https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f423a34d54e9fa1ce3cce4904251b6fc.pdf 841ef61729e35d42ead72c850c9e501a PDF Text Text File No. Dossier Volume (_ 20-22-TFK-DOCUMENTS OFTEN USED _From-De 7070 OS T^-A 7-Z05H CLASSIFIE CLASSIFI 2QQ2AL nsi m x H \ V OI TITLE—TITRE POLITICAL AFFAIRS INTERNAL SECURITY TASK FORC E ON KID NAPPING DOCUMENTS OFTEN U SED S£ inn i __ m o Retention period-Periode de retention: EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES ET COMMERCE EXTERIEUR CANADA �MIN P&rl.Sec. "PDM PDF/P.A.Bissonnette/dsta *to-92-7fo' aaa October 3, 1970 -I y .^y MEHQUHDOM POH TIE KTWT^TI-a Abduction of J.R. Cross -ftroposedposition when direct contact aa/ie yfX%h J44iWPPerSt It is not too soon to determine what our tactics and requirementa should be. In the event that contact is established, it is recommended that anappropriate federal official (in conjunction with an appropriate provincial official) be designated to conduct at least the first phase of negotiation and that he be instructed as follows: a) To indicate to the kidnappers that as the Government has already Bade clear it is not in a position to agree to requests that it regards entirely unjustifiable on the basis of blackmail, but that it is anxious to preserve Mr. Cross1 life. More specifically the Government will not yield to the threat of blackmail on those requests which, if grantee., would tend to destroy the basis of law and order in this country. On those matters that relate to the abduction itself the Government is prepared to discuss thea in the context of an arrangement which would lead to Mr. Cross1 release. b) For example, with regard to the so-called manifesto, the wider publication of it is not lu itself relevant to the maintenance of law and order. If it is insisted that the publicity that the manifesto haa already received is insufficient, the Government would be prepared to consider allowing Its facilities to be used in this connection. (This is subject to an opinion Proa the Department of Justice on the risk of incurring libel action from the persons mentioned in the manifesto.) e) Since further publicity will no doubt be sought, if only for reason of face, you should then say that the Government is prepared to agree to this particular requirement as part of a package settlement. d) Turning then very serious by their act they must be to more substantial matters, you should refer to the position in which the abductors have put themselves and to indicate that the Government recognises that concerned about their position; in the context of an ... 2 �- 2 - arrangement for Mr. Cross' release, the Government would be prepared to discuss arrangements relating to their present exposed position. Guch arrangements might include their transfer to another country if there is one willing to accept them. e) With regard to the other demands of the abductors, the Government would not be prepared to bargain with regard to (i) the release of prisoners now in custody, (ii) the ransom, (iii; the re-engagement of the Lapalme workers except on the terms already offered to then, and (iv) the question of the alleged informer. (However, in subsequent discussions of the r&oaon dejaand, it could be i dicat-d that the Government would recognise in the concept of a settlement involving their transfer to another country that they would have certain expanses to meet. This concept should not, however, be raised until the discussion of transfer to another country is being actively pursued with some prospect that it might lead to a settlement.) f) Tou should encourage them to pursue the idea of cutting their losses and accepting a safe-conduct arrangement as the basis for a settlement and to this end encourage then to iiaouas some of the practical problems which would be involved: (i) the mechanics whereby 11T. Cross would be released following their safe transfer to another country, (ii) who would be holding him meanwhile, (iii) the numbers requiring the safe conduct, (iv) the question whether a country acceptable to thea is willing to receive them, (v) the arrangements for transport (if other matters are agreed, the Government would presumably be prepared to provide an aircraft) g) In the context of a discussion on the safe conduct, you could use the granting of monies for actual expenditures as an inducement to facilitate their accepting a settlement based on safe conduct. h) Since we do not expect that all details of the above arrangement will be settled at the first meeting, you should make clear that you wish to have further meetings with thou. 2. It will be both politically and legally (granting of immunity rests principally with Quebec Government) necessary to obtain Quebec approval on above position. 3. This haa already been discussed with officials of Justice and PCO. Tou may wish now to consult the Pritae -inister about these ideas and about who might be the Federal representative. I assume that the official should be a French-speaking Canadian (good possibilities from this Gepartment would be Claude .coquet at the initial period and Andre Bissonnette if later someone with a more formal official position were to be required). ii.E.R. �d yp P.F-A y-i .-• y -i^^C^ p ,AF&- '/ Axy/vx TAA CONFIDMTIA A7. October 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR THS MINISTER Abduction of Mr. Cross - FLQ Demands The first fact to be taken into consideration ie? that the threat to Mr. Cross's life is real. This is the RCMP assessment, in view of the type of men likely to be involved on the FIQ side and of the outside "professional11 help they might conceivably have enlisted. We agree with this assessment. It will of course be up to the Government to decide what attitude it wishes to take in this matter and whether any of the FLQ, demands could be entertained. As indicated below, oui1 obligations in international lav,' to take "appropriate" action for the safeguard of diplomatic personnel are clear although not detailed. Essentially, the decision will have to be political and encompass a wide variety of factors v.'hich we seek to analyse further on in this memorandum. Immediate Measures 2. While v/e v/ill not be able to avoid a decision on the substance of the problem, urgent consideration must be given to certain immediate measieres . First, you may agree that it would be very much to our advantage to gain time vis-a-vis the FLQ, if only to allow police action to proceed, and also to consider any political negotiations we may wish to undertake. This being so, we should avoid categorical statements that might be interpreted by the FLQ as a flat rejection of their demands. I see no harm in our position being somewp.at blurred. This might lead to a v;erePee.rePp.eg in the FLQ demands and give the Government time to take decisions on the substance of the problem. All the better if the Federal Government appears relatively discreet, given the considerable interest of the Quebec Government in the matter. 3. Another immediate problem is to ready ourselves for a possible dialogue with Cuba and Algeria in this matter. Since our new Ambassador is not at present in Havana and since we have no resident mission in Algeria, I propose that we stand ready to send Mr. Mayrand (who has been requested to be in Ottawa Tuesday morning) to Cuba to deal with this specific problem if required. Similarly, Mr. J.M. Dery, the Head of oun." Francophone Division, who has extensive African experience, would proceed to Paris on the evening of October 6 so as to be ready for immediate move to Algiers in case of need (or possibly in advance of actual need, perhaps for the ostensible purpose of discussing the basis on which our proposed Canadian mission in Algiers might be opened). There might even be some advantage in letting it be known that contacts were being established with the two governments concerned in view of the FLQ reference to them. We �could of course deny any implication that this implied Canadian Government acceptance of the FLQ terms and we could simply indicate that in our thorough consideration of all elements of the situation we were naturally exploring those aspects affecting one or both of those governments. I should be grateful for your comments on this proposal. We would of course notify the Quebec authorities in advance. 4. Another means of gaining time, admittedly risky, v/ould be to seek to establish some kind of contact wi.th the FLQ. Vie shall be cautiously exploring this possibility. It might have the advantage of decreasing the risk to Mr. Cross by reducing the harshness of the confrontation. At the same time, if the Government felt compelled to negotiate terms with the FLQ (it is unlikely that v/e would wish to accede to all their demands), a channel for doing so would have been established. Of course, one could conceive of other means of conducting such negotiations, e.g., through a public statement by the Canadian Government of the terms it was willing to accept. Nonetheless the direct method has certain attractions, especially in terms of gaining time. v British Attitude and Canadian Legal Obligations 5. Our relations with the British Government in this matter are, of course, important. Any immediate steps of the kind mentioned above that v/e can announce to them would of course remove some of the pressure on them as well as on us. There is every indication to date that the British Government intends to be understanding and cooperative. Of course the British authorities have every concern for the life of a British representative, but they are also aware of the abdication of government responsibility that could be involved in complying with unlimited terrorist demands. In the recent Middle "fast crisis the British Government, at least initially, adopted a hard line towards Palestinian hijackers demands and rallied to its viewpoint the Germans and the Swiss who were first inclined to immediate compliance. The British took the lead in coordinating efforts and in bargaining with the terrorists through the Red Cross. In the event, these governments did negotiate with the Palestinians and, after several days, secured the release of all hostages before airy of the prisoners were released. In a parliamentary debate at the end of April, the Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Shepherd) noted that the responsibility for the safety of an Ambassador and his staff lay with the host country. He recognized, hov/ever, that with the best will im the world no country could give complete protection against kidnappings of diplomats any more than any other form of crime. 6. Non-compliance v/ith the request to take the prisoners to Cuba or Algeria involves the international responsibility of the Canadian Government to protect the persons of diplomats im its territory. This obligation is spelled out in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Article 40, which reads : �"The receiving state shall . . . take all appropriate steps to prevent anj attack on their person, freedom or dignity." It follows that the receiving state has a responsibility to mitigate any consequences of not having fulfilled this obligation. Tho British Government might blame the Canadian Government for not talcing the appropriate measures of protection given the political situation in Quebec. Although Canada is not yet a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations it represents general principles of international lav/ which v/e follow. Our decisions, while they should be consistent with those general obligations, can nevertheless vary considerably in the light of our practical and political assessment of the situation. 7. We attempt below to analyse the implications of the FLQ ransom demands, to determine what would be involved in complying partly or fully with them and what would be the implications of refusing to do so. AnaLYsis of the Demands The demands can be summarized as follows: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) stop police investigation; wide press and TV publicity for the FLQ political manifesto; release of over 20 prisoners; facilities for their transport by plane to Cuba or Algeria; rehiring of the LaPalme workers by the Post Office Department; $500,000 in gold; public information on am alleged spy within the FLQ. The full text of the demands is attached. 8. With regard to point (l), the police investigation is of course going on and will not be brought to a stop unless the Quebec and Federal Government so direct. Such a large investigation cannot, of course, be kept secret and the press is bound to be aware that it is going on. Nonetheless, in order not to present the kidnappers with too direct a challenge, we should do what we can to avoid any official confirmation that this aspect of the FI/Q/isOeimg ignored, /demand 9. The freeing of prisoners (point 3) would involve decisions by both the Federal and the Quebec Governments. More than half the persons in question are in federal institutions, either medium or maximum security ones. We expect to receive early on October 6 an assessment of each one of the prisoners by officials of the Solicitor General and the RCMP; it will thus be possible to establish what internal security risks would be involved for the Canadian and Quebec Governments in releasing some or all of these ;. isoners. ..4 000006 �CONFIDENTIAL 4- 10. Arrangements with Cuba and Algeria to receive these prisoners (point. 4) raise a number of political and. legal considerations. The first question would be whether we could obtain entry for these people from one or the other government. .It is difficult at this stage to assess what the reaction of the Cuban Government would be. Premier Castro in the past has made it clear that Ceiba encourages revolutionaries in the hemisphere; it has granted asylum to numerous political activists from a number of countries. In a public statement recently<• however, Castro drew a distinction between what he called "genuine revolutionaries" and what he termed "cojmmon crirmiiuils". The former would be granted asylum but the latter would be jailed. Indeed, only a few weeks ago, for the first tine, the Cuban Government deported a United States citizen who claimed to be a political refugee. On the other hand, the present Cuban attitude toward tlie FLQ is less clear. We are examining to what extent Castro has been showing sympathy for the FLQ in recent months. 11. Should the Canadian Government formally request Cuba to accept these persons, Casuro might do so, explaining that such action should be viewed as a favour to us and as a humanitarian act. It will be recalled that in previous cases of diplomatic kidnappings Mexico has received prisoners freed in other countries. By acceding to the request, Castro could claim his action should be viewed in the context of friendly relations vrith Canada and at trie sajne time disclaim any responsibility for activity supporting tne FLQ in Cuba. He heps denied in the past accusations that his government was extending such support by providing training facilities for extremists. There have been indications that at least some Qucpbec separatist extremists were not over welcome in Cuba. 12. As for Algeria, aithough it has shown sympathy towards "liberation movements", its relations with Canada have been developing favourably over the last year. The Algerian Government has snown considerable interest in the Canadian Government as a trade and aid partner. Algeria may therefore be extremely loathe to get involved in the proDlem. It might conceivably accept our request. It may be that Algeria would abide more strictly than Cuba by sr.y agreement we reached with thorn concerning the activities of the prisoners once in Algeria. On the other hand, asylum in Cuba v/ould give the FLQ extremists a rather less favourable image than if they were welcomed in Algeria, a more neutral and respectable country. 13. The second question relates to extradition. It would be ideal of course if arrangements could be made for the prisoners to proceed to Cuba or Algeria, then to be promptly returned by the local government on the basis of a previous arrangement. It i.s highly unlikely that such an agreement could be reached. On the contrary, either government would no doubt insist as a condition of its acceptance of these prisoners that we waive any rights to ask for the return of the prisoners. (.We would have some legal grounds ...5 �CONFIDENTIAL - 5- for requesting return in the case of Cuba. We have an extradition treaty with that country, but Cuba could of course choose to consider the prisoners as "political" and therefore not extraditable. We have no extradition treaty with Algeria.) A return, or at least freezing of amy funds paid to the FLQ, could perhaps more easily be agreed. 14. The' third question relates to tine activities of these persons once in Cuba or Algeria. We could request and perhaps obtain an undertaking from the receiving government that the prisoners would not be allowed to engage in any political activity in that, country, nor to use or transfer for political purposes any of the funds they might have received from authorities in Canada. Finally we would wish to examine whether the released prisoners would be granted political asylum in the receiving country. Clearly it would be preferable to avoid such a development, since this would lend credence to the FLQ claim that these were victims of political persecution and not common criminals. 1$. Concerning the half a million dollars' ransom (point 6), the Government would have to weigh the risk that such funds might find their way back to Canada to finance heightened terrorist activity. The measures mentioned in the previous paragraph might alleviate this danger, 16. The denunciation of any "spy" in the FLQ (demand 7) v/ould be of course quite unprecedented and in many ways damaging. It may well be one of the demands the FLQ might give up. Implications of Giving In 17. A decision to give in to most or all of tne FLQ demands would in all probability ensure the return of Mr. Cross. However, its negative effects must also be weighed. It would involve to some extent am abdication of the Government's responsibility for the maintenance of law and oreier in the country. It would acknowledge that the FLQ is a force to be reckoned with aeici can negotiate witn the Canadian and Quebec Governments. It would tend to undermine the authority of both the Federal and Quebec Governmentg, the morale of the population especially in Quebec, and to some extent confidence abroad im the future of this country. It v/ould tend to encourage similar kinds of terrorism in the future, both in Canada and abroad. It might lend some credence to the thesis that French Canadians are politically oppressed and must use violence to secure their freedom. It is clear that the interest of the Quebec Government in most of these aspects of the matter is very considerable indeed. We would have to consider its interest and its views before reaching any decision to effect a major compromise with the FLQ, �CONFJLENTIAI J c.v\. s-.x 18. It may be possible to identify some half-way compromises which the Government might decide to offer to the kidnappers. For instance, the Government might undertake to consider whether grounds existed for parole io be granted in the case of some or all of the prisoners concerned; an undertaking night be given to allow the kidnappers to leave the country. We shall go into this kind of contingency planning. Implications of Refusal IV. If we refu.se pointblank tne FLQ proposals or took such measures as wholesale sweeps of FLQ suspects, v/e might of course succeed in intimidating the FLQ and bringing about a release of Mr. Cross, This, however, is unlikely and the risk of his death would be serious indeed. Wliile this would bring some revulsion against the FIQ, it v/ould also place the Canadian Government in a very difficult position with the Canadian public. The British public's (if not Government's) reaction could also be expected to be strong. The essential question the Canadian Government would have to answer v/ould be whether it had done everything reasonable and appropriate and imaginative to save the British diplomat's life. �<s<sl*i. ±.±sXJfc* x X X V i j • F \ October 5, 1970. MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER Abduction of Mr. Cross - FLQ Demands The first fact to be taken into consideration is that the threat to Mr. Cross's life is real. This is#the RCMP assessment, in view of the type of men likely to be involved on the FLQ side and of the outside "professional" help they might conceivably have enlisted. We agree with this assessment. It will of course be up to the Government to decide what attitude it wishes to take in this matter and whether any of the FLQ demands could be entertained. As indicated below, our obligations in international law to take "appropriate" action for the safeguard of diplomatic personnel are clear although not detailed. Essentially, the decision will have to be political and encompass a wide variety of factors which we seek to analyse further on in this memorandum. Immediate Measures 2. While we will not be able to avoid a decision on the substance of the problem, urgent consideration must be given to certain inmediate measures. First, you may agree that it would be very much to our advantage to gain time viz-a-viz the FLQ, if only to allow police action to proceed, and also to consider any political negotiations we may wish to undertake. This being so, we should avoid categorical statements that might be interpreted by the FLQ as a flat rejection of their demands. I see no harm in our position being somewhat blurred. This might lead to a weakening in the FLQ demands and give the Government time to take decisions on the substance of the problem. All the better if the Federal Government appears relatively discreet, given the considerable interest of the Quebec Government in the matter. 3. Another immediate problem is to ready ourselves for a possible dialogue with Cuba and Algeria im this matter. Since our new Ambassador is not at present in Havana and since we have no resident mission in Algeria, I propose that we stand ready to send Mr. Mayrand (who has been requested to be in Ottawa Tuesday morning) to Cuba to deal with this specific problem if required. Similarly, Mr. J.M. Dery, the Head of our ^Francophone Division, who has extensive African experience, would proceed lb Paris on the evening of October 6 so as to be ready for Inmediate move tb Algiers in case of need (or possibly in advance of actual need, perhaps for the ostensible purpose of discussing the basis on which our proposed Canadian mission in Algiers might be opened). There might even be some advantage in letting it be known that contacts were being established with the two governments concerned in view of the FLQ reference to them. We • • • <C �could of course deny any implication that this implied Canadian Government acceptance of the FLQ terms and we could simply indicate that in our thorough consideration of all elements of the situation we were naturally exploring those aspects affecting one or both of those governments. I should be grateful for your comments on this proposal. We would of course notify the Quebec authorities in advance. 4. Another means of gaining time, admittedly risky, would be to seek to establish some kind of contact with the FLQ. We shall be cautiously exploring thia possibility. It might have the advantage of decreasing the risk to Mr. Cross by reducing the harshness of the confrontation. At the same time, if the Government felt compelled to negotiate terms with the FLQ (it is unlikely that we would wish to accede to all their demands), a channel for doing so would have been established. Of course, one could conceive of other means of conducting such negotiations, e.g., through a public statement by the Canadian Government of the terms it was willing to accept. Nonetheless the direct method has certain attractions, especially in terms of gaining time. British Attitude and Canadian Legal Obligations 5. Our relations with the British Government in this matter are, of course, important. Any immediate steps of the kind mentioned above that we can announce to them would of course remove some of the pressure on them as well as cm us. There is every indication to date that the British Government intends to be understanding and cooperative. Of course the British authorities have every concern for the life of a British representative, but they are also aware of the abdication of government responsibility that could be involved in complying with unlimited terrorist demands. In the recent Middle East crisis the British Government, at least initially, adopted a hard line towards Palestinian hijackers demands and rallied to its viewpoint the Germans and the Swiss who were first inclined to immediate compliance. Ihe British took the lead in coordinating efforts and in bargaining with the terrorists through the Red Cross. In the event, these governments did negotiate with the Palestinians and, after several days, secured the release of all hostages before any of the prisoners were released. In a parliamentary debate at the end of April, the Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Shepherd) noted that the responsibility for the safety of an Ambassador and his staff lay with the host country. He recognized, however, that with the best will in the world no country could give complete protection against kidnappings of diplomats any more than any other form of crime. 6. Non-compliance with the request to take the prisoners to Cuba or Algeria involves the international responsibility of the Canadian Government to protect the persons of diplomats in its territory. This obligation is spelled out in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Article 40, which reads: ...3 000011 �"The receiving state shall . . . take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom or dignity." It follows that the receiving state has a responsibility to mitigate any consequences of not having fulfilled this obligation. The British Government might blame the Canadian Government for not taking the appropriate measures of protection given the political situation in Quebec. Although Canada is not yet a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations it represents general principles of international law which we follow. Our decisions, while they should be consistent with those general obligations, can nevertheless vary considerably in the light of our practical and political assessment of the situation. 7. We attempt below to analyse the implications of the FLQ ransom demands, to determine what would be involved in complying partly or fully with them and what would be the implications of refusing to do so. Analysis of the Demands The demands can be summarized as follows: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) stop police investigation; wide press and TV publicity for the FLQ political manifesto; release of over 20 prisoners; facilities for their transport by plane to Cuba or Algeria; rehiring of the LaPalme workers by the Post Office Department; $500,000 in gold; public information on an alleged spy within the FLQ. The full text of the demands is attached. 8. With regard to point (l), the police investigation is of course going on and will not be brought to a stop unless the Quebec and Federal Government so direct. Such a large investigation cannot, of course, be kept secret and the press is bound to be aware that it is going on. Nonetheless, in order not to present the kidnappers with too direct a challenge, we should do what we can to avoid any official confirmation that this aspect of the FLQ/ia being ignored. /demand 9. The freeing of prisoners (point 3) would involve decisions by both the Federal and the Quebec Governments. More than half the persons in question are in federal institutions, either medium or maximum security ones. We expect to receive early on October 6 an assessment of each one of the prisoners by officials of the Solicitor General and the RCMP; it will thus be possible to establish what internal security risks would be involved for the Canadian and Quebec Governments in releasing some or all of these prisoners. . • .4 000012 �CONFIDENTIAL - 4 - 10. Arrangements with Cuba and Algeria to receive these prisoners (point, 4) raise a number of political and legal considerations. The first question would be whether we could obtain entry for these people from one or erne other government. It is difficult at this stage to assess what the reaction of the Cuban Government would be. Premier Castro in the past has made it clear that Cuba encourages revolutionaries in the hemisphere; it has granted asylum to numerous political activists from a number of countries. In a public statement recently, however, Castro drew a distinction between what he called "genuine revolutionaries" and what he termed "common criminals". The former would be granted asylum but the latter would be jailed. Indeed, only a few weeks ago, for the first time, the Cuban Government deported a United States citizen who claimed to be a political . refugee. On the other hand, the present Cuban attitude toward the FLQ is A less clear. We are examining to what extent Castro has been showing sympathy for the FLQ in recent months. 11. Should the Canadian Government formally request Cuba to accept these persons, Castro might do so, explaining that such action should be viewed as a favour to us and as a humanitarian act. It will be recalled that in previous cases of diplomatic kidnappings Mexico has received prisoners freed in other countries. By acceding to the request, Castro could claim his action should be viewed in the context of friendly relations with Canada and at the same time disclaim any responsibility for activity supporting the FLQ in Cuba. He has denied in the past accusations that his government was extending such support by providing training facilities for extremists. There have been indications that at least some Quebec separatist extremists were not over welcome im Cuba. 12. As for Algeria, although it has shown sympathy towards "liberation movements", its relations with Canada have been developing favourably over the last year. The Algerian Government has shown considerable interest in the Canadian Government as a trade and aid partner. Algeria may therefore be extremely loathe to get involved in the problem. It might conceivably accept our request. It may be that Algeria would abide more strictly than Cuba by any agreement we reached with them concerning the activities of the prisoners once in Algeria. On the other hand, asylum in Cuba would give the FLQ extremists a rather less favourable image than if they were welcomed in Algeria, a more neutral and respectable country. 13. The second question relates to extradition. It would be ideal of course if arrangements could be made for the prisoners to proceed to Cuba or Algeria, then to be promptly returned by the local government on the basis of a previous arrangement. It is highly unlikely that such am agreement could be reached. On the contrary, either government would no doubt insist as a condition of its acceptance of these prisoners that we waive any rights to ask for the return of the prisoners. (We would have some legal grounds ...5 000013 �CONFIDENTIAL - 5 - for requesting return in the case of Cuba. We have an extradition treaty with that country, but Cuba could of course choose to consider the prisoners as "political" and therefore not extraditable. We have no extradition treaty with Algeria.) A return, or at least freezing of any funds paid to the FLQ, could perhaps more easily be agreed. 14. The third question relates to the activities of these persons once in Cuba or Algeria. We could request and perhaps obtain an undertaking from the receiving government that the prisoners would not be allowed to engage in any political activity in that country, nor to use or transfer for political purposes any of the funds they might have received from authorities in Canada. Finally we would wish to examine whether the released prisoners would be granted political asylum in the receiving country. Clearly it would be preferable to avoid such a development, since this would lend credence to the FLQ claim that these were victims of political persecution and not common criminals. 1$. Concerning the half a million dollars' ransom (point 6), the Government would have to weigh the risk that such funds might find their way back to Canada to finance heightened terrorist activity. The measures mentioned in the previous paragraph might alleviate this danger. 16. The denunciation of any "spy" in the FIQ (demand 7) would be of course quite unprecedented and in many ways damaging. It may well be one of the demands the FLQ might give up. Implications of Giving In 17. A decision to give in to most or all of tne FLQ demands would in all probability ensure the return of Mr. Cross. However, its negative effects must also be weighed. It would involve to some extent an abdication of the Government's responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the country. It would acknowledge that the FLQ is a force to be reckoned with and can negotiate with the Canadian and Quebec Governments. It would tend to undermine the authority of both the Federal and Quebec Governmentf, the morale of the population especially in Quebec, and to some extent confidence abroad in the future of this country. It would tend to encourage similar kinds of terrorism in the future, both in Canada and abroad. It might lend some credence to the thesis that French Canadians are politically oppressed and must use violence to secure their freedom. It is clear that the interest of the Quebec Government in most of these aspects of the matter is very considerable indeed. We would have to consider its interest and its views before reaching any decision to effect a major compromise with the FLQ. .. .6 �CONFIDENTIAL -6 18. IT, may be possible to identify some half-way compromises which the 'Government might decide to offer to the kidnappers. For instance, the Government might undertake to consider whether grounds existed for parole to be granted in the case of some or all of the prisoners concerned; aii undertaking might be given to allow the kidnappers to leave the country. We shall go into this kind of contingency planning. Implications of Refusal IV. If we refuse pointblank the FLQ proposals or took such measures as wholesale sweeps of FLQ suspects, we might of course succeed in intimidating the FLQ and bringing about a release of Mr. Cross. This, however, is unlikely and the risk of his death would be serious indeed. While this would bring some revulsion against the FLQ, it would also place the Canadian Government in a very difficult position with the Canadian public. The British public's (if not Government's) reaction could also be expected to be strong. The essential question the Canadian Government would have to answer would be whether it had done everything reasonable and appropriate and imaginative to save the British diplomat's life. AA * �CONFIDENTIAL October 6, 1970. MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER Federal. Response to FLQ Demands - Contingency Planning Wi.th a view to Cabinet Committee discussion of the kidnapping, you may find useful some preliminary comments on the FLQ demands, the degree to which each one could be met and the kind of offer the Government might hint at if it so wished. 2. Politically, the provision of money to the FLQ is perhaps the least damaging gesture we could make. Indeed I would see distinct advantages in the Government making quite clear early on October 6 that money is no consideration when the life of a man is at stake. This v/ould be a broad hint that at least some of the FLQ requests could be considered. It would constitute no immediate commitment. I think it v/ould at the same time make a favourable impression upon the British Government and the public, both British and Canadian. 3. The promise of safe conduct for the kidnappers if they return Cross might not reelse overwhelming political difficulties. It is true that v/ould ensure thera immunity for their criminal act. At the same time they v/ould be leaving Canada permanently and deprived of their Canadian citizenship. It could not be said that they got away scotfree. There v/ould be no objection in providing them v/ith air transport if need be. To this point the kidnappers v/ould have merely been treated by the Canadian Government as successful criminals, allowed to escape v/ith their loot. The impact on the public, I think, v/ould not be particularly favourable to the kidnappers. 4. Presumably the Canadian Government v/ould have to arrange with Cuba or Algeria for entry by the kidnappers, end perhaps by one or more prisoners. If only the kidnappers -were involved, a demarche of this nature to foreign governments should not present too many drawbacks and v/ould be in accordance vrith the Iceic cf allowing them to leave with their- money. Such a demarche relating to prisoners would raise different questions. 5. If the Government felt compelled to go further, perhaps some negotiation would be possible on the number of prisoners to be released. It could be argued, for instance, that the release of one of the present prisoners in exchange for Mr. Cress was not am unreasonable gesture. This might of course lead to bargaining on numbers as between the 23 requested rpred the figure of 1 v/e v/ould ini.tip.lly propose. It o �- 2 - CONFIDENTIAL ro xx i-A must be realized, however, that at this point v/e v/ould enter into much more delicate political grounds, since the release of prisoners could be interpreted as a tacit admission that they were not common criminals. 6. Of the other FLQ conditions, only the request that all police activity relating to the kidnapping be stopped can be ranked with the earlier ones in importance from the FLQ viewpoint. I take i.t that neither Ottawa nor Quebec v/ould be willing to call off the police, at least until a deal had been made. In the circumstances, this FLQ condition must be ignored. As a corollary there should be a concerted effort in the federal and provincial capitals to say as little as possible on police activity so as net to alarm the kidnappers. I appreciate that this will be difficult to do in face of questions by the press, and especially in the House, but I think these must be sidestepped on the perfectly reasonable grounds that matters are extremely delicate and that a life hangs in the balance, 7. It is more difficult to take seriously the other three demands. To seek press publicity for the FLQ manifesto would involve some political self-abasement on the part of the Federal and Quebec Governments. This said, the manifesto is a rather crude document that may arouse more distaste than enthusiastic support in Quebec. It is for consideration whether the Government v/ould wish at one point to release the text to the press, which v/ould no doubt give it considerable coverage but hardly full-length publication on the front page. Another approach night be to seek publication of the text through paid advertisements, perhaps prefaced, by a notice to the effect that the text v/as being published, to save the life cf a foreign, representative in Canada. While v/e mention these possibilities in order to cover the ground, v/e do believe that publication of the manifesto and a half hour of television publicity for it and the prisoners must be marginal to the FLQ's objectives and that they could also be ignored, at least for the time being, especially if there were some points on which the Government were willing to hint at an arrangement. The same reasoning applies even more strongly to the requests relating to the LaPalme workers and to the alleged informer within the FLQ. It is hard to believe that the FLQ would kill for such minor objectives. So much the better, of course, i.f the LaPalme item could be wiped off the list of requests through a statement by the interested parties that they had no wish to obtain advantages from the Federal Government by means of a threat to a foreign diplomat. 