le jeu des ravisseurs de Monsieur Cross et vous leur permettez de rester caches Ce faisant vous leur donnez une publicite qu'ils ne devraient pas avoir, parce qu'a tout evenement, c'est. une organisation qui est coupable d'un enlevement: et c'est une organisation qui est condamn able." "Alors vous considerez qu'en renseignant la popul it ion, nous nous rendons complice du FLQ et nous faisons La propacjando du PLQ. " "Jc1 vous das que la facon dont vous traitez les nouvel I es concernant le FLQ et la facon dont vous traitez les commtmiquBs 'In FLQ est reprehensile> 1 ej. Vous pourriez exercer un sens eie 1'ethique prof ess ionne 1lc beaucoup plus aigti et vous pourriez davantage aider les corps policiers a faire- Leur devoir et trouver ces ravisseurs, en �faisant moins de publicite et moins de tapage au sujet de cette affaire malheureuse." P.P. "Qu*est-ce que vous appelez la publicite et du tapage? Est-ce que vous nous avez ecoute regulierement pour dire que nous faisons trop de tapage?" A.O. "J'ai eu 1'occasion de vous ecouter deja a deux reprises et j'ai eu une foule de commentaires de Montrealais qui desopprouvent totalement la fagon dont vous vous conduisez sur les ondeis. En fait, je vous rends tous les temoignages que j'ai recus de personnels qui vous ont ecoute. P.P. se. A.O. P.P. "Vous disiez ce matin cfue j'etais tendancieux et degueulasPour quelle1 raison?" "Non! Non! A une occasion, alors que je vous ecoutais, j'ai trouve que vous etiez maiheureusement un peu partisan. C'est 1'impression que vous m'aviez donnee cette fois-la. Lorsque l'on faisait valoir un point de vue favorable au PLQ, vous ecoutiez jusqu'a la fin, tandis que lorsqu'une bonne dame a fait valoir un point de vue defavorable au FLQ, vous lui. avez coupe la parole et vous avez ferme la ligne." "Ah nonj M. Ouellet, je ne ferme jamais la ligne a personne. A.O. "Enfin, qu 'est-ce que vous voulez que je vous elise de plus cjuo ce que j'ai entendu? Vous avez eu la gentillesse d'ecouter mon point de vue; j'espere que vous en prendrez bonne note et e;ue vous vous refrenerez dans vos propos pour faciliter la tache des autorites." P.P. "Mais vous nous crlites que vous nous parlez en votre nom personnel, mais vous savez trees bien que lorsque le Secretaire par lemontaire d'un ministre federal dit ce que vous venez de dire, cela a beaucoup plus de poids que si c'etait une personne ordinaire qui parlait." A.O. "Tant mieux, j'espere que vous m 'ecouterez. " P.P. "Monsieur Turner, a deja dit qu'il n'y avait pas cie censure au Canada mais la les propos cjuo vous nous donnez ..." A.O. "Je maintiens cju'il n'y a pas de censure au Canada, mars je vous invite a vou:; discipliner vous-meme. Ce cju'il faut faire, c'est d'avoir le sens des responsabilites voulu pour faire face a cette situation, ne publier que ce qui est pubtiable et ue peis donner cours a toutes sortes d' informations qui sont plus ou moins objectives. C'est vrai que nous ne voulons pas qu'il y ait une censure, mais nous esperons que les journalistes aussi bien de la presse ecrite que de la presse par lee auront ce sens des responsabiiites pour eux-memes decider de ce qui peut etre une nouvelle et de cc: equi ne doit pas etre dit. Je vous suggere done dc; faire attention a ce que vous Bites." P.P. "C'est presqu'une mise en garde et une menace de la part d'un Secretaire parlementaire." . .0. P.P. "Mais non! Mais non!" "Quand vous dites qu'on est complice du FLQ, vous savez tres bien que ceci est tres grave." 001199 �O. P.P "Je vous ai dit que vous pouviez etre complice: d'une certaine facon en seprvant par la voie des ondes d'intermediaire au FLQ. C'est pourquoi je vous signaie que vous devriez justement etudier de tres pres pour voir jusqu'a quel point votre comportement ne pourrait pas devenir de la compiici te." "Bon M Ouellet, je vous remercie beaucoup." 30 001200 �MESSAGE LIEU SECURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER DEPARTMENT 20-22-TFK-l MINISTERE CONFIDENTISL 20-32-TFK-FLQ-3 FM/DE PRECEDENCE TO/A WASHINGTON A2. BUENOS AIRES INFO DISTR. GLA, GUS, PSI, TASK FORCE PER VOS TELS. 3250 ET 3264 DU IB NOV. URUGUAY - ENLEVEMENTS SUB/SUJ NOUS VOUS REMERCIONS DE L' ANALYSE ET DES SUGGESTIONS QUE CONTIENNENT VOS TELEGRAHMES MENTIONNES EN REFERENCE. 2. NOUS SOMMES D'ACCORD QU'IL FAUDRAIT EVITER SI POSSIBLE DE DONNER UNE REPONSE PUREMENT NEGATIVE A LA SUGGESTION DE MARASCUILO-, D» AUTANT PLUS QUE L» ELARGISSEMENT DE FLT POUEHAIT AVOIR UN CERTAIN EFFET SUR LA SITUATION DE CROSS. COMME VOUS, NOUS CROTONS QUE CET EFFET POURRAIT ETRE PLUTOT DISTANT ET ATTENUE. DE PLUS, CCMME NOUS NOUS TROUVONS (ET NOUS TROUVERONS PEUT-ETRE A NOUVEAU A L'AVENIR) DANS LA MEME SITUATION QUE LES URUGUAXENS, IL POUKRAIT ETRE DANGEREUX POUR NOUS DE SEMBLER NOUS FAIRE LES AVOCATS DES CONCESSIONS QUANT IL S'AGIT DES AUTRES GOUVERN6MirNTS. 3. NOUS SCMMES DONC D'ACCORD AVEC VOUS/-QUE TOUTE ACTIQ|j DE NOTRE PART EN VERS L'URUGUAI DANS CETTE AFFAIIi&f NE DOIT PAS MM \ INSPIRES PAR LES ETATS-UNIS NI P M U M M C CONSTnUER UNE PRESSION INDUE. It DEVRAIT CEPENDANT ETRE POSSIBLE DE TRANSMETTRE AUX U1UGUAYENS UNE DOCUMENTATION SUR L'EXPE\ RIENCE CANADIENNE SUIT* AUX ENLEVEMENTS, T COMPRIS LES POLITIQUES QUE NOUS AVONS ADOPTEES^ NOTAMMENT EN RAPPORT AVEC LE MANIFESTE FLQ, SANS POURTANT PARAITRE LEUR FAIRE LA LECCM. TOUT CECI S'INSERERAIT NHWALEMENT DANS LES ECHANGES DE VUES ET D»INFORMATIONS ENTRE LES DEUX GOUVEfiNEMENTS DANS DES SITUATIONS COMPARABLES. IL ME SMKERAIT DANGEREUX CEPENDANT DS \ SOULIGNuR TROP FORTEMENT L*ASPECT RELATIF AU MANIFESTE. IL FAUDRAIT DRAFTER/REDACTEUR SJG. .Q..3XWl/.Tt. EXT l a / B I L (REV 8/70) DI VI S I O N / O I R E C T I O N POP ..a/* APPROVED/ APPROUVE TELEPHONE SIG. A . E. Rnrcwii 001201 �CONFIDENTIEL •»2— LAISSER LES URUGUAIENS TIRER LEURS PROPRES CONCLUSIONS A CE SUJET. 