https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a65b030244338c0ef137726f6e7bdc71.pdf 82197b8c8299dcd7b8869618ccf2b17d PDF Text Text > .. artment of External Affairs 7 -"^' . S~ 7. P.. --' •• V v-"Xp v . ; v. -. A 0 I. CLASSIFIED r »* -- . *e a '" - .** .-.•-- p - \ • ' o ••. . i 50-22-TFK-l Subject: ' Vol.—ONE From OCT J>/7C ToOe.T )Fk)7d A POLITICAL AFFAIRS .• a lmKl^oSECUiilTY - issra TASK FOR wx^OOf&fi References to Related Files mAku Subject File No. AC&aaa- to'INFORMA-'IQISIL MINED BY / EXAMINE PAR: m DATE«EDA: rr : .; ., ./Xx x 'JLsi-j-.nrxr*--, •--^ —— -' P2'i~AP • -'.yd' —~•-• •//7'. •• ,'• • - *V '* •'.' 4 si2 - j p -"•'' F l— , J— — 7 - ^ f f ... . _ ' . . . . . . ' • TOO? _ _ ._ . o --.. -* NaBi -. •••' • •' : 0 - / •- N d -^ ~ - P . . — p. , - . A . - - DIVISIONAL SYM0OC • " 7 y - A x.. gL. F p ' •2 .:-• a : -: &0p< P •i,a ' M. d -xy -.- 'max h 72AXX-X /—.---•, y - "3s - d . - -p'p- '• 000435 ^ �w £t> (Qd-olS- F^^l 9e Jt , CROSS • . . i' ... •: ..I '.'• ' . t. ni > WHO'S WHO 1970 CROSS, Hannah Margaret; barrister-at-law; r> 1946-47. Lecturer in Physiology, 1947 25 April 1908; o d o"late F. J. K. Cross and Reader, 1952, St Mary's Hosp. Publicationi Eleanor Mary Cross (nee Phillimore); m 1936, contrib. to Journal of Physiology. Recrtmim sailing. Address: The Mill House, Culler's Edmund Gordon Wright, barrister-at-law: one Green, Thaxted, Essex. T: Thaxted 202. .v one ,/. Educ: Downe House Sch.; St Hilda's Coll., Oxford. BA 1929. Called to Bar, Lincoln's Inn, 1931; first woman Mem. of CROSS, Rev. Leslie Basil, MA Oxon; Fello», Gen. Council of Bar, 1938-45; Civil Defence, 1927-47, formerly Chaplain, Tutor and Junior 1939-45. Address 901d Square, Lincoln's Inn, Bursar of Jesus College, Oxford] Felloo WC2. T; 01-405 4038; The Quay House, Emeritus, 1960; b 18 April 1895; j of John Sidlesham, near Chichester. Sussex. T: James Cross, formerly Rector of Revest... Sidlesham 258. Lines, and Mary Emma Aspden; m 1921 Gertrude, 4th d of Waller Savill, Finchc CROSS, James Richard; Senior British Trade Lindfield, Sussex. Educ: Trent Coll.; Kehle Commissioner. Montreal, since 1968; b 29 Coll.. Oxford; Wycliffe Hall, Oxford. Am Sept. 1921; s of J. P. Cross and Dinah Cross Master, Lake House Preparatory Sch, (nee Hodgms); m 1945. Barbara Dagg; one d. Bexhill-on-Sea, 1916-17; Housemaster Educ: King's Hosp. Dublin; I n n C,>ll., Stamford Grammar Sch., 1918-19. Dublin. _Scholar, First CI. Modcrulonhip Headmaster, Trent Coll. Preparatory Sch.. Economics and Polil. Science IM il ,. 1922-23; Chaplain and Lecturer in Theologv, Asst Principal, Bd of Trade, 194 P i ' , , . J- 7,7, Coll., Oxford, 1923-26; Lecturer in to Parly Sec, 1947-49; Principal, I9iu, i....ic 1 licology, to St Peters Hall, Oxford, 1928-J1, Commissioner; New Delhi, 1953-56; Halnax, Examining Chaplain to Archbishop of York. 1957-60; Winnipeg, 1960-62; Asst Sec. 1962; 1925-28; Examining Chaplain lo Bishop of Sen. Trade Comr, Kuala Lumpur, 1962-66; Bd Manchester, 1929-39; and Truro, 1935-54 of Trade, 1966-67; Under Sec, 1968. Vice-Principal, Ripon Hall, Oxford, 1933-S-t. Recreations: theatre, bridge, camping. Address: Select Preacher, Oxford, 1935 and 1937, c/0 FCO, King Charles Street, SW1; British Proctor for University of Oxford in Government Office, 635 Dorchester Convocation of Canterbury, 1936; Public Boulevard West, Montreal 101. PQ, Canada. Examiner in Final Honour Sch. of Theoloes, Clubs: Travellers'; St James's (Montreal). 1937-39; Estates Bursar, Jesus Coll., 1941-5), SeniorTutor, 1945-47:Junior Proctor, Oxford Univ., 1943-44. Publications: Essay in Tht CROSS, J o a n , C B E 1951; opera singer; b Sept. Atonement in History and in Life; articles in 1900. Educ: St Paul's Girls' Sch. Principal The Modern Churchman, e t c and pamphlen soprano. Old Vic and Sadler's Wells, 1924-44; Recreations: fishing, shooting, gardemnf Dir of Opera, Sadler's Wells, 1941-44; Address: 27 Linton Road, Oxford. subsequently Principal, National Sch. of Opera (Ltd), Morley Coll., London, resigned. Address: 2 Cavendish Avenue, NW8. CROSS, Brigadier Lionel Lesley, CBE 1950. Secretary of the Commonwealth Press Union since 1959; b 7 June 1899; yr s of Charles CROSS, Air Chief Marshal Sir Kenneth (Brian Frederick Cross, FRS, and Edith, JofMajBoydkKCB 1959 (CB 1954); CBE 1945; DSO Gen. Charles Stainforlh, CB; m 1940, Rose 1943; D F C 1940; b 4 Oct. 19(1; sof Pembroke Blanche Margaret, d of Sir Robert Taylor. H. C. Cross and Mrs Jean Cross; m 1945, Kvtes, Herts; no c. Educ: Wellington Coll; Brenda Megan, d of Wing-Comdr F. J. B. RMA Woolwich. Commissioned RFA, 1911*. Powell; two s one d. Educ: Kingswood Sch., France and Belgium, 1918. Adjutanl Buck, Bath. Pilot Officer, RAF, 1930; Flying Badge, and Berks Yeo. Artillery, 1925-29; retd 1929 1931; 25 Fighter Sqdn. 1931; Flying Officer, Rejoined Army, 1939; Staff Capt. RA 1939, 1932; Flying Instructor, No. 5 FTS Sealand France and Belgium, 1940; Major 1941; Lieutand Cambridge Univ. Air Sqdn, 1934; Fit Lt Col 1942; Asst Dir of Public Relations. War 1935; Sqdn Ldr 1938; commanded No. 46 Office, 1942-46; Brig. 1946; Dep. Dir of Public Fighter Sqdn UK, Norway. 1939-40; Wing Relations, War Office, 1946-50; Chief of Comdr 1940; posted MHdle Fast. 1941; Actg Public Information, SHAPE. 1954-58 (Dtp. Group Capt. 1941; Actg Air Commodore, 1951-54); retired, 1958. Recreations: rac.nf, 1943; Director Overseas Operations, Air bridge. Addresss: 15 Cedar House, Marloc. Ministry, 1944; Imperial Defence Coll., 1946; Road. W8. T: 01-937 0112. Club: Army tnt reverted Group Capt., 1946; Group Capt. Navy. Operations HQ BAFO Germany, 1947; OC Eastern Sector Fighter Command, 1949; Dir of Weapons, Air Ministry, 1952; subs. Air CROSS, Prof. Robert Craigie, MA Glasgow, MA Cdre, 1953; Dir of Ops. Air Defence, 1954Oxford; Regius Professor of Logic, Universal D e c 1955; Air Vice-Marshal. 1956;AOCNo. 3 of Aberdeen, since 1953; b 24 April 1911; J of (Bomber) Group, 1956-59; Air Marshal, 1961; Matthew Cross and Margaret Dickson; m AOC-in-C, Bomber Comd, 1959-63; Air Chief 1943, Peggy Catherine Elizabeth Vernon-t«o Marshal, 1965; AOC-in-C, Transport Comd, d. Educ: Glasgow Univ.; Queen's Coll. 1963-66, retd. Dir Suffolk Branch, British Red Oxford. MA 1st CI. Hons Classics, Glas«o» Cross Soc, 1968. Norwegian War Cross, 1941; 1932; 1st CI. Hons Classical Mods, Oxford USA Legion of Merit, 1944; French Legion of 1934. 1st CI. Lit. Hum., Oxford. 1936. Fello» Honour, 1944; French Croix de Guerre, 1944; and t u t o r in Philsophy, Jesus Coll.. Oxford. Dutch Order of Orange Nassau, 1945. 1938; served War, 1941-45. Navy and Recreations: Rugby football and golf (colours Admiralty; Senior Tutor, Jesus Coll., Oxford RAF). Clubs: Royal Air Force, Army and 1948-53. Trustee, Scottish Hospiul Navy. Endowments Research Trust, 1968-; Mem. University Grants Ctlee. 1965-; Mem., North Eastern Regional Hospital Bd, 1958-6? CROSS, Prof. Kenneth William, MB, D S c Publications: (with A. D. Woozley) Plato' FRCP; Professor of Physiology, London Republic: A Philosophical Commentary, I9M; Hospital Medical College since 1960; Hon. contributions to learned jls. Address •* Physiologist to The London Hospital; b 26 Westfield Terrace, Aberdeen. T: 22470. CM March 1916; s of late George Cross, Ealing; m United University. 1942, Joyce M. Wilson (nee Lack); one step d. Educ: St Paul's Sch.; St Mary's Hospital Medical Sch. Qualified, 1940; House CROSS, Rev. Robert Nicol, MA; b Hamilton. Scotland, 1883; m 1910. Nellie Reeves; one J appointments in St Mary's Hospital Sector; two d. Educ: Hamilton Academy; Univs oi graded Physician EMS Amersham Emergency Glasgow, St Andrews and Marburj. Hosp. 1945; Friends' Ambulance Unit, China, 726 u S'-. ' 0 • '" ' . fis . • it it'.' l.ectr, L.:< Mechanical 1946-59. A Mechanics on fatigue fluid n::cfj strengli. c welding, Recreatio.tsl Queen' 30111. CROSSlJ lord 1914; / -ill 1st 194, l9:,3.JoanJ Sc 19^ "ci, Chief l.l 1950-571957- S9\< Purchase! and SerT / 000436 �w TASK Dept. Name fj S2d\i^7i7X^r> Office Tel. Division pYTfcacAl s CPfo "p. se^&FfING A.A. F^o1°j 7 ^ 6 U-*2Pf^ 2 • 77/7 O.?- 7?^£ £ / £ / 5" S £ A f, g'Jr. O I j). F IF A LA. PC-O •• F &&? F H z. '-Lome Tel to DO O A? a A) ' -75"?o 7v-^- ?*"%/ O/07S24 1 r) 6 'B B i \ o oo"/ <• I o o v - ^ , 5 3 5 ! / o AO JjA/77 &£TZiE £A (A. ^ - 70 r / i L^ o/usst-/) Iv •£ r/> f J . T ) o n t ^s A . e Ii h L 6 / o2 r - d - > [Ok &'• FA 6 sr^-z 6 F932 fatlP- A-^A'/J 2 1)F\. CoRsvAPAf 2 ,Z f\A) rZkFit Ff-FAAf FJ 77L777f\I /I ~Lp JT'OFI^- V F7/L2 Jrl- €& d<,co stay "7BB ^d 2 9 i FAF 1*1 x2 7- as /o -73 3-77S? ?3£ ' 76 oZ ?37--36</l />A7-A J3^ ^ 7 ^ ' ? <7 6 AFA/cyC S 2 Lf 000437 �-j , < d <-.•' ^ y -r~/'s> <xy y x<x *** y- CONFIDENTIAL October 5 , 1970. MEMORANDUM FOI THE MINISTER Abduction of Mr. Cross - FLQ Demands The first fact to be taken into consideration is that the threat to Mr. 0088*8 life is real. This is the RCMP assessment, in view of the type of men likely to be involved on the FLQ side and of the outside "professional" help they might conceivably have enlisted. We agree with this assessment. It will of course be up to the Government to decide what attitude it wishes to take in this matter and whether any of the FLQ demands could be entertained. As indicated below, our obligations in international law to take "appropriate" action for the safeguard of diplomatic personnel are clear although not detailed. Essentially, the decision will have to be political and encompass a wide variety of factors which we seek to analyse further on in this memorandum. Immediate Measures 2. While we will not be able to avoid a decision on the substance of the problem, urgent consideration must be given to certain immediate measures. First, you may agree that it would be very much to our advantage to gain time vls»a-vis the FLQ, if only to allow police action to proceed, and also to consider any political negotiations we may wish to undertake. This being so, we should avoid categorical statements that might be interpreted by the FLQ as a flat rejection of their demands. I see no harm in our position being somewhat blurred. This might lead to a weakening in the FLQ demands and give the Government time to take decisions on the substance of the problem. All the better if the Federal Government appears relatively discreet, given the considerable interest of the Quebec Government in the matter. 3. Another immediate problem is to ready ourselves for a possible dialogue with Cuba and Algeria in this matter. Since our new Ambassador is not at present in Havana and since we have no resident mission in Algeria, I propose that we stand ready to send Mr. Mayrand (who has been requested to be in Ottawa Tuesday morning) to Cuba to deal with this specific problem if required. Similarly, Hr. J.M. Dery, the Head of ovaFrancophone Division, who has extensive African experience, would proceed to Paris on the evening of October 6 so as to be ready for inmediate move to Algiers in case of need (or possibly in advance of actual need, perhaps for the ostensible purpose of discussing the basis on which our proposed Canadian mission in Algiers might be opened). There might even be some advantage in letting it be known that contacts were being established with the two governments concerned in view of the FLQ reference to them. We ...2 000438 �- 2 - could of course deny any implication that this implied Canadian Government acceptance of the FLQ terms and we could simply indicate that in our thorough consideration of all elements of the situation we were naturally exploring those aspects affecting one or both of those governments. I should be grateful for your comnents on this proposal. We would of course notify the Quebec authorities in advance. k. Another means of gaining time, admittedly risky, would be to seek to establish some kind of contact with the FLQ. We shall be cautiously exploring this possibility. It might have the advantage of decreasing the risk to Hr. Cross by reducing the harshness of the confrontation. At the same time, if the Government felt compelled to negotiate terms with the FLQ (it is unlikely that we would wish to accede to all their demands), a channel for doing so would have been established. Of course, one could conceive of other means of conducting such negotiations, e.g., through a public statement by the Canadian Government of the terms it was willing to accept. Nonetheless the direct method has certain attractions, especially in terms of gaining time. British Attitude and Canadian Legal Obligations 5. Our relations with the British Government in this matter are, of course, important. Any immediate steps of the kind mentioned above that we can announce to them would of course remove some of the pressure on them as well as on us. There is every indication to date that the British Government intends to be understanding and cooperative. Of course the British authorities have every concern for the life of a British representative, but they are also aware of the abdication of government responsibility that could be involved in complying with unlimited terrorist demands. In the recent Middle East crisis the British Government, at least initially, adopted a hard line towards Palestinian hijackers demands and rallied to its viewpoint the Germans and the Swiss who were first inclined to immediate compliance. The British took the lead in coordinating efforts and in bargaining with the terrorists through the Red Cross. In the event, these governments did negotiate with the Palestinians and, after several days, secured the release of all hostages before any of the prisoners were released. In a parliamentary debate at the end of April, the Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Shepherd) noted that the responsibility for the safety of an Ambassador and his staff lay with the host country. He recognized, however, that with the best will in the world no country could give complete protection against kidnappings of diplomats any more than any other form of crime. 6. Non-compliance with the request to take the prisoners to Cuba or Algeria involves the international responsibility of the Canadian Government to protect the persons of diplomats in its territory. This obligation is spelled out in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Article 40, which reads: �"The receiving state shall . . . take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom or dignity." It follows that the receiving state has a responsibility to mitigate any consequences of not having fulfilled this obligation. Ihe British Government might blame the Canadian Government for not taking the appropriate measures of protection given the political situation in Quebec. Although Canada is not yet a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations it represents general principles of international law which we follow. Our decisions, while they should be consistent with those general obligations, can nevertheless vary considerably in the light of our practical and political assessment of the situation. 7. We attempt below to analyse the implications of the FIQ ransom demands, to determine what would be involved in complying partly or fully with them and what would be the implications of refusing to do so. Analysis of the Demands The demands can be summarized as follows: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) stop police investigation; wide press and TV publicity for the FLQ political manifesto; release of over 20 prisoners; facilities for their transport by plane to Cuba or Algeria; rehiring of the LaPalme workers by the Post Office Department; $500,000 in gold; public information cn an alleged spy within the FLQ. The full text of the demands is attached. 8. With regard to point (1), the police investigation is of course going on and will not be brought to a stop unless the Quebec and Federal Government so direct. Such a large investigation cannot, of course, be kept secret and the press is bound to be aware that it is going on. Nonetheless, in order not to present the kidnappers with too direct a challenge, we should do what we can to avoid any official confirmation that this aspect of the FIQ/is being ignored, /demand 9. The freeing of prisoners (point 3) would involve decisions by both the Federal and the Quebec Governments. More than half the persons in question aire in federal institutions, either medium or maximum security ones. We expect to receive early on October 6 an assessment of each one of the prisoners by officials of the Solicitor General and the RCMP; it will thus be possible to establish what internal security risks would be involved for the Canadian and Quebec Governments in releasing some or all of these prisoners. �CONFIDENTIAL -4 - 10. Arrangements with Cuba sad Algeria to receive these prisoners (point 4) raise a number of political and legal considerations. Tha first question would bo whether vs eoald obtain entry for those people from one or the other government. It is difficult at this stage to assess what the reaction of the Cuban Government would be. Premier Castro in the past has made it clear that Cuba encourages revolutionaries in the hemisphere) it has granted asylum to numerous political activists from a number of countries. In a public statement recently, however, Castro drew a distlnetioa between what he called "genuine revolutionaries" and what he tensed "common criminals". The former would be granted asylum but the latter would be Jailed. Indeed, only a few weeks ago, for the first time, the Cuban Government deported a United States citizen who claimed to be a political refugee. Cn the other hand, the present Cuban attitude toward the FLQ is less clear. Va are examining to what extent Castro has been showing sympathy for the FLQ in recent months. 11. Should the Canadian Government formally request Cuba to accept these persons, Castro might do so, explaining that such action should be viewed as a favour to us and as a humanitarian act. It will be recalled that In previous cases of diplomatic kidnappings Mexico has received prisoners freed in ether countries. By acceding to the request, Castro could claim his action should be viewed in the context of friendly relations with Canada and at the same time disclaim any responsibility for activity supporting the FLQ in Cuba. He has denied in the past accusations that his government was extending such support by providing training facilities for extremists. There have been indications that at least some Quebec separatist extremists were not over welcome in Cuba. 12. As for Algeria, although it has shown sympathy towards "liberation movements", its relations with Canada have been developing favourably over the last year. The Algerian Government has shown considerable interest in the Canadian Government as a trade end aid partner. Algeria aay therefore be extremely loathe to get involved in the problem. It might conceivably accept our request. It aay be that Algeria would abide more strictly than Cuba by any agreement we reached with thea concerning the activities of the prisoners once in Algeria. On the other hand, asylum in Cuba would give the FLQ extremists a rather less favourable image than if they were welcomed in Algeria, a more neutral and respectable country. 13. The second question relates to extradition. It would be ideal of course if arrangements oould be made for the prisoners to proceed to Cuba or Algeria, then to be promptly returned by the local government on the basis of a previous arrangement. It ie highly unlikely that such sn agreement could be reached. Cn the contrary, either government would no doubt insist as a condition of its acceptance of these prisoners that we waive any rights to ask for the return of the prisoners. (Vs would have some legal grounds ...5 000441 �CONFIDENTIAL - 5 - for requesting return in the case of Cuba. We have an extradition treaty with that country, but Cuba could of course choose to consider the prisoners as "political" and therefore not extraditable, lie have no extradition treaty with Algeria.) A return, or at leaet freeling of any funds paid to the FLQ, oould perhaps more easily be agreed. 14. The third question relates to the activities of these persons once in Cuba or Algeria. We could request and perhaps obtain an undertaking from the receiving government that the prisoners would not be allowed to engage in any political activity in that country, nor to use or transfer for political purposes any of the funds they aight have reeeived from authorities in Canada. Finally we would wish to examine whether the released prisoners would be granted political asylum in the receiving country. Clearly lt would be preferable to avoid such a development, since this would lend credence to the FLQ claim that these were victims of political persecution and not common criminals. 15* Concerning the half a million dollars* ransom (point 6), the Government would have to weigh the risk that such funds might find their way back to Canada to finance heightened terrorist activity. The measures mentioned in the previous paragraph might alleviate this danger. 16. The denunciation of any "spy" in the FLQ (demand 7) would be of course quite unprecedented and in many ways damaging. It may well be one of the demands the FLQ aight give up. Implications of Giving In 17* A decision to give in to most or all of the FLQ demands would in all probability ensure the return of Mr. Cross. However, ite negative effects aust also be weighed. It would involve to some extent an abdication of the Government's responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the country. It would acknowledge that the FLQ le a force to be reckoned with and can negotiate with the Canadian and Quebec Governments. It would tend to undermine the authority of both the Federal ana Quebec Governments, the morale of the population especially In Quebec, and to seas extent confidence abroad in the future of this country. It would tend to encourage similar kinds of terrorism in the future, both in Canada and abroad. It aight land some credence to the thesis that French Canadians are politically oppressed and aust use violence to secure their freedom. It is dear that the interest of the Quebec Government in most of these aspects of the matter is very considerable indeed. We would have to consider ite interest and its views before reaching any decision to effect a major compromise with the FLQ. •. .6 �CONFIDENTIAL - 6 - IS. It may be possible to identify some half-way compromises which the Government might decide to offer to the kidnappers. For instance, the Government aight undertake to consider whether grounds existed for parole to be granted in the case of some or all of the prisoners concerned] an undertaking might be given to allow the kidnappers to leave the country. We shall go into this kind of contingency planning. Implications of Refusal 19. If we refuse pointblank the FIQ proposals or took such measures as wholesale sweeps of FLQ suspects, we might of course succeed in intimidating the FLQ and bringing about a release of Mr. Cross. This, however, is unlikely and the risk of his death would be serious indeed. While this would bring some revulsion against the FLQ, it would also place the Canadian Government in a very difficult position with the Canadian public. The British public*s (if not Government's) reaction could also be expected to be strong. The essential question the Canadian Government would have to answer would be whether lt had done everything reasonable and appropriate and imaginative to save the British diplomat's life. �p—w Mg | :>>.*-- P^*$p£ BE'-' r ,.': WrW • f. • 1 Mll8 v a n a v r y r $ IQ"1Q »lSS6a 1 4th lead-kidnapping-?.:-;1 USJENT MONTREAL Cp - P o l i c e have t e m p o r a r i l y h a l t e d t h e i r manhunt jnto t h e kidnapping of James Richard Cross, s e n i o r B r i t i s h t r a d e commissioner, afcducted from h i s Bon.e e a r l j f/.onday morning. A p o l i c e spokesman s a i d t h e o p e r a t i o n of t r a c k i n g down t h e kidnappers was s t o p p e - a f t e r a ransoin n o t e from tho k i d n a p p e r s was received c a l l i n g f o r «<r.o p o l i c e a c t i o n a g a i n s t u s . * > The spokesman d e s c r i t e B t&fl h a l t in the i n v e s t i g a t i o n as ««essentlal>» "because a man*a l i f e i s a t s t a k e * 'and we don»t want to make t h s t e r r o r i s t s j i t t e r - - . •• J u s t i c e M i n i s t e r Jerome CUoiustte p a r t i a l l y r e v e a l e d the c o n t e n t s <£ the ransom n o t e a t a news conference Monday a f t e r n o o n , and l a t e ] Trough t the m a t t e r "before t h s p r o v i n c i a l c d i n e t . A f t e r the c a b i n e t mee ting !,'r. S&CAtfette s a i d he had no u r t h e r comment to make. Premier Hobert Bourassa s a i d a f t e r the meeting he had " n o t h i n g t o eay>» a "bout the k i d n a p p i n g . Mr. Choquette s a i d a c t i o n w i l l be taken J o i n t l y "by the p r o v i n c i a l and f e d e r a l governments and added t h a t whaJ; now i s happening i s ' «"btural and u s e l e s s .»» 7 " S i m i l a r a c t i o n s i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s has n e v e r "brought any r e s u l t s w h a t s o e v e r , •» he added. The k i d n a p p e r s , s u s p e c t e d t o be tee'rr."fcars of the t e r r o r i s t f r o n t de ^ i t e r a t i o n ^ v s t - e e o i s , a group seeking * u e l e c independence, demanded fSoOfCCC i n gold and" t h e r e l e a s e of •*$ l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s * » in exchange f c r t h e s e n i o r B r i t i s h t r a d e commissioner. . p a r a «, ?rd lead kidnapping-Mr) 3 Hi C'x'l AH A A 1000444 �p/ CONFIDENTIAL October 5, 1970. MEMORANDUM FOR J E . RITC Quebec Government - Latest Line on the Kidnapping As you know, I have been unable to reach Mr. Chouinard [tonight. / However, I must draw to your attention on an urgent basis a CP bulletin issues in Montreal following the Quebec Cabinet meeting on the evening of October 5. Mr. Bourassa and Mr. Choquette apparently both refused to make any comment whatsoever. However, a police spokesman, apparently in Montreal, is quoted as saying that the police hunt into the kidnapping has been stopped in response to a request by the kidnappers. 2. It is conceivable that this line was taken by the Montreal police as a result of the Quebec Cabinet meeting. I would doubt that any such decision has been taken by the Quebec authorities. However, they may have deliberately decided to launch this rumour about the stopping of police activities in order to protect the life of Mr. Cross. It seems to me essential that the news be in no way contradicted from Ottawa until we have been able to learn more of the Quebec Government's decisions. 3. Accordingly I am asking the Operations Centre to phone Mr. Francis of the Press Office and also Inspector Ferraris of the RCMP to ensure that no immediate denial is made in Ottawa. I am also sending copies of this memorandum to those most closely involved in the matter in Ottawa so that they are aware of the problem at the beginning of the work day on October 6. C'.R. c.c. PMO/Mr. Lalonde MIN/Mr. Taylor PCO/Mr. Wall FPR/Mr. Francis PPR/Mr. Read RCMP/lnspector Ferraris 000445 �, ^/too ; / T (A. R E S T R I C T E D A? FM LDN OCT5/70 NO/MO STANDARD TO EXTER 33.3/1 FLASH KIDNAPPING OF BRIT TRADE COMMISSIONER PRESS ENQUIRIES ARE COMMENCING AMD BE EXPECT HEAVY VOLUME TOMORROW. AT MOMENT WE ARE SAYING THAT WE HAVE NO/NO MORE INFO THAN THAT CONTAINED IN AGENCY REPORTS.GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE BY OFFICE OPENING TOMORROW IN DEALING WITH MORE OBVIOUS SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WHICH WILL BE RAISED.FCO PRESS OFFICE ARE REFERRING PRESS ENQUIRIES TO US. X RFT 05 174 6Z I 20 d I 000446 �GCO/D. C o r n e t t / b b F October 5, 1970 "37 I k ^ v ^%/V. l^JkiiuF A I n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h . t h e kidnapping of 7>r. Cross 1 a t t a c h c o p i e s of laasa&^e, id p a t c h e d viu C h a r l e s R i t c h i e i n London t o Pri a ?Liai3tor iieeth aad t o S i r .*lec Douglas-Horae. L7UM7ss^i 0 v yOyL^^-^vFl^ x_ Crn\ U^* '- . E . C o l l i n s G . S . Whitehead. B s q . , C.K.G., K.V.C., A c t i n g i i r i t l u h High C o a a i s s i o a e r , Ottawa 000447 �Personal Message from Prime Minister Trudeau to Prime Minister Heath dated Oct.5. 1970 I am sure you realize how shocked I was to learn of the kidnapping of your Trade Commissioner in Montreal this morning. The drastic implications of this latest example of international political blacKmail - the first in Canada - are only now emerging. I wish to give you my personal assurance that in determining the course of action this Government must follow, we are fully aware oftthe grave responsibility which rests vdth us. I should add that we are receiving the fullest cooperation from the Quebec and Montreal Governments and are keeping in close touch with your people here. �Personal Message from the Secretary of State for External Affairs to Sir Alec Douglas-Home dated October 5. 1970 The Prime Minister has sent a personal message to Mr. Heath expressing his shock and concern over the kidnapping of Mr. Cross in Montreal. To this I wish to add my own profound regret that Canada should be involved. You will have received from your High Commission here the details of the demands which have now been submitted. The dilemma which we face is one of which you and your colleagues have only too recently had bitter experience. We for our part are not underestimating the determination of those responsible for this act. We shall continue to be in constant touch through your High Commission as the situation unfolds. �Elrr S>rn>htnT tff S'hih* lax Jxxtermil Affairs iPfO*!., % Aecrehiive FFhA mxx Affninpss mleri&uxesi . (Simjtda - / CONFIDENTIAL October 5, 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER Message to Prime Minister Heath In connection with the kidnapping of Mr. James Cross I am sending a personal message to Sir Alec Douglas-Home. In view of the many difficult decisions which confront us and the need to maintain closest consultation with the British Government you may wish to approve the attached message to Prime Minister Heath. M.S. 000450 �V* MESSAGE WE OCT5/70 EXTEROTT FILt;/pO$5l6R J>3~%-Ji~jS'~ NO LDN PRECEDENCE IMMED PDG- TO/A INFO &\^>* CONF -M FM/DE SECURITY SECURITE BRU NATODEL WA3HDC BERNE HAVANA SSL (JURTBL PB3 SUB/SUJ PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MR HEATH: I AM SURE YOU REALIZE HOW SHOCKED I WAS TO LEARN OF THE KIDNAPPING OF YOUR TRADE COMMISSIONER IN MONTREAL THIS MORNING. THE DRASTIC IMPLICATIONS OF THIS LATEST EXAMPLE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL BLACKMAIL - THE FIRST IN CANADA - ARE ONLY NOW EMERGING. I WISH TO GIVE YOU MY PERSONAL ASSURANCE THAT IN DETERMINING THE COURSE OF ACTION THIS GOVERNMENT MUST FOLLOW, WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY WHICH RESTS WITH US. I SHOULD ADD THAT WE ARK RECEIVING THE FULLEST COOPERATION FROM THE QU33EC AND MONTREAL GOVERNMENTS AND ARE KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH \,ITH YOUR PEOPLE HERE. - NO STD DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR 8, ^E-;~coHiHs7tny EXT 18/BIL (REV 5 / 6 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) DIVISION PDG APPRCVED/AUTORISE TELEPHONE SIO 2-4605 000451 �MESSAGE . „ _ FW71 EXTEROTT FM/DE TO/A fILE/PQSSlER 7 i FFFVTJFFFZ*^ ~AT -PRIP^ IA*- LDN mmSECURITY XJ INFO ? W / ? W PLEASE CONVEY THE F0l.L0V.ING MEBB.AGE FROM MINISTER TO HOME: THE PRIMS MINISTER H/-B : BNT A PERSONAL MESoAGE TO HR HEATH EXPRESSING H I - .:W ... OF MR CROSS IN MONTREAL. ' TO THIJ ^£RN OVER THE KIDNAPPING I « H VO ADD MX OWN PRO- FOUND REGRET THAT CAKADA SHOULD 32 INVOLVED. YOU rfILL HAVE RECEIVED FROM YOUR HIGH CGOBISAKO B IE rHfi DETAILS Or THE DEMANDS WHICH HATE BOW BEEN SOBKITTKB. IHE DXL&MiA OilBF. *E FACE IB CM* OF *HICH YOU AMD TOUR COLLEAGUES HAVE ONLY TOO RECENTLY HAD BITTER EXPERIENCE. Hi FOB OUR PART ARE NOT/NOT •UNDERESTIMATING THE DETERMINATION OF THuSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS ACT. BE .HALL COlfflNUE IB 3E IK CONSTANT TOUCH THOUGH YOUR IMME HIGH C0KKX3SIOS AE THE SITUATION UNFOLDL . DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR R.E. Collin3/bb SIG.. NO STD DIVISION TDCT mom APPRCVED/AUTORISE SIO. EXT18/BIL (REV 8/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 000452 �• / R E S T R I C T E D FM LDN OCT5/70 NO/NO STA.JDARD TO EXTER 3304 FLASH KIDNAPPING OF BRIT TRADE COMMISSIONER PRESS ENQUIRIES ARE COMMENCING AND WE EXPECT HEAVY VOLUME TOMORROW. AT MOMENT UE ARE SAYING THAT WE HAVE NO/NO BORE INFO THAN THAT CONTAINED IN AGENCY REPORTS.GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE BY OFFICE OPENING TOMORROW IN DEALING WITH MORE OBVIOUS SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WHICH WILL EE RAISED.FCO PRESS OFFICE ARE REFERRING PRESS ENQUIRIES TO US. RFT 05 174 6Z 000453 �'Of MESSAGE DATE EATFPS• FM/DE EXTEROTT OCT 5 20 FILE/DOSSIER OCT UI 5/70 SECURITY SECURITE CONFD NO LDN poP JO<[ TO/A PRECEDENCE FLASH INFO BEL KIDNAPPING OF BRITISH OFFICIAL. SUB/SUJ WE NEED URGENTLY TEX&OF ANY POLICY STATMMTS THAT BRITISH GOVT HAS RECENTLY MADE ON ABDUCTED DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL. 2. YOUR iiliTITTTrr OF THEIR OFFICIAL ATTITUDE WOULD ALSO BE APPRECIATED A$>P DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE STD ORK3INATOR/REDACTEUR '2 OF^, / n DIVISION POP EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/04) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) FO J TELEPHONE APPRCVED/AUTORISE 8l0....1.^4t..^R^r.