https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ec388baf07d23061a52b2605f2fecaf9.pdf ae6bc3fa8bdb71c4f485e1368c8bc715 PDF Text Text u2 ^...j7 JF F. a V F » K F F) ^ F S £ K ^AyF FFM &* &>- ja-TFK-l CONFIDENTIAL October 12 197 ' ° ^ kidnappings - Assessment of the Situation as of October 12 This memorandum summarizes the evolution of our dealings with the kidnappers up to Mr. Laporte's abduction. It points out the important bearing of the Laporte kidnapping on our negotiation position. It analyses the FLQ negotiating stand, as it can be deduced from the October 12 communique, which resolves the confusions implicit in the October 11 communiques from the cells. Finally, it seeks to assess the implications of the Bourassa statement and the choices open to us in its wake. I. Before the Laporte Kidnapping Although we have officially declined to negotiate in public, there has in fact been a process of accommodation on both sides. One of the seven FLQ demands has been met by the governments: the manifesto has been broadcast. Another demand (end of police action) has been mostly ignored but, at leas^a.-^ one crucial point on October 10, was met discreetly for a while until the Laporte abduction took place. On its side, the FLQ gradually dropped some of its subsiduary demands (money, Lapalme workers, denunciation of the informer). Up to the Laporte kidnapping, through the issuance of 7 communiques by the first cell, the FLQ focussed increasingly on a central demand: release of the "political prisoners". It became increasingly probable that there might be no deal with the FLQ unless this demand were at least partly met. In part for that reason the federal government insisted on the importance of negotiations aimed at producing solid guarantees (even if there was no hope of agreement): such negotiation would gain us time, perhaps a week, before a final deadlock became apparent over the "political prisoners". However, the FLQ rejected the prospect of negotiation (or as they put it "mediation"). The FLQ also ignored the reference, in Mr. Choquette's Oct. 10 speech, to parole applying th the political prisoners-: this is obviously not enough. Another offer by the governments, made on October 10 by Mr. Choquette, related to the safe conduct for the kidnappers. It has elicited no response, which is natural as long as the kidnappers feel safe. To sum up, between October 5 and October 10, there was a narrowing down of issues to one major point of unresolved difference: the release of political prisoners. In addition, the governments continued to attach central importance to the related matters of negotiation and guarantee. II. Effect of the Laporte Kidnapping Perhaps the most important effect has been to decrease any reasonable hope the government could have that the problem would be resolved through a sudden police success. The second kidnapping (despite the increased risk it involved for the FLQ) suggests that their organization is perhaps better than 2 000656 �- 2anticipated. More important, by acquiring a second hostage, the FLQ is now in a position to protect either operation, to some extent, from the effects of discovery by the police. Up to October 10, discovery of the kidnappers' hideout would have involved the risk that a police attack on it would bring about the death of Mr. Cross: this gave a measure of protection to the kidnappers. After October 10, discovery of one of the cells by the police would leave the other cell and the other hostage untouched. The second hostage might be killed. Alternatively, he might be used to keep the FLQ in a fairly strong negotiating position. (Admittedly, discovery of one of the hideouts would help retrieve the image of the police.) There is a more significant aspect of the matter. The Laporte kidnapping brought home to the public the extent of the FLQ resolve and may have increased the sense that the authorities were powerless to meet their tactics. Most important of all, it greatly increased the pressures on the Quebec government for an accommodation with the FLQ. Indirectly, these pressures affect the position of the Canadian government, if only because of the danger there would be in allowing a gap to develop between the federal and provincial positions. III. The Effect of the Bourassa Statement For the public, the Bourassa statement will seem to contain, if not a formal commitment to release the political prisoners, at least a strong hint that this could be arranged, subject to negotiation. What the real intent of the Quebec government is remains uncertain. Mr. Bourassa's line could be interpreted as an attempt to spin out the Cross and Laporte cases, combined with the unstated intent that the prisoners would in fact never be released. If this is indeed his intention, a gap may develop between Quebec policy and the expectations of the Quebec public. Quebec opinion may now press for the freeing of the prisoners! Mr. Bourassa, with his statement may have started a process that can end only with the liberation of at least some of these prisoners and perhaps all. IV. October 12 a.m. Communique The main effect of this communique