8. In conclusion, I v/ould recommend that v/e immediately make our position, clear about the money. It is of course up to Ministers to decide how much further they might be willing to go at this point. If we were ready to undertake informal contacts v/ith the FLQ, I think v/e should hint initially at an arrangement involving money, safe coriductQtransport and arrangements for admittance into Cuba or Algeria. It is also for consideration whether we should add an offer relating to at least one of the prisoners. This may depend in part on whether • • •J 2" �3 - CONFIDENTIAL some of the prisoners night not be considered as eligible for release on parole in the near future, which of cours ea v/ould facilitate matters, I am fully aware of the disadvantages of undertaking even covert negotiations v/ith the FLQ. On the other hand, because of the vague 48 hour deadline v/e are faced with, it may be wise to register with the Front the possibility of a deal in order- to prevent any reaction of panic on the part, of the kidnappers and to establish for the record that the Government had not adopted a passive or negative position. A.E.R. 000018 �CONFIDENTIAL October 6, 1970. MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER Federal Response to FLQ Demands - Contingency Planning With a view to Cabinet Conmittee discussion of the kidnapping, you may find useful some preliminary comments on the FLQ demands, the degree to which each one could be met and the kind of offer the Government might hint at if it so wished. 2. Politically, the provision of money to the FLQ is perhaps the least damaging gesture we could make. Indeed I would see distinct advantages in the Government making quite clear early on October 6 that money is no consideration when the life of a man is at stake. This would be a broad hint that at least some of the FLQ requests could be considered. It would constitute no immediate conmitment. I think it would at the same time make a favourable impression upon the British Government and the public, both British and Canadian. 3. The promise of safe conduct for the kidnappers if they return Cross might not raise overwhelming political difficulties. It is true that would ensure them immunity for their criminal act. At the same time they would be leaving Canada permanently and deprived of their Canadian citizenship. It could not be said that they got away scotfree. There would be no objection in providing them with air transport if need be. To this point the kidnappers would have merely been treated by the Canadian Government as successful criminals, allowed to escape with their loot. The impact on the public, I think, would not be particularly favourable to the kidnappers. 4. Presumably the Canadian Government would have to arrange with Cuba or Algeria for entry by the kidnappers, and perhaps by one or more prisoners. If only the kidnappers were involved, a demarche of this nature to foreign governments should not present too many drawbacks and would be in accordance with the logic of allowing them to leave with their money. Such a demarche relating to prisoners would raise different questions. 5. If the Government felt compelled to go further, perhaps some negotiation would be possible on the number of prisoners to be released. It could be argued, for instance, that the release of one of the present prisoners in exchange for Mr. Cross was not an unreasonable gesture. This might of course lead to bargaining on numbers as between the 23 requested and the figure of 1 we would initially propose. It �CONFIDENTIAL JGCJ must be realized, however, that at this point we would enter into much more delicate political grounds, since the release of prisoners could be interpreted as a tacit admission that they were not common criminals. 6. Of the other FLQ conditions, only the request that all police activity relating to the kidnapping be stopped can be ranked with the earlier ones in importance from the FLQ viewpoint. I take it that neither Ottawa nor Quebec would be willing to call off the police, at least until a deal had been made. In the circumstances, this FLQ condition must be ignored. As a corollary there should be a concerted effort in the federal and provincial capitals to say as little as possible on police activity so as not to alarm the kidnappers. I appreciate that this will be difficult to do in face of questions by the press, and especially in the House, but I think these must be sidestepped on the perfectly reasonable grounds that matters are extremely delicate and that a life hangs in the balance. 7. It is more difficult to take seriously the other three demands. To seek press publicity for the FLQ manifesto would involve some political self-abasement on the part of the Federal and Quebec Governments. This said, the manifesto is a rather crude document that may arouse more distaste than enthusiastic support in Quebec. It is for consideration whether the Government would wish at one point to release the text to the press, which would no doubt give it considerable coverage but hardly full-length publication on the front page. Another approach might be to seek publication of the text through paid advertisements, perhaps prefaced by a notice to the effect that the text was being published to save the life of a foreign representative in Canada. While we mention these possibilities in order to cover the ground, we do believe that publication of the manifesto and a half hour of television publicity for it and the prisoners must be marginal to the FLQTs objectives and that they could also be ignored, at least for the time being, especially if there were some points on which the Government were willing to hint at an arrangement. The same reasoning applies even more strongly to the requests relating to the LaPalme workers and to the alleged informer within the FLQ. It is hard to believe that the FLQ would kill for such minor objectives. So much the better, of course, if the LaPalme Item could be wiped off the list of requests through a statement by the interested parties that they had no wish to obtain advantages from the Federal Government by means of a threat to a foreign diplomat. 8. In conclusion, I would recommend that we immediately make our position clear about the money. It is of course up to Ministers to decide how much further they might be willing to go at this point. If we were ready to undertake informal contacts with the FLQ, I think we should hint initially at an arrangement involving money, safe conduct, transport and arrangements for admittance into Cuba or Algeria. I f is also for consideration whether we should add an offer relating to at least one of the prisoners. This may depend in part on whether ...3 000020 �some of the prisoners might not be considered as eligible for release on parole in the near future, which of course would facilitate matters. I am fully aware of the disadvantages of undertaking even covert negotiations with the FLQ. On the other hand, because of the vague 48 hour deadline we are faced with, it may be wise to register with the Front the possibility of a deal in order to prevent any reaction of panic on the part of the kidnappers and to establish for the record that the Government had not adopted a passive or negative position. F A.E.R. 000021 �MIN PARLSEC PDM FPR COVHaKTIaL - -i i - i sssso October 7, 1970 IBS^SmJLSSJSBBSm. fidnapping ef Cross - Use of an Intaioodlary Xn via* cf the d i f f i e u l t i a e we are enocamturing i a the receipt and analysing of a variety of • i w l l l t l l i " ftua the FLQ, about which you have alraody aeon ay maaaraaAwk at today's date, My I have your i n—iite aa tho following tentative proposal. 2. Faffhope consideration m M oo given t o appointing aa i n t e r aodleiy for tho g i i u i w i t o at ftMoo end Quebec who might meet oa latar—Hiiiy for thooe responaible for lor. Cross** abduction. Thia person appointed by tho g n w — i U would oo —pasurod t o meet tho other side o t o location Mutually ae sept a hie t o both s i d e s . Ho oould have t o oaouro toot too intermediary fcr too abductors asderatood toot sueh a meeting would ba on tho basis of oofa conduct for a i a , with a aoloan undertaking that there would bo no police iatorferaojoo, surveillance, e t c . , either of tola and euboeouoat meetings, cr of contacts which tho abductors» enouoaaa would Mod to nake with thorn. We Mdarataad that, should tho too gavarnaeats 04x00 t o such 0 proposal, such aolrai undert a k i n g with rogaril t o those points oould bo arranged. 3. ma chcdeo of 0 j s i a n o m t intermediary w i l l bo of major importance, l a oould bo a potnam l i k o Claude Ryan, Bogor Gaudry, Rector of tho Mioaroity of Hontreal, or Laoio Laberge of tho C.L.C. The eventual choiea would, X f o o l , bo h o t l e f t t o tho c o l l e c t i v e judgment of too Cabinet, sines your eolloafaoa w i l l bora views on tho acceptab i l i t y of various of tho M M O propped above and undoubtedly w i l l suggest at hare who night bo eoMidered. Ino pcroon should not, I suggest, bo o mediator. There would bo rami danger i n such a parson proposing a oonproniao Mcosoptsbla t o tho Canadian g u w a i i — 1 . This would gravely undondao our (MOT excellent) aaral poeition. 4. Xt strikes M that, i f wo should decide t o appoint a genreranont iuteraediaiy, ho night have with him, ot tho f i r s t nesting, OOM points which too two p i n — t i fool are negotiable. Although not exhaustive, X would suggest ppMidorotlon oft (o) an offer of lnotmity frou iaoodiate arrest and prosecution and of oofo conduct fbr too kidnappers t o any country of their choice which would bo willing to accept them; and �T£X)V T^ IT^I. 2 (b) release of most (if aot all) of those paople whom tho Queboc polioe have resent ly picked op in their various raids and searches. It of course is understood that these oonditiona hinge on assurances that Mr. Croaa will bo rolooood safely at a tiao aad place which the abductors may wish to chooc* aad which aaa bo verified oiaultanaoualy. 5. The above le a secy general outline of thia proposal, but one which, X feel, merits POM Id oration. 3y our proposing on Intermediary (whether publicly or privately) we have two diotinot advantages t (a) we have aade a Meaningful gesture, aad (b) we place the abductors In the position ef bettor oaaoratoadiag tho fact that their •eoonanloatlam* are not coning through load aad olaar, aad thai offering then a ehanoo to aako direct contact, ovaa if only far their propaganda purpoeas. 000023 �rr, n _a L/^ru m e V i_...e.t C „ 7-,.it; tiia,A cncuige, c i s p o Uj. LA e eauebecke 7 O^*o J 'XI • -+P* v*Cu aesoite UCttl o.I O'u^.u a. Cu erence u JOO OU T^J.C .> y a. »c c 30 I -7 r cOG r~\ r r.m WL' e proo_ue^ i s LLA C A O LaGCxOVV C£al o c c c U c o u r t s Ox j-ciW can OQ cue e x e r c i s e o uy wn^cn O U U J GUUG o r onaj. r o U - . V _L-L*U.^ . • J . G»*G CMXU. soc o orce Dec&use o CM..7_J/.'Oj. A ex eworA w i t e r e s t s of gro UJCJ e.ij r > y u s e of b l a c k m a i l c iJcJCc77.GSe t h e ncreation n oi Ij^Juu US u c* OxICaLuG ciX • L i . .7^ nvoivec I understand that it, is in the name of a certain conception of society that the offers of the rapt of Mr. Cross have acted. But this conception they cannot impose on the majority of their citizens Xy violence or by murder which would in effect discredit for always this J conception. Without acceding to undue pressure, even dangerous pressure, the authorities, as you say, are not without realizing that there are areas of discontent in our society, and that injustice exists. I think the persons involved in this matter are adult enough to admit first that in this field there is room for divergence of opinion: their opinion, they have ail the freedoms to translate it in speeches and in action . .. as long as they have no recourse.'to violence or to murder of an innot person. 000024 �- 2 •^n tnu cop*vTcpy, ^nece opinions can mserv trrepr-seives in an cPvC.-pange, in a cis cuss ion wmch wouxc oe frank anc open oetween all the elements OP* society to contribute to a constructive and positive solution oi our pro sterns. reform. P.ae government of Que sec is a Government dedicated to It is profoundly preoccupied by social justice and Xy ail its citizens, especially those who are tne poorest. Therefore, the overture that 1 can maKe in tne present conditions is to asK you to ta^ce account oi our good faith and of our desire to examine objectively these injustices of our society. What mechanism, what instituions should be set up? TP.V Govern- ment is making an intense 6iporu to listen to a^x w..e socia.<. groups, me importance and the interest which it gives to Citizens' Committees is a prooj. op. its preoccupation witn the reiorm OP our society. p.t intends to examine with all these who are conscious of this necessity of reform the betterment of our structures so that the revindications of citizens be heard and that groups may also express themselves to orient by this way the action 0^ ^ne ^.tate so oerat iv oe m acccrGsm.ee witn socia^. evolution, ^-t would be the negation of these efforts to take measures which would go against the social order which we are building. This is why we cannot accept to forget about those crimes which nave oeon. committed by persons called political prisoners There exists a parole procedure which applies to all cases and it will be followed Gojectiveiy. Tais Goes not mean a_L.GG tnat the cases wnich are presently before the courts dealing with certain accused can be forgotten, can be erased, because the contrary there again, would evidence, would be the proof of the construction of our social order which we must build;, but we will consider with clemency, with the clemency which is opportune in the circumstances, 000025 �your gesture which should end terrorism here. As an ultimate concession to save the life cf Mr. Cross, the Federal Government has instructed me that it is disposed to offer you safe conduct towards a foreign country. If or. tr.e other hand you choose to refuse such, safe conduct, I can assure you that you will benefit before our courts of all the ele;;.ency which courts can grant in view oz a numanitarian gesture to avoid the.ceath of Mr. Cross. This I can assure you. I therefore ask you a gesture of absolute good faith; release Mr. Cross immediately. Beyond all the individual cases involved we must build a society which deals effectively . wiw* justice ana iiserty. L/ont_^emw*p, you nave your par^ «o piay in this enterprise if you so choose. », , 000026 �o n • - r\ J^.... Cu*. .. iJ -.W U7J bV^i <J x. J t\J ••^/rfjU qui anire.e ce^ui qui va vous parler est celui eie la i », poooercPxia-i,iorp s o c i a ^ s . ^ Cu .. a c c e p t a t i o n GU cp.auge.Tien.. ue l a Q.p.spcrsp.e et U.t! O \^q ^.*.voqu.o^ oo uo J. a IV.CJ. Ocooco>lo.u r*ct-i. ^. oorr.oiVu u© O OUS ^.OS VUO OOCGOO iv.o,^^iro nos a - cooor.un. a;vor,^rtCc3 iju pr oolc;rr*6 so" p o s o d-rurua'wiquo.oont '-* i. GCCaSOOn Cu ^ 0**u.0VC7io*A w U. OO*. nCr*07iO - **- # ^ * ' O o S . IT.aiS Uj. nOUS iifipX iqUQ 0 OUS • i-m .kucunQ s c c o o o o no p o u t accopoor* q u o ,*.es c i o c i o i o n s c*o s o s m»-Owiwuoion* [jOUVc x*r*orr»Qi*"oCOi. uo co y o u i c i a i . r o S OO i o n x r o o i i s o S or* c^ucti w i on o u o cai"* ^uuJ pa*? LG rr*oycn du cnu^i-a^u o-coi*co pai* u n o^oupOj ^hlW Gt u03 gI*0\lp6S j .. M W CC*? CO - t o w CUI* cc*.a s i ^ n i t i o .OtTwO CtltO L c * A * A • • . . - ' . - '• - COS XJuU.lVlG.UE no peut s'oxprirr.er q u ' i 1'interiour d'un -i-lOOIT *0 cuuro ci ir*sti«utions cui arc i t rent, xos com.^it s ot los i^tGrct3 co on 1 :• - .J. ^-' « • - ^ *J CUWMO• >• o0 OC.TipiT O*,Cu3 CUG .'Cu bOl" UT.O CO^t-UinO COO.CGpXl.Or*. do la/oOOlc uC; qui ; „ — — .: v, .< i -. _ 1._„. U t t J ^ l ^ G l e u a ^ w U U.i •3 du I ' e n l S v o n nt• .OG i m p o s e r at lei r. «_ C * * A WO •.. -. <T. l - . '—. — * i U -. -. -v — ... >-• Ouww n C U S v. I A U CO U ^ A O W U . ^*o*OOJT^. <_- COS OiOOiOS cu*r*0*01*0"USOC .j Xai ,,,i A „ , 4 . r-.ai s ces conceptionsy x^s no psuvont o cenextoyons pur* *a vio^onco ou pur* ui* G U * . U ^ . ~)UT^aiS j4. , 0^o*0*'.u) C-v. -'f, iUbU*ikvtid -v- **C0«'*O.-.u<s*;w.-w' CJCCU 0 0 I V O w , , »» t X7 ^-\"1 *» rs ^, VI ' <a*» | ) i . M u u COS COi'iCO'jl* 000*3 * . -.-^-v^-^ UUUUJIU *r f~^ 1 ^ r - J. ,. ,-. \—y...-,., A u U.kUo r*ox**t) s o c i o vO * 5# ,7,'OJ.G J o p o n s o quo l o s ITO-Vosscurs c o **.# o r o s s sor*v ^ s s o s po^iir ad.T.cttro t o u t {jonco d c v u e . *AU'U*COS O« d ' a o o r d q^co d a n s c o d o m a i n e i l p o u t y a v o i r Lours opinions 7 divor— l i s ont touto la lioor^e oo xes tracuiiro par 000027 �2. la parole et l'action, tant qu'ils n'ont pas recours & la. violence ou 1 la mort d'un innocent. Bien plutot, ces opinions peuvent s'inserer elans un echange et une discussion franche et ouvorte entre les differents elements de ia societe, afin de contribuer *a une solution constructive et positive de nos problemes. 6. Le Gouvernement du Qu£beo est un Gouvernement de reformes. II se preoccupe profondement de la justice sociale, du- sort de tous les citoyens, surtout des plus demunis. At' 7. Par consequent, -la'-sctrleOouverture que nous pouvons vous faire dans les conditions actuelles, est de vous demander de prendre acte de notre bonne foi et de notre desir d'examiner objectivement ces injustices qui existent chez nous. Quels mecanismes, quelles institutions doivent etre mis sur pied pour le faire? 8. Le Gouvernement s'efforce intensement d'etre 3 l'£coute de tous les groupes sociaux. L'importance et I'interet qu'il accorde a des grou— pements comme les comites de citoyens, et il tcmoignent de son souci profond en a donne la preuve, de reforme de notre societe. II entend examiner avec tous ceux qui sont conscients des rSformes souhaitables, I'amelioration de nos structures pour que soient entendues les revendications des citoyens et des groupes afin d'onienter ainsi l'action de I'Etat pour qu'elles concordent avec 1.'evolution sociale. 9. Ce serait la negation de ces efforts que de prendre des mesures qui iraient dans le serx de la destruction de I'ordre social quo noussommes P\ "dStir. C'est pourquoi il nous est interdit de passer 1'Pponge sur le cas �•3 cos personnes qu'on a designe comme des prisonniers politiques. Ii cams tous ces cas et cpui sera suivi oojectivement. VC'/.t 10. Ceci mrr-/eut;.pac dire egalement que les causes qui sont actu- ellement mues devant.les Tribunaux quant a certains accuses »e devront pas- £tre jugees car ie contraire serait ii, encore une fois, la destruction de I'ordre social que nous avons a BStir, mais nous les considererons avec la clemence qui s*impose vu votre geste qui devrait mettre un terme au terrorisms. 11. A titre de concession ultime, pour sauver la vie de K. Cross, le Gouvernement federal m'informe qu'il est dispose a, vous^offrir le saufconduit vers un pays etranger. Si,d'autre part, vous choisissez de refu- ser ie sauf-conduit, je puis vous assurer que vous beneficierez devant les Tribunaux de toute la clemence qu'ils pourront exercer en prenant acte de tout geste' humanitaire que vous pourriez poser en vue d'epargner la vie de K. Cross. 12. Ceci je puis vous 1'assurer. Jo vous demande done un geste d'absolue bonne fci: relScher M. Cross immediatement.Oi-deli de toutes les contingences individuelles /•/ et des cas particuliers^ -IP nous faut batir une societe qui tienne compte y , de la justice ct de la liberte. Messieurs, vous avez votre part a jouer dans cette entreprise si vous le choisissez. 000029 �,/p<£~ J CGNF1DENTIEL :U< <Ff~F F" (g Amendements proposes.au projet de declaration de M . Choquette O ^ i- ' O ^ z^**" -A 7r'/7*<y< («•«** au Gureau ce A . wioquette, a, 1 5 . 2 5 ie le j_u octosre xy/Oj Aucune societe ne peut accepter que les decisions de ses las^j-tutiGrps gouverr.ementales et judiciaires soient remises en question oa ccsrtPcs pa;" _o moy-n cu chantage excrce par un gp-oupe, car cela s-i-gr.ipie _s I^P GS PC/PL. enure social, ce qui est jus ter .rent .-a negation ae la liberte ces indiviuus et des g r o u p e s , car cette liberte ne.peut s'exprimer q u ' i I'interieur d'un cadre d'institutions qui arbitrent les conflits et Ies interets des groupes en c a u s e . 2. Je comprends que ce soit une certaine conception de la societe qui a inspire les auteurs de l'enlevement. M a i s ces conceptions, ils ne peuvent les imposer a la m a j o r i t e ae leurs concitoyens par la violence ou par un meurtre q u i n e ferait que aiscreGiter a jamais ces conceptions. 3. Je pense qae les ravisseurs d e M . Cross sont assez adultes et m u r s pour admettre tout d'abord que dans ce domaine il peut y avoir divergence de'vue. Leurs o p i n i o n s , ils ont toute liberte de ies traduire p a r la parole et l'action, tant q u ' i l s n'ont pas recours a la violence ou a l a m o r t d'un innocent„ 3ien p l u t S t , ces opinions peuvent s'inserer dans un echange et u n e discussion franche et ouverte entre les differents elements de la societe,, afin de contribuer a u n e solution constructive et positive de nos p r o b l e m e s , 4. Le Gouvernement du Quebec est u n Gouvernement u e r e f o r m e s , II se preoccupe profondPment de la justice sociale, du sort de tous Ies citoyens, surtout Ies plus d e m u n i s . D e s programmes or.t deja ete mis sur pied a cette fin. D'autres m e c a n i s m e s , d'autres institutions soret-ils necessaires? Ie Gouvernement est en train d'etudier. C'^st ce que Notre effort n'en est qu'i son debut et se poursuit de jour en j o u r . 000030 �- 2 - 5„ ccnyiLarppiPL Ce serait ia negation de ces efforts que ae prendre des mesures qui iraient dans le sens de la destruction de i'ordre social que nous oc.tmes a batir. C ! est pourquoi il nous est interdit de passer I'eponge erar le cas G G S personnes qu'on a appose des prisonniers ooliticues. II exr^ote deja une procedure ee liberation conditionnelle qui s!applique cans tous ces cas 61; que nous sutvrons oer^ectivement3 6. A titre de concession ultime, pour sauver ia vie de M. Cross, nous ja..:..ea v^_^,_y^.-^c^ c vsu^ e*rP*P ^.e saue—conduit vers un pays ee»raagc.rtt Gl, d1autre part, vo^s choioissez de refuser le sauf-conauit, je puis vous assurer erue vous beneficierez devant les Tribunaux de la clemence qu' iis pourront exercer en prenant acte de tout geste numanitaire que vous pourriez poser en vue d'epargner la vie de M. Cross. 7. Je vous demande done un geste d'absolue bonne foi: relacher M. Cross immediatement. 000031 �y> ^F ^ T : ^ ^F ; 0 ixLU'lF-vw ^ / V ^ ^ ~ i— | " ! 7 O -r O. O ^ > j ce~. u (_a——X- <-» c h^ ._ Lc< ( C b ^.v-te^r>—^ . V -C~«r—Aj^ IO ocJ~o W < _ -M C0NflDENT1AL JU/tsT^vu*^ S*yL-^L4li^ ^*.. Aucune societe ne peut accepter que les decisions de ses JboiwX. institutions gouvernementales et judiciaires s»i^ remises en question ou ecartees par le moyen au chantage exerce par un groupe, qu'il soit minoritaire ou majoritaire.car cela signifie la fin de tout ordre social^ ce qui est justement la negation de la liberte des individus et des groupes car cette liberte ne peut s'exprimer qu'a I'interieur d'un cadre d'institutions qui arbitrent les conflits et les interSts des groupes en cause, Evidemment, nous aurions pu vous offrir k titre de concession ultime pour la vie de M. Cross le sauf-conduit pour vous vers un pays etranger, mais nous vous ferons le credit que vous n'auriez pas accepte cette solution au probleme, ce qui aurait exclusivement satisfait a votre interSt personnel d'eviter des poursuites ici et vous aurait/olassfecomme Itches aupres de vos amis. Nous vous ferons egalement le credit que le geste que vous avez pose l'a ete au nom d'un ideal. Sans nous rendre £. des pressions que nous considerons excessives, m&nes damgereuses, les "autorites en place", comme vous dites, ne sont pas sans se rendre compte des malaises profonds et des injustices souvent flagrantes qui existent dams notre societe. Je pense que vous §tes assez adultes et mtirs pour admettre, tout d'abord, que dans ce domaine il peut y avoir divergence de vue. Votre opinion n'est pas necessairement celle qui doit prevaloir, mais bien plutfit cette opinion peut provoquer un echange et une discussion franche et ouverte entre les differents elements de cette societe et elle pourra contribuer a une solution constructive et positive de nos problemes . 2 7 000032 �- 2 - Vous conviendrez que la correction de ces injustices n'est pas une chose qui puisse se realiser instantanement car nous ne sommes pas exclusivement cans le monde des idees mais bien dans celui de la realite de tous les jours qui resiste a'TJ changement^. Par consequent, la seule ouverture que nous pouvons vous faire dans les conditions actuelles, est de vous demander de prendre accmpisa ae notre bonne foi et ae notre desir a"examiner objectivement ces injustices qui sont ies notres. Quels mecanismes, quelles institutions doivent etre mis sur pied pour le faire? Je suis charge par le Premier ministre du Quebec d'annoncer la creation d'un Ministere de la Paix sociale dont la mission sera de s'ocoupei' de ces situations que vous reprochez £. notre societe. II s'agit liL d'un engagement absolu et irrevocable ae notre part0 Je puis vous assurer egalement que, quant au cas de ces personnes que vous appelez des prisonniers politiques, comme je l'ai dit plus haut, il nous est interdit de passer I'eponge, mais nous pouvons, et nous nous engageons a considerer objectivement leur cas de liberation conditionnelie. Ceci ne veut pas dire egalement que les causes qui sont actuellement mues devant Ies Tribunaux quant a certains accuses ne devront pas Stre jugees car le contraire serait la, encore une fois, la destruction de I'ordre social que nous avons a batir, mais nous considererons ces instances en prenant en consideration que ces crLmes ont ete commis au nom d'un ideal mSme si les moyens employes sont inacceptables. Je vous demande done un geste d'absolue bonne foi — reiacher ivi. Cross immediatement — . . . .S 000033 �- 3Demo.-! cote, meme si vous Stes traduitsen justice pour ce que vous avez fait, cet acte volontaire de votre part vous sera compte au point que toute sentence qui pourrait vous 8tre imposee ne sera que symbolique. Ceci, je puis vous en assurer, Mais au dela ae toutes ces contingences individuelles, il nous faut, ensemble, batir -une societe qui tienne compte de la justice-et de la liberte. Vous avez votre part a jouer dams cette entreprise. - 30 - �CONFIDENTIAL 0^ ^J\A\ *<£* Z- **£* \ \W®&&* October 12, 1970 idnappings - Aeseasoent of the Situation aa of October 12 This oeeoraaduo aumaarisea the evolution of our dealings with the kidnappers up to Mr. Laporte*s abduction. It points out the important bearing of the Laporte kidnapping va our negotiation position. It analyses the FLQ negotiating stand, as it eaa ba deduced from the October 12 communique, which resolves the confusions implicit in the October 11 communiques from the cells. Finally, it seeks te assess the implications of the Bourassa statement and tha choices open to ua in ita wake. I. Before the Laporte Kidnapping Although we have officially declined to negotiate in public, there has in fact been a process of accomodation on both sides. One of the seven FLQ demands has been met by the governments: the manifesto has been broadcast. Another demand (end of police action) has been mostly ignored but, at leas^ojt" one crucial paint an October 10, was met discreetly for a while until the Laporte abduction took place. Cn its side, the FLQ gradually dropped some of its subsiduary demands (money, Lapalme workers, denunciation of the informer). Up to the Laporte kidnapping, through the issuance of 7 communiques by the first cell, the FLQ focuased increasingly on a central demand: release of the "political prisoners". It became increasingly probable that there might be no deal with the PLQ unless this demand were at least partly met. In part for that reason the federal government insisted on the importance of negotiations aimed at producing solid guarantees (even if there was no hope of agreement): such negotiation would gain us time, perhape a week, before a final deadlock became apparent over tha "political prisoners". However, the FLQ rejected the prospect of negotiation (or aa they put it "mediation"). The FLQ also ignored tha reference, in Mr. Choquette's Oct. 10 speech, to parole applying th the political prisoners: thia is obviously not enough. Another offer by the governments, made on October 10 by Mr. Choquette, related to the safe conduct for the kidnappers. It has elicited no response, which is natural aa long as the kidnappers feel safe. To sum up, between October 5 and October 10, there was a narrowing down of issues to one major point of unresolved difference: the release of political prisoners. In addition, the governments continued to attach central importance to the related matters of negotiation and guarantee. II. Effect of the Laporte Kidnapping Perhaps the most important effect has been to decrease any reasonable hope the government could have that the problem would be resolved through a sudden police success. The second kidnapping (despite the increased risk it involved for the FLQ) suggests that their organization is perhaps better than 2 000035 \ �- 2anticipated. More important, by acquiring a second hostage, the FLQ is now in a position to protect either operation, to some extent, from the effects of discovery by the police. Up to October 10, discovery of the kidnappers' hideout would have involved the risk that a police attack on it would bring about the death of Mr. Cross: this gave a measure of protection to the kidnappers. After October 10, discovery of one of the cells by the police would leave the other cell and the other hostage untouched. The second hostage might be killed. Alternatively, he might be used to keep the FLQ in a fairly strong negotiating position. (Admittedly, discovery of one of the hideouts would help retrieve the image of the police.) There is a more significant aspect of the matter. The Laporte kidnapping brought home to the public the extant of the FLQ resolve and may have increased the sense that the authorities were powerless to meet their tactics. Most important of all, it greatly increased the pressures on the Quebec government for an accoamodation with the FLQ. Indirectly, these pressures affect the position of the Canadian government, if only because of the danger there would be in allowing a gap to develop between the federal and provincial positions. III. The Effect of the Bourassa Statement For the public, the Bourassa statement will seem to contain, if not a formal commitment to release the political prisoners, at least a strong hint that thia could be arranged, subject to negotiation. What the real intent of the Quebec government is remains uncertain. Mr. BourassaTs line could be interpreted as an attempt to spin out the Cross and Laporte cases, combined with the unstated intent that the prisoners would in fact never be released. If this is indeed his intention, a gap may develop between Quebec policy and the expectations of the Quebec public. Quebec opinion may now press for the freeing of the prisoners I Mr. Bourassa, with his statement may have started a process that can end only with the liberation of at least some of these prisoners and perhaps all. IV. October 12 a.m. CoBMuniqu<§ The main affect of this coomunique is to resume the dialogue which was perturbed by the Laporte kidnapping and subsequent communiques. It is the FLQ, not a cell, that speaks in the present communique. The text is crisp; it is ambiguous only concerning the "intermediaire". The communique and the enclosed letter from Cross confirm that he is alive. (We understand the writing is authentic and the style presents no unusual feature.) It imposes no new deadline, although one will presumably be forthcoming promptly if the authorities are not seen to be moving to meet the latest FLQ conditions. In contrast^, with previous communiques, there is no explicit threat of "liquidation" directed at either hostage in the letter. The communique appears calculated not to be provocative, perhaps because of a feeling that the Bourassa statement provides an opening for moving ahead. We are back to two conditions only for the liberation of the hostages: release of prisoners and end of police activity. The latter point is not unduly stressed. There is no reference to a permanent end of police enquiries. Since Mr. Bourassa, after recognizing in his speech yesterday that it was one of two ...3 000036 �V - 3conditions mentioned in the Laporte letter, then proceeded to ignore the matter, one would have expected a strong FLQ reaction if the police aspect were a crucial one for them. This did not occur. Nonetheless, it is obvious that, if we intend to make a deal with the FLQ or at least to gain time, a low profile of police activity would be desirable. The most interesting aspect of the communique, from the federal viewpoint, is the reference to an intermediaire: "De plus, Maitre Lemieux devrait servir d'intermediaire entre les deux cellules du FLQ et les autorites en place". What this means is far from clear. At a minimum, it may simply mean that Lemieux will deal with the governments on behalf of the FLQ in the practical arrangements for the departure of the prisoners. The reference to the "intermediaire" comes at the end of a paragraph on practical arrangements for the release of the prisoners and should perhaps be read strictly in that context. It may mean no more than what was said in communique No. 6 of October 8 i.e. that Lemieux will watch and assist that process. There is also, however, a possibility that the FLQ is trying to give minimal satisfaction to Mr. Bourassa's instance on some form of negotiation. Under this interpretation, the communique would be hinting that we should talk to Lemieux. If we do we may well find he has no particular mandate and that the only line he can take with us is to request full compliance with the FLQ communique, The federal and Quebec governments will have to decide whether to so und out Lemieux in order to determine if he can or will discuss substantive issues. There would be obvious risks. He might seek to embarrass the governments in public. He might interpret his role in a different way from the two governments. There would be the added problem of establishing a secure contact, between him and the FLQ, of a kind which would be necessary if there were to be bargaining over more than technical and administrative issues connected with the prisoners ' release. On "political prisoners'1, the latest communique restates all the detailed requirements put forward in the very first comnunique. These relate to publicity, wives and children and accompanying lawyers and Journalists. If the prisoners were released, presumably there would be here an area of practical accomodation arrangements to be agreed with Lemieux. A long section is devoted to a solemn guarantee by the FLQ concerning the release of the hostages. Incidentally, even if we cannot have meaningful negotiations with an FLQ representative, the question of guarantee need not present insurmountable difficulties. If the federal and Quebec governments were willing to release the prisoners, it would be possible to make with the receiving country (and not with the FLQ) a public arrangement which would tie prisoners' release to the release of Cross and Laporte. We believe this technique has been used in similar cases in other countries. The prisoners would proceed to Cuba but remain in Canriian hands there. Once confirmed that the hostages had been released, the Cuban government would take custody of the prisoners. If the hostages were not released within an agreed period, the Cubans would allow their return to Canada. (The need for complicated and negotiated guarantees would arise only if the kidnappers themselves wanted safe conduct which is not the case as yet.) .. .4 �CGSS 000038 �000039 �FAFK'JTXAJF NOUS VIVONS DANS UN ENDROIT OU LA LIBERTE D'EXPRESSION EST L'UNE DES PLUS GRANDES ET D'ACTION DE TOUS LES PAYS DU MONDE-, MEWS LES PARTIS Qui MSTTENT EN CAUSE LE REGIME POLITIQUE LUI MEME ES TOUTES L E S LIBERTES DE S'EXPRIMER , D'AILLEUR S CETTE LIBERTE D'EXPRESSION , ON N'A PAS MANQUE DE L'UTILISER CES .DERNIERES ANNESS . EN SEMAljfc SYSTEMATIQUEMENT LA HAINE ET LE MENSONGE. LE GOUVERNEMENT NE PEUT, NE DOIT ET NE RESTERA PAS PASSIF LORSQUE LE EIEN ETRE DS L'INDIVIDU EST MENACE JUSQUE DANS SES RACINES. JE SUIS '.POP FIER D'ETRE QUEBECOIS POUR NE PAS VOUS DIRS TOUTE MA RESOLUTION ET CELLE DU GOUVERNEMENT QUE JE DIRIGE POUR SURMONTSR CETTE CRISE -TRES GRAVE. DANS CE TRAVAIL POUR SAUVEGARDER LES VALEURS FONDAMENTALES DE NOTRE CIVILISATI ON JE SUIS CONVAINCU D'AVOJR L'APPUI DE TOUS LES REPRESENTANTS ELUS DU PEUPLE. JE DEMANDE A TOUTE LA POPULATION DE FAIRE PREUVE, DANS CL3 CIRCONSTANCES DIFFICILES DE CALME ET DE CONFIANCE. EN EFFET LA VALEUR^ [O NCTRS PEUPLE SON EXCEPTIONNEL ESPRIT DE TRAVAIL SO N RESPECT D'AUTRUI/ jt4" SON SENS DE LA LIBERTE NE SONT-ILS PAS LES MEILLEURS GAGES DE LA VICTOIRS LE LA JUSTICE* ET DE LA PAIX. <\Q DOIT NOUS RASSURER CETTE SITUATION^ONJ QUI EN FIN DE COMPTE NE DOIT PAS NOUS FAIRE OUBLIER TOUTEFOIS LES PROBLEMES EXTREMEMENT PRESSANTS ET QUI ONT POUR ENJEU LA VIE DE D'UN HOMME POLITIQUE DE SA COMMUNAUTE TYPIQUEMENT QUEBECOIS ET COMBIEN ET D'UN DISTINGUE DIPLOMATE.ETRANGER TE NOTRE SOCIETE. A CET EGARD, LE FLQ DEUX PERSONNES, SOIT DEVOUE AU PROGRES AUX TENSIONS QU'AFFRON- A FAIT PARVENIR UN COMMUNIQUE EXIGEANT L'ACCEPTATION INTEGRALE ET TOTALE DE LEUR^SEPT DEMANDES O PAR AILLEURs" LE MINISTRE DU TRAVAIL M'A FAIT PARVENIR UNE LETTRE OU IL TRAITE DE DEUX QUESTIONS, SOIT LBS FOUILLES POLICIERES ET LA LIBERATION DES PRISONIERS POLITIQUES. NOUS TENONS TOUS, EST*IL BESOIN DE LE DIRE, ALA VIE LE M. LAPORTE ! &DE MEME Qtt'A CELLE DE M, CROSS. LE SORT, DANS UN RARE EXEMPLE DE SA CRUAUTE A VOULU QUE CE SOIT SUR EUX QUE REPOSE LE MAINTIEN D E L'ORDRE PUBLIC MAIS C'EST PARCE QUE NOUS TENONS VERITABLEMENT A LA VIE DE MM LAPORTE ET Z>7~ CROSS QUE NOUS VOULONS, AVANT/DISCUTER 2) L'APPLICATION DES DEMANDES QUI SONT FAITES ETABLIR DES MECANISMES QUI GARANTIRAIENT.SI L'ON VEUT PRENDRE L'EXEMPLE DONJ^ARLE M. PIERRE LAPORTE^ QUE LA LIBERATION DES PRISONIERS POLITIQUES 'Lh.! COMME RESULTAT CERTAIN LA VIE_.gAUVE AUX DEUX OTAGES. IL Y A $ LA UN PREALABLE QUE LE SIMPLE BON SENS NOUS FORCE A DEMANDER ET C'EST A 'BoOL^A^ �A CE TITRE AVEC NOUS. QUE NOUS DEMANDONS AUX RAVISSEURS D'ENTRER EN COMMUNICATION COMMENT, EN EFFET, ACCEDER AUX DEMANDES SANS *AVOIR LA 'CONVICTION QUE LA CONTRE PARTIE SERA REALISEE. LE GOUVERNEMENT DU QUEBEC CROIT QU'IL SERAIP IRRESPONSABLE VIS A VIS ET DE L'ETAT ET DE MM LAPORTE ET CROSS S'IL NE DEMANDAIT PAS CETTE PRECAUTION. NOUS VOULONS SAUVER LA VIE LE MM LAPORTE ET CROSS ET C'EST PARCE QUE NOUS LE VOULONS DE TOUTES NOS FORCES QUE NOUS POSONS CE GESTE. MES CHERS CONCITOYENS, UN GRAND HOWIE D'ETAT A DEJA DITJ GOUVERNER C'EST CHOISIR* ET COLLECTIVE. NOUS AVONS CHOISI,NOUS, LA JUSTICE, INDIVIDUELLE QUANT A MOI, JE ME BATTRAI POUR CETTE JUSTICE JUSQU'A LA LIMITE DE '£MES MOYENS EN ASSUMANT gOys^LES RISflUES JjUgLS QU'ILS SOIENT ET QUI SONT ESSENTIELS A L«AVENIR DE NOTraPHJPLE. �j * ^kfFJs KjF'F <i > % " 'A A J *r , '. J ^ *s .a .