--.t^Hr' 000454 �V>£V. 7> W M O/USSEA (Mr. Jtoquet) GC< FCII PPlt GE1 BB - 15 French - Mr. Speaker) Caps Jklk{Mr. Taylpr) / MIN(Mr. Church) •«*• MEN (Mr. Vincent) br&v Sight Hon. Jo Oo DIEOTENBAKKR ^Prinee Albert)* Mr, Speaker, 1. d i r e c t wy question t o the Secretary of Gtn#e f o r External A f f a i r s . Xt has t o dm with the matter thfct h«< oreught before t.lw Ke>u»© thftj &ftem©on. Xn view of tha d&aboXlc&l nature ©f t h e crlese which w i l l give Canada a bleak *y<i I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y unlsss te^-di ate a c t i o n ia taken t o b r i n g about/Arrest and convlctlen ©f the wrongdoers, would tha m i n i s t e r consider m o b i l i s i n g , with tho a s s i s t a n t * of the Montreal p o l i c e and a l s o the Quebec p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c e 0 a l l experienced iw-cmbgrw of t h s Royal Canadian Mounted Poliee/ffros* across Canada oo t h a t th@r@ w i l l be the f u l l e s t and iswaedlate a c t i o n t&k«nt Th* Mounted f o l i c e always get t h e i r imn. Hon. MXTCHSLL SHA2UP {Secretary ©f S t a t e f o r External Affairs) Mr. Speaker, I should l i k « t o reassure the r i g h t hon. gentlemen th&t. the 3&CM1P I s oobil&lng a l l I t s t a l e n t s In t h i s p a r t i c u l a r e a s e , and 1 thank him f o r h i s expression of confidence In th&m. 000455 �BB - 14 Mr, o £»XKSffi!NfiAKF.Bg Mr. 8$&(ik.®r, while I r e a l i s e that, s e c u r i t y surd tlie need f o r oeovijey la of gme&t Importance during an i n v e s t i g a t i o n »MCB aa t h l o , le the nainieter In a poaition a t U,tn £ l « t o say *d<ad on t h e b a s i s of tha i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h a t ha« already tsfcan p l a a e , e a r l y ers-eata may Im «xp«et«d or antici$%t<$dt Mr. SHARPs give ttiat atateiwent. N®„ Mr. Speiilkcr^ X rogret t h a t I could not X w i l l c e r t a i n l y malcw an aimouncewont aa noon ae the arrow t e have bo<yn mad®, but I cannot way anything about t h a t w a t t e r u n t i l euch tiiua. �MESSAGE DATE £>/noo FM/DE EXTERNAL OTT Off TQ/A SECURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER OCT 5/70 UNCLASS TW ^ P ^ PRECEDENCE NO POP-211 LONDON IMMED INFO BEL OURTEL POP207 OCT5/70 SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING OF BRITISH OFFICIAL FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF QUESTION PERIOD IN HOUSE THIS AFTERNOON: (COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED) 2. MR. STANBIELB, DOUGLAS, CAOUETTE MADE STATEMMTS EXPRESSING REGRETS TO BRITISH GOVT. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR SIO..., xA . J... .Heaters/raj.EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) DIVISION APPROVED/AUTORISE TELEPHONE 310 POP 5-626E F B>- : ^ . 000457 �1/F.BILD/lz October 5, 1970. £.0- <2P- TPJtZ- j CO] ... OL ELE - (Bolicy) (Chronology) Task Borce on Kidnapping of British Trade Commissioner, J. Cross, in Montreal Operations Centre, Department of Rxternal 'fairs, 11:00 a.m.. October 5. 1970. Attending: , Chairman, aui Tremblay, Associate Under-Secretary of State, ...B. Barton, Assistant Under-Secretary, re Lalonde, Prime Binister's Office, P.M. Roberts, Prime Binister's Office, D.B. .. 11, Privy Council Office, J.H. Taylor, SSEA»s Office, T Claude Roquet, I s Office, F. Bild, USSEA's Office, D.B. Cornett, Commonwealth Division, aid Stansfield, Coordination Division, E.G. Lee, Le£ I.vision, J. Demers, Legal Division, J.R. Barker, Operations Centre, .. Francis,^Press Office, Read, Protocol Division, E.R. Rettie, Security and Intelligence Liaison, A.D. Rowe, Security and Intelligence Liaison, Inspector Ferraris,.. c/3upt. Ouimet, RC] . . The meeting was informed that according to information received from the British High Commission in Ottawa, the senior British Trade Commissioner in Lontreal had been abducted at 3:30 a.m. by armed men who had gained access to his home on the pretext of delivering a parcel for which they had to obtain a signed receipt. The men were thought to Belong to the FB but no confirmation to that effect had yet been obtained. . ,/2 �p ,~\?,TTPT'n" -'TTrnT ,' ~1 2. In PP joint efraort to identify the a'.Ouctors and liberate Br. Cross, the RCIBP v/as maintaining closed^ contacts with the Quebec Provincial Police as well as the Lontreal City Bolice, (jurisdictions of both these police forces are involved in this case). 3. In the course of the meeting,it was learned that the Binister of Justice of Oebec, Br. Jerome Choquette, had telephoned the Prime minister to inform him that Quebec authorities were sparing no efforts in this matter "eut that they assumed that they would soon face a demand for the release of a number of FLQ members imprisoned in Quebec. The meeting decided that: 1. The Operations Centre of External Affairs eOll be used as the central coordinating point for information and consultation on this question; it will remain in continuous operation and able to channel all calls and ques'pions to appropriate members of the Task force; 2. Claude Roquet will be In charge of coordination and liaison; 3. Close contacts will Be maintained throughout with the government of Buebec; B. B statement v/ill 'es prepared for use by the government in this afternoon's session of the Bouse of Commons and v/ould Be delivered either by the Secretary of State for External Affairs or Br. Bcllraith, the Solicitor General; 3. Bor the time Being, the question v/ould Be considered simply as a criminal offence requiring cooperation oX several authorities; 5. Bo comments v/ould Be made as to the identity of the perpetrators until it had been firmly established; 7- Contingency statements would Be prepared, however, to allow for the possiBility that more accurate information on this case and Its developments became available later on in the day; O c Lontreal and Ottawa police forces v/ould be requested !/ to reinforce their protection of foreign diplomatic personnel and premises; . Once the situation had developed sufficiently, the • 27 000459 �3 - COBjdD.i . J 7 a.., .pritish High Commission would Be invited to delegate someone to a special Briefing By the Task Borce; ! 10. A telegram v/ould be sent to all poets to acquaint vem the facts of the situation and ths rps reing taken to sal tVi 000460 �0," \ *•*/ ^ r* * _ *oK^w * F y J O . ±rLy*l, 1. T S E C R E T 1 l^i/C A ^ ^ / October 6, 1970. £1 -/u .... re -... -' ..t> . c* • - •• !!<•;- . $77J$A.. Continue police investigations quietly but intensively. 2. Send representatives to Havana and Algiers without too precise public explanation of their missions. 3. Attempt some kind of contact with FLQ leaders (or make public statements) recording readiness to explore alternatives to their more extreme demands (e.g. number of prisoners to be released, arrangements for being sure of recovering Mr. Cross), 4. In particular, let it be known that possibility of producing ransom money is being explored. 5. Seek cooperation of opposition leaders in minimum of public questioning in order to keep captors in dark. 6. Keep close to Quebec Government throughout. 7. Have Quebec Police force (or joint Federal and Provincial force) ready to make sudden raid on FLQ leaders when most likely to be effective and when public likely to regard as unavoidable. 1 %, %0*. v*«*©-A^j»-fc» O- ) ofo-P^/f/r'-f 000461 �.. . -^— C.Roquet/mj "-•-:•-• X.7X. • • • CCWFUffJfTIAL • . "• • • October 6, 1970. ; iTonn MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER T e i c r a l Bespoase t o fiaj Dementis • Contingency Planning ! - ' • - - • with a -view to Cabinet Coanittee ait>cusoioti of the kidnapping, you zvy find useful aaaa preliminary coamenta on the fit} demands, the decree to which each one oould be met and the kind of offer the Government might hint at If it so wished. 2. "olitically, th* provision of ronoy to the PLQ is perhaps the least damaging gesture vre could make. Indeed I would see distinct advantages in the Govermasnt making quite clear early on October 6 that money is no consideration when the life of a man is at stake. This would be a broad hint that at least some of the FLQ requests could be considered. It would constitute no Iwaarllate coomitmsnt. I think it would at the same time make a favourable impression upon the British Government and the public, both British and Canadian. 3. The promise of safe conduct for the kidnappers if they return Croes might not raise overwhelming political difficulties. It is true that would ensure them immunity far their criminal act. At the same time they would be leaving Canada permanently and deprived of their Canadian citizenship. It could not be said that they got away scotfree. There would be no objection in providing them with air transport if need be. To this point the kidnappers would have merely been treated by the Canadian Government as successful criminals, allowed to escape with their loot. The impact on the public, I think, would not be particularly favourable to the Kidnappers. 4. Presumably the Canadian Government would have to arrange , with Cuba or Algeria for entry lay the Kidnappers, and perhaps by one or more prisoners. If only the kidnappers were involved, a demarche of this nature to foreign governments should not present too many drawbacks and would be in accordance with the logic of allowing them to leave with their money. Such a demarche relating to prisoners would raise different questions. . 5. If the Government felt compelled to go further, perhaps some negotiation would be possible on the number of prisoners to be released. It could be argued, far instance, that the release af one of the present prisoners in exchange for h$r. Croes waa not an unreasonable gesture. This might of course lead to bargaining on numbers as between the 23 requested and the figure of 1 we would Initially propose. It : • .• . , ..2 000462 �COHFIflSMTLiL 7 • must be realized, however, that at this point we would enter into much more delicate political grounds, since the release of prisoners could be interpreted as a tacit admission that they were not coeaoen criminals. 6. Of the other FLQ conditions, only the request that all police activity relating to the kidnapping be stopped can be ranked with the earlier ones in importance from the PLQ viewpoint. I take it that neither Ottawa nor Quebec would be willing to cnll off the police, at least -ntil a deal had'been made. In the circumstances, this FLQ condition must be Ignored. As a corollary there should be a concerted effort in the federal and provincial capitals to say as little as possible on police activity so as not to alerm the kidnappers. I appreciate that this will be difficult to do in face of questions by the raress, and especially in the House, but I think these must be sidestepped on the perfectly reasonable grounds that ratters are extremely delicate Bad that a life han/»s in the balance. 7. It is more difficult to take seriously the other three demands. To seek press publicity for the FLQ manifesto would involve some political self-abasement on the part of the Federal and Quebec Governments. This said, the manifesto ie a rather crude document that may arouse more distaste than enthusiastic support in Quebec. It is for consideration whether the Government would wish at one point to release the text to the press, which would no doubt give it considerable coverage but hardly full-length publication cn the front page. Another approach might be to seek publication of the text through paid advertisements, perhape prefaced by a notice to the effect that the text waa being published to save the life of a foreign representative in Canada. Bhile we mention these possibilities in order to cower the ground, we do believe that publication of the manifesto and a half hoar of television publicity for it and the prisoners must be marginal to the FLQ's objectives and that they could also be Ignored, at least for the time being, especially if there were some points on which the Government were willing to hint at an arrangement. The same reasoning appli.es even more strongly to tho requests relating to the LaPalme workers and to the alleged Informer within the FLO.. It le hard to believe that the FLQ would kill for such minor objectives. So much the better, of course, if the LaPalme item oould be wiped off the list of requests through a statement by the interested parties that they had no wish to obtain advantages from the Federal Government by means of a throat to a foreign diplomat. 8. Ia conclusion, I would reconnend that we iawertlately make our fiosition clear about the money. It ia of course up to Ministers to decide how much further they might be willing to go at this point. If we were ready to undertake informal contacts with the FLQ, I think we should hint initially at an arrangement involving money, safe conduct, transport and arrangements for admittance into Cuba or Algeria. It is also for consideration whether we should add an offer relating to at least one of the prisoners. This may depend in part on whether .3 000463 �, — • • a . . * 3- . - CCKFlDBiiTIAL . • . • • .•• • • ... - •- - some ot the prisoners might aot be considered as eligible for release on parole in the near future, which of course would facilitate matters. I am fully aware of the disadvantages of undertaking even covert negotiations with the FLQ. Oa the other head, because of the vague 48 hour deadline we are faced with, it may be wise to register with the Front the poeaibillty at a deal in order to prevent any reaction of paru on the part of tha kidaappera aad to establish for the record that the Government had not adopted a passive or negative poeition. . .. . . • - . . 7 ... ' ' P . ' - - 7 . A.E.R. • • : .ddd • - , • •p • I ' i " - • • . .- • • . - 7 . •. r P • . . ' • ' • • • • • . . • , 000464 • •. • ••.. • — �-/ CONFIDENTIEL le 6 octobre 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RITCHIE Conditions du F.L.Q. Reponses possibles Satisfaction Conditions 1. Operations Police 1. 2. 3. 2.*)Publication Manifeste Annoncer ha ite enquetes, rechercl arrestations donner assurance impunite- *^**^£ responsables du kidnap annonce liberation personnes deO& arret£es FLq 1. Gouv. Quebec lance appel aux quotidiens pour publier en iSre page 2. Que. ou Ottawa paie espace de quotidien QuebeCypeKP- publication ldre page ^K 3* (b) Emission T.-V. 1. Radio-Canada enregistre emission' d etre diffusee apres liberation Cross 2. Radio-Canada organise emission speciale 1/2 heure en soiree pr6cedee d*une explication Liberation prisonniers 1. Liberer sans plus 2. Afin de les inciter a rester, le liberer en disant que leur depar serait permanent (perte de citoyennete). 3. Offrir liberation et ajouter mise en garde sur aggravation de leur sort lorsque repris. 000465 �/*.(a) Avion 1. Vol commercial possible? (e.g. via Mexico) 2. Organiser vol special (Air Canada, Transport, Defence?) 3. (b) Entente avec Cuba, Algerie 1. Demander droit d'atterrissage, debarquement et liberation de 1Tavion et equipage 2. Demander memes droits et avantages et en plus extradition subsequente. 3. Demander idem et extradition seulement si Mr. Cross n'est pas retrouve' sain et sauf. 5. Travailleurs postaux 1. Promettre reclassement ou entrainement pour nouvelles fonctions. 2. Promettre reengagement a d'autres tfiches a travers fonction publique. 3. Promettre reengagement pur et simple. 6. Rancjon en or 1. Mettre a bord avion des rauisseurs. 2. Remettre en main tierre pom- 6tre verse* lors liberation Mr. Cross. 3. Offrir a Cuba ou Alger de saisir et garder part: ou totalite de la rancon en d£domnageroent et contr< extradition des membres FLQ. 000466 �- 3- 7. DelAii+8 heures 1. Annoncer que mesures ont et£ pricey pour remplir conditions posees. ?. Annoncer que les autorites responsables sont disposei a remplir demande mais delai additionnel necessaire. 3. Annoncer que les autorites responsables ont d6ja remplis certaines demandes et desirent negotier les autres. 000467 �7F,.y- f 7/ ^y^ / .-'•• • •• •• •• ....'••• -Xi ,yy>- V ' F S t a t e m e n t f o r u s e i n t h e House of Commons on October 6 on t h e Cross k i d n a p p i n g . * Yesterday I announced regretfully to the House the news of the kidnapping of James Cross, senior British Trade Commissioner in Montreal. Members asked to be kept informed of developments in this case. I now have a further statement to make. 2. Shortly after 1 spoke yesterday, I was given a summary of the document containing the terms demanded by Mr. Cross* safe release. captors for his The document itself is in the form of a statement or communique. It is not addressed directly either to the Federal Government or to the Quebec Government, nor was it delivered direct. The comrnuniquS confirms that Mr. Cross is in the hands of the Front de Liberation du Quebec and sets 7 conditions for his safe release. 3. These conditions can be summarized as follows: 1. The police investigation is to be stopped; 2. Wide press and television publicity is to be given the political manifesto of the FLQ; »U �• - 3. 2 - Over 20 prisoners linked with the FLQ are to be released; 4. The released prisoners are to be transported by plane to Cuba or Algeria if they will accept them; 5. Tho Lapalme v/orkers released by the Post Office Department are to be rehired; 6. A ransom of $500,000 in gold is to be paid; 7. Information is to be supplied about an alleged spy in the FLQ. This communiquS demands that these conditions be met within 48 hours from the time of the issuing of the communiques. 4. Clearly these are wholly unreasonable demands and their authors could not have expected them to be accepted. say that this set of demands will not be met. I need hardly I continue, hov/ever, to hope that some basis can be found for Mr. Cross's safe return. All the authorities concerned are dealing with this case on the basis that we have the double responsibility to do our best to safeguard Mr. Cross and at tlie same time to preserve the integrity of our country. possible is being done. The House can be sure that everything I trust that Members will not ask me to go into this delicate matter further at this moment. 000469 �C)Aj7i 1 < O J . O X±, - -1 39-%'2 FAAf- BRITISH H I G H COMMISSION _ <? r - c P/ ~~~ 6 October, 1970 A 'Vvu- <&~+-/ llrwA^, ' l*y~**cAJi— I have been asked to pass you the following message from Mr. Heath:"I am most grateful for the personal assurance which you have sent me in your message about the kidnapping of our Trade Commissioner in Montreal. We have the fullest confidence that the Canadian authorities, in the exercise of their responsibility for the safety of Mr. Cross, will take every possible step to secure his release unharmed. I know that you will keep me fully informed of any developments". Edward Heath. /#WvO <Ot~*^CrC-+*cJ{ (G. S. Whitehead) The Rt. Hon. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, P.O., Q.C., M.P., Prime Minister of Canada, Ottawa 2A ..FF 000470 �FICHf DB SSRVICE ACTION REQUEST CABINET DU SEAE - OFFICE OF THE SSEA pate Oct 20/70 A: To: 4 Zi&SS , G.VINCENT A c Lettre en date du Letter dated su[et Oct de 6/70 ntT>rs}'*F'77A)yj British High Commission from Message from Prime Minister Heath—with attached statement in the House Subject Action requise: — Action required: Reponse pour la signature du Premier Ministre Reply for Prime Minister's signature pour avis et retourner for advice and return Reponse pour la signature du Ministre "Reply for Minister's signature noter et retourner note and return Reponse au nom du P.M. /ou Ministre "Reply on behalf of PM/or SSEA traduction for translation Reponse pour la signature de Reply for signature of: Commentaires: Comments: For information. Porter a I'attention d e s archives du SEAE le_ B. F. to Minister's registry on Commentaires par D.C.O.: D.C.O.'s comments: -000471 :XT 439/BIL �CONFIDENTIAL 6 October, 1970 I have been asked to pass you the following message from Mr. Heath:"I am most grateful for the personal assurance which you have sent me in your message about the kidnapping of our Trade Commissioner in Montreal, V/e have the fullest confidence that the Canadian authorities, in the exercise of their responsibility for the safety of Mr. Cross, will take every possible step to secure his release unharmed, I know that you will keep me fully informed of any developments", Edward Heath. (O. 3. Whitehead) The Rt. Hon. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, P.C., * . C , M.P., Prime Minister of Canada, Ottawa C0BF11;EBTIBL �I I i .77 La- LLLLmK B A --L / TO/A »l «/. j-"i ~0 V'"d »'••. t. i 1 <-P y / INFO SECUR TE Q27 7J7x m~*2- 7<-j i.-t". •: f\--.-..-* 'jAiXjii. Oil JLijJL KO PRECEDENCE! UK- Z 7 } j- •. Br™" ' i'' i T ™""T^ j ,. - ^ ' / i A .'./ x> a UP b O. ..aa j . u SECURITY '-'• xx y * JttlQE oajOJiiBsiiiL <y l *3*7 ra T I'-if-^-r fl tPir? li-ii-i-BDlAlS . OQOO : OddOdOO> --^V7A Ol '^j-ji^rgCT?^: SMS^U AT THIS VEPiY ANXIOUS TIBB I SIMPLY WANT TO LBT YOU KK0;7 THAT 77 12F2 170 ABD YOUH FAMILY VOHY MUCH II] MliiD ABB ABB DOIBB ffiLSXXXH EVERYTHING 77 POSSIBLY CAN. MITCHELL SHARP SECRETARY OE STATB 702 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ^e^^Mrag^'agir^'arej^g^^^Tazgpga^err--: £*g.^^ :-M.\*am&^s!"zr.^-~a :y-pJ J".ez miUS'ii cc; Of£ice~oT tho British High Commissioner (Done in Div) 0RK3l?<ATOH/REDACTOJa ,....„ 0IF^F F i / MSTRIBUTION .OCAL/LOCALE 13 / <F T7 DIVISION , J.*l\A$A)ilQM\\Gu> '." .. 0/-IIH TELEPHONE 2-2150 APPROVEDMLTCRISE SIG... 0:o:oo:;;ooopB"0'. X T I 0 / B 1 L (REV C/C-") 000473 �A . E . RITCHIE/PS MESSRS. c . c . Lalonde (PMO) Wall (PCO) E l l i o t t (GAF) DIER (GLA) MEKG* >• B C 7. 7 T —»• m wmip * win* mmm October 6, 1970. I O CA.ilBBT) Brlti^O Vi.^-''P ••• X-(* ''ulnarvyi/y Mr, Whitehead, the British Charts d'Af^B • .-» called on rae this afternoon on instructions from London to indicate that if -40 decided to proceed with any ex»loratio y '• I -iav&na or Algiers, they /ould bo very gldd to help ua with com «u .ications or any it J.H assistance that they i d- 1 Be able . ovlda. They ess J ? '-.-.a;, if approadr.es *ere to be cade in these two capitals one of the >bjects mi dt be to enccurare a nagatira respo :3o to any proposal that the iuebac prisoners be transferred »-i vv. to those countries. iheao sucr ic* Lvit " In r those two capitals ni Bt at J.east a' .*o buy some t », 2. Ed i iead r e p o r t e d t h a t a c c o r d i n g t o a c o n v e r s a t i o n Which fchair ae i n Montreal Bad Bad vrith " a s M ( ? } , ono of t h e A l g e r i an r e p - e - s e n t a t i v e s a t ICAO, t h e A l g e r i a n Govarrtrnent vias unlik.u ly t o r e c e i v e t h o r e l e a s e e ! p r i s o n e r s u n l e s s s p e c i f i c a l l y r e ques. t«$d tO .... so by t h a Canadian Q o v s m n a n t . • .Whitehead noted t h a t no s t a t a n e n t had been laado 3. a t t h e oparOi.g of b u s i n e s s today and he -von-"lerad whether House i n tha one was like!/ later this afternoon or this oveninr.. He aaid that he assume! soma Government statement ./ould be issued before 8,20 toiaorrow norning since presumably tlie Coverncient .#ould not wish tha i" houra to'elapse without saying anything desired to Influence the BIB captors. I observed that if it was decided to say something with a view to influence^ the kidnappers this sight be done either publicly or quietly through an intermediary, ia concluded by indicating that ve did not know yet what the Government's intentions were about any statement since Ministers were still considering the very difficult issues involved. A.S.R. 000474 �MESSAGE ma 2 x > ~ X * . ~ TFK-tf- DATE FM/DE TPXf- * SANS PRECEDENCE 6 OCT/70 EXTERNAL OCT 6 H l«*W NO GCO-214 TUNIS TO/A SECURITY SECURtTE HUE/POKIER po-Xfc- EXTIIW %tff*HP INFO IMMEDIATE <lT> K**uU*y-<-JL ga PoP FtZlt, BEE NOTRE TEL POP-212 OCT 5 / 7 0 ?UB/?UJ ENLEVEMENT REPRESENTANT BRITANNIQUE POUR VOTRE INFO, LES PREMIERES REACTIONS OFFICIELLES: 1 . DECLARATION EN CHAMBRE DU S . E . A . E . TEXTE DEBUTE: I REGRET TO TELL THE HOUSE THAT MR. JAMES RICHARD CROSS, SENIOR TRADE COMMISSIONER OF THE BRITISH TRADE COMMISSION IN MONTREAL, WAS ABDUCTED FRCM HIS HOME EARLY THIS MORNING BY ARMED MEN. THE REASONS FOR THIS ACT HAVE NOT BEEN CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED. POLICE WERE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED AND ROADBLOCKS AND SPOT CHECKS ON MAJOR ARTERIES LEADING TO AND FROM THE CITY, INCLUDING BRIDGES LEADING TO THE SOUTH SHORE HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. THE MONTREAL POLICE, THE QUEBEC PROVINCIAL POLICE AND THE RCMP ARE COOPERATING IN INVESTIGATING THIS CASE. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT I S CONSULTING CLOSELY WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES IN THIS MATTER. I T I S FULLY AWARE OF I T S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES IN THIS COUNTRY AND I S SPARING NO EFFORT TO DISCHARGE THIS DUTY. ALL APPROPRIATE STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO ENSURE ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONS ON PREMISES. WE ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ALL PROVINCIAL Ai© MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES CONCERNED DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE NO STD ORIGIN SIO.. ~BZ REDACTEUR L .OsHisra/ ,.£../.... ilOpsnisr EXT 18/BIL (REV 8 / 8 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) DIVISION TELEPHONE OPS CENTRE 6-2467 APPRCNED/AUTORISE PRCVEP/AL 810. Z7.Z7zrc.WLiLx2 000475 �-2- AND THERE IS NO DOUBT AS TO THEIR FULL COOPERATION. FIN TEXTE. 2. REPONSES DU SEAE A QUESTIONS JOURNALISTES: TEXTE DEBUTE: THE GOVERNMEIMT HAS RESPONSIBILITY, THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT IT, FOR THE SAFETY OF DIPLOMATS. BUT WHETHER 'WE HAVE TO MEET THIS PARTICULAR DEMAND IS SOMETHING THAT TliE GOVERNMENT WELL HAVE TO STUDY VERY CAREFULLY, AND I SEE NO PROFIT AT ALL IN SPECULATING ABOUT THAT AT PRESENT..THE POLICE ARE NOW ENGAGED IN TRYING TO TRACK DOWN THESE CRIMINALS AND HAVE THIS MAN RELEASED ONE THING IS QUITE CLEAR, AND THAT IS THAT IF THERE WAS ANY VERY STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE CAUSE OF SEPARATISM, THIS INCIDENT HAS DEALT THEM A VERY SERIOUS BLOW. TO HAVE SEPARATISTS WHO ARE PREPARED TO RESORT TO MEASURES LIKE THIS CERTAINLY PUTS THE CAUSE OF SEPARATISM IN A RATHER DIFFERENT CATEGORY TO WHAT IT WAS BEFORE. I DON'T THINK ANYONE WOULD OBJECT TO THOSE WHO ADVOCATE ANY POLITICAL ACTION BY CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, BUT WHEN CRIMINALS INVOLVE INNOCENT DIPLOMATS IN THIS WAY, THEN ONE DOUBTS WHAT THEIR PURPOSES ARE. FIN TEXTE. 3. DECLAiiATION DU MINISTRE DE JUSTICE DU QUEBEC, M. CHOQUETTE: TEXTE DEBUTE: NOW I HAVE CONFERRED WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THREE MAIN POLICE FORCES WHO ARE INTERESTED IN THIS MATTER - THE MONTREAL POLICE, THE PROVINCIAL POLICE AND THE ROIIAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE. I THINK THE ONLY STATEMENT I CAN MAKE IS THAT I WILL REPORT TO THE CABINET TONIGHT AT ITS MEETING IN QUEBEC CITY, AND I CANNOT ADD ANYTHING TO THIS, EXBEPT THAT IT IS KNOWN THAT MR. CROSS SUFFERS FRCM HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE, AND THAT HE IS REQUIRED TO TAKE MEDICAMENTS OR DRUGS. FIN TEXTE. �C O N F I D E N T IAL FM LDN OCT6/70 NO/NO STANDARD TO EXTER 3307 FLASH REF YOURTEL POP208 OCT5 KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL FCO WISH TO KNOW POINT OF TIMECIE A PARTIR DE LEMISSION DE CE COMMUNIQUE)FROM WHICH FORTYEIGHT HOUR PERIOD BEGAN TO RUN, 000477 �'aa , • P P7»7 e B r 6XTF? EXT OTT FM/DE OCT MESSAGE DATE : Oct.6/70 Ps" •1 > ~rr\ - I COLiFD 6 IZ «I5 7P NO PRECEDENCE FLASH POP 215 LDN TO/A SECURITY SECURITE FILE /DOSSIER "7 INFO BEL you*! 9W9W 3 5 0 7 OCT (y? KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL POINT OF TIME FROM WHICH KIBBAPPERS WOULD CONSIDER FORTY-EIGHT HOURS PERIOD AS BEGINNING IS UNFORTUNATELY NOT YET CLEAR. 2. COPY OF DEi-iAUD MANIFESTO WHICH CAME mm GOVT HANDS WAS APPARENTLY MAILED SOME TIME OCT 4 . FEDERAL RECEIVED BY ADDRESSEE ( A UNIVERSITY IN MTL) IN MORNING MAIL/\ POLICE IN MIL HAD IT AT MID-DAY ABD IT V/AS SEBT TO RCMP OTT AT 1 3 : 4 4 EDT. GOVT TASK FORCE RECEIVED I T SHORTLY THEREAFTER. COPY V/AS PASSED TO REP OF BRITISH HICOM AT 1 4 : 3 0 . DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE Mn lj qTAm ° -TAID ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR .Pn POP 12 AKD DIVISION POP zx^Mm&zffi.::::::::::: EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) .COMCENTRE p l e a s e do TELEPHONE 5-6107 APPRCVED/AUTORISE 0OA,E. Ritchie •=000478 �MESSAGE TOR'? COM; , EXTERNA' FM/DE TO/A EXTER DATE SECURITY SECURITE FUE/PQSSIER ?a-}> TAJ- / OCT 6 15 f F f f OCT6/7Q UNCLASSIFIED NO PRECEDENCE -AH DUBLIN POP IMMED INFO BEE YOURTEL 285 OCT 6 SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL MESSAGE PASSED TO MRS CROSS THROUGH BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION HERE. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR DIVISION APPROVED/AUTORISE TELEPHONE t SIO EXT 18/BIL (REV 8 / 6 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) POP 5-6435 MFF JJt^^FL^ J , Barker/Tin 000479 �'iA ' M : MESSAGE il.l DATE EX^Bs FM/DE FlUE/DO$SIER A ExiAaAiB j j * ? 2 - JF 7< - / 0CT6/70 UNCLASSIFIED PRECEDENCE NO POP- LDN TO/A SECURITY SECURITE a/S PRIORITY INFO N JBEE YOURTEL 3312 OCT * affi/SUj KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF STATEMENTS MADE IN HOUSE BY MR STANFIELD, DOUGLAS AND CAOUETTE: QUOTE DISTRIBUTION: DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE RCMP (FERRARIS) RCMP(OUIMET) gffi PDM(ROQUET) PMO (ROBERTS) PCO(WALLS) PPR(READ) FLE(DEMERS) PSI(ROWE) FCO(STANSFIELD) GCO(PUDDINGTON) DEPT OF JUSTICE(CHRISTIE) SOLICITOR GEN(HOFLEY) ORKSINATOR/REDACTEUR SIO.. EXT 18/BIL (REV 8 / 6 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) DIVISION POP APPROVED/AUTORISE TELEPHONE 5-6435 SIO. "7.MA2MsSs\ i&KfAAmF. 000480 �L MESSAGE TQf: C0M{ EXTERNe FM/DE TO/A EXTER OCT DATE SECURfTY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER .< 6 11 5 Vit OCT6/7Q r | UNCLASSIFIED PRECEDENCE NO POP- Fctf DUBLIN PRIORITY INFO OURTEL POP 217 OCT 6 §Ufi/SW KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING INFO TO MR. DAGG. MRS. CROSS MOST GRATEFUL FOR NEW TELEPHONE NUMBER AND HAS ASKED THAT HER WARM THANKS BE PASSED TO HER BROTHERS FOR THEIR KIND THOUGHTS BUT SHE DOES NOT RPT NOT THINK I T NECESSARY FOR THEM TO COME TO CANADA AT THE MOMENT. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE AfO S/O ORIGINATOft/REDACTEUR SIO.. __L DIVISION TELEPHONE FJ POP EXT 18/BIL (REV 8 / 6 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 5-6435 T. APPROVED/AUTORISE muM 000481 �M&SAG£< '•'••» « 5^: e^7 FM/DE EXTERNAL TO/A LONDON EXTfP OCT 6 n -Ocr-fr 197 in •i:F ' FILE/DOSSIER TAZ<7 SECURITY F) CONFID * fo POP-224 FLASH INFO \| BEE. " SJffl/§Uii "^ ~~~ ' ~~"~ ~~ ^ KIDNAPPING OF BRITISH OFFICIAL FOR YOUR INFO FOLLOWING I S XXXI EMBARGOED TEXT OF STATEMENT EXPECTED TO BE MADE BY MINISTER IN HOUSE OF COMMONS AT APPROX 2000 HOURS OTT TIME. 2. CONFIRMATION ON DELIVERY WILL FOLLOW. EMBARGOED TEXT GIVEN TO BRITISH HICCM WITH WARNING TO CHECK i AGAINST DELIVERY. 3. TEXT BEGINS. QUOTE (COMCENTFtf., PLEASE COPY ATTACHED MARKED TEXT). UNQUOTE. l „ y-x^ - ENDS. ^"flftWiiflHmii^H^ .yi-"*y> -.--,...-.XXy. ~- - ---•->••..-.-.... a FCA> DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE TASK FORCE LIST & RCMP (POP 12 c o p i e s ) . DIVISION OPS CENTRE ,...:;•'•> . 7 . . , : - : 'zmhw* EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 000482 �S t a t e m e n t made i n t o e d l o u s e of Commons, OcjBe^Or 6, by t h e Seeretary^Of S t a t e for External Af f j i j ^ s T t h e H ono a r a b l e .chell Sharp. frieli'iaD / "Yesterday I announced regretfully to the House the news of the kidnapping of James Cross, senior British Trade Commissioner in Montreal. Members asked to be kept informed of developments in this case. I now have a further statement to make. Shortly after I spoke yesterday, I was given a summary of the document containing the terms demanded by Mr. Cross' captors for his safe release. The document itself is in the form of a statement or communique. It is not addressed directly either to the Federal Government or to the Quebec Government, nor was it delivered direct. The communique confirms that Mr.Cross is in the hands of the Front de Liberation du Quebec and sets 7 conditions for his safe release. These conditions can be summarized as follows: 1. the police investigation is to be stopped; 2. wide press and television publicity is to be given to a so-called political manifesto of the FLQ; 3. over 20 prisoners are to be released; 4. facilities for their transportation by plane to Cuba or Algeria are to be arranged; 5. rehiring! ofjche Lapalme workers/on the terms and conditions set out by the Union before the breakdown of negotiations; 6. a ransom of $500,000 in gold is to be paid; 7. public disclosure is to be made about an alleged informer in the FLQ. This communique demands that these conditions be met within 4$ hours from the time of the issuing of the communique. /2 000483 �Clearly these are wholly unreasonable demands and their authors could not have expected them to be accepted. I need hardly say that this set of demands will not be met. I continue, however, to hope that some basis can be found for Fir. Cross's safe return. Indeed I hope the abductors will find a way to establish communication to achieve this. All the authorities concerned are dealing v/ith this case on the basis that we have the double responsibility to do our best to safeguard Mr.Cross and at the same time to preserve the rule of law in our country. The House can be sure that everything possible is being done. I trust that Members will not ask me to go into this delicate matter further at this moment." - 30 - �COEIlBBddlA.7 October 6, 1970. MEMORANDUM FOI THE MINISTER Federal Response to FLQ Derng.rj.ds - Contingency PIanning With a view to Cabinet Committee discussion of the kidnapping, you may find useful soiree preliminary comments on the FLQ demands, the degree to v.'hich each one could be met and the kind of offer the Government might hint at if it so wished. 