4. IL SERAS^JPROBABLEMENT POSSIBLE DE FAIRE LES ARRANGEMENTS ASSES BIENTOT POUR LA PRESENTATION DES LETTRES DE CREANCE DE L« AMBASSADEUR UkUGUAYEN A OTTAWA. S I CECI SE CONFIRME, NOUS POURRONS AMORCER LE DIALOGUE AVEC LUI A CE SUJET ET LUI DONNER LA DOCUMENTATION QUE NOUS AVONS L»INTENTI DE PREPARER, ET DONT NOUS VOUS FERONS,, DE TOUTE? FACQNS^ TENIR COPIE. D'AUTRE PART, S I L«AMBASSADEUR NE PEUT SE PRESENTER BIENTOT, NOUS VOUS DEMANDERIQNS DS LUI FAIRE TENIR VOUS-MEME LA DOCUMENTATION ET DE PROCEDER SELON LA PREMIERE POSSIBILITE DECRITE DANS VOTRE TEL 3 2 6 4 PARA 4 * A . E . RITCHIE �J' £ cJd/d/Ac' PD Ff\- -^AxAF A ^2dF,A .yAAxAfyA JJ-2 x^rA^TF Z2A2 A - A ^ . C- ' • y s - t A I J - AFZA^ Kl 7 ^ - mo FAX A d., A A«2 J>/Pr2 r^>°PPXAAAx 7 AL/3 c+b v 7V > ^ X •V V ,\SL<iyAA/S JJ A Jfl <™^W 001203 �/ ' / ZLiJk. flA^tf^*^ cTOfc lUdxX *ov Ab L/( ,\ if ")—<; -i^,<~ A7&^£ o^ZprCFA K JrZ<—d * . 4Cx \n Cd ^ F^Aii fr-x :)UA^C7(A- l<^7Fcr7 ; U. C*~ Is, SI^V-KPLC-^J* l^Txx^rd C#~A^ii. cfc\.i-^A <j 70L ( ZAZ <A ^-yi Aci^c-^-eri^-t -F^^l 3 /U-fc*v-» <*Xs*~~-*- 72x22 -j eittUvi^o M x i I /. ^ ' y\ Jw^-£BB-~ > 'U CjJ fl ) J L_t^~ . c" / C-^x O B 7 A^-L^U-JB> 001204 �ACTION REQUEST- FICHE DE SERVICE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA FILE N O . — DOSSIER N 7 • • • znp. I EXTENSION-^OSlf) TEL. NO.—N« TEL. I—| PLEASE CALL PRIERE D'APPEIER TIME/HEURE W A N T S TO SEE Y O U DtSIRE VOUS VOIR WILL CALL A G A I N DOIT RAPPELER ACTION DONNER SUITE \ 2 XJ COMMENTS COMMENTAIRES • MAKE JJU / yfXs- NOTE A N D FILE NOTER ET CLASSER I—I NOTE 8, FORWARD 1 I NOTER ET FAIRE SUIVRE 'ssA. A-** 'rX2. fy^ APPROVAL APPROBATION I—I DRAFT REPLY I I PROJET DE RiPONSE • FAIRE /...COPIES I—I NOTE 8. RETURN I I NOTER ET RETOURNER (JZCAX-'SS • K •wLs t C/XSSA- AA.77-- h (y^Q ax S. <x -fP' CALL RECEIVED BY MESSAGE RECU PAR CGSB STANDARD FORM 12C 7340-21-029-0576 TIME HEURE 001205 7 2 �LP0p.;;.3|irB;(\nr;c^ . M<yx4 CLtfvJL ~fe> 72F2C&2* C O N F I D E N T I A L (j//9 /JtUd PD rn FM WSHDC 3250 NOV 18/70 TO OTT EXT POP BAG BAIRS DE OTT ) FFTXH&ddji-s-c, 0 C***~*«Z~ DISTR GLA GUS REF OURTEL 3 0 4 2 0CT28 URUGUAY-KIDNAPPINGS LATE YESTERDAY,MARASCUILO,ACTING DIRECTOR FOR ARGENTINA/URUGUAY/ PARAGUAY,TOLD US THAT ICRC REP WORKING THROUGH URUGUAYAN LAWYERS HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH TUPAMAROS AND I S CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL RELEASE FLY,USA AGRONOMIST,IF THEIR MANIFESTO I S PUBLISHED IN THE MANNER THEY D E S I R E . T H I S CLARIFIES THE SITUATION SLIGHTLY INASMUCH AS EARLIER THEY HAD REFUSED TO SPECIFY WHETHER THEY WOULD RELEASE FLY OR GOMlDE f THE BRAZILIAN DIPLOMAT.NEVERTHELESS THE URUGUAYAN GOVT REMAINS OBDURATE AND SO FAR WILL NOT/NOT ALLOW I T S PUBLICATION BY THE REQUIRED SEVEN NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO AND TV. (PREVIOUSLY SOME RELATIVELY MINOR DAILIES HAD RELEASED I T ) . T O EMPHASIZE I T S OPPOSITION IT HAS IMPOSED A DEGREE OF CENSORSHIP ON THE PRESS ESSENTIALLY TO PREVENT ANY NEWSPAPERS TAKING THE INITIATIVE AND PUBLISHING THE DOCU.SOME OF THEM ADMITTEDLY SUPPORT THE GOVT AND CLAIM THEY WILL NOT/NOT CARRY IT IN ANY CASE. IN THE HOPE OF CHANGING THEIR MIND AS WELL AS BRINGING ADDED PRESSURE ON THE URUGUAYAN GOVT CERTAIN USA NEWSPAPERS PROBABLY AT SUGGESTION OF SIATE DEPT HAVE SENT M9SS URGING ITS PUBLICATION2.MARASCUILO MADE CLEAR THAT ICRC WAS ONLY ACTINB ON BEHALF OF FLY, « « a A. 001206 �PAGE TWO 3 2 5 0 CONFD AFTER SOME I N I T I A L HESITATION THE BRAZILIANS SAID THAT THEY DID NOT/ NOT WANT THEM TO REPRESENT GOMIDES INTERESTS APPARENTLY BECAUSE OF ICRC ATTITUDE OVER THE ISSUE OF BRAZILIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS. AS WE MENTIONED IN REFTELVURUGUAYAN ARE CONCERNED THAT I F THEY AGREE TO PAY THE FBR ICE DEMANDED FOR FLYS RELEASE MODEST AS IT MAY BE BRAZILIAN PRESSURE ON THEM TO SECURE GOMIDES RELEASE WILL INCREASE. TUPAMAROS WILL THUS DEMAND A VERY HIGH PRICE FOR HIM. 3.MEANWHILE,MARASCUILO TOLD US THAT U THANT RELEASED A STATEMENT YESTERDAY ADDRESSED TO QUOTE ALL CONCERNED UNQUOTE CALLING FOR THE RELEASE OF FLY. IT SAID THAT HE WAS ACTING AT THE REQUEST OF THE FLY FAMILY AND IN RECOGNITION OF FLYS ASSN IN THE PAST WITH FAO AND UNDP. A,MARASCUILO ALSO TOLD US THAT CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN TO RECOMMENDING TO SECTY ROGERS THAT HE CALL IN URUGUAYAN AMBASSADOR' TO ASK THAT THE MANIFESTO BE PUBLISHED. RFT 192255Z 001207 �C O N F I D E N T I A L FM WSHDC 32 64 NOV 1 8 / 7 0 TO OTT EXT POP BAG BAIRS DE OTT DISTR GLA GUS REF OURTELS 3 042 0CT2 3 AND 3 2 5 S NOV 18 URUGUAY-KIDNAPPINGS-POSSIBLE CDN ACTION DURING OUR CONVERSATION WITH MARASCUILO,ACTING DIRECTOR FOR ARGENTINA/URUGUAY/PARAGUAY,HE NOTED THAT THE URUGUAYANS HAVE OFTEN CITED CDN POLICY IN DEALING WITH THE FLQ BY WAY OF BUTTRESSING THEIR REFUSAL TO PUBLISH THE TERRORISTS MANIFESTO IN ORDER TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF FLY.THEY HAVE CLAIMED,SO MARASCUILO S A I D , THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN A POSITIOM VERY SIMILAR TO OUR OWN IN REFUSING TO RELEASE THEIR PRISONERS AND IN THEIR GEN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE KIDNAPPERS.THIS I S NOT/NOT THE CASE OF COURSE SINCE AMONGST OTHER THINGS,THE CDN GOVT DID NOT/NOT OPPOSE THE PUBLICATION OF THE FLQ MANIFESTO AND WE OFFERED THE KIDNAPPERS SAFE CONDUCT TO CU3A IF THEY WOULD RELEASE MESSRS LAPORTE AND CROSS. 2.MARASCUILO THEREFORE WONDERED WHETHER WE COULD ADD FURTHER SUBSTANCE TO USA PLEAS FOR THE PUBLICATION OF THE TUPAMAROS MANIFESTO AND THE RELEASE OF FLY BY SPEAKING TO THE URUGUAYANS. COULD I FOR EXAMPLE SPEAK TO L U I S I , T H E URUGUAYAN AMBASSADOR HERE IN H I S CAPACITY AS AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE TO CDA?ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT/ NOT SPECIFY WHAT WE MIGHT SAY PRESUMABLY HE HAD IN MIND A DISCUSSION OF OUR OWN EXPERIENCE IN CDA AND THE GOVTS HANDLING OF FLO DEMANDS r> 001208 �PAGE TWO 32<S4 CONFD WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS AS APPROPRIATE OM THE QUESTION OF THE MANIFESTO. 2 e A S IT SO HAPPENED,!. HAD LUNCH WITH L U I S ) LAST WEEKAT HIS INVITATION.MOST CF THE CONVERSATION WAS DEVOTED TO THE KIDNAPPINGS IN URUGUAY AND CDA WITH L U I S I COMPLAINING ABOUT THE PRESSURE THAT THE USA I S BRINGING ON URUGUAY TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF FLY. HE MENTIONED THAT TKE FLY FAMILY AND THEIR FRIENDS WERE VERY ACTIVE V I S - A - V I S THE ADMIN AND CONGRESS AND THAT OF COURSE HE HIMSELF HAD HAD TO RECEIVE A GOOD MANY PEOPLE CLAIMING AN INTEREST IN THE CASE. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE STATE DEPT HAD OFFICIALLY BEEN RELATIVELY RESTRAINED IN THE PRESSURE THAT THEY HAVE EXERTED BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE BEHIND A GOOD DEAL OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE FLY FAMILYcTHlS MAY NOT/NOT BE ENTIRELY THE CASE SINCE WE KNOW FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH THE STATE DEPT THAT FLYS SUPPORTERS HAVE ACTED ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE IN SOME INSTANCES BUT WHETHER IT I S SO OR NOT/NOT,THE URUGUAYAN AMBASSADOR INDICATED THAT HIS GOVT WAS BECOMING A LITTLE IRRITATED WITH THE NUMBER OF DEMARCHES MADE TO THEM FROM ONE QUARTER TO ANOTHER. 3 d MENTION THIS POINT BECAUSE IT WOULD SEEM APPARENT THAT IF WE ARE TO TAKE AMY USEFUL ACTION,WE MUST TRY TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT/MOT ACTING AT THE BEHEST OF THE STATE D E P T , I F URUGUAYANS BECAME CONVINCED THAT WE WERE,OUR APPROACHES COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. A,THIS SAIDjlT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE ARE FOUR ALTERNATIVES THAT m m mO 001209 �^AGE THREE 3264 CONFD YOU MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER IF YOU THOUGHT WE SHOULD RESPOND TO USA REQUEST.IN ALL OF THEM WE COULD BEGIN BY EXPRESSING OUR DESIRE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON 6_ MUTUAL PROBLEM AND THEN,AS I MENTIONED ABOVEs 1/ - • A CENTER_TO_SOME EXTENT ON MANIFESTO QUESTION.BY WAY OF INDICATING OUR INTEREST IN FLY CASE,WE COULD SUGGEST THAT HIS RELEASE MIGHT BE ANOTHER FACTOR THAT WOULD WEIGH IN FLQS KIND ABOUT RELEASING CROSS. ' THIS MAY BE LONG SHOT BUT WITHIN REALM OF POSSIBILITY.FIRST ALTERNATIVE,AS MARASCUILO SUGGESTED,WOULD BE FOR ME TO GET IN TOUCH WITH LUISI.HOWEVER,AS I HAVE JUST SEEN HIM IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE WISE TO TACKLE HIM AGAIN ON SUBJ WITHOUT RAISING HIS SUSPICION ABOUT STATE DEPT PROMPTING MY APPROACH.I COULD HOWEVER SEND HIM AS FOLLOW-UP TO OUR EARLIER CONVERSATIONS MATERIAL FOR HIS GOVTS INFO OUTLINING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN SEIZURE OF LAPORTE AND CROSS AND INDICATING WHAT ACTION OR DECISIONS GOVT HAS TAKEN AT VARIOUS POINTS,FOR EXAMPLE NEGOTIATIONS WITH FLQ,PUBLICATION OF MANIFESTO, OFFER ABOUT SAFE-CONDUCT TO CUBA,ETC.(ONLY MATERIAL THAT WE HAVE OF THIS PARTICULAR NATURE I S SERIES OF ARTICLES FROM TOR STAR LAST OF WHICH WAS DATED 0CT19.THIS HOWEVER WOULD NOT/NOT BE SUFFICIENTLY AUTHORITATIVE AND BESIDES IT I S NOT/NOT UP TO D.ATE.)COULD YOU ASSEMBLE AND SEND TO ME SUCH MATERIAL?PERHAPS IF LUISI WAS SUFFICIENTLY INTERESTED IN IT HE MIGHT TAKE INITIATIVE IN CONTACTING ME AGAIN AT WHICH TIME I COULD MAKE ABOVE POINTS. 5.SECONDLY,YOU COULD CALL IN URUGUAYAN CHARGE AND GO OVER GROUND V/ITH HIM. I DOUBT HOWEVER THAT THIS WOULD BE VERY EFFECTIVE .EVEN IF HE REPORTED YOUR CONVERSATION BY TEL PERHAPS HE MAY NOT/NOT BE SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN IN MVDEO FOR HIS REPORT TO CARRY MUCH •.*A 001210 �PAGE FOUR 32 54 CONFD WEIGHT. 6.THIRDLY,LUISI INDICATED TO ME THAT HE I S INTERESTED IN GOING TO CDA TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS.IF DATE COULD BE SET FAIRLY PROMPTLY,THIS WOULD GIVE YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS KIDNAPPINGS WITH HIM AND PRESUMABLY ON H I S RETURN TO WSHDC HE WOULD REPORT YOUR VIEWS, 7.FOURTHLY,IE BISSONNET I S ON THE POINT OF PRESENTING HIS CREDENTIALS IN MVDEO,PERHAPS HE COULD TAKE UP THE MATERIAL AT THAT TIME WITH THE URUGUAYAN AUTHORITIES.THIS WOULD ENSURE THAT OUR VIEWS WERE REGISTERED WITH THEM IN THE MANNER WE DESIRED ALTHOUGH ON THE OTHER HAND IT MIGHT GIVE OUR I N I T I A T I V E MORE PROMINENCE THAN OUR LOCUS STANDI WOULD J U S T I F Y , 8 . O F THESE FOUR ALTERNATIVES YOU MIGHT CONSIDER THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO BEGIN WITH THE FIRST BUT AT THE SAME TIME YOU MIGHT WISH TO GIVE THOUGHT TO THE SECOND AND SET AN EARLY DATE FOR L U I 3 1 TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS.THIS HAS TO BE DONE IN ANY CASE AND PERHAPS YOU MIGHT THINK IT PREFERABLE TO DO IT SOONER THAN LATER. 