https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ff14899cd487166df8cfa100029e6db4.pdf a2d76d41f2c02d3a78d583d9ca761e26 PDF Text Text . . C t . s U ^ T i A . - CcOXvL \— s * i ' ^ ^ - X - b t o r it <l—t ' / o ^ i t 7(,P < * c-^yj U , ^. r^^j •^U^ ^ v ^ A> FLs fcl^L , 0-,_ -v-,^. /vu-s s ~ \ 1 ( O f Ao A < _ / IP , 1l^. c • ; t,- l u A ^ j d , , C ( £~ t ^ <y e-^Ao v •! /ffv- 3 ^0 ^ ^ y> «-A* • e ^ v - O ^ - O O cc tt oo bb ee rr 99 ,, MEMORANDUM / ^ - v — >"fc^ t-t-'vi ^~xAt7^/L^A F&AA4 T • ] -v~ <? -^c t _ , . F6~o$-IJsF-\' IS 1 9 7700.. C C ^ ~ J Q - 7 B O . < 7^ C r o s s K i d n a p p i n g - f e d e r a l n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n 2. . r<Ov«. and m e c h a n i c s f o r t h e r e l e a s e / This memorandum outlines the bargaining position which could be adopted by the Canadian government with the kidnappers on Various issues they have raised. It makes recommendations as to what the final, maximum package might be which we could, offer to the kidnappers if necessary It describes how the negotiations could be handled on the government side. Finally an annex deals with the alternative sets of mechanics for the actual release of Mr, Cross. The proposals hereunder are predicated on the assumption that the government's final position would involve the safe passage of the abductors, and possibly some members of their families, to a country which would accept them. There is reason to believe that Cuba would. 000666 �ffe examine below the issues one by one starting with the least difficult ones: (a) Lapalme workers. - it seems that this was a propaganda issue for the FLQ. Now that it has been exploited they can be expected to drop it quietly, especially as therejkre now talks going on between which the government and the union (for/the FLQ may claim some credit). Our negotiator shoud therefore ignore this issue. Only if the FLQ veere adamant about it and if it became the last obstacle to an agreed settlement vrould it be submitted to the government for reconsideration; (b) Denunciation of the informer. - Even if there was an informer to reaeal his identity vrould be to expose him to assassination by the FLQ. This is a moral responsibility the government could not accept, quite apart from the other obvious drawbacks. The government negotiator should therefore deny that there is an informer and categorically exclude any concession on this point; (c) the Money.- our negotiator vrould refuse to discuss any ransom m&ney. To pay ransom would be to submit openly to blackmail. However, in subsequent discussions of the FLQ demands, it could be indicated that the g overnment would recognize, in the concept of a statement involving the kidnappers to another country, that they vrould have certain transitional expenses to meet. when prospect of an agreement on the This could be broached* kidnappers abroad appeared good. Tie sums involved should be modest and cover perhaps six months expenses in a hotel, with variations to take account of the possible departure of kidnappers'families. If the Canadian Government agreed to reimburse* Cuba for the cost of an aircraft, this could be another indirect Canadian Government financial contribution to Mr. Cross's safety - the funds for the kidnappers upkeep would not be paid in gold. They could be �- 2 'turned over to the Cuban Mission, on the aircraft, or upon arrival in Cuba. (d) Publicity. - our initial position would be that any publicity during the whole operation should be excluded. For one thing, arrangements could be destructive by excessive interest on the part of the press and the public. For another, the security of Mr. Cross in the first part of the arrangements and of the kidnappers themselves might be at steke. A fanatic might take a potshot at the kidnappers. Of course publicity which would fcO' PL fly ^he kidnappers as romantic heroes would not be either to our advantage. However, as in the matter of the Lapalme workers this point might be considered by the goveernment if it were the last obstacle to a successful statement. (e) Access to their .alwyers for the kidnappers. - We believe this could take place only on the aircraft or after arrival in Cuba. If a lawyer like Mr. Lemieux got access to the kidnappers at the Cuban Embassy, he could well persuade his clients to risk upsetting all the arrangements staying and £j2±±xng in the mission for a longer period of uninhibited propaganda. This is an unacceptable risk. (f) Presence of lawyers and journalists on the axl aircraft. It vrould be preferable to avoid both. At le8st the presence of journalists could be objected to, although a lav/yer like Mr. Lemieux would produce no less copy than a journalist. As a last resort, howeevr, the government might consider accepting the presenc .; atieast of the lawyer which could be justified on human right air grounds. Newsmen can always await the axicraft in Cuba if they so wish. (g) Provision of_a.ircraft. - There would be distinct advantages in asking and (, I,.It.