2. Politically, the provision of money to the FLQ is perhaps the least damaging gesture we could make. Indeed I v/ould see distinct advantages in the Government making quite clear early on October 6 that money is no consideration when the life of a man is at stake. This would be a broad hint that at least some of the FLQ requests could be considered. It would constitute no immediate commitment. I think it would at the same time make a favourable impression upon the British Government and the public, both British and Canadian. 3. The promise of safe conduct for the kidnappers if they return Cress might not raise overwhelming political difficulties. It is true that v/ould ensure them immunity for their criminal act. At the same time they v/ould be leaving Canada permanently and deprived of their1 Canadian citizenship. It could not be said that they got away scotfree. There would be no objection in providing them v/ith air transport if need be. To this point the kidnappers would have merely been treated by tlie Canadien Government as successful criminals, allowed to escape v/ith their loot. The impact on the public, I think, v/ould not be particularly favourable to the kidnappers. 4. Presumably the Canadian Government would have to arrange with Cuba or Algeria for entry by the kidnappers, and perhaps by one or more prisoners. If only the kidnappers were involved, a demarche of this nature to foreign governments should not- present too many drawbacks and v/ould be in accordance v/ith the Icdc of allov/Inr them to leave v/ith their money. Such a demarche relating to prisoners would raise different questions. 5. If the Government felt compelled to go further, perhaps some negotiation v/ould be possible on the number of prisoners to be released. It could be argued, for instance, that the release of one of the present prisoners in exchange foe' Mr. Cross v/as not an unreasonable gesture. This might of course lead to bargaining on numbers as between the 23 requested and the figure of 1 ere v/ould initially propose. It 000485 �- 2 -- COHFIDIeMTIAL must be realized, however, that at this point v/e would enter into much more delicate political grounds, since the release of prisoners could be interpreted as a tacit admission that they veere not common criminals. 6. Of the other FLQ conditions, only the request that all police activity relating to the kidnapping be stopped can be ranked v/ith the earlier ones in importance from the FLQ viewpoint. I take it that neither Ottawa nor Quebec would be willing to call off the police, at least until a deal heed been made. In the circumstances, this FLQ conditierre must be ignored. As a corollary there shoaild be a concerted effort in the federal and provincial capitals to say as little as possible on police activity so as not to alarm the kidnappers. I appreciate that this v/ill be difficult to do in face of questions by the press, and especially in the House, but I think these must be sidestepped on the perfectly reasonable grounds that matters are extremely delicate and that a life hangs in the balance. 7. It is more difficult to take seriously the other three demands. To seek press publicity for the BLQ manifesto v/ould involve some political self-abasement on the part of the Federal and Quebec Governments. This said, the manifesto is a rather crude document that may arouse more distaste than enthusiastic support in Quebec. It is for consideration whether the Government would v/ish at one point to release the text to the press, which would no doubt give it considerable coverage But hardly full-length publication on the front page. Another approach might be to seek publication of the text throned paid advertisements, perheips prefaced by a notice to the effect that the text v/as being published to save the life cf a foreign representative in Canada. While v/e mention these possibilities in order to cover the ground, we do believe that publication of the manifesto and a half hour of television publicity for it and the prisoners must be marginal to the FLQ's objectives and that they could also be Ignored, at least for the time being, especially if there were some points on which the Government were willing to hint at an arrangement. The same reasoning applies even more strongly to the requests relating to the LaPalme workers and to tne alleged informer v/ithin the FLQ. It is hard to believe that the FLQ v/ould kill for such minor objectives. So much the better, of coarse, if the LaPalme item could be veined off the list of requests through a statement by the interested parties that they had ieo v/ish to obtain advantages from the Federal Government by means of a threat to ee foreign diplomat. 8. In conclusion, I would recommend that v/e immediately make oeir position clear about the money. It is of course up to Ministers to decide hen; much further they might be willing to go at this point. It v;e veere ready to undertake informal contacts v/ith the FLQ, I think v/e should hint initially at an arrangement involving money, safe conduct, transport and arrangements for admittance into Cirba or Algeria. It is also for consideration whether vre should add an offer relating to at least one of the prisoner's. This may depend in part on whether 000486 �some of the prisoners might not be considered as eligible for release on parole in the near future, which of course v/ould facilitate matters. I am fully aware of the disadvantages of under taking even covert negotiations v/ith the FIB}. On the other hand, because of the vague 12 hour deadline v/e are faced with, it may be v/ise to register v/ith the Front the: possibility of a deal in order to prevent any reaction of panic on the part of the kidnappers and to establish for the record that the Government had not adopted a passive or negative position. A.E.R. �_. A2. Circulation PFE/J.a.Francis/nv ^- Div. Diary Diary(Francis) jLiiary\rrancis/ « lllG / . idnapping - British reaction. • • • .• • d The HPI story from London today included the following relevant extract: . POP .Br. Cornett "British officials expressed concern that the kidnapping of Cross early Monday could create * differences* between Canada and Britain over how far governments can go in meeting the demands of the kidnappers* Officials said Britain might be less willing to go ahead with a ranso... deal than the Canadian Government. Both governments %/ould inevitably be faced with the unpleasant question of horn, far they should yield to lawlessness they said. Officials said Britain would be forced to take a much harder attitude than when it bowed to Arab guerillas dessands that the Palestinian hijackers be released.w •. 6 ....".. J.R.Francis Press Office • oo •. • - • • '-''.-. • • • . •J- % r o PX)J • 000488 A A �A.K.RITCHWPr MESSRS. « . c . U U n d « (PMO) Wall (PCO) t i e i l T if • T. ft Tl 1 » - / jBjBMSH BB MS HDiiSTKg (iv CABINET} British Views on «so Kidnapping Mr. Whitehead, the British Charg* d»Affaires called on ae this afternoon on instructions frow London to indicate that if we decided to proceed with any explorations in Havana or Algiers, they would be very glad to help us with cowaunications or any other assistance that they night be able to provide. They assume that if approaches were to be node in those two capitals one of the objects night be to encourage a negative response to any proposal that the Quebec prisoners be transferred to those countries. Whitehead remarked that such activity in those two capitals night at least help to buy sons tine. 2. Mr. Whitehead reported that according to a conversation which their nan in Montreal had had with Yasid (?), one of the Algerian representatives at ICAO, the Algerian Government waa unlikely to receive the released prisoners unless specifically requested to do so by the Canadian Government. 3. Mr. Whitehead noted that no statencnt had bean aade in the House st the opening of business today and he wondered whether one waa likely later thia afternoon or thia evening. He aaid that he assumed some Government statement would be loaned before 8.20 tomorrow morning since presumably the Government would not wish the kS hours to elapse without saying anything designed to Influence the PLQ captors. I observed that if it was decided to say something with a view to influences the kidnappers this night bo done either publicly or quietly through an intermediary. We concluded by indicating that we did net know yet what the Government's intentions were about any statement since Ministers wore still considering the very difficult issues involved. . . A.E.S. 3^ 000489 • i �'•. - - - SECRET October 6, 1970, - ! 1. Continue police investigations quietly but intensively. 2. Send representatives to Havana and Algiers without too precise public explanation of their missions. 3. Attempt some kind of contact with FLQ leaders (or make public statements) regarding readiness to explore alternatives to their more extreme demands (e.g. number of prisoners to be released, arrangements for being sure of recovering Mr. Cross). 4. In particular, let it be known that possibility of producing ransom money is being explored. 5. Seek cooperation of opposition leaders in minimum of public questioning in order to keep captors in dark. 6. Keep close to Quebec Government throughout. 7. Pave Quebec Police force (or joint Federal and Provincial force) ready to make sudden raid on FLQ leadera when most likely to be effective and when public likely to regard as unavoidable. tf.™ I 000490 �CONFIDENTIAL October 6, 1970. p 7 ,p- TO A - / MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ^IfiftfE Comparison of the Texts of the Ransom Note concerning the Abortive Attempt to Kidnap the American Consul Burgess with the Text of the Note received concerning the Kidnapping of Mr. Cross It is obvious that the new text was closely modelled on the original Burgess demands. However, there are some differences, some of which may be significant. Salient Points 1. Algeria is added as a possible country of destination in the second note. This may perhaps indicate that the FLQ were no longer sure that Cuba would accept the prisoners and wished therefore to hedge their bets by including a second country of destination. 2. There appears to be a realization on the part of the FLQ that an official demarche by Canada is required to secure the entry of the prisoners into either Cuba or Algeria. This would indicate that a more realistic view of this operation is being taken by the FLQ. 3. Following are differences in the conditions for release that could be significant: (A) Publicity - In their new demand the FLQ have reduced their request for TV publicity from one hour to thirty minutes. This may be a hint that the publicity aspect is a negotiable demand for the FLQ. However they have linked such publicity with their manifesto. This was not a requirement in the Burgess text. Furthermore the new text shows rather more specific concern for full coverage throughout Quebec. (b) The "Lapalme" item is still fully covered in the Cross text as in the Burgess note. However, in contrast to the earlier text, it is not mentioned in the final paragraph summarizing the point at which Mr. Cross might be released. This may or may not be a hint that the Lapalme issue is relatively marginal in FLQ eyes. /+. In the present text, Mr. Cross's name is mentioned only in the beginning of the note and not in the conclusion or in the body of the note as in the previous case. This could indicate that the FLQ was not certain until very late who their victim would be. �- 2 - 5. CONFIDENTIAL Six new paragraphs of polemics explaining the purpose of the kidnapping and the injustices of Confederation have been added. FLQ support is also indicated for the black power movements in the United States and Africa, liberation movements in Latin America, Palestine and Asia, and for the Catholics in Northern Ireland. Particular mention is made of the lessons to be learned from the Cuban and Algerian revolutions. This has obviously all been added to justify Quebec separatism in anticolonial terms and to link it with liberation movements elsewhere. This seems an effort on the part of the FLQ to make their kidnapping appear as a revolutionary act. Their favourable comments on the Algerian and Cuban revolutions were added for obvious reasons. Additional Minor Differences 1. The list of prisoners for release in the Cross note takes account of changes which have occurred since the Burgess note was prepared. 2. More detailed publicity requirements are specified in the Cross note. 3. An additional demand has been added in the Cross note for the release to the public of information on the alleged informer in the FLQ. A. Wives and children of the prisoners are to be allowed to accompany them if they so desire. l_ 000492 �PoP UNCLAS \ FM DBLIN OCT6 TO TT EKTOTT 285 IMMED DE LDN IP KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL A A { h F 7 HAVE HAD ENQUIRIES FM NOEL DAGG BROTHER IN LAW OF MR CROSS, WHO IS DBLIN RESIDENT. FULL NEWS SVC COVERAGE AND FRONT PAGE TREATMENT GIVEN SUBJECT HERE BECAUSE VICTIM IS IRISH BORN. 2. BECAUSE OF PARTICULAR FAMILY INTEREST HERE PLS PROVIDE US WITH ANY QUOTE OFFICIAL UNQUOTE RELEASES AS THEY ARE MADE. 3. MR DAGG HOPES YOU WILL TRANSMIT TO MRS CROSS HIS NEW TEELEPHONE NBR WHICH IS DUBLIN 85 1602 RPT DUBLIN 851602. HE WOULD LIKE HER AS WELL TO KNOW THAT HER TWO BROTHERS HERE IN DBLIN OFFER THEIR DEEPEST SYMPATHY AND ARE WILLING TO DO ALL THEY CAN TO BE OF ASSISTANCE INCLUDING COMING TO CDA IF SHE WISHES. MCCARDLE 6 CCT 9: 19 000493 �ACTION COPY jF of ZCC U N C L A S S I F I E D FM JOBRG OCT6/70 TO EXTER 279 PRIORITY -,-•. Jy- PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO UK TRADE COMMISSIONERS OFFICE MTL FOR BARBARA CROSS HEIDI AND I WERE SHOCKED TO LEARN OF JASPERS ABDUCT ION.OUR THOUGHTS ARE WITH YOU AS ARE OUR HOPES AND CONVICTION THAT ALL WILL TURN OUT WELL.WARMEST REGARDS BILL JONES. a* RFT 06125 0Z F S0 6f. Q I & l,% s >/n ^ J 000494 �C 0 N F I D E N T I A L FM LDN OCT6/70 TO EXTER 3305 IMMED <7j REF MY TELECON WITH USSEA OCT5 KIDNAPPING CF BRIT OFFICIAL AS REPORTED ON TELEPHONE I GOT IN TOUCH LAST NIGHT WITH SIR DENIS GREENHILL AND OUTLINED TO HIM THE KIDNAPPERS TERMS FOR RELEASE OF CROSS AND SOUGHT INDICATION OF DRIT ATTITUDE.GREENHILL WHO WAS DINING WITH THE PM SrOKE TO BR HEATH A WD THE FOREIGN SECRETARY BRIEFLY ON THIS SUBJ ABD REPORTED TO ME THAT.THEIR FIRST REACTION WAS THAT THEY COULD SOT/HOT ADVISE OR SUGGEST TO THE CDr.) GOVT THAT THEY SHOULD ACCEPT TERMS OUTLINED AND THAT THEY WERE CONFIDENT THAT GDI] AUTHORITIES WOULD BE DOING THEIR UTMOST FOR CP03SS PROTECTION.THIS FIRST BRIT REACTION IS NOT/NOT FOR PUBLIC USB. WE EXPECT FURTHER COMMENT FROM BRiT AUTHORITIES LATER TODAY AS SUBJ BEING DISCUSSED AT BRIT CABINET MTG THIS MORNING RITCHIE RFT 0610 ! 77. 000495 �/ C O N F I D E N T I A L FM LDN OCT6/70 NO/NO STANDARD TO EXTER 3 3 0 7 FLASH REF YOURTEL POP208 OCT5 KIDNAPPING OF BRIT r OFFICIAL FCO WISH TO KNOW POINT OF TIMECIE A PARTIR DE LEMISSION DE CE COMMUNlQUE)FROM WHICH FORTYEIGHT HOUR PERIOD BEGAN TO RUN. 000496 �BP * ill MESSAGE DATE IFF.X FM/DE EXTER OTT OCT 6 j5jB*7fl OCT 6/70 FILE /DOSSIER 2 .' TPK- SECURITY SECURITE ) CONFIDENTIAL FLB-J427 NATO BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE REF SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING OF DIPLOMATS IN ADDITION TO POLAt>PAPER WHICH Vffi HAVE ON THIS SUBJECT, GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER ANY DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE W AD HOG WORKING GROUP CONCERNING THE EXTENT OF LEGAL OBLIGATION OF RECEIVING STATE TO ACCEDE TO DEMANDS CF KIDNAPPERS OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL BOTH IN CASES WHERE KIDNAPPING COULD NOT BE REASONABLY FORSEEN AND IN CASES WHERE UNDER ARTICLE 29 CF VIENNA CONVENTION RECEIVING STATE HAD CLEAR DUTY TO TAKE ALL M W M M K ^ STEPS TO PREVENT ATTACK ON FREEDOM OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL. WHILE QUESTION OF ACCEDING TO DEMANDS OF KIDNAPPERS M Y DEPEND LARGELY ON HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS Vffi ARE INTERESTED IN ANY LEGAL POSITIONS THAT M Y HAVE BEEN EXPOUNDED IN AD HOC CTTEE. GRATEFUL FOR REPLY SOONEST o ADDRESSED TO LEGAL DIVISION DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE ORIGINA' SIO.. NO STD ,%2A227A$JI277. IACTEUR DIVISION FLE - LEGAL TELEPHONE 2-2104 APPROVED//AUTORISE 810 EXT18/BIL (REV 8 / 0 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 000497 �< a- TOR/' COMCt MESSAGE OCT 6 / 7 0 FM/DE iBCTER OTT TO/A BONN OCT E FILE/DOSSIER DATE EXTERN:' .27-27 SECURITY SECURITE - AA 77 ~ / COM'IDENT IAL \WArn NO PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE FLE-IA.25 INFO BEE SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING OF DIPLOMATS GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD MAKE DISCREET URGENT ENQUIRIES CF APPROPRIATE GERMAN AUTHORITIES ON QUESTION OF LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF RECEIVING STATE TO ACCEDE TO DEMANDS OF KIDNAPPERS OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THIS QUESTION WOULD NOT BE DETERMINED SOLELY ON LEGAL GROUNDS BY ANY MEANS BUT Vffi WOULD LIKE TO GET VIEWS CF GERMAN AUTHORITIES BASED ON THEIR EXPERIENCE AS TO WHETHER THEY CONSIDER^ APART FROM HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL GROUNDS/THE RECEIVING STATE HAjlA SPECIAL DUTY NOT ONLY TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO PROTECT DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL FROM ANY ATTACK ON THEIR PERSON, FREEDOM OR DIGNITY BUT ALSO A SPECIAL DUTY TO ENSURE WE RELEASE fio-rH *"<> Ceo 10 AFTER HAVING BEEN' KIDNAPPED 0 WHERE THE KIDNAPPING COULDZNOT REASONABLY HAVE BEEN FORSEEN. IN VIEW OF CURRENT INCIDENT' IN CDA WE HOPE THAT YOU COULD DISCUSS THIS ON PERSONAL BASIS WITH APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL IN LEGAL DIVISION OF FOREIGN MINISTRY IN A DISCREET AND AS OBJECTIVELY ACADEMIC MANNER AS POSSIBLE, PERHAPS INDICATING THAT THE HUMANITARIAN AND POLU'ICAL Xl • • * J* DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE NO STD 0RK3INATOR/REDACTEUR SIO 7X(AA~A ....E.«C.fctfee/m<? DIVISION FLE - LEGAL TELEPHONE 2-2104 APPRCVEty/AUTORISE 810 fJJF^ • ••"£;•£. "Lee EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/04) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 000498 �CONSIDERATIONS M Y WELL BE OVERRIDING DESPITE WHATEVER THE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS M Y BE.) FOR REPLY ADDRESSED TO LEGAL DIVISION SOONEST. i.l GRATEFUL a joO Shc^ia COfis-+iAse lAsau^.fly ro/e/x A e> r i 11 k:A»Appr»,<r *PA' ** i *~P "tlU-?* Am A* rwdox. o seek 7 J �^ F P O I / PDM (ROQUET) PMO(ROBERTS) PCO(WALLS) PPFc(REAP) FLE(DEMERS) PSI (ROBE) FCO(STANSFIELD) GOO(PUDDIKGTON) DEPT Or JUSTICE(CHRISTIE) SOLICITOR GEN(HOFIEY) 6 OCT I U 57 C O N F I D E N T I A L FM LDN O C T 6 / 7 0 NO/NO STANDARD TO EXTER 3 3 1 1 FLASH REFYOURTEL POP209 OCT5 KIDNAPPING OF BRIT ONLY SUBSTANTIVE OFFICIAL PUBLIC STATEMENT ON KIDNAPPING WHICH FCO HAS DRAWN TO OUR ATTN I S STATEMENT BY LORD SHEPHERD,MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,GIVEN IN HOUSE OF LORDS APR30 OF THIS YEAR.WE ARE SENDING EXCERPT FROM STATEMENT DEALING WITH KIDNAPPING BY SEPARATE TEL LORD SHEPHERDS STATEMENT IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS RAISED BY LORD TWEEDSMUIR ABOUT STEPS WHICH BRIT GOVT WERE TAKING IN CONCERT WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO MEET PROBLEM OF AIRCRAFT HIJACKING AND KIDNAPPING OF DIPLOMATS. 2 . FOR VERY GENERAL BRIT APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS ,YOiJ MAY WISH TO REFER TO SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOMES STATEMENT IN UNGA SEP24 AND TO CANDELNY TEL 1 3 6 9 S E P 2 4 . 0 N BASIS OF PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH FO IT I S OUR IMPRESSION THAT BRITS HAVE CAREFULLY AVOIDED MAKING SPECIFIC POLICY COMMITMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH INCIDENTS AS ASSASSINATION OF GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN GUATEMALA.PCO LARGELY HAVE DIRECTED THEIR EFFORTS TO WORK ON PREVENTIVE MEASURES TO REDUCE RISK OF KIDNAPPING.CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SO VARIABLE THAT THEY HAVE AVOIDED POLICY LINE WHICH MIGHT I N H I 3 I T THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION IN FUTURE CASES. 000500 �ACTION COM? POPfa)M(ROQUET) P.Y.O (ROBERTS) PCO (WALLS) PPR (READ)" FLE (DEMERS) PSI (XOV.'E) FCO(STANSFIELD) GCO (PUDDINGTON) DEPT OF JUSTICE (CHRISTIE) SOLICITOR GEN (HOFLEY) F cf U N C L A S S I F I E D FM LDN OCT6/70 NO/NO STANDARD TO EXTER 33 12 IMMED REFYOURTEL P0P211 0CT5 KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL PLEASE SEND BY TEL STATEMENTS IN HOUSE BY STANFIELD,DOUGLAS AND CAOUETTE EXPRESSING REGRET TO BRIT GOVT. RFT 06 1414Z it: 33 000501 �(gffl)ROQUET (PDM) Pi.,0 (ROBERTS) PCO(WALLS) PPR(READ) FLE(DEMERS) PSI(R0WE) FCO(STANSFIELD) GCO(PUDDINGTON) DEPT OF JUSTICE(CHRISTIE) SOLICTOR GNU (ASST DEPUTY HOFLEY ACTION COPY po i C O N F I D E N T I A L FM LDN OCT6/70 NO/NO STANDARD TO EXTER 3313 IMMED REFOURTEL 3305 OCT6 KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL BOTH FCO PRESS OFFICE AND OURSELVES ARE CONFIRMING TO ENQUIRERS THAT MR TRUDEAU HAS SENT MSG TO MR HEATH.UE ARE NOT/NOT GIVING TEXT OF MSG BUT ARE INDICATING IN GENERAL TERMS THAT MR TRUDEAU EXPRESSED SHOCK AND SENT APPROPRIATE ASSURANCES OF CONCERN TO MR HEATH. 2.MR TRUDEAUS MSG WOULD HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE TO REGULAR CABINET MTG THIS MORNING AT WHICH KIDNAPPING WAS BEING DISCUSSED.ANY BRIT STATEMENT WILL OF COURSE AWAIT CONCLUSION OF THIS MTG. RFT 0614 HZ 6 OCT 10: 4! 000502 �A* no copfH r p.v.o( ) PCO (WALLS) PPR(REVD) FLE(US. •^ PSI • ) y. S—y FCO(STANSFIELD) GCO(PUDDINGTON) DEFT OF JUSTIC;(CHRISTIE) SOLICITOR GEN(HOFLEY) USSEA(RITCHIE) SSEA / - F ! U N C L A S S I F I E D FM LDN O C T 6 / 7 0 NO/NO STANDARD TO EXTER 3 3 1 5 FLASH REF OURTEL 3 3 1 1 0CT6 KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL FOLLOWING I S EXCERPT FROM STATEMENT BY LORD SHEPHERD IN HOUSE OF LORDS A P R 3 0 : BEGINS I TURN NOW TO THE PROBLEM OF THE KIDNAPPING OF DIPLOMATS,THE NOBLE LORD,LORD SHERFIELD,SAID THAT DIPLOMACYS BECOMING AN I N CREASINGLY DANGEROUS OCCUPATION.THJS I S A NEW THREAT, ALTHOUGH IT HAS HAPPENED BEFORE: IT I S NEW PERHAPS FOR THE IMPLICATIONS THAT LIE BEHIND THE KIDNAPPING.I CAN ONLY SAY TO THE NOBLE LORD,LORD SHERFIELD,THAT I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH OUR DIPLOMATIC SERVICE OVERSEAS,AND PARTICULARLY IN SOUTH AMERICA,AND THEY ARE TAKING THEIR TRADITIONAL VIEW OF THE SITUATION AND ARE NOT UNDULY CONCERNED.ALTHOUGH SO FAR THE KIDNAPPING HAS OCCURRED IN A LIMITED NUMBER OF COUNTRIES,I THINK IT RIGHT THAT WE SHOULD RECOGNISE THAT IT COULD WELL OCCUR IN MANY OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD.AND WHILE THE A C T I V I T I E S OF KIDNAPPERS HAVE SO FAR BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST AMBASSADORS AND SENIOR DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR STAFF,WE CANNOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT ATTACKS OF THIS SORT MIGHT BE MADE ON JUNIOR STAFF OP EVEN ON WIVES !\MD FAMILIES OF OUR DIPLOMATS; THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SAFETY OF AN AMBASSADOR AND HIS STAFF L I E S WITH THE HOST GOVT.THIS I S STATED CLEARLY IN ART 000503 o . e o y.. �PAGE TWO 53 J5 UNCLAS TWENTYNINE OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS,AND IS ALSO ESTABLISHED BY LONG INTERNATIONAL TRADITION AND PRECEDENT. INDEED, IT IS THE BASIS TO THE EFFICIENT CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THAT ACCREDITED REPS SHOULD BE FREE AND SECURE TO GO ABOUT THEIR BUSINESS.] BELIEVE THAT VIRTUALLY ALL GOVTS IN THE WORLD ARE AWARE OF AND ACCEPT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY.I AM EQUALLY SURE THAT THE GREAT MAJORITY TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO PROTECT THE DIPLOMATS STATIONED IN THEIR COUNTRIES. AT THE SAME TIME,WE HAVE TO RECOGNISE THAT,WITH THE BEST WILL IN THE WORLD,NO COUNTRY CAN GIVE COMPLETE AND ABSOLUTE PROTECTION AGAINST THE KIDNAPPING OF DIPLOMATS ANY MORE THAN AGAINST OTHER FORMS OF CRIME.IN THE LAST ANALYSIS,IF INADEQUATE PROTECTION IS AFFORDED TO DIPLOMATS BY THE AUTHORITIES IN THE COUNTRY CONCERNED,THE ONLY COMPLETE SOLUTION LIES IN THE DRASTIC REDUCTION,OR EVEN TOTAL CLOSURE,OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS CONCERNED,ACTION OF THIS KIND WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE TAKEN ONLY IN THE VERY LAST RESORT,IF IT APPEARED THAT THERE WAS NO OTHER WAY OF ENSURING THE SAFETY CF OUR DIPLOMATIC STAFF IN A GIVEN COUNTRY. THE PROBLEM IS MADE ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT BY THE READINESS OF KIDNAPPERS TO SEIZE HOSTAGES AT RANDOM.THE LATE GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO GUATEMALA,AS THE NOBLE LORD,LORD ERROLL,SAID,SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SEIZED BY HIS KIDNAPPERS SIMPLY BECAUSE HE WAS A PROMINENT PERSON WHOSE CAPTURE WOULDSTHEY BELIEVED,ENSURE THEM THE BARGAINING HM-di: AND i'lipi.J01i V THtt'J i HFY DESIRED- II IS THUS �PAGE THREE 3 3 1 5 UNCLAS NECESSARY FOR A GOVT TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION NOT JUST FOR THE REPS OF COUNTRIES WITH WHOSE POLICY THE KIDNAPPERS MAY BE ASSUMED TO DISAGREE BUT FOR ALL DIPLO REPS,IRRESPECTIVE OF THE POLICY OF THEIR COUNTRIES. ALTHOUGH,AS I HAVE SAID,THE HOST GOVT HAS THE FULL FORMAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING A DIPLOMATS SAFETY,UE THINK IT RIGHT THAT WE SHOULD ALSO TAKE CARE TO ENSURE THAT OUR STAFFS OVERSEAS ARE PROVIDED WITH ANY ADDITIONAL HELP FROM OUR OUN RESOURCES WHICH MAY SEEM PRACTICABLE AND DESIRABLE IN THE LIGHT OF LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES.UE HAD IN FACT ISSUED GUIDANCE TO ALL OUR OVERSEAS MISSIONS LAST YEAR ON PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN TO REDUCE THE RISK OF KIDNAPPING.MORE RECENTLY WE HAVE CONSULTED MANY OF OUR POSTS ON THE NEED FOR ANY ADDITIONAL MEASURES.FOR OBVIOUS REASONS,! CANNOT REVEAL IN DETAIL WHAT THESE MEASURES ARE, BUT I CAN ASSURE THE HOUSE THAT WE ARE VERY CONCERNED AT THE DANGER AND HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN TRYING TO REDUCE A SECURITY EXPERT FROM THE FOREIGN AND COMWEL OFFICE IT. IS AT PRESENT TOURING A NUMBER OF OUR MISSIONS IN LATIN AMERICA TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AT FIRST HAND,TO ADVISE MISSIONS ON WHAT FURTHER PRECAUTIONS SHOULD BE INSTITUTED IMMEDLY AND,WHERE NECESSARY,TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION IN THE LONGER TERM THAT WOULD REDUCE THE RISK TO A MINIMUM,I HAVE SEEN THE QUOTE SHOPPING LIST UNQUOTE,! HAVE ALSO SEEN THE ACTION TAKEN AND WOULD ASSURE THE HOUSE THAT WHERE REQUESTS HAVE BEEN MADE ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN.WE ARE ALSO ISSUING FURTHER GUIDANCE TO ALL CUR POSTS OVERSEAS,BAGZD a a aH 000505 �• PAGE FOUR 33 15 UNCLAS ON THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM RECENT EVENTS IN LATIN AMERICA.I SINCERELY HOPE AND TRUST THAT NO KIDNAPPING ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE AGAINST ANY MEMBER OF OUR MISSIONS OVERSEAS.BUT IF AN ATTEMPT WERE MADE,THEY ARE AS READY FOR IT AS THEY CAN POSSIBLY BE,TAKING INTO ACCOUNT WHAT THEIR DUTIES ARE.AN OVERSEAS MISSION THAT IS CONFINED TO ITS COMPOUND MIGHT AS WELL NOT BE THERE AT ALL.THE PURPOSE OF A MISSION IS TO BE ABLE TO MOVE AROUND,NOT ONLY BETWEEN EMBASSY AND GOVT BUILDINGS,BUT ALSO TO SENSE WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE. I NEED HARDLY ADD THAT HER MAJESTYS GOVT ARE ALSO GIVING DUE ATTN TO THE PROTECTION OF DIPLO REPS IN LDN.AGAIN IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR ME TO GO INTO DETAIL,BUT THE HOUSE MAY WISH TO SEE THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM.WE HAVE SOME SEVEN THOUSAND PEOPLE,WITH THEIR FAMILIES,REPRESENTING DIPLO MISSIONS.IT IS A VERY SIZEABLE PROBLEM,BUT I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT SCOTLAND YARD,WHO HAVE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY,ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE DANGERS AND ARE TAKING THE NECESSARY ACTION. SO FAR I HAVE DEALT ONLY WITH THE IMMED QUESTION OF HOW TO AVOID OR DETER POTENTIAL KIDNAPPERS.WHILE UE HAVE BEEN TAKING ACTION ON THIS MATTER WE HAVE ALSO BEEN CONSIDERING WHAT MEASURES WOULD BE TAKEN INNATELY TO PUT AN END TO THIS THREAT. IMMEDLY AFTER THE MURDER OF THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO GUATEMALA WE INITIATED CONSULTATIONS WITH A NUMBER OF GOVTS WHO FACED PROBLEMS SIMILAR TO OUR OWN.WE HAVE EXCHANGED IDEAS,BOTH ON THE IMMED PROBLEM 07 PROTECTION AND ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF 000506 �PAGE FIVE 3315 UNCLAS A LONGER-TERM SOLUTION.WE ARE ANXIOUS TO ENSURE THAT ALL USEFUL IDEAS ARE FULLY CONSIDERED.IT WOULD,HOWEVER,BE WRONG TO SUPPOSE THAT ANY FORM OF INNATL ACTION OR AGREEMENT IS LIKELY TO PRODUCE EFFECTIVE RESULTS IN THE SHORT TERM.THE LEGAL POSITION IS ALREADY PERFECTLY CLEAR.VIRTUALLY NO GOVT CONDONES ATTACKS ON DIPLOMATS ACCREDITED TO IT OR REFUSES TO RECOGNISE KIDNAPPING AS A CRIME.THE PROBLEM IS THEREFORE NOT TO ESTABLISH A LEGAL BASIS FOR ACTION AGAINST THE KIDNAPPERS,BUT TO FIND MEANS OF DETERRING KIDNAPPERS FROM VIOLATING EXISTING LAWS, VARIOUS IDEAS HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED.FOR EXAMPLE,THERE IS THE PROPOSAL TO OBTAIN INNATL AGREEMENT THAT PRISONERS RELEASED AS A RESULT OF KIDNAPPING SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED POLITICAL ASYLUM IN A THIRD COUNTRY.THAT IDEA HAS OBVIOUS ATTRACT IONS,BUT I AM NOT AT ALL SURE THAT IT WOULD COMMAND UNIVERSAL ACCEPTANCE. LEAVING ASIDE THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH ARE ILL-DISPOSED TOWARDS THE WEST AND WHOSE ATTITUDE TOWARDS KIDNAPPING OF A WESTERN DIPLO REP ELSEWHERE MIGHT BE DOUBTFUL,MANY COUNTRIES HAVE LONG-ESTABLISHED,HONOURABLE TRADITIONS OF GRANTING POLITICAL ASYLUM AND MIGHT WELL BE RELUCTANT TO LIMIT THEIR TRADITIONAL FREEDOM TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. 000507 �PAGE SIX 3315 UNCLAS TO SUM UP,I BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE TWO THINGS THAT WE SHOULD BE DOING AND WHICH WE ARE DOING.WE ARE TAKING ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF OUR STAFF OVERSEAS.AND WE ARE EXPLORING WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES ALL IDEAS THAT COULD HELP TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM.BUT WE HAVE TO RECOGNISE THE VERY REAL DIFFICULTIES OF EFFECTIVE INNAL ACT ION.EACH CASE IS DIFFERENT AND EACH CASE INVOLVES A HUMAN LIFE.WE MUST THEREFORE TAKE CARE TO AVOID ANY ACTION THAT IS OF DOUBTFUL VALUE BUT THAT MIGHT TIE OUR HANDS IF A BRIT DIPLOMAT WERE KIDNAPPED. ENDS VS13S/70. RFT 0615!GZ �} * J xJ 000509 �POP fell: PPM(RITCHIE) PDM(ROQUET) PMQ (ROBERTS) PCO(WALLS) PPR(READ) FLE(DEMERS) PSI(FOBE) FCO(STABBFIELD) GOO(PUDDINGTON) DEpT OF JUSTICE(CHRISTIE) SOLICITOR GEN(HOFLEY) ACTION COPY U N C L A S S I F I E D FM LDN OCT6/70 TO EXTER 3 3 2 1 IMMED KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL THROUGH COMMERCIAL OFFICE WE HAVE HAD CALL FROM BERNARD DARBYSHIRE VJHO SAYS HE WAS BEST MAN AT WEDDING OF MR AND MRS CROSS AND I S MOST ANXIOUS TO DO ANYTHING HE CAN TO HELP.HE WOULD BE GLAD TO 7 OCT Bft^TO CDA IF THAT v/oULD HELP MRS CROSS. 2.WE HAVE NO/NO MEANS OF CHECKING BONA FIDES OF DARBYSHIRE.YOU MIGHT WISH TO FIND OUT POSSIBLY THROUGH EARNSCLIFFE IF MRS CROSS INTERESTED IN THIS OFFER. RFT 0 6 1 7 1 2 Z 000510 �ACTION COPY ,'j is\ Fi ^F F.7(F F AF v7F &^\>o •lA C U N C L A S S I F I E D FM LDN O C T 6 / 7 0 NO/NO STANDARD TO EXTER 3 3 2 3 PRIORITY •AS- JAMES RICHARD CROSS c 'J IF YOU THINK IT APPROPRIATE,PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MSG TO EARNSCLIFFE FOR TRANSMISSION TO MRS CROSS:MAY I EXPRESS ON BEHALF OF THE CDN HIGHCOM IN LDN OUR SHOCK AND DISTRESS AT THE ABDUCTION OF YOUR HUSBAND.YOU HAVE OUR SYMPATHY AND OUR MOST EARNEST WISH FOR HIS SWIFT AND SAFE RELEASE. CSA R I T C H I E . RFT 061715Z a 000511 �f RESTRICTED October 7, 1970 TASK FORCE NOTE FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION Further to his 1320 hours telephone conversation, Mr. Whitehead called to say that Mrs. Cross and the maid had returned home from the police station. Apparently there was no positive identification although they were suspicious about one of the men in the police line-up. As far as the British know, the journey to and from the police station was not observed by any members of the press. �TASK FORCE MMORANDUM • • Time: 13:45 October 7, 1970 At 1:30 P.M. Mr. WhiteAfc»d the Acting British High Commissioner telephoned to say that about one hour ago the police called at the Cross household and asked if Mrs. Cross and the maid could accompany them for the purposes of a police identification parade. The British Office in Montreal agreed, after they were assured by the police that this would materially assist the investigation and would not prejudice the case. At 12:45 Mrs. Cross and the maid accompanied by Mr. Ashford, British First Secretary, left the Cross home with the police by the rear exit and were not apparently seen doing so by any press people. Should, however, they be recognized at the police station the British officials will simply say that the police have requested the assistance of Mrs. Cross and the maid and that they were doing so. Should there be any further press questions, the British will direct them to the police. 2. Mr. White had also added that the British had been informed the police believed they had found the right taxi. V 7 p < Jim Puddington \: 000513 �(0*51 U. l^xds^FF^V F D C fiLF<A „.