9.ALTHOUGH I COULD OF COURSE SEND L U I S I THE SUMMARY OF EVENTS I MENTIONED WITHOUT FURTHER CONSULTATION W TH THE STATE DEPT IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO SOUND OUT OFFICIALS MORE SENIOR THAN MARASCUILO ABOUT A MORE SUBSTANTIVE DEMARCHE.ON BALANCE HIS IDEA I S NOT/NOT UNACCEPTABLE,IF WE WENT ALONG WITH IT WE COULD BE HELPING USA OVER A MATTER OF SOME CONCERN TO THEM AS WELL AS POSSIBLY SERVING OUR OWN INTEREST V I S - A - V I S CROSS,ADMITTEDLY OUR RELATIONS WITH URUGUAY MAY c » e -<•- 001211 �PAGE FIVE 3264 CONFD NOT/NOT BE AS CLOSE AS THEY WERE WITH THE CLOSING OF OUR MISSION BUT EVEN IF IT DOES NOT/NOT GIVE MUCH WEIGHT TO OUR VIEWS WE MAY NOT/NOT LOSE VERY MUCH IN THE PROCESS PROVIDED THATHWE HANDLE THE QUESTION CAREFULLY AND MINIMIZE THE CONNECTION WITH USA. 10.1 LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VIEWS AND IF. YOU WISH ME TO ACT TO THE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AND DECISIONS THAT I MENTIONED CADIEUX RFT 192255Z 001212 �POP/A.D.Rowe/mk file BD5g— extra COKPIDENTIAL PDM (Mr. Ritchie) 2k, 1970 POP (Mr. Rowe - Task Porce) eet Conversations with R.C.M.P. At aad at tha 20-22-TFK-l 20-22-TFK-FLQ-l , I spoke to Insp. Ferraris aa point (a), time ha ijuaoauied aa follows on othai a) Laporte Inquest i The Inspector ia still of tha opini< that there was no direct connection between tho tao cells. Ha * seen no evidence to support tha nana roporta of to-day's data.. On tho other hand, it la possible that tha Quebec poliea interrogating officers have gathered aono evidence which they ara net sharing with tha R.C.M.P. b a p . Ferraris fait that thia lack of information In Ottawa aaad not bo viewed negatively since a police force with responsibility in a aaaa (in thia instance, homicide) would bo reluctant to disseminate information which eoald bo need aa evidence in an eventual trial. The R.C.M.P. expect to receive copies of yesterday's testimony (a public document) in daa course. Delays are inevitable for technical reasons - editing and printing. ») ftwPQQia Qlrod - Interview in LUanreeet The R.C.M.P. have nortiminonlstlanto identify who Cirod might bo. They have asked tho French authorities for assistance. To data, no response haa boon forthcoming. It ia quite poaaibla that tha nana of thia alleged F W spokesman in Algeria ia false. London telegram 3876 (c) Richard BrosI: You will have ao sn his of Hu»naliin 23, 1970 (oopor attached). Insp. Ferraris had copy, and agreed with tho inforaatlon given. Bros waa known to tho R.C.M.P. fbr some time and from a police operational point ef view, he will net be missed. A. D. Rowe 001213 �POP/A.D.Rowe/mk ' EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES do..yja-TFA 12 MEMORANDUM PDM ( M r . \ i * 6 h i e ) TO k FROM Da , ry \ SECURITY Stcurtli CONFIDENTIAL DATE November 24, 1970 POP (Mr. Rowe - Task Force) Numiro REFERENCE Mfiranc, OTTAWA SUBJECT Sujet Conversations with R.C.M.P. cn: 20-22-TFK-l 20-22-TFK-FTQ-1 MISSION ENCLOSURES Annexes At your request, I spoke to Insp. Ferraris on point (a), and at the same time he commented as follows on other aspects. DISTRIBUTION a) Laporte Inquest: The Inspector is still of the opinion that there was no direct connection between the two cells. He has seen no evidence to support the news reports of to-day's date.. On the other hand, it is possible that the Quebec police interrogating officers have gathered some evidence which they are not sharing with the R.C.M.P. Insp. Ferraris felt that this lack of information in Ottawa need not be viewed negatively since a police force with responsibility in a case (in this instance, homicide) would be reluctant to disseminate information which could be used as evidence in an eventual trial. The R.C.M.P. expect to receive copies of yesterday's testimony (a public document) in due course. Delays are inevitable for technical reasons - editing and printing. b) Francois Girod - Interview in L'Express; The R.C.M.P. have no documentatien to identify who Girod might be. They have asked the French authorities for assistance. To date, no response has been forthcoming. It is quite possible that the name of this alleged FLQ spokesman in Algeria is false. (c) Richard Bros: You will have seen London telegram 3876 of November 23, 1970 (copy attached). Insp. Ferraris had seen his copy, and agreed with the information given. Bros was known to the R.C.M.P. for some time and from a police operational point of view, he will not be missed. AC CCA A. D. Rowe ^7U, vx C*~yXAFl<-«>. / TAJ-JV*^. ^tU UKHC LISXS- CAMJIJI. (J^ jALALcyvX^ 7 ^ - -JJ-- ^^-cy-AA2( ^ - ^ \JA L< A APP&AkL ^Jnj/AK-^ (. kv C Ext. 407A/BU. (Admin. Services Div.) -AJXA AU^t^f CSXXA^^ w-vJicv^^-JtU. £<Av\J° AlAuA. 001214 CtJ- �IN(V F^(P.^RS)^PSI(BRETT)TFCOtSTANSFliS)) j GCO(PqDDjMGTON) ) JDSTICE(CHRISTIE) 1 SOL GEN(HOFLEX) 3 ACTION COPY C O N F I D E N T I A L u &y26J>. <?or. i rv-uc—r FM LDN 3 8 7 6 TO OTT EXT NOV23/70 ... U^K^JL INFO PARIS TT RCMPOTT DE OTT DISTR POP FPR PSI, DEATH OF RICHARD BROS RICHARD PIERRE ANTOINE BROS,A NATURALIZED CDN,COMMITTED SUICIDE IN AN ISLINGTON POLICE STATION CELL IN LDN N0V22.RCMP HAVE FILE ON BROS FOR CRIMINAL OFFENCES AS WELL AS FOR FLQ SYMPATHIES. BROS HAS BEEN WELL KNOWN TO QUE HOUSE AS POTENTIAL TROUBLE-MAKER AND RECENTLY HAD ARTICLE IN PARIS MATCH SYMPATHETIC TO FLQ. 2 . B R I T AND CDN PRESS HAVE BEEN ENQUIRING WHETHER BROSS7 ARREST WAS RELATED TO FLQ ACTIVITIES IN ANY WAY.AFTER CHECKING WITH SCOTLAND YARD WE ARE ABLE TO INFORM PRESS THAT BROSS AREST STEMMED EXCLUSIVELY FROM CRIMINAL CHARGE UNRELATED TO FLQ.FACTS OBTAINED FROM POLICE ARE AS FOLLOWS:BROS WAS ARRESTED N0V21 ON BASIS OF A COMPLAINT BY LANDLORD THAT BROS HAD BEATEN HIM WHEN LANDLORD APPARENTLY ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN RENT MONEY.WHILE IN JAIL POLICE SEARCHED BROSS FLAT AND FOUND APPROX ONE-HALF POUND OF HEROIN VALUED AT APPROX POUNDS 5 0 0 0 . B R O S WAS FOUND HANGING IN HIS CELL AT ISLINGTON POLICE STATION AT 1755 HOURS N0V22.HE WAS UNSTABLE CHARACTER AND POLICE SUSPECT THAT PROSPECT OF HEAVY PRISON SENTENCE CAUSED HIM TO COMMIT SUICIDE. 3 . I N F O GIVEN TO PRESS SIMPLY CONFIRMS THAT HE I S CDN CITIZEN BORN IN FRANCE,ARRESTED N0V21 ON CHARGE OF ALLEGED ASSAULT AND FOUND HANGING IN HIS CELL N 0 V 2 2 . RFT 2 3 1 7 2 5 Z �MESSAGE i^^ DEPARTMENT FLACK MINISTERE OTT FM/DE EXTER ORIO. NO. XjT=.,r~.