-~ .' paying for a group aircraft. If the kidnappers insisted on having their w eapons until they board the plane, there is a risk that they might decide to re. Canadian aircraft for the sake of further publicity and a further hijack ^he indignity to the Canadian government. aircraft. They would hardly jljack a Cuban „*„„„„ 000668 �(h) Safe Conduct for Kidnappers. This seems to be the core of any settlement. They will not relinquish Mr. Cross unless they feel safe. There may be discussion of hou many would be allowed safe conduct. In the end it may be to our advantage to ensure the departure from Canada of as many as possible of those implicated in the kidnapping (probably up to 10 or even 15). it would get them out of our hair. This irould identify them; It would also help the kidnappers to accept a hard federal position on the "political" prisoners, since the departure of 10 or 15 kidnappers would look like a substantial concession. y-y^ - O * * -y would also accept the departure of wives and children if PrcXvrf,Ay\,w£ x P P . • • • i - required. r — t If only a few kidnappers v/ish to leave, v/e may be asked for an end of all enquiries into the Cross case, in perpetuity. This v/ould amount to an amnesty for all those implicated in the Cross affair, whether they went abroad or remained in Canada or returned to it. This would bo unacceptable. The only acceptable formula might be a safe conduct until arrival in a foreign country. While the kidnappers could not be prevented from returning, they could be arrested and tried upon setting foot in Canada. — Incidentally, we K E X K H £ would ask the receiving country not to glorify the 000669 �kidnappers by granting them "political asylum". — Since we have an extradition treaty with Cuba (not with Algeria), we presumably v/ill be asked to guarantee that our rights under this treaty will not be exercised. The Cubans are bound to raise this if the kidnappers don't. It would be to our advantage to accept, since otherv/ise the Cubans might refuse to cooperate or might refuse extradition, under the terms of the treaty, on the grounds that the kidnappers were "political refugees". �0 SECRET j) The prisoners". Fe This will be the most difficult point^presumably a basic U issue of principled^involved for the Canadian government . c.,.0 I--- --i^ If it is decided that no compromise farm is nossible (e.g. exchange of one orisoner for Mr. Cross), the best our negotiators could do would be to stress to the kidnaoners that a number cf CLsX. or . the prisoners on very short sentences might qualify shortly A A Or parole^ the government may wish to consider whether, if this issue threatens the outcome of the negotiations, a review of the prisoners' requestj for parole might paKksp-s be agreed. Presumably such a review should take olace after the departure of the kidnappers, unless it is decided that it could be undertaken immediately. LLFEDERA: POSF.ION OVERALLFEDERAL / In-sufrtma-ry;—t^eHmTrd^CLJli^jtTOme-^urH^ 000671 �In summary, the kind of outcome our negotiators would seek would be: a) a formula which would insure Mr. Cross' safety before the kidnappers leave the country; b) a temporary safe conduct for even a fairly large number of ihl-y-27 the kidnappers, families included if desired; uiLb—a-e-a-fe cf>»d«T-t~tO' expire upon their arrival in Cuba; c) no release for prisoners to depart Cdnada, although some review of paroles might be considered; d) no concession on the informer; no concession on the Lapalme workers and on publicity except as a last resort; a. e) no ransom money, although modest contribution could be made A f o r upkeep o f t h e k i d n a p p e r s and t h e i r f a m i l i e s ; we could A /\ r e i m b u r s e Cuba f o r use of an a i r c r a f t ; f) on mechanics of t h e r e l e a s e , we v/ould p r e f e r t h e f i r s t , but could a c c e p t t h e second approach d e s c r i b e d i n t h e Annex. HANDLING OF TiE NEGOTIATIONS Before any meeting*-©!' n e g o t i a t i o n c o u l d b e g i n , we vrould r e q u i r e proof t h a t Mr. Cross was a l i v e . We might a l s o face an FLQ r e q u e s t 000672 �SECRET that all police investigations be stopped. To this we could presumably agree, for the duration of the discussions. At the start our negotiators might indicate our basic approach: we shall make no further unilateral move or concession, and any arrangements we may agree with the kidnappers v/ould be subject to agreed mechanics which would tie Mr. Cross release to these arrangements. We will not accept accommodation for the kidnappers subject to later release of Mr. Cross on their mere say so.— A threat might be issued at the same time both to the kidnappers and the FIQ. Tne kidnappers would be warned that, if anything went wrong with Mr. Cross, we would never give U P our efforts to capture them and would apply to them any rigours of the law. The FLQ might be threatened with treatment appropriate to treasonable organizations, if ministers consider this appropriate.—This done, our representatiwes might start off negotiations by pointing out that both Mr. Cross and all the kidnappers v/ere .engraved personal jeopardy. be killed. Mr. Cross could The kidnappers would face major charges for kidnapping «: and possibly murder. for both. It might be possible to find -ofcHt-ti*e way out F 3y focussing discussions upon the faith of the kidnappers �9 SECRET v/e may achieve a psychological effect and render more di-f£xc"K!t an agreement on the other issues. 000674 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00018 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 9-Oct-70 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy, RG25, vol. 25741, 20-22-TFK-1, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Cross Kidnapping - federal negotiating position and mechanics of the release Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en