„-„=*-/ PRO J E T r l e 7 octobre 1970 CONFIDENTIEL Q~€F W^ jr^^.J? f»* ^&~^ ^ MEMOIRE AU MINISTRE l)4Le fas^cJtJ Ly fUs LA Enlevement Cross - Evenements depuis & ~ votre declaration dC*v*~ ( Csc t"7j Voici un somnaire et une analyse des principaux evenements qui se sont derouies depuis votre declaration en Chambre le 6 octobre. 2. En general, les rapports de presse et de radio/ television sur votre declaration sont r»igflnnahl»immt equilibres. On note le refus federal d'accepter les conditions du FLQ mais aussi la volonte d*etablir un dialogue avec les auteurs de l'enlevement. On peut done supposer que ceux-ci se rendent compte que le gouvernement canadien ne ferme pas toutes les avenues. Les nouvelles ont fait etat depute du fait que notre centre d'operaA -L A toutes comnunicationsnauit comnunicationsnaui et joiuMet que le tions est ouver^ ministre quebecois de la justice est loimiiii dispose A recevoir toutes conmunications des ravisseurs. ...2 000514 �- 3. 2 - CQKFIDB1TIBL Plusieurs documents,supposement en provenance du FLQ, sont veaus entre les mains des autorites federales et provinciales pendant la nuit. Le premier se presente conme etant le communique numero 2 du FLQ au sujet de l'enlevement (copie jointe). Le docvnent a ete decouvert dans les postes suite A vine nouvelle de la dL ACQ s t a t i o n CKAC, qui avait reijuVune n o t i f i c a t i o n k ce s u j e t . t i c i t e du communique ne f a i t gufcre de doute. ment avec l e premier communique. L'authen- I I concorde p a r f a i t e - I I e t a i t d ' a i l l e u r s accompagne d'une l e t t r e de M. Cross A son epouse dont 1 ' a u t h e n t i c i t e semble etablie. I I n ' e s t pas c e r t a i n que l e communique numero 2 constitue une reponse A votre declaration du 6 octobre. On n ' a pas pu e t a b l i r l e moment ou i l fut depose A l a poste mais l a police suppose que ce fut avant 8 heures hier s o i r . t e ton general du communique suggfcre q u ' i l a ete redige plutGt A la lumiere des declarations de M. Choquetter^tMmmkaa tarn a£JMia**4mJkk^mmtma^*m4apamaaa+'m pnnmnit ^ a premiere phrase du communique.et l e f a i t q u ' i l s i t u e A midi l e temps limite pour repondre aux demandes des r a v i s s e u r s , pourraient e t r e i n t e r p r e t e s comme r e f l e t a n t les donnees contenues dans votre deraiere d e c l a r a t i o n . I I est plus probable que nonA �I - 3 - CCMFIDBITIEL I I ejJ. a u w w > w i l que l e temps l i m i t e a i t ete place k midi dans ca j w w t eargys ravisseurs ont pu calculer que leurs demandes n ' e t a i e n t parvenues aux a u t o r i t e s que vers midi l e 5 octobre. if I I faulOnoter que ceci ne constitue probablement pas un report du temps l i m i t e . TjCertaLnes autres remarques s'imposent sur l e contenu du communique. Les demandes du FLQ sont maintenues ..fa sans nuance.( Ces demandes sont appeiees des "recommendations" ce qui n ' a peut-§tre par de s i g n i f i c a t i o n p a r t i c u l i e r e V 1nimqo* menace •de mory A 1'egard de M. Cross mais presentence t e l l e facon q u ' e l l e ne constitue pas un engagement formel A le tuer. II est curieux que, en essayant de justifier la mort eventuelle de M. Cross, i n le document se refere au sort des ouvriers de Lapalme, ce qui «•*> q ^ e l q u u y x b w r t w i enleve/un peu de son xPm.k\m^ammmnKZA.. Le ton du document e s t assure, sans indice de panique ou de hAte: on peut supposer q u ' i l avait ete prepare A I'avance ou tout au moins redige A l o i s i r . Finalement ±mxxamaadapBkx. on demande que l e contenu du communique s o i t rendu public. Nous prenons pour acquis que l e gouvernement canadien ne prendra aucune mesure k cet e f f e t . Le t e x t e du communique a ete diffuse presque en e n t i e r par une s t a t i o n de r a d i o . ..4 000516 �- k - COWFIDBiTIEL ML Is.. ' La lettre de M. Cross A son epouse etait Jolnte A ce communique. Vous en trouverez le texte en annexe. Le HautK—dbjaaabfc commissariat britannique nous indique que, de l ' a v i s de Mme Cross et itodt du Haut commissariat, la l e t t r e est authentique. CAJL~. <w 'JJUA. e-AtM-^ i * £.-* i T E l l e est sans d a t e / ' f **~ U v 7 . - ^ v w , ~xU+.*. n fo'f, ' 4« C #«jo» On peut done supposer q u ' i l l e a pu fitre e c r i t e peu de temps apres l'enlevement de M. Cross et ne permet dome pas iKooBJocbaaexx de^ conclusion^ absolument ferme^ sur son e t a t present. La lettre ne contient apparemment aucun indice qui puisse e t r e utrfriarH u t i l e s a la p o l i c e . Nous avons suggere au Haut Consnissariat 8z±k±v"britannique de verifier si elle pourrait neanmoins presenter certains caractfcres significatifs que seul un familier de M. Cross pourrait reconnaitre. C'est improbable. Le texte de la lettre n ' e s t pas encore aux mains des media. 5. Communication A la s t a t i o n CKAC. - Conme nous l'avons signaie plus haut .le FLQ a conmunique avec CKAC afin de permettre l a decouverte du communique numero 2 e t / l a l e t t r e de M. Cross. commentaires du FLQ A CKAC sont MMWBBBBB l u t i importants. Les Malheu- a Tinne 'r^nrnr" jmnrnnn —*^TI~"~ m • p p i mpfam reusement, tout ce que la police ai !haua pp-"~ 4 ~- e s t contenu dans un bref b u l l e t i n de l a Presse>^anadianne ( c i - j o i n t ) ...5 000517 » �- Selon cette source le FLQ 5 - CONFIDENTIEL aurait indique que si ses k, n'etaient pas acceptees avant 0130 hmoma du matin le 7 octobre, M. Cross serait tue. "Si l'on ne se rend pas A nos demandes nous n'hesiterons pas a supprimer M. Cross." II s'agissait IA selon CKAC d'une reponse directe a votre declaration du 6 octobre. II est frappant de constater la difference du temps— limite entre le communique numero 2 et le message du FLQ a CKAC au sujet de ce m6me communique: dans un cas midi, dans l'autre -JL'. 8/30 h a w w . Deux interpretations sont possibles. Si l'on admet que le communique numero 2 a ete mis A la poste avant votre declaration et que le message du FLQ A CKAC a ete fait apres votre declaration (ce qui semble probable), on pourrait supposer que le temps»limite a ete ramene de midi au matin pour signifier un aaHwria deplaisir a 1'egard de la position federale. Une autre interpretation semble plus probable, n^p^iif .»ppA..^ qu'une cellule du FLQ etait responsable de rediger et de poster le communique numero 2 et qu'une autre s'est mise en rapport avec la station de radio a ce sujet. Que les deux cellules aient interprete de faijon differente le temps-limite ne serait pas etonnant. L '000518 �- 6. 6 - CONFIDENTIAL Finalement une breve note maaw—^•*—dto» decouverte fi "• " A Ottawa par la police a la station d'autobus Colonial (texte joint). II faut signaler immediatement que ce document n'emane peut-§tre pas du FLQ. II est court, assez mal redige,en lettres moulees, et ne se presente done pas conme les autres documents du FLQ. De plus, il se refere a "5 conditions" du FLQ alors que celui-ci en a **f*0 pose Jta II semble probable que l'auteur se soit inspire def nouvelles (e.g. manchettes du Devoir du 6 octobre , declaration qui-faisanjr aussi allusion a K conditions. L'auteur ne semble done pas §tre dans le coup. Cependant, il n'est pas totalement exclurf qu'il s'agisse IA d'une operation subsfdiaire et hAtive d'une branche du FLQ peut etre mAme A la demande des organisateurs de l'enlevement. Bi effet, la methode utilisee pour faire decouvrir les documents est presque identique A celle qu'a employe le FLQ relativement A son communique numero 2. Un appel telephonique a une station francaise de Montreal (vers 9 heures hier soir) revela la presence du document A Ottawa. ...7 000519 �- 7 - COHTIDBTCTEL L'appelVsoulign&it que ce document etait k votre intention et a m u H const it uait une reponse k votre awaaaiax declaration. II fixait le tempe—limite a 9 heures ce matin et demandait que le Premier ministre confirme l'acceptation des "5 conditions". I 7. Certaines conclusions d ' o r d r e general se degagent. ksr~* 6si*ji.^A. »•*«** """ «•*' ^o^*4**** D'abord on ne peut pas <Mam que l e FLQ a i t r e t a r d e l e tempe l i m i t e , e t q u ' i l a i t lui-meme e n f r e i n t A son ultimatum de 48 h e u r e s . ^ u . ' ' i j *'• .i \*mmrmB-mmmaa+mommoi i. Deuxiemement, l e FLQ n ' a pas r e d u i t s e s exigences quant aux c o n d i t i o n s de relachement de M. C r o s s . Le conmunique numero 2 e t l a communication a CKAC s ' e n t i e n n e n t a i x demandes i n i t i a l e s . Le document d e c o u v e r t a Ottawa ne mentionne que 4 c o n d i t i o n s mais ne s u g g i r e aucunement q u ' i l s ' a g i i ^ IA d ' u n e atx r e d u c t i o n des e x i g e n c e s du FLQ. Ou b i e n ce document n ' e s t pas a u t h e n t i q u e ou b i e n i l l a i s s e de cfite des exigences q\«4-««irt^HHrtWI87!THreyTBrtEW*aes i i n e u r e s qui sont maintenant caduques ( a r r e t des r e c h e r c h e s p o l i c i e r e s , puintiisiixH p u b l i c i t e pour l e m a n i f e s t e FLQ). ancune i n d i c a t i o n que l e FLQ r e t r a i t e . Somme t o u t e , Heureusement, i l JQUX ne semble 000520 �- 8 - CONPIDHHTIEL pas non plus y avoir de reactions trop violentes ou paniques S m $ de la part des ravisseurs. Cependant le ton de la conmunication A CKAC est un peu inquietant. * Je devrais mentionner que j'ai parie GZflu. s*s»**4 8. avec notre Haut Consnissaire a Londres pour l e mettre au Kmorzxt ^X^ f a i t des evenements recents et que nous avons tenu l e Haut Commiss a i r e s Britannique au f n 11 ri nn aef linaawtts . / D ' a u t r e p a r t , afin d'elucider I'authenticite du document trouve a Ottawa, nous avons donne dbsKK certains d e t a i l s A l a • r e s s e A ce sujet (texte j o i n t ) . Ceci p o u r r a i t d ' a i l l e u r s avoir l'avantage d'amener l e FLQ A preeiser s_t±k s ' i l en e s t l ' a u t e u r et s i l ' a l l u s i o n A mja conaitions* est pre- significatiwB. Si l e FLQ prend la peine J* ce cisions aa sera autant de temps de gagne. 7«r f\jU^ ,i , ^ ^ i jtxA, - ' p fourrvvV JL* -•* <**-. e e « . > - . t ; c ^ ^ O f o oU- t F * ^ * t ^ ^ des s*«-•&•--• AV"-**-*' *» l»Ft.* <-*,^ ti^Bap^"**"**^ « *• * -Ei ' .1 <-<*.,;, OOO V*- /«.»- ~~ * 0 - « . # « - y- - * — * * <<**..... ,.. . 3 ^, t.A r+*-*. \ V \u~o - — - y - - - *k C*^x i *. *- „ ,cO' A L.ZC A AA-^-^, c«?. £ * + i ( F <*> " • — 2r w^» o«^ C* 0%*.£iu V**-*^..*/"*" 000521 I -j �• 0.A*-- ri^w,, t F A>^AJt~~. </ *--*LL* r'.JJys^. d/j, FL yF. -is*. Y' *~ ^ '^ "^F-f& - A. CU.22 / . £tC-" /»*^rw, fr.,^.~ &.*^7T; "Tit: A F 000522 i �le 7 octobre 197C. CONPI rTEWTlKL RE^OIFE Ag KIHISTRE Ifrilfevement Cross - Evenements deruis votre declaration Voici un Borrtrair© et une analyse les rrlnoipaux Evenetrienta qui ae sont derouies depuis votro declaration en Chambre le 6 octobre. 2. Eh funeral, les rapports de presse et de radio/t'1 vision sur votre declaration sont assez equilibria. f*i note le refus federal d'acoepter les conditions du FLC mais aussi la volonte d'etablir un dialogue avec les auteurs de 1*enlevement. On pent done supposer que ceux-ci se rendent compte que le gouvernement canadien ne f e m e pas toutes lea avenues. Les nouvelles ont depuis fait etat du fait que notre contre d*operations est ouvert nuit et jour a toutes communications et que le ministre quebecois de la justice est Egalement dispose il recevoir toutes coranranioat ions des ravisseurs. 3, Flusieurs documents, supposement en provenance du PLQ, sont venus entre les mains <]es autorites federales et pre— vinciales pendant la nuit. Le premier pie presente comme etant le connunique numero 2 du FLQ au sujet le l'enlevement (copie jointe). Le document a He decouvert dans les postes suite a une nouvelle da la station CKAC, qui avait recu du FLO une notification A ce 6ujet. I'authenticite du communique ne fnit puere de doute. II concorde parfaitement avec le premier comrrunique. Tl etait d'ailleurs aocomrapn'' d'une lettre de V. Cross A son 'pause dont I'authenticite semble etablie. II n'est ras certain que le communique numero 2 constitue une reponse A votre declaration du 6 octobre. On n'a pas pu etatlir le moment oft il fut depose & la poste mais la police suppose que ce fut avant 8 heures hiar soir. le ton p^n^ral du communique svp-gfcre qu'il a ete redige plut8t A la lumiere des declarations de F. Choquette. (La premiere phrase du communique, et la fait qu'il situe A midi le temps limite pour repondre aux demandes des ravisseurs, rcurraient Stre interpret's comma refieiant les donn'-es contenne's dans votre rierniere declaration. II est plus probable que n o n O �c~;TnpamEL - 2 - II n'est pas etonnant qua le temps limits ait ete place A midi dans 1« communique* nu»ero 2. Les ravisseurs ont pu calculer qua leurs demandes n'etaient parvenues aux autorites que vers midi le 5 octobre. II faut done noter q-ee ceci ne constitue T rotable— ment pas un report du temps limite. 4* Certaines autres remarques s'im'osent sur le oonl enu du communique. Les denandes du FLQ sont maintenues sans nuance. (Ces demandes sont appelSee les "recommendations", oe qui n'a pout-Stre pa3 de signification partiouliSre). Una menace de mort est formulee & 1'egard de M. Cross, mais presentee de telle faejon qu'elle ne constitue pas un engagement formel ft le tuer. II est ourieux que, en ei'saynnt -ie .tust'fier la mort eventuella de K. Croaa, le document se refire au sort des ouvriars de Laralme, ce qui enleve & la menace un peu de son apparenee de serieux. Le ton du docunent est assure, sans indice de panique ou da hfite: on i>eut su] poser qu'il avait etc" pre par' A I'avance ou tout au moins redige' a loisir. Finalement on demande qua le contenu du communique soit rendu public. Nous prenons pour acquis q- e le gouvernement canadien ne prendra aucune masure a cet effet. Le texts du communique a ete diffuse preaque an entier par une station de radio. 5« La lettre de ¥.. Cross A son epouse etait jointe A ce communique. Vous en trouverez le texte en annexe. Te Haut-commissariat britannique nous indique que, de l'avis de "re Cross et du Haut commissariat, la lettre est authentique. Elle est sans date bien qu'elle accomiafne un communique date du 6 octobre A midi. Cn peut done sun oser qu'elle a pu etre ecrite peu de temps apres l'enlevement de F. Cross et ne permet pas de conclusion absolument ferme sur son etat present. La lettre ne contient apparemment aucun ineiioe qui puisse etre utile a la polioe. Nous avons suggere au Haut-commissariat britannique de verifier si alia pourrait neanmoins presenter certains caraoteres significatifs que seul un familiar de F. Cress pourrait reconnaitre. C'est improbable. Le texte ele la lettre n'est ras encore aux mains des media. 6. Communication A la station CKAC. — Comme nous 1 'avons signaie plus haut, le FLQ a corronuniqnA avec CKAC afin de rermettra la decouverte du communique numero 2 et de la lettre de F. Cross. Les commentaires du FLQ A CKAC nont importnnts. Falheureusement, tout ce qua la police a pu arrrendre ft ce sujet est contenu dans . ./3 �C NFlDUfTlEL - 3 - un bref b u l l e t i n de l a Fresse canadienne ( c i - . i o i n t ) . Selon c e t t a source l e FIQ a u r a i t indiejue que s i ses exigences n ' e t a i e n t ras accer-teeo avant 8 h 3C du matin l e 7 octobre, K. Cross s e r a i t t u e . "Si l ' c n ne se rend pas ft ncs demandes nous n ' h e s i t e r o n s pas ft supjrimer F . Cross". I I s ' a r i s s a i t 1ft, s a lon CKAC, d'une reponse d i r e c t e ft votre declaration du 6 octobre. I I e s t frappant de oonstater l a difference du temps-liroite entre l e communique num'ro 2 et le messap e du FlaQ A (T'AC au sujet de ca rnone communiquet dans un cas midi, dans l ' a u t r e 8 h 30. "•eux i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s sort p o s s i b l e s . Si l ' o n aelmet que la communique numero 2 a e t e mis ft l a ^oete avant votre declaration et que l e message du FLQ ft CKAC a e t e f a i t a r r ? s votre d e c l a r a t i o n (ce qui semble probable), on pourrait surposer que l e tempsl i m i t e a ete ramen£ de midi au matin pour s i g n i f i e r vaa net d<*— p l a i s i r 5 l ' e g a r d de l a position f e d e r a l s . Une autre i n t e r p r e t a t i o n semble plus probable. I I e s t po33ible qu'une c e l l u l e du FLQ e t a i t resjonsable de rediger et de poster l a communique numero 2 et qu'une a u t r e 3 ' e s t rrise en raryort avec l a s t a t i o n da radio ft ce s u j e t . Qua l e s deux c e l l u l e s aient i n t e r p r e t e de f a yon differents l e tamps limite ne s e r a i t pas etonnant. 7. Finalement ^entionuons vane brfcve note deoouverte ft Ottawa par l a p o l i c e , S la s t a t i o n d'autobus Colonial (texte .joint). II faut signaler irtim-'diatement que ee document n'e-tnane r e u t - € t r e r a s du FIQ. I I est court, assez mal r e d i g e , e c r i t A la main en l e t t r e s moul^es, e t ne se presents done pas comme l e s a u t r e s documents du FLQ. T>e p l u s , i l so r£f£re ft "5 conditions" elu FLQ a l o r s que c e l u i - c i en a pose s e p t . I I semble probable que I'p.uteur oe s o i t inspire de nouvelles ( e . g . manohettes du "He— v o i r du 6 octobre, declaration de !•'. Choquette) qui f a i s a i e n t aussi a l l u s i o n A cinq conditions. L'auteur ne semble done pas e t r e dans l a coup. Cependant, i l n ' e s t pas totalement exclu q u ' i l s'agi^se IA d'une operation subsieliairo et hative d'une branehe du FL^, peut-€tre meme A la demande des organieateurs de l ' e n l e vement. 2n e f f e t , l a m'thode u t i l i s / a pour f n i r e decouvrir l e s documents est presque identique A c e l l e qu'a emrleye l e FLQ r e l a tivement ft son communique numero 2 . Un appel telephonique A une s t a t i o n frangaise de Fontreal (vers 9 heures b i e r s o i r ) reveia la presence du document ft ttawa. I ' a p p e l telephonique soulipnait que ce document e t a i t ft votre intention et e o n s t i t u a i t una reponse A votre d e c l a r a t i o n . Tl f i x a i t l a temrs-limite A 9 heures ce mat i n et iemandait que l e ! remier ministre confirme 1'acceptation des "5 c o n d i t i o n s " . . . /4 �crr-rj r?»TlFL -4 - 8. Certaines conclusions d'ordre ggneral se d'pagent. D'abord on ne peut pas oonclure fermement que le FI.Q ait retards le tempa-limite, et qu'il ait lui-meme enfreint ft son ultimatum fie 48 heures. Deuxiemement, le FIQ n'a pas reduit ses exigences quant aux conditions de relachement de F. Cross. Le communique num'ro 2 et la oommunieation ft CKAC s'en tiennent aux demandes initiales. Le document decouvert ft Cttawa ne menti nne que cinq conditions mais ne euggere aucunement qu'il s'agit 1ft d'une reduction den exigonco3 du FLQ. Ou bien ce document n'eart pas authentique, ou bien il laisse de o$te des exigences mineures qui sont maintenant caduquec (arrSt don recherches roliciAres', publicite pour le manifeste FLQ). Somme toute, aucune indication que le FLQ retraite. Hcureusement, il ne semble pas nan plus y avoir de reactions tr violentes ou paniques de la part des ravisseurs. Cependant le ton le la communication A CFAC est peut8tra un peu plus vif que celui des communiques. 9« Je devrais renteonner q\ie j'ai parie cette nuit avec notre Haut-Ccmmissaire A Lonlres our le wettre au fait des evenements recents et que nous avons tenu le Haut-Cornminsaire britannique au courant. Je vous fais tenir un m w i r e serare sur une autre conversation que j'ai cue ce matin avec Charles Pitchie. D*autre part, afin d'elucider I'authenticite du document troure ft Cttawa, nous avons donn* certains details ft la rresse A ce sujet (texte joint). Ceci pourrait d'ailleurs avoir 1'avantare d'amener le FLQ ft yreciser s'il en est l'auteur et oi ]'allusionftcinq conditions est significative. Si le FLQ prend la r-eine de fournir des precisions, ca sera autant de temrs de gagne. 10. Vous aurez note qr.e nous r.'avons pas pris 1'initiative jusqu'ioi de rendre publics lea cemmur.icrues du FIQ. Eh effet, si nous laissons le FLQ dans 1'incertitude enoant au moment oti ses communications nous rarviennent, il est plus difficile rour les ravisseurs d*etablir quand le temrs-limite pourreit Stre atteint. Ceei nous avantage. 11. Nous attendons des renseignements sur les oT^rat^ons da police du Quebec et sur des contacts josrihles du FIQ avec les autorites quebecoises. Toute information la-dessus vous sera communiquSe sans deiai. �» • / CONFIDENTIAL October 7, 1970 MEMORANDUM TO THE MEMS TER Kidnapping of Cross - Use of an Intermediary for Contact with the Abductors In view of the difficulties we are encountering in the receipt and analysing of a variety of "communications" from the FLQ, about which you have already seen my memorandum of today's date, may I have your comments on the following tentative proposal? 2. Perhaps consideration could be given to appointing an intermediary for the governments of Canada and Quebec who might meet an intermediary for those responsible for Mr. Cross's abduction. This person appointed by the governments would be empowered to meet the other side at a location mutually acceptable to both sides. We would have to ensure that the intermediary for the abductors understood that such a meeting would be on the basis of safe conduct for him, with a solemn undertaking that there would be no police interference, surveillance, etc., either of this and subsequent meetings, or of contacts which the abductors' spokesman would need to make with them. We understand that, should the two governments agree to such a proposal, such solemn undertakings with regard to these points could be arranged. 3. The choice of a government intermediary will be of major importance. He could be a person like Claude Ryan, Roger Gaudry, Rector of the University of Montreal, or Louis Laberge of the C.L.C. The eventual choice would, I feel, be best left to the collective judgment of the Cabinet, since your colleagues will have views on the acceptability of various of the names proposed above and undoubtedly will suggest others who might be considered. The person should not, I suggest, be a mediator. There would be real danger in such a person proposing a compromise unacceptable to the Canadian government. This would gravely undermine our (now excellent) moral position. 4. It strikes me that, if we should decide to appoint a government intermediary, he might have with him, at the first meeting, some points which the two governments feel are negotiable. Although not exhaustive, I would suggest consideration of: (a) an offer of immunity from immediate arrest and prosecution and of safe conduct for the kidnappers to any country of their choice which would be willing to accept them; and 000527 �CONFIDENTIAL 2 (b) release of most (if not all) of those people whom the Quebec police have recently picked up in their various raids and searches. It of course is understood that these conditions hinge on assurances that Mr. Cross will be released safely at a time and place which the abductors may wish to choose and which can be verified simultaneously. 5. The above is a very general outline of this proposal, but one which, I feel, merits consideration. 3y our proposing an intermediary (whether publicly or privately) v/e have two distinct advantages: (a) we have made a meaningful gesture, and (b) we place the abductors in the position of better understanding the fact that their "communications" are not coming through loud and clear, and thus offering them a chance to make direct contact, even if only for their propaganda purposes. FFAA. E. R. �CROSS KIDNAPPING ^(c F BOO TFK-I zF October 7, 1970 ANTICIPATED QUESTION HOUSE OF COMMONS Cross Kidnapping QUESTION: ANSWER: Can the Secretary of State for External Affairs give the House any further information in connection with the Cross kidnapping? Since my statement to the House last night, a number of communications have been received by the authorities in Montreal and in Ottawa. Some are documents bearing no specific address. Once again, they have arrived indirectly. that they are authentic. There is no guarantee They may or may not be. At least some purport to come from Mr. Cross's kidnappers, and we are taking them seriously. The problem remains one of establishing communication with the kidnappers. As I said last night, the federal authorities want to enter into communication with Mr. Cross's kidnappers. The Minister of Justice of Quebec, Mr. Choquette, has just confirmed late this morning, at a press conference in Montreal, that this is also the desire of the Quebec authorities, with whom we remain in closest contact. • • o TXt 000529 �- 2 SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION: Does the Government not fear that the danger to Mr. Crosses life has increased because the deadline mentioned by the FLQ has been passed? ANSWER: There does not in fact seem to be a single deadline. mentioned. Various deadlines have been It is, in any event, not possible to subject the complex problems and humane considerations involved to a deadline. SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION: What steps is the Government taking to determine the attitude of the Cuban and Algerian Governments to the possibility of receiving released members of the FLQ? Arrangements have been made to inform ANSWER: the Cuban and Algerian Governments of the references to them in the documents issued by the FLQ. 000530 �r CONFIDENTIAL Bi ' October 7, 1970. MEMORANDUM FOR THS MINISTER 27~Ff< / ' ( TFkF- 1 - CuJA& Cc :Od- ^^ ' The Cross Kidnapping: Activity in Algiers and Havana If you are asked by the press whether it is true that a special representative has been sent to Algiers, and our Embassy in Havana instructed to speak to the Cuban Foreign Ministry, you might reply as follows: "Yes. A special representative has been sent from Ottawa Bo Algiers - where there is no resident Canadian diplomatic mission - and our Embassy in Havana has been instructed to speak to the Cuban Foreign Ministry. The purpose of these approaches is to inform the Algerian and Cuban Governments of the references to them made in published documents connected with Mr. Cross's kidnapping. I am sure these references were made without the knowledge of the governments concerned." A. E. R. 000531 �•t*6> V CL MVP 000532 �l^C «Ti Jk h -xiU F&Tu^jFxjtJ |3-V| Faf' r\ri , \J* t**~fc**'4 c?o-2?-7flA-\ 7<0.0?« F.L.Q. Kidnapping of U.K. Trade Commissioner General: *>—lv Non-compliance with the request to take the prisoners to Cuba or Algeria involves the international responsibility of the Canadian ,y X Government to protect the persons of diplomats in its territory. This obligation is spelled out in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Article AO, which reads: "The receiving state shall ... take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom or dignity." • _2 •y It follows that the receiving state has a responsibility to mitigate any consequences of not having fulfilled this obligation. The British Government might blame the Canadian Government for not taking the appropriate ,2 measures of protection given the political situation in Quebec. '••: Although Canada is not yet a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations .. •••• : i t r e p r e s e n t s g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law which we f o l l o w . ,, -f .»., yeA-**(2l • ' . ,y . y. - 2 Point •' 0 ? ' * A o^-F-..L.Q. -'•"'"' ' ^ Denarxi: O E O , x A:L > , -. 7 7 7 - p.L . Fx L - 2 . J , %„ • . fO-. Pt^T^A^FM^^M B I cru. [,>, -,: -2--PPX.. -... .... ggrr*. ;,',.,.. Compliance with the request of the F.L.Q. for an aircraft to tA • transport the F.L.Q. members might imply that we have made some arrangement with Cuba or Algeria because their demand embodies such a request. We already have an extradition agreement with Cuba but none with Algeria. The extradition J •• a . agreement with Cuba specifies that extradition will be granted for kidnapping (Section 2, Article 7 ) . But Section 6 provides that "a fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offence in respect of which his surrender ... s. 000533 �m - 2 - is demanded is one of a political character, or if he proves that the requisition for his surrender has, in fact, been made with a view to try or punish him for an offence of a political character". The question remains whether the Cubans would consider members of the F.L.Q. (either prisoners or kidnappers of diplomats) as political fugitives or as common law criminals. Aside from the extradition agreement we would probably require an agreement for return of the aircraft and crew to Canada and we might wish to obtain a secret agreement with Cuba concerning the eventual return of the F.L.Q. members. If the Cubans refuse to enter into an agreement with Canada on this matter, the only recourse left to Canada will be the provisions of the extradition treaty. It does not appear that this matter could be considered as a hijacking question and in any event we have not yet reached even the initial stages of an agreement with Cuba on hijacking of aircraft. Reaching an agreement with the Algerian authorities could involve the same considerations but because we do not have an extradition treaty with Algeria, we would not have the same legal umbrella under which to negotiate. If Cuba or Algeria decided to accord political asylum to the F.L.Q. members we would be unable to obtain their return buL we should still seek the return of the aircraft and crew and we might request that the Cuban or Algerian Governments restrict the political activities of the F.L.Q. members in their countries. 000534 �• • ^ i F [ F C O N F I D E N T I A L FM EXTEROTT OCT7/70 TO LDN (RITCHIE) PDM231 FLASH " " INFO RCMP(FERRARIS-SANDI),OUIMET) REF YOURTEL 3345 KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL BEST ASSESSMENT I CAN GIVE AT THE MOMENT IS CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REPRODUCED BELOW.IT IS NOT/NOT YET CERTAIN WHETHER THE MINISTER WILL IN FACT USE THESE ANSWERS THIS AFTERNOON.I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT PRESS REPORTS OF A BODY BEING FOUND ARE NOT/NOT ACCURATE.IN A FOLLOWING MESSAGE WE ARE SENDING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE QUEBEC MINISTER OF JUSTICE HR CHOQUETTE WHICH IS REFERRED TO IN THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS GIVEN BELOW.TEXT BEG INS ANTICIPATED QUESTION ,HOUSE OF COMMONS-CROSS KIDNAPPING QUESTION tCAN THE SEC OF STATE FOR EXTER GIVE THE HOUSE ANY FURTHER INFO IN CONNECTION WITH THE CROSS KIDNAPPING? ANSWER :SINCE MY STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE LAST NIGHT ,A NUMBER OF COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY THE AUTHORITIES IN MTL AND IN OTT.SOME ARE DOCUS BEARING NO/NO SPECIFIC ADDRESS.ONCE AGAIN, THEY HAVE ARRIVED INDIRECTLY.THERE IS NO/MO GUARANTEE THAT THEY ARE AUTHENTIC.THEY MAY OR MAY NOT/NOT BE.AT LEAST SOME PURPORT TO COME FROM MR CROSS KIDNAPPERS, AND WE ARE TAKING THEM SERIOUSLY. THE PROBLEM REMAINS ONE OF ESTABLISHING COMMUNICATION WITH THE KIDNAPPERS.AS I SAID LAST NIGHT,THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES WANT TO ENTER INTO COMMUNICATION WITH MR CROSS KIDNAPPERS .THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE OF QUEBEC,MR CHOQUETTE .HAS JUST CONFIRMED LATE ... 2 000535 ^ �PAGE TWO PDM23 1 CONFD THIS MORNING,AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN MTL .THAT THIS IS ALSO THE DESIRE OF THE QUEBEC AUTHORITIES,WITH WHOM WE REMAIN IN CLOSEST CONTACT. SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION'.DOES THE GOVT NOT /NOT FEAR THAT THE DANGER TO MR CROSS L I F E HAS INCREASED BECAUSE THE DEADLINE MENTIONED BY THE FLQ HAS BEEN PASSED? ANSWER-.THERE DOES NOT/NOT IM FACT SEEM TO BE A SINGLE DEADLINE. VARIOUS DEADLINES HAVE BEEN MENTIONED.IT IS,IN ANY EVENT,NOT/NOT POSSIBLE TO SUBJECT THE COMPLEX PROBLEMS AND HUMANE CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED TO A DEADLINE. SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONJWHAT STEPS I S THE GOVT TAKING TO DETERMINE THE ATTITUDE OF THE CUBAN AND ALGERIAN GOVTS TO THE P O S S I B I L I T Y OF RECEIVING RELEASED MEMBERS OF THE FLQ? ANSWER'.ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO INFORM THE CUBAN AND ALGERIAN GOVTS OF THE REFS TO THEM IN THE DOCUS ISSUED BY THE FLQ.TEXT ENDS RFT 07 1709Z �POP MIN PDM (RITCHIE) PDM (ROQUET) PMO (ROBERTS^WtWALLS) PPR (READ) FLE (DEMERS) PSI (ROBE) b^lh. FCO(STANSFIELD) GOO(PUDDINGTON) DEPT OF JUSTICE(CHRISTIE) SOLICITOR GEN(HOFLEY) ACTSOM COP Y 6 C O N F I D E N T I A L i FM CANDELNATO OCT7/70 NO/NO STANDARD TO TT E X T E R ( F L E ) 2 2 5 6 IMMED DE LDN REF YOURTEL FLE1427 0CT6 KIDNAPPING OF DIPLOMATS (FOR DELIVERY TO DESK OFFICER BY 0900AM OTT TIME)"' NO/NO CONSIDERATION GIVEN IN AD HOC GROUP TO LEGAL QUESTIONS AS IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT IMMED NEED WAS FOR PRACTICAL MEASURES AND BECAUSE LEGAL ASPECT BEING DEALT WITH IN OTHER FORA SUCH AS WEU, COFE AND OAS. RFT 070857Z 000537 �7 "< • poP «&?*-£ C O N F I D E N T I A L QJT^ FM BONN OCT7/70 NO/MO STANDARD TO TT EXTER / 1071 IMMED DE LDN REF YOURTEL FLE 1425 OCTS KIDNAPING OF DIPLOMATS WE DISCUSSED LEGAL POSITION ADOPTED BY FGR AT TIME OF VON SPRETI KIDNAPING WITH STROTHMANN,HEAD OF FOURTH LEGAL DIV WHO WAS JOINED BY OFFICIAL WHO HAD BEEN COUNSELLOR IN GUATEMALA AT THAT TIME.THEY SAID THEIR POSITION HAD BEEN FIRMLY BASED OH ARTICLE 29 OF VIENN CONVENTION REQUIRING RECEIVING STATES TO TAKE.ACCORDING TO THEIR TRANSLATION,QUOTE ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES UNQUOTE TO PROTECT DIPLOMATS FROM ATTACK.THEY INTERPRET ARTICLE 29 A3 CONTINUING TO REQUIRE THAT ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES BE TAKEN AFTER KIDNAPING HAS OCCURRED SINCE ATTACK ON PERSON AND FREEDOM CONTINUES.THEY NOTED INCIDENTALLY THAT ARTICLE 4 0 OF CONSULAR CONVENTION ALTHOUGH WORDED SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY IMPOSES SAME ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS. 2.STROTHMANN OBSERVED THAT GUATEMALAN PROBLEM DIFFERED IN SEVERAL RESPECTS FROM OURS.GUATEMALAN RELUCTANCE TO MEET KIDNAPERS DEMANDS WAS BASED ON CONTENTION THAT TO DO SO IN CERTAIN CASES WOULD UNDERMINE THEIR CONSTITUTION.FGR POSITION HAD BEEN THAT INTERNATL OBLIGATIONS OVERRIDE NOT/NOT ONLY NATL LEGISLAT ION,WHICH GUATEMALANS CONCEDED,BUT ALSO CONSITUTION,WHICH GUATEMALANS DISPUTED.MOREOVER IN GUATEMALAN CASE THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO BASICALLY IRRELEVANT DEMAND SUCH AS THAT CONCERNING POST OFFICE WORKERS. 