— DATE N ° D'ORla. P0P-U5 ^TxXlxttrrX., V^-A\t . - . . . <.,..,-••,. ••- riLI/DOMIIR L eet SECURITY •ECURITE >^ S E C R E T 20-22-TFK-7-CUBA>*t^ NW24/70 f»'_A Je A 20-22-^FK-l ^ r — PRECEDENCE OP IMMED HAVANA TO/A xfinimr INFO PSI DISTR. ECT GLA SUB/SUJ REPRESENTATIONS BY CUBAN AMB FOR TOUR INFO COSSIO CALLED ON PDF NCV23 ON INSTRUCTIONS FM HAVANA TO BRING FOLLOWING TO OUR ATTN: (A) AIR CDA ANNOUNCEMa*T REPORTS) IN OTT PAPER N0V19 STATED THAT SERIES OF FIVE CHARTER FLIGHTS TO CUBA FM MTL WERE CANCELLED IN OCT BECAUSE OF POLITICAL CLIMATE IN QUE FOLLOWING IHE TWO FLQ \ KIDNAPPINGS. ACCORDING TO AMB THIS STATEMENT IMPLIED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUBA AND QUE SITUATION. ( B ) ON N0V20 AND 2 1 HOMES OF SIX CUBAN NATIONALS CONNECTED WITH CUBAN TRADE OFFICE MTL HAD BEEN SEARCHED BT POLICE. NAMES GIVEN MIQUEL PEREZ (CATTLE EXPERT) ANDRES MACIAS (CATTLEMAN) JOSE BETANCOURT (CATTLEMAN) ANGEL HERNANDEZ (OFFICIAL MTL OFFICE) HUGO CHE GIL (OFFICIAL MTL OFFICE) AND SERGIO PEREZ (OFFICIAL MTL OFFICE). (C) THE CUBAN GOVT HAD AGREED TO START NEGOTIATIONS ON A HIJACKING BILATERAL \ AGREEMENT. CDA AHM00faH&NT HAD j A l MADE rflTHQU^BPR KNOWLEDGS^Hfe FOR I N C I D p f S 0 %j |jpfWS WOUIDXNVpmGATE FAftfcS jpTk [Mki^mL^, afERE U K n W l N G AND M/^oT^iLs PART DRAFT E R / R E D A C T E u t l Ol VI S I O N / O I R E C T I O N APPROVED/APPROUVE P.A.BISSONNETTE tXT 18/HIL IHRV 8/701 001216 �^ UNDER-SEC HAD LOBG TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH CUBAN A O EVENING MOV23, DURING THE COURSE OF WHICH HE MADE FGLLG/ONG P O U T S BEPEATBDLTl (A) IHE TWO INCIDENTS RSPOMTSD BT THE AMB, IE THE AIE CDA AMOflKSHcMT AMD IMS SEARCH OF CUBAN HOMES, DID MOT IMVQLTB IM A I T WAT A JUDGEMENT BT THE COM GOVT AMD SHOULD MOT THRHSFGRE REFLECT IM AIT WAT CM OiA-CUIiA RELATIONS. THEME WAS MO CHANGE IM THE3- - RELATIONS SINCE THESE WAS MO JUDGEMENT OH PAMT OF COM GOVT, AMD MOREOVER CDM GOVT WAS VERT GRATEFUL TO CUMAI GOTT FOB I T S COOPERATION IM RELATION TO THE SAFE CONDUCT FOft THE ElDNAPPERSj (M) MORE 3 P S C I F I C A L L I , THE UNDSR-SEC TOLD AMB THAT GOVT OP CDA MAD HOT BEEN W O U N D IM AMD HAD HOT BEEN AWA8E CT THE ANNOUNCEMENT MADE B T AIM CDA. THE CGMPAMT, WHICH MAS A DXMAMIC CHE AMD THEREFORE BELUCTAMT U K E AMT SUCH COMFAMT TO DISCARD COMMERCIAL BESEFXTS, MAT HAVE DECJDH) THAT CHAHTEE FLXBHTS IM PRESENT COMDITICMS AT CDM AIBPOR-.S WHERE SECURITT MEASURES WERE STRINGENT WERE MORE A MOISAHCS THAM A BENEFIT* (C) AS TO THE SEARCH OF CUBAM HOMES, U O S HAD M S B A POLICE MATTER FOR POLICE PURPOSES AHD HAD MOT INVOLVED IM AMT WAT THE GOVTS CP CDA AMD OP QUEBEC. OTHER ICM-CDI HOMES HAD BESM SEAKCHtP WHEN, FOR IMSTAMCE, WHOLE AREAS OR BLOCKS HAD B U M SEARCHED. IM SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, I T WAS MOT POSSIBLE TO SEARCH OMLT CDM HOMES,, AMD E V B R 9 0 D T LIVING IM THE AREA OR BLOCK IM QUESTION HAD TO SUBMIT TO THE SEARCH. THIS CCOLU HAPPEM TO ANT OF U S , WITH THE EXCEPTION OF COURSE OF THOSE EKJGTHG DIPLO IMMBNITT, JHICH WAS MOT THE CASE FOR THE CUBAM OFFICIALS MENTIONED B T XHE AMB,AMD CD) IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WS WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT MO MORE SUCH CUBAN OFFICIALS WOULD BE SEARCH!®, BUT WE WEBB LOOKING INTO THE CAS-^S AND rfOULD GIVE THE AMB THE RESULTS OF CUR INVESTIGATION I F WS COULD. �P J / / P .A ..JpBwBB»,.BB'B/dst& : J 3 U M T C T I J " • . : / . F O R t S S A- . j . - t ten lloyy "xr > C c Jo~X3' ? B , 1 dx I^ / 7 ^presentations by Cuban Ambassador Further to ny memorandum of November 23, I wish to report that tha Undar-Cecretary had a Ions telephone conversation with tho Cuban Ambassador at 7*10 p.m. on Hovenber 23, during tho course of which h© nada the following points repaatedly; (a) Tha two incidents raportad by the Ambassador, i.e. tha Air Canada announcarant and tha search of Juban hone3, did not involve in any way a judgement by tho Canadian Government and should not tharafora reflect in any way on Canada-Cuba rala ions. There was no change in these relations sinea thera i .fas nc t1ud3t3rr.ant on tha part of the 'Canadian Govem.it, and moraovar the Canadian Government was vary grateful to the Cuban Government for its cooperation in relation to tha safe conduct for the kidnappers. (b) "ore specifically, the Under-Secretary told the Bassa-ior that tha Govarrorant of Canada had not been involved in and had not bean aware of th© announcement nada by Air Canada. The company, which was a dynamic one and tharafora reluctant like any such co.-ipany to discard coranerclal benefits, :nay have decided that charter flights in present conditions ai Canadian airports where security measures ware stringent ware ore a miisancu than a Benefit. (c) As to the search of Cuban hos'.es, this had bean a poliea ratter for police pirpoaea and hact not involved in any way thr- CkBvern»r;*mt«j of Canada and of Quebec. Other non-Canadian hones li&d been searched when, for instance, whole areas or blocks had been searched. In such circv-istances, it was not possible to search only Canadian ho^ea, and everybody living in the area or i^lock in question had to subrr.it> to tlie search. This 2 ce: PJW tp-.t PSI 001218 �3SCHBT _ 2 - could happen to any of us, with tha exception of course of those enjoying diplotr^ttic immunity, which was not tha case for tha Cuban officials mentioned by tha Ambassador, (d) In tins circunstancas, we were not in a position to give assurances that no nore sueh Cuban officials wouli ba searched, but we ware IdOklag into tha cases and would ^iva th« Arcbassador th<? results of our investigation If wa could. **• B'SSONNETTir F'.A.B. 001219 �POP/C.Roquet/rf cc: PPR (Mr. Read) GLA (Mr. Dier) November 24 - 17:45 f-A NOTE FOR FILE CONFIDENTIAL <A Subject; Uruguay - Kidnapping Mr. Middleton of our Washington ihbassy telephoned me at 17:45 concerning our proposed dialogue with the Uruguayans on political kidnappings. He said the Uruguayan Ambassador had requested (yesterday I believe) an interview with Ambassador Cadieux. This has been set for Friday. Coincidentally, Mr. Read of Protocol informed the Sabassy this morning that we would be able to receive the Uruguayan Ambassador in Ottawa on December 1 for presentation of his credentials, if this were convenient to him. As it turns out, the Uruguayan Ambassador doubts this date can be accepted, if only because his credentials have not yet arrived. 