https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ca94db3651d4f82fedf32734996761ff.pdf 3a5df27f5ce14e12406888d34bf679e6 PDF Text Text C. R O Q U E T / L ^ / M S S C it I T October 13, 1970. ,Ja4GRAHD»l TO : HR BISMMETTE KR. -ILK MR. lettffi HR. Lfci cot Mr. RITCHIE MR. tOtOL Kidnappings = negotiations with Cuba or Algeria I think we should work out a list of the topica we would have to raise with the Cubans or Algerians, should we aak thea to receive the kidnappera or the prisoners. We could also outline our poaition on each point. 2. The first point, of course, concerns the persons that the host country would be willing to receive : (a) they aight want tall dossiers on thai} (b) how ruany oould they take? itot to aeration 15 or 20 pzlaonera, they sight have to receive up to 10 or 20 kidnappers, specially if the full laeaberaidp of both cells along with their couriers were to be identified and to seek safe conductj (c) would they be willing tc receive wives and families ? 3. Devices to guarantee both the safe conduct and the release of the hostages might tena to implicate the receiving governments : (a) safe conduct, for the kidnappera aight require the involvement of Cuban or Algerian representatives (and diplomatic premises; in Canada. It ia not certain that the govennents in question would be willing to get involved that far. Possible mechanisms for this operation are outlined in the annex of a memorandum to Cabinet on October 9} (b) a public agreement with the receiving country would probably have to be drawn up in order to tie the official surrender of the prisoners to the receiving government on the one hand with the safe release of the hostagea on the other. A possible arrangement to this effect haa been outlined in a memorandum in the special Operationa Centre file. 4. * number of detailed arrangement a would have to be worked out concerning the transit of kidnappera or priaonera from Canada to the roooiving country. Some are of political significance. For instance t eee/2 000696 �- 2 - o :•-. C h A T (a) will the prisoners be accompanied by Canadian officials, or by lawyers and journalists aa the FLQ requests J I beiiove the Mexicans, in the Brazilian case, ruled out any accompanying personnel. The Algerians do not. If the Mexican precedent is confirmed, we could useit to persuade the Algerians to turn down the PL^ request in this respect; (b) the provision of a Cuban or Algerian aircraft ia another possibility referred to in the above mentioned annex. Canauian government reimbursement could be asoured. 5. There are also matters relating to the upkeep of the kicinappers or prisoners in the receiving country : (a) would tiie receiving country see to it, without compensation'-" i believe the Mexicans colunteered the provision of one month's upkeep} (b) should we offer to compensate the receiving country (e.g. for three months' upkeep by providing a fixed sum) ? (c) would the receiving government also cover upkeep costs for wives and families? Apparently the Algerians would, (incidentally, for presentation reasons, we probably would not want the wives and families to accompany the kidnappers or prisoners on the same flight to Cuba. This raises the question .irether we would want to pay the air transport, but this is not a matterfOK agreement with the receiving ^overnaient). 6. There ere other political aspects : (a) Algeria would apparently insist in granting political asylum to the kidnappers or prisoners. Should we not ask them to avoid this le^al category, and merely to receive ths FLQ members: "As a humanitarian gesture vis-a-vis Mr. Cross and Mr. Laporte and at the request of the Canadian government*? Could the kidnappera or prisoners fit into some political categories other than that of political refugees? In any event, we should aak the relgerlana not to use publicly the terms "political asylum" but to speak rather of "accueil, refuge"; (b) we would have to obtain guarantees relating to political activitiea of the FLQ members in the receiving country. This would publicity for their statements, their use of local media, their communications with Canaaa. (c) if a ransom were paid by Lanaua, an agreement would also have to be reached on its possible return to the Canadian govenmient under a secret agreement, or else freezing of tne money} alternatively, 000697 �XL - 3 - (c) continued an agreement would be required against its return to the FLw here for purposes of terrorism} (a) the fi-eedom of movement of une FIQ members snould also be covered. The Algerians have indicated they would not prevent their departure for another country and would thereafter be no longer responsible for controlling their political activities. 7. Travel documents would have to be looked into t (a) we could refuse the terrorists a Canadian passport, on the underatending that e.g. the Algerians would issue them temporary travel documents if needed (they have already said they would)} (b) would we prefer to give them a permanent Canadian travel document which would not be a passportV Or else a short term travel document or passport'• Or a passport or document valid only for travel to Algeria 1 (o) could a Canadian document or passport be made not valid for return to Canada? The government might decide to prevent their return by all possib&e means. 6. 1 hope someone in the Taak Force can prepare contingency instructions to Havana or Algiers (or even a draft informal agreement) on these pointa or any others you can think of. I would be grateful for your coaaents on this memorandum *no for nay information Ar. iier may obtain, on the basis of kidnappings eiset&ere, on the kinos of problems ana arrangements made in those cases, Maybe he couia get in touch with African & Middle ..astern division concerning the precedent involved In the Middle eastern hijackings concerning the return of the released terrorists. There should be information in London on these ana other Cases. 9. i think our chancee are high of having to use this contingency planning. Tii* police might uiscover one of the ceils and be unable to capture it because of the threat to the hostages. The safe conduct would then be required. X find it significant that none of tiie FLU messages has turned down our offer of safe conduct or indeed made any allusion to it. it would have been very easy for them to reject it with conspicious "bravery". 1 think they are keeping their options open. C.U. 000698 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00027 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum to: Mr. Bissonnette, Mr, Dikr, Mr. Row, Mr. Lee Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 13-Oct-70 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy, RG25, vol. 25741, 20-22-TFK-1, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Kidnappings - Negotiations with Cuba or Algeria Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en