3.COUNSELLOR SAID HE HAD TRIED TO PERSUADE GUATEMALANS TO BARGAIN EG TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CONVICTED PRISONERS AND THOSE AWAITING �PAGE TWO 1071 CONFD MO/NO STANDARD TRIAL AND TO MAKE COUNTER OFFER.HE ADDED THAT HE HAD GIVEN SIMILAR COUNSEL TO URUGUAYAN EMB INFORMALLY WHEN THEY FACED THIS PROBLEM. HE MAINTAINED THAT MAKING COUNTER OFFER HAD CERTAIN ADVANTAGES INCLUDING PUBLIC RELATIONS CONSIDERATIONS, 4.STROTHMANN SAID FGR ATTITUDE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THEIR DOMESTIC LEGISLATION.BECAUSE OF BLACKMAIL ARRESTS OF EG FGR TOURISTS WHICH EAST BLOCK COUNTRIES HAVE MADE FOR MANY YEARS WHEN SPIES ARE CAUGHT IN FGR FOREIGNERS CONVICTED OF CRIMES CAN NOW LEGALLY BE DEPORTED WITHOUT SERVING SENTENCES.FGR NATLS PRESENT DIFFICULT LEGAL PROBLEM IF THEY ARE STILL AWAITING TRIAL.HOWEVER AFTER THEIR CONVICTION THEIR DISPOSAL INVOLVES DIFFERENT ELEMENTS AND THEIR RELEASE CAN BE EFFECTED WITHOUT DISTURBING ESTABLISHED LEGAL PROCEDURES, 5.SUMMING UP STROTHMANN SAID IT WAS HARD TO SAY HOW FAR OBLIGATIONS UNDER VIENN CONVENTION COULD BE PRESSED.AS CLOSE OBSERVERS OF KIDNAPING PROBLEMS FGR HAD NOTICED THAT VIEW THAT GOVTS SHOULD NOT/NOT YIELD OR KIDNAPPERS DEMANDS WOULD KEEP.GROWING WAS BECOMING MORE PREVALENT.ANY GIVEN CASE HAD ACCORDINGLY TO BE EXAMINED POB IT J.CAL.L Y AND FROM OTHER ANGLES AS WELL AS IN LIGHT OF VIENN CONVENTION. RFT 071537Z 000539 �PPR (READ) FLE(DB<EnS) PSI (RO'.VE) -POOMIB PDM(niTCHIE) RDM(ROQUET) PMO(HODE| 'O(BALIP) FCO(STANSFIELD) GCO(PUDDILGTOB) DHpT 0? J blRISTIE) SOLICITOR GEN(HOFLEY) ACTION COPY •. 7 OCT - / 8 : 55 R E S T R I C T E D FM LDN OCT7/70 NO/NO STANDARD TO EXTER 3 3 2 7 IMMED KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL BRITS PLAN TO GIVE PRESS CONFERENCE AT 1 2 : 3 0 HOURS TODAY. SIR DENIS GREENHILL INDICATED TO ME THAT LINE THEY INTEND TO TAKE I S BASICALLY AS FOLLOWS:BRIT GOVT I S IN CLOSEST TOUCH WITH CDN GOVT AND CDN GOVT HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY FULLY ACCEPT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFETY OF DIPLOS.THE UK GOVT ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE CDN GOVT ARE DOING EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO SECURE THE SAFETY OF MR CROSS. *. �FCO (STANSFIELD) GCO(PUDDIKGTOJl) DEFT OP JUSTICE (CHRISTIE) SOLICITOR GEN(HOFLEY) ACTION COPY 27 ' . / C O N F I D E N T I A L FM LDN OCT7/70 NO/NO STANDARD OCT fg EKTER 3328 IMMED REF OURTEL 33 11 0CT6 KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL WE HAVE HAD FURTHER DISCUSSION OF BRIT POLICY TOWARD KIDNAPPING OF DIPLOS WITH EMPSON.HEAD OF SECURITY DEPT FCO.WHILE EMPSONS COMMENTS DO NOT/NOT ALTER BRIT POSITION AS DESCRIBED IN REFTEL, THEY MAY BE USEFUL TO YOU.AS SERIES OF KIDNAPPINGS IN LATIN AMERICA GATHERED MOMENTUM,BR IT CAREFULLY EXAMINED POSITION OF THEIR OFFICERS ABROAD.EMPSON SAID THAT THE MORE THEY LOOKED AT THE PROBLEM THE MORE THEY BECAME CONVINCED OF WISDOM OF PRAGMATIC APPROACH.RECENT CASE OF LEILA KHALED IS CASE IN POINT WHICH BRITS HANDLED WITH GREAT DISCRETION TO AVOID PRE-EMPTING ANY OPT IONS.GENERAL STATEMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS IN SUCH FORUMS AS UN HAVE NO/NO INFLUENCE ON KIDNAPPERS AND BRITS TEND TO DISTRUST GENERAL EXHORTATIONS OF THIS NATURE. BRITS HAVE NOT/NOT FOUND ANY ACCEPTABLE OR REMOTELY WATERTIGHT FORMULATION WHICH WOULD MEET THE INFINITELY VARIED CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH KIDNAPPINGS CAN TAKE PLACE.EMPSON SAID THAT THE ONLY RELEVANT COMMITMENT FOR WHICH A CONSENSUS HAD BEEN FOUND WAS ARTICLE TWENTY-NINE OF VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLO PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.HE SAID THAT KEY WORDS IN THIS ARTICLE ARE EVIDENTLY QUOTE ALL APPROPRIATE STEPS UNQUOTE. RFT 07/1218Z 000541 �JKAJ2Z PDM(RITCHIE) PDM(ROQUET) PMO (ROBERTS) PCO(WALLS) PPR(READ) FLE(DEMURS) PSI (ROBE) FCO (STANSFIELD) GOO(PUDDII;GTOM) DEPT 0? JUSTICE(CHRISTIE) SOLICITOR GEN (HOFLEY) % ACTION COPY 7 OCT S:OioN F I D E N I I U FM LDN OCT7/70 NO/NO STANDARD TO EXTER 3329 IMMED KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL FCO PRESS OFFICE HAVE ENQUIRED WHETHER CONTENTS OF LETTER FROM MR CROSS TO MRS CROSS HAVE BEEN MADE PUBLIC.WE HAVE ALSO HAD ENQUIRY ABOUT NAMES OF PRISONERS LISTED IN FLQ MANIFESTO.ARE THESE PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE? 2.WE HAVE READ WHAT APPEARS TO BE COMPREHENSIVE ARTICLE ON FLQ BY RONALD LEBEL IN GLOBE MAGAZINE OF SEP 19.APPRECIATE KNOWING WHETHER ARTICLE CONTAINS RELIABLE BACKGROUND INFO ON FLQ TO WHICH UE CAN REFER ENQUIRERS.IN DOING SO WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR IT IS NOT/NOT A GOVT OR AUTHORIZED ACCOUNT. 3.ANOTHER QUESTION WHICH WE ANTICIPATE FROM THE FCO AND/OR PRESS IS WHETHER CDN GOVT HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH OR MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO GOVTS OF CUBA AND ALGERIA ABOUT THE POSITION OF THESE COUNTRIES WITH REGARD TO MANIFESTO. RFT 07/1218Z 000542 �a ro f C O N F I D E N T I A L 7114 FM LDN O C T 7 / 7 0 TO EXTER 3345 FLASH «««<•«« KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL PHONE CABLE OUT OF ORDER AND NO/NO CALLS ACCEPTED.WIRE BACK FLASH HOW MATTERS NOW STAND DEADLINE HAVING PASSED. RITCHIE RFT 071632Z 000543 �FCO(STANSFIELD) GOO(PUDDINGTON) DEPT OF JUSTICE(CHRISTIE) SOLICITOR GEN(nOFLEY) W - / R E S T R I C T E D FM LDN O C T 7 / 7 0 NO/NO STANDARD TO EXTER 335 6 IMMED REF OURTEL 3 3 2 7 OCT? KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL FOLLOWING I S TRANSCRIPT OF BRIT STATEMENT AT REGULAR PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY,TOGETHER WITH ANTICIPATED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON KIDNAPPING: ON THE RECORD THE BRIT GOVT ARE IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH THE CDN GOVT WHO HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY FULLY ACCEPT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SAFETY OF DIPLOMATS.THE BRIT GOVT ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE CDN AUTHORITIES ARE DOING EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO SECURE THE SAFETY AND RELEASE OF MR CROSS. UNATTRIBUTABLY,1N ANSWER TO QUESTIONS: QUEST ION;WERE WE CONSULTED ABOUT THE CDN DECISION TO TURN DOWN THE KIDNAPPERS DEMANDS? ANSWER;WE HAVE BEEN IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH THE CDN AUTHORITIES THROUGHOUT AND HAVE BEEN KEPT INFORMED AT EVERY STAGE OF WHAT THE CDN GOVT ARE TRYING TO DO* QUESTION DO WE APPROVE THE CDN DECISION? ANSWERjWE ARE OF COURSE GRAVELY CONCERNED FOR THE SAFETY OF MR CROSS,BUT IT I S NOT/NOT FOR US TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE THE CDN GOVTS DECISION,THEY HAVE ACCEPTED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE bAFETY 000544 �PAGE TWO 335 6 RESIR OF DIPLOMATS AND WE ARE SATISFIED THAT THEY ARE DOING ALL THEY CAN TO FULFILL IT. NEWS DEPT ALSO REFERRED IM UNATTRIBUTABLE BRIEFING TO MR SHARPS STATEMENT:QUOTE I CONTINUE,HOWEVER,TO HOPE THAT SOME BASIS CAN 3E FOUND FOR MR CROSSS SAFE RETURN UNQUOTE. RFT 0717B3Z 000545 �POP/J.DEMERS/jad DISTRIBUTION MIN PARLSEC PDM iPDM(Roquet) FPR CnMrpKMTT^T. October 7, 1970 MBMOUMDUM FOE THE MIMISTES Conversation with High Commissioner, London, concerning FCO Staff Meeting on the Croaa Kidnapping In oar conversation (about 6:00 thia morning), the High Commissioner in London reported a telephone eall from Mr. Greenhill, the Permanent UnderSecretary, to inform the High Commissioner of a "ataff meeting" in the Foreign Office ef ataff associations in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office en the •attar of the safety of their colleague. 2, The ataff groups stated that they generally understood and appreciated the attitude adopted by the Canadian government. They wondered, however, if consideration had been given, in order to attract the kidnappers, to a promise of amnesty for any captor who might come forward to negotiate. I confirmed confidentially that consideration had been given te a safe conduct offer. Thia idea might be reconsidered in light of developments. 3. The feeling in London seems to be that the kidnappers are not raallj prepared to execute Mr. Cross if they fail in their demands. I made the point that we consider then deadly serious and that thia should be conveyed to the British to avoid the strong and unavoidable reaction if Mr. Croaa were to be executed. A. E . R. 000546 �POP/J. Puddington/nv * • • • - , October 7, 1970, . • - ••• • • • • , • Dear Hr. Whitehead, • . .. • . . • .' •' Our High Coraiaissioner in London, Ikr. Char-led , has aaked that the following neseage from hi» and his staff be transmitted to l-we. Cross. • • • •• • - - I should like to add that I and the staff of the Department of External Affairs fully share the sentiments eacpreesed by our High CouaisBimu I I • «Kay I express on behelf of the High CojKBiission in London our shock and distress at the abduction of your husband. Tou have our apagethy and no at earnest wish for his swift and safe release.*1 ^ . ' • . lours sincerely, A. E. RITCHIE nder-Secretary i - Mr* George Whitehead, Acting British Higja Cot.miseionar, British High Coiauission, #0 Elgin S t r e e t , Ottawa, Ontario. • • • " • - • • ' - •• 000547 . • :* y- • • .- �23 MESSAGE DATE OCT f/10 FM/DE SECURITY SECURITE HUE/DOSSIER y EN CLAIR EXTBROTT PRECEDENCE NO R. BENJAMIN MEJIA|, DEAN OF THE CONSULAR CORPS OF MONTRI Af>op_ o / £ ROUTINE C/O CONSULATE GENERAL OF HONDURAS, 1225 ST. MARC (SUITE 101) Wf-Q- MONTREAL BEL SUB/SUJ I HAVE THE HONOUR TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR TELEGRAM OF OCTOBER 5. IN RESPONSE I WOULD CONFIRM TO YOU THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA DEEPLY REGRETS THE ABDUCTION OF THE BRITISH SENIOR TRADE ' COMMISSIONER IN MONTREAL. I WOULD ALSO ASSURE YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THE CONSULAR CORPS IN MONTREAL OF THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTINUING CONCERN FOR "Wm PERSONAL SECURITY AND I K INTENTION TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO SECURE THE RELEASE UNHARMED OF MR. CROSS. 2. ACCEPT, SIR, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGH CONSIDERATION. MITCHELL SHARP. DISTRIBUTION STANDARD CC: PM PDA GCO MIN PEM(ROQUET) PPR PSI (DONE IN DIV) LOCAL/LOCALE 0RK3INAT0R/REDACTEUR F^IFAL EXT 18/BIL (REV 5/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) DIVISION 62528 POP F/0.7F0:) ^ APPROVED/AUTORISE TELEPHONE <\FF sio F - LILFFMLIF^APF. 000548 �MESSAGE PATE EXIEE FM/DE 13 JH'TR 7 OCT 70 CONED NO HAVAN BERN LDN WSHDC PARIS BRU NATOBRU TUNIS PRMNY TO/A INFO OCT 7 NOTRETEL POP222 OCT 6 SUB/SUJ POP- PRECEDENCE 227 IMMED CF' "sjfa/i; I g j M I ) Zg /"/- ^ / ^ ^J/V/ITT/ ^\] BEE SECURITY SECURITE FlUE/DOSSIER ' " ~~ ENLEVEMENT DUN REP BRIT POUR VOTRE INTO SEULEMENT VOICI LES FAITS SAILLANTS DEPUIS DECLARATION MINISTRE SHARP EN CHAMBRE OCT 6 EN REPONSE A DEMANDES DSS RAVISSEURS. 2. DEUX MSGS ATTRI3UES AU FIQ NOUS SONT PARVENUS INDIRECTEMENT. ILS NE SEMBLENT PAS CONSTITUER REPONSE DIRECTE A DECLARATION DU MINISTRE. IL N m PAS EU A DATE DE PRISE DE CONTACT DU FIQ AVEC GOUVT$ FEDERAL. 3. LE PREMIER MSG ACflEKENE PAR LA POSTE ET DATE DE MIDI OCT 6 INDIQUAIT QUIL RESTAIT A rCE MOMENT 2k HEURES AU GOUVT FOUR AGIR, SOUS PEINE DE MORT POUR CROSS UNE LET DE M CROSS A SA FEMME ETAIT ATTACHEE A CE PREMIER MESSAGE QUI EST SANS DOUTE AUTHENTIQUE. km LE DEUXIEME MSG TROUVE AU TERMINUS AUTOBUS DOTT NE PORTE PAS DE DATE ET EX. UNE DECLARATION FAVORABLE DU PREMIER MINISTRE TRUDEAU AVANT NEUF HEURES AM MER OCT 7. IL SE REFERE S A N S PRECISER A "CINQ CONDITIONS" DU FIQ ET NON A SEPT. IL POURRAIT NE PAS ETRE AUTHENTIQUE. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE <* 1 / f / &1 0RK5INATOR/REDACTEUR '722 DIVISION pop TELEPHONE APPRCVED/AUTORISE 5-6107 ,..G.»..BQ«M».A/ EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/84) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 000549 �MESSAGE "IBJ ' : J'a :• - • '! « FM/DE EXTER OCT / / 2-L txu- (ZFQJT SECURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER CONFD PRECEDENCE 0CI7/70 rrr^te NO IT" POP- 3- 'l-tf LDN (FOR HIGH COMMISSIONER) TO/A INFO DATE IMMEDC^^ a Ja AfA7F(F~ U£&_ (sash BEE SUg/SUg KIDNAPPING OF BRITISH OFFICIAL SINCE GREBfflILL MENTIONED IMMUNITY AS ONE AREA WE MIGHT WISH TO EMMINE, YOU MIGHT TELL HIM tNFORMALLY AND VERY CONFIDENTIALLY THAT WE ARE CONTINUING TO EXAMINE POSSIBILITIES OF THIS KIND. Vffi MIGHT BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU FURTHER INFORMATION TODAY IN THIS RESPECT. 2. YOU MIGHT ALSO TELL FO IN CONFIDENCE THAT WE ARE APPROACHING CUBANS AND ALGERIANS FOR OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE OF DRAWING TO THEIR ATTENTION THE FLQ COMMUNIQUE REFERRING TO THOSE COUNTRIES AS WELL AS MINISTER'S STATEMENTS IN THE HOUSE. WHILE DEMARCHES WOULD BE ONLY OF AN INFORMATION NATURE FOR THE TIME BEING, WE NATURALIZ HOPE TO ELICIT SOME INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER THOSE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE LIKELY OR NOT TO WISH TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER. 3. NONE OF ABOVE INFORMATION I S BEING MADE PUBLIC FOR THE TIME BEING . A . E . RITCHIE AF DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE ORKSINATOR/REDACTEUR SIO.. Q7) .G*R»aueW.lw. EXT 18/BIL (REV 8 / 8 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) DIVISION BP POP 5-6107 f APPROVEO/AUTORISE TELEPHONE 810. C t..&*L^Gi%<iL.. 000550 �MESSAGE PATE SECURITY SECURITE FlUE /DOSSIER XT 7 1970 EXTERNAL CONFID FM/DE NO POP-230 LONDON TO/A PRECEDENCE IMMED INFO \ j BEL 3W'9W TOUR TEL 3 3 2 9 X T 7 KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL YOUR PARA 1 . MR. CROSS'S LET TO MBS. CROSS NOT/NOT YET RELEASES TO PUBLIC B I MRS. CROSS, BRIT OR CDN OR OTHER AUTHORITIES. NAMES OF PRISONERS SO FAR MENTIONED IN PRESS ARE: PIERRE PAUL GBOFFROY CLAUDE MORENCT ANDRE ROI FRANCOIS LANCTOT ROBERT LEVESQUE PIERRE DEMERS GABRIEL HUDON ROBERT HUDON FRANCOIS 3CHIRM EDMOND GUENNETTE PIERRE BOUCHER ANDRE OUELLETTE ...2 DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE SIO TASK FORCE LIST & RCMP ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR J . R . B a r k e r / C Glover EXT 18/BIL (REV 8 / 8 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) M< DIVISION OPS CENTRE TELEPHONE 5-6107 810 APPROVED/AUTORISE J . R . BARKER 000551 i �- 2 - SCME OF THESE INCLUDES CN LIST PREPARES FOR UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT ON USA CONSUL GENERAL THREE MONTHS AGO. IT ALSO INCISDH): MARCEL FAULKNER SERGE DEMERS CTRIAQUE DLLISLE GERARD LAQUERRE REAL I'lATHlKU CLAUDE SIMA1S PIERRE MARCH CHARLES GAGNON PIERRE VALLIERES LAST THREE IN MEANTIME RELEASES. 2. IDUR PARA 2 . LEBEL ARTICLE OK AS NON-GOVT UNAUTHORIZED BACKGROUND TO FLQ. 3. TOUR PARA 3 . OUR TEL PCP 2 2 8 X T 7 REFERS. �MESSAGE DATE FILE/DOSSIER 0CT7/ft> FM/DE CONFIDENTIAL PRECEDENCE NO LDN TO/A POP- SECURITY SECURITE i-yis INFO BE£ YOURTEL 3 3 4 1 OCT? SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL TEXT LOCKER MESSAGE PASSED TO BRIT HICOM 0 3 0 0 HRS EDT OCT 7 . SUBSEQUENT ANS OTHER TEXTS HAVE ALSO BEEN PASSED TO BRIT HICOM SHORTXJ AFTER RECEIVED IN DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE T,VSK 0RK3INAT0R/REDA<CTEOR OPERATIONS GOITRE. SGRCfe U S T jiMD RCMP DIVISION APPRWED/AUTORISE TELEPHONE sie. SIO.. FOP EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/84) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) ASSUME THESE PASSED 1 0 FCO. 5-6435 • J-.PR.-.- aavlear/lM000553 �MESSAGE 9 Bf"~ FM/DE . SECURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER DATE j'. EXTER ttftm CONFIDENTIAL OCT7/7Q ^Ttnm NO PRECEDENCE IMMED POP-232 TQ/A LDN INFO 0TT fajW v BEL YOURTEL 3341 OCT 7 SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL TEXT LOCKER MESSAGE PASSED TO BRIT HICOM 0300 HRS EDT OCT 7. OTHER TEXTS OF VARIOUS COMMUNICATIONS OF SIMILAR KIND HAVE ALSO B E M PASSED TO BRIT HICOM SHORTLY AFTER RECEIVED IN OPERATIONS CENTRE. ASSUME THESE PASSED TO FCO 2. TEXT OF MESSAGE IN LOCKER IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE LES DEMANDES CITEES SONT EXACTES. ELLES SONT LES 5 CONDITIONS ESSENTIELLES A LA LIBERATION DE CROSS. TRUDEAU DANS UNE DECLARATION PUBLIQUE DEVRA AVANT 9 HEURES A.M. MECREDI (SIC) AVOIR DECIDE SUR LE SORT DE CROSS. VIVE LE FLQ... VIVE LA LUTTE DE LIBERATION DU PEUPLE QUEBECOIS. NOUS VAINCRONS. UNQUOTE? 3. TEXT OF FLQ DECLARATION TO WHICH WAS ATTACHED PERSONAL LETTER FROM MR. CROSS TO HIS WIFE IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE FRONT DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC (AVEC LES COULEURS DU DRAPEAU DES PATRIOTES) COMMUNIQUE NUMERO 2 6 OCTOBRE 1970; 12 HEURES (MIDI), DELAI: 2k HEURES. LES AUTORITES EN PLACE NE SEMBLENT PAS PRENDRE AU SERIEUX LES RECOMMENDATIONS FORMULEES PAR LE FRONT DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC DANS LE PREMIER COMMUNIQUE. IL SERAIT PLUS SAGE POUR SAUVER LA VIE DU DIPLOMATE CROSS DE S'EN TENIR A NOS CONDITIONS QUE DE LANCER DES APPELS LARMOYANTS AUX PILULES QUE DOIT PRENDRE J. Z 22.2 DISTRIBUTION TASK FORCE LIST AND LOCAL/LOCALE 0RIGIMATJDR7REDACTEUR DIVISION •-F, TELEPHONE APPRCVED/AUTORISE / &> POP EXT18/BIL (REV 8 / 8 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 4-6435 A7LMA.£iW$g&& 000554 �V r MESSAGE roR'u , o M •: i DATE SECURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER EXTERNA FM/DE TO/A ACT 7 18 13*70 EXTER OCT7/70 NO LDN POP-233 wQeOD PRECEDENCE IMMED INFO REF our POP 230 OCT 7 SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL MONTREAL GAZETTE OCT 7 PUBLISHED TEXT OF QUOTE KIDNAP LETTER UNQUOTE FROM FLQ CONTAINING NAMES OF PRISONERS FOR RELEASE AS GIVEN PARA 3 OUR POP 208 OCT 7. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE TASK ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR SIO EXT 18/BIL (REV 8 / 8 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) F0RCE L I S T & RCMP DIVISION POP TELEPHONE 4-6435 APPROVED/AUTORISE aio>0yJA.yFXlALrfi&r ~~' 000555 1 �STATBBBB'T TO 3E HARE ;B THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR IBRBrBNAL AFFAIRS, BIB HOHORABLE BTiCHELL SHARP, Ge OCTOBER 7- 1970 I have seen the text of the latest communique from the abductors of Br. Cross, together with a letter from Kr. Cross. Both the communique and the letter attach particular import ranee to the broadcasting of a certain manifesto or communique on radio and television over Radio Canada. V/e arc prepared to arrange for the broadcast, although v:e are not quite sure vrhich document is involved. Feu, we must have assurances that, without the imposition of unacceptable conditions. Kr. Cross will be delivered safe and sound. I leave already rae.de clear that the set of seven conditions originally stipulated by the abductors is wholly unreasonable. .Beat the governement needs now is the precise basis on which it can bo assured of Kr. Cross's safe release, and where and when. Otherwise there can bs no dependable discussion, since the captors might held on to IB-. Cross ine'efinitely. For this purpose, and for- the discussion of any other matters that may arise, the problem of arranging some acceptable means of coirrmunication with the abductors still remains. There are a variety of ways in vrhich this could Be done. Bed, as a first step, I invite those holding Mr. Cross to name some person with whom the authorities, or a person representing the authorities, can deal with confielence in making arrangements leading to Mr. Cross's early and saferelease . 000556 �MESSAGE T(jr: F M / D E ,TQ/A COHC EXTERN* EXTER OTT 5 7 SECURITE UN CLASS. //0<NO POP-236 0 2 2170 OCT LONDON SECURITY HUE/DOSSIER OCT. 7 1970 PRECEDENCE FLASH INFO N BEL ^F(Hr^ SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING OF BRIT TRADE COMMISSIONER £s<5TA? FOLLOWING I S THE STATEMENT MDE BY /IT710. cz> m IvJoOTl. 7, 1970. QUOTE DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE TASK FORCE LIST AND RCMP ORK5INATOR/REDACTEUR sio DIVISION ^ ..„„„-,_,._. EXT 18/BIL (REV 8 / 8 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 000557 �CROSS. QU'IL SOIT BUN CLAIR QUE LORSQUE LE DELAI SERA ECOULE NOUS N'HESITERONS NULLEMENT A SUPPRIMER J . CROSS...CAR LA VIE ET LA LIBERTE DES PRISONNIERS POLITIQUES ET DES GARS DE LAPALME VALENT BUM DES CENTAINES DE DIPL014ATES VOUEES AUX SEULS INTERETS FINANCIERS DES BIG BOSS ANGLO-SAXONS ET AMERICANS. PLACE SERONT LES SEULS VRAIS RESPONSABLES DE SA MORT. DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC. NOUS VAINCRONS, FRONT REMARQUE 1 - LE CONTENU DE CE COMMUNIQUE DOIT OBLIGATOIREMENT ETRE RENDU PUBLIC. COMMUNIQUE UNE LETTRE DE J . 4. LES AUTORITES EN REMARQUE 2 - NOUS JOIGNONS A CE DEUXIEME CROSS A SON EPOUSE. THESE TEXTS HAVE NOT BEEN RELEASED TO THE PRESS NOR HAS I T BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED OFFICIALLY THAT ANY PARTICULAR MESSAGE HAS BEEN RECEIVED. THE ABOVE TEXTS ARE FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY AND SHOULD HAVE A VERY LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. 000558 �MESSAGE FM/DE § • qcmT: 7 EXT! RN1970 EXTER OTT OCT TQ/A DATE HUE/DOSSIER : o • 2 2 - " T f /< I It w n t 1 NO POP-239 LONDON SECURITY SECURITE UNCLASSIFIED PRECEDENCE ROUTINE INFO ™^ YOURTEL 3 3 2 3 OCT. 6 SW'SW J A M S RICHARD CROSS MESSAGE PASSED. X DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE ORK5INATOR/REDACTEUR ..^/jipj Gv->-mwk*,/', EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/84) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) i DIVISION TELEPHONE APPROVED/AUTORISE a\a..C2kFl2. 000559 �personal Information / renseignements personnels '000560 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000561 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000562 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000563 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000564 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000565 �1 ' personal Information / renseignements personnels 000566 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000567 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000568 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000569 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000570 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000571 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000572 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000573 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000574 �personal Information / renseignements personnels i 000575 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000576 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000577 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000578 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000579 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000580 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000581 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000582 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000583 �r personal Information / renseignements personnels 000584 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000585 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 000586 �r personal Information / renseignements personnels 000587 �J personal Information / renseignements personnels 000588 �PDK/A.E.Ritchie/PS \>j F Octobsr a, 1970. yjEKOEUHDUy FOR Ktt.ft.G.ROBb&TSOK (FRIYTf COUKCIL^FFICE) The FLC Kidnappin: / ^ ' ^ - W - / As you no doubt know (as Don dall suggested} wa Lavs a small group working rsry quietly on what may have to be said or done if this incident turns out in the wors possible H&V and Br. Cross is killed. 2. It seems to me thst we should also be providing for the possibility that the incident ends with Br. Cross still alive. Bven then, thsrs would be a need presumably for the Government (tlie Prime rinister ?) to say something to the people of Quebec snd the Canadian public generally. If no fundamental concessions have been mada the Government might consider it desirable to say something about the lessons of this experience in which a little band of people have been able to endanger not only one man's life but the institutions of the country; fortunately on this occasion we have come through without najor damage but we shall need to take precautions against a repetition in the future. If of course fundamental concessions have been made, the Government v:KP have to make a much more difficult statement. 3. fright I suggest that your office may wish to head up a little group to consider the sort of statement the Prime Minister might make if Kr» Cross has been returned alive and either (i) no major concessions have been madeMii) major concaasions have been made, tfs would be glad to have an officer of thia Department participate in this exercise. 4. Regarding our other current activity relating to this case, we now have in operation: (a) the general interdepartmental ''Task ?orca" under Claude Roquet in the Operations Centre. (b) Bill Barton's group on what may be necessary if ?r. Cross is killed; and (c) a group under Andre1 Bissonnette to consider the basis on which contact might be established with the abductors (e.g. who might might be our intermediary? what concessions might he be allowed to offer from one stage to another). Ross Francis, the Press Officer of this Department is in touch with the CBC about the manner in which the so-called "manifesto7' might be aired if the Government decide to ask the CBC to broadcast it. 5. Heedless to say none of these groups will take any significant action without full consultation with Ministers. ... z �S K C k L T V - 2 - 6. I should add that we are keeping as close as possible txy the Quebec authorities on these different activities, ho doubt if you decide to establish a group on the question of some Prime Kinisterial statement you will wish to consider the sort of relationship which would be desirable with the Quebec authorities on that matter as well. A. E. RITCHIE A.L.ii. ccs Mr. Mr. Mr. Kr. /Vv Barton 31aaonnette Koquet Francis I tX-*yC*--y 1 000590 �I -I October 8, 1970 MOVEMENTS OF PREMIER BOURASSA OF QUEBEC Mr. D. C. Reefie confirmed at 4=45 p.m. that Premier Bourassa had arrived in New York. He is staying in Suite 911 of the Plaza Hotel, telephone number is PL-93000. Between 5 0 0 and 7:00 p.m. he will be unavailable as he is in a meeting. Messages during that time can be passed to him by Mr. Bruce Rankin, Canadian Consul General, who will be in Suite 249 of the Plaza Hotel. At 7:00 p.m. Mr. Bourassa is attending a dinner of the Canadian Society to be held in the Plaza Hotel where he is the guest speaker. The Canadian Consulate General is involved with the arrangements for Mr. Bourassa's visit. Mr. Rankin's home telephone number is 838-7008. Mr. Yvon Beaulne's, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, home telephone number is TE-27787. J. If./Ijuddington 4 PUo 4 pco PSB fA{ POO ?D-B ?[)& V> Dtyj Oi{ 17 Q)(2(2 <p9 VA PCO Qkj-F, V2Z A OMO r- F. s P<0i A p>R 000591 �M E M O R A N D U M Mr. Whitehead informed us this evening at 19*15 hres that at 15:00 hrs this afternoon, October 8, Mrs. Cross again went to a police station in an attempt to identify some of the arrested suspects. She was not able to identify anyone and returned home. Apparently she was photographed going to and from her home. J.D.P. �<|| /MOTH fo>7 /}),< 'JltSSon/A/BTTZ Monsieur Lee a telephone au sujet de: Possible libel charges against Federal Government on PL^ communique. (Of Ten ice ) Don Christie/advises that although there are a few libellous statements in communique, that they are not sufficient to prevent BBC from publicizing communique, CBC shoulei make clear however that document is being read over tire air as a result of FLQ demand. 000593 �October 6, 1970 MBsJtoMHM FOR MS. RIS5H1 9m% .„.., ^ ^ ^ Mr. Biaacnnette Subject: Kidnapping and Lapalme Uorkers: Coaaents of the Postmaster Beneral .Minister Cotd returned ny call tonight. I said I had wanted to consult him on your behalf on the possibility of * reference to the Lapalme conflict ae one which the Interested parties wished to settle by themselves. However the idea of a statement touching on this point has now been dropped. Mr. Cot4 said that he was currently negotiating with the Lapalme workers. He personally thought that no agreement would be possible with them. Mo optimistic statement in that respect was therefore possible. It remained that the LspsXms workers had sede it clear that they did aot want anyone, including the FLQ, to seek to aet on their behalf. 2. Mr. Cote* added that, of course, if it was felt that the Lapalme ccnflict must be settled on the other side's terms, because of the more inportant iasue of the kidnapping, this could no doubt be done. X said X doubted very much whether this was a substantive issue sith the PLQ. We had ignored it and we suspected they would drop it after using it for propaganda prrpoeee. Nevertheless, X thanked him for his inforaaticn and 3* X should add that X had cancelled ay request to speak with Minister Cote. X assist* he called back in the evening because of his Intereet in the Cross ease. Claude ****»•* �MESSAGE "PfE" FM/DE EXTER SECURITY SECURITE HUE /DOSSIER CONFD 0CT8/70 NO PRECEDENCE //tWwA.-! POP-240 TO/A LDN INFO j \ CtTJ >F BEL YOURTEL 3341 0CT7 OURTEL POP-232 OCT7 $UB/§Uy) KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM FLQ SINCE OURTEL UNDER REF. 2. COMMUNIQUE NO. 4 LEFT WITH CKLM RADIO STATION MONTREAL AT NOON OCT7.WITH COVERING LET TO MANAGER PIERRE PASCAU. TEXT OF COVERING LET IS QUOTE (COMCENTRE PLEASE COPY ATTACHED) 3. TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE NO. 4 IS QUOTE (COMCENTRE PLEASE COPY ATTACHED) 4. THIS COMMUNIQUE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY LET TO AUTHORITIES FROM CROSS AUB tfAS DATED 9:45 P.M. PREVIOUS EVENING TUE OCT6. TEXT IS QUOTE (COMCENTRE PLEASE COPY ATTACHED) 5. COMMUNIQUE ALSO ACCOMPANIED BY LET FROM CROSS TO HIS 'WIFE UNDATED. (WE ARE NOT/NOT TRANSMITTING THIS BECAUSE OF PERSONAL NATURE OF LET. BRIT HIGHCOMM HERE HAS ALSO REFRAINED FROM SENDING THIS LET TO LDN AT REQUEST OF MRS. CROSS.) 6. LET TO MRS CROSS WAS IN ENVELOPE ON WHICH WAS WRITTEN IN BLOCK LETTERS .../2 DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE TASK FORCE LIST ORK5INA70R/REDACTEUR 4' €.'A SIO BP— DIVISION TELEPHONE APPRCVED/AUTORISE 810. J.Uo^AJr^f^A^A^iFLZ2.„ _ I,.Mifte EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/84) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) "000595 �- 2 - CONFD QUOTE POUR MADAME CROSS ET S I MADAME CROSS VEUT PARLER A SON EPOUX QU'ELLE LE FASSE PAR CKLM A PARTIR DE 9 HEURES AM MERCREDI UNQUOTE. 7 . ON THIS POINT OUR ADVICE SHARED BY BRIT HERE WAS THAT RADIO STATEMENT BY MRS CROSS WOULD NOT/NOT SERVE AiMY PURPOSE AND THEREFORE SHE DID NOT/NOT COMPLY WITH THIS OFFER. �MESSAGE DATE FM/DE BX'fFf ™SR TO/A LDN INFO RCMP OCT SECURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER OCT8/70 8 10 UNCLAS NO 55 70 PRECEDENCE FLASH POP-241 BEL YOURTEL 3359 OCT8 SUfiZSW KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL FOLLGWING IS TEXT OF INTERVIEW WITH MR. TRUDEAU REPORTED BY JOHN DRURY, CBC NEWS, 9:00 A.M. OCT7: QUOTE (COMCENTRE PLEASE COPY ATTACHED) UNQUOTE. 2. IN HOUSE OCT7 MR. DIEFENBAKER ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY HOPE REMAINING FOR SURVIVAL OF MR. CROSS; PM REPLIED QUOTE HOPE STILL EXISTS UNQUOTE AND STATED HE COULD NOT/NOT USEFULLY ADD ANYTHING AT THIS TIME. EXCHANGE CONTINUED AS FOLLOWS QUOTE (COMCENTRE PLEASE COPY ATTACHED) II UNQUOTE. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE N0 STANDARD ORK3INATOR/REDACTEUR :Lz::z:w%;jmmzzz:i EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/84) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) TASK FORCE LIST DIVISION TELEPHONE APPROVED/AUTORISE 7 F-.l^sMMsm.....'.'.'.'.". 000597 �MESSAGE 70ft DATE 'AT* fcX'«'rr: . TFK- UCT fl i 6 3<7B NO LDN TO/A I 0CT8/70 EXTER FM/DE SECURITY SECURITE FIUE/DOSSIER POP- aM-a RESTRICTED PRECEDENCE IMMED INFO N BEE YOURTEL 3 3 6 8 OCT 8 SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING PRESS OFFICER TOLD PRESS TODAY THAT FOLLOWING HIS STATEMENT LAST NIGHT MR. SHARP WAS ANXIOUS TO RECEIVE EARLY CONFIRMATION THAT THE ABDUCTORS OF MR. CROSS WERE WILLING TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS AIMING AT HIS RELEASE. THE AUTHORITIES ARE READY QUICKLY TO DESIGNATE A PERSON BEST SUITED AS A CONTACT, WHEN THEY KNOW THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE THE ABDUCTORS CHOOSE. HE STRESSED THAT MR. SHARP'S REQUEST TO THE ABDUCTORS TO NAME A REPRESMTATIVE HAD BEEN MADE IN GOOD FAITH. DISTRIBUTION _l LOCAL/LOCALE ^ * f'°* ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR $\a..i^A27%L7LA».^J^^^ JLAF.. R-.JPHAHOTa/lM EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/84) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) c * U /ST 1. ? C H P DIVISION TELEPHONE POP 5*6107 APPRCVED/AUTORISE ^07^^^^.A7X^2^ uuuoaa �MESSAGE DATE OCT 8 1970 EXTERNAL FM/PE UNCLASS _N0 ALL POSTS TO/A SECURITY SECURITE aira*03B£ (COMCENTRE - PLEASE GIVE THIS TEL PRECEDENCE IMMED PGP-243 SAME DISTRIBUTION AS P G P - 2 3 7 ) . INFO BEL SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS RELEASED AT 1 2 0 0 NOON OCT 8 TEXT BEGINS AN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN SAID TODAY THAT, FOLLOWING HIS STATi3ffiHT LAST NIGHT, MR. SHAV WAS ANXIOUS TO RECEIVE EARLY CONFIRMATION THAT THE ABDUCTORS OF MR. CROSS MERE WILLING TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS AIMING AT HIS RELEASE. THE AUTHORITIES ARE KoADY QUICKLY TO DESIGNATE A PERSON BEST SUITED AS A CONTACT, ,-MW THEY KNOW THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE THE ABDUCTORS CHOOSE. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE TEXT ENDS. TASK poRCE 0RK3INATOR/REDACTEUR L I S T 4 j^jp DIVISION APPRCVED/AUTORISE TELEPHONE 810. SIO.. y "J'JP'l'' ixe^ins^<»s/tmV EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/84) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) OPO MsfflMh >6107 000599 �MESSAGE w FM/PE TO/A INFO DAfE FIUE/POSSIER OCT 8 1970 EXTfm EXTERNAL SECURITY SECURITE UNCLASS Oil 8 i 9 I r 7 0 NO POP-246 LONDON PRECEDENCE FLASH CONGEN NEW YORK RITCHIEWBWDK-RITCHIE TELECON BEL KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL SUB/SUJ vjl500 XEX HOURS mtlz CBC HAS JUSTYRETRACTED STORY THAT CROSS HAD BEEN QUOTE LIQUIDATED UNQUOTE IN FOLLOWING TERMS BEGINS (COMCENTRE PLEASE CCPY ATTACHED MARKED TEXT) X DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE SIO.. TASK FORCE LIST & RCMP ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR J . R . BARKER/bm EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/84) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) DIVISION OPCENTRE TELEPHONE 5-6107 SIO. ^ — - ^ J.T. R R . BARKER RARKV.B P7 000600 �FM/DE a or J P.V ' - P ^ MESSAGE EKTW OCT 8 23 23*18 EXTERNAL DATE FIUE/POSSIER OCT 8 1970 TF77 - / SECURITY SECURITE CONFID. NO TQ/A PRECEDENCE FLASH (FL. POP-248 LONDON FOR HIGH COMMISSIONER INFO BEL SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING - CBC BROADCAST OF MANIFESTO CBC FRENCH NETWORK WILL BROADCAST TONIGHT AT TEN THIRTY THE ABDUCTORS MANIFESTO BOTH ON RADIO AND TELEVISION. ANNOUNCEMENT OF BROADCAST WILL BE MADE BY CBC AT EIGHT 0'CLOCK. 2. BRITISH HICCM OTTAWA HAVE BEEN INFORMED. X DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE TASK F0RCE ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR C. Roquet/bm EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/84) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) DISTRIBUTION & RCMP DIVISION OPS CENTRE TELEPHONE 5-6107 APPROVED/AUTORISE C. ROQUET C F t ^ i ^ 000601 �PROJET ' . « M l AU MBUSTRE Qj CONFIDENTIEL 7*1/SffO- frk'- fajffC- Affaire Cross: Negociations eventuelles sur prisonniers ELj Je vous suggere ci-dessous quelques elements de reponses aux questions qui pourraient se poser si le Gouvernement decide de negocier la liberation de prisonniers FLQ en echange de M. Cross. Procedure legale Le Cabinet pourrait adopter un ordre-en-conseil accordant un pardon (Art. 655, para 2, ^ode criminel) complet ou conditionnel aux individus designes, actuellement detenus dans des institutions penitentiaires federales. La liberation peut aussi se faire par la prerogative royale de grace du Gouverneur General. J->es effets sont les memes que pour le pardon. Le choix entre les deux est plutot d'ordre politique. La liberation conditionnelle pour bonne conduite est une autre possibilite en certains cas. Mais vu les restrictions de la loi des liberations conditionnelles, il est douteux que ce moyen puisse etre utilise dans les circonstances et pour les raisons actuelles. Quelle que soit la procedure choisie, il faut noter que cinq prisonniers (Morency, Lanctot, Roy, Robert fiudon. Gabriel Hudon) attendent ou subissent actuellement leur proces et se trouvent de ce fait sous juridiction provinciale. -^e Gouverneinant provincial pourrait les liberer en retirant l'acte d'accusation. Choix des prisonniers. Trois principaux criteres peuvent etre utilises pour le choix des prisonniers a liberer: l) le risque qu'ils representent encore pour la societe; 2) la proximite de la date ou ils deviendront eligibles a une liberation conditionnelle; 3) l'importance du dossier judiciaire et la nature des crimes reproches. ...2 �-2- CCNFIDENTIEL * Le facteur risque est evalue sur leur caractere, sur leur determination a poursuivre leurs activitt's illegales a leur sortie de prison. Le tableau A ci-joint classe les prisonniers dans un ordre croissant de danger public, a partir d1 evaluations de la Commission nationale des liberations conditio.inelles (Ministere du Solliciteur general) et de la Gendarmerie hoyale. ^e facteur eligibility a une liberation condri tionnelle fait 1 objet du tableau B. Les numeros les moins e'leves i .diquent une olus grande proximite de la date ou la Commission doit considerer si une liberation conditionnelle sera accorde'e ou non. Le tableau C donne un apercu des crimes reoroches a chaque orisonnier. La nature exacte, la frequence, les circonstances des crimesZ-judiciaires etablis par la Gendarmerie Royale et attaches en annexe D. ^ressortent des resumes des dossiers 000603 �MIN ^Parl.Sec. - ~ PDM PDF/P.A.Bissonnette/dsta A- - 'AZ - 'J77A i •y- » iA-BS. -^ # HlRKUy*'*) Tu<> n C /= (O) ^ • 6V/rti S ft is ) Gctobor d, 197C X.jiiLii2i.7L\l> FQ-C TfL i J^lJTrPi Abduction of J . H . r Jrod3 - fropossd p o s i t i o n whan d i r e c t c o n t a c t ^ r f e ^ Y B fclcUapjerg. j..t i s not t o o soon t o detertedne what our t a c t i c s and '. . . .xxty.u.d.-i should b e . I a tho avant t h a t c o n t a c t i s e s t a b l i s h e d , i t i s reoowiaoadod t h a t an a p p r o p r i a t e f e a e r a l o f f i c i a l ( i n c o n j u n o t i o n witn an a p p r o p r i a t e p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c i a l ; be d e s i g n a t e d t o conduct a t l e a s t t h e f i r s t phase of n e g o t i a t i o n and t h u t ha be? i n s t r u c t e d aa f o l l o w s t 8P To indicate to the kidnappers that as the Govermaeut has already wade dear it is aot in a position to agree to rerjUftsts that it regards entirely unjustifiable on the basis of hiackztfiii, but that it is anxious to preserve ix. Cross' life. ;*ora specdfiaully tlie JO verruueat will not yield to the threat of blackmail on those requests viiieh, if granted, would tend to destroy the basis of law ana order in this country. Ca those letters thba relate to the abduction itself the uoverxiaent is prepared to discuss thou in the context of an arrangement which would lead to Lr. Cross' release. For exeuaple, with regard to the so-called aanii'eeto, the widei* publicatioa of it ls not in itself relevant to the ciiintenance of law and order. If lt is insisted that the publicity that tue manifesto has already recoived is iusuffiuient, t:*e Qoverniaent would be prepared to consider allowing its facilities to be used in tids connection. (This is subject to an opinion froa, the ^epartsent of Justice on the risk of incurring: libel action frost tne persons mentioned in the aaaifesto.) 2 uince further ,rualieity will no doubt b» sougtit, if ouly for reason of face, you should then say that the Govemaent is prepared to agree to this particular requirement as purt of a package settlement. d) Turning then very serious by their act they Emst be to iaor« substuiitial Batters, you should refer to the position in which the abductors have put themselves and to indicate that tho Jovarnneiit x'eoognises thut concerned about their poaition; in the context of an 000604 �arrangeiaeat for IJC. Gross' r e l e a s e , the Government woula be Prepared t o discuss arrangeaenta relut.li<g to t h e i r r e s e n t exposed position. ~>uch arrangements might incluue t h e i r t r a n s f e r to another country i f there La out willing to ace-apt t. l*&*s . e) *'ith regard t o th»a other deuands cf tua abductors, trie jovei'aJaeat would not be prejfeu'ed to odu'^ain with regux'u t^ vi; tue relouee of prisoner* now in custody, ( i i ; tiie ransou, p i - - , tne re-engu^eaent of tho Lapalue workers except on tiie torus already offered t o tuew, and (iv) the question of the alleged informer. (However, ia subsequent discussions of the ransom demand, i t could be i dicut.-d t h a t the uoverni.iu.it would racj^.ir.i.e x.i tne concept of a settlement involving t h e i r t r a n s f e r t o another couato-y that they would have c e r t a i n expenses t o a e e t . This coneept should not, however, be raised u n t i l th« discussion of ti*jwiiifer t o another country I s being a c t i v e l y pursued -with 3u«ie prospect t h a t i t aight loan t o a a*ttlasent*) t) xou should eucourage thorn to pursue the icon of cuttle,; p.p.rr l o s d c j anei accepting a safe—conduct arrai^eoeat .oa tne basic for a settiexient and to thie; end encourage theia t c discuss sane of the p r a c t i c a l problems which would Oe involved: ( i j the mechanics whereby .ir. Cross wouli be released following t h e i r safe t r a n s f e r to another country, ( i i ; who would bo holding hiss, meanwhile, U - i ; the numbers requiring tne safe conduct, (iv; the question whether a country acceptable to tuw^ i s willing t« receive thea, vv; the arrangements for transport ( i f other nattex*a are agreed, the Goverii&ent would preauaably Be prepareo t o provide an a i r c r a f t , g; In tue context ox" u aiacussicn on the sai'e conduct, you couia use the granting ox jto;des for actual expenditures a.: an induoetient to f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r accepting a settlement baaed oa aafe oonouct. h) .-inee we uo not expect that a l l date i l s of the above arraagoaent w i l l be a e t t l e u ui tne fxrst meeting, you should luake cleux* that you wisi. to have further meetings with them. -c. I t w i l l be both p o l i t i c a l l y eujm l e g a l l y varautxng of ixauunity r e s t s p r i n c i p a l l y uith ...uecicc Governments necessary Xso obtain .uabeo approval on above p o s i t i o n . 3. This haa alreaoy beea oi^cussei with o f f i c i a l s of J u s t i c e and a.BB . You may wxan nou to consult t:ie .rime i d n i e t e r about t ese ideas niu aoout who might be tne Beaerai r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . I assume t h a t the o f f i c i a l shouia be a ripened—speaking Canadian (good [ o a s i o i l i t x e s from t h i s ^epaxtatont would be Claune .<.oquat a t the i n i t i a l periou onu .aiorv Hisaonaette i f l a t e r soueoue with a wore fonsal o f f i c i a l position wure t o be r e q u i r e d ) . 000605 �C. ROQUET/k« f October 8 , 1970 f\JF 7 CONFIDENTIAL 3.J2- 7> 'A-CJAS^ MEMORANDUM FOR TIIE MINI3TOI Subject: Croes Kidnapping 8—diaa Canadian Red Cross General Wrinch of tha Canadian Red Croes telephoned frea Toronto about 8:00 paa. on October 8 to make a cautious sounding about a pooalblo Rad Cross role la tha current kidnapping case. He told tho head of our Task Force that ho realized his was an eleventh hour eall* R e m ha was wonder lag If there aaa may role tha Rad Croaa eould play la thia matter, particularly la any mediation that might ba required. 2. Thia possibility had bean taken up with hla by hie thia matter with them a day er so agp. They had alerted hla to the fact that. If the kidnappers should suggest a role for tha Canadian Rod Croaa la tha kidnapping case, they would ba glad to assist ta tha beet of their ability. 3* The General wast ea to aay that, if by ang we fait that aaaa completely outside person er authority required, ha oould gat la touch with the tot arnational Committee in Geneva. Ha had aot broached tho natter with thea at all, of course, and eould aot ba certain that they would bo dlapoaad to bo involved. Indeed ha appeared somewhat doubtful. Ho aaid it would aot bo required of course that a fonaal request for Rad Croaa involveaaent should eone frea tho Canadian Government, er that such involvement should involve any publicity. The General aaid that ha waa a "bit pessimistic** about these ideas, which wa took to aaaa that they not, la hla view, likely to bo practicable. 4. General Wrinch asked that hla —JUL should ba brought to jour attention. If ha should receive word Area you that tha ideas ha had put forward presented any hopeful prospects, ha would then ba dlapoaad to get la touch with tho Rad Croaa la • • •< 000606 �- 2 - be Thia being a serious and considerate ao—ding on the part of a Tory diatingniahad personality, wo assume that you would wish yourself to give the General a substantive reply. Our officer simply thanked the General for hla eall and assured hla that hla ideas would bo promptly submitted to you la full and that your reaction would undoubtedly be conveyed to hla vary shortly. However In order to ensure that tha Genaral should not entertain unduly high hopes, it waa mentioned to hla that tha kidnappers had rejected any idea of mediation In their fifth cotaaunique. Mention waa also aado of the broadcast of tho FLQ manifesto by Radio Canada on October 8 aa a development which night affect the alt—tl—. 6. Tou will no doubt agree that all our actions to date have been baaed on tha assumption that thia natter aust be settled la Canada between Canadians, and that 1 — 1 — a t from outside would give an unnecessary and indeed highly undesirable new iatatwntl«"*i dimension to tho Croaa affair. I would suggest tharafora that you reassure tha Genaral aa to tha present evolution of tho case aad let hla know that Rad Cross involvement at thia stage night coapHaate a delicate but not hopeless situation. I oould if you wish, apeak with tha General without delay along these lines, if you prefer. �,,**«•» ACTION COPY JKOTM5B^M(lllTCilIE') PD:A(!10QUKT) PBO (POBFBeTS) PCO(WALLS) PPU<itiI/\D) FLE(DEWcllS) Pol (i J B r O ^ ^ H ' a l M B } GCOd'UBBIr.iBTO:!) PAddi' 07 JUSj'KB: (CaULSV) E) iaOLKBTOB CBN (HORPY) C O N F I D E N T I A L FM CANDELNATO O C T 8 / 7 0 TO TT EXTER 2 2 9 0 DE LDN INFO TT WSHDC DE OTT REF P 0 P 2 2 2 1 0CT6 PROTECTION OF DIPLOSsNAC OCT7 AFTER POINTING OUT POIGNANCY AND URGENCY WHICH THIS SUBJ HAD NOW ACQUIRED FOR CDN GOVT AND EXPRESSING OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL REGRETS THAT KIDNAPPING HAD OCCURRED I GAVE OUTLINE OF CIRCUMSTANCES BASED ON REFTEL AND CIRCULATED COPIES OF STATEMENTS MADE BY SSEA ON OCT5 AND 6 . 1 EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE RELUCTANT TO CIRCULATE TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE FOR REASON GIVEN YOURTEL BUT SAID IT WAS AVAILABLE ON CONFD BASIS FOR THOSE WHO WERE INTERESTED. 2.UK REP SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE FULLY SATISFIED WITH MEASURES BEING TAKEN BY CDA TO OBTAIN SAFE RELEASE OF CROSS AND WERE CONFIDENT OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. 3 . P O ( 7 0 ) 4 0 WAS ACCEPTED BY NAC WITH SEVERAL REPS COMMENTING THAT THEIR AUTHORITIES HAD ALREADY PUT INTO EFFECT SOME OF SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN IT.FRENCH REP IN ACCPETING DOCU POINTED OUT DANGER OF ATTRACTING ATTN TO DIPLOS BY TOO CLOSE OR FORMAL CONSULTATION AMONG FRIENDLY EMBS.HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT SUCH COOPERATION SHOULD NOT/NOT BE LTD TO NATO MEMBERS. 4.USA REP ANNOUNCED THAT REPORT OF INTERAMERICAN JURIDICAL CTTEE (WSHDC TEL 2 4 3 0 SEP2)WOULD BE COMPLETED IN NEXT WEEK OR TWO AND WOULD BE DISTRIBUTED IN PAC.IM EXPECTATION THAT WSHDC WILL MAKE T H I S �9 PAGE TWO 229G CONFD - , ^ r r ,nr r n m n SEND IT WE SHALL NOT/MOl AVAILABLE TO YOU WOO BEFORE WE COULD SEND DO SO UNLESS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED CAMPBELL RFT 0 8 1 8 3 3 Z 000609 . J �. October 9, 1970 7i*e: JS'/O NOTE FOP. MR. RITCHIE Inspector Ferraris asked that you be informed that Assistant Commissioner Parent of the R.C.M.P. will be coming to the Operations Centre at 4 O O p.m. and would like to see you if possible as he has been asked to brief Cabinet on the Cross situation at 5:00 p.m. J. DJ Puddington �October 9, 1970. MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROQUET CUBA AND ALGERIA - MISSIONS IN MONTREAL AND RELATIONS WITH UK (A) MISSIONS IN MONTREAL ALGERIA - NIL CUBA - CONSUL (none a t p r e s e n t ) , 1255 U n i v e r s i t y Avenue, S u i t e 1514. Telephone: 861-4396. - TRADE COMMISSIONER - Ricardo C a b r i s a s , 3737 Blvd. M e t r o p o l i t a n , S u i t e 1200, V i l l e S t - M i c h e l . Telephone: 725-5235. (B) MISSIONS IN OTTAWA CUBA - EMBASSY. H.E. Dr. Jose Fernandez de Cossio, Residence ChLcery Tel:' 233-1497. T " ' ^ ^ ALGERIA - EMBASSY. HJS. Tayeb Seddikioui, 200 Rideau Terrace t*W«<0^*< (residence), Suite 409. Residence Tel: 749-1121 ?"»"%£, . ^ Chancery Tel.: 749-1121. , . , ^ L "» (C) CURRENT STATE OF RELATIONS WITH UNITED KINGDOM: ^ ^ ^ s ^ /iKotC CUBA - as good, or better than ours; mission active, trade lively. ALGERIA - normal and healthy; not necessarily close. Active mission, looks after our consular problems r.R. BARKER, Operations Centre. 70) 000611 s^ �f : ^ k ; P J P < B ) GCO(PUBD);.vGTOB) PBPT 01- JUSTICE (CBBBB ]E) SOLICITOR C£IJ(1!Q1-LEY) . " 7 CT1C : C - • / R E S T R I C T E D FM LDN O C T 9 / 7 0 TO EXTER 33 83 IMMED REF YOURTEL PDG002 0CT5 KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL FOLLOWING FOR SSEA FROM SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME.QUOTE I WAS VERY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR MSG ABOUT THE KIDNAPPING OF MR CROSS WHICH CHARLES RITCHIE CONVEYED TO ME YESTERDAY.WE DO INDEED UNDERSTAND THE APPALLING DILEMMA WHICH YOU FACE AND MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE THAT YOU ARE DOING ALL YOU POSSIBLY CAN TO ENSURE THAT MR CROSS I S RELEASED UNHARMED.UNQUOTE. 20 :<5l 100 6 000612 �% C O N F I D E N T I A L *' s21 "" -LOO 6 FM LDN OCT9/70 TO EXTER 3395 FLASH REF MY TELECON WITH USSEA KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL FCO MUCH APPRECIATE POSSIBILITY OF SSEA PHONING SIR ALEC ON THIS SUBJ.BEST TIME TO REACH HIM AT BLACKPOOL IS FROM 1730 TO 1300 LOCAL TIME.PHONE NUMBER BLACKPOOL TRUNKS SUB 19 RITCHIE RFT 091554Z j / FfA n ~f/) l9D* jj[yf FA 7 000613 �POP MIM pBM(tBBi'CHTE) FPU(BOQUBBP) PBO (KOBSTS) PGQ(BAUB ) p?Ii(ilEAD) FLH(BB.Vai;3) p51 (iPJ.p) FCQ(STABSPIFLD) GCO(PU1»IKGTOM) BaBf" OP JUSTICE (CiliU"S.T)E) SOLICITOR GEB(IIOFLHY) / 9 OCT ,, n ?8° " F *D E » f c / > f r ft L FM LDN OCT9/70 TO EXTER 3395 FLASH REF MY.TELECON WITH USSEA KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL FCO MUCH APPRECIATE POSSIBILITY OF SSEA PHONING SIR ALEC ON T![IS SUBJ,BEST TIME TO REACH HIM AT BLACKPOOL IS FROM 1730 TO 1800 I LOCAL TIME.PHONE NUMBER BLACKPOOL TRUNKS SUB 19 RITCHIE RFT 09 1554Z J ; A7 X . / ) O 7\ a F 0 r 000614 �FCO0U'BBB .B) CCO (PUDDINGTON) I'BPT OP JUSTICE(CHRIS/IE) SOLICITOR GEU (HOMEY) ACTION COPY 9 OCT 19: 29 C O N F I D E N T ! A L FM LDN OCT9/70 NO/NO STANDARD TO EXTER 34 02 IMMED INFO RCMPOTTCSANDI FERRARIS)CIB OUIMET IMMED KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAV'P. LIST SOONEST OF OFFENCES COMMITTED BY PRISONERS LISTED IN MANIFESTO.IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL FOR OURSELVES AND FCO IN DEALING WITH ENQUIRIES ABOUT THESE PRISONERS TO BE ABLE TO INDICATE HOW MANY WBRE INDICTED FOR OFFENCES OF MURDER,MA NSLAUGHTER,ET C, RFT 09 174 2Z 000615 �—fy tZ ~~ B O00 F^F 6 2 J '^' " SECRET (77,2 &'<>*F cJ October 9, 1 JL JF ) 19 7 0 . MEMORANDUM Cross Kidnapping - federal negotiating position and mechanics for the release This memorandum outlines the bargaining position which could be adopted by the Canadian government with the kidnappers on various issues they have raised. It makes recommendations as to what the final, maximum package might be v.'hich we could offer to the kidnappers if necessary It describes how the negotiations could be handled on the government side. Finally an annex deals with the alternative sets of mechanics for tlie actual release of Mr. Cross. The proposals hereunder are predicated, on the assumption that the government's final position would involve the safe passage of the abductors, and possibly some members of their families, to a country which would accept them. There: is reason to believe that Cuba would. 000616 �<Je examine below the issues one by one starting v/ith the 3-3ast difficult CHOP.: (a) Lapalme workers. - it seems that this v/as a propaganda issue for the FLQ. Now that it has been exploited they can be expected to drop it quietly, especially as therekre now talks going on between which the government and the union (for/the FLQ may claim some credit). Our negotiator shoud therefore ignore this issue. Only if the FLQ were adamant about it and if it became the last obstacle to an agreed settlement would it be submitted to the government for reconsideration; (b) Denunciation of the informer. - Even if there was an informer to reaeal his identity would be to expose him to assassination by the FLQ. This is a moral responsibility the government could not accept, quite apart from the other obvious drawbacks. The government negotiator should therefore deny that there is an informer and categorically exclude any concession on this point; (c) the Money.- our negotiator v/ould refuse to discuss any ransom money. To pay ransom would be to submit openly to blackmail. However, in subsequent discussions of the FLQ demands, it could be indicated that the g overnment would recognize, in the concept of a statement involving the kidnappers to another country, that they would A have certain transitional expenses to meet. This could be broached* when prospect of an agreement on the kidnappers abroad appeared good. K Tfe sums involved should be modest and cover perhaps six months expenses in a hotel, with variations to take account of the possible departure of kidnappers'families. If the Canadian Government agreed to reimburse" Cuba for the cost of an aircraft, this could be another indirect Canadian Government financial contribution to Mr. Cross's safety - the funds .for the kidnappers upkeep would not be padd in gold. They could be �- 2 'turned over to the Cuban Mission, on the aircraft, or upon arrival in Cuba. (d) Publicity. - our initial position would be that any publicity during the whole operation should be excluded. For one thing, arrangements could be destructive by.excessive interest on the part of the press and the public. For another, the security of Mr. Cross in the first part of the arrangements and of the kidnappers themselves might be at stake. A fanatic might take a potshot at the kidnappers. Of course publicity which v/ould kP 1 '- '-'i-^f either to our advantage. the kidnappers as romantic heroes would not be Hov/ever, as in the matter of the Lapalme workers this point might be considered by the goveernment if it were the last obstacle to a successful statement. (e) Access to their alwyers for the kidnappers. - 'Be believe this could take place only on the aircraft or after arrival, in Cuba. If a lawyer like Mr. Lemieux got access to the kidnappers at the Cuban Embassy, he could v/ell persuade his clients to risk upsetting all the arrangements staying and Bratting in the mission for a longer period of uninhibited propaganda. This is an unacceptable risk. (f) Presence of lawyers and journalists on the SEX aircraft. It would be preferable to avoid both. At leBst the presence of journalists could be objected to, although a lav/yer like Per. Lemieux v/ould produce no less copy than a journalist. As a last resort, howeevr, the government might consider accepting the presence atdeast of th'S lawyer which could be justified on human right air grounds. Newsmen can always await the axicraft in Cuba if they so wish. (g) Provisionj^f aircraft. - There would be distinct advantages in asking and paying for a group aircraft. If the kidnappers insisted on having their weapons until they board the plane, there is a risk that they might decide to a. hijack the" Canadian aircraft for the sake of further publicity and a further J\ indignity to the Canadian government. They would hardly jijack a Cuban aircraft. 000618 �(h) Safe Conduct for Kidnappers This seems to be the core of any settlement. They will not relinquish Mr. Cross unless they feel safe. There may be discussion of how many would be allowed safe conduct. In the end it may be to our advantage to ensure the departure from Canada of as many as possible of those implicated in the kidnapping (probably up to 10 or even 15). This vrould identify them; it v/ould get them out of our hair. It v/ould also help the kidnappers to accept a hard federal position on the "political" prisoners, since the departure of 10 or 15 kidnappers would look like a substantial concession. /*~y: 7 9. * B Prcr.v'-aiVlBX1-7- v/ould also accept the departure of wives and children if required. — If only a few kidnappers v/ish to leave, we may be asked for an end of all enquiries into the Cross case, in perpetuity. This v/ould amount to an amnesty for all those implicated in the Cross affair, whether they went abroad or remained in Canada or returned to it. This would be unacceptable. The only acceptable formula might be a safe conduct until arrival in a foreign country. While the kidnappers could not be prevented from returning, they could be arrested and tried upon setting foot in Canada. — Incidentally, we drExJij-ik would ask the receiving country not to glorify the �kidnappers by granting them "political asylum". — Since we have an Extradition treaty with Cuba (not with Algeria), we presumably v.dll be asked to guarantee that our rights under this treaty will not be exercised. The Cubans are bound to raise this if the kidnappers don't. It would bete our advantage to accept, since otherwise the Cubans might refuse to cooperate or might refuse extradition, under the terms of the treaty, on the grounds that the kidnappers were "political refugees". �<b SECRET j ) The p r i s o n e r s " . This will be the most difficult point^presumably a basic rpre issue of principle^ involved for the Canadian government . i ^-. TV r I f i t i s decided t h a t no compromise furra i s nossible ( e . g . exchange of one urisoner for Mr. Cross), the b e s t our negotiators could do would be to s t r e s s t o the kidnappers t h a t a number of 2y or the prisoners on very short sentences might qualify s h o r t l y C\ oarole,-. t h e government may wish t o c o n s i d e r whether, i f r pr '(' this i s s u e t h r e a t e n s t h e outcome of t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s , a review of t h e p r i s o n e r s ' r e q u e s t ; for p a r o l e might pereiiacrs be a g r e e d . Presumably such a review s h o u l d t a k e t)lace a f t e r t h e d e p a r t u r e of t h e k i d n a p p e r s , u n l e s s i t i s decided t h a t i t c o u l d be u n d e r t a k e n immediately. OVERALLfBDERAL POSITION In-suwma-rjr;—Hrr Pinri nfTnrfacowe ou*' HUWJ liatora——~• 000621 �I n summary, t h e kind of outcome our n e g o t i a t o r s would seek v/ould be: a) a formula which would i n s u r e Br. C r o s s ' s a f e t y b e f o r e t h e kidnappers leave t h e country; b) a t e m o o r a r y s a f e conduct for even a f a i r l y l a r g e numjger of O-I-PBO t h e kidnapepers, families incluc.ec: i f d e s i r e d ; with—a-e-«£e cp+Mtectrtx^ e x p i r e upon t h e i r a r r i v a l i n Cuba; c) no r e l e a s e for p r i s o n e r s t o depart Canada, although some review of p a r o l e s might be considered; d) no c o n c e s s i o n on t h e informer; no concession on t h e Lapalme workers and on p u b l i c i t y except as a l a s t r e s o r t ; e) no ransom money, although modest c o n t r i b u t i o n could be made A f o r Aupkeep o f t h e kidnanoers and t h e i r f a m i l i e s ; we could t\ ' r e i m b u r s e Cuba for use of an a i r c r a f t ; f) on mechanics of t h e r e l e a s e , we would p r e f e r t h e f i r s t , but c o u l d a c c e p t t h e second accroach d e s c r i b e d i n t h e Annex. HANDLING OF TPE NEGOTIATIONS Before any fw»etrt«g-o-i» n e g o t i a t i o n could begin, vre v/ould r e q u i r e proof t h a t Mr. Cross was a l i v e . V/e might a l s c face an FIQ r e q u e s t 000622 �8 SECRET that all police investigations be stooped. To this we could presumably agree, for the duration of the discussions. At the start our negotiators might indicate our basic approach: we shall make no further unilateral move or concession, and any arrangements we may agree vdth the kidnappers would be subject to agreed mechanics which would tie Mr. Cross release to these arrangements. We will not accept accommodation for the kidnappers subject to later release of Br. Cross on their mere say so.— A threat might be issued at the same time both to the kidnappers and the FIQ. The kidnappers would be warned that, if anything went wrong with Mr. Cross, we would never give up our efforts to caoture all them and would apply to them any rigours Of the law. The FLQ might be threatened with treatment appropriate to treasonable organizations, if ministers consider this appropriate.—This done, our reoresentatiwes might start off negotiations by pointing out that both Mr. Cross and all the kidnaoDers v/ere engraved personal jeonardy. be killed. Mr. Cross could The kidnaopers would face major charges for kidnapping Ct: and possibly murder. for both. It might be possible to find -Q«t—t»e way out F< By focussing discussions upon the faith of the kidnappers 000623 �9 SECRET we may achieve a psychological effect and render lore di-ffBenult an agreement on the other i s s u e s . 000624 �MESSAGE DATE FM/DE OCT 9 1970 JtfCIiJRNAL TO/A SECURITY SECURITE HUE /POSS1ER CCNFID. NX^'^T PRECEDENCE POP-252 LaJDON INFO 10UE 3 3 9 5 OCT 9 / 7 0 SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL MINlSTiH TELEPHONED DOUGLAS HOME AT BLACKPOOL ABOUT 1 3 0 0 HOURS EDT. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/ LOCALE TASK FORCE DISTHBUTIQH & RCMP 0RI6INATOR/REDACTEUR SIO J . E . . Barkar EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) DIVISION OPS CEHTKE APPROVED/AUTORISE TELEPHONE 5-6107 *•* .... J JL.RABIES 000625 �MESSAGE DATE • FM/DE SECURITY SECURITE HUE/DOSSIER OCT 9 1970 EXTERNAL UNCLASS NO TO/A LONDON PRECEDENCE FLASH POP-253 INFO SUB'SW KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL FOLLOWING I S I JIT OF QUEBEC MINISTER OF JUSTICE CHOQUETTE STATEMENT MADE THIS AFTERNOON WHEN HE WAS INTBHSlEtfm B I PIERRE PASCAU OP RADIO STATION CKLM IN MONTREAL. BEGINS; (CONCENTRE PLEASE QUOTE MARKED TEXT) DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE TASK FORCE LIST lc RCMP ORIGINATOR/ REDACTEUR SIG J J ) . PUDDMGTGH/b* EXT18/BIL (REV 8/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) ENDS. DIVISION OPS CENTRE APPROVED/AUTORISE TELEPHONE 5-6107 8io J J>. PUDDINGTON £000626 �MESSAGE A, FM/DE TO/A INFO DATE HUE/DOSSIER OCT 9 1970 SECURITY SECURITE CONFID. ^^SXTiBHAL NO LONDON POP-254 PRECEDENCE IMMED. RCMPOTT (BANDI FLRRARIS) CIB OUIMET IMMSD BEE TOUR 3 * 0 2 OCT 9 / 7 0 SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL ON BALANCE tfE BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE THAT YOU NOT/HOT BECOME INVOLVED IN THIS ASPECT OP THE CASE AT THIS TIME. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE SIO TAsK poRCE ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR J J ) . PUDDINGTON .. EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) JJSJ 4 z BQQ, DIVISION OPS CENTRE APPRCVED/AUTORISE J . D . PUDDlNliTUN TELEPHONE 5-6107 SIO, 000627 �* 1 » ^ £>Q B T " F I r ( / O c t o b e r 10, 1970./j, j ^ a- ms ,; a 7 A J LAPORTE KIDNAPPING - FEDERAL COMPETENCE. Here are the views of Mr. Bee and Br. Christie. 2. From a strictly legal point of view, the Laporte kidnapping is a matter for the Provincial police in the administration of the code on kidnapping. (Close cooperation and consultation by the RCMP with the Provincial police is, of course, natural.) The fact that Mr. Laporte is a Minister of the Crown is of no legal relevance. His position is that of an ordinary citizen. However, there is ground for federal involvement because the connection between the two kidnappings should be assumed until proven otherwise. 3. Both Mr. Christie and Mr. Lee feel that a link must be assumed to exist between the Cross and Laporte cases. In Mr. Christie's view, this justifies External Affairs continuing to lead the operation at the federal end. Presumably Justice will take a closer interest. Mr. Christie and Mr. Lee both feel that we should bargain for both men jointly, i.e. not make concessions for the release of one only. C. Roquet. 000628 �PDe/OH.BartonAiJ ?. A Y, §,, A y Ostobsr 3, 1970. Oofttin^ency Bta.fc«s*»nts for ftouaa iia MBB& ta %^f^^..^,,.M^]\.a,f,fjr/.i;,r9,??a Attachod are d r a f t s of two eontl&sovcy statsatonta, ou«s for poaalble uno i n th« ovont of Hr. Cross* < r«l«as* and tUe ©tlir;:* ir. thee enfant Of d i s d«d.th. 2* Copias oi' tbos* stat«R«nt3 havs boon gi*sa t o th« F r i t y Count*..*, '^fftes strtff, t o bo takers i n t o account i c any ststosMmt* t h a t Vto&y way pr®p&ra f o r tho Prists Kitils&or. - :,.R. �3 SOHBT October 3, 1970. StatOBc its in event of Release or Deith or Kr. Cross jlltarna&iy.3 A: X sua sure t h a t tha shook -ml horror chat tho y .ot.s et the l a s t few Hays have i n ^ t i l l e i In rac aad o t h e r members of the Uo/erijaont are s h a r e ! by everyone in t h i s Bouse. 4e have rea?«©n, of c©ursa, t o be - r a t i f u l for the outcome. The ,1oy and happiness a t the- knowledge of the reunion of Kr. Cross and hi3 faraily reflect.-?, If-> .aura, the* r e a c t i o n of Canadians e v e r w h e r e . I would not wish t o lose thi-3 opportunity, however, t o extend t o Mr. en Mrs. Cross a t h e i r f a a i l y , a t tha saate t i n e as wo c e l e b r a t e vrith them t h i s hippy noment, the equally profound, disnay and sympathy with which wa An+r,* I t h e i r a ©ry of < hose 1 ---i jiiirj days. I t «raj evident Brotri oho s t a r t ef t h i s aightaar t h a t t h e uoverna«nt could not yield t o the tyranny implied i n t l i i s s o r t of b l a c k b a l l . The deoisicm.it took, i n consultation ifith the Gov«rowent of aiebec, t o leave ©?