2. In the circumstances Mr. Middleton was wondering whether the Friday appointment between the Ambassadors might not provide the desired opportunity for presenting the Uruguayan Ambassador with a piece of paper on developments in Canada relating to the kidnappings. This would allow Mr. Cadieux to discuss the whole matter in the manner envisaged in our latest telegram of instructions to Washington on this subject. Mr. Middleton stressed that he had not had an occasion to discuss this idea with Mr. Cadieux yet. 3. I told Mr. Middleton that pressure of work had suddenly, increased here and that, especially in view of the forthcoming trip to London by the Minister, I very much doubted that we would be able to put together for Friday the kind of paper that is required. In the circumstances, 1 hoped the Qabassy had enough information (including the parallel jeari; up by PSI between the Uruguayan and Canadian experiences) to allow Mr. Cadieux to have a really substantial exchange of information and views with his Uruguayan colleague without giving him any document. Mr. Middleton thought this would be possible. 4. I stressed again the importance of not seeming to preach to the Uruguayans or even to underline too much any particular aspect of our decisions relating to the kidnappings. What we have been able to do here might present special difficulties in another country and vice-versa. Mr. Middleton agreed that the approach would be simply to have a neutral exchange of information and views. He would discuss our conversation with Ambassador Cadieux. Fix C. Roquet �MESSAGE ^ ^ ^ ^ • i, ci' * 11D j DEPARTMENT ORIG. NO. MINISTERE N ° O'ORIQ. LIEU FM/DE 1 OTTAWA EXTERNAL POP-416 DATE - -,.< X N0V24/70 V AAyXA -- Ay '7 .« ttenm NIN i-J ~ u TO/A PTr.RMT.qNV INFO CNGNT LDN DISTR. TASK FORCE LIST PMO PCO SOC OUN SUB/SUJ SECURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER 22- 7 UNCLAS /A PRECEDENCE IMMED PARIS WASHDC FPR HAVAN CANDELNATO QJd- (ty/HcrA QdZ BERNE BONN FIS CROSS KIDNAPPING - UN SECGEN IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION IN THE HOUSE PM SAID THAT QUOTE THE OFFER WHICH WAS MADE MUCH EARLIER BY THE GOVT OF QUEBEC AND BY THIS GOVT TO ENSURE THE SAFE CONDUCT OF THE KIDNAPPERS OUT OF THE COUNTRY IN RETURN FOR THE SAFE RELEASE OF MR CROSS STILL STANDS. IF THROUGH ONE MH)IATOR OR ANOTHER THE FLQ WANTS TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE GOVT, WE ARE STILL PREPARED TO DISCUSS IT UNQUOTE. 2. \ SSEA'S PARLIAMENTARY SEC, MR OUELLET, ALSO SAID IN HOUSE THAT SECGEN HIMSELF HAD ALREADY MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS AVAILABLE TO ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY IN CERTAIN CASES BUT THAT THE REQUEST SHOUID BE MADE BY THE \ GOVTS AND NOT BY CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS. MR OUELLET LATER ANSWERED QUESTION; BY TV AND RADIO REPORTERS OF BOTH FRENCH AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE NETWORKS. HIS COMMENTS TO THE MEDIA WERE THAT THE LATEST MSG FRCM THE KIDNAPPERS, BOTH BY ITS TENOR AND BY ITS TONE, SURELY DID NOT JUSTIFY INTERVENTIOJ ON THE PART OF THE SECGEN OF THE UN. THERE WAS NO INTENTION ON PART OF CDN GOVT TO REQUEST SUCH AN INTERVENTION. CDN GOVTS POSITION WAS WELL KNOWN. ,g DRAFTER/REDACTEUR S;G. C. ROQUET E X T 1 8 / B I L (REV 8/701 Ol VI S I O N / D I RECTION POP APPROVED/APPROUVE TELEPHONE SIG. C< tu i 5001221 �- 2 * OFFER OF SAFE CONDUCT, TO BE FOLLOWED BY RELEASE OF MR CROSS, RB1AINED OPEN TO THE KIDNAPPERS. ALL THEY HAD TO DO TO THIS EFFECT WAS TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE APPROPRIATE POLICE AUTHORITIES. EXT ISA(8/64) (COMM'S UV) �x 2 -. :• • -f pr x ij -i v y : ,-..A ff ''•'•'' P . Jb>-fit-TTAS*( A •• il '''' r-y, i 0y2py-A .1 p. FA 27 7 71 ll 1 ,..!•• * 727. P.p.:.....APP /.,.L'-r'-. *",:';. A ir. PC" f. A...X. 001223 I I •^ �r pr.p i..v ... ..'<:•:.• • I .../. •.> .j'-.: u p f. P 001224 �MR. CROSS'S LETTER - NOVEMBER 15 In his letter Mr. Cross makes repeated reference to "political prisoimers" - prisoners being spelt always in a French style with a double "n". Is Mr. Cross focusing attention on the so-called FLQ "political prisonners"? If certain seemingly extraneous phrases in the first part of the letter are lifted and pieced together they say: if there are still some .... in jail .. I have all the information possible, 2. (omit the "It" and "I") Both "hot" and "questionhed" are set apart by Mr. Cross in quotation marks. Is he now trying to tell who that prisoner is that has the information? Is it someone who has been "hot-questioned" or "grilled" already. 3. Does this someone "drag very heavily" or in other words, is a very heavy smoker? 4* (Line 14) Is this someone, "a political prisonner ... in captivity? (Lines 16-18) 5. "hard" (Line 23) is extra to the sense of the sentence. Does "hard" relate in some way to that someone. 6. "But it must be the same for the families of the FLQ political prisonners" (lines 24-25) ^at must be the sarae; the ordeal of Mrs. Cross or the possible hint that a "political prisoner" has the necessary information? In other words, do some among the families of FLQ prisoners also have information? 