-y Ay yL POp c /- OO-OO /• > vOOO~' £, ' , 0 " - O V ; X £o Fee . 1 October !!, 197<>0O -.vl-O"A- /- JzxFFFFFFz FFFFFFF^F FF "i^^' ^ u } / A^AAAAPXFAF -.,A.^>> F ^ A 0/ o SEC Subject: RET /V.WW > ' <^ ; . - ^ O P . \ - "NOTE NOTE FOR IFILE ' .S A PA ROQU^A 6 ' ,-V ft Events surrounding Mr. Choquettefs statement of October 10 fs First call by Mr. Choquette to Mr. Sharp: — Mr. Choquette phoned Mr. Sharp around mid-day indicating that he proposed to make a statement in the afternoon appealing to the kidnappers to release Cross, and giving them inducements to do so. He read to Mr. Sharp on the phone a draft of his statement. .(Text attached as Annex 1 ) . The Minister indicated he could not give a definitive reaction on the basis of a text read quickly on the telephone in French. However, he expressed strong reservations on some of its aspects, even hinting that he might not be able to associate himself with such a text. He asked that it be dictated to us in full on the telephone. After studying it, Mr. Sharp would phone back Mr. Choquette. The Minister pointed out that we had not intended that any statement be issued. In particular there were objections to making public what concessions we were willing to make to the kidnappers. Our line was that negotiations should take place privately, in the context of specific arrangements for Mr. Cross's release. Iff' /yw-'l « . 2. A study of Mr. Choquette's draft confirmed the Minister's fears. One weakness of the draft was to imply that the FLQ was inspired by idealism. It announced a major social initiative of the Quebec Government (creation of a "social peace department") in a context clearly suggesting that this was a concession to the FLQ. It implied that this organisation was the spearhead of efforts in Quebec to remove profound injustices prevailing in the Province. Another grave flaw was that, after stressing that the judicial institutions could not be tampered with, Mr. Choquette stated that the kidnappers would receive only symbolic sentences. The reference to review of paroles could be taken to mean that such reviews in the past had not necessarily been honestly carried out. A third major defect was that the text not only referred to safe conduct for the kidnappers, but did so in such a way as to make it impossible for them to accept it. . 000042 �- 2 - SECRET - Counter-proposal by Ottawa:— 3. It waa felt in Ottawa that a flat refusal to let Mr. Choquette issue his statement might not prevent him frcm doing so, given his attitude. Furthermore, if we succeeded in preventing issuance of this statement, there was a risk (should Cross be killed) that we would appear as: having prevented Quebec from making a positive appeal to the kidnappers. In the circuxaatanc.es the best approach seemed to be to prepare a counter-draft.. This was done, in consultation with Mr. Gordon Robertson, and the text despatched to Mr. Choquette. (Text attached as Annex 2). Mr. Lalonde was informed of the situation on the phono and his comments obtained. The Minister sought to reach tha P.M. on tha phone. First talk with Mr. Chouinard; — - - - jj • 4* V&th Mr. Lalonde's agreement, we called Mr. Chouinard, Secretary of the Quebec Executive Council. We described the situation to him, outlined Mr. Choquette's draft, read him our counter•• 7, draft, and sought his comments. Mr. Chouinard questioned the need . for any statement. We told him we had seen no need for a statement, but that Mr. Choquette seemed determined to proceed; hence our counter-draft. Mr. Chouinard strongly agreed with every one of the I e • changes we proposed to the Choquette draft. In addition he doubted . whether any reference should be made either to safe conduct or to parole. He said he had never heard of any proposed "ministry of aocial peace". ,He quite agreed with our view that any announcement on this point could not be made in a statement about the FLQ, as this would suggest that it was a response to FLQ pressure. Dn-. fortunately, Mr. Chouinard waa not sure he could intervene. He had a mandate from Premier Bourassa to deal with the Cross affair, but could not invoke this mandate and overrule Mr. Choquette. He mentioned that Quebec Ministers were deeply divided over the matter of parole. Since Mr. Sharp was having a second talk with Mr. Choquette at that point, it was agreed that we would call back Mr. Chouinard. Second Sharp-Choouette telephone call;— 5. Mr. Choquette had seen our draft and wanted to stick essentially to his own. He was willing to drop the reference to a ministry of social peace. As for safe conduct he would prefer not to mention it at all if we did not agree to his text. Mr. Sharp explained in detail all our objections to his text, and said quietly but firmly that he would have to dissociate himself frcm the Choquette statement if issued. This would be an unthinkable and highly dangerous situation. Mr. Choquette said he would think matters over and call back. 000043 • �• •• SECRET — 3 — : • • , Second c a l l t o Mr. Chouinard;— . • • • ' a.. . - s • a - ' ' . • 6. We informed Mr. Chouinard of the situation resulting • from the second conversation between the two Ministers. We suggested Mr. Chouinard get in touch with Mr. Choquette's headquarters by way of enquiring into developments • He night thus '•'•> • y-•.•.'.be given an opening for offering advice to Mr. Choquette. Chouinard said he doubted that the Minister would take his advice. However, Chouinard might be able tp provoke intervention by someone in Mr. Bourassa's office who could overrule Mr. Choquette* This . would be difficult, however, since we did not wish Mr* Choquette to realise that Ottawa had alerted anyone else in Quebec. Mr. Chouinard could not therefore commit himself to any particular course of action, but would do his best. ,-, . • i ' • • e Third Sharp-Choouette conversation;— FAy • , y . I, It appeared to Mr. Sharp that the. moat plausible ex• planation for Mr. Choquette's draft statement would be that the ! latter had received firm information that the terms of his appeal would be immediately accepted by the FLQ* The Minister therefore put to Mr. Choquette a direct question. Did he-have any specific reason or information leading him to believe that such a deal would be accepted by the FLQ? Mr. Choquette said that he had no such information (arising for instance from covered contacts with the FLQ)* His planned statement was based on the advice of a prominent, highly respected personality in Montreal. (The Minister immediately surmised that this must be Mr* Claude Ryan) — Mr. Choquette was lees adamant at this point. He was willing to revise his statement ' along the lines of our suggestions. He now wished to keep in the section on safe conduct, aa re-drafted by us. He said he would use substantially our text with same changes of wording and with an introduction of a purely personal character. In the middle of the • . afternoon Mr. Choquette's press conference had been announced for ea 5:00 o'clock. In the event it was delayed to 5:30 as a result of our discussions with him. We sought to obtain the final text of Mr. Choquette'a proposed statement early enough to pass on further reactions. In fact, the final text was received only a few minutes before the press conference — too late for any further communication with Mr. Choquette concerning it. However the text on the whole was perhaps better thin we had reason to expect and was mostly based on our re-draft. A copy of thia final statement is attached as Annex C. " A •• ' aO 7 ' . 7 Claude'Roquet ,• • ••-. ,a„ • : - M • • .• 7 • V 1 •• : •" •' .-.*•" * * p ';. ;•' • . . •- . •• '•' p * > 'vj'* . • -4 1 * •i. .- • • ', • .. - • - •i j 0. '" • - • '• -. ' 1 < . LM 000044 — * ' * - "«•- �u>Jj\^l\JJiX J.GOL October 13th, 1970. EVENTS_ON THE WEEKEND KS THE FLQ Fry.ds._Y.i. October 9th 5.00 p.m. - Meeting of Cabinet Committee on Security « - Considered general situation re Cross - Decided maximum "package" to ojrfer v/as safe conduct fcr abductors - (no release of prisoners) Negotiations to be joined on mechanisms for FLQ to release Cross Saturelay, October 10th Deadline for killing of Cross had been set at 6.00 p.m. Sharp - Choquette discussions - In the morning Choquette firm; no release of prisoners^ - afternoon proposed weak statement appealing to FLQ etc. - Final statement issued 5.30 p.m. made no reference to release of prisoners; included safe conduct offer for abductors 6.00 p.m. - abduction of Pierre Laporte 000045 �Sunday, October 11th Continuous exchanges and discussions with Quebec including several conversations between Prime Minister and Mr.Bourassa Principal questions 1. Legal measures to permit round-up of FLQ - War Measures Act; special temporary legislation, etc. 2. Extent of possible action to arrest and detain under existing legislation 3. Possibility of military assistance (Quebec told could be provided if requested) 4. Attitude of Quebec government on release of '"") prisoners and negotiations with FLQ 5. Federal security measures 6. Means of contact and communication between governments; security of communication, etc, Monday, October 12th 11.00 a.m. - Meeting of Cabinet Committee on Security Principal conclusions: 1. No change in "package" as agreed Friday (no release of prisoners) 000046 �2. Essential to maintain coordinated policy with Quebec - principally by Prime Minister v/ith Bourassa -- operations room in East Block to be centre for general contacts - contacts at police level in normal way 3. Communications v/ith FLQ - prepared to accept Lemieux as FLQ "messenger" if released from custody by normal process < - would accept Robert D^ leers on basis would be "messenger" and not negotiator or mediator (v/ould be messenger for both federal and provincial governments) 4. Security for listed persons and places to prevent further abductions - to be done by Aimed Services to leave police for police work 5. Leaders of Opposition Parties to be advised Afternoon - statement by Bourassa - Demers designated as representative to talk to Lemieux - nothing said re conditions 000047 �• _ 4 FLQ communique - 5.00 p.m. 1. Cross v/ill be released on liberation of prisoners plus halt cf police "repression" 2. No release of Pierre Laporte without acceptance of all original conditions 3. No new time limit set but indicated Cross would be releaseel in 24 hours (if 2 demands met); Laporte to be held until all demands mot. 000048 �CU^ITY SECURITE FiyE/POSSISB 0CT14/70 SECRET EXTrROTT FM/DE PRECEDENCE 1- FLiJSH HAVANA ALGIERS Kiii-0 .fj?,FA-'> SV.T> '• '27' '"IIOP,Tf'i'fJ.. TMJT2II.•JU? WBGoyfAgaois WITH RFCEIVINQ OOUIIITIT UB/SUJ / Z /"FOLLOWING ARE YOUR INSTRUCTIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH LOCAL /(J'FP V IX AUTHORITIES CONCERNING RELEASE OF CROSS AND UPCRTE AND SAFE CONDUCT FOR KIDNAPPERS. YOU SHOULD INFORM RECEIVING GOVT THAT IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH KIDNAPPERS ON THEIR SAFE CONDUCT Vffi EiJVISAGE FOLLOWING SCENARIO: (A) IT 'PILL BE KC23 DIFFICULT TO SUPPLY INFO ON THE KIDNAPPERS firUt e-trrfitA UNTIL Vffiift«©W VJHO THEY ARE BUT YOU SHOULD PROMISE THAT WE VDULD GIVE THEM ALL THE INFO V/E HAVE ON THE KIDNAPPERS, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THRU INTERPOL. THERE MIGHT BE 25 CR MORE KIDNAPPERS ALONG Pa fC faA3 WITH SOME OF THE KIDNAPPERS1 WIVES AND CHILDREN AND*A FEW "7 ACCOMPANYING LAWYERS OR JOURNALISTS. YCU SHOULD MENTION THIS FACT TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND OBTAIN THEIR REACTIONS TO THE NUMBERS THEY MAY HAVE TO CARE FOR. YOU SHOULD RAISE WITH THEM PARTICULARLY THE WHOLE QUESTION OF RECEIVING WIVES AND CHILDREN BECAUSE OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KIDNAPPERS WELL BE DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE VIEWS THE LOC/L AUTHORITIES HAVE ON THIS QUESTION. ... DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE ZFLFFAFFF'. JFL NO STD ORiGiMATGR/RcDAC • E !!:? SIG 2 DiVISI AFrrwjV/C.1 TELEriiOi<n. <J^v>yfC>C. SIO. 'xF.77777 EXT 10/OIL (REV.O/CK) (COMMUNICATIONS DIV) 000049 �(B) PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE BY CDN GOVT OF AGREEMENT REACHED WITH KIDNAPPERS AND OF ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY US WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES. BY 12. V/E PROPOSE THAT KIDNAPPERS STILL XPP2 7770 ACCOMPANIED CROSS AND MR. LAFCRTE WHOSE LIFE WOULD REMAIN UNDER THREAT, 1#\:. WOULD PROCEED TO CUBAN (OR ALGERIAN) OFFICE IN MTL, ^PX.XXPJ Till: APPROACHES TO THE OFFICES COU1D EITHER BE CLEARED BY POLICE Oe MADE SECURE BY POLICE, AS THE KIDNAPPERS WISH. YOU SHOULD SEEK THE VIEWS OF RECEIVING GOVT ON THIS PROPOSAL AND IF THEY AGREE REQUEST TIffiM TO INSTRUCT THEIR REPS IN MIL ACCORDINGLY ON THEIR POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN THIS MATTER. (C) YOU SHOULD SEEK APPROVAL TO PROPOSE THAT UPON ARRIVE INSIDE THE OFFICE IN MTL TIE KIDNAPPERS WOULD HAND MR. CROSS AND MR. IA PORTE INTO CUSTODY OF THE RECEIVING GOVT THRU THEIR REP IN MTL. THE KIDNAPPERS V/OULD ALSO BS REQUIRED TO TURN THEIR WEAPONS OVER TO THE REP. IF TiEY AGREE TO ACCEPT SOME OF KIDNAPPERS WIVES AMD CHILDREN THEIR PRIOR ARRIVAL AT TIE OFFICE COULD BE ARRANGED OR ALTERNATIVELY IF OFFICES ARE NOT/NOT LARGE ENOUGH T"!E WIVES AND CHILDREN COULD BE GATHERED IN A SECURE ROOM AT AIRPORT. (D) WE PROPOSE THAT WITHIN FIXED T H E , PERHAPS ONE HOUR AFTER THEY ARRIVE AT OFFICE, THE KIDNAPPERS AND PERHAPS TPEIR FAMILIES V/OULD, ALONG WITH RECEIVING GOVTS REPS, BE TRANSPORTED, PROBABLY IN CDN MILITARY VEHICLES, TO ALRPORT UNDER CDN SECURITY ESCORT. AT AIRPORT THEY WOULD BE PLACED ON BOARD CDN GOVT AIRCRAFT BOUND FOR RECEIVING COUNTRY. PROVIDED THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AGREE IE V/OULD PROPOSE THAT A MINIMAL NUMBER OF CDN OFFICIALS, RECEIVING GOVT REPSyjLAWYERS AND JOURNALISTS V/OULD 'ACCOMPANY KIDNAPPERS AND THEIR FAMILIES. ALL OF FOREGOING PER30i\TS WOULD BE UNARM™ BUT THERE WOULD BE CDN SECURITY �PERSONNEL ON BOARD AIRCRAFT WHO WOULD BE ARMED SOLELY TO MAINTAIN ORDER ON THE AIRCRAFT. THIS L.TTER REQUIREMENT 13 IN OUR VIEW At] ESSENTIAL ONE TO TiE OPERATION. I E BELIEVE THAT ACCOMPANYING OFFICIALS, /7>'d7+T rt-£t.f> £A&*.'/e£ atep>f*7/t76 TfrTfruP^ 7/ tdipvyiPS'yt XXXI22 AliO JOURNALISTS WS£S=AiSSSBS AN T1TV).p-im , a ? - - ^ r ^ XPPUis CN BOARD AIRCRAFT. (E) V/E WOULD ALSO STRONGLY IREFER TIE USE OF CDN AIRCRAFT BECAUSE VE V/OULD HAVE MORE CONTROL OVER ITS OPERATIONS AND THERE IS ALSO QUESTION OF NATIONAL PRIDE INVOLVED IN ENSURING THAT A FOREIGN AIRCRAFT DOES NOT/NOT PICE UP THE KIDNAPPERS. WE WOULD ALSO BE CONCERNED AT DELAY WHICH MIGffl' BE CAUSED I F V/E REQUIRED KIDNAPPERS TO WAIT UNTIL A FOREIGN AIRCRAFT ARRIVED IN MTL WHEREAS CDN AIRCRAFT I S ALREADY AVAIIABIE . (F) UPON SAFE LANDING OF KIDNAPPERS IN CUBA (OR ALGERIA) Vffi WOULD ENVISAGE THAT RECEIVING GOVT V/OULD XKEH2XZE AUTHORIZE ITS REP IN MTL TO TURN MR. CROSS AND MR. UPORTE OVER TO CDN AUTHORITIES AND TO ALLOW AIRCRAJT CREW AND ACCOMPANYING OFFICIALS TO RETURN ASAP TO CDA ALONG V/ITH LAWJ&RS ANE JOURNALISTS I F TIEY SO WISH. YOU SHOULD SEEK RECEIVING GOVTS APPROVAL TO THIS PROPOSAL. (G) V/ITH REGARD TO TRAVEL DOCUS Vffi PROPOSE TO ISSUE GROUP OF KIDNAPPERS WITH A COLLECTIVE CERTIFICATE WHICH CONTAINS PHOTO OF EACH INDIVIDUAL AND BASIC PERSONAL INFO. THIS CERTIFICATE V/OULD BE ISSUED TO GROUP OF KIDNAPPERS FOR TRAVELTO TIE RECEIVING COUNTRY AND WOULD BECOME INVALID UPON THEIR ARRIVAL. YOU SHOULD SEEK RECEIVING GOVTS APPROV/LTO THIS PROPOSAL AND INFORM THEM TH.PT IT I S OUR HOPE THAT I F WE ARE UNABLE TO OBTAIN PHOTOS FOR ALL KIDNAPPERS IN TIE SHORT T H E AVAILABLE THEY V/ILL STILL ACCEPT VALIDITY OF THE CERTIFICATE. TIE WIVES AND CHILDREN OF THE KIDNAPPERS WOULD BE ISSUED ORDINARY CDN PASSPORTS WHICH V/OULD BE VALID IN THE NORMAL WAY FOR TRAVEL TO MOST ALL COUNTRIES. ALTHOUGH YOU SHOULD NOT/NOT RAISE POSSIBILITY UNLESS LOCAL AUTHORITIES OBJECT TC A COLLECTIVE CERTIFICATE, V/E COULD ARRANGE . . . 000051 �TO ISSUE EACH KIDNAPPER XXSXEOZGBffiX WITH A-SEPARATE Hl-ERGENCY CERTIFICATE VALID FGR TRAVEL TO TIE RECEIVING COUNTRY ONLY, OR AS THIRD ALTERNATIVE WE COULD ISSUE THEM WITH REGUIPE PASSPORT VALID FCR TrPP.EL ONE WAY TO RECEIVING COUNTRY AND OF VERY SHORT TEMPORAL VALIDITY. (H) WHILE YOU SHOULD NOT/NOT RAISE QUESTION OF UPKEEP OF KIDNAPPERS IN RECEIVING COUNTRY, IF LOCAL AUTHORITIES RAISE SUBJECT YOU SHOUID INDICATE CDN GOVTS WILLINGNESS TO GIVE RECEIVING GOVT IN TRUST FOR THEIR UPKEEP ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR EACH KIDNAPPER AND WIFE AND CHILDREN. IF HOWEVER LOCAL AUTHORITIES INDICATE THEY INTEND TO CHARGE US FOR ADMIN EXPENSES YOU SHOULD IN ASCERTAIN WHAT THESE WOULD AMOUNT TO AND SEEK FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS INDICATING TO TIEM THAT THIS MAY AFFECT OUR OFFER OF ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS PER PERSON. (I) IF RECEIVING GOVT INSISTS ON GRANTING POLITICAL ASYLUM TO KIDNAPPERS YOU SHOULD ASCERTAIN WHETHER THIS IS NECESSARY AS BEING THE ONLY WAY UNDER LOCAL LAW THAT KIDNAPPERS COULD BE ACCEPTED QUICKLY. IT IF APPEARS THAT THIS IS ONLY WAY THEY CAN BE ACCEFTED YOU SHOULD NOT/NOT RAISE MATTER FURTHER BUT IF IT SEEMS TO FEE FOR POLITICAL REASONS ONLY YOU COULD SUGGEST THAT RECEIVING GOVT RECEIVE TIE FLQ MEMBERS ON BASIS OF A QUOTE HUMANITARIAN GESTURE AT THE REQUEST OF THE CDN GOVT UNQUOTE. THE TERM QUOTE POLITICAL PRISONER UNQUOTE HAS B EEN USED LOOSELY AND INCORRECTLY IN PUBLIC DOMAIN HERE EVER SINCE THE KIDNAPPING TO REFER TO THE PRISONERS SO TILT Vffi DO NOT/NOT EXPECT TIE PUBLIC V/OULD BE VERY CONCERNED WHETHER OR NOT/NOT RECEIVING COUNTRY GRANTED POLITICAL ASYLUM TO KIDNAPPERS. NEVERTHELESS IF TIE TERM POLITICAL ASYLUM CAN BS AVOIDED IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE. ON BLASTS OF OUR GOOD RELATIONS YOU SHOULD ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN GUARANTEES RELATING TO POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE FLQ 1EMBERS IN RECEIVING COUNTRY. THIS SHOULD COVER PUBLICITY FOR THEIR STATEMENTS, THEIR USE OF LOCAL MEDIA AND THEIR COMMUNICATIONS V/ITH CDA. r �- 5 2. 77 SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR A REPORT FROM YOU ON YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH LOPE., AUTHORITIES ON POINTS RAISIN) IN TRIP TEL AS SPPP AS POPSlBL-P. I P ; ALGIERS: SINCE.THERE I S NO/NO ALGERIAN OFFICE IN MTL YOU SHOULD SUGGEST TO LOE.L AUTHORITIES T H E TIEY AUTHORIZE ALGERIAN CHARGE OR ONE OF HIS OFFICERS TO PROCEED TO MTL WHERE VE COULD TIEN MAKE APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS AT OUR EXPENSE FOR THA" DESIGNATED OFFICER TO RECEIVE HOSTAGES AND KID.JAPIERS IN MTL IN AN OFFICE AS ENVISAGED IN SUB-PARA (B) ABOVE. F^xr- J"J> S �MESSAGE eg. ^ ~ : ^ TFZC-7- &Jf o p>. n *". r ,WDE p p O * Y P ! 5 • t i r J x FlU/90mR .DATE OCT 1 ^ 1970 227 . I SECURITY o ix r. i « .PPEDEXE •n or-', -•-:•-rr 0/A 20 REF KIDNAPPINGS SU3/SUJ FOR YOEe INFO FOLLOWING AiE EXCERPTS GF TRIE FROM EEiY IN AILIEKS EEPCETE E ON P I S DISCUSSIONS WITH ALGERIAN, OFFICIALS. 2. TEL $ OCT 10 - ALGERIAN MEA. CONFIRMED AT 1139 ROUTE E E S MORNING P I E S . BOEEDIENIE EAS AGREED TO RECEIVE PRISONERS AND/OR ABEUCTOrE I F AX SO WISH QUOTE FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS UNQUOTE. 3. TEL 6 OCT 11 QUOTE: MEDJAD TO BE HEAD OF CONSULAR AND JURIDICAL AFFAIRS EFFECTIVE TOMORIiOW COULD AREiNGE RECEPTION. £2 HE CONFIRMED THAT ONLY POSSIBLE BASIS FGR IKSIR ENTRY COUIE BE UNDER GRANT OF POLITICAL ASYLUM. AS SUCH THEY WOULD BE DISCOURAGED FROM ENGAGING IN AIRY POLITICAL ACTIVITY^HaE^ _KO.EVE! I F THEY SO REQUEST THEY WOULD BE PROVIDED WITH SHORT jrERH SPECIAL PASSPORTS TO TRAVEL E i S E ' . H E E E"' '"tr'i^Tr K m NO CONTROL WOULD 3E MADE BY ALGERIA OF THEIR ACTIVITIES. SEE EtffiSCUAN REFUGEES WERE GIVEN SUCH PASSPORTS VALID FOR T E E E MONTHS AND PROCEEDED TO FRANCE VExE THEY DID ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. THEY RAVE SINCE RETUR1ED IERS. RANSOM! HONEY IJDuID THEREFORE POSPI^ET gtaBMUM^ DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE NO/NO DISTRIBUTION OR'JGiUATOR/REDACTEUR SIO.. F. Livingston yij: :FF± DIVISION Cos Centre TELEPHONE APPRCWED/AUTCaiSE j? • /-• uVlii^'-i A- ^- 5-6107 sta FJ v 7- EXT 10/BIL (RSV 8/04) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 000054 �- 2 - L -:. o u ^> ..._J c > • " * . " " • •»• /-•, T P U T T ' S i r r ~ ">T"» : r t •»• • T • " J f r > y \ T " " \ * **-*> i n i isi .jl;«l, .. T 7^ L . ^ ' . ' " • ' , .-U..^~J .Ui*-' v 7j .^i .-. T . - . r TA ..^.-^yl.1. :'"~P . . ,J. O O .\J rpn 1\J ,' C T'^"^ i*'..7*_, A'r^ri-7 TTT- "P1"" j. Xl _ „ . j TV J.w, n n n - r TrVA'iTT1 P,T'"' i Jj; *:° -a/-e:- c . p . W ^ . .^. U " T^jr r \~ <--,•-• • 7,.,..^.7A..y f e i r m f M-<T, • x.. . . . . •• / r n r a'PT 1 rnp, T T;-in"1 A ' . T V T?T.^ ?.n~e---,^• r ra, 1 'fVPTV' Hr,.~-r ~JX.^.J,X/..±:LI r-rpT J.»U -~ .• > - - . U.^uUlJ, ^-,"7-|r;,L i|. . 7 / Of" uo. 1-3 " " p . n T p , x^i ^ u u i i • T f n- T T5. - ( Q J-UTJ^^^ . it._j.jo V/rrP'M iiienjiii 1 ; - -i v"vrP TT", iJ4. * u . . * i ' a . , VVCI""'];?"V i^,e5» . . - ^ . . i DECLARATION AND EXTENSIVE FLQ COPEUNIQUES (INCLUDING C C . j . E P E S YOUR POP 27U) BUT I S STILL DELETING DlicRCT REFERENCES IN COE-IDEIQuES TC CUBA OR ALGERIA SUBSTITUTING QUOTE PAYS DE LEUR CHCEX NEVIETHELSSS OFFER I S STILL FIRM. 2A»XXZ. ( I HAVE NO F E E N E . QUERY ON CUBA'S ELECTION AID E V E NATURALLY NOT RAISED SUBJECT MYSELF). E . E J E TO PRO PASS ALL MAT RIAL YOU S E E LE BY TELEX CONFIRM ' LJ J rEAND BY FIQ THAT WIVES AND CHILDREN ALSO E I ALLOVED TO PXCXXA WOLTE EE ACCEPTABLE: TO THEM ALTHOUGH AIEING GREATLY OF CCEEE TO BURDEN CF ALGERIAN GOVT. ACCEPTANCE SHOUIE XP: DUE AS QUOTE KUPENITAPX'E VIS-A-VIS MESSRS. CROSS AIE LAPORTE AND CDN GOVT UNQUOTE. SESTET1. EQUALLY PRESPNCE OF LEMIEUX AIE JOURNALISTS "WOULD PIP'S XX NO PROBLEM ALTPOiEII QUOTE ALGERIANS WOULD DO NOTEEE FOR THEM OEIE. THAN PROVIDE HOTEL ACCOMMODATION I F IEEO EE EIQUOTE. UJEK I SE-MIS'E PLANE WOULD ,'ENT TO GO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO COl'PLETE OPE.ATION. ALGEl-JANS QUIPE INDIGNANT AT EDITORIAL ATTITUDE CF MEW YORK T E E S , REPRODUCED I E Emca(a/ed • —-',- ,.,x �/ \J J j..~ --, '. - OS —,.--.r-,.—,. . ^JJ^.^U.'.AJ U o l 7 ^.—.^-.^..vui . .,.—-.-^ jWl^U.'. f .n XL. L,U-.-.., ^.^r,^, 7tO^.-' ..!._• .-..eu-^-i.JJ.iii . . . r TO^T r i T " r y i o O W . ' i . X 1'. J...<jX>~> n uO\ .._• p "V e i ~ Trl UIJ^OOX.J. -~..:, A . P y )N GOVT MOULD POT, AS BRAZIL HAD DONE, E.TER JOIN I P CON 2.7. THEIR HUMANITARIAN ATTITUDE. I R E A S S U A E D RIM. UNQUOTE. \ r----,- l "* (-•-•'<: tr./.j.' r.\i\i 1000056 �-.. . R I ' J .• n , \ s S E C R E T sy^\\^X' O, SXAAZ y October 1 5 , "*970. HEKORANDUK FOR THK MINISTER ( I N CABINET) **dflftpp*,"*;g Kr. Choquette telephoned me at 5.30 to ask whether we were considering tha possibility of releasing the five prisoners who ware "eligible for parole' . He thought it important that tha two Governments make soma such proposition since otherwise it would look as though they ware standing pat and not really negotiating at all. 2. I reminded Kr. Choquette that this idea had been mentioned to me on Tuesday ('Without mention of any number) when I took the call from him at tho Arts Centre during the Polish luncheon. I pointed out that the possibility had been discussed st that time and that a reply had bean sent to him from tha Government here indicating that it was not considered acceptable (copy of our message to Kr. Choquette is attache* ). }. I added that Ministers had been meeting here pretty continously today on various aspects of the situation. I said that I would ba speaking with you at>out his call and that you might possibly be able to telephone hjro later today. U. Ke repeated that he hoped the Government here would re-examine the proposal urgently. 5. On this occasion, Mr. Choquette uiu not, mention whether the suggestion he was making had been discussed with Er. Bourassa or any other Ministers. J A. E . R I T C H I E A • E . Ii. �I '4 • i *• P'O •P m >-_-:... -.7- fcrf-7 ..-77 1 **»„/• . /J •SSSEfciH/iU** 0 0 EXT OTT D£ PARL&PE tf€Z6i</•? 0 & fl 17-: i o CO—*- #1 A 1 7k J , OJr.'T" £U-rfo~«i ^~—*~3* t*~*~A<L*ztx*u~J ~ * ^ **•. DEtUT TEXT * rF TRANSMETTRE I'NKLEMEMI A rtOMifcUa&R GORDON RCbLRTSON CJGEREka A; PROJECT L E 3.JLL APX FJ.MS CE DISCUSSION MODIFICATION: i. • v I MODIFIER LARTICLE 4 Eri AJO O A K ! LM.., " AGRAPHE a COMME S!?iT : " Q , PRECONISE 0 1 I L I S L L*A KGRCft OP' L t CRIME CGMME MOYEM 0 1 INSTR-jML NT AaX K I N - - CE ""R£AL1&£# UN CHANGEMENT DE SOUVERNEMLeJT AP CANADA." . . . . . 2 . MODIFIER LARLICLE 7 i.N RETRANChANT LE% «CT3 "A LA SEULE FIN DAioP'RER aA PRESENCE AU PROCES S E LINCJLPAT IQN POOR LALELLE IL A t T E DETENiJ* , 3 . MODIFIER LE PARAGRAPHS C DE- L2ARI ICLk !> EN REMPLACANT " 3 A F " PAR — a A 3 ' " , _ 4 . IL EST SUGGERE DAJGUTEfi JN ARTICLE ANALOGUE "lUTADIS M'JTAMOIS" A LART I'CLEE-SSttP DU. CODE CRIMINEL. 3p. MODIFIER LARTICLE 12 EN AJGUTANT APRES: LE MOT "LOCAL", LES rfOTS "MAlsOM-OllAdJTATIOtl-*. o AU POINT DE •! X. PROCEDURE •>'#& EST- SLJG GERE 3 ' E LA JURIDICxION S O U COMDEREi A •', riAulbXKjtf SPIVANT LARTICLE 467 P . COCI -CRIMINEL. „ .'- FIN TEXT m 3 . P7\ 7. ' • • I IrlteiR • PSE CORRECT ' • - lH'2:.p " IM PARA W,; PO 5 'EtLE / a* �< • yA ****••• I tA •-" v I h; i s T' F_ e» P W E M > E O t t a w a (4), October 14th, 1970. L>c^<&*9-<F™r?0 The ghastly experience which you are going through is shocking and revolting to all of us. Your courage in a very trying situation is admirable. I am writing to assure you that the plight of your husband is constantly in my mind, and in the minds of my Ministers, as we attempt to solve this cruel problem which has been thrust upon us. My sympathy and prayers are with you and your daughter. O ^-^*A.i. Mrs. James R. Cross, 1297 Redpath Crescent, Montreal 109, P.Q. 000059 �N eson/v 000060 CGSS No. 7690-21-. �S E C R E T <?,-aa-TFKW-<0«r October 12, 1970, tf\7a <^J F>'27±- 7c K- IJ Kidnappings - Means.of.Gaining Time V/hether or not an agreed solution can be found with the kidnappers, it is essential to gain time. Hence the need for moves designed to postpone an assassination of one or both of the hostages. Here is a list of such possible moves, of which the foremost is the proposed negotiations themselves. -o v I - To avoid an early deadlock in the negotiations, topics could be broached in the following order: (a) to clear the way for negotiations: - .possible announcement concerning a federal representative; - proof should be sought that the hostages are still alive; - M. Lemieux may seek his immediate release; - enquire into Lemieux*s mandate from each one of the two cells and from the FLQ; on its extent, (can he discuss substance; can he reach an arrangement on his ovm authority); - enquire into his ability to refer back any governmental counter-proposals (i.e., his communications with the FLQ, especially the two cells); - possible request for a guarantee of LemieuxTs security, freedom of movement, freedom from surveillance; (b) point of departure of the governmental negotiator: - our inability to make further unilateral concessions; our inability to take the kidnappers on faith; - warnings of the consequences of any murder of the hostages, and on the grave jeopardy in vrhich the kidnanners find themselves; 2 s a • '- 000061 �(c) possible non-essential demands of the FLQ to be cleared up: - anticipate a request by Lemieux for a stop of police activity: during the negotiations; permanently; - Lapalme workers: refer to the wishes of the union itself, to its current talks with the Postmaster General; alleged informer: denial of any knowledge; - the ransom: point to statements by the FLQ and Lemieux himself amounting to a waiver of this demand, for good reason; (d) our offer of safe conduct for the kidnappers: - .kept for the end, as the subject leads into that of political prisoners; - restate our offer; discuss whether it could extend to the second cell of kidnappers; complexity of arranging a receiving country; - provision of transport; - go into the complex problem of a guarantee both for the hostages and the kidnappers; outline the possible arrangements. The discussions would eventually deal v/ith release of the prisoners, a difficult and perhaps insoluble problem vrhich should be kept for the end. One device to be used at this stage might be to ask for time to establish ourselves the wishes of the prisoners. II - Other moves:(a) additional public information on the safeguards and guarantees to be extended to Mr. Lemieux; (b) public information on the (at least apparent) decrease of police activity; (c) additional public information on our demarches in Cuba and Algeria (e.g., special envoy to Algiers since October 7) ; this subject can touch on tlie prisoners' issue and should be handled carefully; ...3 000062 �possible news of a parole for the least dangerous of the prisoners. - It is doubtful whether this would be possible, but if it could be done in the normal course of the administration of justice, such news might be used should the degree of danger to the hostages justify this in the eyes of the government; should the Prime Minister decide at one point to make a major public intervention in the case, this would of course in itself give a new turn to the case, should a moment of extreme danger arise. �S1EPET October H , 1970 Kfff-'ORAKDUK TO CABTlJET Instructions to Caiiadie. •. Negotiator Concerning the Abduction of Messrs. Cross and Laporte Attached for your consideration are: a) Draft instructions to the Canadian negotiator, H e Robert Demers; b) 2. A telegram to Havana and Algiers. These two documents, if approved, would enable the C anadian side in the current negotiationrj with M e Robert Lemieux to make a detailed proposal concerning the related questions of safe conduct for the kidnappers and safe return of the hostages. Secretary of State for External Affairs �PDF/R.A.BIPSOEETTE/dsta SECRET le 17 octobre 1970 PROJET Instructions a lle Robert Demers Les modalites pour la mise en liberte! des otages et pour le sauf-conduit doer ravisseurs devront etre agreoes, quelle que soit 1"issue des negociations sur l'une ou l'autre des demandes du FLQ. Da plus, tout t des ravishears pourrait 3 p-iorite' sur toute autre modalite. Discuter des modalites pour la mise en liberte des otages et pour le sauf-conduit des ravisseurs est aussi de notre point de vue un moyen de detourner I'attention des negociateurs de la question de la liberation des prisonniers pour la concentrer sur la question du. sauf-conduit pour les ravisseurs. Propositions Vous etes done autorise a proposer a lie Lemieux les modalites suivantes pour la mise en liberte des otages et pour le sauf-conduit des ravisseurs O e s modalites sont pour le moment, sujet tea a 1'approbation du pays de destination que nous sommes en train de n:'gocier): I 000065 �- 2- a) Les ravisseurs, toujours area's et accompagnos de MM. Cross et laporte, se rendront au eonsulat du'rrf.ys de destination (Cuba ou l'Algirie) a Eontr.'al. (L'Algerie n'ayant pas de consulat a Montreal, le Gouvernement canadien pourrait reconnaitre pour la duree de cette op-iration un local a Montreal, une suite d'hotel par exeeiple, comme consulat. Ua membre de l'Ainbassade d'Alg.'rie a Ottawa se rendrait a Montreal et agirait comme consul pour la duree de 1'operation.) b) La route conduisant au consulat en question serait ou bien completement degagee par la police, ou bien gardee par la police; c) A l'arrivee au consulat les ravisseurs remcttraient MM, Cross et Laporte a la garde du Gouvernement cubain ou algerien par le truchement de leur representant consulaire. Le consul demanderait alors aux ravisseurs de rendre leurs armes. d) Dans I'heure suivant leur arrivee au consulat, les ravisseurs accompeign-'s du consul seraient conduits dans un vehicule militairo canadien a Terre des Hommes. Un he'licoptere les coneluirait a. l'a«roport ou ils prendraient place a bord d'un avion militaire canadien. Un nombre minimum de fonctionnaires 000066 �~ 3 canadiens et de representants du pays de destination accornpagneraient les ravisseurs. e) Le personnel dc securite de 1'avion serait arr.O dans le seul but de maintenir I'ordre a bord. f, A l'arrivee au pays de destination, le gouvernement bote autoriserait son representant a Montreal a remettre MM. Cross et Laporte aux autorites canadiennes. g) Des documents de voyage acceptables aux autorites du pays de destination seront remis a chacun des passagers. Aspects supplementalres pour discussion Les aspects suivants de notre proposition pourraient etre concedes, a votre discretion, au cours de la discussion: a) En principe, nous n'aurions pas d'objection a ce que les ravisseurs soient accompagnes de leurs conjoints et de leurs enfants.. b) Nous serions aussi prets a faire parvenir une sonic d'argent au gouvernement du pays de destination, qui permettrait aux ravisseurs et a leurs families, s'il y a lieu, de vivre pour un mois. c) L'aeroport de depart devrait etre St-IIubert. Cet aoroport etant sit lie sur une base rnilitaire, il serait plus facile d'pviter la publicite. Nous 000067 �-5Conolooloa 10. Ton will afffroolato that ma do not odvooato oay prooooo of iMjH lot Ua or oajr To oui on Ima. of tho offoro BOW being pot forward pobllalyt * l o a ovo oooooriilly liadtod to oofo-ooadaot with oa odd aootioa of poraloo. Tha mbaam amramw ovtllaoo, howovor, tao tan** of looaoo whloh oould orloo If tha kldaapporo triad ta atrjpln ooor ar. Crooo* rolooao within tho llalta of tao Ootabor 10 and Ootaaar 15 offoro. u. TRE?ABLAV. P. framblare �CKCH - 14h28 - 15 octobre 1970 - / Voici le texte du communique du Premier Ministre Bourassa: "Apres discussions avec les autorites policieres dans le but d*assurer la securite de la population et des edifices publics, le gouvernement du Quebec a decide de demander le support de l'armee. En effet, 3. la suite des evenements des derniers jours, les energies des forces policieres pour la protection de la population et de sa security ont ete considerablement deployees. A cet egard, le Premier Ministre Bourassa a souligne qu'il a hesite jusqu'2. maintenant 3. recourir 3. cette mesure mais que le souci du bien-§tre et de la securite de la population ne peut lui permettre de retarder plus longtemps de faire appel aux appuis necessaires". Un detachement de la base de Ste-Therese est presentement en route vers la metropole. ' Me Lemieux vient tout juste de recevoir un appel telephonique de la part de Me Demers, negociateur du parti gouvernemental. Ce dernier lui / a fait savoir que le gouvernement provincial se reunit cet apres-midi et qu'une reponse du gouvernement Bourassa lui sera transmise avant sa conference de presse preVue pour 5n30 & I'hCtel Nelson dans le Vieux-Montr<5al. II est possible quo loo dincuaoionrj 00 dProulont sur lea conditions en plus do la question priiuL'iblo. cEu ^VM_£5 / ' V * I N ^ C P D O GAF <&co7} i.P0u2> iSopA .cco[> CIDA DOPS < J » D S J > S J P D G ; > <^POAO> PGP ttmm—w———mm MIHMTKRC H I Ai»r*M«a M T W H U i i a i GFE cTCLA^ CEUE GEUW CRF GUS Y'Pfl ' 0MP > ouH ECp C ^> <0»*O OMA PCH <JFCO*> OAD <^PLE > • 1 ., 1 CEHTKC D'OPERATIONS CENTRB T»»l «-A111 1 n« AFP ECD App ECL SRB Cj??0 APO ECT PAG "" 11 '• >^, pp **> I ' "0Q0069 PB^ANTMBNT O * «KTKMNAI. * r r A i » u �TEXTE TRTQGREZ DU LA DECLARATION OPFICIELLE DU PREMIER MINISTRE ROBERT 2222A27 • . '""'A' A //,e-.rtP... J'ai d<*cid3 d'agir de fagon rapide et ferme. par Robert Bourassa Le gouvernement du Quebec a demande au gouvernement federal 1'adoption de certain's pouvoirs d'urgence afin d 'apporter des i-emSdes efficaces a la crise que le Quebec traverse actuellement. II est Evident pour le gouvernement comme kxsxxj&u pour tous les qu,5b£coia qu'il aurait ete preferable de se de l'armee. dispenser de tels pouvoirs de meme que du support C'est pourquoi au moment meme ou les restes d'anarchie paraissaient prendre une nouvelle dimension j'ai d^cid^ d'agir de facon rapide et ferme. Les Evenements au Qu'bec ces dours derniers ont eteroatid^ U(Ujy. 2 l d'une fagon certaine que le> puiaie exeroicewes libertes fondamentales exigait que des remedes soient apr>ort<5s en certaines occasions du^oins pour assurer le fonctionnement normal en regime democratique. C'est avec enorm^ment de reticence que le gouvernement a d'cidg d'avoir recours aux mesures des dernieres heures. II se rend bien compte des implications de ees decisions mais les gestes successifs causes par le PLQ, manifestations violentes, bombes, enlevement, ne lui laissaient qu'un seul choix s'il ne voulait pas trahir son mandat de gouvernement £lu democratiquement, Le PLQ par ses actes qui briment les droits de la personne humaine ne peut certainement pas prctendre l^gitimernent servir le Quebec. Bien au contraire ces gestes des derniers .iours constituent des atteintes & la fiertP de tous les qu'b^cois. On peut et on doit souhaiter que le PLQ renonce a son escalade dont la nlus certaine cons'quence eai de desservir lourdement ceux qu'il pretend devoir aider. De tout ex maniere le gouvernement lui.poursuivra sa lutte non seulement pour la sauvegarde des libertes democratique3 fondamentales-mais 'Egalement pour uno aocieto' oei la justice et le progres social n'auront pour limito que lo respect de con libort^ct$02" dim? G D £ > jmb Cmf> DOPS & V C&& P^P GAF GEU ^P> GEUE ^'CffF GFE tf>^ ^ST%) GEUW FIS CENTO* ftTLQJ GUS FAC OMP (ouj£ CBP ftti OMA OAD dSS? £$P ECP ECD EC >- ECT AFP SRB APP £AJ AP0 FSR J&% 00007 ° �A 77. POP * BULLETIN DATE HR. Q J t i g 2.1-00 SOURCE CLASSIFICATION witi4L UAJC^$SJ LE GOVERNEMENT DU QUEBEC DONNE SON POINT DE VUE DEFINITIF AUX RAVISSEURS DE MM. CROSS ET LAPORTE QUEBEC, LE 15 OCTOBRE 1970 - DEVANT LA DETERIORATION DE LA SITUATION ET LA NECESSITE DASSURER LORDRE PUBLIC, LE GOUVERNEMENT DU QUEBEC A DECIDE DE DONNER SON POINT DE VUE DEFINITIF DANS SES C£G0CIATI0NS AVEC LE FRONT DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC POUT CE QUI A TRAIT A LA QUESTION PREALABLE, SOIT LA LIBERATION SAINE ET SAUVE DE MM. LAPORTE ET CROSS, LE GOUVERNEMENT DU QUEBEC SUGGERE QUE LA CROIX ROUGE INTERNATIONALS SE SERVE DINTERMEDIAIRE ENTRE LES DEUX PARTIES. QUANT A,IX CONDITIONS EXIGEES PAR LE FRONT DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC, LE GOUVERNEMENT REPOND CE QUI SUIT: 1 - IL NACCEPTE PAS LELARGISSEMENT DE LA TOTALITE DES PRISONNIERS ENUMERES PAR LE FRONT DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC. PAR AILLEURS, IL SENGAGE A RECOMMANDER FERMEMENT LA LIBERATION CONDITIONNELLE DE CINQ DE CES PRISONNIERS QUI ONT DEMANDE UNE TELLE LIBERATION. IL A DEJA ENTREPRIS DES DEMARCHES A CET EGA3D. • 2 - LES AUTORITES CONCERNEES S EHGAGENT A FOURNIR UN SAUF -CONDUIT AUX MEMBRES DES CELLULES DU F.L.Q. QUI ONT PROCEDE A 000071 �-1 9 I ENLEVEMENT DE MM. LAPORTE ET CROSS. 3 - LES MEMES AUTORITES SONT DISPOSEES A S ASSURER QU IL Y A H UN AVION'POUR FINS DE TRANSPORT DANS LE PAYS COISI. 