https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/64efd500e9ed5079d154294a5b2fa706.pdf 48e2c912d4681c77cf5c44eef6ee325b PDF Text Text -j , < d <-.•' ^ y -r~/'s> <xy y x<x *** y- CONFIDENTIAL October 5 , 1970. MEMORANDUM FOI THE MINISTER Abduction of Mr. Cross - FLQ Demands The first fact to be taken into consideration is that the threat to Mr. 0088*8 life is real. This is the RCMP assessment, in view of the type of men likely to be involved on the FLQ side and of the outside "professional" help they might conceivably have enlisted. We agree with this assessment. It will of course be up to the Government to decide what attitude it wishes to take in this matter and whether any of the FLQ demands could be entertained. As indicated below, our obligations in international law to take "appropriate" action for the safeguard of diplomatic personnel are clear although not detailed. Essentially, the decision will have to be political and encompass a wide variety of factors which we seek to analyse further on in this memorandum. Immediate Measures 2. While we will not be able to avoid a decision on the substance of the problem, urgent consideration must be given to certain immediate measures. First, you may agree that it would be very much to our advantage to gain time vls»a-vis the FLQ, if only to allow police action to proceed, and also to consider any political negotiations we may wish to undertake. This being so, we should avoid categorical statements that might be interpreted by the FLQ as a flat rejection of their demands. I see no harm in our position being somewhat blurred. This might lead to a weakening in the FLQ demands and give the Government time to take decisions on the substance of the problem. All the better if the Federal Government appears relatively discreet, given the considerable interest of the Quebec Government in the matter. 3. Another immediate problem is to ready ourselves for a possible dialogue with Cuba and Algeria in this matter. Since our new Ambassador is not at present in Havana and since we have no resident mission in Algeria, I propose that we stand ready to send Mr. Mayrand (who has been requested to be in Ottawa Tuesday morning) to Cuba to deal with this specific problem if required. Similarly, Hr. J.M. Dery, the Head of ovaFrancophone Division, who has extensive African experience, would proceed to Paris on the evening of October 6 so as to be ready for inmediate move to Algiers in case of need (or possibly in advance of actual need, perhaps for the ostensible purpose of discussing the basis on which our proposed Canadian mission in Algiers might be opened). There might even be some advantage in letting it be known that contacts were being established with the two governments concerned in view of the FLQ reference to them. We ...2 000438 �- 2 - could of course deny any implication that this implied Canadian Government acceptance of the FLQ terms and we could simply indicate that in our thorough consideration of all elements of the situation we were naturally exploring those aspects affecting one or both of those governments. I should be grateful for your comnents on this proposal. We would of course notify the Quebec authorities in advance. k. Another means of gaining time, admittedly risky, would be to seek to establish some kind of contact with the FLQ. We shall be cautiously exploring this possibility. It might have the advantage of decreasing the risk to Hr. Cross by reducing the harshness of the confrontation. At the same time, if the Government felt compelled to negotiate terms with the FLQ (it is unlikely that we would wish to accede to all their demands), a channel for doing so would have been established. Of course, one could conceive of other means of conducting such negotiations, e.g., through a public statement by the Canadian Government of the terms it was willing to accept. Nonetheless the direct method has certain attractions, especially in terms of gaining time. British Attitude and Canadian Legal Obligations 5. Our relations with the British Government in this matter are, of course, important. Any immediate steps of the kind mentioned above that we can announce to them would of course remove some of the pressure on them as well as on us. There is every indication to date that the British Government intends to be understanding and cooperative. Of course the British authorities have every concern for the life of a British representative, but they are also aware of the abdication of government responsibility that could be involved in complying with unlimited terrorist demands. In the recent Middle East crisis the British Government, at least initially, adopted a hard line towards Palestinian hijackers demands and rallied to its viewpoint the Germans and the Swiss who were first inclined to immediate compliance. The British took the lead in coordinating efforts and in bargaining with the terrorists through the Red Cross. In the event, these governments did negotiate with the Palestinians and, after several days, secured the release of all hostages before any of the prisoners were released. In a parliamentary debate at the end of April, the Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Shepherd) noted that the responsibility for the safety of an Ambassador and his staff lay with the host country. He recognized, however, that with the best will in the world no country could give complete protection against kidnappings of diplomats any more than any other form of crime. 