7. "Bad dream" - why "bad dream" rather then nightmare? I am unable to see through this one. . . .2 001225 �- 2 ^* 8. "on what depend my liberty .... I ara still hoping" (Lines 29-31) - Is Mr. Cross suggesting he hopes his liberty is dependant in someway on this letter (or successful reading of it)? Twice Mr. Cross uses "I have heard" (Lines 5 and 21) rather then the more usual "I heard". I have heard i3 a literal English translation from the French. This as well as using "join" rather thsn "attach" in his P.S. suggests perhaps this was a deliberate attempt to call the reader's attention to the francophone undertones of his theme, the hidden theme of some FLQ "political prisoners" and their families who could provide information as to his whereabouts. « 001226 �5^6-Qi-TFt7- J cc .-A-VP-TF/P- 7 "Transcription des remarques de M. Ouellet concernant le communique du FLQ.' Cc o -»~ frty^. R. Je pense que le ton et le contenu du communique emis ne justifit pas du tout une intervention semblable. Deuxiemement, le gouvernement Canadien a fait connaitre clairement sa position et c'est aux ravisseurs a se prevaloir^ du sauf conduit que le gouvernment leurs offre. Q. Le gouvernement Canadien ne se desinteresse pas de M. Cross, a-t-il de nouvelle proposition ou peut-il preciser une fois de plus quelle est sa position? R. Le gouvernement s'interesse beaucoup a la vie de M. Cross et a son bien-etre, le gouvernement demande aux ravisseurs d'accepter ce sauf conduit. Ils savent o$ telephoner, ils n'ont qu'S communiquer et se prevaloir# du sauf conduit, s'est tout. Q. Mais, de quelle faqon, il faut bien qu'il y ait quelqu'un pour faire ces contacts, ces communications, un mediateur d'une certaine faqon? R. Pas necessairement, le gouvernement a fait connaitre bien clairement sa position. Nous offrons aux ravisseurs un sauf conduit pour quitter 5i4.-Q.rc <*V-£ »>wvi s.it~~ C *"j.t le pays et la liberation ssss sssJUs—aacjgB-de M. Cross, ii writ la position du gouvernement; elle n'a pas changee. esc -r7 C&A. G~~£*) F^IAAX Xj 19JO. 001227 r �i-Ah/Vi -Us EXTERNAL AFFAIRS UA_B—>.. , , J 1 .-- AFFAIRES EXTERIt'JRES . •- SECURITY S<ScurM Mr. 3c?we. POP DATE ,. Green, BCD q-vm 2=£iB . i i November 24, 1970 NUMBER Numero j FILE: ijO TI TI A/ \W v tA/ \ JDJECT L e t t e r of Mir. Cross dated November 15 - Personal Interpretation B. &o~3J-Tft<!- 1 MISSION I attach for your considerationraypersonal interpretation of a possible hidden meaning in the latest letter written by Mr. Cross, dated November 15. 7777A LC\ x>7 ; d" L7F L. Green 7J, 001228 �FAC/D.BOILY/cb J EXTERNAL AFFAIRS • TO AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES MEMORANDUM A S7 Memoire au dossier via M, Y DATE o. Delano Boily SECRET 24 novembre 1970 NUMBER Numiro REFERENCE Rifirence DOSSIER SUBJECT _ . -i • % -. sujei Pressions psychologiques a exercer sur l e s r a v i s s e u r s de M. James Cross A~ , /f F^ ; , . •, C, TFL ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION LL y a dej£ quelque temps que les gouvernements ont entrepris des demarches visant a faire pression sur la cellule qui detient James Cross pour qu'elle relfiche celui-ci. Depuis quelques semaines, par la publication regulilre de leurs communiques, ils ont seuls tenu les media et l,opinion publique en haleine sans que beaucoup de choses aient ete faites et elaborees par les divers niveaux de gouvernements pour equilibrer cette image. Bien stir le silence sur la cellule qui detient Cross a fort bien pu itre d*or en ce qu'il les laisse a eux-memes quant aux intentions des gouvernements, mais le temps est peut-£tre aussi venu de considerer ce que nous pourrions faire pour les forcer psychologiquement £ liberer Cross. Uhe raison supplementaire est qu'il ne faudrait pas, autant que faire se peut, que l'opinion publique et le Haut Commissariat britannique en viennent a croire que nous nous desinteressons plus ou moins du sort de M. Cross; ce dont M. Cross se faisait d'ailleurs le reflet dramatique dans sa lettre publique (dict^e ou non) du 15 novembre. 2. A cause de ce qui semble etre la seule menace a la vie de Cross (selon les dires m&tes du FLQ) et de l'efficacite relative des forces policieres, il n'est peut-etre pas souhaitable que la police le trouve au cours d'une operation de police. Pour ces raisons, nous devrions approcher d'une fagon plus systematique et scientifique I'etude des pressions psychologiques que nous pourrions faire sur les ravisseurs. Nous pourrions le faire a partir par exemple 1 )de l'evolution qu'il y a eu dans les communications de la cellule qui d€tient Cross (vous vous souviendrez de ce commentaire en apparence quelque peu desespere ecrit £ l'arriere d'une des photos de Cross que les ravisseurs ont publiee il y a une dizaine de jours); 2 )de 1'analyse graphologique et 3 )de leur personnalite. Sur ces deux derniers points, la GRC pourrait sans doute nous Stre utile. 3. Bien que ceci devrait e"tre etudie plus a fond, il semble que nous pourrions baser nos speculations et definir des actions possibles £ partir des deux premices suivantes: d'une part, que les ravisseurs de James Cross n'ont pas 1'intention de le liquider £ moins qu'ils n'en soient forces par une operation de police qui les prendrait par surprise; d'autre part/ils doivent maintenant e*tre convaincus que le gouvernement n*accedera pas £ leur demands de relacher les prisonniers et, qu'£ moins que de nouveaux evenements ne surviennent, c'est pour des fins de stricte propagande qu'ils gardent encore M. Cross prisonnier. ...2 •Ext. 407A/BH. 001229 �SECRET 2... 