4 - ENFIN, POUR CE QUI A TRAIT AUX AUTRES CONDITIONS, LE GOUVERNEMENT NE CROIT PAS QU IL SOIT LEGITIME DE LES ACCEPTER. LE GOUVERNEMENT A PRIS CETTE DECISION EN MESURANT TOUTES LES IMPLICATIONS DES ALTERNATIVES QUI POUVAIENT EXISTER. EN RAISON DE LA NATURE DE LA SITUATION ET DES DELAIS MULTIPLES QUI EXISTENT DEJA, LE GOUVERNEMENT DEMANDE UNE REPONSE DANS LES SIX HEURES QUI SUIVRONT LA PUBLICATION DE CE COMMUNIQUE ME ROBERT LEMIEUX A ETE PREVENU DU CONTENU DE CE COMMUNIQUE PAR ME ROBERT DEMERS. MOTE; V.R ROBERT DEMERS A AJOUTE, VERSALSMENT DANS SA LECTURE' DE COMMUNIQUE A ROBERT LEMIEUX - AU DEUXIEME PARAGRAPHE: "SOIT LA CROIX ROUGE INTERNATIONALE SOIT LE CONSULAT DE CUBA A MONTREAL". FIN TEXT C IN PARA ONE WORD AFTER VUE DEFINITIF DAS// DANS SES PAR 2 WA UN SAUF-CONDUIT PARA 3 WA PAYS CHOISI �fFju 1 ^i 5<^, iF~k :3» ^ £>x« A-k **<**-0 < ^ '•< "te. " * 'P ^ . l C / R } u j^P^ SECRET 5~- i ^ - P j . (/ OTTAWA, October 12, 1970. MEMORANDUM FOH THE MINISTER. THE LAPORTE AND CROSS-KIDNAPPINGS. The last FLQ communique was Issued last night. It seems to be genuine. It reiterates the conditions of Communique No. 6: (a) release of the "political11 prisoners who agree and their removal with their families to Cuba or Algeria, with Robert Lemieux, Pierre Pascau and Louis Fournier as possible witnesses and Lemieux. serving as go-between} and (b) cessation of all police operations. On fulfilment of these conditions, Mr. Laporte and Mr. Cross will be released in 24 hours. No time limit is set, but. the authorities are expected to act quickly. 2. A number of questions arise: (a) Intermediary of the kidnappers: The captors have at last responded to repeated requests from the authorities to name an intermediary. They have named Lemieux, and insist on this nomination (••Maitre Lemieux devrait servir d'intermediare"). Is Lemieux acceptable in this role, either partially or completely? Is there any alternative to accepting him? If he is accepted, should he be told this privately, or should there be a public response, to ensure the captors know that the authorities have decided to accept him? (b) Negotiation! Are prisoners to be released? If so, how many and in what circumstances? Who is to be named to speak with Lemieux if he is accepted as intermediary? Would a joint team of federal and provincial representatives be required? whether or not there is a joint team, who should be the federal liaison with Quebec? Should further assurances be sought as to the arrangements for the safe release of Mr. Laporte and Mr. Cross before there is any discussion of arrangements for tho prisoners? Is there any point in spinning out the negotiations, or should they be concluded quickly? (b) Release arrangements: If ministers agree to release prisoners, what arrangements need to be made? Both Cuba and Algeria would accept them, but to which country would it be preferable to see them sent? On what authority would this be done, and who would negotiate the arrangements? 2 • o • *• 000073 �SECflBT. (d) P r e s e n t a t i o n : I f p r i s o n e r s a r e r e l e a s e d , how should the g o v e r n m e n t ' s d e c i s i o n be e x p l a i n e d i n Canada ana abroad so as t o avoid r e f l e c t i n g d i s c r e d i t on our i n s t i t u t i o n s ? A.E.R. X 000074 �DISCOURS uU PREMIER MINISTRE DU QUEBEC ROBERT iiC'JRASSA NOUS VIVONS DANS UN ENIROIT OU LA LIBERTE D'EXPRESSION EST L'UNE DES PLUS GRANDES rh a u ET D'ACTION DE TOUS LES PAYS DU MONgEj, MEXE LES PARTIS QUI METTENT EN CAUSE LE REGIME POLITIQUE LUI MEME IX TOUTES ^ LIBERTES DE S'EXPRIMER , D'AILLEUR S CETTE LIBERTE D'EXPRESSION , ON N'A PAS MANQUE DE L'UTILISER CES DERNIERES ANNEES - EN SEMAND SYSTEMATI.UEMENT LA HAINE ET LE MENSONGE. LE GOUVERNEMENT NE PEUT, NE DOIT ET NE RESTERA PAS PASSIF LORSQUE LE BIEN ETRE DE L'INDIVIDU EST MENACE JUSQUE DANS SES RACINES. JE SUIS TROP FIER D'ETRE QUEBECOIS POUR NE PAS VOUS DIRE TOUT! MA RESOLUTION ET' CELLE DU GOUVERNEMENT QUE JE DIRIGE POUR SURMONTER CETTE CRISE TRES GRAVE. DANS CE TRAVAIL POUR SAUVEGARDER LES VALEURS FONDAMENTALES DE NOTRE CIVILISATI ON JE SUIS CONVAINCU D'AVOjR L'APPUI DE TOUS LES REPRESENTANTS ELUS DU PEUPLE. JE DEMANDE A TOUTE LA POPULATION DE FAIRE PREUVE, DANS CES CIRCONSTANCES DIFFICILES DE CALME ET DE CONFIAMCB.| EN' EFFET LA VALEUR DE NOTRE PEUPLE SON EXCEPTIONNEL ESPRIT DE TRAVAIL SO N RESPECT D'AUTRUI SON SENS DE LA LIBERTE NE SONT-ILS PAS LES MEILLEURS GAGES DE LA VICTOIRE DE LA JUSTICE^ ET DE LA PAIX. CETTE SITUATION.FONfl) QUI EN FIN DE COKPT& ..*... 0~* 27 • DOIT NOUS RA3SURER NE DOIT PAS NOUS FAIRE OUBLIER TOUTEFOIS LES PROBLEMES EXTREMEMENT PRESSANTS ET QUI ONT POUR ENJEU LA VIE DE DEUX PERSONNES, SOIT D'UN HOMME POLITIQUE DE SA COMMUNAUTE TYPIQUEMENT QUEBECOIS ET COMBIEN ET D'UN DISTINGUE DIPLOMATE ITOANGER DEVOUE AU PROGRES AUX TENSIONS QU'AFFRON- TE NOTRE SOCIETE. A CET EGARD, LE FLQ A FAIT PARVENIR UN COMMUNIQUE EXIGEANT L'ACCEPTATION INTEGRALE ET TOTALE DE LEUR SEPT DEMANDES. PAR AILLEURS" LE MINISTRE DU TRAVAIL M'A FAIT PARVENIR UNE LETTRE OU IL TRAITE BE DEUX QUESTIONS, SOIT LES FOUILLES POLICIERES ET LA LIBERATION DES PRISONIERS POLITIQUES. NOUS TENONS TOUS, EST*IL BESOIN DE LE DIRE, fA VIE DE M. LAPORTE EDE MEME QU'A CELLE DE M, CROSS. LE SORT, DANS UN RARE EXEMPLE DE SA CRUAUTE A VOULU QUE CE SOIT SUR EUX QUE REPOSE LE MAINTIEN D E L'ORDRE PUBLIC MAIS C'EST PARCE QUE NOUS TENONS VERITABLEMENT A LA VIE DE MM LAPORTE ET CROSS QUE NOUS VOULONS, AVANT/blSCUTER H L'APPLICATION DES DEMANDES QUI SONT FAITES ETABLIR DES MECANISMES QUI GARANTIRAIENT SI L'ON VEUT PRENDRE L'EXEMPLE DONJjRARLE M. PIERRE LAPORTE, QUE LA LIBERATION DES PRISONIERS POLITIQUES fiafcOMME RESULTAT CERTAIN LA VIE SAUVE AUX DEUX OTACBS. IL Y A € LA UN PREALABLE QUE LE SIMPLE BON SENS NOUS FORCE A DPMANDER ET C'EST A s M > OOO-^ ^ I 0. X • te-Ai ATFsuX A <§. <X2\ . / w O ^ ^FiX^ " Qs GEUE GEUW 000075 MimiTtm o n AffAinai EXTCRIKUREI Otnikt 0 OrLRATiCisJ CENTSC 'CUNAL trrtim �A CE TITRE QUE NOUS DEMANDONS AUX RAVISSEURS D«ENTRER EN COMMUNICATION AVEC NOUS. , COMMENT, EN EFFET, ACCEDER AUX DEMANDES SANS EAVOIR LA CONVICTIOM QUE LA CONTRE PARTIE SERA REALISEE. LE GOUVERNEMENT DU QUEBEC CROIT QU'IL SERAIT IRRESPONSABLE VIS A VIS ET DE L'ETAT. ET DE MM LAPORTE ET CROSS S'IL NI DEMANDAIT PAS CETTE PRECAUTION. NOUS VOULONS SAUVER LA VIE DE MM LAPORTE ET CROSS ET C'EST PARCE QUE NCUS LE VOULONS DE TOUTES NOS FORCES QUE NOUS POSONS CE GESTE. MES CiffiRS CONCITOYENS, UN GRAND HOMME D'ETAT A DEJA DITS GOUVERNER C'EST CHOISIR. ET COLLECTIVE. LIMITE DE NOUS AVONS CHOISI,NOUS, LA JUSTICE, INDIVIDUELLE QUANT A MOI, JE ME BATTRAI POUR CETTE JUSTICE JUSQU'A LA EMES MOYENS EN ASSUMANT TCUS LES RISQUES QUELS QU'ILS SOIENT ET QUI SONT ESSENTIELS A L»AVENIR DE NOTRE PEUPLE. �• .,i it,7 n ' • T- •'.<•• • ^Ouio^-p.vA T l T T 7 D-i ePUEEEC DOKNE SOU POINT DE VUE DE r x .V J f» o n o •-* ~~ """ A >' * - J _ ,yOii.Pj.h "'^''C ,.»wi7^ p»"i 7.7-7^ L.U.,U;Vt- '77 1.7. D i i c t t l U t f A i iC.\ i (J_J_P.^;> i*_ "OOMT P 7 ' - J^ ^7.nu ' •"—e>,i n:; i i « 0 . . U \j V M .-. —.-. :nx,x.o. x Oi. VI|_P.P,J_ .., flllTST'1 V:. P. J_ _, ^ . O o UJL . I n ^ , A C?.01X iJU P.L-J..- JA.'.b ^)„S , n.-:-ii*i-i iii-C.» A- I i>LP t.A vi'Jw V—r\ .Vilia.1 : . i Ur. Vu'- V i i ' i i U i i . ' < J I V I 1 4 fc. i_ ,.,iii l-t -,t jcwA^i ow.. r U i . . . i^ 7— I-.LJ. ^ * "> ^ D ™ !7 >(^. U^W-. 2 y/£! i-i^/Ow.i— i. I p.p. x T !T iii;' i,^. u o j V i / EOUEE i:i7ER«Al.I0t\'ALS y. ,, SC SEPP/E OiPOZ.P- A & Lrf O . 1 - . p . v.'--»_-. .. 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H ' . i . w.'.'p DA.Wii p.£. 0 • -.re ''• ""1 T , 1 r. . *s 3 . v^,'., j JSJA o i Qwi A i n A l i AUX AU*i\ES .' _ . . ^*>xi __~ O, ^ J i,.e::i ^ P ' : y IKE DeJ L- \j\J X . r T 7 / • » / ttfW *-> a c : 1 j-.^O^, O ^.O1 .•- bit *'#*• D'U* /m*m\**£*r*L+i OaS DES ALTEXu'AV JVSS QUI PGUVAIE.MT EXISYE; ,.v r.Aibue. uz. LA wAiuixE DE LA S i * UAi iv/a Li i^ELalS L>JI£> 'LES QUI EXISTENT DEJA, LE GCUVXPpE.aEO L / ' U . - . . ^ ..X* —. . i S SIX HEURES QUI SUiv/iO^T LA PL'ELI CAT. W.. EiE PPscVEUb DJ C v A i £ ; - . u *>.e- i/ w A\ e" *«.jL, U .'-— ^ Ji A —. W^J . . A 7^. O^.'.-'iU'i.^u. i~ ™ •• •' r. <~, s. pij.'.-.cnz.» D.-OS SA 2. ,_- - :Oe.e.U;.OU£ A X0BEST LEMIEUX - AU DEUXIi ?ARAGRA?KE. "so:r . LA ", v 0 IP ?ASA exoix ROUGE INTERNA!JOKALE e>'P J.l SO: o w .» ^. w -,.-. . (..-.. r _ ->• " O.E WOSD AFTER VUE DEFINITIF D A S / / DAKS SES PAX" 2 PA UO S.,U:"-CCiVDUIT PARA 3 WA O O S CKOISI 000078 �60 2 MESSAGE WT OCT FILE/DOSSIER SECURITY SECURITE 15/70 S E C R E T EXT OTTAWA FM/DE NO PDM-234 LDN (FOR RITCHIE ONLY) TO/A -g& as / Ft INFO PRECEDENCE FLASH y yA- d SSL SUB/SUJ PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY THE FOLLOWING SECRET MESSAGE FROM MR. TRUDEAU TO MR. HEATH. Text BEGINS: MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER, MY COLLEAGUES AND I AND THE QUEBE GOVERNMENT ARE DOING EVERYTHING WE CAN TO SECURE THE SAFE RELEASE OF MR. CROSS AND MR. LAPORTE M THEIR ABDUgTQRS. AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST PREVENT THE UNDERMINING OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND LAW IN THIS COUNTRY. UNFORTUNATELY, THAT IS NO EXAGGERATION OF WHAT Vffi NOW FACE. NEW PARA THE POTENTIALITIES OF THE COURSE WHICH WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOT PROVED POSSIBLE. SERIOUS AN INDEFINITE CON- TINUATION OF THIS PROCESS SHOWS NO PROSPECT OF LIFTING FROf MR. CROSS OR MR. LAPORTE THE DANGER WHICH HANGS OVER THEM AT THE WHIM OF THEIR CAPTORS. MEANTIME THE INTEGRITY OF OUR POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEM IS BEING SERIOUSLY % a a J* DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE NO DISTRIBUTION ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR S, V.-E"."RITOrTE/PS - '" DIVISION PDM TELEPHONE 2L303 APPRCVED/AUTORISE .l&FLTri&sm ."..'. EXT18/BIL (REV 8 / 6 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 'fr Q 000079 �S E C R E T 2 - CHALLENGED BY A RECKLESS GROUP AND THE RISK OF OTHER INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM ENDANGERING HUMAN LIFE IS INCREASING. NEW PARA CONSEQUENTLY WE SHALL HAVE TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION WHICH I AM NOW OF DISCUSSING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER/ QUEBEC AND OPPOSITION LEADERS IN PARLIAMENT, AonTTT yjyjg m T . n u u i mn nrv.tK gnftTT rnr nnT«p TI-I m g E33&B I All II IM II limO vffi SHALL GIVE THE KIDNAPPERS EVERY CHANCE TO RETURN THEIR CAPTIVES IF THEY ARE AT ALL PREPARED TO DO sC*yQje. SO. THEN WE SHALL HAVE TO BRING TO DEAR ALL THE POWERS AND THAT WE CAN MUSTER RESOURCES/MXBISXBISPBSXX TO END THE TERROR TO WHICH THIS GROUP WOULD SUBJECT THEIR CAPTIVES AND THE CANADIAN PEOPLE. NEW PARA I ASSURE YOU THAT WE SHALL TIUfTT ADFifflTi'inTl IIPftTiTYOPPORTUNITY TO BRING ABOUT THE SAFE RELEASE OF MR. CROSS AND MR. LAPORTE. P.E. TRUDEAU EXT ISA (a/64) (COMM'S DIV) TEXT ENDS �CURITY SECURITE FILE/DOSSIER CCTH/70 SECRET EXTJ-JtOTT FM/DE PRECEDENCE FUSH LiiEAL^*-NG - NEGOTIATIONS WITN RECEIVING OOUHTPl sun/?u.i 7 /"FOLLOWING ARE YOUR INSTRUCTIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS '.PITH LOCAl "J V ,R AUTHORITIES CONOILWING RELEASE OF CROSS AND EXPORTS AND SAFE CONDUCT TOR KIDNAPPERS. YOU SHOULD INFORM RECEIVING GOVT THAT IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS V/ITH KIDNAFTERS OP THPIR SAFE CONDUCT AX ERJVISI.GE FOLLOWING SCENARIO: (A) IT PULL IIP VXZZ DIFFICULT TO SUPPLY INFO ON THE KIDNAPPERS UNTIL \I&M/BA VJHO TPEY ARE BUP YOU SHOULD PROMISE THAT 72 IDULD GIVE THEM ALL THE INFU UE HAVE ON THE KIDNAJ PEPS, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THRU INTERPOL. THERE MIGHT BE 77 OR MO! P KIDNAPPERS AL011G ApfiXfoPS 1 WITH SOl-E OF TIE KIDNAPPERS WIVES ANDYOU CHILDREN FEU'THIS FACT ACCOMPANYING LAWYERS OR JOURNALISTS. SHOULD A.iDiA MENTION TO THE LOCAL AIT POP IT I..3 AND OBTAIN THE IP. KE.PJiUONS TO THE NUMBERS THEY MAX HAVE TO CARE FOR. YOU SHOULD RAISE WITH THRU PARTICULARLY THE WHOLE QUESTION 77 RECEIVING WIVES AND CHILDREN BECAUSE OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KIDNAPPERS '.ALL BE DI P.PTLY AFFECTED BY TIE VIEWS TIPS LOC/L AUTHORITIES HATE ON THIS QUESTION. ... 2 DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE 7 31 o NO STD bniaiiJAiort/AcDAt I Jv _ 177:7 " 7..X..: .4. D1VISI AFrAGViTn' r'\i'i Ci">iSc. TELEFi iGiNc 1 SO. .tOC'.,...OOOrtOpp EXT 10/OIL (RSV.5/CC] (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 000081 �(B) PUBLIC AP :CUNCPPET WOULD BE PIPA BY CJP GOT. OF AGREEENT REACHED WITH A".PaP-:'i] .P. PIPPPVEPS APP OP ARP.'P.GPEJ-N.VS H U E PA VX 7P2 ' LOCAL XP EXPOSE THAT KIDNAHERf PXJ) , .PP : • .PXX.AXP VA r.7. CROSS P.Xi MR. L/iPGRTK WPGSE LIP;, WOULD P7X..7 , IPX:,-:. 7HREAT Ui'-'TT'') V " f " a re '-'n H ' T a M . P P . 1 7 i . .p_l.... ,..' \ \ J 7- Oe.-J.".,J (fp £ 1C7•" i 0"N (YiiVY,'"'' ^VJlt t'.Li.i^i. . J .1.-1 y \.e ^^^^w?"~ J J- 7. . . I TPE APPROACH'S TO TIE OFFICES COULD EITEPP HE CP': ... . 'X POLICE OR MUE SECURE DY POLICE, AS T I E KIDNAPPERS WISE. YOP SHOULD GE;E TNE \ VIE X OP RECEIVING GOVT ON T P I 3 PROFOS/l.-ED I P Pi; E AGREE REQUEST TEEM To INSTRUCT THEIR REPS IN I E E /ECQRUINPLY OP THEIR POSSIBLE INVOLVEPENT IN THIS MATTER. (C) YOU SHOULD SEEN APPROVAL TO PPOPOPT. • VP.PT UPON ARRIVAL INSIDE THE OFFICE IN MTL TIE KIDNAPPERS W.ULP P,P.,P ]2. CPCPJ AND MR. IA PORTE INTO CUSTODY OF T i E RECEIVING GOVT THRU TPEIP. REP IN KTL. THE KIDNAPPERS WOULD ALSO BE REQUIRED TO TURN E E I P WEE OPS OVER TO T I E REP. I F TIES AGREE TO ACCEIT SOLE OF KID.PPEFP.S WIVES AND CHILDREN THEIR PRIOR ARRIVAL AT TIE OFFICE COULD PP AELEGED OR ALTERNATIVELY I F OFFICES ARE NUT/NOT LARGE ENOUGH T ' E LEV;S AND CHILDREN COULD RE GATHERED IN A SECURE ROOM AT AIRFORT. (D) WE PROPOSE THAT WITHIN FINED T U P . , FEE: DUE ONE HOUR AFTER THEY ARRIVE AT OFFICE, TIE KIDNAPPERS AIJD ITE HAPS TIEIR FAMILIES WOULD, ALONG WITH RECEIVII.'G GOVTS REPS, B" TRE.SPORTED, PROBABLY IN CDN MILITARY VEHICLES, TO AIRPORT UNDER CDN SPCURIT'-' PPCORT. T1EY WOULD IE PLACED ON BOARD AT AIRPORT CDN GOVT AIR'P.tA.-E E E N J FOR RECEIVING COUNTRY. FAOVTDED TPE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AG.P. : WE WOULD PROPOSE X ,v p> E # 5 5 > ' / / 3 ^ / /•/ Z£t*> THAT A MINIMAL I E E E I OF CDN OrFICL'.ES, IP .J IVJNG GOVT REPS J LAWYERS AND JOURNALISTS WOULD ACCOMP.EIY IMDP.EI.PO .,P .' FE..!EE'P. ALP GP FOREGOING PERSONS WOULD BE UNARM"'^ BUT T H E E 000082 �PERSONNEL ON BOARD AIRCRAFT WHO WOULD HP AHMED SOLELY TO MAINTAIN EIDER ON T E , AIRCRAFT. THIS L'.TTER REQUIRE ..EE I S IN CEP VIEW AN ESSENTIAL ONE TO TIE OPERATION. /7!<6/+T .X...PX7 £»•$<...ft y*i<.Pfyy-'y- t/rr/r^s* .-XP) JOURNALISTS *ff*nTf-*nr;rv^ />>; M > - XXPP (E) I E BELIEVE PPX.: 2C y+ti-p •ZZm OFFICIALS, Ay *'ip*'*wx CN POEiD PP WOULD ALSO STRONGLY 1REFER TIE USE CP CD i ,..LeCP/ET BECAUSE VE PIPLP HATE MORE CONTROL OVER ITS OPERATIONS AND PEP' E IP E S O QUESTION OE N.eEONAL PRIDE INVOLVED IN ENSURING TILE A FOREIGN AIRCRAFT DOES NCEOCE PIC;. UP THE KIDNAPPERS. WE WOULD PESO IE CONCEEED AT DELAY WHICH MIGHT DE CAUSED I F WE REQUIRED KIDNAPiE .S TO WATT UNTIL A FOREIGN AIRCRAFT ARRIVED IN MTL WHEREAS CDN AIRCRAIE IP EPEnDY AV/PILVBIE , (F) UPON SAFE LVNDING OF KIDNAPPERS IN Q7PX,-. (OP ALGERIA) VE WOULD E..VISAGE THAT RECEIVING GOVT WOULD A E R E E I E E AUTHORIZE IPS REP IN MTL TO TUP. Ue. CROSS AND ME LAPORTE OVER TO CEP AUTHORITIES AND TO ALLOW AIRCRAFT CREW AND ACCOMPANYING OFFICIALS TO RETURN ASAP TO CDA ALONG WITH LAWrf-pRS AND JOURNALISTS I F THEY SO WISH. YOU SHOULD SEEK RECEIVING GOVTS APPROVAL TO TIES PROPOSAL. (G) WITH REGARD TO TRAVEL DOCUS VE PROPOSE To ISSUE GROUP CF KIDNAPPERS V/ITH A COLLECTIVE CERTIFICATE WHICH CONTAINS PHOTO CF EACH INDIVIDUAL AND BASIC PERSONAL INTO. THIS C E J E I F I C A T E 'WOULD BE ISSUED TO GROUP OF KIDNAPPERS FOR TRAVLLTO TIE RECEIVING COUNTRY AND WOULD BECOME INVALID UPON THEIR ARRIVAL. YOP SHOULD SEE, RECEIVING GOVTS APPROV/LTO TIES PROPOSAL AND INFORM T E E T E E IT IS OUR HOPE THAT I F AVAILABLE THEY WILL STILL ACCEPT VALIDITY OP '. PP CERTIFICATE. TIE WIVE:, AND CHILDR1E OF TIE KIDNAPPERS WOULD BE ISSUED ORDINARY CDN P A S S P O R T S WHICH WOULD BE V A L I D L J T I E ALL C O U N T R I E S . PX<X:..P ..MY FOR TRAVEL T O MOST ALTHOUGH YOU SHOULD N O T / N O T RAISA, P C S S I B I E I T / LOCAL A U T H O R I T I E S O B J E C T T O A C O L L E C T I V E C: 2 2 1 PP: . UNLESS P P COPED ARLRAU: a X . . . 000083 �TO ISSUE KlDNAITEA E I E X E E E P E E ! WITH A "SEPARATE EPEGENCY EACH CERTIFICATE VAJ.ID FOR TPEVEL TO TIE RECEIVING COIPPRY ONLY, OR AS '. II S e.LTEREEEE WE COPED IPSE;' THIS. P I E " > P P E E E RESTORE VALID FOR '. ; .. (P) i: :. , . - ::•:: p; RECEIVING C O P E AY AND OP P . : EI P . P . , , . . P P . VAI I D E P. WEiLE YOU SHOULD NOl/NOT IPESE QUESTION OP E S P . ) OF iEDNAf-ERS REEE7IPG COUNTRY, I F LOCAL AUTHORITIES RAISE SUBJECT YEJ SHOUID E . IP . CDN GOVTS WILLINGNESS TO GIVE RECEIVING GOVT IE X. PX FOR TEEIR 1 E E E P ONE THOUSAND DOLLES FCR EACH PPEPET P EJD E E . AND CHILDREN. US FOR I F HOWEVER LOCAL AUTHORITIES INDICATE T P E INTEND TO CHARGE ADEIN EXPENSES YOU SHOULD IX ASCERTAIN PPAP THESE WOULD AMOUNT TO END SEE; FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS INDICAT.I E TO TEE.. TEAS THIS LEY AP.ECT OUR OFFER OF ONE THOUSAND DOLES j I.e. (I) EEECN. I F RECLIVIIE GOVT INSISTS ON G E E ING POLITICAL ASYLUM TO KIDNAPPERS YOU SHOULD ASCERTAIN WHETHER TIES IP NECESSARY ,-.S BEING THE ONLY ,12 UIEER LOCAL LAN THAT KIDNAPPEE COULD BE ACCEI1ED QPICELY. IT I P APPEARS THAT THIS IS ONLY w.'.Y TIEY CAN 3E ACCEPTED YOU SHOULD NOT/NOT RAISE METER FURTHER BUT 17 IT SPPMS TO B_E FOR POLITICAL REASONS O..EY YE' Co'JLU SUGGEST TILE RECEIVING E S T RECEIVE THE FLQ MEMBERS ON P A S I S OF A QUOTE HUMEEE'EIAN GEEPPP 2 CAP GOVT UNQUOTE. E i P REQUEST OF TIE THE TEN, QUOTE POLITICAL PAISPPEK UNQUOTE HAS B EEP USED LOOSELY «IID INCORRECTLY IN PUBLIC , J.X7L7 I E X EVER SINCE TIE KIDNAPPING TO R E E E TO THE PRISONERS Si PUBLIC WOULD BE VERY COPCERNED \LX.7\2 .72 LP VE PP NOT/NOT EXPECT TPE P'OT/NO. RP SEV1PG COUNTRY GRAEED POLITICAL ASYLUM TO PINNA! PIES. NEVP Tr " S S IE E I, TERM POLITICAL ASYLUM CA.. JS AVOIDED IT 7217 BE E . . . E . E U E . OlE GOOD P P L . E E J E YOU SHOULD ATTEMPT E OB'JEIN GUARANTEES R E . P E E E ON BLASTS CP TO POLITICAL ,IOTIVITL..S OF TIE F L , 2AX, I E I., RECEIVING CCUPEPE THIS SHOULD COVER PUBLICITY FOE THEIR S P . P . . S P E S , Ti..PP USE OP LOCE MEDIA AND PEER CO.EUNICATIOIE WITH CDA. �2. LE SHOUID BE GRATEFUL PPR A RETORT E R E YOU ON YOUR DISCI? PEEPS WIPE IEEE, AUTHORITIES ON POINTS RAISED IN THIS TIE AS , P POSSIBLE. P. . ..'27, EM SJ.PE THERE IS No/N'O ALGERIAN C VICE. E M'iS. YOU SHOULD E EaEE : .P LOE.L AUTiX CITIES TEE T E E AUTHORIZE ALGPRIA i CIERGE EP ONE. CP IES OFFICERS TO PROCEED TO MTL WHERE WE CCPIE E E N MEE APPROPRIATE ARREEBiENTS AT OUR EXPENSE FOR THA" DESIGNATED OFFICER TO RECrEVB HOSTAGES AND KID.EEERS IN ILL IN AN OFFICE AS ENVISAGED IN S U B - P A R A (B) ABOVE. 7 ^x-r~ J "is �MESSAGE ee# TFk'~ 1£>~Z£L- 7 - <5^> FlLE/DCSEiSR ,r •:EC:T-15 EED5^ J PCX o p o - -ZA^-TPK- : r> & r> * VS SECURITY SECUR TE 7>g(/iV» 0 re ! . . 5 u u _ «L EPPMCE ePVP FF 7.JuiJi.il.. ?'E/PQJ . i.'7UJ YOE; E.FO FOLLOWING AiE EXCERPTS OF E:LS E.OM .2.2 A. ..A-—...PJc ape. "?, ..x.-O 1..X ON iES DISCUSSIONS \.T7E ALGERIAN. GFEICE.LS. 2. TEL 5 OCT 10 - ALGERIAN MEA CCNFIEEE ..P 1139 NODES MES ROPPE; E E L . BOUMEDIENNE HAS AGREED TO PXX^AP PRISON MS EE/CA AEoUCTCES IF ,E SO WISH QUOTE FOE A JMANE.fteEiil J. ^.SO^L 3. PXL 6 OCT 11 QUOTE: w...*U0'iE. IEEJA„ TO XX IPSE oF > N S J E . . . A..J o o . . ^ . E . AF.'AEtS EFFECTIVE TOMOEEW COuLD AE_,..EL P E" o T:0N. NE CoEFIR T-l£ EET ONLY POSSISLE BASIS FOR Xd.A. PEPRY CCEE. 3E POLITICAL ASYLUM. j . : ; Aiii ROI-LITICAL XA AS SJCH THEY WOULD DP LESCODEAuE-* PSrOE ENGA ACTIVITY L E E . HCEFVEe IP 7AEY Se P .A.X EEY ..oEE) SB E.0VISED WITH SHORT TEEI S " E C I A L BAOSE -MS TO P ..V E F . E T E E E XXZX NO CCEPEOL V.OJLD BE MADE BY ALCE..IA CF TENIA E A E . P S. SE E E ^ L I A N REFUGEES WS..E GIVEN SUCH P,..EPE.PB E.L1D .-OR EEEP MCE., ..ED P..CCSECED TO FEN.NCE WEE THEY S E E.^AGE IN BOLITICA: PEEY IEVE SINCE RETURNED SXx.. DISTRIBUTION j/.iO LOCAL/LOCALE SIO... THE..EE.E POL. DiijiK J o i x u . ORiGlNATOft/REDACTEUR E. AANSCif ..OiPeY X E J X.^XX,. y-EriiP^stcr. DIVISION Ops Centre TELEPHONE | i3-6io? APPRCVED';' .YEBISE - • ' '• - -.e ' sto .p.r......e....pp.-..r.P. .•......-- c x T i c / 3 i L (rrsv 5 / 6 4 ) (COfc!«UN;CATIC«3 OIV) 000086 �J .ll.~A .-T\. '...'X. mj'.-.l.I'i'l.'CI] o'OULo F •— . {. ,' ( • ,• • r • • T ' , ^ - w w — * . - - . ^ w ^ * " v U - , « - • r n r - v rwi'iT " s T » ' l C r - O i ' J l " , * * . . • > 1 H " 1 -»-••• 7 -in i •"••'• i ' i X * V - — " ~ * J * * T - -•» r * E"** r "" * J * J ^ - % - y e - . - .T'JZZF.'J JL ..— . > ~ 1 - u V i ' ' f , - r »* _ . '• - ! T tf" n - • . * — •*•• - i r . -i- r *> . - . _ 1 - " * X 1 H - . . JL, * . FJ?. * * ~"\ • • _ — ' - J - . - . - . - - - 7 — ' * " A - M J • - V T * . - > - - A P " EEIE TO C.TER TO DO SO SEO.E.SE CF VERY DEi.IC.ME X^:2.X2P. '..EE CM.' GCVT FEES ITSELF. ^ ^ ^ w . u L . v J C i i w h . . w . O l J ^/ v»iV_ L>Ti O.iJU O - J j i ^ . JCLO *-.-.L-i..w Hfr, • r v fry r*T r*C C A * "^TD TO OmTTT •*>rr-_r ' r J A * ) ' A X J - i.uOL. C . . . ^ ^ . rs 1 - *TV * " T i< J . • . O iJ-L I v i . ^ . ; - . . - . . l X.OV I . ,iJ-it-llj OI,L.*J O . ^ . . u '*".* * * / p ._-.*-' • 0 C ' . 1 ' ' " , X J-fcO.. ' T .is N V i . Okvw AOvP' l/.j<titi J . ; - J A > . . . ' ^.- - _ . m EN 0 w - ^ -> r " * ,'" * *- —^ A J J • . - A ^ . ,U—A ,,, . - C A '"• - . . . O U , . .^ ^I «, »- * ^ < ..-' P.L/O I j i * . . . t e -J J J I C K AS SOON AS PCS..EELE TO C0.v' 5 LeEE CPE A 1 E E . E I . E I o N A N T AT SDITGI-tXAL AETIPUDE CF IT.'..' YORK P E E S . .^L . 1 'E ' ei' „..', ..«._„» .e.>... .. v... . . . u u l i j ^ • ' ....... ^ iv/OPE -vL^...EANS i.E'JL-i DO ..CPE.1...G FO.. T E . . . O P . . . . . Er_... P. ^ . ' 1 . .•.^wC . i / j . . » i C j N ^.i1 !>-•• D u E j . . < D 0 i . ^ . . .--> ^^..~.. u..-.,,0 . . . ..a f^ .,-•••*;••• , .w._..._ .\,^i._' ... ^ O ,v -«-%-» 7/ / • - -»• - • • « ^ ' * r- * L- ' o . . „wO - *. , "V.' *''T r* N I..' ^u..o J i j ^ v . AO ^ . GC.-..J*.-.* ,o"Z ^ .^0- U . . u u j r...±j -«4.'0.e»„ .•..!_- o ^ i . uu.' . Luji-ii.-UA .vi.ij u e u . . , ' , . . . , - j i ^ ^ i** • * "*n ' N ' T *J-i . (x-.d-w^., f T ----- .I;-*.-. A L i h ^ w a h :uj_>..itj u . . - a L . i lAoo.io. r . . ,o ,.Aj^. P. T . 'J.X^/ >*-". » -.r "i ».- ri, r__> .^ • • •"/ • " n o -^ " A T ' •*' DNPEOE. JI*.EL*'.iICN A*w L.\l* JWSXVIJ kLTt CO. *.»o..I._«--» IO . * . — w...... PC...^ ....... ^ 0 T^C P.'.P.S PX'XXX P . . E E -J IP 000087 �_ Q'WP n - T • - — -, • ~> — •-' e '" ,0, . Jul. ,7VV^-' ..V7* J ...^ ij*Ji^J.-J ii-t^ » -.X..~ • ^v.e\.. y .... . . . . . _ * . . 7. \ ^Xi Aii.iivl\l A . XJL 1 ^02. . J. .7. -^v— 7J. . . v > ^ _ _ . \ \ / / V r"- '? -. - * Ir-. /'' *•' (. X r. w\! 000088 �CzPc .er 16, IE70 Telenhone nessa^e r e c e i v e d at 1:2'" n.m. . rrtc.or 16 from Or. Hardee, Charge d*Affaire5. Cp.pElpn Em. •" s s y , Pnvane: 6 Foreign M i n i s t e r hoa c a l l e d me i n a p i r i f t 113N to cf ' r t o w;.at amounted -La "ceirte blanche" or: Cuban coo-p r a t i o n . had J u s t c o n s u l t e d t i e Cuban uovernment. Ee A? a r e s u l t 12 Sudan government was nrepar^d to c o o p e r a t e f u l l y e.Mth tho Canadian Government i n the l e t t e r ' s attemot to r e s o l v ° the m a t t e r . The Cuban Government, t h e Foreign S i n i s t e r s a i d , would ''-xc-ed" to Canadian r e q u i r e m e n t s on a l l thr p o i n t r t h a t we had r a i s e d vrith them, i n c l u d i n g t h e use 2 t h e Consulate i n ! I o n t r n a l . I f t h e r e were o t h e r w;tye- i n which X ]C. j u , ,-n .iovern^ent could be of a s s i s t a n c e then ;,e should rerav. thpf x. air tta.Eion. Foreign M i n i s t e r Roa s a i d t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n s along t n e l i n e s of t h e aboyp a r e goin., t o Ambassador lor.^io i . - n e d i s t e l y . 000089 �•^0^d--Add" 7 - » DMWin OCTOBHI 16, 1970 TOt J-M DERI HOTEL 8 T GEORGE ALGIERS ALGERIA 8 POP-308 THIS 1 3 TO CONFIRM INID ON DEVEIOPMENTS WK UNDERSTAND TOU HATE BEEN RECEIVING RSGUXASII PROM BERNE. A RESOLUTION IB NOV BEING DEBATED IN PARLIAMENT, TO APPROVE ACTION AlRKADT TAKEN BI FEDERAL GOVT IN ASSUNDfc A NUMBBROF POWERS UNDER THE WAR MEASURES ACT FOR a MONTHS ( 1 0 APRIL JO NEXT). THIS FEDERAL ACTION MAS TAKEN AT REQUEST OF GOVT OF QUEBEC AND JOBTHEAL MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES. 2. POUCE HATE NOTED ID ROUND UP TERRORISTS. 3. BECAUSE OF BOURASSA'8 OFFER OF SAFE CONDUCT TO KIDNAPPERS MADE AT 2 1 0 0 HRS EDT OCT 1 5 , WITH 6 BR DEADLINE, MB MOTH) IMMEDIATELY TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES BE MENTIONED OF MTOLVING INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS OR CUBA IN ARRANGEMENTS FOR DESPATCH OF PRISONERS AMD KIDNAPPERS BD ANOTHER OOUNTRI OF THEIR CHOICE. 1*. FOR XDUR INFO ONLT HE HATE PURSUED WITH CUBAN AUTHORITIES THE QUESTION OUTLINED IN OURTEL 293 OF OCT 1 5 . COOPERATION ON aVL ASPECTS. THET HATE CFFEREDTOTAL THERE Ifl HORPT NO REQUIREMENT THEREFORE FOR ACTION BI TOU FOR THE PRESENT ZN THIS RESPECT. 5. RE * B f PARA IOUR TEL NO 5 OF 15 OCT WE THINK PROPOSED TORMUUTIOM UNSATISFACTORY BECAUSE I f OOUID IMPLY AUJERIA MAS ACTINQ OUT OF HUMANITARIAN FEELINGS FOR "PERSECUTED" CDNS ZE KIDNAPPERS. TOU MIGHT MAEE THIS POINT 1 0 MEJAD AND HATE MATTA IN ABEIANCE TOR TIME BEING. HE MILL 1ST roU KNOW I F TOU SHOUID DISCUSS IT FlfiCSR AOAIN WITH ALGERIANS. « 2 ��MESSAGE • DATE SECURITY SECURITE _F!LE/DOSSIER E'ATA; JL80CT70 FM/DE SANS COTE EXTER OTT NO TO/A PARTE INFO BERNE E'OP PiTPPY ATPTTKR.S) 3 7 PRECEDENCE POP-3 24 J/H)*>Fl FLASH r£ n IMMEDIATE B£L YOU MAY HAVE LEARNED THE TRAGIC NEWS THAT QUEBEC MINISTER PIERRE LAPORTE WAS MURDERED. 2. THE F A 3 S E 0 F MR. CROSS IS STILL NOT RPT NOT KNOWN AT THIS HOUR 0730Z 180CT. 3. IF ANY COUNTRY LS TO BE USED AS DESTINATION FOR KIDNAPPERS OF MR. CROSS IT WILL BE CUBA RPT CUBAj THEREFORE YOUR MISSION MAY BE CONSIDERED COMPLETED; AND YOU SHOULD RETURN TO OTTAWA. A. KINDIZ EXPRESS OUR SINCERE APPRECIATION/ TO THE ALGERIAN AUTHORITIES FCR THEIR COOPERATION. YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THIS AND THE WORK YOU HAVE DONE IS .APPRECIATED. RITCHIE. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE ORIGIN, O ^ S T x TASK FORCE DIVISION flCTEUrt POP TELEPHONE APPROVED/ 819. / EXT 18/BIL (REV 8 / 8 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS OIV) 000092 �CONFIDENTIAL October 19, 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER KIDNAPPINGS The Task Force met for three hours on October 19 to plan further action in the light of Mr. Laporte's death and of the FLQ's stated intention of holding Mr. Cross indefinitely. Here are some of its main conclusions. Basic Assumptions. — The more the Government can take the initiative on the basis of a strategy of its own, the more it can fill the media with its own approach, the better. Part of our strategy, on a government-wide basis, should be to isolate the FLQ from the rest of Quebec opinion, and to avoid anything which might drive moderate or radical opinion in the arms of the FLQ. For this reason, and because the group holding Mr. Cross may be more amenable to reason than the other cell, we should try to put pressure on the kidnappers, through public opinion, in favour of an early release of Mr. Cross. We should also induce the public to support the police effort. In all this, we should avoid the appearance of doing much more for Mr. Cross than we were willing to do for Mr. Laporte. Appeal to the Kidnappers. — We see considerable advantage to a statement,on the day after the funeral of Mr. Laporte, in which Mr. Bourassa and/or some other personality like Mr. Drapeau would make a public appeal to the kidnappers on behalf of an early release of Mr. Cross. The appeal would stress the pointlessness of hi3 indefinite detention, the incredible strain it involves on him and his family, the fact that his health must be affected (in his last letters he spoke of his weariness and of his shock that his wife might have thought him dead). The statement could hint at the slow torture involved for his family in his detention, particularly following the brutal murder of Mr. Laporte. Py touching on the theme ofthe family, such a statement should carry <msiderable weight in Quebec. It could end with an appeal to the kidnappers and also an appeal to the public to assist the authorities in seeking his release. (The latter would meet the police requirement for public support of their activities, including provision of information to the police.) This appeal would have to be handled in such a way as not to increase the pressures on us (or to give the kidnappers the impression that their leverage on us is growing because of our concern for Cross or his family). Appeal by Hrs. Laporte. — A variation of this idea would be to ask Mrs. Laporte to make an appeal to the kidnappers to spare Mr. Cross's life. This should have a very strong impact, but it is by no means �- 2 - CONFIDENTIAL certain that Mrs. Laporte would be willing to lend herself to it. Perhaps some Quebec ministers in the Federal Cabinet, or better one of Mr. Laporte's colleagues in Quebec, could broach the subject with her if her disposition seems favourable. In any event, the idea would no doubt have to be cleared with Mr. Pourassa, since there is a risk that it could backfire if Mrs. Laporte refuses and her refusal becomes known. Appeal to Commentators. — An effort should be made to counteract the tendency of many respectable commentators, in French and in English Canada, to blame the Federal Cabinet and its firmness for the death of Mr. Laporte. I would hope that we might be able to persuade a highly respected personality to point out In public that, by focusing the blame on the Government when in fact the FLQ has carried out the killing, some opinion leaders may in fact be creating conditions in which the life of Per. Cross is more threatened than before. The FLQ may calculate that it can, without serious political loss, pursue its campaign of intimidation by killing the British diplomat. Whatever they think of Government's policies, commentators surely have a moral duty to speak in such a way that the FLQ will not dare kill Mr. Cross for fear of the political loss they would thereby incur. At some point it might be desirable for a highly regarded spokesman to point out that those public commentators who blame the "hard lines" of the Government for the death of Mr. Laporte may themselves cause a loss of life. If they encourage the kidnappers to think that the Governments may soften and accede to the demands of the kidnappers if only they hold out they iriay be responsible for bringing about an eventual "shoot out" in which a number of people may be killed. Those commentators would be more realistic and more humane if they emphasized the firmness of the Governments (and the country's) position and urged the kidnappers to give up. Safe Conduct. — The Quebec Government is issuing again tonight a statement on the safe conduct for the Cross kidnappers, which adds further details to the earlier one. We shall have to keep this subject alive periodically. iHowever, as time passes and it becomes obvious that the kidnappers intend to wait indefinitely, it will be impossible to refer to it continually without incurring some ridicule. Reward. — The time may have come to implement this proposal. Among many possible approaches, the Task Force recommends that the reward be offered by the Quebec Provincial Police. If questioned about the source of the financing, the Provincial Police would indicate that all three police forces involved were contributing to it. Thus the Federal Government could quietly contribute most of it. The reward being a police device, we believe lt would be appropriate that it be announced by the police. In addition it might be slightly less provocative for the kidnappers than an announcement by the governments 000094 �-3 - CONFIDENTIAL or even by the Solicitor General and the Quebec Minister of Justice. The reward would be $100,000 for information leading to the capture of Mr. Laporte's murderers and of $100,000 for information leading to Mr. Cross's release and to the capture of his kidnappers. (This latter reward should be available unless or until definite word is received that the kidnappers are moving immediately to the place designated for the release of Mr. Cross and for their own safe conduct to Cuba). It could also be announced that the identity of anyone supplying information would be fully protected and kept confidential. — An alternative would be to offer a reward only for the capture of Hr. Laporte's murderers. This way we would not be presenting any challenge to Mr. Cross's kidnappers. However, I favour a reward relating to both cases. Statement by the Cuban Ambassador. — We have sought to convince the Ambassador to associate himself with the Quebec statement on safe conduct in such a way as to suggest that he was appealing for the release of Mr, Cross. He preferred not to do so, but accepted a suggestion that he speak with a Canadian Press newsman to the same effect. Government Gesture Towards Mr. Laporte's Dependents. — The Quebec Government may already have considered the possibility of some financial contribution towards the upkeep of Mr. Laporte's dependents. (His last letters underlined his concern for his family's fate.) It would seem appropriate for the Federal Government, preferably in conjunction with the Provincial Government, to provide some kind of a pension or trust fund (preferably on a scale which would strike the FLQ as very large) possibly a capital fund of $500,000 corresponding to the amovint the kidnappers were seeking. Such a move should be well received in Quebec. In adopting any position in this matter, the Government should no doubt decide to do the same if Mr. Cross were killed. Possibility of Mr. Cross's Kidnappers Being Found Out. — Unless special orders have been given to the Quebec and Montreal Police, they might as a matter of course try to capture Mr. Cross's kidnappers in the event of their discovery. This could of course involve grave risk to Mr. Cross's life. We recommend that you ask Mr. Choquette what contingency planning he has done for that eventuality. If Quebec has not considered this point, the Canadian Government night have to ask Quebec to establish in this respect a policy designed to protect Mr. Cross's life. For instance, we could suggest that Mr. Choquette issue orders to the police that, unless immediate police action was required following the discovery of the kidnappers, he would wish to make personally the decision whether the police should try to "rush" the kidnappers, or should merely surround them and offer them safe conduct in exchange for Mr. Cross. The decision would depend on the degree of risk to Mr. Cross. �-4 - CONFIDENTIAL Language. — It is to our advantage to deal with Mr. Cross's kidnappers as if they night be more humane than Mr. Laporte's killers. The term "murderers" should not be meted out to the former, and the general tone of our communications directed specifically to them should be moderate. — For different reasons, we think a policy should be established within the Government, and indeed in conjunction with Quebec, on language to be used concerning the FLQ and its activities. As much as possible, the term "FLQ" should be avoided in order not to give that movement the air of a "liberation front" on the FIN model or of a substantial political party. Thus, your statements to date have all been directed to "the kidnappers". Similarly, the use of "terrorism" in connection with the FLQ has the disadvantage of suggesting that the FLQ maintains a disrupting and continuing activity on a large scale throughout the country, possibly with support from outside. "Terrorism" would have such connotations in much of the third world. It might be better to speak of "acts of violence" or "actions threatening the safety of individuals", etc. Opinion Abroad. — There have been some very luke-warm comments from Algeria and Palestine on the FLQ action. It would be useful to impress on Canadian opinion, perhaps through one of your next statements or through the departmental spokesman, that the kidnappers' actions are an irrevelant aping of movements in the under-developing world, and that they are wholly disconnected from Canadian reality, problems and mechanisms for change. There have been indications, in reports from Algeria and the Arab world, of real distaste for the FLQ kind of activity in our country. Posts. — We shall ask our missions to make it clear to local opinion that the "political prisoners" are common-law criminals and are not persecuted for their opinions. Criminal records of the iidividuals concerned have been sent to all missions. — We also intend to provide additional guidance to our posts on the fundamental reasons for the Government's refusal to yield to blackmail. We can point out that Canada's firm stand decreases, rather than increases the likelihood of further kidnappings of this type. It fosters, therefore, the security of foreign diplomats here and that of Canadians, by depriving the FLQ of a success which would encourage it to further recourse tc violence. We could add that what the Government objects to is not the existence of a separatist or a Communist party (both exist) but bombs, kidnappings and murders. British Government. — Some of the moves above should help us convince the British that we are doing our best. We shall of course continue to keep their mission, and in particular the new High Commissioner, fully informed both of the facts available to us and of our intentions. �- 5 - CONFIDENTIAL I shall submit to you later a fuller account of our conclusions and particularly of the strategy which underlies them. A.E.R. 000097 �000098 CGSS No. 7690-21 �* t 9 CONFIDENTIAL October 19, 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTHt EDUAPPINGS The Task Force met for three hours on October 19 to plan further action in the light of Mr. laporte's death and of the FLQ's stated intention of holding Mr. Cross indefinitely. Here are some of its main conclusions, Basic Assumptions. — The more the Government can take the initiative on the basis of a strategy of its own, the more it can fill the media with its own approach, the better. Part of our strategy, on a government-wide basis, should be to isolate the FLQ from the rest of Quebec opinion, and to avoid anything which might drive moderate or radical opinion in the arms of the FLQ. For this reason, and because the group holding Mr. Cross may be more amenable to reason than the other cell, we should try to put pressure on the kidnappers, through public opinion, in favour of an early release of Mr. Cross. We should also induce the public to support the police effort. In all this, we should avoid the appearance of doing much more for Mr. Cross than we were willing to do for Mr. Laporte. Appeal to the Kidnappers. — We see considerable advantage to a statement,cm the day after the funeral of Mr. Laporte, in which Mr. Bourassa and/or some other personality like Kr. Drapeau would make a public appeal to the kidnappers on behalf of an early release of Mr. Cross. The appeal would stress the pointlessness of his indefinite detention, the incredible strain it involves on him and his family, the fact that his health must be affected (in his last letters he spoke of his weariness and of his shock that his wife might here thought him dead). The statement could hint at the slow torture involved for his family in his detention, particularly following the brutal murder of Mr. Laporte. r3y touching on the theme ofthe family, such a statement should carry ensiderable weight in Quebec. It could end with an appeal to the kidnappers and also an appeal to the public to assist the authorities in seeking his release. (The latter would meet the police requirement for public support of their activities, including provision of information to the police.) This appeal would have to be handled in such a way as not to increase the pressures on us (or to give the kidnappers the impression that their leverage on us is growing because of our concern for Cross or his family). Appeal by Mrs. Laporte. — A variation of this idea would be to ask Mrs. Laporte to make an appeal to the kidnappers to spare Mr. Cross's life. This should have a very strong impact, but it is by no means ... 