**•< ?11 p o s s i b i l i t i e s of contact anrf n e g o t i a t i o n with the ki' 1 - o p p ^ s saenei nonetheless the only reasonable one under the circumstances. e e • m 000630 �2 q 7 a o tr T ~. i,^*. X x.z. A. O. It is incredible to think that in a country whore there is the widest freedom of expression, any yr:roup of people would seek to publicise thair stand throurh threats on thi-i livj3 of innocent people. /e son only hope that tho mesbars of the small ga; - ipon3ible for this crime will h re learned frc ' experience the bankruptcy of tho course they - '-rv-..-. I hon* that the warm feelings transmitted to there froa all over Canada will help thea to overcom- the painful aeaor/ of this experience and will make it possible for then to continue to enjoy their assignment in Montr 1. �- 3 - Alternative B: The events which led to the death of Fr. Cross .-/ill leave a nerrcanont mark on the life of this country. I an sure that my feelings of horror anJ profound sadness are ••-••- ' by all but a handful of Canali^.-.. I express to Mrs. Cross anO. hsr fvnily "ny moot fa ^t-.Telt sy ipathy. I know that I •] . for ^ve~v p^rso-. with normal bunan feelings in conveying to Mrs. Cross the grief that u.xs piilou our hearts at the news of thia tra^e iy. It; was evident froa tho start of this nightmare that rhe . ov$?rrj«ant coul i not yield to the tyranny of this sort of blackball. By leaving open all possibilities of contact and na; otiation, it was our hope that soae way our. could be fcuni. That all our effort.^ did not succeed is a measure of th© lunacy of those responsible for this act. I still find it hard to IOBB n 'O • , AP -J country where there is the v/iaest Breeder.; oB expression, any Broup of people woul-e murder an irmoc .rt man in u attempt to force the country to lister to views which could not m * their way on their own merit. No society can tolerate this kind of terrorism .and in no part of the Canadian public will such barbarism find any response but utter disgust. �ACTION REQUEST- FICHE DE SERVICE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA FILE NO.—DOSSIER N PLATa^ /i, TO—A m 2 (AST) FROM—OE "aAF J. Pa i-uu • • W A N T S TO SEE Y O U DESIRE VOUS VOIR • WILL CALL A G A I N D O I T RAPPELER • ACTION DONNER SUITE • COMMENTS COMMENTA/RES I—I MAKE I I FAIRE A^C w. EXTENSION—POSTE L. N O . — N o TEL PLEASE CALL PRIERE D'APPEIER TIME—HEURE MF APPROVAL APPROBATION I—I DRAFT REPLY I I PROJET DE REPONSE I—I NOTE AND FILE I I NOTER ET CLASSER COPIES I—I NOTE 8, RETURN I I NOTER ET RETOURNER • A .-AA*syxysy*> NOTE & FORWARD NOTER ET FAIRE SUIVRE Cy(^*,£.y^r.. yyytAZL JLJ... j/Fb>^ xti^A Jr^AC. ch^^FyiFSJ jhyrr...SyT^^rs *S-\sTs, % CALL RECEIVED BY MESSAGE RECU PAR CGSB STANDARD FORM 1 ZC 7340-21-029-0376 x zF •S^-7P>*j TIME HEURE 000633 �ACTION REQUEST- FICHE DE SERVICE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA 2 1=ILE NO.—DOSSIER N° y?zL. 3 3 • 'j. I ^ { f ( j l > V L / ' / l•vy-y AcAc, 1—1 PLEASE CALL 1 1 PRlfRE D'APPEIER 1 TEL- N O . — N ° TEL. |—1 WANTS TO SEE YOU 1 1 DESIRE VOUS VOIR I 1—1 WILL CALL AGAIN 1 1 DOIT RAPPELER • DATE I TIME—HEURE ' ' 1 f ACTION I EXTENSION—POSTE I—I APPROVAL DONNER SUITE I—I COMMENTS I I COMMENTAIRES MAKE I I I—I I I I—I FAIRE COPIES I — | NOTE & RETURN I I NOTER ET RETOURNER I I NOTER ET CLASSER I—I NOTE & FORWARD I I NOTER ET FAIRE SUIVRE • CALL RECEIVED BY MESSAGE RECU PAR COSB STANDARD FORM 12C 7540-2 1 -029-0576 APPROBATION DRAFT REPLY PROJET DE REPONSE NOTE AND FILE TIME HEURE DnDfi'M �E CR E T QUESTIONS AND POINTS ON WHICH DECISIONS WILL BE REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF THE DEATH OF MR. CROSS. FORMALITIES. 1. ' ' ... Oct tbfa . ./<•' - / Messages (a) from Governor General to the Queen (Personal); (b) Prime Minister to the Queen through Government House channel; . (c) from Prime Minister to Prime Minister; (d) from SSEA to Lord Home; (e) personal messages to Mrs. Cross from above. 2. Statements to the Press . (a) Prime Minister; (b) SSEA. 3. Flags. (a) Decision on whether Peace Tower flag should be at half mast; ( i) on date death is discovered; ( ii) on date of departure of body from Canada; (iii) on day of funeral; ( iv) full period that body in Canada. 4. Arrangements. (a) Decision whether to press for an autopsy; (b) Decision required asto whether embalming, preparation of body, and other funeral expenses should be met by Canadian Government, including provision of hearses and limousines. 0 000635 �Arre.n.pP'Peerits ( c o n t ' d ) 0) Decision whether "transportation of body to place of /e*rn_a_i_ ^_Lrep_apierr; j ( vcxd be cost of Canadian Government: i) be by commercial airline, if so, Canadian or British; ( ii) be by chartered aircraft; (iii) be by' Canadian Forces aircraft, either 707 or Yukon (type of aircraft used might be determined by arrival time desired) (d) Decision whether expenses of trans-Atlantic trip of Mrs. Cross and-family should be met by Canadigan Government; (e) Decision as to whether Mrs. Cross should be accompanied by a Minister or senior official; 00 5. If Mrs. Cross wishes to be accompanied by British Officials are their expenses to be borne by Canadian Government. :eremonial Arrangements• (which must be. discussed with Quebec authorities, and which would be subject to Mrs. Cross's wishes). (a) Question of whether there will be a lying in state in Montreal, and if so, where; ( i) Provision of guard of honour; (ii) Attendance by Federal Ministers or senior officials: (b) Question: If Mrs. Cross wishes funeral service and burial in Montreal - attendance at service of Federal Ministers or senior officials: (c) Departure of body from Montreal airport: ( i) Guard of honour; military band? (ii) Attendance of Federal Ministers and Officials. 000636 �-3 S E C R E T 5. \ Ceremonial Arrangements (cont'd) (d) Canadian Head of Post to meet the aircraft bearing the body and to attend the funeral/burial service: (i) Question of whether the Queen should designate the Canadian attendant at the funeral as her personal representative; j (e) Decision required: Whether Canadian Government would want to organize a memorial service in Ottawa: (f) If British High Commission should organize memorial service question of governmental representation by: ( i) Governor General; ( ii) Prime Minister; (iii) Ministers; ( iv) Officials: ( v) Ministers and officials of the Government of •Quebec and Montreal. T. Read t"CT*V J. Puddingtinr^" OTTAWA, October 10, 1970. 000637 �MESSAGE "a-* FM/DE toll) TP/A OCT10/70 H»'7' SECURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER DATE ' t*«A EXTEROTT - / ^ ^ - - P O r - e*?eSS CONFD «*/ PRECEDENCE NO f LCA& IDN (FOR BITCHIE) FLASH £ INFO v I \ | BEE SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING OF BRIT OFFICIAL FOLIDWING STATEMENT WILL BE GIVM TO THE PRESS IN THE NAME OF SSEA AT 12 NOON OTT TIME QUOTE LAST NIGHT'S DOCUMENTS HAVE NOrf BEEN THOROUGHLY STUDIED.THEY DO NOT RPT NOT GIVE ANY INDICATION OF HOW OR WHERE MR. CROSS WOULD BE SAFELY RELEASED.THEY EVEN SUGGEST THAT THE GOVT WOULD BE EXPECTED TO RELY COMPLETELY ON THE KIDNAPPERS TO TURN MR. CROSS OVER AFTER THEY HAD GOT EVERYTHING THEY WANTED.NO RPT NO GOVT COULD POSSIBLY AGREE TO DO SO. I T SURELY I S CLEAR THAT WHATEVER WE ARE GOING TO DISCUSS/WE MUST FIRST HAVE A PRECISE AND DEPENDABLE ARRANGEMENT FOR MR.CROSS' SAFE DELIVERY UNQUOTE.BRIT HIGH COMMISSIONER HERE HAS BEEN INFORMED. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE lrt<z>f< Fcfra ORIGINATOR/ REDACTEUR FU-*F& EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) (JUtd P^mT DIVISION TELEPHONE /AUTORISE r^.w.^'B... ..W...P. i-. ri v -A (J ^000638 �MESSAGE DATE FILE/DOSSIER whxjio SECURITY SECURITE CONFD FM/DE TO/A NO POP-260 Ifll(F0B RITCHIE) PRECEDENCE PUSH INFO SE£ - ODBBL FCO-259 OCTIO W ' W STATEMBJT KIWAPPIB» BRIT GfflCIAL IM REFTEL BEING BELAYED .WILL KDVISE IP AMD VHBI BEHO REIMSED. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE ORK5INATOR/REDACTEUR SIO _ DIVISION APPROVED/AUTORISE TELEPHONE SIO 3-:rmmrr EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/64) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) •••••• 000639 �MESSAGE m FM/PE EXTEROTT TO/A LDN \| SECURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER ')<- - OCT 10/70 NO (ccttissmr NFO DATE / OONFD PRECEDENCE -fuaaIIAVAH WASHDC FABIS HRU OTASBRU TUNIS BEEN DUBLM BEE SHIVICE OtttTEL TOD-258 OCT 1 0 , AND FC0-259 OCT 1 0 , 310ULD m NUMBERED FOP 2 5 8 AND POP 2 $ 9 . TRIBUTION AL/LOCALE 0RK5INATOR/REDACTEUR DIVISION TELEPHONE APPROVED/AUTORISE SIO. l/BIL (REV 8 / 6 4 ) UNICATIONS OIV) mwmwimin l / ^ U000640 �October 1 1 , 1970 * CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR FILE Possible message from Mrs. Cross to Madame Laporte Mr. McConville at the U.K. High Commission telephoned this a.m. to say that Mrs. Cross wanted to send a message of sympathy to Madame Laporte. Dunrossil had seen the text and saw no objection, even if it should, as the Brits thought likely, become public. The High Commission wondered if we had any objections. Mr. Ritchie thought not, in the circumstances. O J . R. Barker LS^-AO ^ Tx. TV^Ff Ji FA % I A . A <r '- ^ tfUxs kF< ': 000641 �BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION 80 Elgin Street, OTTAWA 4 / - 11 October 1970 Mr. E. Ritchie, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, OTTAWA K— ft* PFU^, : ( 0 i< \ } t, .. \ p 7 . :> F. J A-' [ 1 - I % v- A«» I have been asked to deliver the following message from Sir Alec Douglas-Home to Mr. Sharp: B I am so sorry that this latest kidnapping has been added to all your worries. Please give my sympathy to M. Laporte's family and colleagues. We are most grateful to you and them for what you are doing and for keeping us in the picture. The text of this message was telephoned to your Operations Room earlier today. May I take this opportunity to thank you for your letter to me of 7 October conveying a message of sympathy from the Canadian High Commission in London to Mrs. Cross and from yourself and the staff of External Affairs. These messages have been passed on to Mrs. Cross who will I know be most grateful for them. I should like also to add the thanks of myself and the staff of the High Commission for the ready way in which the Canadian autnorities have enabled us to keep in close touch with you over developments throughout the past week. \/J\FCJLj^jt-J (G.S. Whitehead) I - P CZ �POP A C7 J -JFK- I 77> I . s*. BULLETIN \ DATE HR. SOURCE CLASSIFICATION RBsrit\cr&De TELEX CONFIDENTIEL A QUEBEC (LIGNE SHARP/CHOQUETTE) TELEX NO 1 MINISTRE DE LA JUSTICE DU QUEBEC A MONTREAL DE SOUS MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES M. SHARP A AUTORISE LE PORTE-PAROLE DU MINISTERE A DIRE A LA PRESSE CE QUI SUIT AU SUJET DE LA DECLARATION DE M. BOURASSA: CIT: M. BOURASSA S'EST ENTRETENU AVEC LE P.M. CE SOIR. ILS SONT TOMBES D'ACCORD QUE LA CONDITION ESSENTIELLE ETAIT UN MECANISME QUI PUISSE GARANTIR LE RETOUR DE MM. CROSS ET LAPORTE SAINS ET SAUFS. ILS SONT AUSSI D'ACCORD QU'IL FAUT QU'IL Y AIT AVEC LES RAVISSEURS DES DISCUSSIONS/FINCIT M. SHARP N'A PAS L'INTENTION D'EMETTRE D'AUTRE COMMENTAIRE A LA PRESSE. LE MINISTRE EST MAINTENANT RETOURNE CHEZ LUI.CEPENDANT SI M.CHOQUETTE SOUHAITAIT SOULEVER QUELQUE QUESTION, NOUS POURRIONS NOUS METTRE EN RAPPORT AVEC M„ SHARP ET TRANSMETTRE SA REPONSE A M. CHOQUETTE. 4<^fepfe CIDA GAF DOPS PGP M I N I S T E R E DES A F F A I R E S EXTERIEURES w: GEU GEUE GEUW FIS OS? GRF GUS FAC CENTRE D'OPERATIONS CENTRE T E L . 5-6331 CoubL^ ECP ECD ECL ECT AFP APP APO FSR D E P A R T M E N T OF E X T E R N A L Al, 000643 �Mr. Bourassa had a discussion vrith t h e Prime K i n i s t e r t h i s evening. They agreed t h a t t h e e s s e n t i a l condition was a mechanism which would guarantee /the safe r e t u r n of Xr. Cross and Mr. Laporte and also agreed that t h e r e should be discussions A>- "t*v T U fa, &wrr*Jt& yf% fo\ S"®-v $' Cfi'v-ot T«; ^ ^vO^.^i^p^K^ t^ZAik ^y^Fi rc*+u F vv*. L t < al J ** &..& <r J ^4t4sw%.rt €•((<€ 4. r»**J" %E&G222» , , .J . \x> F robust UA MM, Cfvtt F /. •fr&A &* M. S*U»H, / 72si_^ TTTpAyJ j™** SeU^i �gso '•'••» W ' 7i2,.,Pw L,,PAX&- ,7 r '.* '.pj ^WViwy .to'V-flOOiidL SECURITY SECURITE I VArfi j FM/C E /.'jAl'.'./t: •-.>•;... 5 JL. V i w 1 o.o. r ,, i , 1 TO/A 1 KO ; 7 .,.'.:.P--.,at./P.,a7',:; p T "s 'PTT 1 LDI'a « j ! ; ; . l y s FC: 1 HAVANA INFO BERN •rjnr.-.T\ X.iXXXjO ,US TUNIS Lwou&oou ESMED DUB1IK s^a^maaaqwa/g^^ d sz-zzzzzizzzyzz&zz. 7-7 eini'/t--ittum ,^-wwwOW"* FCJLLOWIWB I S CONFZBKED TE1T OF N"i£tf QUOTE COMMUNIQUE UNQUOTE S2CEIVED A.K. EOT OCT 1 1 QUOTE (CaiCENTRS PLEASE TRANSMIT ATTACHED) UNQUOTE mmmnmiuiiiiuuiijumiiuiiaa, ssayBflisaiujsfeiftaiiSoarfi^^ DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE ORIG1NATOR/REDACTEUR SIG . J [ J ^ J M O T X f l l ^ 9 DIVISION TELEPHONE PO? APPRGVED/AUTQRiSE 810 •••••• EXT 18/BIL (REV 8/34) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) • 000645 �i A- :<"•' /• rr '. • ' . : . '..-f <-.••-: \.- -'.'> \ '' k ••' ^ i ' < w O vv FRONT P.X. LIB'S.\TIGTJ DU yAPAo a ne pas obtemperer aux exigences du Front de L i b e r a t i o n du Quebec e t conforraernent au p l a n 3 p r e a l a b l e m e n t e t a b l i en p r e v i s i o n d ' u n t e l r e f u s , l a c e l l u l e ae financcmont Chenier v i e n t d ' e n l e v e r l e M i n i s t r e du Choriiage' e t ae I 1 A s s i m i l a t i o n aes Quebecois P i e r r e L a p o r t e . Le e-linistre s e r a ereecuto dimanche s o i r a 10 h e u r e s p.rrL. s i d:ici l a l e s auoori'Des en p.i.ac£ n ' o n o p a s repor.au xavoraoie.epenu aux s c p c oemunbes emises a. l a . s u i t e de 1'enlcve.r;ent de James C r o s s . Toute a c c e p t a t i o n p a r t i e l l e s e r a c o n s i d ^ r e e comme un r e f u s . E n t r e - t e m p s l a c e l l u l e de l i b e r a t i o n f e r a c o n n a i t r e l e s m o d a l i t e s t e c h n i q u e s ' de 1 ' ensemble de I ' o p ^ r a t i c a . t ""r I Liu-M1' ep -j^ w i v x i ( •" / ../••-.-^-j C ' e s t s i g n e , Nous V a i r . c r c n s . F r o n t de L i b e r a t i o n du Quebec, . , . ~ A • A t t a c h e a ce communique se t r o u v a i t une c a r t e d ' i d e n t i t e de P i e r r e L a p o r t e avec s a photo e t l ' e m p r e i n t e du pouce d r o i t . La c a r t e p o r t e i e numero 165 s t l a d a t e d 1 e x p i r a t i o n e s t l e 3 1 - 1 2 - 7 1 . La c a r t e p o r t e l a d e s c r i p t i o n de M. L a p o r t e . La c a r t e e s t du Gouvernement du Quebec e t d i t : f. e.ous c e r t i f i o n s cue l a p e r s o n n e d e c r i t e au v e r s o , P i e r r e Laporte^ est depute de Chambly. .^.O'u.e.a.au- Oaoorai i>agenais ^- A oynj_o o.vP.w are^u un appex "uea.epnonp.c_ue 4_eur i n o i q u a n t q u ' u n communique s e r a i t t r o u v e dans une p o u b e l l e aux c o i n s des rue; i aic'ccalfe e*o e eej. o r i s der j.a s t a u i o n ea mot.ro. 000646 �MESSAGE DATE OCT 11 1970 FM/DE RSSTD 3^siffirt5Tr WO POP-265 IDS TO/A SECURSTY SSC5JRSTE FLE/DOSSER PAZC£CS^C2 IKMED INFO BEL SUB/SUJ . KIDNAPPING FOLLCvSKG IS TEXT OF LET RECEIVED BY USSEA FRCM ACTING BRIT HIGH COMMISSIONER OCT 11 CONVEYING MESSAGE TO SSEA FROM SIR ALEC. QUOTE (C02-ICENTRE PLEASE TRANSMIT ATTACHED) UNQUOTE DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR SIG -, DIVISION APPROVED/AUTORISE sio ..._ : j-;B;-?usDi!XTa:A»''""-"" "" EXT IQ/31L (REV 8/G«) XXXXoyiCXiX.X DiV) TELEPHONE > CLLF.FLLLL. POP 000647 �o. o '. "j~ vc ;_• !_' i y x' f f- v iV • c c t s\ \ i SOSlgfn Street, OTTAWA 4 . y-.ypi x/sz: Mx»/ E . R i t c h i e , . Untie r - S e c r e t a r y of ^tarter • /fonOSxternal Affairs, v G'^JAttA —"*" r^>T TS5T?/AJS A (Q<*F£F /? 1 <-N/ I have been a s k e d t o d e l i v e r the f o l l o w i n g message from S i r Aleo Douglas-Hone t o l l r . Sharp: •I am so s o r r y t h a t t h i s l a t e s t k i d n a p p i n g h a s "Seen ic.ee t o a u i your- w o r r i e s P l e a s e give V.my sympatny to h„ Laporte's family and colleagues. i"<j . . . O o o grate-iui to you and tnem lor wnat yon are doing ana x O'x neepsng us sn one picture. The text of this rr.esss.ge v/as telephoned to your Operations Room earlier today. Kay I take this opportunity to thank you for your letter to me of 7 October conveying a message, of sympathy from the Canadian High Commission in London to Mrs. Cross and from yourself and the staff of External Affairs. These messages have seen passed oa to Hrs. Cross v/ho v/ill I know be most grateful for them. -t ,-. .*_ _*- . I should like also to add the thanks of myself fnO^lC/ J. and the staff of the High Commission fo >eady way in which the Canadian authorities have enabled us to keep in close touch with you over developments throughout the past week. ( C. Ci \ U • O• V'^y -:-rPr,,r.-. r'X i.i.i. O W u ^ a u ^ \2-<s*-^~*Ar£<-, $Ff J, — — >/ 000648 •' �-AJJ AA . y 27 y ]>. F F A POP/C. ROQUET A e 2, FAJLC1 '• October^'11/1970 £ A iv. /Vrt NOTE FOR FILE Subject: Events surrounding Mr. Choquette's statement of October 10 (W ^-TFK- S E C RET <> FF " Fy\<FAs F &>- a^TF/F-i t It « / >•• ^ iv) ;K First call by Mr. Choquette to Mr. Sharp: — "I 0 £°o A J Mr. Choquette phoned Mr. Sharp around mid-day^indicating that he proposed to make a statement in the afternoon appealing to the kidnappers to release Cross, and giving them inducements to do so. He read to Mr. Sharp on the phone a draft of his statement. ^j(Text attached as Annex 1). The Minister indicated he could not give a definitive reaction on the basis of a text read quickly on the telephone in French. However, he expressed strong reservations on some of its aspects, even hinting that he might not be able to associate himself with such a text. He asked that it be dictated to us in full on the telephone. After studying it, Mr. Sharp would phone back Mr. Choquette. The Minister pointed out that we had not intended that any statement be issued. In particular there were objections to making public what concessions we were willing to make to the kidnappers. Our line was that negotiations should take place privately, in the context of specific arrangements for Mr. Cross's release. 2. A study of Mr. Choquette's draft confirmed the Minister's fears. One weakness of the draft was to imply that the FLQ was inspired by idealism. It announced a major social initiative of the Quebec Government (creation of a "social peace department") in a context clearly suggesting that this was a concession to the FLQ. It implied that this organisation was the spearhead of efforts in Quebec to remove profound injustices prevailing in the Province. Another grave flaw was that, after stressing that the judicial institutions could not be tampered with, Mr. Choquette stated that the kidnappers would receive only symbolic sentences. The reference to review of paroles could be taken to mean that such reviews in the past had not necessarily been honestly carried out. A third major defect was that the text not only referred to safe conduct for the kidnappers, but did so in such a way as to make it impossible for them to accept it. • • m A \-~Q#€ �- 2 - SECRET Counter-proposal by Ottawa:— 3. It was felt in Ottawa that a flat refusal to let Mr. Choquette issue his statement might not prevent him frcm doing so, given his attitude. Furthermore, if we succeeded in preventing issuance of this statement, there v/as a risk (should Cross be killed) that v/e would appear as' having prevented Quebec from making a positive appeal to the kidnappers. In the circumstances the best approach seemed to be to prepare a counter-draft. This was done, in consultation with Mr. Gordon Robertson, and the text despatched to Mr. Choquette. (Text attached as Annex 2). Mr. Lalonde was informed of the situation on the phone ana his comments obtained. The Minister sought to reach the P.M. on the phone. First talk with Mr. Chouinard:— 4. With Mr. Lalonde's agreement, v/e called Mr. Chouinard, Secretary of the Quebec Executive Council„ We described the situation to him, outlined Mr. Choquette's draft, read him our counterdraft, and sought his c'onrments. Mr. Chouinard questioned the need for any statement. We told him we had seen no need for a statement, but that Mr. Choquette seemed determined to proceed; hence our counter-draft. Mr. Chouinard strongly agreed v/ith every one of the changes we proposed to the Choquette draft* In addition he doubted whether any reference should be made either to safe conduct or to parole. He said he had never heard of any proposed "ministry of social peace". ,He quite agreed with our view that any announcement on this point could not be made in a statement about the FLQ, as this would suggest that it was a response to FLQ pressure. Unfortunately, Mr. Chouinard was not sure he could intervene. He had a mandate from Premier Bourassa to deal with the Cross affair, but could not invoke this mandate and overrule Mr. Choquette. He mentioned that Quebec Ministers were deeply divided over the matter of parole. Since Mr. Sharp was having a second talk with Mr. Choquette at that point, it was agreed that v/e v/ould call back Mr. Chouinard. Second Sharp-Choquette telephone call:— 5. Mr. Choquette had seen our draft and wanted to stick essentially to his own. He was willing to drop the reference to a ministry of social peace. As for safe conduct he v/ould prefer not to mention it at all if we did not agree to his text. Mr. Sharp explained in detail all our objections to his text, and said quietly but firmly that he v/ould have to dissociate himself from the Choquette statement if issued. This v/ould be an unthinkable and highly dangerous situation. Mr. Choquette said he would think matters over and call back. . • • . s 000650 �SECRET Second call to Mr. Chouinard:— 6. We informed Mr. Chouinard of the situation resulting from the second conversation between the two Ministers. We suggested Mr. Chouinard get in touch with Mr. Choquette's headquarters by way of enquiring into developments. He might thus be given an opening for offering advice to Mr. Choquette. Chouinard said he doubted that the Minister would take his advice. However, Chouinard might be able tp provoke intervention by someone in Mr. Bourassa's office who could overrule Mr. Choquette. This would be difficult, however, since we did not wish Mr. Choquette to realize that Ottawa had alerted anyone else in Quebec. Mr. Chouinard could not therefore commit himself to any particular course of action, but would do his best. Third Sharp-Choquette conversation:— 7. It appeared to Mr. Sharp that- the. most plausible explanation for Mr. Choquette's draft statement would be that the latter had received firm information that the terms of his appeal would be immediately accepted by the FLQ. The Minister therefore put to Mr. Choquette a direct question. Did he have any specific reason or information leading him to believe that such a deal would be accepted by the FLQ? Mr. Choquette said that he had no such information (arising for instance from covered contacts with the FLQ). His planned statement was based on the advice of a prominent, highly respected personality in Montreal. (The Minister immediately surmised that this must be Mr. Claude Ryan) — Mr. Choquette was less adamant at this point. He was willing to revise his statement along the lines of our suggestions. He now wifehed to keep in the section on safe conduct, as re-drafted by us. He said he would use substantially our text with some changes of wording and with an introduction of a purely personal character. In the middle of the afternoon Mr. Choquette's press conference had been announced for 5:00 o'clock. In the event it was delayed to 5:30 as a result of our discussions with him. We sought to obtain the final text of Mr. Choquette's proposed statement early enough to pass on further reactions. In fact, the final text was received only a few minutes before the press conference — too late for any further communication with Mr. Choquette concerning it. However the text on the whole was perhaps better than we had reason to expect and was mostly based on our re-draft. A copy of this final statement is attached as Annex C. Claude Roquet �MESSAGE DATE EATffl EXTERNAL FM/PE c u b FIUE/DOSSIER 777>-2*- TAZTj - / 11^11 L0CT11/70 OCT 12 M n>7( NO POP 270 TO/A IMMEDIA INFO ^s BEE SUB/SUJ ICAO LEGAL CTTEE MTG ON HIJACKING TOR OBVIOUS REASONS BISS0N8TTE WILL BE UNABLE TO ATTEND TBK MTG BUT dZtLL SMAtJZ CAHlJJ?<2 LORNE CLARKfi& SCHEDULED MONDAY MORNING. WE_ ASSUME THAT SOROKAN VJILL LEAD DELEGATION WHICH WILL BE UUillTO.U DY CLARK AND WE UNDERSTAND f&Q A I-EMBER OF MOT WHO WILL STAY OVER FROM MTG ON SABOTAGE. X DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE K0 STD 0RK5INAT0R/REDACTEUR SIG .... DIVISION TELEPHONE APPRCVED/AUTORISE SIO.. yF^^^A2t^Xyy2'Z^7 Hr. EXT 18/BIL (REV 8 / 6 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) Bissonnette 000652 �/ &•/*. OTTAWA, October 12, 1970. Dear Hr. Coleman, This will confirm the telephone conversation we had shortly after 2*00 p.m. today. We have received from Canada House in London a request to provide information on the charges against the 23 prisoners whose release the FIQ is demanding. This information would, we understand, be used in the preparation of a memorandum for the British Cabinet* trie will be informing Canada House that we are passing this information through you. While some of it has appeared in the press we should appreciate it if /ou would treat the material as confidential* ftrCr ILL, Tours sincerely. JUT Under-Secretary o f State for External Affairs* Mr* B. Coleman, First Secretary, British High Commission, OTTAWA* (ktouLfot CAMJUL HuPi ItaJbirMAbn* be boittJL • Jrr 000653 �pDM(RnCillE) l-m.WOlil) KAU)! VPAFP^TO) POO(VJAUS) lP'O^r'O FLE(D!if.SRS) P3I (EOV-) FCOCSTAWSFIFLD) GCO (PUDDL^TOH) YAAl OF JUSTICE (GilitlSl 5 E) SOLICITOR GEi!(HOr'L0Y) 12 OCT 15: 0 3 C O N F I D E N T I A L FM LDN OCT 1 2 / 7 0 TO EXTER 3407 NO/NO STANDARD IMMED FCO HAS ASKED US FOR L I S T OF CRIMES COMMITTED BY QUOTE PRISONERS UNQUOTE FOR BRIEF UNDERSTAND T H I S RFT INFO NOT/NOT FOR CABINET.GRATEFUL IF POLITICAL YOU COULD SUPPLY FOR OUR GENERAL USE WHEN PROVIDED. 121449Z nfriiUl^ pop 27# *f njiojrrc m 000654 �22 c ^ / FFFzx^yr^y^sA F-y Ay-r-0»^> r .e_.» The government has decided that members of the Canadian Armed Forces will be used to supplement the RCMP in the Ottawa area on protective and seouri-fy duties. The members of the armed forces who will be used on these duties will come from CFB Petawawa and will arrive in Ottawa late today. > 000655 �u2 ^...j7 JF F. a V F » K F F) ^ F S £ K ^AyF FFM &* &>- ja-TFK-l CONFIDENTIAL October 12 197 ' ° ^ kidnappings - Assessment of the Situation as of October 12 This memorandum summarizes the evolution of our dealings with the kidnappers up to Mr. Laporte's abduction. It points out the important bearing of the Laporte kidnapping on our negotiation position. It analyses the FLQ negotiating stand, as it can be deduced from the October 12 communique, which resolves the confusions implicit in the October 11 communiques from the cells. Finally, it seeks to assess the implications of the Bourassa statement and the choices open to us in its wake. I. Before the Laporte Kidnapping Although we have officially declined to negotiate in public, there has in fact been a process of accommodation on both sides. One of the seven FLQ demands has been met by the governments: the manifesto has been broadcast. Another demand (end of police action) has been mostly ignored but, at leas^a.-^ one crucial point on October 10, was met discreetly for a while until the Laporte abduction took place. On its side, the FLQ gradually dropped some of its subsiduary demands (money, Lapalme workers, denunciation of the informer). Up to the Laporte kidnapping, through the issuance of 7 communiques by the first cell, the FLQ focussed increasingly on a central demand: release of the "political prisoners". It became increasingly probable that there might be no deal with the FLQ unless this demand were at least partly met. In part for that reason the federal government insisted on the importance of negotiations aimed at producing solid guarantees (even if there was no hope of agreement): such negotiation would gain us time, perhaps a week, before a final deadlock became apparent over the "political prisoners". However, the FLQ rejected the prospect of negotiation (or as they put it "mediation"). The FLQ also ignored the reference, in Mr. Choquette's Oct. 10 speech, to parole applying th the political prisoners-: this is obviously not enough. Another offer by the governments, made on October 10 by Mr. Choquette, related to the safe conduct for the kidnappers. It has elicited no response, which is natural as long as the kidnappers feel safe. To sum up, between October 5 and October 10, there was a narrowing down of issues to one major point of unresolved difference: the release of political prisoners. In addition, the governments continued to attach central importance to the related matters of negotiation and guarantee. II. Effect of the Laporte Kidnapping Perhaps the most important effect has been to decrease any reasonable hope the government could have that the problem would be resolved through a sudden police success. The second kidnapping (despite the increased risk it involved for the FLQ) suggests that their organization is perhaps better than 2 000656 �- 2anticipated. More important, by acquiring a second hostage, the FLQ is now in a position to protect either operation, to some extent, from the effects of discovery by the police. Up to October 10, discovery of the kidnappers' hideout would have involved the risk that a police attack on it would bring about the death of Mr. Cross: this gave a measure of protection to the kidnappers. After October 10, discovery of one of the cells by the police would leave the other cell and the other hostage untouched. The second hostage might be killed. Alternatively, he might be used to keep the FLQ in a fairly strong negotiating position. (Admittedly, discovery of one of the hideouts would help retrieve the image of the police.) There is a more significant aspect of the matter. The Laporte kidnapping brought home to the public the extent of the FLQ resolve and may have increased the sense that the authorities were powerless to meet their tactics. Most important of all, it greatly increased the pressures on the Quebec government for an accommodation with the FLQ. Indirectly, these pressures affect the position of the Canadian government, if only because of the danger there would be in allowing a gap to develop between the federal and provincial positions. III. The Effect of the Bourassa Statement For the public, the Bourassa statement will seem to contain, if not a formal commitment to release the political prisoners, at least a strong hint that this could be arranged, subject to negotiation. What the real intent of the Quebec government is remains uncertain. Mr. Bourassa's line could be interpreted as an attempt to spin out the Cross and Laporte cases, combined with the unstated intent that the prisoners would in fact never be released. If this is indeed his intention, a gap may develop between Quebec policy and the expectations of the Quebec public. Quebec opinion may now press for the freeing of the prisoners! Mr. Bourassa, with his statement may have started a process that can end only with the liberation of at least some of these prisoners and perhaps all. IV. October 12 a.m. Communique The main effect of this communique is to resume the dialogue which was perturbed by the Laporte kidnapping and subsequent communiques. It is the FLQ, not a cell, that speaks in the present communique. The text is crisp; it is ambiguous only concerning the "intermediaire". The communique and the enclosed letter from Cross confirm that he is alive. (We understand the writing is authentic and the style presents no unusual feature.) It imposes no new deadline, although one will presumably be forthcoming promptly if the authorities are not seen to be moving to meet the latest FLQ conditions. In contrast^,, with previous communiques, there is no explicit threat of "liquidation" directed at either hostage in the letter. The communique appears calculated not to be provocative, perhaps because of a feeling that the Bourassa statement provides an opening for moving ahead. We are back to two conditions only for the liberation of the hostages: release of prisoners and end of police activity. The latter point is not unduly stressed. There is no reference to a permanent end of police enquiries. Since Mr. Bourassa, after recognizing in his speech yesterday that it was one of two ...3 000657 �conditions mentioned in the Laporte letter, then proceeded to ignore the matter, one would have expected a strong FLQ reaction if the police aspect were a crucial one for them. This did not occur. Nonetheless, it is obvious that, if we intend to make a deal with the FLQ or at least to gain time, a low profile of police activity would be desirable. The most interesting aspect of the communique, from the federal viewpoint, is the reference to an intermediaire: "De plus, Maitre Lemieux devrait servir d'intermediaire entre les deux cellules du FLQ et les autorites en place". What this means is far from clear. At a minimum, it may simply mean that Lemieux will deal with the governments on behalf of the FLQ in the practical arrangements for the departure of the prisoners. The reference to the "intermediaire" comes at the end of a paragraph on practical arrangements for the release of the prisoners and should perhaps be read strictly in that context. It may mean no more than what was said in communique No. 6 of October 8 i.e. that Lemieux will watch and assist that process. There is also, however, a possibility that the FLQ is trying to give minimal satisfaction to Mr. Bourassa's instance on some form of negotiation. Under this interpretation, the communique would be hinting that we should talk to Lemieux. If we do we may well find he has no particular mandate and that the only line he can take with us is to request full compliance with the FLQ communique, The federal and Quebec governments will have to decide whether to so und out Lemieux in order to determine if he can or will discuss substantive issues. There would be obvious risks. He might seek to embarrass the governments in public. He might interpret his role in a different way from the two governments. There would be the added problem of establishing a secure contact, between him and the FLQ, of a kind which would be necessary if there were to be bargaining over more than technical and administrative issues connected with the prisoners' release. On "political prisoners", the latest communique restates all the detailed requirements put forward in the very first communique. These relate to publicity, wives and children and accompanying lawyers and journalists. If the prisoners were released, presumably there would be here an area of practical accommodation arrangements to be agreed with Lemieux. A long section is devoted to a solemn guarantee by the FLQ concerning the release of the hostages. Incidentally, even if we cannot have meaningful negotiations with an FLQ representative, the question of guarantee need not present insurmountable difficulties. If the federal and Quebec governments were willing to release the prisoners, it would be possible to make with the receiving country (and not with the FLQ) a public arrangement which would tie prisoners' release to the release of Cross and Laporte. We believe this technique has been used in similar cases in other countries. The prisoners would proceed to Cuba but remain in Caraiian hands there. Once confirmed that the hostages had been released, the Cuban government would take custody of the prisoners. If the hostages were not released within an agreed period, the Cubans would allow their return to Canada. (The need for complicated and negotiated guarantees would arise only if the kidnappers themselves wanted safe conduct which is not the case as yet.) ~ J*P ...4 ,, A A* ^ 000658 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 1000659 �personal Information / renseignements personnels 2 000860 V / �• *. : 0 . ? P - " ' f K ' (jAaj^x " /UL$+J\j.