4* Nous basant sur ces premices, nous pourrions projeter des actions eventuelles dans une double direction. Assumant que la propagande qu'ils en tirent est devenue la cause effective de la detention continue de M. Cross, nous devrions analyser ce que nous pourrions faire pour neutraliser cette propagande, ou au moins empScher qu'elle ne soit diffusee. Uhe fois la cause effective de sa detention disparue, il est fort probable qu'ils libereront leur captif; ce qu'ils n'ont, dans leur propre logique, aucun interet £ faire aussi longtemps qu'il leur sera utile. Dans une autre direction, nos actions devraient consister £ elaborer des moyens de pression psychologique, soit en suscitant des prises de position favorable £ la liberation de M. Cross chez ceux qui constitue la "3e force" (ce dont je vous ai parle cs matin en constitue un exemple, £ mon avis, interessant), soit en faisant des declarations ou en posant des actes qui pourraient inciter directement ou indirectement la cellule qui detient M. Cross £ le relficher. 5. Uhe des raisons majeures pour laquelle M. Cross est encore detenu est la publicite gratuite et genereuse qui leur est accordes par les masses media des qu'ils publient un communique. Dej£, si nous pouvions empecher que le texte de leurs communiques et de ce qui s'y rattache soit publie, ce serait dej£ un grand pas vers la liberation de M. Cross. 6. A cet egard, je me demande si,advenant le cas oil l'on commencerait le proces de Bernard Lortie en l'impliquant dans le double kidnapping de Cross et de Laporte et la mort de ce dernier, il ne serait pas possible de museler la presse quant £ la publication du texte/des communiques grfice au pretexte que l'affaire serait "sub judice". II semble evident que Bernard Lortie n'a pas ete implique dans l'enlevement de Cross mais la question que je me pose est: Est-ce qu'il serait possible qu'il soit mis en accusation pour les deux enlevements et la mort de laporte, quitte £ ce qu'il ne soit condamne que pour un seul enlevement pourvu que ceci permette d'empecher effectivement la publication du texte des communiques de la cellule detenant M. Cross? 7. Si tenant compte de la strategic que les ravisseurs de M. Cross semblent avoir adoptee de publier un communique le samedi pour qu'il soit rapporte dans le Quebec-Presse et le Journal de Montreal du lendenan, nous pourrions, par exemple, le lundi ou le mardi, repeter I'offre de sauf-conduit et le jour suivant, repandre la rumeur que quelqu'un a donne des informations (et peut-Stre mSme easayer de faire croire £ un deiateur au sein mime de la cellule puisqu'ils sont sensibles £ cela) et que ce n'est qu'une question de temps avant qu'on ne mette la main sur les ravisseurs de M. Cross. Cette approche serait evidemment tres delicate en ce que dans un geste de panique, ils pourraient liquider M. Cross, Miis ils 1'ont dej£ affirme: ils ne le liquideront que dans 1'eventualite ou la police viendrait les deioger de leur cachet te,* ce qui ne serait pas le cas puisqu'il s'agirait d'une fausse rumeur. Quoiqu'il en soit, il ne faudrait pas rejeter cette a..3 �SECRET 3... approche £ cause du risque qu'il semble comporter £ prime abord pour la vie de M. Cross. Iftie telle strategie pourrait les apeurer et les amener £ relacher Cross en profitant de I'offre du sauf-conduit. D'autre part, en repandant cette rumeur le mercredi, nous serions a meme de voir dans quelle mesure celle-ci les aurait influences dans le communique de fin de semaine, et prevoir ainsi des actions futures. 8. Uhe autre possibilite £ considerer serait une lettre ouverte de line Cross aux media d'information leur demandant de s*abstenir de publier les textes des communiques du FLQ pour les raisons que l'on connait. Uhe autre pourrait etre une lettre de celle-ci £ certains groupes intermediaires, tel le Comite quebecois pour la defense des libertes ou d'autres groupes du meme genre, leur demandant d*appuyer ses efforts pour la liberation de son epoux. Mne Cross n'etant pas elle-meme diplomate et s'adressant non pas £ des organismes gouvernementaux mais £ des institutions privees, on ne pourrait pas facilement qualifier ce genre d*action d'ingerence dans les affaires interieures du Canada. 9. Pour qu'elle puisse etre efficace, il me semble que notre approche devrait etre multiple. LL est peu probable qu'une seule action, par nous initiee, puisse influencer les ravisseurs au point qu'ils relachent M. Cross. Nous devrions eiaborer un faisceau d,actions qui, telles celles mentionnees ci-dessus, pourrait ou briser leur moral ou les convaincre qu'ils ont maintenant avantage £ relScher M. Cross. 10. Quoiqu'il en soit, il me semble que ce serait la tache de notre Ministere plus que de toute autre institution engagee dans cette operation Cross-Laporte, que d'essayer de forcer les ravisseurs £ rel£cher Cross. Puisque le kidnapping de M. Cross est la raison principale d'existence de la Task Force, nous devrions depenser plus de temps £ eiaborer des strategies telles que celles mentionnees plus haut. Ia ou les personnes qui auraient cette tache devraient y consacrer une bonne partie de leur temps pour que 1'operation ait quelque chance de succes. Ces personnes devraient en principe Stre habilite £ contacter les autres institutions ou niveaux de gouvernement pour discuter, eiaborer ou entreprendre des actions conjointes. Delano Boily 001231 �i CANADA DATED FROM QC3T Hf7S FILE NO.JL& A.Jjt*JPKmf TO fjfiV VOLUME NO 2^/JO 3 CLOSED VOLUME DO NOT PLACE ANY CORRESPONDENCE O N THIS FILE FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE: FILE N O.^Aj0• .* ..) 2:..•IfctC~/ VOLUME NO ^f PLEASE KEEP A T T A C H E D TO TOP OF FILE 7540-21-562-8210 001232 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00048 Title A name given to the resource Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy - Part 3 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 26-Oct-70 to 24-Nov-70 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy, RG25, vol. 25741, 20-22-TFK-1, part 3, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Entire File Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en