2 �- 2 - CONFIDENTIAL certain that Mrs. Laporte would be willing to lend herself to it. Perhaps some Quebec ministers in the Federal Cabinet, or better one of Mr. Laporte's colleagues in Quebec, could broach the subject with her if her disposition seems favourable. In any event, the idea would no doubt have to be cleared with Mr. Bourassa, since there is a risk that it could backfire if Mrs. Laporte refuses and her refusal becomes known. Appeal to Commentators. — An effort should be made to counteract the tendency of many respectable commentators, in French and in Ijiglish Canada, to blame the Federal Cabinet and its firmness for the death of Mr. Laporte. I would hope that we night be able to persuade a highly respected personality to point out in public that, by focusing the blame on the Government when in fact the FLQ has carried out the killing, some opinion leaders may in fact be creating conditions in which the life of Mr. Cross is more threatened than before. The FLQ may calculate that it can, without serious political loss, pursue its campaign of intimidation by killing the British diplomat. Whatever they think of Government's policies, commentators surely have a moral duty to speak in such a way that the FLQ will not dare kill Mr. Cross for fear of the political loss they would thereby incur. At some point it might be desirable for a highly regarded spokesman to point out that those public commentators who blame the "hard lines" of the Government for the death of Mr. Laporte may themselves cause a loss of life. If they encourage the kidnappers to think that the Governments may soften and accede to the demands of the kidnappers if only they hold out they may be responsible for bringing about an eventual "shoot out" in which a number of people may be killed. Those commentators would be more realistic and more humane if they emphasized the firmness of the Governments (and the country's) position and urged the kidnappers to give up. Safe Conduct. — The Quebec Government is issuing again tonight a statement on the safe conduct for the Cross kidnappers, which adds further details to the earlier one. We shall have to keep this subject alive periodically. However, as time passes and it becomes obvious that the kidnappers intend to wait indefinitely, it will be impossible to refer to it oontinually without incurring some ridicule. Reward. — The time may have come to implement this proposal. Among many possible approaches, the Task Force recommends that the reward be offered by the Quebec Provincial Police. If questioned about the source of the financing, the Provincial Police would indicate that all three police forces involved were contributing to it. Thus the Federal Government could quietly contribute most of it. The reward being a police device, we believe it would be appropriate that it be announced by the police. In addition it might be slightly less provocative for the kidnappers than an announcement by the governments ... �- 3- CONFIDENTIAL or even by the Solicitor General and the Quebec Minister of Justice. The reward would be $100,000 for information leading to the capture of Mr. laporte's murderers and of $100,000 for information leading to Mr. Cross's release and to the capture of his kidnappers. (This latter reward should be available unless or until definite word is received that the kidnappers are moving immediately to the place designated for the release of Mr. Cross and for their own safe conduct to Cuba), It could also be announced that the identity of anyone supplying information would be fully protected and kept confidential. — An alternative would be to offer a reward only for the capture of Mr. Laporte's murderers. This way we would not be presenting any challenge to Mr. Cross's kidnappers. However, I favour a reward relating to both cases. Statement by the Cuban Ambassador. — We have sought to convince the Ambassador to associate himself with the Quebec statement on safe conduct in such a way as to suggest that he was appealing for the release of Mr. Cross. He preferred not to do so, but accepted a suggestion that he speak with a Canadian Press newsman to the same effect. Government Gesture Towards Mr. Laporte's Dependents. — The Quebec Government may already have considered the possibility of some financial contribution towards the upkeep of Mr. Laporte's dependents. (His last letters underlined his concern for his family's fate.) It would seem appropriate for the Federal Governerent, preferably in, conjunction with the Provincial Government, to provide some kind of a pension or trust fund (preferably on a scale which would strike the FLQ as very large) possibly a capital fund of $500,000 corresponding to the amount the kidnappers were seeking. Such a move should be well received in Quebec. In adopting any position in this matter, the Government should no doubt decide to do the same if Mr. Cross were killed. Possibility of Hr. Cross's Kidnappers Being Found Out. — Unless special orders have been given to the Quebec and Montreal Police, they might as a matter of course try to capture Mr. Cross's kidnappers in the event of their discovery. This could of course involve grave risk to Mr. Cross's life. We recommend that you ask Mr. Choquette what contingency planning he has done for that eventuality. If Quebec has not considered this point, the Canadian Government might have to ask Quebec to establish in this respect a policy designed to protect Mr. Cross's life. For instance, we could suggest that Mr. Choquette issue orders to the police that, unless immediate police action was required following the discovery of the kidnappers, he would wish to make personally the decision whether the police should try to "rush" the kidnappers, or should merely surround them and offer them safe conduct in exchange for Mr. Cross. The decision would depend on the degree of risk to Mr. Cross. �-A- CONFIDENTIAL language. — It is to our advantage to deal with dr. Press's kidnappers as if they might be more humane than Ir. Laporte's killers. The term "murderers" should not be meted ou! to the former, and the general tone of our communications .Erected specifically to thera should be moderate. — For different reasons, we think a policy should be established within the Government, and indeed in conjunction with Quebec, on language to be U3ed concerning trie FLQ and its activities. As much as possible, the term "FLQ" should be avoided in order not to give that movement the air of a "liberation front" on t;:e ?u .Model or of a substantial political party. Thus, your statements to date have all been directed to "the kidnappers". Similarly, the use of "terrorism" in connection with the FLQ has the disadvantage of suggesting that the FLQ maintains a disrupting and continuing activity on a large scale throughout the country, possibly with support from outside. "Terrorism" would' have such connotations in much of the third world. It might be better to speak of "acts of violence" or "actions threatening the safety of individuals", etc. There have been soi.e e*erv luke-v/anr. comments Opinion Abroad. from Algeria and Palestine on the FLw act ion. et would be useful to impress on Canadian opinion, perhape through one of your next statements or through the departmental spokesman, that the kidnappers' actions are an irrevelant aping of movement si in tlie under-developing world, and that they are wholly disconnected fro:. Canadian reality, problems and mechanisms for change. There Pave ueen indications, in reports from Algeria and the Arab world, of real distaste for the FLQ kind of activity in our country. Posts. — We shall ask our missions to reear tc local opinion that the ,fpolitical prisoners" are common-law criminals and are not persecuted for their opinions. Criminal records of the Eidividuals concerned have been sent to all missions. — We also iitend to provide additional guidance to our posts on the fundamental reasons for the Government's refusal to yield to blackmail. We car; point out that Canada's firm stand decreases, rather than increases the likelihood of further kidnappings of this type. It fosters, therefore, the security of foreign diplomats here and that of Canadians, by lei-riving the FLQ of a success which would encourage it to further recourse to violence. We could add that what the Government objects tc is nut the existence of a separatist or a Communist party (both exist) but ex.ire.Ps, kieinappings and murders. Some of the moves above should help us convince Pritish Government. the Pritish that we are doing our best. We shall of course continue to keep their mission, and in particular the new High Pjrnmissioner, fully informed both of the facts available tc us and of o-xr intentions. 000102 �' E t c e r 16, I p ' E Telenhone -esse! c r e c e i v e d a t 1:2P n,m. 7 etc er- 16 from Mr. 'Ereie.., Charge d ' a f f a i r e s , Cae.a.rEa:i Tea r r s y , Ppp.ne Forei 0 n M i n i s t e r hoa c a l l e d me i n a^ain a t 113 ^ 2 w.nt amp.mt<~ : cf'"e to le " c a r t e blanch'-" on Cuban c o o o r r t i o n . hud j p s t c o n s u l t e d t .e Puban j o v e r n w n t . aovernment was T e o a r e d to c o o ^ c r a t p f u l l , he .-.? a r e s u l t P <= E b a n rePE. thr Canadian jovernner.p ir. i: <-• l a t t e r 1 S attemot to r e s o l v e trie m a t t e r . Tie Cuban l o v e r n n r p t , t h e Foreign E i n i s t ^ r r.-Ed, woul'1 "^xceed" to Canadian requireaneets on a l l pP- p o i n t s t h a t v;e had r a i ? e c with Enem, i n c l u d i n g t h e us^ p the Consulate i n M o n t r e a l , I f t h e r e were o t h e r wayr In whi~;. t-P^ Eu nn iovertreent be of a s s i s t a n c e then \.e should .paa tr.if x. air "ould attention. Poreign M i n i s t e r Koa s a i d t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n s a l o n u t e e 1 l e e s 7 f tire abov r a r e g o i n b t c Ambassador J e s s i e 1 ,, edi;.x.°ly. �mm un o g m 16, ltro TOl J * DERI VOP-306 MOTEL ST O f fit AlOIBB AlOSRtt 8 THIS IS 10 SBKFrW IMFO 0 1 BBWttOfHBMBI WE JNDEBSTAHD VM HATE SEEM RECSflND RBOUURtt FROM S U B . A RSSOLCTIOM 3 MO* BBXBB 1 DSBATEB IS PARUAMBMT, fO AMOTB AOfXOR AIBBAPT TAOS SI FEBBRA& QOTT I I ABBURXBO A HtSSBRQF FOUBRS BBBB THE HAS MEASURES ACT RSI a mmtm (to AFBIL 30 n o t ) , na HDJERAI, AOTZW WAS TAXKH AT RBWBST OF OOfT Of W D M AMB R0M9BRAL MWXOXftAL AUTHORITIES. 1. FOUOE HATS HOTED 10 BOOB OP CTSR0RIST8. J. BECAUSE OF SOlBASSA't CS7FS& OF SAFE 00MDDOT 10 KSMAPPSM MRBB AT 210© IBS SOT OCT 15, WEH a S t DBABLIMS, IB WffB IWBDIATBU TO • P U B S RBBfXBXIITXBS SB MBBTIOHED OF IMIOLflMO IMTBBNATIOHJi REI B B M OB OBA XV tlllBJIMSBBl FOB DBBFRTOH OF PRISONERS AMD KXBMAFPBRS •> AMOTHBI OODMTRI OF WBIR CHOICE. a* FOB BBBB IBFO OBUT BI HATE P B B B B MXTH GUSAI AVMORITIES 1KB QlBSTMS 0U1UMBB I I O O t t l 1 9 } OT OBf 1 5 . ^ ^ ^ • • " omrmm^f* s^m* THET HATE OfFSBBBIOXAl *m_ * TB^=P^^ V8R AOtSOl MX WO BOB B S BJBBBM1 IM THIS RESFECT. U m H i t **U BBB f f t SB 9 Of tf BOT MB HUBS ROFCBBB BOBBBUnBI (SBAfZBVAOfOBf BBOAUSB I f 00019 XMFU AlflBBIA MAS ACTIMO OUT OP H I _ J I uaM___j. flh^VAac M M M t '&^mt^^m ^ma^s% ^tm^^^i^ma^Lm^smr^mmmsWium M<IMB V^B V V VIBA A H__________n_Q wwv KBMff MJLMJK V U FBXBt W BBfftB ABB HATE BLFBB ZM AMBTAMBB RDM TUB BBSB. ME MXU 1ST 100 BKBf Xf B B SHOULD B2S00BS IT FIBHBR AOAXM VHB ALBBIARE. 000104 �MESSAGE h-BATE EATtr E£IZ^gE£ y.'.iill- J80C170 SANS COTE ETER CTT FM/pe PRECEDENCE Jfi. •L'h. ,,-Pi Y E r , T M E Q ^ JP/A__.iLJE POP - p E f#0*JG) # JE IMMEDIATE •y - INFO SSL YOU MAY HAVE LEARNED THE TRAGIC NEWo THAT QUEBEC MINISTER PIERRE LAPORTE WAS MURDERED. 2 . THE F A U K O F m.. CROSS I S r^TILL NOT RPT NOT KNOWN AT THIS HOUR 073OZ 180CT. 3. IF AiA' COUNTRY I S TO BE USED AS DESTINATION FOR KIDNAPPERS uF MR. CROSS I T WILL BE CUBA KPT CUBA, MAY BE CONSIDERED COMPI£TEB; k. T.IEREFORE YOLR MISSION AND YOU SHOULD RETIEN TC OTTAWA. KLNDLY EXPRESS OUR SINCiRE APPRECIATION/ TO E E ALGERIAN AUTHORITIES FCR THEIR COOPERATION. YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THIS AND 4A£0 THE WORK YOU HAVE DONE ^ A P P R E C I A T E D . RITCHIE. DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE "V TASK FORCE ORKSIN^pBe/fEQACTEyrt tfy^ sio..._ 7 - XjZlltr lyZJxxxL-- ri DIVISION POP TELEPHONE APPRCVED/AOTDR.ISE • 19.. s .LAFFF •FAAA OCT 1 8 / i l L (HtV » / M ) (COMMUNICATION* OIV) 000105 �y p FF-L^-*^- 22, AciJj*^~~^ 7<As<2> ZA 7* c*- CONFIDENTIAL October 19, 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER KIDNAPPINGS The Task Force met for three hours on October 19 to plan further action in the light of Mr. Laporte's death and of the FLQ's stated intention of holding Mr. Cross indefinitely. Here are some of its main conclusions. Basic Assumptions. — The more the Government can take the initiative on the basis of a strategy of it3 own, the more it can fill the media with its own approach, the better. Part of our strategy, on a government-wide basis, should be to isolate the FLQ from the rest of Quebec opinion, and to avoid anything which might drive moderate or radical opinion in the arms of the FLQ. For this reason, and because the group holding Mr. Cross may be more amenable to reason than the other cell, we should try to put pressure on the kidnappers, through public opinion, in favour of an early release of Mr. Cross. We should also induce the public to support the police effort. In all this, we should avoid the appearance of doing much more for Mr, Cross than we were willing to do for Mr. Laporte. Appeal to the Kidnappers, — We see considerable advantage to a statement,on the day after the funeral of Mr, Laporte, in which Mr. Bourassa and/or some other personality like Mr. Drapeau would make a public appeal to the kidnappers on behalf of an early release of Mr. Cross. The appeal would stress the pointlessness of his indefinite detention, the incredible strain it involves on him and his family, the fact that his health must be affected (in his last letters he spoke of his weariness and of his shock that his wife might have thought him dead). The statement could hint at the slow torture involved for his family in his detention, particularly following the brutal murder of Mr. Laporte. By touching on the theme ofthe family, such a statement should carry mnsiderable weight in Quebec, It could end with an appeal to the kidnappers and also an appeal to the public to assist the authorities in seeking his release. (The latter would meet the police requirement for public support of their activities, including provision of information to the police.) This appeal would have to be handled in such a way as not to increase the pressures on us (or to give the kidnappers the impression that their leverage on us is growing because of our concern for Cross or his family). Appeal by Mrs. Laporte. — A variation of this idea would be to ask Mrs. Laporte to make an appeal to the kidnappers to spare Mr. Cross's life. This should have a very strong impact, but it is by no means �- 2 - CONFIDENTIAL certain that Mrs. Laporte would be willing to lend herself to it. Perhaps some Quebec ministers in the Federal Cabinet, or better one of Mr. Laporte's colleagues in Quebec, could broach the subject with her if her disposition seems favourable. In any event, the idea would no doubt have to be cleared with Mr. Bourassa, since there is a risk that it could backfire if Mrs. Laporte refuses and her refusal becomes known. Appeal to Commentators. — An effort should be made to counteract the tendency of many respectable commentators, in French and in English Canada, to blame the Federal Cabinet and its firmness for the death of Mr. Laporte. I would hope that we might be able to persuade a highly respected personality to point out in public that, by focusing the blame on the Government when in fact the FLQ has carried out the killing, some opinion leaders may in fact be creating conditions in which the life of Mr. Cross is more threatened than before. The FLQ may calculate that it can, without serious political loss, pursue its campaign of intimidation by killing the British diplomat. Whatever they think of Government's policies, commentators surely have a moral duty to speak in such a way that the FLQ will not dare kill Mr. Cross for fear of the political loss they would thereby incur. At some point it might be desirable for a highly regarded spokesman to point out that those public commentators who blame the "hard lines" of the Government for the death of Mr. Laporte may themselves cause a loss of life. If they encourage the kidnappers to think that the Governments may soften and accede to the demands of the kidnappers if only they hold out they may be responsible for bringing about an eventual "shoot out" in which a number of people may be killed. Those commentators would be more realistic and more humane if they emphasized the firmness of the Governments (and the country's) position and urged the kidnappers to give up. Safe Conduct. — The Quebec Government is issuing again tonight a statement on the safe conduct for the Cross kidnappers, which adds further details to the earlier one. We shall have to keep this subject alive periodically. However, as time passes and it becomes obvious that the kidnappers intend to wait indefinitely, it will be impossible to refer to it continually without incurring some ridicule. Reward. — The time may have come to implement this proposal. Among many possible approaches, the Task Force recommends that the reward be offered by the Quebec Provincial Police. If questioned about the source of the financing, the Provincial Police would indicate that all three police forces involved were contributing to it. Thus the Federal Government could quietly contribute most of it. The reward being a police device, we believe it would be appropriate that it be announced by the police. In addition it might be slightly less provocative for the kidnappers than an announcement by the governments �- 3- CONFIDENTIAL or even by the Solicitor General and the Quebec Minister of Justice. The reward would be $100,000 for information leading to the capture of Mr. Laporte's murderers and of $100,000 for information leading to Mr. Cross's release and to the capture of his kidnappers. (This latter reward should be available unless or until definite word is received that the kidnappers are moving immediately to the place designated for the release of Mr. Cross and for their own safe conduct to Cuba). It could also be announced that the identity of anyone supplying information would be fully protected and kept confidential. — An alternative would be to offer a reward only for the capture of Mr. Laporte's murderers. This way we would not be presenting any challenge to Mr. Cross's kidnappers. However, I favour a reward relating to both cases. Statement by the Cuban Ambassador. — We have sought to convince the Ambassador to associate himself with the Quebec statement on safe conduct in such a way as to suggest that he was appealing for the release of Mr. Cross. He preferred not to do so, but accepted a suggestion that he speak with a Canadian Press newsman to the same effect. Government Gesture Towards Mr. Laporte's Dependents. — The Quebec Government may already have considered the possibility of some financial contribution towards the upkeep of Mr, Laporte's dependents. (His last letters underlined his concern for his family's fate.) It would seem appropriate for the Federal Government, preferably in conjunction with the Provincial Government, to provide some kind of a pension or trust fund (preferably on a scale which would strike the FLQ as very large) possibly a capital fund of $500,000 corresponding to the amount the kidnappers were seeking. Such a move should be well received in Quebec. In adopting any position in this matter, the Government should no doubt decide to do the sarae if Mr. Cross were killed. Possibility of Mr. Cross's Kidnappers Being Found Out. — Unless special orders have been given to the Quebec and Montreal Police, they might as a matter of course try to capture Hr. Cross's kidnappers in the event of their discovery. This could of course involve grave risk to Mr. Cross's life. We recommend that you ask Mr. Choquette what contingency planning he has done for that eventuality. If Quebec has not considered this point, the Canadian Government might have to ask Quebec to establish in this respect a policy designed to protect Mr, Cross's life. For instance, we could suggest that Mr. Choquette issue orders to the police that, unless immediate police action was required following the discovery of the kidnappers, he would wish to make personally the decision whether the police should try to "rush" the kidnappers, or should merely surround them and offer them safe conduct in exchange for Mr. Cross. The decision would depend on the degree of risk to Mr. Cross. �-4 - CONFIDENTIAL Language. — It is to our advantage to deal with Pr. Cross's kidnappers as if they might be more humane than Mr. Laporte's killers. The term "murderers" should not be meted out to the former, and the general tone of our communications directed specifically to them should be moderate. — For different reasons, we think a policy should be established within the Government, and indeed in conjunction with Quebec, on language to be used concerning trie FLQ and its activities. As much as possible, the term "FLQ" should be avoided in order not to give that movement the air of a "liberation front" on the FIL' model or of a substantial political party. Thus, your statements to date have all been directed to "the kidnappers". Similarly, the use of "terrorism" in connection with the FLQ has the disadvantage of suggesting that the FLQ maintains a disrupting and continuing activity on a large scale throughout the country, possibly with support from outside. "Terrorism" would have such connotations in much of the third world. It might be better to speak of "acts of violence" or "actions threatening the safety of individuals", etc. Opinion Abroad. — There have been some very luke-warm comments from Algeria and Palestine on the FLQ action. It would be useful to impress on Canadian opinion, perhaps through one of your next statements or through the departmental spokesman, tnat the kidnappers' actions are an irrevelant aping of movements in the under-developing world, and that they are wholly disconnected froi; Canadian reality, problems and mechanisms for change. There have been indications, in reports from Algeria and the Arab world, of real distaste for the FLQ kind of activity in our country. Posts. — We shall ask our missions to make it clear to local opinion that the "political prisoners" are common-law crruiiinals ajid are not persecuted for their opinions. Criminal records of the individuals concerned have been sent to all missions. — 'We also intend to provide additional guidance to our posts on the fundamental reasons for the Government's refusal to yield to blackmail. We can point out that Canada's firm stand decreases, rather than increases the likelihood of further kidnappings of this type. It fosters, therefore, the security of foreign diplomats here and that of Canadians, by depriving the FL2 of a success which would encourage it to further recourse to violence. We could add that what the Government objects to is not the existence of a separatist or a Communist party (both exist) but bombs, kidnappings and murders. Pritish Government. — Some of the moves above should help us convince the British that we are doing our best. We shall of course continue to keep their mission, and in particular the new High Commissioner, fully informed both of the facts available to us and of our intentions. �- 5- ;O;:FIDEJTIAL I shall submit to you later a fuller account of our conclusions and particularly of the strategy which underlies them. A.L.R. 000110 �EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES Z^ys-^y 7A~ zL Mr. B i s s o n n e t t e (PDF) TO A FROM O. /Qyf* SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL 5mcttrttm DATE Mr. Read October 1 9 , 1970 NUMBER Numiro REFERENCE FILE OTTAWA SUBJECT DOSSIER D i s c u s s i o n s i n M o n t r e a l October 1 7 / l 8 and I 8 / 1 9 Sujel MISSION ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION Head of Task Force PDM As you know, I Bpent in Montreal for discussions with of Cuba, Mr. Ramirez, concerning extension of the Cuban Consulate liberate Mr. James R. Cross. the nights of October 17/l8 and 18/19 Mr. Robert Demers and the Acting Consul the use of Terre des Hommes as an to facilitate the exchange designed to 2. On the first occasion I was unable to pick up Ramirez and get to the Administration Building in Cite du Havre until shortly before midnight. We were received there by Ceneral Brown and Colonel Oauthier and ushered into a meeting in the conference room where were present Mr. Courchesne and others from the Tassport Office, Kr. Demers, a representative of the Quebec Harbour Board Police, and I believe a representative of the Montreal Police Force. 3. The meeting started with consideration of the offer to the kidnappers published by the Premier of Quebec at 11:30 that evening. There followed a preliminary discussion of the general logistics, e.g. provision of beds, food, medical services for eilher Mr. Cross or the kidnappers on their arrival at Man and His World. It having been recognized that it would not be possible for the Canadian army to supply these items and services once the territory was occupied as Cuban Consular territory it was decided to discuss the possible sites to usee as the consular headquarters. The Administralion Building at Cite du Havre was excluded because technically it is not in the area of Terre dee Hommes. It was then decided to send for Acting Inspector-in-Chief St. Maurice and Captain Marquis, who I understood to be IVontreal police responsible in the area. On his arrival Captain Marquis in particular seemed well acquainted with the pavillions. He strongly recommended the Canadian pavillion and was pretty certain that not many other pavillions would have the necessary facilities of which heating might be the most important. He did not even consider it worthwhile to look at the Cuban pavillion. 4. While awaiting ihe arrival of the necesse^ry keys to nermit an on-site look at the pavillions a coffee hreak became possible and Exi. 407A/BU. Admin. S e r v i c e s Div.) 000111 �- 2 - it was during this time that General Brown, having been called to the telephone, took m^ to one side and informed me confidentially of the news on the army network that the bodies of Mr. Laporte and Mr. Cross had been found. After a pause he announced to the group that he was under orders to report to his headquarters and with Colonel Gauthier in attendance left the meeting. Thereafter an attempt was made to renew the discussion but it was a matter of minutes only before Mr. Demers received word that the discovery of the bodies (pluralN' had been confirmed. At this point it seemed that the purpose of the meeting heed disappeared and without a formal conclusion being reached the participants discontinued their efforts. 5. On the occasion of the second visit to Montreal, I was met I at the airport by General Richard and Colonel Gauthier who were good | enough to drive me to the Administration Building. I had called to the meeting directly or indirectly a number of differen4 people but unfortunately understood that Mr. Demers was going to call Mr. Ramirez. In the event it became necessary to call Mr. Pamirez af'er the meeting had started and there was a delay therefore of about 0 hours before -> ^ he was able to turn up. This period of time was mos-1 valuable. It ^-2~~\ allowed discussions concerning 4 he procedures which would be followed, working on the assumption that the Canada pavillion would be chosen as the headquarters. Captain Marquis who was there outlined the arrangements he had made to isolate the two islands end 4 he army's role in regard tc guarding or controlling was discussed principally between General Richard and Mr. Demers with the participation of de Miffonis j of the Quebec Provincial Police and Director Holt of the Harbour Board I Police. Mr. Tourville, the D e p u y Director of T<"an and His World, was on hand and he indica'ed complete willingness <o fall in with all necessary arrangements made to turn the control of the Canada pavillion over to the Cuban Consul. 6. The opportunity was also taken to menieon some concern on the part of General Richard concerning the safety of the aircraft. (This was a question he raised with me on the way in from 4 he airport). In the end it seemed taken care of by the acceptance by Mr. Ramirez of the necessity of having two members of the crewpresent r or security duties. Mr. Ramirez's agreement seemed essential since with Mr. Mayrand's help he would necessarily have to explain * o the kidnappers why there were personnel on security du-ies - if this became obvious. 7. The discussion also covered the matter of locatinr the s passport issuing centre. At one s'age it was thouahl tha+ a red ice s trailer on the Concord Bridge might be an appropriate r-l ace for Mr. Courchesne and Mr. Bourgeois to receive the kidnappers and complete the collective certificate. However in the end it was receded that if Mr. Ramirez agreed the passport operation -lipht 'ahe "lace without I ob.ection on the part of he kidnar-ers in the headquar'ers of the consular area. ...3 000112 �- 3 8. Prior to inspection of the Canadian navillion, Mr. Ramirez was given an explanation in detail of how many guards were stationed at what localities to isolate the.islands. He accepted this motion reservation. It seemed essential that he be fully aware of this since it affected his consular area. He saw no objection to the nrooosed • mechanics of the arrival of the kidnappers in cars, their reception at the Canadian pavillion and later their transportation in the same I cars to the helicopter pad. He agreed to supply a representative to travel to Cuba on the aircraft and to have another representative available at the helicopter pad who would assume charge of Mr. Cross and return him to wait at the Canadian pavillion. He further was aware that he would have to have staff at the pavillion in order to I provide coffee or food and he agreed that if Mr. Cross required medical I care he would summon a local doctor. ' 9. The problem that would be created if the kidnappers arrived I in the consular area with their machine guns and side arms was mentioned, Mr. Ramirez agreed that it would hardly be proper for armed men to enter a consulate. It was understood however that he will ake what action he decides upon on the spot. 10. On visiting the Canadian pavillion Mr. Ramirez declared that the ground floor of the administration section would be adequate in itself and that he would not have to use the second floor. He suggested (as he had the previous evening) that a sign be made indicating that the building was "under the jurisdiction of 4he Consulate of Cuba". The inscription would be in French and in Spanish. Such a sign ' is being prepared by the Canadian forces. The Cubans will have a Cuban flag in the foyer to emphasize the position. 11. At one point Mr. Ramirez concluded as ] had earlier that it might be better to have a reception area near the helicopter pad. From this the kidnappers would go on board the helicopter and then Mr. Cross would be escorted to the Canadian pavillion. However the complications lof this although not vital were sufficiently against it and it was 'decided that the Canadian pavillion would be used for all purposes. Upon inspection, the helicopter had proved to be lacking lighting for night (codings and to have half its surface taken up by the cars from the minirail. Captain Marquis undertook to have this cleared and to have the lighting arranged and thereafter Commander Hewer was of the opinion that it would take very bad weather during the dayiime to prevent the helicopter coming in. No guarantee of a successful night landing could be given, however, if the weather was in any way inclimate. 12. Following inspection of the heliport we returned to the Administration Building. The major meeting broke up and Ramirez declared himself to be completely sa1isfied and left for his home. However there was a further informal meeting in the lobby with Mr. Demers, Mr. Mayrand, General Richards and Colonel Gauthier at which Mr. Demers suggested and it was generally agreed, that the choice of Terre des Hommes for the operation could certainly be improved upon and that if it became possible to contemplate makinr completely new .. .4 000113 �arrangements for a simpler site within a 75-roile range of Dorval. 13. In regard to organizing act ion following the receipt of a call from the kidnappers on the Quebec Provincial Police number 395-41951 Mr* Demers said that he would receive word immediately from the Quebec Provincial Folice and would thereafter telephone the Operations Room here or, if he could not get a number, the Prime Minister's Office. He believed it was up to us to notify Mr. Ramirez, and also the Canadian Forces. I agreed on this and noted that I would give instructions accordingly so that the task force staff would call the following people: (a) (b) (c) (d) Ramirez; the Ambassador of Cuba; National Defence operations; Mr. Mayrand (who will go immediately to the Canadian pavillion); (a) Mr. Courchesne. 1 14. In my discussions with Courchesne I made him aware of what I saw to be the system to operate. In regard to getting to the Canadian pavillion out of office hours he noted that he would call Mr. Bourgeois to assist him and thaJ the two of them would be at the pavilion in approximately 25 minutes to 30 minutes. This just about matches Mr. Ramirez's timing. 15. I told Courchesne that Colonel Gauthier had undertaken to arrange that he and Bourgeois would gain access to Man and His World on the presentation of their identity cards. T. H. W. Read �Oc; [\ • - e-..-p,-" 'tF ': • y • ' ••• I 0 • sA'\ u f. 1 COLAT.RNIiNHLNT DU Qt|§BIiC . CONSEH, r:x£cuTM r INF0KMAT10N llOTCL DU GOUVEKNtMCNT OUfOEC CO.HHUNI QUE " Pour d i f f u s i o n immediate • • • LE GOUVERNEMENT DU QUEBEC DONNE SON • POINT OE.VUE DEFINITIF AUX RAVISSEURS DE MM. CROSS ET LAPORTE Quebec, le 15 octobre 1970 - Devant la tion et la necessite d'assurer I'ordre Quebec a decide de donner son point de gociations avec le Front de liberation 7 Pour ce qui a trait a la question prealable, soit la liberation salne et sauve de MM. Laporte et Cross, le gouvernement du Quebec suggcre que, soit la Croix rouge Internationale, soit le Consulat de Cuba a Montreal, serve d'interm6diaire entre les deux partie* . • Quant aux conditions exigees par lc Front de liberation du Quebec, le gouvernement repond ce qui suit; X j 1 - |1 n'accepte pas I'elargissement de la totalIte des prisonniers enum£r£s par le Front de liberation du Quebec. Par ai!leurs, il s' engage 3 reconvnander fermement, la" 1 i Deration cond it lonnelle de cinq de ces prisonniers qui ont w demonde une telle liberation. II a dlJA entreprls des d«marches a cet egord. - ' •• 1 d6t6r{oration de la situapublic, le gouvernement du vue definitif dons ses nedu Q.u6bec. • 2 - Les autorit£s concernees s'engagent a fournir un saufconduit aux membres des cellules du F.L.Q. qui ont procede 3 1'enlevement de MM. Laporte et Cross. • • 3 - Les memes autorites sont disposdes 3 s'assurer qu'il y alt un avion pour fins de transport dans le pays choisi. • ••*• h - Enfin, pour ce qui a trait aux autres conditions, le gouvernement ne croit pas qu'il soit legitime de les accepter. Le gouvernement a pris cette decision cn mesurant toutes les ^plications des -alternatives qui pouvaient exister. EP fp •• prr- ' - i • X • * * * w . i f ^ « T * " ' • • " M V T * • * f * * y *.^7T-.w, ••_« • *. r-\ ;p- "T\^->v-r< ;.-yr-.-^-r;7",r.——|i-*«-?.---•--.•• ;•,--•; 1 . 1000115 �A - 2 - En raison do la nature dc la situation et des d6!ois multiples qui existent doj<3, lc gouvernement demande une reponse dans les six heures qui suivront lo publication dc ce communique. Me Robert-Lemieux a ete prevenu du contenu de ce communique" par Me Robert Demers. , -. • 30 SOURCE: Charles Denis (418) 6/0-5321 - , �. F A •, i 277* CAXIVHKNKMHNT D I I QUf-ilHC _coNSt:iL!rxt:cuTir INI'OKMATION H6TCL DU GOUVlflNtMiTNT oueotc COMMUNIQUE POUR DIFFUSION IMMEDIATE L E S AUTORITES ENONCENT LES MODALITES DE LEUR O F F R E AUX RAVISSEURS Q u d b e c , l e 17 o c t o b r e 1970 - L e s m e s u r e s g r a v e s p r i s e s p a r l c g o u v e r n e m e n t du Quebec ont p e r m i s d ' a s s u r e r le c a l m c n e c e s s a i r e a une action p r e c i s e . L e s a u t o r i t e s inforrnent done l e s r a v i s s e u r s de M M . C r o s s et L a p o r t e des d e t a i l s suivants c o n c e r nant 1'offre definitive qui a ete f o r m u l e e p a r ces m e m e s a u t o r i t e s . E l l e s p r c c i s e n t l e s m d c a n i s m e s dc l e u r offre aux r a v i s s e u r s , m e c a n i s m e s qui d e v r a i e n t p e r m e t t r e d ' a t t e i n d r c l ' o b j e c t i f r e c h e r c h e , a s a v o i r la v i e sauve de M M . C r o s s et L a p o r t e de la facon qui s e m b l e la "plus s u r e . J L a population c o m p r e n d que des m e s u r e s de s e c u r i t e sans p r e c e d e n t ont ete m i s e s en p l a c e . On r e c o m m a n d e cependant ^ chacun de v a q u c r ci s e s o c c u p a t i o n s h a b i t u c l l e s : de cette facon, la population n ' a aucune r a i s o n dc s ' i n q u i c t e r , en p a r t i c u l i e r si p e r sonne ne s ' a p p r o c h e des l i e u x qui vont e t r e rnentionnes subs6qucm~ ment. L e s a u t o r i t e s comptent s u r la c o o p e r a t i o n de t o u s : ce s e r a la m e i l l e u r e facon pour chacun d ' e n t r e nous d ' a i d c r a s a u v e r c e s vies humaines. Voici l e s d e t a i l s e s s e n t i e l s quant a la question p r e a l a b l e ct quant a 1'offre dvi g o u v e r n e m e n t du Qeiebec.' Ces d e t a i l s sont c o m m u n i q u e s par Me R o b e r t D e m e r s , r e p r e s e n t a n t d e s a u t o r i t e s conc e r n e e s . Ils constituent l e s m o d a l i t e s pour la m i s e en l i b e r t e d c ; o t a g e s ct pour le sauf-conduit d e s r a v i s s e u r s . C ' e s t a la d e m a n d e du g o u v e r n e m e n t c a n a d i e n , faite pour des r a i s o n s h u m a n i t a i r c s , que le g o u v e r n e m e n t cubain a bien voulu, pour ces m e m o s r a i s o n s , a u t o r i s e r s e s r e p r e s e n t a n t s ci p a r t i c i p c r a c e s m o d a l i t e s . .2 3 I 1'j " A -.