https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/8500f1a6c03541f11eb2d6fc1cde498e.pdf ab415b76b22c7b93cbf38a84dbcdabbb PDF Text Text .. . -^— C.Roquet/mj "-•-:•-• X.7X. • • • CCWFUffJfTIAL • . "• • • October 6, 1970. ; iTonn MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER T e i c r a l Bespoase t o fiaj Dementis • Contingency Planning ! - ' • - - • with a -view to Cabinet Coanittee ait>cusoioti of the kidnapping, you zvy find useful aaaa preliminary coamenta on the fit} demands, the decree to which each one oould be met and the kind of offer the Government might hint at If it so wished. 2. "olitically, th* provision of ronoy to the PLQ is perhaps the least damaging gesture vre could make. Indeed I would see distinct advantages in the Govermasnt making quite clear early on October 6 that money is no consideration when the life of a man is at stake. This would be a broad hint that at least some of the FLQ requests could be considered. It would constitute no Iwaarllate coomitmsnt. I think it would at the same time make a favourable impression upon the British Government and the public, both British and Canadian. 3. The promise of safe conduct for the kidnappers if they return Croes might not raise overwhelming political difficulties. It is true that would ensure them immunity far their criminal act. At the same time they would be leaving Canada permanently and deprived of their Canadian citizenship. It could not be said that they got away scotfree. There would be no objection in providing them with air transport if need be. To this point the kidnappers would have merely been treated by the Canadian Government as successful criminals, allowed to escape with their loot. The impact on the public, I think, would not be particularly favourable to the Kidnappers. 4. Presumably the Canadian Government would have to arrange , with Cuba or Algeria for entry lay the Kidnappers, and perhaps by one or more prisoners. If only the kidnappers were involved, a demarche of this nature to foreign governments should not present too many drawbacks and would be in accordance with the logic of allowing them to leave with their money. Such a demarche relating to prisoners would raise different questions. . 5. If the Government felt compelled to go further, perhaps some negotiation would be possible on the number of prisoners to be released. It could be argued, far instance, that the release af one of the present prisoners in exchange for h$r. Croes waa not an unreasonable gesture. This might of course lead to bargaining on numbers as between the 23 requested and the figure of 1 we would Initially propose. It : • .• . , ..2 000462 �COHFIflSMTLiL 7 • must be realized, however, that at this point we would enter into much more delicate political grounds, since the release of prisoners could be interpreted as a tacit admission that they were not coeaoen criminals. 6. Of the other FLQ conditions, only the request that all police activity relating to the kidnapping be stopped can be ranked with the earlier ones in importance from the PLQ viewpoint. I take it that neither Ottawa nor Quebec would be willing to cnll off the police, at least -ntil a deal had'been made. In the circumstances, this FLQ condition must be Ignored. As a corollary there should be a concerted effort in the federal and provincial capitals to say as little as possible on police activity so as not to alerm the kidnappers. I appreciate that this will be difficult to do in face of questions by the raress, and especially in the House, but I think these must be sidestepped on the perfectly reasonable grounds that ratters are extremely delicate Bad that a life han/»s in the balance. 7. It is more difficult to take seriously the other three demands. To seek press publicity for the FLQ manifesto would involve some political self-abasement on the part of the Federal and Quebec Governments. This said, the manifesto ie a rather crude document that may arouse more distaste than enthusiastic support in Quebec. It is for consideration whether the Government would wish at one point to release the text to the press, which would no doubt give it considerable coverage but hardly full-length publication cn the front page. Another approach might be to seek publication of the text through paid advertisements, perhape prefaced by a notice to the effect that the text waa being published to save the life of a foreign representative in Canada. Bhile we mention these possibilities in order to cower the ground, we do believe that publication of the manifesto and a half hoar of television publicity for it and the prisoners must be marginal to the FLQ's objectives and that they could also be Ignored, at least for the time being, especially if there were some points on which the Government were willing to hint at an arrangement. The same reasoning appli.es even more strongly to tho requests relating to the LaPalme workers and to the alleged Informer within the FLO.. It le hard to believe that the FLQ would kill for such minor objectives. So much the better, of course, if the LaPalme item oould be wiped off the list of requests through a statement by the interested parties that they had no wish to obtain advantages from the Federal Government by means of a throat to a foreign diplomat. 8. Ia conclusion, I would reconnend that we iawertlately make our fiosition clear about the money. It ia of course up to Ministers to decide how much further they might be willing to go at this point. If we were ready to undertake informal contacts with the FLQ, I think we should hint initially at an arrangement involving money, safe conduct, transport and arrangements for admittance into Cuba or Algeria. It is also for consideration whether we should add an offer relating to at least one of the prisoners. This may depend in part on whether .3 000463 �, — • • a . . * 3- . - CCKFlDBiiTIAL . • . • • .•• • • ... - •- - some ot the prisoners might aot be considered as eligible for release on parole in the near future, which of course would facilitate matters. I am fully aware of the disadvantages of undertaking even covert negotiations with the FLQ. Oa the other head, because of the vague 48 hour deadline we are faced with, it may be wise to register with the Front the poeaibillty at a deal in order to prevent any reaction of paru on the part of tha kidaappera aad to establish for the record that the Government had not adopted a passive or negative poeition. . .. . . • - . . 7 ... ' ' P . ' - - 7 . A.E.R. • • : .ddd • - , • •p • I ' i " - • • . .- • • . - 7 . •. r P • . . ' • ' • • • • • . . • , 000464 • •. • ••.. • — � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00006 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum for the Minister Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 6-Oct-70 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy, RG25, vol. 25741, 20-22-TFK-1, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Federal Response to FLQ Demands - Contingency Planning Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en