is to resume the dialogue which was perturbed by the Laporte kidnapping and subsequent communiques. It is the FLQ, not a cell, that speaks in the present communique. The text is crisp; it is ambiguous only concerning the "intermediaire". The communique and the enclosed letter from Cross confirm that he is alive. (We understand the writing is authentic and the style presents no unusual feature.) It imposes no new deadline, although one will presumably be forthcoming promptly if the authorities are not seen to be moving to meet the latest FLQ conditions. In contrast^,, with previous communiques, there is no explicit threat of "liquidation" directed at either hostage in the letter. The communique appears calculated not to be provocative, perhaps because of a feeling that the Bourassa statement provides an opening for moving ahead. We are back to two conditions only for the liberation of the hostages: release of prisoners and end of police activity. The latter point is not unduly stressed. There is no reference to a permanent end of police enquiries. Since Mr. Bourassa, after recognizing in his speech yesterday that it was one of two ...3 000657 �conditions mentioned in the Laporte letter, then proceeded to ignore the matter, one would have expected a strong FLQ reaction if the police aspect were a crucial one for them. This did not occur. Nonetheless, it is obvious that, if we intend to make a deal with the FLQ or at least to gain time, a low profile of police activity would be desirable. The most interesting aspect of the communique, from the federal viewpoint, is the reference to an intermediaire: "De plus, Maitre Lemieux devrait servir d'intermediaire entre les deux cellules du FLQ et les autorites en place". What this means is far from clear. At a minimum, it may simply mean that Lemieux will deal with the governments on behalf of the FLQ in the practical arrangements for the departure of the prisoners. The reference to the "intermediaire" comes at the end of a paragraph on practical arrangements for the release of the prisoners and should perhaps be read strictly in that context. It may mean no more than what was said in communique No. 6 of October 8 i.e. that Lemieux will watch and assist that process. There is also, however, a possibility that the FLQ is trying to give minimal satisfaction to Mr. Bourassa's instance on some form of negotiation. Under this interpretation, the communique would be hinting that we should talk to Lemieux. If we do we may well find he has no particular mandate and that the only line he can take with us is to request full compliance with the FLQ communique, The federal and Quebec governments will have to decide whether to so und out Lemieux in order to determine if he can or will discuss substantive issues. There would be obvious risks. He might seek to embarrass the governments in public. He might interpret his role in a different way from the two governments. There would be the added problem of establishing a secure contact, between him and the FLQ, of a kind which would be necessary if there were to be bargaining over more than technical and administrative issues connected with the prisoners' release. On "political prisoners", the latest communique restates all the detailed requirements put forward in the very first communique. These relate to publicity, wives and children and accompanying lawyers and journalists. If the prisoners were released, presumably there would be here an area of practical accommodation arrangements to be agreed with Lemieux. A long section is devoted to a solemn guarantee by the FLQ concerning the release of the hostages. Incidentally, even if we cannot have meaningful negotiations with an FLQ representative, the question of guarantee need not present insurmountable difficulties. If the federal and Quebec governments were willing to release the prisoners, it would be possible to make with the receiving country (and not with the FLQ) a public arrangement which would tie prisoners' release to the release of Cross and Laporte. We believe this technique has been used in similar cases in other countries. The prisoners would proceed to Cuba but remain in Caraiian hands there. Once confirmed that the hostages had been released, the Cuban government would take custody of the prisoners. If the hostages were not released within an agreed period, the Cubans would allow their return to Canada. (The need for complicated and negotiated guarantees would arise only if the kidnappers themselves wanted safe conduct which is not the case as yet.) ~ ...4 J*P ,, A A* ^ 000658 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 1000659 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 2 000860 V / � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00022 Title A name given to the resource Brief by Roquet Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 12-Oct-70 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy, RG25, vol. 25741, 20-22-TFK-1, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Kidnappings - Assessment of the Situation as of October 12 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en