- x- -- . •- 1000117 �— L e s r a v i s s e u r s , t o u j o u r s a r m e s , ct a c c o m p a g n e s de M M . C r o s s ct L a p o r t e , devront se r e n d r e par Ic pont de la Concorde a T e r r e des H o m m e s , lieu d e s i g n e , peer accord e n t r e le g o u v e r nement du Canada ct le g o u v e r n e m e n t do Cuba, c o m m e etant une extension du consulat de Cuba a M o n t r e a l . Cette extension c o m p o r t c tous l e s p r i v i l e g e s ct i m m u n i t y s a t t a c h e s a un consulat'. B- La r o u t e conduisant ^. I ' e n d r o i t designe s e r a c o m p l c l e m e n t d e g a g e e ou g a r d e e par la police et peer l ' a r m e e . II suffira pour cela que l e s r a v i s s e u r s en f a s s e n t la demande cn appelant la Surete du Q u e b e c , a 3 9 5 - 4 1 9 5 . L e s m i l i t a i r e s ct p o l i c i e r s r e c e v r o n t a l o r s I ' o r d r e de l a i s s e r p a s s e r indemnes l e s r a v i s s e u r s , t o u j o u r s a r m e s , se d i r i g e a n t , a c c o m p a g n e s de M M . C r o s s et L a p o r t e , v e r s le lieu d e s i g n e . A l ' a r r i v e e au lieu d e s i g n e , l e s r a v i s s e u r s r e m e t t r o n t M M . C r o s s et L a p o r t e au g o u v e r n e m e n t cubain r e p r e s e n t e par son c o n s u l . Le consul de Cuba d e m a n d e r a a l o r s aux r a v i s s e u r s dc lui r e m e t t r e l e u r s a r m e s . D- Dans i ' h e u r e suivant l e u r a r r i v e e au lieu d e s i g n e , l e s r a v i s s e u r s , a c c o m p a g n e s du consul de Cuba, s e r o n t conduits a. un a d r o p o r t ou i l s p r e n d r o n t place a b o r d d ' u n avion. Un n o m b r e r e s t r e i n t de f o n c t i o n n a i r e s canadiens et de r e p r e s e n t a n t s du go uv e r n e m e n t cubain a c c o m p a g n e r o n t l e s r a v i s s e u r s . E- A l ' a r r i v d c & Cuba, l e g o u v e r n e m e n t de ce pays a u t o r i s c r a son consul a M o n t r e a l "&. r e m e t t r e M M . C r o s s el L a p o r t e aux autorites canadiennes. F- Des d o c u m e n t s de voyage sont p r e p a r e s et seront r e m i s aux passagers. G- ' De c o n c e r t avec le g o u v e r n e m e n t du Q u e b e c , le g o u v e r n e m e n t c a n a d i e n 3 ' e s t entendu avec lc g o u v e r n e m e n t de Cuba sur c e s m o dal i t d s . 30 - S o u r c e : B u r e a u du P r e m i e r m i n i s t r e du Quebec H e u r e d ' e x p e d i t i o n sur T E L B E C ; 23h.28 �. . ) I A • COUVn.RNF.ML-NT DU QL'fittllC CONSE IL_EX£CUT1P C O M M U N I Q U E INFORMATION HOTEL ou GOUVERNEMENT QUEBEC Pour d i f f u s i o n immediate ' Pour les ravisseurs de M. Cross ^ LE GOUVERNEMENT RAPPELLE QUE SON OFFRE DE 1 s SAUF-CONDUIT T I E N T TOUJOURS • Quebec, le 19 octobre 1970 - Le Gouvernement du Quebec a publid a nouveau les modalites d6ja" enoncdes dans son communique de samedi dernier, en signalant que ces modalitds s'appliquent toujours aux ravisseurs de M. James Richard Cross. Le gouvernement du Quebec signaie que c'est a la demande du gouvernement canadien, pour des raisons. humanitaires, que le gouvernement cubain a bien voulu, pour . ces memes raisons, autoriser ses representants a" participer el ces modalites. Les autorites signalent que le Pavilion du Canada est le lieu precis ou sont situes les bureaux de 1'extension du Consulat de Cuba. • .-', • Le consul de Cuba a Montreal, M. Alfredo Ramirez, a effectivement etabli un bureau au Pavilion du "Canada. Par ail leurs, on tient de source officielle federale qu'un avion so tient constamment prfit i decoller pour Cuba & partir d'un des aflroports de la region montrdalalse et que le transport entre le Pavilion du Canada et cet adroport se fera dans un heiicoptere. Le reprdsentant des autorites concernees, Me Robert Demers, communique a nouveau, pour memoire, les details essentiels a la bonne marche de 1'operation. Les autorites entendent ainsi faire tout ce qui est possible afin que le diplomate britannique ait la vie sauve. De son cot6. 1'ambassadeur de Cuba au Canada a declare souhaiter que cette offre soit accept6e par les ravisseurs pour des raisons humanitaires. LES MODALITES A) Les ravisseurs toujours armes, et accompagnes de M. Cross, devront se rendre par le pont de la Concorde au Pavilion du Canada, sur Terre des Hommes. Le Pavilion du Canada est le lieu designd, par accord entre le gouvernement du Canada et le gouvernement de Cuba, comme dtant une extension du Consulat de Cuba & Montw • • • i AX-A-' 1000119 �• # . • , 2 £72) , COUVSIRNEMF.N'T DU QUfiBEC CONS!-: IL LXLCUIIF 1NF0KMAT10N HOTEL DU OOUVERNEMtNT C O M M U N I Q U E pOUr d i f f u s i o n i i^ddjate !l 7 I C O R R E C T ! ON Quebec, l e 20 o c t o b r e 1970 - La t r o i s ierne p h r a s e du t r o i s i e r n e p a r a g r a p h e du communique d i f f u s e h i e r s o i r e t i n t i t u l e ; • "Pour les ravisseurs de M. Cross LE GOUVERNEMENT RAPPELLE QUE SON OFFRE DE SAUF-CONDUIT TIENT TOUJOURS" d o i t e t r e supprimee e t d o l t e t r e remplacde p a r : "De son cOte, ]_'ambassadeur de Cuba au Canada a d e c l a r e q u ' i l c o n f l r m a l t q u ' u n accord e x i s t e e n t r e l e s gouvernements cubain e t c a n a d i e n , a la demande du gouvernement c a n a d i e n , e t que l e gouvernement cubain a c c e p t e pour d e s r a i s o n s h u m a n i t a i r c s de p a r t l c l p e r aux modalites pubTides p a r l e gouvernement c a n a d i e n . " - 30 7 SOUiHCE: Bur-eau du Premier m i n i s t r e pi 18) 643-5321 p - /* - ••-• y*.t**»%>+.:-* w/rsm'w-^t^Jmi&r^irh: i r«mama ^at»^ ••»• 1000120 �' * « • GOUVKRNIiMllNI" OU Ql'l'ilMiC CONSl-IL l-PNUCUI'll-' INI'OUMATION COMMUNIQUE H6TEI DU OOUVLflNtMINT outiuc Pour diffusion Immediate L'enlevement de M. Cross ME DEMERS FOURNIT DES PRECISIONS QUANT AUX MODALITES Quebec, le 26 octobre 1970 - Dans le but d1assurer en tout temps le sauf conduit aux ravisseurs de M. Cross tout en permettant le fonctionnement normal de l'lle Salnte-Hdlene, le representant du gouvernement, Me Robert Demers, communique a la suite de consultations entre les autorites gouvernementales et le gouvernement cubain ce quI suit: A) L'acces du public a l'lle Salnte-Hdlene sera retablT. B) Le personnel d'entretien des pavilions et le personnel d'administration de Terre des Hommes auront acces a l'lle Notre-Dame. •"*• ... , C) Une procedure prdcise ct rapide d1evacuation des deux lies a et6 prevue pour permettre dons un delai trfes bref de retabllr les mesures de s6cur!t6 necessaires a la mise en application du sauf conduit. D) Un avion demeurera pret a ddcoller aussitSt que requis. E) Le personnel du Consulat cubain £ Montreal sera pret en tout temps a se rendre au Pavilion du Canada pour acceuilllr les ravisseurs. Ces disposltIons_seront mises en vigueur mercredi le 28 octobre a partir de 7 heures du matin. Les autoritds rappellent que les modalitds du sauf condui t ddj^ enoncdes sont les sulvantes: A) | Les ravisseurs toujours de M. Cross, devront se Concorde au Pavilion cu Hommes. Le Pavilion du armes, et accompagnds rendre par le pont de la Canada, sur Terre des Canada est le lieu i . * > jj **'.'*yr "• £000121 �. # • I deslgnd, par accord entre lc gouvernement du Canada et le gouvernement dc Cuba, comme etant • une extension du Consulat de Cuba a Montreal. Cette extension comporte tous les privileges ct lmmunltes attaches a un consulat. B) La route condulsant 'i I'endroit ddsignd sera complbtcment d6gagdc ou gardee par la police et par l'armde. II suffira pour cela que les ravisseurs dc M. Cross en fassent la demande en'appelant la Surete du Quebec a 3950195. Les mllltalrcs ct policiers ont recu I'ordre de laisser passer indemnes les ravisseurs; toujours armes, se dirigeant, accompagnes dc M. Cross, vers lc lieu designe. C) A l'arrlvfie au lieu designd, les ravisseurs remettront M. Cross au gouvernement cubain representd par-son consul. Le consul de Cuba demandera alors aux ravisseurs de lui remote " armes. D) I Dans I'heure suivant leur arrivde au lieu ddsignd, les ravisseurs, accompagnds du consul de Cuba, seront conduits a un adroport et prendront place a bord d'un avion qui s'envolora Immediatement pour Cuba. Un nombre restrelnt de fonctionnaires canadiens/ sous la direction de M. Leon Mayrand, ancien ambassadeur du Canada a Cuba, et de representants du gouvernement cubain accompagneront les ravisseurs. E) A l'arrivee a Cuba, le gouvernement de ce pays autorlsera son consul a Montreal a remettre M. Cross aux autorites canadiennes. F) Des documents de voyage sont prepares et seront remis aux passagers. G) De concert avec le gouvernement du Qudbec, le gouvernement canadien s'est entendu avec le gouvernement de Cuba sur ces modalitds. - 30 SOURCE: Bureau du Premier ministre ( M 8 ) - 6*13-5321 *ff*,"* ,•"* ^» »^» • f T « f l l ***. —-— yr^vmry r- 000122 �• R E S T R I C T E D FM EXTEROTT OCT 1 8 / 7 0 TO LDN P 0 P 3 3 3 FLASH ' "* ENLEVEMENTS NOUS TRANSMETTONS POUR VOTRE INFO SEULEMENT TEXTE 2 LETS DE M CROSS. AUTHENTICITE NA PAS ENCORE ETE ETABLIE.LES MEDIA DINFO NEN ONT PAS ENCORE RAPPORTE LEXISTENCE. 2.DEBUT TEXTE CIT AM SUN OCT 18 MY OWN BARBIE.DARLING I WAS HEARTBROKEN FOR YOU LAST NIGHT WHEN I HEARD ON TV THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT MY BODY HAD BEEN FOUND. I CAN ONLY PRAY THAT YOU WERE ASLEEP BEFORE THE NEWS BROKE AND DID NOT HAVE TO SUFFER THE UNCERTAINTLY. I AM SAFE AND WELL BUT OF COURSE TERRIBLY DISTURBED BY THE EVENTS OF LAST N I G H T . I HOPE SOME WAY CAN BE FOUND TO RESOLVE THIS DREADFUL PROBLEM AND ALLOW US TO BE TOGETHER AGAIN. I LOVE YOU MY DARLING.KEEP YOURSELF CHEERFUL FOR MY SAKE GIVE MY LOVE TO SUSAN.I AM THINKING OF BOTH OF YOU EVERY MINUTE. YOUR OWN J A S P I E FOO 09 AM SUN OCT 18 TO THE AUTHORITIES I WANT TO REASSURE THOSE INTERESTED THAT I AM STILL ALIVE AND IN GOOD HEALTH.MY L I F E I S NOT/NOT MENACED AT PRESENT.THE FLQ WHO KIDNAPPED ME HAS TOLD ME THAT I WAS A (POLITICAL PRISONER). AND THAT THEY WOULD TREAT ME AS A PRISONER(TWO WORDS MISSING) AS THE AUTHORITIES CONCERNED DID NOT/NOT ACCEPT THE FREEDOM OF ALL THE FLQ POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO ARE NOW IN J A I L . T H E ONLY DANGER �PAGE TWO P 0 P 3 3 3 RESTR FOR MY LIFE I S I F THE POLICE FIND OUT WHERE I AM AND WANT TO INTERVENE.THE FLQ WILL NOT/NOT GIVE UP AND I WILL BE THE FIRST DEAD.EARLY THIS MORNING I HAVE SEEN MY DEATH ANNOUNCED ON TV. THIS WAS T E R R I B L E . I WROTE TO MY WIFE YESTERDAY MORNING(THE WORD QUOTE MORNING UNQUOTE I S CROSSED OUT) WHICH WAS PLACED IN THE HALL OF THE CHURCH ST BAPTIST DE LASALLE,2585 PIE IX BOULEVARD AND BOTH CKAC AND CKLM WERE CALLED BUT N030DY SEEMED TO GO THERE.IN SPITE OF T H I S LET IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT I WAS DEAD AND THAY MY BODY HAD BEEN FOUND AND MUST HAVE BEEN TERRIBLY DEPRESSING FOR MY WIFE. THE FLQ SAY THAT IT WILL 3E BETTER FOR EVERYONE I F THE GOVT RELEASED THE POLITICAL PRISONERS AS DEMANDED.THE AUTHORITIES WILL NVEVER FIND THE PLACE WHERE I AM IN CAPTIVITY. I AM A PRISONER LIKE THE FLQ MEMBERS IN JAIL.PERHAPS THE RED CROSS OR CUBAN CONSULATE COULD ACT AS INTERMEDIARIES FOR MY EXCHANGE AGAINST THE FREEDOM OF THE PRISONERS IN JAIL.EVERYTHING CAN BE DONE WITHOUT VIOLENCE.I HOPE T H I S CAN BE ACCEPTED. I AM SENDING A SEPARATE LET TO MY WIFE. (SIGNED) JR CROSS FIN CIT 000124 �EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES Mr. Bissonnette (PDF) SKunmr A CONFIDENTIAL SiewM ftOM Oa DAT* Mr. Head October 19, 1970 NIJMMH WFCMNCE Rif4r.ec. FILE OTTAWA IUIJECT Discussions in Montreal October 17/l8 and 18/19 Sujel ENCIOSUMS AMMJItl DISTBBUTION Head of Task Farce TTM As you know, I Bpent in Montreal for discussions with of Cuba, Mr. Ramirez, concerning extension of the Cuban Consulate liberate Mr. James R. CroBS. the nights of October 17/l8 and 18/19 Mr. Robert Demers and the Acting Consul the use of Terre des Hommes as an to facilitate the exchange designed to 2. On the first occasion 3 was unable to pick up Ramirez and pet to the Administration Building in Cits du Havre until shortly before midnight. We were received there by Ceneral Brown and Colonel Oauthier and ushered into a meeting in the conference room where were present Mr. Courchesne and others from the Passport Office, Mr. Demers, a representative of the Quebec Harbour Board 'olice, and I believe a representative of the Mon4real Police Force. 3. The meeting started with consideration o^ the offer to the kidnappers published by the Premier or Quebec al 11:30 that evening. There followed a preliminary discussion of ihe general logistics, e.g. provision of beds, food, medical services for either Mr. Cross or the kidnappers on their arrival at Man and His World. I* h a v m r teen recognized that it would not be possible for the Canadian army to supply these items and services once the tern + ory w,-is occupied as Cuban Consuleir territory it was decided to discuss the possible si + ^s ^. o ure as the consular headquarters. The Administration Buildinr at Cite du Havre was excluded because technically it is not in the area of Terre des Hommes. It_vms_then decided to send for Acting Inspector-in-Chief St. Maurice and Captain Marquis, who I underntood to be Montreal police responsible in the area. On his arr-.val Carta n Mcrquis in rar+icular seemed well acquainted with the pavillions. He strongly recommended the CanadiTan pavillion and was pretty certain thi1 no' many other pavillions would have the necessary facilities of which heating mifht be + he most important. He did not even consider it worthwhile to look at the Cuban pavillion. 4. While awaiting the arrival of <-• no cry. kovs t o Hermit an o n - s i t e look at t he n a v i l l i o n s a coffee hreak became p o s s i b l e and Ex l. 4 0 7 A / B U . Admin. SrrTice. Div.) ,000125 �• i4 wan during this time that. General Brown, having been called to the 'elephone, tooi ni^ to one side and informed me confidentially of the news on the arm,, network that the bodies of Mr. Laporte and Mr. Cross had been found. After a pause he announced to 'he rroup that he was under orders to report to his headquarters and with Colonel Gauthier en attendance left the meeting. Thereafter an at temp4 was made to renew the discussion but it was a matter of miniates only before Mr. Demers received word that, the discover,, of the bodies (pluraO had been confirmed. At this point it seemed that the purpose of -the meeting had disappeared and without a formal conclusion being reached the participants discontinued their efforts. 5. On the occasion of the second visit to Montreal, I was met at the airport by General Richard and Colonel Gauthier who were good enough to drive me to the Administration Building. I had called to 4 he meeting directly or indirectly a number of differen4 people but unfortunately understood that Mr. Demers was going to call Mr. Ramirez. In the event it became necessary to call Mr. Pamirez af'er the meeting had started and there was a delay therefore of about 1 ] hours before he was able to turn up. This period of time was mos' valuable. Tt allowed discussions concerning '_he procedures which would be followed, working on the assumption that the Canada ravillion would be chosen as the headquarters. Captain Marquis who war, thev-e outlined the arrange— ments he had made to isolate the two islands :>nd 'he army's role in regard to guarding or controlling was discussed principally between General Richard and Mr. n emers with 'he part i ci pa4 ion o4" de Miffonis of the Quebec Frovincial Police and Direcpir Holt of 4 he HarVour Board Police. Mr. Tourville, the Depu y Direc-or of Man and "is World, was on hand and he indicated complete willingness to fall in with all necessary arrangements made to turn the con - rr 1 of ' u e Canada pavillion over to the Cuban Consul. 6. The opportunity was also taken to mere -o r none concern on the part of General Richard concerning the safety of the aircraft. (This was a question he raised with me on the wa,. in f'rom ' he airrortO In the end it seemed taken care o r by tre accep'ance by w r . Ramirez of the necessity of having two members cf 'he crewraeeu-ai ror security duties. Mr. Ramirez's agreement seemed esrer.' a1 since with Mr. Mayrand's help he would necessarily hav« to explain 'o X f- kidnappers why 1 here were personnel on security du ies - i r thin recame obvious. I. The discussion also covered lie m - ' p - r loca+in.-- the pass-port issuing centre. At one s'age it war- 'Pen i •• - ' a r- t ice s trailer or. the Concord Bridge might he an aprrorr ial o • lace for *'r. Courchesne an-1 Mr. Bourgeois *o receive tvP ki]rai:re-p and complete 4 he collective cert fica 4 e. However it; f he P.- ' ii w :- ec :e't 4'nat if Mr-. Pamirez agreed the passport opera1 ior -, 1 h' V o -'nee without ot eet ion on "he part of - v e kidnap ers in •'• e hp; -q ia- P P ; of *'-e consular area. ...3 000126 �- 4 - arrangements for a simpler site within a ^S-mile range of Dorval. 13. In regard to organizing act ion follow.n the receipt of a call from the kidnappers on the Quebec Provincial Police number 395-41951 M*". Demers said that he would receive word immediately from the Quebec Provincial Folice and would thereafter telephone the Operations Room here or, if he could not get a number, the prime Minister's Office. He believed it was up to us to notify Mr. Ramirez, and also the Canadian Forces. I agreed on this and noted that I would give instructions accordingly so that the task force staff would call the following people: (a) Ramirez; (b) the Ambassador of Cuba; (c) National Defence operations; (d) Mr. Mayrand (who will go immediately to the Canadian pavillion); (ey) Mr. \&) Mr. Courchesne. jjUUjyueaiJK. / Xf) (jJ^. UUAsJje^j^ / W t ^ u ^ - 14. In my di discussions with Courchesne T made him aware of what In my I saw to be the system to operate. In regard to getting to the Canadian pavillion ont of office hours he noted that he would call Mr. Bourgeois to assist him and tha' the two of ;hem would be at the pavilion in approximately ?5 minutes to 30 minutes. This ,iust about matches Mr. Ramirez's timing. 15. I told Courchesne that Colonel Gauthier had undertaken to arrange that he and Bourgeois would gain access to Man and His World on the presentation of their identity cards. T. H. W. Read 000127 �T.H,W. KSiB/rf Mr. B i s a o a a e t t o (PDF) (DHfLJatTXJkX, October 20, H910 9 T.H.tf* Read Hjr aaaoraadaa e f Ootooer 19, 1970 Biscueaion IA Montreal, Oct. 11/18 u d 18/19 to too aaaoraadua uocer ro for—no, I would like to offer tho fallowing Uaa4 Took *. PDH to think l a torn of pooketo of r«soonaibility Ua* there are several authoritleo involved: i f each doee i t a nart, thea t h o p l a n w i l l work, s t o p by at.>p. He baa a o t allowed f o r a a y o p e r a t i o n a l eoordlaatlea i a nraetioo. Thia aay work, tot I wonder i f the ohaaBoa ar* aot pretty that tho iaproviaatioa required in not going to be oo great toat at er other, a v i t a l decision or eeriao of doeieloa w i l l aot be far a r a b l e , sugpoolag Raairea aad the kidaappers ao aet agree aa to the rtlspoaal of whatrvw arma arm brought onto the iilaaaa f Ta aaaa dooa leairaa tora I f he aaato tele petat of view to be apholaT^Bft ham sea i f dtoeaeatoa over tho arma aattor brings sow* additional elpiaant l a t a the bargaiaiag picture? Who a l l l approve, far instance, i f the kldaappeaa decide toat Croaa oust aeaoapeay thea to Dorval laatead of re-saining i a the i? aha w i l l Reairea tora to? These a a / be a alteration*, aad they are dearly hsiOciaigfat. However, i t oooura that tha plan developed loans heavily aa a baa l a hoaeety aad daaaaay - or an absolute aeed to get away flroa Qaaaaa at a l l oaato • aa tao part af the kjdaaapeaa. I f there are reaervatlaa « their part, thea a l l l develop lata probloao aad ftaalrea aay have to to fiad aaaaoae to eoaealt. A Ibrther, and large, unknown ia the deaaads that tha kidnappers aay leoge whoa the/ aako the telephone c a l l . Suppoeiag they want seas alteration of the plan -eg. to accept i t but to deny peeaage to Mr. Nayraad ar to add a groap of their own witn< u t v the plan toad? Ia tha f i r s t ease, a dsoisioa w i l l be available, i f «»> when everyone i s available, after the QPP e a l l fleaare and iJaaara c a l l s you in Ottawa. The accent aay be oaaier. Xevertneleaa, the i l l a o t r a t l o a s fliasy although they aay ba, aaaaaaise that this organiaatioa laoke proxlbility - o f which, i a t h i s aaae a b i l i t y to reach aa aaaeptable decision quickly ia a characteristic. .../2 000128 �CQUFllSSilUd. - 2 It ws were convinced that the procedures now planned weald be used, it would be possibls to appoint a coordinator, possessing full powers from both geveranaate, who would be the centre of a aaall eeeaanicationa network cantered upon the "hot line" bat providing instant ceonunieation with the Canadian forces (thoss on protection aad guar* auty aa wall aa those aaaaglng the availability of tha aircraft), tha Cuban authorltiea, the Montreal and Harbour police, and tha Passport Office. Of course we are aat ao convinced. The operation aa mounted ia only a contingency, aad ae such can hardly deaaad ths presence in Montreal en stand-by of an official ef the rank that coordination would require. It is however ay conclusion that ualeaa coordination ia provided, dooieiea aay be taken by an office of the QPP lacking as esse to political authority, which aight Jeopardise tho aaeeoae of the oporatioa or lead to tho crootlaa of an Intolerable alauaderotandlng ia tho relations between Canada aad Cuba. Ia regard to tho question of ares, I did aot think to pat forward at the meeting tho euggeetioa that the kidnappers divest theaeelvee of their anas prior to entering the consular territory. This was aot aado a condition la tha government's offer aad aight aot be workable, since tha kidnappers aight wish to guard against any change of mind aa the part of the goveraaaat by retaining their araa aad haacs the poesibility of retaialag their hostage. However, the caaaolaa forces which are already concerned for th safety at their aircrew aight welcome a review of thia eabJect with the Cuban Aabaaaatar ia erdar to ensure that the kidnappers are diearaed, at tho latest, at the heliport. There la some chance if they have got that far, tha ktenappero will then he prepared to diaara - provided they are aaeured that tho Cuban authorltiea will aot let the lukon land In Cubs. Finally, X aa not aware that any arrangement have been aado with the Cuban authorltiea to cover the coot that they will have to aaaaaa. It waa evident that Poaore oaaelderod that aay coot ahould bo aet by tho federal guiariaaatt. AaaaaJag that kaaires sad ita collaborate™ meet their own expenses for tha aaa of their cars, to got to Terre dee aaaaaa, there will etill be additional coat for feed and perhaps fbr medical service if thia la required. Xf aa guaranty has boon given to the Aabaaaador on thia point, I suggest that lt will be appropriate to do aaaa. T.H.*-. ft&AD ��T.H.M. K54B/rf ^ Blnsoaaetto (POP) October 20, 1910 T.H.W. ef October 19, 1970 Sleouaaiaa la Moatreal, Oct. 11/11 aaal 13/19 farther to too offer the Mlowian Teak ' . , I woald l i k e to jeeaa to taiak i a terms of pooketa ef nwpeoAibiliby i . e . there are several anthorltiee iavelvedt i f emeu doea i t a part, ths plan w i l l work, atop by etep. l a too aot allowed for aay operational oooraUaattoa la praatlea. that the Thia aay work, tot I aaadar i f the ehaaeea are aot pretty reqmirod ia ast going to be ao groat that at i , a v i t a l daaiatoa or oeriee of daeiolea w i l l aot be aad the kidnappera do ast aa to tha dlopeeal ef abatenrer eras are brought onto the ialaaaUT Ta doea •aalraa tora i f he aaato his point of view to be upheld? What i f eUaaaaatoa over too aaaa aattor erlage eowj# additional e l bargaiaiag pietore? Mao a l l l approve, tar laataaae, i f the it aaaaapaay thea to Boreal laatead of rewaJAJAg to the i? toe w i l l Baal ras tora to? , 1* a l l aaato • their part, to i, aad they are dearly htiDdelgat. that tha plea developed loaaa h«evUy ea a tosie • ar aa absolute need to get away from aa the part af the ktdaappera. Xf there are rea thee- w i l l dsvalap lata probloaa aad toairea aay have to flad t n a i i a i t o i a the demaadi that tha toe telephone e a l l . Sutipoeiag thay altatattoa of toe plaa -eg. to aaoept i t but to deny paaaage to Mr. aayraad ar to add a grcap ef their owe witn-ee-« t- the plaa leod? Xa the f i r s t aaaa, a dealstea w i l l be available, i f aa» when svaryaaa ia available, after the QPP e a l l tie—aw aad itowrs c e l l s you in Ottawa. Th* oeeoai aay be eealar. Mevertheaaaa, <he illaatratloas flimsy although they aay ba, eayhaalee that this orgaaiaatioa lacks proxibillty - o f which, i a tola aaae a b i l i t y to reaah ea seeeptable iVcUloa quickly ia a eaaraeteriatto. .../2 000131 �- 2 - Xf we were aaaviaead that the procedures now planned weald be used, i t would bo posaiblo to appoint a coordinator, poaseaeiag f a l l powers frea both govern—ta, who woald be the centre of a aaall eeoaaaicatlana network centered upea the "hot llae" bat providiag Instant ooaaaaiaatiaa with the Canadian forces (those aa protection aad guard duty aa wall aa thooe aaa»g*»g the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the a i r c r a f t ) , tha Cabaa authorltiea, tha Montreal aad Harbour p o l i c e , and the Paa apart Office. Of oouree we are aot oo convinced. The operation aa aeaatod i a only a contingency, aad aa such can hardly demand the preeance l a Montreal ea stand-by af an o f f i c i a l at the rank that coordination would require. It i a however ay coaolaaloa that ualeoa ooeroinetlea la provided, daaiaiaa aay be taken by aa office of the QPP laekiag aaaaaa to p o l i t i c a l authority, which aight jeopardise the eueeeae at the operaUae er load t o tho areetlaa af on intolerable alaaaa?aral and! eg l a the relatione betweem Canada aad Cuba. Ia regard to tha question of araa, I did aot taiak to pat forward at the Booting the eaggeetiea that the kidaappera diveot thoaaalvaa ef their aaaa prior to materia* the aaaaalar territory. Thia waa aet aada a aaadltlaa i a tha gevetasaat's offer aad aight aet be workable, siaee ths klrtaaaoora aight wish to guard again st aay change of aind ea the part af tho goveraaaat by reteiaiag tenia araa aad hence the poesibility at retaialag their he stage. However, the GaaadJ an tar^w which are already caaseraad far the safety at t h e i r aircrew might wolooao a review cf thia aubjeet with the Cabaa totoaaaaar l a erdar t o eaanre that tho kidaeppare are dleamed, at the l a t e e t j at the heliport. There i a aaae chance i f they have get that far, tha •idaappero w i l l thea be prepared t o diaara - provided they are assured that the Cabaa authorities w i l l aot l e t the Stoon lead in Cuba. Finally, X aa aet aware that aay arrangement have beea aeda with tho Cabaa aatharitiaa to cover the coat that they w i l l have to aaaaaa. It waa evident that Paa a n taaaldafea that aay aeet should he aot by; the federal gimraaaal. toaaalag that maalrea aad i t a collaborators aeet their own expeases for tha aaa of their care, t e get t e Terre dea Hommes, there w i l l s t i l l he addltlaaal cost for food aad perhape fbr medical service i f thia i a required. Xf aa gaaiaaty haa aeon given t o the Ambaeaeder on tola point, I auggest that l t w i l l be appropriate t o do some. T.H.M. ft&AD �CGSS No. 7690-21-56 1- �Cannot find this reference. c/vv Oxv 000134 �-,'••- • •• 1 r ..,. . . . N , ; ... •' a &" x r m^am*** 4iL£S?li/2fc d OC EXT OTT § | PAhlilUE • % P 2t>2.53„*Z S £ Op ET •' 7 • P PU ?R L HONORABLE JOHN TURNER-, rtR-'Xh PARI DE HOiis'ifcOR j t i y CROJJINARD ' •' : typ ENT9 -23 a*s * l r O » I T E DE 9 CONCERNANT LE PRO JET DE LO I POURRtitPLACER I DE 1S70 CONCERNANT L CRDRh. PuriLIC, £ ^ | & 4 ^ $ \ LA.LUI -7..n LE* J l E S J K E : , ^ u . E R M ,' ET > R E P £ R A N T . ' i f t ^ W l ^ L A S S 1F11EE .. "SECRET" SOE il ADRESbAlT LE S O | % a p . l S ? | j f | K M S J E O R flAXi/ELL* LE ' •• ( (p."at;., ,r ; ' ; tgZ'tf "'..- 2 8 OCTOBRE, ET A NOTRE CONVERSATION TUJ^O^WM 7 •, .<_.. •;_ : D*02$ QCT03RE, HJJftV £&T SUGGERE DE CONSIDERER U t PCS$$|i&ltEV J3£- 80DIFIER LA PARTIE j l DU PROJET, A L ARTICLE 16, LN REMPLACAttT IX PARASRAPKE 1J3S OASS LE SENS SUIVANT. L ARTICLE 71 Du CODE Ch 1« MEL PAR X& .--a- J3E3JT TEXTE J .»•-. - • P:0,,, REm p , . 2 * - . C n CMAtiUt ¥016 2± LE LIE d T E N A # J - d | t ^ N E O R . EN CCN&EIL I '"NE w< pe x, $ Pi©LIC DANS PROVINCE EST D AVib A2c LA PAlK Olj $ij i F • .. .. j PROVINCE SONT -rtENACEi i Ah SvITE DE BS^ORDRES 0 1 DE VIOLENCE .->-..--•• ' RESiLTANT DI FAIT ii A X-: -.a - l-a GRQuPE Ox -M. ASSOCIATION DE PERSONNES A 'JMlt, OC MENACE DE K A I h E , UN ACTE 9 $ UNE CHOSE, ET QJ EN CONSE•&p-:- 'y 2p iUENCES DE CELA, IL EOT NECESiWiiftS D£ PRENDRE DES DISPOSITIONS t 0 URGENCE EN VjE DE PROTEGER U> PAIX 0U L ORDHE P ' S L I C , - •-• A: El aft1? QX IL EN FAIT LA DErtANDE A0 GOsV&RMfcUR EN CONSEIL, CEl 1-CI 3/77- gf U ' • - • DECLARER PAR PROCLAMATION, - 1 • . : - 1 •y •••.' •. •. • . • 7 St, 7. •-' • F»'^ 1 000135 �. . . r- - . ,i.:o * a ^ . \ -i ^ „ r o r c-y bVtiuji r-i*'ii-LC: Op.OilTtfL'LXOno V.'CO*C O i r O C O ^ O .- „. ... . ^ . . 4 - ,. — 4. -1 J: ,. .; .,.,. Oy "C.O0 oC_L2».C<2j " C . c 'Ov!*lO*£ i'Oi"*C< .-,«,": - LO-iOOOCO D3"c00i&Q 0 O 0 VwG jCVO^rr^TiSTiXS J LicLison v 00 "thiol "the rccor:,.. L.-ovc*ooioer:t, jOjOixSCO* ".;l_"lO tOO0 oi".00,00O O—^O o02££UL&31.G.0 , A.Z OOOOxNOS 1^0i.XC& ZFQTJZ; v O'C _O0-C i* 0**C 0 V/ciO OH "t-.IC i'OCc—VO'iO^ is of Mr. Ttcqust as Head of Task Force — To ensure that all departments concerned were informed of developppeeits as they occurred. — Monitoring of radio ar.d television stations. — Cons citation with Quebec (kr.v3rnne.Tt and various agencies in Quebec. — Continuous liaison with British Hign Comruission and Cieban Embassy.. — Contact with our posts aorcae^ an particular t-nose Gireculy concerned such as London, Berne (whore Mrs. Cross has been) and Brussels (whore SSilA has been this week). — Consultation with posts abroad regarding reactions cf other goverrepr.e7i.ppp to the crisis. — Guidance to our post,s abroad on how they might beccue involved (for example, Havana). — Provide information to r/aehington ana our Latin American posts where there was special interest in the crisis. • • ^ -. �Ooerations Centre — The Operations Centre is a permanent part of the Department of External Affairs. — Set up to deal with crises of all kinds. — This is not the first time that the Operations Centre has aeon •used to deal with a crisis.. ! .' 5 » 000137 JUL— �i i*p' *<t- Possible question from the Press: Question: What has been the role of External Affairs in the period sines the kidnapping of Mr. Croaa? Answer: We have played our part but nothing would have been possible without the success of the Police in finding the place where Mr. Cross was located and without the skill of Mr. Demers in his discussions with the terrorists. 000138 •- . '. ,;i-.X -IX..XP: �- : k. • •- _ •. ' F 7 •, AO •i - ^ \ i X ie 2 . : ( ^ ! \ -t. J - ss • I \ • .: V ocooore x77 f: 2 I ••• C J-*J -.' 0 wl • 0/0 7 IJCIA ! ' .rtU DU P u.PJ.1.1. m "ar It I OU c ' •. -' J : • : • ; • iTiTri [ITCKgjpi PICE DU QUEBEC Du ifuiNISTRSi DE LA .-'~7 ^ . ..... ...... kJlixU ' . C '"HP"? M. LE ;4iNISTF >-L_4 'V i i I JE X' INTSRRGG : CTT-D UR ESS CHOIX QUI POURi _„!._/ 7 S I LA CELLUIE.DU FLQ QUI DETIENT A . JAMES CROSS ETAIT .EPL^eEE PAR I P\ I LA POLICE. ' o 2. ' ^ : I L SE PEUT SVIDEt&EET QUE LA BSCGUVEEIB DB LA CELLULE CB V ! FASSE DANS DES CONDITIONS QUI XX LAISSENT A EA POLICE D'AUTEB OHOE-l J1 11 I ; QU'UNE ATTAQUE IMMEDIATE ET VIG0URBU5E OONTES LED RAVISSEURS DE ... < ; ; CROSS, MEME SL CECI CCMPCRTAIT UN RISQUE POUR CE DERNiER. ~F 'O >• ' [ C-P^NBAAT ~ ON PEUT SLWISAGSR D'AUTRES CIRCONSTANCES OU IL SERAIT PG3SIBEB PCJR • ' . ' LA POLICE DE PESER LES RISQUES A L O I S I R . SELON LBS CIRCaeSEECES; h ON POURRAIT DECIDER SOIT DE TENTER DE -LIBEEER M. CROSS PAR L A FORCE, i a • ; : SOIT DE CHERCrEIR A IE SAUVER IE" INFORMANT SES RAVISSEURS QU'ILS J **• • •— ETAIENT EKTOURES ET EN LEUR OFFRANT LE SAUF-CONDUIT. * '• EEMB DANS CB DERNIER CAS* ON NE PEUT EXCLURB L'H^POTHESE QUE LBS RAVISSEURS v • . • "2,lO 'y. 000139 �_ 2 — UT-'-P'-; BEFUSB-.T I E SAUF-CONDUIT, SXIGINT DBS CONDITIONS SNTEA7AGE.' LES ET S'ACCOMMCDENT D'UN SIEGE EN REGEE PAR LA POLICE QUI POURRAIT CQMPORTSR DES RISQUES GRAVES POUR LEUR OTAGE. 3. 'JE. NE SAIS QUELLE PROCEDURE ON A PU ETABLIR POUR LA POLICE A CET EGARD' ET S I VOUS AVEZ CHOISI DE VOUS RE SERVER GET TS DECISION'CRUCIALE S I LES CONDITIONS LE PEEEETTENT. XX SERAIS REUREUX DE SAVOIR COMMENT VOUS ENVISAGES CE PROBLEM: LX JUSQU'A QUEL POINT VOUtCROYEZ POSSIBLE D'EN PLANIFIER LA SOLUTION. 4. JE EE RENDS CCEPfE QUE CE SERONT LA EATTEEBB DEEICATES ET COMPLEXES RELATIVES AU TRAVAIL DE LA POLICE. EN .RAISON DE NOB OBLIGATIONS V I S - A - V I S IE- GOUVERNENENT ETRANGE?. EN QUESTION, VCUS CCMPRENDREZ QUE J E M" INTERRCGE SUR I E DBEGBLEMffiT D ! UNE GPEEATIGN QUI SCELLERAIT D'UNE FACON OU D'UNE AUTRE I E SORT DE Si. CROSS AUQUEL NCUS ATTACHONS COMME VCUS LA PLUS GRANDE IMPORTANCE. �SECRET October 23, 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER Kidnappings - Contingency Planning We should look ahead to likely developments in the Cross case, assess probable FLQ intentions and develop a strategy or at least a contingency planning of our own. This memorandum deals, first, with problems which may face us until the kidnappers holding Mr. Cross are discovered, and, second, with the situation we could encounter if the kidnappers are found with Mr. Cross still in their hands. UNTIL THE KIDNAPPERS ARE FOUND 2. We leave aside here two possibilities: that Mr. Cross may be found dead, or that he may be released voluntarily either on the basis of a safe-conduct or in connection with the flight of his captors. 3. The stated intention of the kidnappers, in their last communique, was to hold Mr. Cross indefinitely. They may simply await quietly the moment of their discovery, in the hope that a lengthy delay will demonstrate the powerlessness of the authorities and of the police and will serve to keep the country in an abnormal state of crisis. 4. We should not exclude however the possibility of other moves by the FLQ or the Cross kidnappers in the meantime. There is little point in speculating as to what we should do if the FLQ manages to extend its campaign through another kidnapping, bombs or assassination. However, other contingencies of a more political impact must be faced. The FLQ hardly needs to make any effort to focus public attention on the human rights issue. Opinion in the parliament, the media and the general public is already moving in this direction. When the FLQ detainees are released, they will provide further ammunition. The government is aware of the dangers here and I believe the Prime Minister's office is mapping out the government's strategy in this respect. 5. Directly relevant to this Department would be an effort by the kidnappers to reopen the whole issue of negotiation or of a deal with them. We could receive, at any time, a communique proposing conversations (e.g. with lawyer Robert Lemieux) without any ...... x> /o:.F^s)jrr 000141 �- 2 - SECRET precondition or restriction on his mandate. If this offer became known publicly, considerable pressure in favour of governmental acceptance could rapidly develop. Such an offer might be interesting, if in fact we had real hopes that the FLQ could accept our position with a few inducements (mainly mpresentational) thrown in. V/e could for instance refer to modest financialarrangements for the upkeep of the kidnappers in Cuba, stress that families would be allowed to rejoin them either at the time of departure or later, offer to pay transport of families to Cuba, perhaps even agree to the presence of a lawyer and journalists on the plane. However, it is extremely doubtful that these marginal points would influence the kidnappers' position one way or the other. 6. In fact there would be grave risks in engaging intfc- any conversations with a spokesman of the kidnappers as was proved by the previous talks. It would again focus attention on the unwillingness of the two governments to compromise, it would revive the ' hopes and combativity of those who have advocated the release of ' prisoners; worse, it would appear to put in question the wisdom ofi the earlier decision by the governments not to compromise. In view of Mr. Laporte's death, it would now be intolerable for the governments even to imply that perhaps a deal had been possible after all and that they were now attempting to reach one, too late for Mr. Laporte to benefit from it. This leads me to the conclusion that we should not accept any offer of talks. If~any was made, the governments should promptly indicate that their final position had been stated by the Quebec Prime Minister. A statement to that effect should be ready for immediate issue by Quebec and/or Ottawa in case of need. It would be for consideration whether we would then wish to announce unilaterally any additional details relating to this final offer, such as those mentioned at the end of paragraph 5 above. I propose therefore that we inform the Quebec authorities immediately of our views in this respect so that governments can react without delay if the question arises. 7. The kidnappers could also embarrass us quite deliberately by making public their willingness to accept reduced conditions. This could take several forms. They could merely restate in the communique that the release of the prisoners was the only condition attached to the release of Mr. Cross. (In effect this would change nothing, since their last statement of conditions referred only to this one and to the stopping of police activity, which is hardly an important point). More pressure on us would be generated if the kidnappers offered to compromise on the issue of the prisoners itself. They might ask that half of them be released, or even only a few. (I do not refer here to the five whose parole has been in question.) I assume that the government would wish to maintain its position of principle even if numbers were reduced. However we must foresee that an important segment of public opinion, and perhaps some within the Quebec government, would be tempted to consider �- 3- SECRET some solution among these lines. For instance, it may be asked whether we could not release on parole a few more of the less hardened criminals, e.g. upon written promise to break with crime and the FLQ. Far from advocating this approach, which would again put in question our principles and the whole government's approach to the laporte case, I nonetheless think that we should confirm the government's intention in this respect and be ready to issue an immediate statement rejecting the possibility of such a compromise, the moment it were put forward. 8. Other variations are possible. One would be, in the event that the laportekidnappers are found, that the other cell should offer to trade their release in exchange for Mr. Cross. This would obviously have to be rejected out of hand and public opinion would no doubt support us. 