6. Non-compliance with the request to take the prisoners to Cuba or Algeria involves the international responsibility of the Canadian Government to protect the persons of diplomats in its territory. This obligation is spelled out in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Article 40, which reads: �"The receiving state shall . . . take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom or dignity." It follows that the receiving state has a responsibility to mitigate any consequences of not having fulfilled this obligation. Ihe British Government might blame the Canadian Government for not taking the appropriate measures of protection given the political situation in Quebec. Although Canada is not yet a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations it represents general principles of international law which we follow. Our decisions, while they should be consistent with those general obligations, can nevertheless vary considerably in the light of our practical and political assessment of the situation. 7. We attempt below to analyse the implications of the FIQ ransom demands, to determine what would be involved in complying partly or fully with them and what would be the implications of refusing to do so. Analysis of the Demands The demands can be summarized as follows: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) stop police investigation; wide press and TV publicity for the FLQ political manifesto; release of over 20 prisoners; facilities for their transport by plane to Cuba or Algeria; rehiring of the LaPalme workers by the Post Office Department; $500,000 in gold; public information cn an alleged spy within the FLQ. The full text of the demands is attached. 8. With regard to point (1), the police investigation is of course going on and will not be brought to a stop unless the Quebec and Federal Government so direct. Such a large investigation cannot, of course, be kept secret and the press is bound to be aware that it is going on. Nonetheless, in order not to present the kidnappers with too direct a challenge, we should do what we can to avoid any official confirmation that this aspect of the FIQ/is being ignored, /demand 9. The freeing of prisoners (point 3) would involve decisions by both the Federal and the Quebec Governments. More than half the persons in question aire in federal institutions, either medium or maximum security ones. We expect to receive early on October 6 an assessment of each one of the prisoners by officials of the Solicitor General and the RCMP; it will thus be possible to establish what internal security risks would be involved for the Canadian and Quebec Governments in releasing some or all of these prisoners. �CONFIDENTIAL -4 - 10. Arrangements with Cuba sad Algeria to receive these prisoners (point 4) raise a number of political and legal considerations. Tha first question would bo whether vs eoald obtain entry for those people from one or the other government. It is difficult at this stage to assess what the reaction of the Cuban Government would be. Premier Castro in the past has made it clear that Cuba encourages revolutionaries in the hemisphere) it has granted asylum to numerous political activists from a number of countries. In a public statement recently, however, Castro drew a distlnetioa between what he called "genuine revolutionaries" and what he tensed "common criminals". The former would be granted asylum but the latter would be Jailed. Indeed, only a few weeks ago, for the first time, the Cuban Government deported a United States citizen who claimed to be a political refugee. Cn the other hand, the present Cuban attitude toward the FLQ is less clear. Va are examining to what extent Castro has been showing sympathy for the FLQ in recent months. 11. Should the Canadian Government formally request Cuba to accept these persons, Castro might do so, explaining that such action should be viewed as a favour to us and as a humanitarian act. It will be recalled that In previous cases of diplomatic kidnappings Mexico has received prisoners freed in ether countries. By acceding to the request, Castro could claim his action should be viewed in the context of friendly relations with Canada and at the same time disclaim any responsibility for activity supporting the FLQ in Cuba. He has denied in the past accusations that his government was extending such support by providing training facilities for extremists. There have been indications that at least some Quebec separatist extremists were not over welcome in Cuba. 12. As for Algeria, although it has shown sympathy towards "liberation movements", its relations with Canada have been developing favourably over the last year. The Algerian Government has shown considerable interest in the Canadian Government as a trade end aid partner. Algeria aay therefore be extremely loathe to get involved in the problem. It might conceivably accept our request. It aay be that Algeria would abide more strictly than Cuba by any agreement we reached with thea concerning the activities of the prisoners once in Algeria. On the other hand, asylum in Cuba would give the FLQ extremists a rather less favourable image than if they were welcomed in Algeria, a more neutral and respectable country. 