https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/337124900e5f56113374d396779fecac.pdf 63b2c079beae5808e3d252b6c71d3529 PDF Text Text SECRET ANNEX Mechanics for release of Mr. Cross and Departure of the Kidnappers for Cuba The Canadian Government will not accept a mere promise of the eventual release of Mr. Cross. Otherwise, following upon whatever concessions the Government can make, Mr. Cross might be held further or killed. Conversely, it can be assumed that the kidnappers will not be willing to put much trust in government undertakings, even public and solemn. For this reason, this annex describes two different approaches to the arrangements for Mr. Cross' release. The first assumes a substantial degree of faith by the kidnappers in a public federal undertaking. This approach could be the one first suggested by our negotiator. The second approach is based on a maximum degree of mistrust on both sides. FIRST APPROACH 2. This approach is not worked out in full details, as it is unlikely of acceptance. It would involve the following steps : (a) the Canadian Government would make a public statement outlining in full the concessions it were willing to make in exchange for Mr. Cross' return. This would include the treatment promised to the kidnappers and any arrangements worked out with the Cuban (Algeriangovernment in this connection; (b) Mr. Cross vrould be released by the kidnappers; (c) when Mr. Cross was safely in Canadian government hands the Canadian government would proceed to fulfill its part of the bargain. The kidnappers would have to assume that the Canadian Government could not renege on its publicly announced solemn undertaking to the kidnappers and to go back on arrangements, also public, made with another country (Cuba or Algeria). For the Canadian government to go back on such undertaking would indeed involve considerable domestic and international embarrassment. But the fact is that it could do so, claiming that the promises had been given under duress. Hence our conclusion that this approach would be unacceptable to the kidnappers. �-2SECOND APPROACH 3. The second approach is more complex but does give additional safeguards to the kidnappers. It involves a heightened degree of involvement by (say) the Cuban government, although perhaps not in a degree unacceptable to the Canadian and Cuban governments. 4. Here is first a brief step by step outline of what would be involved: (a) public announcement by the authorities of the agreement reached with the kidnappers and of the arrangements made by us with the Cuban authorities. In essence this would involve the safe conduct for the kidnappers to proceed to Cuba; (c) the kidnappers, still armed and accompanied by Mr. Cross, whose life would remain under threat, would proceed on their own to the Cuban office in Montreal. The approaches to the office could be cleared of police (or alternatively made secure by the police, as the kidnappers wished); (c) upon arrival inside the Cuban mission, the kidnappers would turn Mr. Cross over into the custody of the Cuban government. They would also turn their e-eeapons over to the Cuban representatives : (d) if the kidnappers wished to be accompanied abroad by their wives and children, their prior arrival at the Cuban mission could have been arranged; (e) within a fixed time (e.g. one hour of their arrival at the Cuban mission) the kidnappers and their families, accompanied by Cuban representatives in a group of cars under Cuban responsibility, would proceed to the airport, preferably escorted by security forces. Shortly after the arrival at the airport, the group would board an aircraft (preferably Cuban, with the Canadian government reimbursing expenses) bound for Cuba; (f) in order that the arrangements not be unexpectedly upset, i.t would be better that lawyers not join them until they have boarded the plane. It would also be better for political and security reasons, that no arrangements be made for publicity before departure; (g) upon the safe landing of the kidnappers in Cuba, the Cuban government would authorize its mission in Montreal to turn Mr. Cross over to the Canadian authorities. 5. Some variation on this framework could be engisaged to make it even more acceptable to the kidnappers. They might refuse to relinquish their weapons at the Cuban mission. Subject to the agreement of the Cuban government (which might not be forthcoming), they might retain their weapons until, they boarded the plane, and surrender them to the Cubans only on/aircraft, Another variation would be for a Cuban representative to be taken to the kidnappers' �-3hide-out by FLQ contacts, so that the kidnappers would be under some degree of Cuban protection on their way from the hide-out to the Cuban mission. The kidnappers might also be nervous about their position once they have relinquished custody of Mr. Cross at the Cuban mission. The government might then have to envisage the possibility of allowing the kidnappers to travel from the mission to the airport with their weapons and accompanied by an unarmed Canadian official who would in effect serve as a hostage. This, however, would probably involve unacceptable risks, since the kidnappers might at the last moment force this official onto the aircraft at gunpoint. 6. It has been assumed in this text that Cuba would be the destination rhosen for the kidnappers. Politically, there is an advantage in doing so. In associating the kidnappers with the Cuban government, we also associate them in the mind of the Canadian public withjthe rather extreme politics and with a government that arouses considerable suspicion. Algeria is more respected by moderate opinion both in Canada and abroad. In any event, the kidnappers themselves may prefer Cuba and feel more secure going there. On the other hand it is true that, given our excellent relations with Algeria, the Algerian authorities could probably be relied upon to abide more faithfully with our wishes in matters such as curbing political activities by the kidnappers once abroad. The reason we recommend Cuba here is that it has a diplomatic mission in Montreal, while Algeria does not. The kidnappers may consider it an important guarantee that they could proceed directly to neutral ground and that Cross could be held on neutral ground until their safe arrival in Cuba. It is unlikely that they would be ready to proceed all the way to the Algerian mission in Ottawa and depart by plane from Ottawa. C. R. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00023 Title A name given to the resource Annex Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource no date Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy, RG25, vol. 25741, 20-22-TFK-1, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Mechanics for release of Mr. Cross and Departure of the Kidnappers for Cuba Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en