'We v/ould face a more difficult problem if the Cross kidnappers, perhaps largely in order to save face, offered to release him subject to release by the Quebec police of all thos_e recently detained. This offer might come either before or after the kidnappersMiideout has been discovered. You will find attached an analysis of this particular problem. It seems to me just possible that such a gesture could be made, providing it were presentedOas a unilateral decision of the Quebec authorities, contingent on the new climate created by the release of Mr. Cross~ahd as part of the normal handling of these detainees, (i.e. not as a deal with the kidnappers) and also providing those released did not include persons against whom the police had established either a serious suspicion or any evidence of wrong doing. However, I should be grateful for your comments on this point. AFTER DISCOVERY OF THE KIDNAPPERS HOLDING CROSS 9. On the face of it, the Cross kidnappers want to hold him as long as they can. If they feel the police closing in, they might in panic either release or kill him. However, they may well already have decided on another strategy which holds real danger and difficulty for us. For reasons already evoked, they may seek to evade detection as long as possible, perhaps even refraining from issuing any communique for fear of giving clues to the police. Furthermore, they may have decided that, upon discovery, they would not surrender Cross in exchange for a safe-conduct but would withstand siege. They could either restate their full demands or make reduced but unacceptable demands. This approach on their part would be designed to put maximum pressure on the government, to prolong the crisis in a maximum blaze of publicity and to project a picture of beleaguered bravery. In the end, under ! the stress of such conditions, they might either kill Cross (and be captured or killed by the police), or else they and Cross might be killed in the course of a police attack. Such an extraordinary situation would generate incredible publicity and excitement. Death under police attack, in particular, might give the FLQ an invaluable aura of desperadoes making a last stand and dying for their cause in a hail of bullets. This could do much to erase, at least in young minds, the disgusting memories of Mr. laporte's death by strangling. If at all possible, v/e should avoid giving the FL^ any ready-made folk heroes. To this effect, as a follow-up to the telex you sent �SECRET • Mr. Choquette on October 23 on this general subject, v/e should probably reach agreement with Quebec That, if O h e kidnappers are ' surrounded and cannot be attacked without serious risk to Mr. Cross's life, the police should notify them that they were surrounded, that they v/ould not be attacked and that they should accept safe conduct. If they refused, the police would merely lay siege and await acceptance of safe conduct. 10. If the Cross kidnappers are consciously pursuing the / strategy outlined above, how can we attain our own objectives which are, first, to ensure Cross's safety, second, to obtain his A release as soon as possible and third, to avoid giving the Cross kidnappers too favourable an image in the end? 11. Our first preoccupation has been to induce the Cross kidnappers to accept safe conduct. It is already encouraging that they have not loudly refused it. Contrary to the Laporte kidnappers, one suspects that they are not eager to kill. The continuing availability of the safe conduct is therefore important. While v/e cannot maintain indefinitely the whole safe conduct arrangements in a sate of immediate readiness (we expect the present high state of alert will have to be toned down quietly if nothing happens by Sunday night), v/e should continue to stress periodically that the safe conduct is available ana" all arrangements in hand. Perhaps each periodic reminder could be accompanied with sufficient variations to induce public interest. For instance, with reference to paragraph 5 above, it could be made clear that such dependents as were ready to accompany the kidnappers could be on the 'plane with theme and that all other dependents would of course be completely free to rejoin the kidnappers at the time of their own doing. It could be Indicated that they would be assisted in this by the authorities (in fact, we nay have to pay 'plane fares). In fact, the Quebec Government may adopt this approach in a statement over the weekend. Such additional details may have the advantage of reassuring the kidnappers (they nay wonder if their families might not be discreetly kept in Canada by the authorities and thus used indirectly as hostages). In addition, new information of this kind would keep public attention focussed on the safe conduct. 12. One other idea we had considered was put to you recently by our ambassador in Tunis. Why not let it be known now that, even if the kidnappers were found and surrounded with Cross still in their hands, they could expect to have safe conduct? 7ie are hesitant to do this. For one thing, by removing any doubt that the kidnappers nay have in this respect, v/e make it easier for them to decide to hold on to Kr. Cross until they are found. (For another, a confused situation might arise if the police wrere to capture the kidnappers. The latter might claim that they had allowed themselves to be taken on the understanding that they v/ould be given safe conduct). It is true that, if our ambassador's ... 5 000144 �suggestion were acted upon, the Government would give an impression of flexibility. The British would no doubt feel we had increased Mi'. Cross.'es chances of survival. In the event that the police burst u***-^. •i(jntni_i* the kidnappers by accident in the course of one of the many " ra-'.ds now roirg oa. ihe point under discussion might just tip the balance, in the kidnappers' mind, in favour of surrender. On the whole, however, I would tend to oppose this proposal vrhich would tend to lengthen Cross's detention and the whole crisis (v/e could of course seek British reaction if we were seriously considering such a move), and which might be thought unduly weak and lenient by some segments of public opinion. In any case, v/e v/ould have to remain clear in our ovm minds, as v/e are now, that the safe conduct could not apply to anyone who v/as knovm to have also taken part in Mr, Laporte's kidnapping and murder. 13. One aspect of the final position stated by Prime Minister Bourassa, which has now faded into the background, was the "firm recommendation" of the Quebec Government"InTTavour cf x_arole for five of the FLQ prisoners. This public offer, which Mr. Bourassa said had already been acted upon, presumably still stands. It does not coriim.it the Federal Government; nor is it for us to restate and even less to withdraw it. It is for consideration whether the Quebec authorities might have advantage at one point in reminding the public of this aspect of the governmental position. The fact is that the parole review board is expected to consider the cases of these five men' between now and December. Be have already indicated orally to the Solicitor General's Department, through their representative on the Task Force, that the"Government should of course receive advance notice of any favourable decisions taken by the parole review board before they are made public, tie v/ould not want this card to be given away before we have had time to assess its effects upon Mr. Cross's chances. «Vhether we could press the review board for an early decision, in order to know whether the Government can actually use these paroles in its dealings v/ith the kidnappers, is for consideration. An announcement of the five releases (even were Cross still captive) might appear desirable at one point, depending on the development of the case and the state of public opinion. 14. We will continue to explore this whole natter but I thought I should send you this preliminary report, on which your comments would of course be helpful. 000145 �October 23, 1970. SECRET ANNEX Possible FLQ request for release of detainees or arrested under the War Measures Act. The arrests made tinder the War Measures Act open the door to a possible request by FLQ for the release of the detainees in question in exchange for the release of Mr. Cross. If such a request were made, what should our position bev LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS 2. A certain number of facts have to be taken into account: (a) the governments have refused to release the FLQ prisoners already undergoing jail sentences. The basis for this was that it was impossible to yield to blackmail and that, more fundamentally, the government could not subvert the legal system of this country. Although the Quebec government has undertaken to recommend firmly in favour of parole for five of the prisoners, this has not been done in such a way as to waive normal procedure and criteria; (b) even in the case of some FLy members who have been charged but not yet tried for crimes of violence, Mr. Choquette refused on October 10 to impede the normal course of justice by withdrawing the charges; (c) it remains that in strictly legal terms, the governments could release detainees arrested but not yet charged under the War Measures Act, withdraw charges where some have been laid, and even release convicted persons by recourse to a pardon. . . /2 �- 2- SECRET 3. Politically however this would raise real problems: (a) for one thing, it is obvious that any detainee seriously suspected or proved to have taken part in the kidnapping and murder of Pierre Laporte could not be allowed to go scot free; (b) anyone involved in the kidnapping of Mr. Cross has had,to date, two options: either temporary safe conduct, or trial in Canada with such clemency as Cross* release would justify (Mr. Choquette's October 10 statement). If any of Cross' kidnappers were among the detainees, they could therefore be . granted this treatment in exchange for his release, but it would be inconsistent with the established policy to grant them simple release in Canada, with implied immunity from prosecution; (c) there may be serious suspicion or proof that some detainees have taken part in other criminal activities (bombings, robberies, etc.). Given the line taken by the governments in the whole Cross-Laporte affair, it is difficult to see how such people could be released, especially where substantial proof exists. (d) as for persons thought guilty of giving support to the FLQ under the War Measures Act (but not of other criminal activity), their release would nonetheless raise questions. It is true that we are dealing on the one hand with charges under the Criminal Code up to and including murder, and on the other hand offenses associated with the FLQ under the War Measures Act for which the maximum penalty is five years' imprisonment. One could therefore probably argue that the charges under the War Measures Act are less serious than the charges under the Criminal Code. This, however, involves a value judgement which might put into question the whole policy followed by the government in the past weeks. Perhaps some of them could be . • /3 000147 �- 3 - SECRET released under the terms of a new, more restricted Act if it had then been enacted. Others, merely suspected, might also be released in the new circumstances following Cross* liberation. When proof of illegal activity existed, however (specially if this were so even under the new Act), release might not be advisable. 4. As for the other detainees, it should be possible to release them. Even there, however, the government would have to guard against two dangers. On the one hand, its decision should not appear as the result of a deal with :tha FLQ involving disregard for normal standards of justice. This would undermine the basic position oi" the government and would raise questions, politically extremely dangerous, as to whether some deal might not have saved Mr. Laporte*s life. On the second hand, the release of detainees should not be presented in such a way as to imply that the War Measures Act was not required to meet a substantial threat but was onlyOa means of pressure which the government could bargain away in exchange for Mr. Cross. 5. Nonetheless, it should be possible for the government to avoid these pitfalls and to release a substantial proportion of the detainees in the new atmosphere which would be created by Mr. Cross' release. The decision should be presented as a unilateral act by the governments, not as a deal with the kidnappers. It would be made clear that nobody was being released against whom there was serious suspicion or proof of any wrong doing. �'• DATE INFORMATION HR. SOURCE " lUTfeHVihW • -•"*.••?" ; ' CLASSIFICATION p - -' L.M.: Je voudrais revenir au point de depart ou vous avez du prendre des positions tres importantes. fii premier lieu, on a eu l'impression \ que vous vousfetesvolontairement efface, laissant 1'initiative au . ministre de la .lustice Me Jerome Choquette, puis en second lieu, a la suite de 1»enlevement de M. Laporte, vous avez manifeste cette fois-li plus d»ouverture quant a la possibility de negociations avec les ravisseurs de MM. Cross et Laporte pour ensuite effectuer ce qui a ete percu par plusieurs conme un retouroement assez brusque, si vous le voulez. R.B.: En premier lieu, j'^tais a New York. Vous vous souvenez que j'avais un voyage a faire a New York d'une durSe de quatre jours, voyage qui etait essentiel, que je ne pouvais pas retarder ou que je ne pouvais retarder que tres difficilement. Le ministre de la justice etait responsable de la situation conme telle, situation dont il a discut6 avec d'autres autorites. A mon retour de New York, il y a eu l'enlevement de mon colligue, M. Laporte, et par la force des choses, il fallait evidenment prendre position. Nous avons essaye" de negocier, comme je l'ai dit a plusieurs reprises lors de conferences de presse. Hier j'ai donne certaines raisons pour lesquelles nous avons essaye de negocier avec le FLQ comme tel. Apres quatre jours de negociations nous avons pris les decisions que vous connaissez. L.M.: A quel moment avez-vous perish pour la premifere fois a la possibilite d'adopter les mesures de guerre et de demander a Ottawa d'appliquer ces mesures de guerre? R.B.: Lorsque j'ai appris l'enlevement de M. Laporte, alors que j'etais a ma maison d'ete a Sorel, mon premier geste a ete evidemment de me rendre inm&liatement a Montreal, etant donnS la gravite de la situation. C'etait ma responsabilite en tant que chef du gouvernement d'etre prudent dans une telle situation, de negliger absolument aucun geste qui pouvait deteriorer davantage la situation. Alors. dans la soiree du samedi, j'ai comnunique" lT,0 avec le PM du Canada et je lui ai demande de garder disponible l'armee au cas ou la situation s'Stait deterioree davantage. Avec l'enlevement d'un ministre et avec le sens d'organisation avec lequel ca ete fait, nous pouvions nous attendre a tout. Et comme chef de gouvernement, je ne pouvais me permettre de rester inactif. Alors j'ai demande au PM du Canada de garder l'armee disponible au cas ou ca deviendrait necessaire, peut-Stre la Journee suivante, dans deux jours, dans trois jours ou dans dix jours, de meme que de considerer a appliquer, si necessaire, des mesures de guerre. Je considerais que c'etait un geste essentiel de ma part; c'etait un geste de prudence que de garder disponible ces deux moyens d'action sans avoir a les utiliser inm^diatement. 000149 �- 2 - L.M. : Considerant les deux communiques' cles, soit celui de dimanche soir dans lequel voua indiquiez la possibilite qu'il y ait negociation avec les ravisseurs et celui de jeudi, dans lequel vous sembliez fermer la porte is'.y . assez radicalement, vous etiez dans un espece de dilemme: d'une part on dit: eh bien! M. Bourassa n'a jamais voulu negocier ou bien tout simplement, il s'est fait tordre le bras par le gouvernement federal qui lui voulait adopter une ligne plus dure. R.B.: C'est faux dans les deux cas. M. Laporte etait un collegue. C'etait un geste sans precedents. Qu'un ministre soit enleve connie cela, je ne crois pas qu'il y a eu un gouvernement qui a eu a faire face a une telle situation en Occident. Notre position de dimanche soir, c'etait que nous etions pr§ts a negocier notanment sur la question du sauf-conduit et qu'il fallait absolument regler. Comme je l'ai dit 4 ce moment-14; c'etait une question prealable, avant de discuter ou meme de considerer les demandes qui etaient faites. C'est ce que j'ai fait dimanche soir. Et j'ai demontre d'une fa<jon concrete, d'une fa<jon r^elle, que nous etions prftts 4 negocier en nonmant Me Robert Demers conme representant du gouvernement. Ce dernier a rencontre Me Lemieux 4 plusieurs reprises. Et c'est 4 la suite de ces plusieurs rencontres, c'est 4 la suite d'autres evenements, soit le fait qu'il y avait eu manifestations qui conmencaient 4 se realiser dans la journee de jeudi; du fait qu'il y avait des informations qui nous etaient donnees par les forces policieres sur les plans d'action de ces groupes de terroristes. Je ne peux quand meme pas donner les details et je ne vois pas pourquoi je devoilerais ceux-ei publiquement alors que les terroristes eux agissent clandestinement. Alors, nous avions ces deux enlevements qui revelaient d'une facon dramatique et spectaculaire 4 quel danger nous avions 4 faire. Done, 4 la lumiere de tous ces faits, j'ai decide jeudi de demander 4 l'armee de venir aider les forces policieres qui etaient epuistfes, parce qu'il fallait qu'elles surveillent tous les edifices publics. II fallait qu'elles voient 4 la securite de milliers et milliers d'individus et j'ai decide d'emettre ce communique dans la soiree de jeudi soir, donnant six heures aux membres du FLQ pour repondre 4 une negociation ou 4 une offre qui etait differente sous certains rapports. Nous offrions de liberer ou d'accorder la liberation conditionnelle de cinq detenus. Alors la preuve de la negociation est faite et si il y a eu changement d'attitude, en mon sens, il y a eu simplement un effort de negociations. Nous avons tire des conclusions de ces negociations et nous avons agi en consequence pour aider la population. L.M.: Comment s'expliquer M. Bourassa, que des citoyens de bonne foi, a la suite de rumeurs, sont venus 4 eiere accus4 de fomenter un coup d'etat? R.B.: Moi, j'ai dit ce que j'avais a dire 14 dessus. J'ai ete informe jar des personnes qu'il y avait possibilite de l'etablissemnt d'un gouvernement parallele, mais je n'ai pas pris cela au serieux. Comment voulez-vous que je prenne cela au serieux alors que je viens d'etre elu, alors que j'ai un appui massif de la population qui s*exprime de differentes faeons, notamment par plusieurs milliers de lettres dont la proportion est sans oontrainte favorable au gouvernement? Comment voulez-vous que je prenne au serieux une telle menace d'un gouvernement parallele, alors que ca pufitrediscute, <ja pufitreline idee qui a ete mise de l'avant par certaines personnes? Mais quant 4 moi, ca ne m'a aucunement influence dans les decisions que j'ai eu 4 prendre pour le bien de la population du Quebec. .. .3 000150 �- 3 - 9 L.M. : Est-ce que vous auriez souhaite quan-d meme que les meseires soient plus limitees que celles d'une loi des mesures de guerre? R.B. : C'est la le probleme. Le gouvernement n'avait pas le choix. Je me suis rendu compte et c'etait evident pour tout le monde, que soit que nous adoptions les mesures de guerre ou soit que nous etions en face de moyens tout 4 fait inefficaces pour que les forces policieres puissent agir. Alors c'etait tout ou rien. Alors, je n'avais pas le droit ou du moins je ne crois pas que je pouvais me permettre d'hesiter un seul instant. Durant quatre jours, j'ai essaye de negocier. J'ai eviter toute provocation. Je n'ai pas fait appel 4 l'armee et je n'ai pas fait appel aux mesures de guerre et je ae suis rendu compte qu'il me fallait dans la journee de jeudi qu'il fallait prendre position, pour des raisons evidentes. Nous avons pris position de differentes faeons pour le sauf-conduit sur les prisonniers eligibles pour la liberation conditionnelle. Quant 4 la liberation des vingt-trois prisonniers, c'est clair que ca ete consider,que 9a ete discute. Mais il y a toute sorte d'arguments qui militaient contre cette liberation. Un argument qui nous a ete fourni par les autorites policieres et qui disait: "Si nous liberons ces vingt-trois prisonniers, ou s'ils peuvent avoir leur liberte apres avoir conmis des vols, apres avoir commis des tentatives de meurtres, dans un cas, je crois que si nous les liberons, c'etait inciter des centaines et des centaines de sympatisants du FIQ, de devenir des terroristes actifs." Ces terroristes se diraient: "Nous pouvons 6tre des terroristes actifs et cela impunement puisque ceux qui 1'ont ete, il y a quelques semaines ou quelques mois ont pu s'en aller librement en Algerie ou 4 Cuba 4 cause d'un enlevement." Alors, il y aurait eu la une incitation 4 faire d'autres enlevements pour ensuite dire: "liberer cinquante, soixante, cent prisonniers politiques, sinon nous tuons la personne." Alors, la responsabilite du gouvernement dans ce cas 14 etait de concilier les objectifs qui pouvaient sembler contradictoires et sauver deux vies humaines. Nous avons fait le maximum, soit tout ce qui etait possible dano les circonstances pour sauver ces vies humaines et esperons que M. Cross aura la vie sauve, mais il ne fallait quand meme pas ouvrir la voie 4 l'anarchie. II fallait faire preuve de fermete, de determination pour empecher que nous tombions dans le carreau au Quebec et au Canada. L.M.: Est-ce que cet argument 14 peut servir 4 ceux qui disent que vous avez mis la raison d'etat au-dessus des vies humaines? R.B. : Nous avons essaye par tous les moyens d'epargner des vies humaines, mais il y avait la raison d'etat conme telle. Je ne •• vois pas, conme chef d'un gouvernement responsable de toute une population, comment je pouvais, par des gestes,ouvrir la voie 4 l'anarchie pour les raisons que je viens de vous mentionner. Vous §tes au courant du plan dont je parlais. II y avait quatre etapes: manifestations violentes, bombes, enlevements, assassinats seiectifs. On pouvait peut-etre faire preuve de septicisme apresla deuxieme etape, mais lorsque l'on voit qu'il y a trois etapes sur quatre qui sont realisees, (nous avon^ des manifestations violentes, nous avons eu des bombes, nous avons maintenant des enlevements spectaculaires), estce que l'on doit attendre qu'il y ait des assassinats pour agir? C'est le gouvernement du Quebec qui a pris les responsabilites en dernier essor. On pourra le prouver. Le gouvernement du Quebec n'avait pas d'autre choix que de prendre les mesures qui etaient 4 sa disposition. II y avait deux mesures. II y avait l'armee pour aider les forces policieres et il y avait la loi sur les mesures de guerre pour donner des pouvoirs accrus aux forces policieres. 000151 *•••'. �- A - L.M. : M. Bourassa, on peut imaginer qu'une des raisons qui a milite en faveur de la venue de l'armee au Quebec etait peut-§tre afin de rassurer la population. Est-ce qu'il n'y aurait pas eu lieu, et certains 1'ont propose, de prolonger la session speciale qui avait lieu sur l'assurance-maladie, pour qu'il y ait un forum dans lequel le debat aurait pu se derouler? R.B.: Un forum, il y en a un actuellement. Tous les chefs politiques qui veulent faire des declarations en font. II y a des chefs politiques qui ont decide de ne pas critiquer la situation et de s'abstenir de declarations. 11 y en a d'autres qui en font 4 tous les jours. Nous avons eu un debat sur l'assurance-Ljaladie. II y a eu une motion qui a ete presentee pour faire un debat sur cette question. La motion a ete rejettee. Si nous decidons qu'il est necessaire de convoquer le parlement nous le ferons. Mais nous croyons dans les circonstances qu'il n'etait pas necessaire comme tel. II y a une loi qui est debattue actuellement au parlement federal, mais forcement c'est une loi federale. Le code penal c'est de la jurisdiction federale. Comment penser par exemple, que nous pouvions avoir un code penal qui serait de la jurisdiction provinciale, c'est-4-dire que quelqu'un pourrait fttre innocent 4 Hull et coupable 4 Ottawa ou a Hawksbury ou a Rigaud. C'est absolument ridicule de penser qu'on pourrait avoir un code penal qui serait. different d'une province 4 l'autre. Done, comme c'est de la juridiction federale ca doit etre debattu 4 la Chambre des Communes. (Ja, je crois que tout le monde va le comprendre et le Quebec est consulte sur ces questions. Le Quebec fait des recommandations, le Conseil des ministres prend position, il agit dans tous les autres secteurs. Nous avons reuni le Parlement quand c'etait essentiel, soit pour appliquer des mesures qui etaient necessaires. Nous ne croyons pas actuellement que ca aiderait a la situation d'avoir des debats sur ces questions. II y aurait des contradictions, mais probablement que les Creditistes le ferait pour , les membres du Parti quebecois le ferait pour . On le sait deja, ils nous 1'ont affirme, ils repeteraient cela au (Couvernerrrent, alors le Gouvernement lui croit qu'il est preferable d'agir au lieu de poursuivre une voie (?) qui n'aurait pas de but tellement utile. Si nous croyons qu'il soit necessaire de reunir le Parlement nous le ferons. D'ailleurs, nous le ferons dans une dizaine de Jours. L.M.: M. Bourassa, si ces mesures de guerre que vous avez reclamees etaient justifiees, comment peut-on justifier d'autre part la tenue d'elections democratiques le 25 octobre dans la ville de Montreal? Est-ce que le climat de la tenue etait vraiment democratique? R.B.: Les elections viennent de le demontrer elles-memes que nous pouvions avoir des elections. Un nombre sans precedent ou presque sans precedent d'electeurs se sont rendus aux urnes. Pourtant il y avait des soldats, il y avait une certaine inquietude. On disait chez beaucoup d'electeurs, et plusieurs disaient les electeurs n'iront pas voter par crainte. Or, ils sont alles voter dans un nombre presque sans precedent. C'est la preuve que l'election etait justifiee, puiequ'ils s'y sont rendus. �- •> - # L.M.: D'apres vous est-ce que c'etait un climat ideal pour la tenue d'elections democratiques? R.3.: Si ce n'etait pas un climat ideal, est-ce que dans deux semaines, le climat aurait ete plus ideal, est-ce que dans un mois ou deux jmois quand les elections etaient fixees? II aurait fallu convoquer une session speciale la veille de l'election. Nous avons aonsidere que si l'on faisait confiance 4 la population pour exercer son droit de vote et la reponse que nous avons recue de la part de la population de Montreal justifie la decision que nous avons prise de ne pas annuler les elections. L.M.: M. Bourassa, il y a eu des arrestations plus ou moins nombreuses et pas encore d'accusations et aussi de nombreuses perquisitions dont plusieurs, selon le Directeur de la securite lui-meme, etaient peu justifiees. Est-ce qu'on peut parler conme l'a fait le commissaire torontois de veritables prisonniers politiques, c'est-4-dire de gens qui auraient ete arretees et emprisonnees parce qu'elles avaient une opinion politique? R.B.: Alors, ca c'est une question qui pourrait etre debattue et discutee assez longtemps. Nous avons 4 faire 4 une nouvelle forme de terrorisme... Une forme de terrorisme qui peut s'appliquer d'une facon extremement facile, comme vous le savez. (Ja prend dix personnes pour enlever quelqu'un. (Ja. suppose des moyens pour lui faire face et nous savons (?) que ce n'est pas une chose facile de combattre line telle forme de terrorisme. Nous l'avons essaye. Monsieur Choquette a rencontre des membres pour former une commission pour eviter les abus. Le Ministre de la Justice a egalement rencontre M. Marceau dans le but egalement d'eviter des abus. Or, dans les circonstances je ne crois pas que l'on puisse reprocher au Gouvernement de n'avoir pas pris les mesures pour essayer de limiter les de ces mesures de guerre qui devaient limiter les abus. II nous fallait agir. Nous n'avions pas le choix. C'etait un moindre mal, ou nous options pour 1 . Imagines, par exemple, si le Gouvernement n'avait pas fait appel a l'armee, si les forces policieres s'etaient opposees 4 surveiller tous les edifices, tous les hopitaue. notamment. On recevait des rapports comme quoi qu'il y avait une situation tres difficile dans le cas des h6pitaux parce que les medecins hesitaient a aller aux hopitaux 4 cause des menaces d'enlevement. Si le gouvernenent n'avait pas agi dans les circonstances, il aurait manque a sa premiere responsabilite. L.M.: M. Bourassa, est-ce-que l'ampleur de la repression ne pourrait pas par exemple indiquer R.B.: L'ampleur de la repression? 11 reste encore cent cinquante-quatre personnes qui sont detenues, les arrestations se chiffrent a quelques centaines, alors on ne peut pas dire que c'est une repression si forte On a arrete quelques centaines de personnes, on a libere les personnes lorsqu'on a pu(?). II en reste cent, cent cinquante. II faut penser qu'on a pas encore trouve les ravisseurs de M. Cross, qu'on a pas encore trouve les assassins de M. Laporte. L.M.: On ne semble guere avoir de piste? R.B.: Eh bien, il ne faut pas commenter sur les operations policieres, mais c'est un fait, conment le gouvernement pourrait-il moderer son action ou renverser sa politique quand les assassins d'un ministre n'ont pas encore ete retrouves? .,000153 �- 6 L.M.: Est-ce qu'il faut deduire, M. Bourassa, que parmi ceux du parti liberal, il y a un esprit de vengeance qui janime__certains milieux proches du pouvoir? On parle d'une certaine categorie de citoyens en particulier comme des journalistes, comme des syndicalistes, comme des gens qui soutiennent certaines opinions politiques Alors, qu'on imagine que c'est une fallait faire conscience collective qu'il R.B.: C'est une periode pendant laquelle nous1 vivons une tres grande tension, mais je pense qu'il y a des gens dont vous parlez que leur parole a depasse leur pensee Alors, il faut comprendre que les circonstances sont tout a fait exceptionnelles pour tous les gens que vous connaissez, pour tout le mcnde L.M.: Vous vous souvenez, il nfy a pas si longtemps, pendant la campagne electorale, vous disiez: "nous devons, quelques soient les circonstances, resister 4 la tentation trop facile d'utiliser les lois comme riposte aux problemes sociaux." R.B.: L.M.: Est-ce qu'en somme, le gouvernement serait deborde par une evolution trop rapide? R.B. : Je ne crois pas que les gouvernement soient debordes, Mais le gouvernement doit envisager d'appliquer les moyens pour faire face aux situations. Des moyens qui n'etaient peut-§tre pas appliques auparavant dans le cas de la construction. II y avait des milliers et des milliers de citoyens qui etaient en greve forcee a cause de la greve de la construction. Et la, comme je vous le disais tantot, le gouvernement devait utiliser les moyens qui etaient disponibles. Quand vous avez des enlevements de ministres et des assassinats de ministre, vous ne pouvez pas recoeirir 4 des moyens ou a des solutions traditionnels. Quand vous avez affaire a des gestes aussi erxtraordinaires, qui bouleversent le Quebec, le Canada, le monde occidental, conment voulez-vous que nous nous tenions a des formules traditionnelles? Ce serait ridicule, ce serait faire preuve d'une stupefiante naivete que de penser qu'on peut s'en tenir 4 des moyens traditionnels quand on a affaire 4 des actes de terrorisme sans precedent dans le monde occidental. L.M.: M. Bourassa, depuis quelques annees on remarque justement, que les gouvernements sont obliges d'avoir recours a des solutions de force. Est-ce qu'on est justifie de croire qu'on s'en va vers une: sorte de gouvernement et que tout sera balaye R.B.: Dans le cas du gouvernement que je dirige, je pense que nous 1'avons demontre depuis cinq mois. Dans le cas du progres social par exemple, ou nous avons, en pleine crise, adopte des lois pour mettre l'assurance-sante en vigueur des le ler novembre. Comment peut-on dire que le e;ouvernement se tourne vers la droite, quand nous adoptons une legislation des plus progressive d'Amerique du Nord, en pleine crise. La loi d'aide sociale �- 7 prendra effet egalement le ler novembre. Dans le domaine de 1'economie, je ne cesse de rencontrer les investisseurs pour les inviter a investir au Quebec. Le gouvernement du Quebec a fait une session quelques semaines seulement apres son entree au pouvoir. C'etait sand precedent que le gouvernement fasse une session aussi rapidement. II n'a pas pris un instant de repit depuis que nous avons ete elus et nou. avons reussi dans le domaine culturel, dans le domaine social, economique (avec des investissements additionnels de pre3 d'un demi-milliard dans differentes regions du Quebec). Nou. avons reussi a donner des resultats concrets. C'est evident qu'on ne pourra jamais satisfaire les assassins de Pierre Laporte ou ces terroristes actifs. Ils veulent le chaos, ils veulent la revolution sociale. Quels que soient les programmes que nous adoptions, il n'y a pas moyen de les satisfaire. �- 8 - R.B.: Le programme d'urgence du Parti quebecois, eh bien c'est dans le programme du parti liberal, c'est dans le programme de 1'Union nationale. Ce sont des mesures que nous sommes en train de realiser, que nous sonmes en train d'appliquer. C'est facile dan3 1'opposition de fixer des calendriers, de fixer des echeanciers. Si d'ici trois mois, telle chose n'est pas faite, ca ne marchera pas. Mais tout ce qui est propose est deja en marche actuellement. Alors, je ne crois pas que ce soit le temps de faire du capital politique dans un temps de crise actuelle. Le gouvernement a fait un appel, je l'ai fait moi-meme, au lendemain de la mort de Pierre Laporte, un appel a la solidarite de tous les Quebecois. C'est une crise sans precedent et c'est seulement ensemble que nous pouvons surmonter cette crise. J'ai nomme un ministre (?) conme exemple d'un geste de nonpartisanerie. J'aurais pu choisir parmi les membres du caucus liberal. II y en avait plusieurs qui auraient pu faire d'excellents ministres du Travail. J'ai choisi quelqu'un 4 l'exterieur du parti liberal pour poser ce geste de non-partisanerie parce que les circonstances se pretent a de tels gestes. L.M. : Mais il parait d'ailleurs que ca souleve certains remous chez ies liberaux eux-memes. R.B. : C'est un geste qui est sans precedent. Je l'ai presente aux membres du caucus, je l'ai presente aux membres de la Federation, aux membres de l'Association de Chambly, au Conseil des Ministres et dans tous les cas, cela a ete accepte. Or evidemment si vous parlez des rumeurs, c'est le temps des rumeurs actuellement au Quebec. Les rumeurs courent dans toutes les directions et les gens, plus que janiais, aiment a commenter les rumeurs mais les faits sont 14 qui parlent par eux-mSmes. L.M.: Mais elles touchent un peu n'importe qui ces rumeurs. M. Bourassa, est-ce qu'on doit voir cette nomination corame celle d'un regroupement qui, dans quelques mois, quelques annees, opposeraient federalistes et independantistes. Est-ce que c'est l'amorce d'un regroupement du genre? R.B.: Je ne crois pas. C'est un geste que j'ai fait dans les circonstances. II n'est pas question d'un gouvernement de coalition. M. Cournoyer etait un des membres de l'Union Nationale dies moins politises. On ne peut pas dire que c'etait un homme politique partisan. II etait respecte des employeurs, des employes, des syndicats. Vous etes au courant du telegramme de Louis Laberge feiicitant la nomination de M. Cournoyer. Done, c'est une nomination, a mon sens, qui s'imposait dans les circonstances. L.M.: Mais on peut voir 14 une espece d'amorce d'union sacree pour offrir quelque repit 4 une societe qui est un peu essoufflee? R.B.: C'est un geste qui permet de montrer 4 la population du Quebec, que le gouvernement actuel doit, dans des circonstances comme celles la, faire des gestes qui ne sont peut-etre pas traditionnels. Autant dans les mesures policieres, il faut eliminer ou ecarter pour quelque temps, les mesures traditionnelles, les solutions traditionnelles, autant dans le milieu politique egalement, il faut envisager des gestes comme ceux-14. �.' L.M.: Justement vous avez fait un geste exceptionnel. D'autre part, vous avez mentionne les secteurs dans lesquels vous avez fait des gestes precis depuis la prise du pouvoir. Est-ce que vous envisagez accele'rer certaines reformes. On mentionne Ie plus souvent. la fameuse reforme electorale. R.3.: La reforme electorale, il n'y a pas de le<,-on a recevoir de personne et pas du Parti quebecois surtout. Le scir de l'election, j'ai dit que j'etais d'accord pour une reforme electorale. jMais le parti liberal a dej4 ete victime de l'absence de reforme. II ne faut pas oublier tout de meme en 'AS, on a eu 1+0% des votes avec huit deputes. C'etait bien pire que ce que le Parti quebecois a a subir actuellement et nous avons eu egalement dans les elections subsequentes, un nombre de deputes qui etait considerablement moindre que celui des autres partis. Alors, nous avons 1'intention d'operer une reforme electorale. C'est essentiel, c'est necessaire, nous en sonmes convaincus et nous allons le faire. Nous avons tenu plusieurs rencontres au cours de l'ete et 4 quelques reprises, c'est le Parti quebecois lui-meme qui a demande que l'on discute du serment d'allegeance au lieu de la reforme electorale. Alors, ils sont mal places quand meme pour nous reprocher de ne pas acceierer 1*etude de cette question. L.M.: Mais pourqoui cela a-t-il traine si longtemps, une carte electorale valable, des mecanismes electoraux qui permettent une representation adequate? R.B.: Je pense que le parti liberal, de »60 4 '66, a pose des gestes tres concrets pour la reforme electorale. Vous vous en souvenez, il y avait le Conseil legislatif domine par 1'Union Nationale qui nous empechait d'aller plus loin, mais le parti liberal a demontre qu'il etait toujours favorable 4 une reforme electorale, il va continuer de le demontrer, il n'a pas besoin des conseils d'autres partis pou* le convaincre de la necessite d'une telle reforme. Je n'ai pas d'objection 4 ce qu'ils nous ckmmt des conseils, je n'ai pas d'objection 4 ce qu'ils nous offrent leur collaboration, je n'ai pas d'objection 4 ce qu'ils cessent de faire de I'electoralisme dans une crise conme celle-14, mais nou avons prouve depuis cinq mois que nous etions prSts, que nous voulions agir et que nous avions dej4 des resultats concrets. L.M.: Nous vivons une epoque tres profonde. II y en aura peut-etre d'autres, des crises tres difficiles dans 1'avenir, ou des gouvernements comme le votre, ou des gouvernements qui vous suivront qui vous succederont. Est-ce que les partis au pouvoir, est-ce qu'il ne faudra pas justement qu'ils aient de tres profondes racines dans la population, pour que spontanement les gens se portent 4 sa rescousse des le depart, des que les crises sont declenchees? R.3. J'en suit absolument convaincu. Depuis que je suis au pouvoir, je me suis rendu en Gaspesie et dans d'autres regions, j'ai communique avec les gens. C'est la meme chose pour d'autres ministres qui rencontrent les groupes interesses. Je suis personnellement depute d'un comte ouvrier, le �- 10 - comte de Mercier et je suis bien au fait des problemes qui interessent ces gens et nous avons 1'intention de poursuivre et d'accelerer , s'il y a lieu, ces contacts etroits avec la population mai„ encore la, je dois vous dire que depuis que nous avons pres le pouvoir, nou;. avons demontre quo nous etions conscients de cette priorite. L.M.: K. Bourassa, 14 dessus, je vous remercie. 