13. The second question relates to extradition. It would be ideal of course if arrangements oould be made for the prisoners to proceed to Cuba or Algeria, then to be promptly returned by the local government on the basis of a previous arrangement. It ie highly unlikely that such sn agreement could be reached. Cn the contrary, either government would no doubt insist as a condition of its acceptance of these prisoners that we waive any rights to ask for the return of the prisoners. (Vs would have some legal grounds ...5 000441 �CONFIDENTIAL - 5 - for requesting return in the case of Cuba. We have an extradition treaty with that country, but Cuba could of course choose to consider the prisoners as "political" and therefore not extraditable, lie have no extradition treaty with Algeria.) A return, or at leaet freeling of any funds paid to the FLQ, oould perhaps more easily be agreed. 14. The third question relates to the activities of these persons once in Cuba or Algeria. We could request and perhaps obtain an undertaking from the receiving government that the prisoners would not be allowed to engage in any political activity in that country, nor to use or transfer for political purposes any of the funds they aight have reeeived from authorities in Canada. Finally we would wish to examine whether the released prisoners would be granted political asylum in the receiving country. Clearly lt would be preferable to avoid such a development, since this would lend credence to the FLQ claim that these were victims of political persecution and not common criminals. 15* Concerning the half a million dollars* ransom (point 6), the Government would have to weigh the risk that such funds might find their way back to Canada to finance heightened terrorist activity. The measures mentioned in the previous paragraph might alleviate this danger. 16. The denunciation of any "spy" in the FLQ (demand 7) would be of course quite unprecedented and in many ways damaging. It may well be one of the demands the FLQ aight give up. Implications of Giving In 17* A decision to give in to most or all of the FLQ demands would in all probability ensure the return of Mr. Cross. However, ite negative effects aust also be weighed. It would involve to some extent an abdication of the Government's responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the country. It would acknowledge that the FLQ le a force to be reckoned with and can negotiate with the Canadian and Quebec Governments. It would tend to undermine the authority of both the Federal ana Quebec Governments, the morale of the population especially In Quebec, and to seas extent confidence abroad in the future of this country. It would tend to encourage similar kinds of terrorism in the future, both in Canada and abroad. It aight land some credence to the thesis that French Canadians are politically oppressed and aust use violence to secure their freedom. It is dea r that the interest of the Quebec Government in most of these aspects of the matter is very considerable indeed. We would have to consider ite interest and its views before reaching any decision to effect a major compromise with the FLQ. •. .6 �CONFIDENTIAL - 6 - IS. It may be possible to identify some half-way compromises which the Government might decide to offer to the kidnappers. For instance, the Government aight undertake to consider whether grounds existed for parole to be granted in the case of some or all of the prisoners concerned] an undertaking might be given to allow the kidnappers to leave the country. We shall go into this kind of contingency planning. Implications of Refusal 19. If we refuse pointblank the FIQ proposals or took such measures as wholesale sweeps of FLQ suspects, we might of course succeed in intimidating the FLQ and bringing about a release of Mr. Cross. This, however, is unlikely and the risk of his death would be serious indeed. While this would bring some revulsion against the FLQ, it would also place the Canadian Government in a very difficult position with the Canadian public. The British public*s (if not Government's) reaction could also be expected to be strong. The essential question the Canadian Government would have to answer would be whether lt had done everything reasonable and appropriate and imaginative to save the British diplomat's life. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00004 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum for the Minister Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 5-Oct-70 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy, RG25, vol. 25741, 20-22-TFK-1, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Abduction of Mr. Cross - FLQ Demands Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en