<J~Uu^ AJ^AU OpA ^ " SECidET OTTAWA, October 12, 1970, MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER. THE LAPOCTE Al.D CRCSS-Al: .MAPPINGS. The last FL^ communique was issued last night. It seems to be genuine. It reiterates the conditions of Communique No. 6: (a) release of the "political" prisoners who agree ana their removal with their families to Cuba or Algeria, with Robert Lemieux, Pierre Pascau and Louis Fournier as possible witnesses and Lemieux serving as go-between; and (b) cessation of all police operations. On fulfilment of these conditions, Mr. Laporte and Mr. Cross will be released in 24 hours. No time limit is set, but the authorities are expected to act quickly. 2, A number of questions arise: (a) Intermediary of the Kianappers: The captors have at last responded to repeated requests from the authorities to name an intermediary. They have named Lemieux, and insist on this nomination ("Maitre Lemieux devrait servir d'intermediare"). Is Lemieux acceptable in this role, either partially or completely? Is tnere any alternative to accepting him? If he is accepted, shoulu he be told this privately, or snould there be a public response, to ensure the captors know that the authorities have decided to accept him? (b) Negotiation: Are prisoners to ue released? If so, how many and in what circumstances? Who is to be named to speak with Lemieux if he is accepted as intermeuiary? Woulu a joint team of federal and provincial representatives be required? ,/fliether or not there is a joint team, who should be the federal liaison with Quebec? Should further assurances be sought as to the arrangements for the safe release of Mr. Laporte and Mr. Cross before there is any discussioij of arrangements for the prisoners? Is there any point in spinning out the negotiations, or should they be concluded quickly? (b) Release arrangements: If r.iin. stert agree to release prisoners, what arrangements need to be made? Both Cuba and Algeria would accept them, but to which country would it be preferable te see them sent? On what authority would this be done, ana who would negotiate the arrangements? �r * SECRST* (d) Presentation: If prisoners are released, how should the government's decision be explained in Canada and abroad so as to avoid reflecting discredit on our institutions? A.E.R. 000662 �SECRET ANNEX Mechanics for release of Mr. Cross and Departure of the Kidnappers for Cuba The Canadian Government will not accept a mere promise of the eventual release of Mr. Cross. Otherwise, following upon whatever concessions the Government can make, Mr. Cross might be held further or killed. Conversely, it can be assumed that the kidnappers will not be willing to put much trust in government undertakings, even public and solemn. For this reason, this annex describes two different approaches to the arrangements for Mr. Cross' release. The first assumes a substantial degree of faith by the kidnappers in a public federal undertaking. This approach could be the one first suggested by our negotiator. The second approach is based on a maximum degree of mistrust on both sides. FIRST APPROACH 2. This approach is not worked out in full details, as it is unlikely of acceptance. It would involve the following steps : (a) the Canadian Government would make a public statement outlining in full the concessions it were willing to make in exchange for Mr. Cross' return. This would include the treatment promised to the kidnappers and any arrangements worked out with the Cuban (Algeriangovernment in this connection; (b) Mr. Cross vrould be released by the kidnappers; (c) when Mr. Cross was safely in Canadian government hands the Canadian government would proceed to fulfill its part of the bargain. The kidnappers would have to assume that the Canadian Government could not renege on its publicly announced solemn undertaking to the kidnappers and to go back on arrangements, also public, made with another country (Cuba or Algeria). For the Canadian government to go back on such undertaking would indeed involve considerable domestic and international embarrassment. But the fact is that it could do so, claiming that the promises had been given under duress. Hence our conclusion that this approach would be unacceptable to the kidnappers. �-2SECOND APPROACH 3. The second approach is more complex but does give additional safeguards to the kidnappers. It involves a heightened degree of involvement by (say) the Cuban government, although perhaps not in a degree unacceptable to the Canadian and Cuban governments. 4. Here is first a brief step by step outline of what would be involved: (a) public announcement by the authorities of the agreement reached with the kidnappers and of the arrangements made by us with the Cuban authorities. In essence this would involve the safe conduct for the kidnappers to proceed to Cuba; (c) the kidnappers, still armed and accompanied by Mr. Cross, whose life would remain under threat, would proceed on their own to the Cuban office in Montreal. The approaches to the office could be cleared of police (or alternatively made secure by the police, as the kidnappers wished); (c) upon arrival inside the Cuban mission, the kidnappers would turn Mr. Cross over into the custody of the Cuban government. They would also turn their e-eeapons over to the Cuban representatives : (d) if the kidnappers wished to be accompanied abroad by their wives and children, their prior arrival at the Cuban mission could have been arranged; (e) within a fixed time (e.g. one hour of their arrival at the Cuban mission) the kidnappers and their families, accompanied by Cuban representatives in a group of cars under Cuban responsibility, would proceed to the airport, preferably escorted by security forces. Shortly after the arrival at the airport, the group would board an aircraft (preferably Cuban, with the Canadian government reimbursing expenses) bound for Cuba; (f) in order that the arrangements not be unexpectedly upset, i.t would be better that lawyers not join them until they have boarded the plane. It would also be better for political and security reasons, that no arrangements be made for publicity before departure; (g) upon the safe landing of the kidnappers in Cuba, the Cuban government would authorize its mission in Montreal to turn Mr. Cross over to the Canadian authorities. 5. Some variation on this framework could be engisaged to make it even more acceptable to the kidnappers. They might refuse to relinquish their weapons at the Cuban mission. Subject to the agreement of the Cuban government (which might not be forthcoming), they might retain their weapons until, they boarded the plane, and surrender them to the Cubans only on/aircraft, Another variation would be for a Cuban representative to be taken to the kidnappers' �-3hide-out by FLQ contacts, so that the kidnappers would be under some degree of Cuban protection on their way from the hide-out to the Cuban mission. The kidnappers might also be nervous about their position once they have relinquished custody of Mr. Cross at the Cuban mission. The government might then have to envisage the possibility of allowing the kidnappers to travel from the mission to the airport with their weapons and accompanied by an unarmed Canadian official who would in effect serve as a hostage. This, however, would probably involve unacceptable risks, since the kidnappers might at the last moment force this official onto the aircraft at gunpoint. 6. It has been assumed in this text that Cuba would be the destination rhosen for the kidnappers. Politically, there is an advantage in doing so. In associating the kidnappers with the Cuban government, we also associate them in the mind of the Canadian public withjthe rather extreme politics and with a government that arouses considerable suspicion. Algeria is more respected by moderate opinion both in Canada and abroad. In any event, the kidnappers themselves may prefer Cuba and feel more secure going there. On the other hand it is true that, given our excellent relations with Algeria, the Algerian authorities could probably be relied upon to abide more faithfully with our wishes in matters such as curbing political activities by the kidnappers once abroad. The reason we recommend Cuba here is that it has a diplomatic mission in Montreal, while Algeria does not. The kidnappers may consider it an important guarantee that they could proceed directly to neutral ground and that Cross could be held on neutral ground until their safe arrival in Cuba. It is unlikely that they would be ready to proceed all the way to the Algerian mission in Ottawa and depart by plane from Ottawa. C. R. �. . C t . s U ^ T i A . - CcOXvL \— s * i ' ^ ^ - X - b t o r it <l—t ' / o ^ i t 7(,P < * c-^yj U , ^ . r^^j •^U^ ^ v ^ A> FLs fcl^L , 0-,_ -v-,^. /vu-s s ~ \ 1 ( O f Ao A < _ / IP , 1l^. c • ; t,- l u A ^ j d , , C ( £~ t ^ <y e-^Ao v •! /ffv- 3 ^0 ^ ^ y> «-A* • e ^ v - O ^ - O O cc tt oo bb ee rr 99 ,, MEMORANDUM / ^ - v — >"fc^ t-t-'vi ^~xAt7^/L^A F&AA4 T • ] -v~ <? -^c t _ , . F6~o$-IJsF-\' IS 1 9 7700.. C C ^ ~ J Q - 7 B O . < 7^ C r o s s K i d n a p p i n g - f e d e r a l n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n 2. . r<Ov«. and m e c h a n i c s f o r t h e r e l e a s e / This memorandum outlines the bargaining position which could be adopted by the Canadian government with the kidnappers on Various issues they have raised. It makes recommendations as to what the final, maximum package might be which we could, offer to the kidnappers if necessary It describes how the negotiations could be handled on the government side. Finally an annex deals with the alternative sets of mechanics for the actual release of Mr, Cross. The proposals hereunder are predicated on the assumption that the government's final position would involve the safe passage of the abductors, and possibly some members of their families, to a country which would accept them. There is reason to believe that Cuba would. 000666 �ffe examine below the issues one by one starting with the least difficult ones: (a) Lapalme workers. - it seems that this was a propaganda issue for the FLQ. Now that it has been exploited they can be expected to drop it quietly, especially as therejkre now talks going on between which the government and the union (for/the FLQ may claim some credit). Our negotiator shoud therefore ignore this issue. Only if the FLQ veere adamant about it and if it became the last obstacle to an agreed settlement vrould it be submitted to the government for reconsideration; (b) Denunciation of the informer. - Even if there was an informer to reaeal his identity vrould be to expose him to assassination by the FLQ. This is a moral responsibility the government could not accept, quite apart from the other obvious drawbacks. The government negotiator should therefore deny that there is an informer and categorically exclude any concession on this point; (c) the Money.- our negotiator vrould refuse to discuss any ransom m&ney. To pay ransom would be to submit openly to blackmail. However, in subsequent discussions of the FLQ demands, it could be indicated that the g overnment would recognize, in the concept of a statement involving the kidnappers to another country, that they vrould have certain transitional expenses to meet. when prospect of an agreement on the This could be broached* kidnappers abroad appeared good. Tie sums involved should be modest and cover perhaps six months expenses in a hotel, with variations to take account of the possible departure of kidnappers'families. If the Canadian Government agreed to reimburse* Cuba for the cost of an aircraft, this could be another indirect Canadian Government financial contribution to Mr. Cross's safety - the funds for the kidnappers upkeep would not be paid in gold. They could be �- 2 'turned over to the Cuban Mission, on the aircraft, or upon arrival in Cuba. (d) Publicity. - our initial position would be that any publicity during the whole operation should be excluded. For one thing, arrangements could be destructive by excessive interest on the part of the press and the public. For another, the security of Mr. Cross in the first part of the arrangements and of the kidnappers themselves might be at steke. A fanatic might take a potshot at the kidnappers. Of course publicity which would fcO' PL fly ^he kidnappers as romantic heroes would not be either to our advantage. However, as in the matter of the Lapalme workers this point might be considered by the goveernment if it were the last obstacle to a successful statement. (e) Access to their .alwyers for the kidnappers. - We believe this could take place only on the aircraft or after arrival in Cuba. If a lawyer like Mr. Lemieux got access to the kidnappers at the Cuban Embassy, he could well persuade his clients to risk upsetting all the arrangements staying and £j2±±xng in the mission for a longer period of uninhibited propaganda. This is an unacceptable risk. (f) Presence of lawyers and journalists on the axl aircraft. It vrould be preferable to avoid both. At le8st the presence of journalists could be objected to, although a lav/yer like Mr. Lemieux would produce no less copy than a journalist. As a last resort, howeevr, the government might consider accepting the presenc .; atieast of the lawyer which could be justified on human right air grounds. Newsmen can always await the axicraft in Cuba if they so wish. (g) Provision of_a.ircraft. - There would be distinct advantages in asking and (, I,.It.-~ .' paying for a group aircraft. If the kidnappers insisted on having their w eapons until they board the plane, there is a risk that they might decide to re. Canadian aircraft for the sake of further publicity and a further hijack ^he indignity to the Canadian government. aircraft. They would hardly jljack a Cuban „*„„„„ 000668 �(h) Safe Conduct for Kidnappers. This seems to be the core of any settlement. They will not relinquish Mr. Cross unless they feel safe. There may be discussion of hou many would be allowed safe conduct. In the end it may be to our advantage to ensure the departure from Canada of as many as possible of those implicated in the kidnapping (probably up to 10 or even 15). it would get them out of our hair. This irould identify them; It would also help the kidnappers to accept a hard federal position on the "political" prisoners, since the departure of 10 or 15 kidnappers would look like a substantial concession. y-y^ - O * * -y PrcXvrf,Ay\,w£ x P P . • • • i - required. r — would also accept the departure of wives and children if t If only a few kidnappers v/ish to leave, v/e may be asked for an end of all enquiries into the Cross case, in perpetuity. This v/ould amount to an amnesty for all those implicated in the Cross affair, whether they went abroad or remained in Canada or returned to it. This would bo unacceptable. The only acceptable formula might be a safe conduct until arrival in a foreign country. While the kidnappers could not be prevented from returning, they could be arrested and tried upon setting foot in Canada. — Incidentally, we K E X K H £ would ask the receiving country not to glorify the 000669 �kidnappers by granting them "political asylum". — Since we have an extradition treaty with Cuba (not with Algeria), we presumably v/ill be asked to guarantee that our rights under this treaty will not be exercised. The Cubans are bound to raise this if the kidnappers don't. It would be to our advantage to accept, since otherv/ise the Cubans might refuse to cooperate or might refuse extradition, under the terms of the treaty, on the grounds that the kidnappers were "political refugees". �0 SECRET j) The prisoners". Fe This will be the most difficult point^presumably a basic U issue of principled^involved for the Canadian government . c.,.0 I--- --i^ If it is decided that no compromise farm is nossible (e.g. exchange of one orisoner for Mr. Cross), the best our negotiators could do would be to stress to the kidnaoners that a number cf CLsX. or . the prisoners on very short sentences might qualify shortly A A Or parole^ the government may wish to consider whether, if this issue threatens the outcome of the negotiations, a review of the prisoners' requestj for parole might paKksp-s be agreed. Presumably such a review should take olace after the departure of the kid- nappers, unless it is decided that it could be undertaken immediately. LLFEDERA: POSF.ION OVERALLFEDERAL / In-sufrtma-ry;—t^eHmTrd^CLJli^jtTOme-^urH^ 000671 �In summary, the kind of outcome our negotiators would seek would be: a) a formula which would insure Mr. Cross' safety before the kidnappers leave the country; b) a temporary safe conduct for even a fairly large number of ihl-y-27 the kidnappers, families included if desired; uiLb—a-e-a-fe cf>»d«T-t~tO' expire upon their arrival in Cuba; c) no release for prisoners to depart Cdnada, although some review of paroles might be considered; d) no concession on the informer; no concession on the Lapalme workers and on publicity except as a last resort; a. e) no ransom money, although modest contribution could be made A f o r upkeep o f t h e k i d n a p p e r s and t h e i r f a m i l i e s ; we could A /\ r e i m b u r s e Cuba f o r use of an a i r c r a f t ; f) on mechanics of t h e r e l e a s e , we v/ould p r e f e r t h e f i r s t , but could a c c e p t t h e second approach d e s c r i b e d i n t h e Annex. HANDLING OF TiE NEGOTIATIONS Before any meeting*-©!' n e g o t i a t i o n c o u l d b e g i n , we vrould r e q u i r e proof t h a t Mr. Cross was a l i v e . We might a l s o face an FLQ r e q u e s t 000672 �SECRET that all police investigations be stopped. To this we could presumably agree, for the duration of the discussions. At the start our negotiators might indicate our basic approach: we shall make no further unilateral move or concession, and any arrangements we may agree with the kidnappers v/ould be subject to agreed mechanics which would tie Mr. Cross release to these arrangements. We will not accept accommodation for the kidnappers subject to later release of Mr. Cross on their mere say so.— A threat might be issued at the same time both to the kidnappers and the FIQ. Tne kidnappers would be warned that, if anything went wrong with Mr. Cross, we would never give U P our efforts to capture them and would apply to them any rigours of the law. The FLQ might be threatened with treatment appropriate to treasonable organizations, if ministers consider this appropriate.—This done, our representatiwes might start off negotiations by pointing out that both Mr. Cross and all the kidnappers v/ere .engraved personal jeopardy. be killed. Mr. Cross could The kidnappers would face major charges for kidnapping «: and possibly murder. It might be possible to find -ofcHt-ti*e way out F for both. 3y focussing discussions upon the faith of the kidnappers �9 SECRET v/e may achieve a psychological effect and render more di-f£xc"K!t an agreement on the other issues. 000674 �SECRET OfTAWA, October 12, 1970, MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER. THE LAPORTE AND CRCSS-KIL-NAPPINGS. The last FLQ. communique was issued last night. It seems to be genuine. It reiterates the conditions of Communique No. 6: (a) release of the "political" prisoners v/ho agree ana their removal with their families to Cuba or Algeria, with Robert Lemieux, Pierre Pascau and Louis Fournier as possible witnesses and Lemieux serving as go-between) and (b) cessation of all police operations. On fulfilment of these conditions, Mr. Laporte and Mr. Gross will be released in 24 hours. No time limit is set, but the authorities are expected to act quickly. 2# A number of questions arise: (a) Intermediary of the kidnappers: The captors have at last responded to repeated requests from the authorities to name an intermediary. They have named Lemieux, and insist on this nomination ("Maitre Lemieux devrait servir d'intermediare"). Is Lemieux acceptable in this role, either partially or completely? Is tnere any alternative to accepting him? If he is accepted, shoulu he be told this privately, or should there be a public response, to ensure the captors know that the authorities have decided to accept him? > (b) Negotiation: Are prisoners to be released? If so, how many and in what circumstances? Who is to be named to speak with Lemieux if he is accepted as intermediary? Would a joint team of federal and provincial representatives be required? Whether or not there is a joint team, who shoula be the federal liaison with Quebec? Should further assurances be sought as to the arrangements for the bafe release of Mr. Laporte and Mr, Cross before there is any discussion of arrangements for the prisoners? Is there any point in spinning out the negotiations, or should they be concluded quickly? ' : (b) Release arrangements: If min. sters agree to release prisoners, what arrangements need to be made? both Cuba and Algeria would accept them, but to which country would it Le preferable t» see them sent? On what authority would this be done, and who would negotiate the arrangements? 2 �r • 1 OldfPA^rn JJJU^LL'l Q (d) Presentation: If prisoners are released, how should the government's decision be explained in Canada ana abroad so as to avoid reflecting discredit on our institutions? A.E,>Ra 000676 �S E C R E T October 12, 1970. Kidnappings -, Means, of Ga^nin^ Tine Whether or not an agreed solution can be found v/ith the kidnappers, it is essential to gain time. Hence the need for moves designed to postpone an assassination of one cr both of the hostages. Here is a list of 3uch possible moves, of which the foremost is the proposed negotiations theoselve3. I - To avoid n early deadlock in the ne, otiations, topics could be broached in the follovring order: (a) to clear the '.ray for negotiations: - possible announcement concerning a federal repres sntative; - proof should be sou ;ht that the hostages are still alive; - M. Lemieux may seek his immediate release; - enquire into Lemieux* s mandate ffrom each one of the two cells -md from the FIO; on its extent, (can he discuss substance; can he reach an arrangement on his own authority); - enquire into his ability to refer back any governmental counter-proposals (i.e., his communications with the FLO especially the two cells); - possible request for a guarantee of Lemieux*s security, freedom of movement, freedom from surveillance; (b) point of departure of the governmental negotiatort - our inability to make further unilateral concessions; - our inability to take the kidnappers on faith; - warnings of the consequences of any murder of the hostages, and on the grave jeopardy in which the kidnappers find themselves; ... y. 000677 �- 2 - S ECRIT * (c) possible non-essential demands of the FLO to be cleared up: - anticipate a request by Lemieux for a stop of police activity: during the negotiations; permanently; - Lapalme workers: refer to the wishes of the union itself, to its current talks with the Postmaster General; - alleged informer: denial of any knowledge; - the ransom: point to statements by the PLQ ^nd Lemieux himself amounting to a waiver oi znxs deaana, for ,.:ood reason; lu) our offer of safe conduct xor tuo kidnappers: - rcept for tne end, as tne subject leads into that of political prisoners; - restate our offer; discuss whether it could extend to une second cell of kidnappers; - complexity of arranging a receiving country; - provision of transport.; - u into the coiuplex problem of a guarantee both for the hostages and the kidnappers; outline the possible arrangements, The discussions would eventually deal with release of tne prisoners, a difficult and perhaps insoluble problem which should be kept for the end. Cue device to be used at this stage might be to ask for time to establish ourselves the wishes of the prisoners. II - Other aoves:(a) additional public infonnation on the safeguards and guarantees to be extended to Mr. Lemieux; (b) public information on the (at least apparent) decrease of police activity; (c) additional public information on our demarches in Cuba and Algeria (e.g., special envoy to Algiers since October 7); this subject can touch on the prisoners* issue and should be handled carefully; ...3 000678 �- 3 - S E CR £T (d) possible news of a parole for the least dangerous of the prisoners. - It is doubtful whethor this would be possible, but if it could be done in the normal course of the administration of justice, such news night be used should the degree of danger to the hostages justify this in the eyes of the government; (e) should the Prime Minister decide at one point to make a major public intervention in the case, this -/ould of course in itself give a new turn to the case, should a moment of extreme danger ..rise. �^X f , U.X-, u w ctv(, t v v O r O <* u t - <•'l^AiA^j) -/£, ^ ^ ^ z O , *^*< S^U^FTU, Lt *^-*- *y 6*. / ^ - < <~\ _. ___- October 12, 1970. -*-y. j t« ~LX« A7-AP^-A2. i*w/"" <—-«-» "ik-^ ^Wr cS (to-^^-u. .<- 27^. f2. A-j-z^.t Tt"^ Kidnappings, -. Means, of _Galning_A-A^3. Ff>*~>. L< <- -«— A ~t. ~^«~ ^ c^i^j^-^i*' tA~~ / v * sC* • t-yCAF / U-^.2/.^ ^v-wi.,w,^ <* -nVi, '7 Y/hether or not an agreed solution can be found /u^-Ow^ tn with the kidnappers, it is essential to gain time. Hence ^ ^ £r;J, the need for moves designed to postpone an assassination F^ /TV *" • ' of one or both of the hostages. Here is a list of such a / 's O ^ O possible moves, of which the foremost is the proposed ^~" "" negotiations themselves. o F t= t-yI - To avoid an early deadlock in the negotiations, topics 7 could be broached in the following order: (a) to clear the way for negotiations: - .possible announcement concerning a federal representative; - proof should be sought that the hostages are still alive; - M* Lemieux may seek his immediate release; enquire into Lemieux*s mandate from each one of the two cells and from the FLQ; on its extent, (can he discuss substance; can he reach an arrangement on his own authority); . - enquire into his ability to refer back any governmental counter-proposals (i.e., his communications with the FLQ, especially the two cells); - possible request for a guarantee of Lemieux*s security, freedom of movement, freedom from surveillance; (b) point of departure of the governmental negotiator: - our inability to make further unilateral concessions; our inability to take the kidnappers on faith; - warnings of the consequences of any murder of the hostages, and on the grave jeopardy in which the kidnanners find themselves; 2 000680 �(c) possible non-essential demands of the FLQ to be cleared up: anticipate a request by Lemieux for a stop of police activity: during the negotiations; permanently; (d) - Lapalme workers: refer to the wishes of the union itself, to its current talks with the Postmaster General; - alleged informer: denial of any knowledge; - the ransom: point to statements by the FLQ and Lemieux himself amounting to a waiver of this demand, for good reason; our offer of safe conduct for the kidnappers: - .kept for the end, as the subject leads into that of political prisoners; - restate our offer; discuss whether it could extend to the second cell of kidnappers; - complexity of arranging a receiving country; - provision of transport; - go into the complex problem of a guarantee both for the hostages and the kidnappers; outline the possible arrangements. The discussions would eventually deal v/ith release of the prisoners, a difficult and perhaps insoluble problem which should be kept for the end. One device to be used at this stage might be to ask for time to establish ourselves the wishes of the prisoners. II - Other moves:(a) additional public information on the safeguards and guarantees to be extended to Mr. Lemieux; \ (b) public information on the (at least apparent) decrease of police activity; (c) additional public information on our demarches in Cuba and Algeria (e.g., special envoy to Algiers since October 7); this subject can touch on the prisoners* issue and should be handled carefully; ...3 000681 �- 3- f (d) possible news of a parole for the least dangerous of the prisoners. - It is doubtful whether this vrould be possible, but if it could be done in the normal course of the administration of justice, such news might be used should the degree of danger to the hostages justify this in the eyes of the government; (e) should the Prime Minister decide at one point to make a major public intervention in the case, this would of course in itself give a new turn to the case, should a moment of extreme danger arise. A*. 000682 �MESSAGE DATE SECURITY SECURITE FIU£/DOSSIER # FM/DE TQ/A INFO kifc: OCT 1 2 / 7 0 KXTKRDTT NO PQP27A -4£tt- H*fflM CCKCaaBg JttSHDC BB1 MATORRII HINTS PARTS KF.RM F L A S H TMMFI) ; J1IRI.IB BEE OUKTEL POP 2 7 1 OCT 1 1 SUB/SUJ KIDNAPPING. FOLLOWING I S TEXT OF LATEST FLQ COMMUNIQUE RECEIVED EARLY THIS MORNING. (COMCENTRE PLEASE TRANSMIT TEXT A . ) 2. ALSO JxTmmm-IS COMMUNIQUE. TEXT OF FURTHER LETTER FROM MR. CROSS ATTACHED TO (COMCENIRE PLEASE TRANSMIT TEXT B . ) DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE NO STD. ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR TASK FORCE LIST * RCMP DIVISION APPROVED/AUTORISE TELEPHONE 810. SIO.. '£'Ls7'W\fb%fmao EXT 18/BIL (REV 8 / 0 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) -P€P000683 �z t uA^ ? ^ 51 * * <{- vw^~ j0<. _^A % C U * YVv« ^•7-7 ^- ~ -,t ~—% <^J0>- -^ ^ ^.AA (p-^ L^£^~ ^ ' a . ^ w v ^ - ^ S ( 7 ] u 7 J_^AT<L^\ ^ FJ-q 6\^ joovv-^Oj £-~4 . \C6L/ 7oo.^ ^ ~ F J -TTN^OO ^ 2d -e. t . ly, & w-Jri)a - 7 FJF (jU^i F =- as^.A2. ttU U/- • .- «»—^ Cvu ,1 r ? /Mt( 4 vX £«4««. ? 1^-xv^x U-cU-^p^—n <n LS- <f\ (LCU«I~«_P, <u~rr^7 «- . £~Z- o, a UO^^JL. ^ pF ^rzi \y rfF ^^^0- -» /0-»C<» <"-0' X£C** O/^ X^-OVrC^ , \ . ^ v \ . 000684 �C+JV^M—W c cyy—yX iSy- JlF*.a~^<£-<=> (TV\^/V^^JL(^»-^2XL<A Sud~e HS C^A' 1^*4 J/F °*- Cy^^"y^a-~^c> ' ^F \V\7J ^r , T-10. ^ ^ c^o .(^/L(p " ^ ^ J ^a^lC^JU^^^ 000685 �XTAI i y O O ^ - ^ ^^A^~ J V - ojj % . jLa^i F f -I '" 0 a O p 6 \ t a ' l ^ F jA^ ~~A FA , 7yy:) ou---7 J Oa ^noaa^^-v^ <TU . A - J! $**.& F * "Fj( dwvt/WPvv^O^ , ess, P*OxOf. rx C±^d F JJ+- A*^*-*- 0 - ^ , ^ ^ - U Fj2Di7^^-e \^> SFu^yjiSXsXl^. _x_o ^ > $-rur<k'j JFJ^ ^ A ^ J f t o ^«4 ^ c«^JTe*Jf^> "£> <db^><^0^ ? ^ q /F J M . iru 9S £ / H - /£xs^\ \F^~~ \ FF^L 1 \.v"b . CO5-0U-, n ^— "A Jy*~y*^-\ ! ' C^uc.^^ZjEtjLs^: S\^C^JU <^c **r^_xo - [ua^^yF < y, N "W<As^-A] U^\ Y I -' Cko^^o^o^lV /(•'& / / 000686 �1 . F -AX 7-^-7 Ox x 0 XXX L A^\v^"""Fiix^A^M \ C)jF> F C 4 FA >\JU' A 0> 000687 �GJF* M ifc ' y-cr\xrvoLoo&- % * ~ J T ~ 1 2 L ^"O-'OOv-L-^-'f v < - — Pi/\ - s ^ a l ^ cL^-O \ * * V I A . ^ X • I . 1/ 5 CJU-—?0 > <^v--ts 0 "YHj). i^fc^ uu A^,.^— cL FF^^ ? J ' q, C J C C A - L X - - C*y± Sx«F \ 000688 �A 2 A -n 000689 �V 9 DATED FROM Q.CT.SJAJD. FILE TO VOLUME NO. 0^-T: I2/7O HoJ0Aj^.FT0€^f CLOSED VOLUME DO NOT PLACE ANY CORRESPONDENCE O N THIS FILE FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE: FILE NO jfeMXdWtX^f VOLUME NO i.....Hftl.. PLEASE KEEP ATTACHED TO TOP OF FILE 7540-21-562-8210 000690 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00003 Title A name given to the resource Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy - Part 1 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 05-Oct-70 to 12-Oct-70 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy, RG25, vol. 25741, 20-22-TFK-1, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Entire file Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en