https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e76705facad9d6a228f429da222fb949.pdf 99cc34e5d963fd250122c636745c4bc0 PDF Text Text -AJJ AA . y 27 y ]>. F F A POP/C. ROQUET A e 2, FAJLC1 '• October^'11/1970 £ A iv. /Vrt NOTE FOR FILE Subject: Events surrounding Mr. Choquette's statement of October 10 (W ^-TFK- S E C RET <> FF " Fy\<FAs F &>- a^TF/F-i It t « / >•• ^ iv) ;K First call by Mr. Choquette to Mr. Sharp: — "I 0 £° o A J Mr. Choquette phoned Mr. Sharp around mid-day^indicating that he proposed to make a statement in the afternoon appealing to the kidnappers to release Cross, and giving them inducements to do so. He read to Mr. Sharp on the phone a draft of his statement. ^j(Text attached as Annex 1). The Minister indicated he could not give a definitive reaction on the basis of a text read quickly on the telephone in French. However, he expressed strong reservations on some of its aspects, even hinting that he might not be able to associate himself with such a text. He asked that it be dictated to us in full on the telephone. After studying it, Mr. Sharp would phone back Mr. Choquette. The Minister pointed out that we had not intended that any statement be issued. In particular there were objections to making public what concessions we were willing to make to the kidnappers. Our line was that negotiations should take place privately, in the context of specific arrangements for Mr. Cross's release. 2. A study of Mr. Choquette's draft confirmed the Minister's fears. One weakness of the draft was to imply that the FLQ was inspired by idealism. It announced a major social initiative of the Quebec Government (creation of a "social peace department") in a context clearly suggesting that this was a concession to the FLQ. It implied that this organisation was the spearhead of efforts in Quebec to remove profound injustices prevailing in the Province. Another grave flaw was that, after stressing that the judicial institutions could not be tampered with, Mr. Choquette stated that the kidnappers would receive only symbolic sentences. The reference to review of paroles could be taken to mean that such reviews in the past had not necessarily been honestly carried out. A third major defect was that the text not only referred to safe conduct for the kidnappers, but did so in such a way as to make it impossible for them to accept it. • • m A \-~Q#€ �- 2 - SECRET Counter-proposal by Ottawa:— 3. It was felt in Ottawa that a flat refusal to let Mr. Choquette issue his statement might not prevent him frcm doing so, given his attitude. Furthermore, if we succeeded in preventing issuance of this statement, there v/as a risk (should Cross be killed) that v/e would appear as' having prevented Quebec from making a positive appeal to the kidnappers. In the circumstances the best approach seemed to be to prepare a counter-draft. This was done, in consultation with Mr. Gordon Robertson, and the text despatched to Mr. Choquette. (Text attached as Annex 2). Mr. Lalonde was informed of the situation on the phone ana his comments obtained. The Minister sought to reach the P.M. on the phone. First talk with Mr. Chouinard:— 4. With Mr. Lalonde's agreement, v/e called Mr. Chouinard, Secretary of the Quebec Executive Council„ We described the situation to him, outlined Mr. Choquette's draft, read him our counterdraft, and sought his c'onrments. Mr. Chouinard questioned the need for any statement. We told him we had seen no need for a statement, but that Mr. Choquette seemed determined to proceed; hence our counter-draft. Mr. Chouinard strongly agreed v/ith every one of the changes we proposed to the Choquette draft* In addition he doubted whether any reference should be made either to safe conduct or to parole. He said he had never heard of any proposed "ministry of social peace". ,He quite agreed with our view that any announcement on this point could not be made in a statement about the FLQ, as this would suggest that it was a response to FLQ pressure. Unfortunately, Mr. Chouinard was not sure he could intervene. He had a mandate from Premier Bourassa to deal with the Cross affair, but could not invoke this mandate and overrule Mr. Choquette. He mentioned that Quebec Ministers were deeply divided over the matter of parole. Since Mr. Sharp was having a second talk with Mr. Choquette at that point, it was agreed that v/e v/ould call back Mr. Chouinard. Second Sharp-Choquette telephone call:— 5. Mr. Choquette had seen our draft and wanted to stick essentially to his own. He was willing to drop the reference to a ministry of social peace. As for safe conduct he v/ould prefer not to mention it at all if we did not agree to his text. Mr. Sharp explained in detail all our objections to his text, and said quietly but firmly that he v/ould have to dissociate himself from the Choquette statement if issued. This v/ould be an unthinkable and highly dangerous situation. Mr. Choquette said he would think matters over and call back. . • • . s 000650 �SECRET Second call to Mr. Chouinard:— 6. We informed Mr. Chouinard of the situation resulting from the second conversation between the two Ministers. We suggested Mr. Chouinard get in touch with Mr. Choquette's headquarters by way of enquiring into developments. He might thus be given an opening for offering advice to Mr. Choquette. Chouinard said he doubted that the Minister would take his advice. However, Chouinard might be able tp provoke intervention by someone in Mr. Bourassa's office who could overrule Mr. Choquette. This would be difficult, however, since we did not wish Mr. Choquette to realize that Ottawa had alerted anyone else in Quebec. Mr. Chouinard could not therefore commit himself to any particular course of action, but would do his best. Third Sharp-Choquette conversation:— 7. It appeared to Mr. Sharp that- the. most plausible explanation for Mr. Choquette's draft statement would be that the latter had received firm information that the terms of his appeal would be immediately accepted by the FLQ. The Minister therefore put to Mr. Choquette a direct question. Did he have any specific reason or information leading him to believe that such a deal would be accepted by the FLQ? Mr. Choquette said that he had no such information (arising for instance from covered contacts with the FLQ). His planned statement was based on the advice of a prominent, highly respected personality in Montreal. (The Minister immediately surmised that this must be Mr. Claude Ryan) — Mr. Choquette was less adamant at this point. He was willing to revise his statement along the lines of our suggestions. He now wifehed to keep in the section on safe conduct, as re-drafted by us. He said he would use substantially our text with some changes of wording and with an introduction of a purely personal character. In the middle of the afternoon Mr. Choquette's press conference had been announced for 5:00 o'clock. In the event it was delayed to 5:30 as a result of our discussions with him. We sought to obtain the final text of Mr. Choquette's proposed statement early enough to pass on further reactions. In fact, the final text was received only a few minutes before the press conference — too late for any further communication with Mr. Choquette concerning it. However the text on the whole was perhaps better than we had reason to expect and was mostly based on our re-draft. A copy of this final statement is attached as Annex C. Claude Roquet � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00021 Title A name given to the resource Note for File Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 11-Oct-70 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy, RG25, vol. 25741, 20-22-TFK-1, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Events surrounding Mr. Choquette’s statement of October 10 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en