000158 �NOUS VIVONS DANS UN ENLROIT OU LA LIBERTE D'EXPRESSION EST L'UNE LES PLUS GRANDES Mk DE TOUS LES PAYS DU MONgj^ METTENT EN CAUSE LE REGIME POLITIQUE ^ E ET L'ACTION MEME LES PARTIS LUI MEME IT TOUTES L E S L^ERTES S'EXPRIMER , D'AlLLEMR S CETTE LIBERTE D'EXPRESSION , ON N'A PAS MANQUE DE L'UTlLISER CHS DERNIERES ANNEBS = ET LE MENSONGE. EN SEMAND SY3TEMATI. USMENT LA HAINE LE GOUVERNEMENT NE PEUT, NE DOIT ET NE RESTERA PAS PASSIF LORSQUE LE tIEN ETRE uE L'INDIVIDU EST MENACE JUSQUE DANS SES RACINES. JE SUIS TROF Fil* D'ETRE QUEBECOIS POUR NE PAS VOUS LIRE TOUTE MA RESOLUTION ET CJ.LLE DU GOUVERNEMENT QUE JE DIRIGE POUR SURMONTER CETTE CRISE TRES GRAVE. LANS CE TRAVAIL POUR SAUVEGARDER LES VALEURS FONDAMENTALES DE NOTRE CIVILISATI ON JE SUIS CONVAINCU D'AVCjR L'APPUI DE TOUS LES REPRESENTANTS ELUS DU PEUPLE. JE DEMANDE A TCUTE LA POPULATION DE FAIRE PREUVE, DANS CES CIRCONSTANCES DIFFICILES DE CALME ET DE CONFIANCE. EN EFFET LA VALEUR DE NOTRE PEUPLE SON EXCEPTIONNEL ESPRIT DE TR'VAIL SO N RESPECT D'AUTRUI SON SENS LE LA LIBERTE NE SONT-ILS PAS LES MEILLEURS GAGES DE LA VICTOIRE VE LA JUSTICE^ ET DE LA PAIX. DOIT NOUS RASSURER CETTE SITl ATION FONT QUI EN FIN DE COMPTE NE DOIT PAS NOUS FAIRE OUBLIER TOUTEPOIS LES PROBLEMES EXTREMEMENT PRESSANTS ET QUI ONT POUR ENJEU LA VIE DE DEUX PERSONNES, SOIT D'UN HOME POLITIQUE DE SA COMMUNAUTE TYPIQUEMENT QUEBECOIS ET COMBIEN ET D'UN DISTINGUE DIPLOMATE ETRANGER TE NOTRE SOCIETE. A CET EGARD, LE FLQ DEVOUE AU PROGRES AUX TENSIONS QU'AFFRON- A FAIT PARVENIR UN COMMUNIQUE EXIGEANT L'ACCEPTATION INTEGRALE ET TOTALE DE LEUR SEPT DEMANDES. PAR AILLEURi LE MINISTRE DU TRAVAIL M'A FAIT PARVENIR UNE LETTRE OU IL TRAITE DE DEUX QUESTIONS, SOIT LES FOUILLES POLICIERES ET LA LIBERATION LES. PRISON?mS_ POLITIQUES. NOUS TENONS TOUS, EST*IL BESOIN jJE LE DIRE, fA VIE DE M. LAPORTE *EDE MEME QU'A CELLS LS M, CROSS. LE SORT, DANS UN RARE EXEMPLE DE SA CRUAUTE A VOULU QUE CE SOIT SUR EUX QUE R.EPOSE LE MAINTIEN D E L'ORDRE PUBLIC M I S C'EST PARCE QUE NOUS TENONS VERITABLEMENT A LA VIE DE MM LAPORTE ET CROSS QUE NOUS VOULONS, AVANT^ilSCUTER 2> L'APPLICATION DES DEMANDES QUI SONT FAITES ETABLIR DES MECANISMES QUI GARANTIRAIENT SI L'ON VEUT PRENDRE_ L'EXEMPLE DONTjIARLE M. PIEHRE LAPORTE, QUE LA LIBERATION DES PRISONIERS POLITIQUES Hl_COMME RESULTAT CERTAIN LA VIE SAUVE .AUX DEUX OTAGES. IL Y A £ LA UN PREALABLE QUE LE SIMPLE BON SENS NOUS FCRCrp A DlMANDER ET C'EST A VJECflu^ iDA DOPS •JISTERE DES AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES GEUE GEUW CENTRE D'OPERATIONS CENTRE TEL. 5-633' ECP ECD ECL ECT AFP APP APO SRB ITJ>SP PAG <gD D E P A R T M E N T OF E X T E R N A L AFFAIHS 000159 y �A CE TITRE AVEC NOUS. QUE NOUS DEMANDONS AUX RAVISSEURS L'ENTRER EN COMMUNICATION COMMENT, EN EFFET, ACCEDER AUX DEMANDES SANS fAVOIR LA CONVICTION Pi E LA CONTRE PARTIE SERA REALISEE. LE GOUVERNEMENT LU rUEiiP.C CROIT QU'IL SERAIT IRRESPONSABLE VIS A VIS ET DE L'ETAT E'i DE .MM LAPORTE ET CROSS S'IL NE DEMANDAIT PA..; CETTE PRECAUTION. NOUS VOULONS SAUVER LA VIE DE MM LAPORTE ET CROSS ET C'EST PARCE QUE NOUS LE VOULONS LE TOUTES PCS FORCES QUE NOUS POSONS CE GESTE. MES CHERS CONCITOYENS, UN GRAND HOLME D'ETAT A DEJA DPI : GOUVERNER C'EST CHOISIR. ET COLLECTIVE. LIMITE DE NOUS AVONS CHOISI,NOUS, LA JUSTICE, IND1VIDUELLE QUANT A MOI, JE ME BATTRAI FOUR CETTE JUSTICE JUSQU'A LA fMES MOYENS EN ASSUMANT TCUS LES RISGUES QUELS QU'ILS SOIENT ET QUI SONT ES3ENTIELS A L'.AVENIR LE NOTRE FEUPLE. �3AM3JSS La 3 noraaar* 1970 17:00 - OUC Ls Minlstrs qutfbsoois ds la Justiss M. Joraom Caoqootts visnt ds dsaandsr 4 Ottawa d'adsptsr ua* legislation psrasasats plutdt qu'nu loi tsaparalr* psur assuror i'ordrs publiqus ds Qusooe. KLsssl St-Lsuis nous deans piss ds details st intorrog* ls Minlstrs Jirmaa Choqustt*. Msaslsur ls Minlstrs ds la Jus ties du Quebec, M. Jsrans Ckoquetts etait sur lss lisux sa rapport partlsl arse ls projet ds loi Impose hier par ls Minlstrs ds la Justies du gourornsasat federal, M. Jsaa Turner, •aia omppor\4 esrtainss audisness *t demands la legislation paraaasnte. "II as ssaels qu'il j aurait arantag* dans un avenir rapproche d'adopter uns legislation peraanante au sujet dss situations d'urgsne* qui psuvsnt ss produlre, Js ns dis pas qu* nous aliens virr* uns situation idsatiqu* & oslls qus nsus avoa connus rsosssMnt nals dans uns societe nodsms ilft\uta'atiendr* a touts sorts ds ruptures ds I'ordrs dss manifestations qui deviennant inoontrdiable*, dss situationa sn towi ou tout sst nsssssairs 4 1'autorite publiqus d'lntervenir d'un* fa 9 an sffieaos d* fafen 4 fairs respecter nsn ssulsaant ost ordrs nais rsspsotsr la liberte exterieure 4 I'interieur ds os tsnps. Or, J* panss qu* 1* gouvorasaait federal devrait dans un avenir rapproche ohsrehsr 4 amandsr soa eods criminal ds fa$oa 4 7 ins*r*r un* procedure dans laquall* 1* gouvornnnsnt d'un* province pourrait 4 un moment donne donandor au gouverneaent federal d'adsptsr dss pouvoirs urgsats ou ds rsstrslndrs sn autant qus aeosssalra dans lss eireoastaness lss droits dss citoyens dans csrtains domain**." �URGENT CGSS No. 7690-21-561-9005 �KeeL—4 \kf. 000163 �A/Z* 71 • t- J*lj y'AFZ ( \,Qv7 7 \\. AdXl -A ** CONFIDENTIEL le 15 Janvier 1971. ai , i NOTE A ACRU pour le dossier des Enlevements (Rapports avec Quebec: chronologie) . Tractationsavec Quebec sur 1'envoi d'un representant federal aupres des autorites provinciales. Je tente de consigner dans cette note une impression tardive d'un aspect de la crise des enlevements qui no parait guere dans le dossier. J'en ai discute avec M. Bissonnette. 2. Apres les 3-4 premiers jours de la crise, il devint Evident que lfon approchait du point ou il faudrait negocier avec les ravisseurs. Du cote federal, un plan de negociations fut etabli, dont copie se trouve au dossier. Les tractations difficiles avec M. Choquette le 10 octobre concernant sa declaration de ce jour, ainsi que lfimminence des negociations, amenerent lTEquipe Speciale et le Cabinet du Premier Ministre^. a songer de plus en plus a envoyer aupres du "gouvernement du Quebec un agent comme M. Bissonnette (il fut aussi question qu'on m'y envoie d'abord, puis plus tard M. Bissonnette pour me remplacer si les negociations atteignaient un point crucial). 3. Le 12 octobre, le gouvernement quebecois annoncait la nomination de M. Robert Demers comme negociateur. Le 12 ou le 13, M. Lalonde se mit en rapport avec M. Chouinard (peutetre pas pour la premiere fois) pour proposer 1'envoi d'un contact federal qui se tiendrait tres pres des centres de decisions quebecois afin de faire connaitre les interets et les opinions du gouvernement federal. II s'interesserait evidemment de pres au processus de negociations (je dois avouer que j'etais inquiet de la fagon dont les negociations avaient commence qar elles s'etaient immediatement ax4es sur I'elargissement des prisonniers FLQ, ce qui etait tres dangereux). /2 /, >' 1 ' ' - -<) 000164 �- 2 - CONFIDENTIEL M....Chouinard_ne jref usa jgas carrementla_ sugge stion de M. Lalonde mais Tai ssa ehtendre qu 'Vile is*. pre se nt a i t certaines difficultes. D'autre part, les communications entre Ottawa et Quebec s'etaient ameOiorees (e.g. telex confidentiel, ligne directe, etc.) et I'envoi d'un agent semblait moins essentiel. De toute facon, il etait un peu tard car les negociations avaient deja pris un pli indefaisable. On laissa done tomber du cote federal; je crois me souvenir que l'on a suppose, & ce moment, que le Quebec ne voulait pas s'exposer a des_ accusations^ d'influence federale indue q^auraitjpu_.S!^levSTla"^risence"a" Quebec ou ^Montreal d'un fonctionnaire federal aupres des centres de pouvoir . On s'est aussi rendu compte qu'il pouvait y avoir certains avantages a ce queles i negociations soient menees uniquement par le Quebec, puisque les resultat^^ grions. 4. Mes remarques ci-haut sont imprecises. Peut-etre faudra-t-il un jour demander a M. Lalonde son impression des faits. Le seul document ou je me souvienne que cetteaffaire soit mentionnee _est un telex PDM-322 du 13 octobre b. notre Mission permanente k New-York, a 1'intention du ministre; ce teiegramme confirme que l'on pensait drewc encore a ce moment que M. Bissonnette pourrait aller a Quebec. <\ U.v O C.R.' 000165 �PSI/A.D. Rowe/cd EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES * MEMORANDUM TO A^tcL^M^ •fr EOT (Mi. ltWJUtH.) ONL1 FAH (Mr. Blanchette) ONLY FROM 0* A.D. Rowe, P S I Fx_ REFERENCE SECURITY Stcurilt CONFIDENTIAL DATE May 1 9 , 1972 NUMMR Nvmtn DOSSIER OTTAWA SO^ECT o r a l H i s t o r y Programme P r o j e c t Events o f O c t o b e r , 1 9 7 0 . i o -2_i_-rr*c- 4= ENCLOSURES AIHWXM DtSTRWUTION In response to Mr. Blanchette's call on me on May 17, I have made the following notes which may be of value to those who will be involved eventually in this project. 2. Government Officials Involved in Cross/Laporte Kidnappings In addition to the names which you may have already noted (Mr. Sharp, Mr. Ritchie, Mr. Bissonnette, Mr. Roquet, etc.), the following persons should be considered for interviews (the function and office noted are for the period under study and the list is not in order of rank or degree of involvement in the events of 1970). Ext. 407A/U. (a) Mr. Jim Davey PMO Mr. Davey was closely involved with the Task Force, the PM's staff, the SOC (Special Operations Centre) and the debriefing of Mr. Cross. (b) Mr. D. Wall PCO Mr. Wall was present on various occasion* when the Cabinet and individual Ministers discussed events and, one presumes, recorded decisions made. On Dec. 11, 1970, Mr. Wall was asked to compare the Task Force Log with PCO records to "suggest where we might add references to Cabinet records" by cross-referencing in order thai "the government (might have) as full a record as possible of the early stages of the crisis". PSI records do not indicate j a reply to this PDM memorandum of Dec. 11.1 (c) Mr. E.A. Cote Deputy Sol. Gen. Mr. Cote was closely involved during the entire crisis acting both as a liaison between our Department and that of his Minister (Mr. Mcllwraith) and as an advisor to the Task Force and, as I recall, the Cabinet. He set up an informal study group during the crisis which analyzed aspects of the events and reported to the Prime Minister. .../2 7B3 0-2 1-029-272* k* �- 2 - CONFIDaiTIAL (d) Mr. W.R.C. Little Exec. Assistant to Sol. Gen. Mr. Little was charged with co-ordinating arrangements made for the protection of Canadian officials and foreign dignitaries in Canada (diplomatic corps, etc.) during the crisis. As he was close to the Sol. Gen., he might be in a position to add commentary • on other aspects as well. (He is now retired7-~ and living in Ontario.) (e) Col. John Cameron Admin. Assistant to Deputy Sol. Gen. Colonel Cameron worked on the official Task Force chronological log (with Mr. Puddington of External) and was another level of liaison between the Sol. Gen. Dept. and the Task Force. (f) Mr. B.C. Hofley Dept. of Sol. Gen. He worked closely with Mr. Cote with particular attention to the aspects, early in the affair, which involved the "political" prisoners jn Canadian penitentiaries about whom the FLQ was interested. (g) Mr. D.H. Christie Dept. of Justice Mr. Christie was closely involved in decisionmaking at the Cabinet level especially when FLQ demands were first made and when it was decided to implement the WMA. (h) Lieut-Gen. M.R. Dare DSO,CD Vice-Chief of Defence Staff General Dare's name figures throughout the history as the key figure in DND for consultations between Mr. Ritchie (USSEA) and the Task Force, in Cabinet discussions, etc. His authority was evident in the deployment of aircraft used, arrangements related to the "safe-conduct" in Montreal, flights to Cuba (abductors) and the UK (Cross), etc. (i) Inspector J. Ferraris Sgt. Banning RCMP The Inspector was the RCMP's senior liaison officer on the Task Force. Sgt. Banning was his assistant. (NOTE: Please consult PSP if thought is given to contacting these jofficers since PSI will wish to know when 'and how the approach is made.) . (j) Mr. T.H.W. Read External (Protocol) Mr. Read was involved in many aspects of the operations: arrangements for safe-conduct through Montreal (advance preparation), actual workings of the safe-conduct when Mr. Cross was freed, protocol involving diplomatic corps in Canada, etc. (k) Mr. O.W. Dier External (Latin America Division) Mr. Dier was the officer involved in political aspects of relations with Cuba, liaison with Task Force on Cuban matters, member of Dept. who, with Mr. Roquet, accompanied the abductors on the flight to Havana. .../3 �- 3 - (1) CONFIDENTIAL Mr. David Stansfield Mr. Stansfield was consulted regularly on External (Co-ordination Div.) aspects of Ottawa-Quebec r e l a t i o n s . ? (m) Mr. K.C. Brown Canadian Ambassador to Cuba Mr. Brown had barely arrived in Cuba when the Cross affair terminated and the abductors were flown to Havana. He may have, however, some thoughts on Cuban reactions, etc. (n) Mr. W.T. Warden Canadian Embassy, Cuba Mr. Warden was Charge d'affaires during the entire period and handled all negotiations in Cuba with the government related to the "safe-conduct". (o) Mr. Jean-Marie Dery External Mr. D£ry flew to Algiers early in October to prepare the way with the Algerian authorities for the possible safe-conduct of the abductors to Algiers if they accepted that destination. As well, Mr. Dery and Mr. P.M. Cornett were the External officials who accompanied Mr. Davey (PMO) and others in the Canadian aircraft that flew Mr. Cross home to England on December 5, 1970. (p) Mr. J.W. Courchesne Regional Chief Passport Officer, Montreal He was involved from the time the safe-conduct policy was decided until the abductors left; "on stand-by" and then "in action" for necessary travel documents, etc., related to the departure of the abductors. Some interesting incidents related to the latter could be recalled by him, and by Mr. Read. (q) Mr. Jon Church Exec. Assistant to SSEA (Mr. Sharp) His name appears occasionally in the records and I am not sure how closely he was involved in any decision-making at a ministerial level. (r) The following are the names and ranks of the aircraft crew that flew the Yukon to Cuba with the abductors and Mr. Roquet and Mr. Dier: Major J.S. Parmelee - Captain Captain R.H. Aitken - 1st Officer Captain David Hanna - Navigator Captain R. Lamont - R. Op. Sergeant G.H.B. Brasseur) Sergeant D.A. Johnson ) Other flight staff Corporal J.A. Gaumond ) and one airforce doctor (name not known) Perhaps for "colour", some of this crew might be asked (through DND) to recall aspects of the Montreal/Havana/Nassau/Trenton flight which would have a bearing on the oral history project intent. CM !. \er-a_. ...A �'A . V— ; f'p P P '.•'• ::Pj j )p7 pyppd) dPPP P'ipdX'PXXdijj :• I 7 7 7 , 7 . 1 , 7 7 , 7 ) COO(iPPA'}P.2jAi) 9 : - • a' X AP-A'r -PAXd %k porJhf • l \p * — j PAX CXX{}iOdyp) JATXTLCF^A EXTOTT DE FARE GUI C O N F I D E N T I E L A TRANSMETTRE AUX HQNORABLES P M -\P>\V.\P i-.\\ - yj iPUP « V m i ft .-7 TTH TitRNJVR DISCOURS DA K. ROBERT BOURASSE PREHIER MINISTRY DU QUEBEC A J.. ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE BUR LES ;-;;* L, ' ~ " T C V L. l V i , 1 - J C i v i •-' ;•<,,,-.. . T - . , , , . . p i - n y . '.if,ir P f h \ < r-.\ ,r-:c T-PII'. l7i n u I . U U I J J 7.'..7i!,i,.(i w l j i . -'- D APRES LE JOURNAL DES DEBATS DU JEUDI VLi-iUi n w 12 NOVEMBRE 1970 1 P.r, ep 000169 �M. LE PRESIDENT, OU A EXPRIME, JE PENSE, DEPUi.. DE DEBUT DS CE DEBAT, LA GEAl'ITE DS LA CE i . NOUS P-DVvEEEONS, A LE DEMONTRER D LINE FACON '.P-xAPP CETTS CHAMBRE EN SONT CONV i N PPA AVAST DE REPONDRE, J AI PR... . . DES TROIS CKEES DP P A R T I , PPP-PP ET AUXQUELLES PP VAIS REPONiX; J CUE JI X'P,P.dPy_. STIOMU a PLUS POURRAIENT ETRE FOSEEe.- FORCEMENT j AUR'A.O PP ENTRAINER RE! NE PUN E EM] ECHEE LE XX IL LTAI'I ' E•• DE PAETJCIPEE DES LE DEBUT A UN AI ECOUTP EE DISCOURS DU C) JE PUISOJE TOUS LPS DEPUTES EN O'TENDEE p.. EXPOS" UTILE DE POUVOIR ECOUTEE LES . DEBAT S(!I V JE N AI PAS REPETITIONS, K P.. L OP:-OSI'j JON. P FEE J rH EE CH.'e • MR I JSE : I' POUR LA TENEUR DE SON DISCOURS ET SOME ! ESPRIT S.PRS LEMUEL JE E A PRO-EONCE, IL A P R I S CONSCIENCE DE LA G.w' 'ITE DE LA ARISE QUE NOUS TRAVERS IONS, IE /, EGALEMENT P R I S CONS! [EN E CUE CE N ETAIT FA. 1 E PACE A CETTE ORIS MOMENT OU EE GUEBEC DVAIf D IJ CAPITAL. POLITIQUE,, TOUTS LA C R I S E , TISTE QUi; ATT Ti U AILLEUE. COMME D HABITUDE, PARTI QUEBECOIS, * T - ' i X r r V . M - l A •• r i 7 c - - M ' I H V M J i ' H , U , DE S Pp<, OU IE A NAINTENUE DUE; J Al ECOUTH EGAEEMENT LE CEEF DU RALLIEMENT CREDIA PARLE D P.. a FACON DIRECTE ET VIC Ni- REUSE, J AI ECOUTP EE DEPUTE DE BOURGET; C PAS LE TEMPS, AU T L CHEF PARLEMENTA IRE DU OUI SOUS A PRESENTE USE DIALECT IDLE SERREE, P J 12 H ; • • • - ' \ . j ! P i \ ' v , l U r ' ~ J " - " O > " ; A ^ i . • i ' . ' c i r • . • < • • \ i j r : INCI- C ~ * y 000170 �M. EE PRESIDENT, NOUS NE POUVONS PAS EV.ALUER L AMPLEUR DE CETTE C R I S E , OCCIDENTAL, QUEL GOUVERNEMENT, DANS LE MONDE A EU A FAIRE FACE A LA SITUATION A LAQUELLE LE QUEBEC A EU A FAIRE FACE ALORS OU UM DIPLOMATE ET X7 DE SES MINISTRES ONT ETE SOIT ENLEVES ET ASSASSINE ET MENACE D EXECUTION? QUEEEES ETAIENT LES VOIES D ACTION DU GOUVERNEMENT A CE MOMENT-LA? IL Y AV-EE" TROIS CHOXs ACCEPTER TOUTES LES SONDITIOilSj. C ETAIT' INADMISSIBLE, CEPTE;; AUCUNE CONDITION, CONDITIONS ETAIENT AU DEPART,. DE L AVIS DE TOUS. N AC- SANS LA MESURE OU CERTAINES DE CES APPEICABLES SANS CONSEQUENCES SERIEUSES POUR LA SECURITE DE L ETAT, C AURAIT ETE EVIDEMMENT R I G I D I O E T , D AILLEURS, TROISIEME ATTITUDE, USE POSITION TROP CERTAINES DES CONDITIONS OUT ETE ACCEPTERS, NEGOCIER CERTAINES CONDITIONS EN AYANT COM- ME DOUBLE OBJECTIF EA VIE SAUVE A MM. CROSS ET LAPORTE ET LA NECESSITE DE BROODER AU DEPART LES RISQUES D ANARCH I E . C EST CE OU A ETE DES EE DEBUT EA POSITION DU QUEBEC, ON A MENTIONNE A QUELQUES R E P R I S E S , SOIT SOUS FORME DE QUESTIONS, COMMCE LE CHEF DE L OPPOSITION, ME D AFFIRMATIONS CRATUITES, BECOIS. SOIT SOUS FOR- COMMCE CELLES DU CEEF DU PARTI QUE- OU IE V AVAIT EU DANS CETTE CRISE UNQ COLLABORATION, AVEC 000171 �v e o t v.* LE GOUVERNEMi .7 LE QUEBEC Ai FEDE RAl ir P EE PPL, • , a iEMENT Ea. MONTREAL, SE .IT PU ETRE La U P PO • • ' ION DELICATE. C EST VRAI QU IL Y A EE COD A . 77: < - . Li S U; RA NIVEAU/ DE GOUVERNEMENT ET , COMME L A SIGNAL I Ee. A EE E OPPO, ] ! JON. !:' A UN RAP' E-iE 7 - DERAL, 0 EST QUELQI E CHO! E FORMAL. P . A DE JURIDICTION FEDER.ELi-r , PENAL SE FAS: EST A e' N.IVLn,j EJEUAL A'!.: ERI; DEBUT Da. EA CRISE , COMMENT : . PL.is ., a 1 Pie ...'. 1. ! A PAA DE FEeEa: ' C D" PENSER , D I S - J E QUE, DANb P LE E DEBAT S SUR LE CO )E TAB. J P ) E-'CE PP E A i DIT A PEU; .' EA ;x pE< Vi [ON DU Q': EE CODE PENAL EST E: i s ... UN REGIME OU IL N Y PEuPOEE IP. AJAI i 1 EL I. VEUi MAN CSS ' • • '. 'P .. .A IME OE IL N Y A PAS DE FRONT I E R E S , SA'O DIFFERENT POUn EE QnpPPi IL POURRAIT Y AVOIR UM DEO J. J PENAL QUI ET SES VOID I.MS? S IE N Y A PAS DE FRONTIEREreR COMMEN'I Aa ER EM IL POURRAIT Y AVOIR UN T BED Ue. AI A HULL ET IN COUPABLE A OTTAUA? IE EST PONG ADMIS QUE CES MESJUara LONl VAIENT ETRE DEBATTUES PAR E FAIT EN CONEULTATION ElKOITE DE J RIDICTION FEDLERALE ET DETO' ;T CPi'.C I S ES'f 'AE! A,- e. ; P P GOUVERNEN PPP DU QUEBEC Gap A yp 2 C L . 1 ^ y ' y . x • • GENERAL ET AVEC E DEL RES ' 1A.MDAT IONS ET DES SUGGEST IONS . 000172 �* • * * H PURQU0I SPENSER QUE CHAQUE FOIL BEE L CN COLLABORE AVEC LE GOUVERNEMENT FEDERAL, COOPERATION, QUE CHAGEE F S I S QU IL Y A C EST NECESSAIREMENT SEBOED INAT ION ? C EST SEULE- MENT CEUX QUI ONT CE CQeEJEir..;E D INFERIORITE DONT NOUS, BE L I 3 E RAUX, NOUS VOULONS ET AVON'S REUSSI A NOUS DEBARRASSER, AUI PENDENT QUA: C Q L L A B O E E H AVEC EE GOUVERNEMENT FEDERAL, C EST DE BA SUBORDINATION. C EST SB QU I I FAUT REPONDRE A CETTE QUESTION NOUS AVA0N3 COQPERE, i"iAIS NOUS AVQNS OOOEEEE A L INTERTEUR DU REGIME FEDERAL. EN ETANT CONBCIENTS QUE C ESI LE GOUVERNEMENT DU GiiEBEC^ DANS LES G IRCJMSTANOEa ; QUO A'-DOiT A PRENDRE LES DEC I 5 IONS r A LA SUITE DE L ENLEVEMENT EE M* LAPORTE, XX GOUVERNEMENT DU QUEBEC, SELON TOUTE EVIDENCE, ETAIT DIRECTE ET PERSONNELLEMENT IMPLIQUE. LE MINISTRE ie... EA J U S T I C E . AN DE SON INTERVENTION, DONNEEA UA EXPLICATIONS QU A DEMANDEie CHEF DU PARTI QUEBECOIS ET EEN AUTRES CHEFS DE PARTIES SUR L ENLEVEMENT DE M. CROSS* J ETAIS, A CE MOMEN '-LA , A L EXTERIEUR DI QUEBEC ET UE TENAIS EN CONSTANTS COMMUNICATION AVEC LUI. EL DECISIONS QUI ONT ETE PRISES L ONT ETE AVEC L ACCORD DU 60Ln. / e. p - NEMENT DU QUEBEC. 000173 �1 ri -• > • i< u YEAN J-IAui'-. VLhie,i\ } 'XL, t, ., Px LiS DEVE; i"> « .' r,! ; . a. , j ,.. .. ..... QU J L Y A I T DEE SEA.'BAEa NORMAL QUE C E S S E A N C E S cr - 7 7 vrp-. ! :e Q U E r a p a .a, i..i7 • .x r.\ Pri ii'iLl-i . AA ..-. ; QU i 0 1 i'i J a fa. E'i r:Pi i . FAIT Y AVAIT DEUX O B J E C T I F S ? DU TOUT SAUVE ; • .-'•• P A R E A ES A: '' A A CONNA.1 D. E U 1 CERTAIN T E M P S , )E £N Si ! .7 LP. '..' 1. w Gap 111 -u .. •.. P NAIT EN J E U . aa J INSjNBi JO'JS DE MM. C U U U . - J a ai uo l • •'. ..• 7, DECISIONS B_U. C E T A I T ,a LK5 Pi j..e i , 1 i. 17a. DE DIMANCaE e.EiBI, i: . P ION SC i 7' AUS3 I 0 •• a E .ur'A.U, E E MONDE, PR D E S C O N D I T I O N S EA V I E .p.. LALLOGJITUN DU S A U F - C O N D U I T . L APPUi :•'. IL. E T A I T QUE VOUS 0-.-• UE L .A .. L .:. ' J SUR 1J INSIS'F.AIS. ETAIT TO ;; LORSQUE DISC.. Al N'A JL EN Q ' D ; N P IdrXP F A I T S a A PREN/. .i • , .,. i a ,; L A :er f LEQUEL CELLE AE p 'J TE I' - e '. NAN'! Te E S M.AEA , A P un Deal.. l o j.lE. S JUST ICJ- J . U E ; . ... « PP7..P ..EL a IT NUr, E'N llaa/v L C I S IONS SLR IE k_ CP .EN IE D E S M I N I S T R E S , . T PAS A P' ;_ Ep..., 1 ,.]EES. EC EA 1 E T ' J . A. 0 AMPLY , UP ).' BLU D PP.P A T T U N E . . . '.,;,,. , . . . .p.. NORMAL INSTANTS, ...,. NOIEN1 SOIR, PRISES LAPuhi'E. D UNE FA QUESTION CONS I D E E I O N S , N AVIONS 7 . 1 /PI J IE R SUR EA E'.e'E P E U T E a.ri UE P E N S E Da T E M P S PAS CERTAINES U ETAIT PREALABLE Lie. AVEC VOULOIR GARANT B-..S LE P R E M I E R OB- 000174 �i, il i. 77 G J E C T I F DE MOM ALLOCUTION DE DlNaNCHE SOIR. A DEUX IE ME OBJECT II ETAIT DE NE PAS ECAETER EA NEGQCIAT ION t S I LE GO"VEHNE t\ v M .1. i ;R ; ,, , 'L N AVAIT QU A INVOQUER LE COMMUNIQUE 77 ESQ DE LUNDI MATIN, LENDEMAIN DE MON A i ......' .J u TION Nap DIMANCHE SOLE, DANS E Q U E L ON DISAIT '. " EA LIBERATION DE PIERRE EAECEIE S'.'PPOS INITIALED DU PLQ V '„ CELA AURAIT E l E INTEGRAL DES SIX CONDITIONS FACILE LOGlQUEilE.JT , SI NOUS N AVION* PAS VOULU NEGOCIER, DE NOES SERVIIR DU COMMUNIQUE DU FEQ OU DE LA CELLULE CErNIEE PIERRE LAPORTE ET DE D I R E : PEISUU OUI DETENAIT IE N Y A RIEN A FA DEL AVEC GES SENS-LA ILS EXIGENT LE RESPECT INTEGRAL DES SIX CONDITIONS. QUAND MEME - ET CA DE-eKENTEE NOTRE DETERMINATION A DISCETER, A TOUT EE MOINS, A NEGOCIER BOR , M. ROBERT DEMURS COM. NEGOCIATIONS. IL Y A EU PLi .PeeESENiA •J j e . n o o o ., Pi .3 - NUNS AVONS NOMME, LUNDI J .- GOUVERP'EaiENI DANS LES EE DISCUS SIGNS ENTRE ME DEMERS ET ME LEMIEUX. C ETAIT PENIBLE POUR L ETAT E T , JE CROIS, POUR TON.; LES QUEBECOIS DE V O I R , A LA T E L E V I S I O N , L ETAT RIDICULISE PAR ME EGBERT LEMIEUX. PLUSIEURS FOIS PAR JOUR,. IL HUM ILIA IT L ETAT DU QUEBEC. NOUN AVONS ACCEPTE. NOUS AVONS TOLERE CA PARCE QUE NOUS VOULIONS SAUVER EA VIE DE PIBEEE LAPORTE. 0 ESI GA LA 000175 �M O «• C ( . a ;;JVE DU GOURVi E . MA I S , . PP !)... MORS :UE NOUS NO IS , A;..' I T QUE M . LEej IE UX D Baa r i E x ... DE .--. d. P .." REND LE USE AUi RE A I A TAB. CO! J UE I .,; 77. i TION NI SAIT . ...PA , UPS . . , H 7- UA Up. P. ,. i , :U U ETA.Fi J EPt-.-LaE. , I.. PPO DAI 77 .. !'j A T I L E R NS...-> ; : .' . .. j . p . VE NEGQCIA La. A:.., ET EN , A ME . v' [ ICE* GETTE | .-. DI- N 0 S 7 0 P RE S 7' •. . . . . - > I.E.. L IBERAl LA 7- Da ! 1 • UE A X a r . , - 1 IANTOT e .1 I-'J- J... II • 7 . ' . - J ..'I : - 7 - ETE Sj P'RIS L•,. p , COSVOe : E 1 ... PARLEMENT EN VIGUEUR EXCUSES PC Ui\ RETARDER PIS LE DEPUTE QUEBECOIS, J JE EN AI LEUR LE LB EOURGET , A DIT FAIT UE, • E (. • S EVE. . , .. CElTc. EE , .. 1 L Al PART Dpi DANS LA SOIR] p. DE J E B) I . UISE A:,.., , . : . . 1 J i : -p . • , o j NO IN.. i-J AUR .'Oar, PA; A UB TONS RA S i- ', I I NOU; AVIONS Ea... E N V .0 ' •' K, .UU.,.S ORp.F C I HIER, CO.-EP UNICUE DU T E N I R AVEC LES NOB- MEILLE'T.ES MA IS- NO'US El LGr«-S DU P A R T I UN DEBAT A OE MOMENT-L, CHEFS BE P A R T I S , QUE Ue. LEUR 'IAJOEITE : :C ENGAGEMENT, FAHLEUENUA LEI DIT LA : i, ENGAiE'-.N; Pi EE METTRE L ASi QUE NOUS ANR10NS 77 , 13 0 0J 03RE 7 P. 1ER NOVEMBRE. QU I E F A L E A I T DISGUTE, AI LB a POUR RESPEC'i EE MALADIE CONSCi: r..r; e a IJ-X L. .-,.,• .1 PAS REAGI FROIDEMENT TER TEOBa L I S :.- 7;.. 1 . .: • i . SOU.:; PP dP7.. VlUNS i PP LA GO AI LORE; REMIS A R E I T EaaP G.EEi S DE PALO I S , LE Ci A:.. i1 a 000176 �...8 L O P P O S I T I O N , LE GEBF BE RALLIEMENT CREDITISTE - UE COMPRENDS Ql EE CHEF DU PARTI Q L ' E B E G O I S AVA IT DES RESERVES - ONT GONVENU QU I TEL DEBAT, DANS LES CIRCONSTANCES, POURRAIT PLUS NUIRE SU AIDER PARCE QUE NOUS E T I O N S , NOUS, DANS Ci P> n '? t 17 i E J \ . . . 7 - ; • . . . a i _ : i L j . . . , \ j . IMPEIOUEO, ON A CONSTATE RILE ET AUJGUBD HUI E UTILITE ELNITEE DES DEBA'fp. PARLEMENTAIRES. ial G EST pOURwUOI vGUS SOMMES VENUS A LA CONCLUSION DE NE PAS FAIRE DE DEBAT B URGENCD SUR CETTE QUESTION. L APFEL A E ARMEE, P2 EE PRESIDENT, S I NOES EN AVONS APPEELE A L ARMEE JEUDI A P R E S - M I D I , C LET PARCE QBE NOUS ETIONS CONSCLENTS AAA, 0 ETA IT NOTRE P R E M B P E E RESPONSABILITE EE NE PAS RETARDER DAVANTAGE, QUI NOUS AURAIT BEA.MES , ET AVEC OGEE LEE DE RAISONS, S IL Y AVAIT EU UN AUTRE ENLEVEMENT? S IE Y AVEAIT EU OLE EMEUTES A MONTREAL. COMMCE IE Y E,^ A DEJA SUES DEPUIS QUELQUES ANNEES? AVEC COMB TEN Ad RAISONS LA POPULATION AURAIT PU NOUS BLAMER D UNE ATTITUDE D ABSTENTION. NOUS AVONS ATTENDU JUSQU A L EXTREME LIMITE POUR EVITEE TOUT GESTE DE PROVOCATION.. ET LORSQUE NOUS AVONS FAIT APEEE A L ARMEE, NOES E AVONS JEST IF IE SIMPLEMENT PAR L EPUISEMENT DES FORCES POLICIERES. C EST LE DEPUTE DE BOURGET QUI POSAIT UNE QUESTiON ET QUI DISAIT l POURQUOI N AVEE-VOUS PAS VU A EA PROTECTION DES MINISTRES 000177 �Oi A ATTITUDE. PART , ' IE .E Pi S OPPOSE, SOL'S E ROE.: ..U EA, L B ] ry y I I G S ? MAIS Mi NT •••.: : iONI OS - r; ,. INDIV ID L SB ESI DEFINITIVE A •• '-'... EE L I B E R A T I O N GETTE L APPUI A ETE . ) •• , :. • e ' •••; ' y- - . .-. E • UUS A i E ' . U I Ai SERV J OIS. ] . ;- , E -L i . s INI P . • COMS . a i.a'E . . . " r. . EiB • POUR . e EVii sO EVEEEEeiENT VAlL y a ; . i E.'ii A TOUTE ESPECE FAITE ESI GONE IT IONNLLLE N E POUVAIT VOLS DONNER PEON EIAI1 . U E LB CINE i P P S j - . DE PROVO- Ai H i . IL ATTENDEE ET , A CE MOMENT-LA, ALA MEMBEES LA FRONT DE;- 10 I I I'VE o<P j. 0 DE e- ; DE L ARMEE. QUE J E UNE OJ F h E E AUTRE A e irl,J 5 UN MOMENT OU E s FA I i a. EASED ' POUR . :T ! N.. D A VO Ii 0 UN UQiBUNT OU EE GOUVi SAAAAUT DEVAN1 BBS R A I S O N S 0 p p s,. L , A E ARMEE E T , a ] '" A .. ' .j NOUS ! Vi OFFBE PAR |7 Mf Le.; POUR a. • . . . NOUS / . s . _ L APPEL VENU "-' .,7p A As ET A LA P EG i B ."ION ! ES B B ! ES. i. i el.iE RETARDER EST '" DA 0 , '. P...,'.-. 0 O I L Li a IE A L AFFEE 7.. VOU RESIDED! , B? COTE. CD IL •' AAA' i d .-• A EL E ."'• .7 I V A UNE CUT PREDICTION < ... NE P ! > P' ' .'• ' :"0 A- CONi LADIC' Ql 1 D OCHi . ALORS po'p!- IE a E K J E L V 1 1 IONS PR ISO A N I E B . E UNE DE L I B E R A T I O N o ::.. 0 1 . 1 . . L . 1 : v. • i i DN J'. la I J PRETS A RECOUMANDER QUI ETAIENT ELIGIBL: LIBERATION. 000178 �e « «t 1 D EST-CE ONE NOUS VOULONS LA PREUVE CUE C EST EE QEEBEG QUI A DECIDE DAN., EES> CIEGONSIANOES? S I NOUS AVIONS VOULU EIBERER OEEE PRISONNIERS AU LIEU LI GIRO, LE GOUVERNEMENT N AURAIT EE QU A INVOQUER UNE PROCEDURE QsE BBS AVOGA.LS PA CETTE CHAMBRE ONT RECONNAITRE EE QUI S A I j ' . ' . ; NOLLS PROSE i U I " ET OUI ALL' AIT PERMIS A SIX AUTRES PEEVENUS D BILE EIBERES ET DE PO'iVOIR UE DRE hix .. L E O P 7.e--UP DUTi's P. aa DU QUO EC BOtAUrlO T O T A L E M E N T S T SIONc. IE Y A nui ELBrELBUsp,. p ,,;v XPP.X a.Pa.. EJ\E . TER ET QUI DEMONTRE GEE NO ET SEULEMENT 7.,, |:, Oi. A Ci.': . <, LE E-oVEENEi AU j.( FAIT > •• • ' ' • 7- I QUL PERSONNE IP PEUT CON LA P O S S I B I L I T E , NOUS, A" QUEB AE QUEBEC, D ABLER PLUS LB IN ila LS vu p.. LES GUWEED SIGNS AU TERROR I EaD. v DANS EA VOIE DE EA COMMISSION AE CHATAGE DE TERRORISTES. LE GOUVLHNEMENi DU QUEBEC POE'VM E E r Hi j \ E S i-i i i-jADDER LA BEE'S I ED ION A AEI Qss pr ,.QJTB JL N A PAS VOELU LE FAIRE POUR EES RAISONS QUE JE VOUS DQNNEEAI TANTOT. QUANT AN TEMPS, POURQLOl AVOIR PRIS CETTE DECISION JEUDI SOIR? CELA DURA IT DEPUIS QUATRE J O U R S . NO Us AVIONS TESTE LA BONNE F O I , OU EA REPRESENTATIVITE DU NEGOCIATEUR DU F E E . IE Y AVEAIT EU, EN DEBUT DE MATINEE, DEs MANIFESTATIONS. CELA A BIEN TOURNE, FINALEMENT. MAIS QU EST-CE QUI AURAIT PU ARRIVER AVEO TOUTES 000179 �. ,; \ PP. , ] ,..':/.:'.•'."'.' .' (EG SUR CE ia •- Oi... A ET E : LI 77 .EN .... A PRi IDRE DE DIRE AU , ' E si E DUI Ai D: N S LA ILL L , a RMALEMEi P EC ; p > . SANS I- REi E QUEBEC s o l . 7. 7 L.L .- S ...... I, i .. ... ELI LE •' <y. • P. 1 ; a. pi EE La. DOS .' NOES E ..', I' Pl.l AMER IC UNE LO • - CJLL. . . MODS AVIONS . . -; 1 J n a. i i.E i RL E O-N A h EA Ui . . L ABE RA I. 0 JE I 7 BN- : .. . Else .7... • DE EA IOURNEE. IC. L EO! dr MIRES 7 ; ', FA. Li :: A .,! A BE A BA ' lUGi.Ni i.' Bl'Ei LE PL/Be AVAIT ETE. RENDU .' DOE .,' i - I.(. v^ a ..- A IDE. G ]P'-:~ RE AA I : • .. II J A E S T E E " ...J-...-. •. .• Se) MRS FA Or: 'U A s s o , I.. 0 PA li .a. II a.,. i I; A FEELER .. .. A I s : a . -, Pi . QUI EE i Iv li EN CO HE E S , ..P. I "ESI I S S IONS « A '" . BA IDE i I RETARD; ( IE E ST PENI • J - EEs ED) IA I N'j X . ':,.•• • X. I -..<: , ... I L ; ..:.- S API'. DANS LP... O.B.CO' U SIB LES, UJ i US CO! s. ..U S T I L I i RA PEA . UNE M.A I LU DERR . " .1. . ESA .,• • i • QUATRE JOURS DE i iGOCIA BIEN [ S QUI MAN . : P ' IL E E s . PARC' A I ET TRO I . . ' , cisi' X .. .• s i r LEIEE OH'/UPU :. ... a I; - •', - 'PI S P P . I R APRES: .'.' P A MOTET R 1V E P A R i ... P A P.P- ' A i USSIBE TION: RILL. • I; 0 i ... DE S i ' 0 UVO Iii S FORME PAR s spa- TCs.p DE ... . P7:.,r. COM- A TDAVAIEEEE J O I'R S E ... ., Al ........ A ..'. A A. TEREC h .0 •.] , GOEVi RNi MENT I '. '.' .' • . 1 . 7 ..1 I y, 7 R:. PP IP I Dli LIES MOYENS PRI \ 0 ' . ! lON . . ' J. U l J l . l ON Q I.' . . I J ,' ; E EAT J'. L. PCsCES • . 7 .. . . .. J . I d I.'. .j 000180 �• 6 » • i .'., MANIFESTATIONS VIOLENTES, BOMEES, ENLEVEMENTS, ASSASSINATS SEL E C T I F S . C EST VBAA.I QLlE CEiilAlNS ONT dd..- SCEPTIOUES. IB SAUENIEH L A ADMIS E U I - E E M E CUT PLUSIEURS Q U E E E G O I S NE POUVAIENT BAG CONCEVOIR QU UN TUB PLAN PUISSE ETEE A.PPEIQUE AU QUEBEC, PAR DES QUEBECOIS, AVEC LA LIBERTE D EXPRESSION DUE NOUS GONNAISSONs, A- LORS QUE NOUS SOMMES L UN DE... aB ..RS PAYS AE MONDE, DANS L H I S TOIRE DU MONDE QUI PERMET Es LIBERTE COMPLETE D EXPRESSION A UN PARTI QUI VEUT DETR SEAa LE REGIME, G EST PP FAIT 7:7 POPS SOMMES L UN DES SBULS BATS AU MONDE, DANS L HLsIOlI-.E OE MONDE, QUI PER BIT A UN P A R T I , LIBREMENT, A V E C TOUS BBS MOYENS EN IE POSSEDE, DE DE- TRUIRE CP. REGIME, ON NIC POUVAIT PAS CONCEVOIR QU ON PUISSE RECOEEIE A DES MOYENS VIOLENTS, A DES MOYENS TERRORISTES. MAIS EA, MO LE PRESIDENT, QUI A 11 v .i. -. . . ' J.T J « r . . ... •'•a.' NOUS AVIONS TROIS ETAPES UNS Iv . a. , 1 '.. ••> la J;, p; j M I V 10L •IL S NOUS AVONS EU DBS BOMBES, NOUS VENIONS D AVOIR DEE ENLEVEMENTS. QUELLE POUVAIT ETEE LA POSITION DU GOUVERNEMENT DU QEEEEC? QUELLE POUVAIT ETRE LA POSITION RATIONNELLE, EA PGRESPONSABLE DU GOUVERNEMENT DU QUEBEC, DANS LES CIRCONSTANCES? SE GROISER LE BRAS? ATTENDRE D AUTRES ENLEVEMENTS? ATTENDRE DES ASC\SPINATS NOIRE RESPONSABILITE SELEGTIFS? ESSENTIELLE. NOTRE RESPONSABILITE PREMIERE. IL AURAIT ETE IMPARDONNABLE DE NE PAS L ASSEMER DANS LES CIRCONSTANCES. 000181 �c » o & LO M. EE PRE; ID! N T , ... iT A. Li i 'Lb i\ A • ..'' 7- .-.• in J .. J el N A I PAS DEMONTEEE C ETAIT NOUS L AVK , s - Xd v A IL S SO IN ER Qi.L CEUSIO.N FA s iOsp. C'LL POOR NOU.- o Pi LO sU . 'I A I' ,' NE O s . • METTRE Us LE EUUE ! IE a s , 0.1 C , a ' _,.. UE ! ERE IN • SO." ! li I IA : DI i P P : P :., • : . I OP . II s A I 1. A A JEN , POL; IAN :i < ET B Es.C I f "U AASP- Er.E. • • ' QU FAISIONS LUI .-I . E A ET ; ... AVONS .; ; ' Ai ... .- ' . s s : P APri A a s .r... 0,1 L CIA 0 ; j I D AEP.P L.L EirOU- SCsi .'. • x '.:':.• .• J ...; MOYi U. LE DA. J S J o UN .• IE A,A. . ALU P B •:. ATE F a E IB, U P D A IELEURS , D Ais NE MOYEN. A P i ' .. . A. MENT .LEIe. ,. 0 Q.'Y PP GE i U.e C P. SPIPE SALE L i 0 :•• n ( uo ,..• ij - LUl-ML EE - p . 0. • I 0 i;,TE, L APPLICATKo . 7 GE L II ACl ' rp'A . ( UA r AU POUVOIR P 1 'A .:,. | p CCA . app AE LE AER.AUT PU I' PRESIDU! f . l B . DIFi- s a " ' I ; •,. Bi : SON A s . VENi.iS A I A A : !IS pOLIQi I'M: 'OO. a EIGNE RES LE QUI AVA ' PLANA IT S R QUEi QUANT AU F O N D , E 77 L E REFUSE D OPTER POUR SOIENT LBS ONES SOIENT LEE 2 3 .A . P R E : LU: . LA UP ETA IE QUE NOUS A , CyhVPPP NO .IS AC. PCs : G. :,,_. PR LEON , LEES POLITIC IES, LA JUL .sa.OOpESI U U; d:P P L iVEE Ql 1. CE EEC OU QUE Cil tre : P . .- ' 000182 �DE L I 3 E R E R . NOUS AVONS EXAMINE TOUTES LEG IMPLICATION'S. NOUS AVONS DISGUTE AVEC DES TL.S..ANTS Pdx DIFFERENTES THESES. DANS DES COMMUNIQUES r: QUEre i><;OUS AVACIe, RENDU PPBEICS AP QUI ETA BINT LA CON- CLUSION DE LONGUES DISCUSS iONs - 2:, ICI, MAIS 72 PEUX LES REPETER ET LES CITER CROIS QUE TOUS LEE DEPUTES EN SONT INFOReRLS - IE ESI CLAIR QU IE N Y A PRE UNE ONCE DE PROVQCAT ION. C EST STRICTEMENT, D AFREs LES F A I T S , EE MIMLIUM QU Ii, FALEAIT LIRE POPE ASSUMER EOS RE SI 0 i S A B I L I T I E S , S I NOSE AVIONS CEDE, Qu EST-CE JE L AI DEJA D I T , LUI SERA IT GALA A'RAIT ETE Ida. A DIT ARRIVE? INGITATION AU TERRORISME. Gal L.J, o 1/UiUUj I .'...•:'• ..J L, i r i ...--.. I.-- J I 7 ••• livl'Si ' . - . - . • • : ; 7 r r T - - . - - I . - T APRES, EGRASER RE TERROR ISEE? 0 BET BIT DE BONNE FOI, MI. IS C EST UNE BONNE FOI QUI EST PROPER!" IONNELEE A ONE NAIVETE. M. LE PRESS DENT lAJ.i U:.n L.L PART I QEEPPCOIS 00 Tl II. NPI V RAIT PAS EE D AUTRES ENLEVEMENTS PAR BA S U I T E , GUI NOUS AURAIENT PEACES DANS QUELLE SITUATION? QUELLE GARANTIE PEUT-IE DOWNER? EN CEDENT, EE GOUVERNEMENT AGGRO ISSAJT CONSIDERABLEMENT LA TACHE DES FORCES POLICIERES D ECRASER LE TERRORISME. CELA DEVENATT UNE TACHE EXTREMEMENT D I F F I C I L E PARCE QUE CELA VOULAIT D I R E , SELON LES INFORMA- TIONS CUI NOUS ETAIENT DONNEES ET COB NOUS AVIONS TOUTES EEC RAISONS DE CROIRE, QUE DES CENTAINES ET DE S CENTAINES DE TERRORISTES EN PUIS- 000183 �SANG. . RA ONT : VAB.A " • : , DEOCPA : L AS sp. ,:.; , : P lid iiCL r- y.y . L... x r, • ...... p.-A I T T! • - "- A , AG'. is.. TO ... Eas TA i IS' '. i •, L EO r. .• 10 :,, ON Li .• : i. ; A VOLO i LI .. ••L L i'r A a HO A. ... Pi S L I D i RLE " 2.. A , , '.•> I - c . , '• ! " s 7 i l :.. . . .-, ) E ;-.••• --• J 1 P BP.BS , j EL DU o.,U B P I E MENT . T iPOS.-l NOMBRE TEE;- p. : CO I. • E 7.s I E ... .- < • '.•:. -.. ' . • p,: 7 . p ! .. s B..E E! .... '; ; I D C I E i [ , AC BO] B I R O h I el 0 -P i • PL !. A A a ; IDEM A - A . I DE Es L ....... X j. A. 'is, dPd....... . ... ."i Dr R_l pi . ETB .' . •,...: , EO • .. . i i ; .. Qi V U IN .• .' ' ". .ROLE Li V : . NA I ! AT ATI PARC'S G ' 0,1 I N C H A i ! LA] 2. AN Gil ( . -• -: ,. i A A DEVEN IR D E S 11 E ... • Ce'E CET IA a I...0 UP: x j as BEs 7P e. EL 000184 �I p. ON POUE A ATT PA PEE E EBB'; 7. : D UNE TAP.BE CO; -\ ' . . . p /, a Be: A QPTE POUR LE SEUL CEO IE DANS I ES G lECQNSTeUiCEo , Es AaAE CHOIX CU IE POUVAIT ACCEPTER. L A IB' 3 L G .LUEUENT ET FEE ' : Ap Al , ,d( G E T Li a QUI A DE PLOsEVi t. 11 , .: . i •. ,.••-..'.., isps E LETS ' I i EOsT 1 • ... f IE 1...I-7 i H J > E E .-> i ii 1 1 D P. E <p E V E A o ; >, j. fir I O l\ 1 ... J s E 1.C; . ; PR : ' i : ras-: r •;> PC". AC J A I A I i .-•BJi A .. . ... i ...... pp. JP.. r, ... h . ' J E i J dx. r LE PP: ' P L a d 10 NO Ui.. ERG A BuP EVEN i'< f a.Eja.7. Bu.sll CBT Ii 7- 7..' ... C'LT Ai' ET ap .. -.-I \d> .; a » CES Q I EE aa < 11 , M < PC' Ui . . . . . . PEL PAR aS i P i;.' i i I P p j [_-,;.; K ;a "w <J . . H 7... I". A EsM...:Id iGUEjn EC DEPUTE DE O P.. 1 O i i i .0 1 A DE i S'\ 0 0 ! UBS E PRETE -. i a.' ':. a j, . R E , AO CAS OU IU EN AEEAII BBSS IU M. Lie PRESIDENT, SII ! N AV.Cd A O l d PAS FAIT LINE TELLE CHOSE, JE ME DEMANDE COMsBUT JE POURRA IS ASSUMER LE POSTS QL'E J ASSUME ACTEELEEMEN'T. UN DIPLOMATE AVAIT ETE ENLEVE, I'M MINsTsE DU CAB INO AVAIL Eld ENLEVE. EA PREMIERE CHOSE QUI M EET VENUE A 000185 �»fttt V- i / A .p.E LA. PO; o ' il IB D ... . . d.A. . JE s A I r.. . FA 1 I si , EE ,•-. 1 .-.. oi A ' A F I T E G E N : • ; ; A. 1 . A X Y -. B O A j ' i .... : G , N r: i 7,' J J A . - ••! - v A ' . A I S . p - : : . . . U p . : . ' , .a. • - . - I C ' I a •• • 1 .. A D . : T"! ET F A R A . . T E E T EC, S O N T L B S - d d . . UR E .... [ Fh y • I I O N , L •- R E N C O N T R E S N O N BEE.d : .'.'. . . . . - ... ' . , a 0 . . I • E; A PEE-,p.... Pi. • ! . 1 " U . P. 7. A J r .'-. i J .OI'B.T', E... , C E S T " XP. P. a , C . ap: P d • a . . . . r. A ' s e ) i ..' : d s ..:. - ' .. : I ' , . ' VO .....; ..; - a ' - . . a J- f II LP • ; LA ' !.. • s • i UU PEER .RLR M IN 1ST' : , y ... PAI ; GET A. ' •. d - •..'.....: E...I.B • I :: . • 'p.... E " • .. . O I L . . . , . ' . • S I. !a , : ' I.GGCIER r A. .. .7.,: , " . . la: R ' a S ' DE P Q E E ,E E . ' ' ' : : - . . - • I JTENTION DAN;. i QU IB Y A D AMOR , P. . ,' As a I TE: I BARE . : 7 ... . RES DE G EERRE, QUI POi d i TANTOT 0 I . . E O i s Err . "U" ' .'. >. la a .P. . . '..: ' I E Er' — . .• . ... 7..E1E .-. • v. s 7X1 a ,' a. ,'. C i I " 1 E , . 1 ._....—. 1 p .. [Pi .AT : 1 a ];. • CO A i U L s I V . i.i. 7 A1 : IE- ; : ... Di .-a a S i T 7 1. . ., P . " L.A. t"i ... u! L . J - . >.. , "I I d , SAM;..IB! . ' L , , P. A ... ]. | ,\. • . . . . - . wn ' d A . A ' ' -.-\' I 1X2 . E d o J PLi : NOMINATION a ,! , • PA: 'P .L. J , DO i d ; . ... .: !B '. 0 , .' Ti ..7 .a ! " i EDi O h O i G .'..A.. A p . J . ,, J L S I Oa. E'ERi 000186 �* ff te- v- I 0 ; PARTIELLEME'NT A CETTE FOFE4L BE S FOUR RE .-'i . '..... e: 7/!, L .; A CONGE LB QUE CETTE ABO UT I , C EST-A A . I RAV ] . . . j_L DEVAIT . . L , , . . . J i LARCH J •OI CHOP:- ,,- a.,..: ALTBITIR API a I -- ', AS Oa N , I.'-1.. ... •.' i. ; . A Us DE EA B U I e -70 do UEiDEEA ET . ,\p , r B •i . . . i . 7 P a I - 1 . . . • > i . A • •• : : . . - . . . : A E EMPRO I ..- TE-i-EAL.A OU DU SONS-NOUS Y AVAIT . BASUTOE.AI'DP RAS P A R T I E DN PARTAKE DU GOGVERHE E IT LA QUEST I C O :. I ix x L . . , ' . - f • - , i . s a - T i . , 7 iJ a f c •: SO .'.A Y A-T-IL . . j i E H S.,., ' X s d D ANOBMAL, ALOES QE IE UM NEBBED OU UN PP P. B I I P'y . . •,..:IT ,. i . : E B INsGLI.TE :.. i e' CU Y A - T - I L DP ,TOE ID LOT I.GN ,, A CE MA Ls 7 UO I ,' A- ICON , DU CANADA'; a ;.-< a-, HE < i, .7 , E Ha GCTOEBE? EE LALONDE LEA] i BI. '.! j S UNA A1.'TRE j p. . . P> •. i .: < AU ELLE A SO: MI E I S A IT Oi A LAPPETE AVAIT ETE ENLEVE. AP 1 J .: •. , ... i. E i : , 7 a . i „ i i i A.., ! I i A jr. J PP.. NEGOGIATJOA -E P E P CPL. ai « P...." I X: . Lo IT SAUF-CB j 71. .5 ) S O.i CLE ST ION ALORS QUE NOUS r. E i PS DEVIONS COILABOREE? AUTRE fii'T U7li QUEST ION : GUEI '-'" ' a. - a L. I7.V1 I \jl r, GOEVERNEMEMTS nc ,,-. p •. v .IT P R E S S IONS ET ii a DB eiONTRPAL ET i a CONTRE a> , a. T P T l .a a j w . a s s I E pes r p p p e D OTTAWA ET D I V E R S E S na POT 'ox. 1 " •" IBBdONNAEITEE DU QUEBEC? 000187 �: p.e,..A L A . ": . .. i '..' i . , . . . . . a. A ET A1 A: 0 P P . , TE. .A. .Ir, , . P B. e ... j rj •A I A: s - a A 0 .; a. XX I . . ; A I ..•'.: ' PPA i'l I M p.''.'- ; PAD CLE •' ..A' NO i L PECTS A . , .: ...;... . . . . , EJ ': ! 0 p. I . I. . A : .- .a.. . p ' .' . >.. LA IMi ; P O I '--' ? ••" ( ,.' o •: ; s I i-1. s . : o • • • .- - • . ' '• .1. s. E s.O A. 0 j 7 71 '. AA PORTS .• I Lie r.A A .. I.A j T E . - i l . B S NIVEA 1 I '.v a , : E . . . . .B • : NO L LP 000188 �e * «- » A.. 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OU I 7. • E ISA'i 000206 �000207 �1 ^ 1 • w m Government of Canada Gouvernement du Canada CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET Dated From A compter du To /& (O OS Jusqu'au ^ LAA-OF,// AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - A METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTERIEURE VOIR File No. - Dossier n° Volume Jo d> F7 - FJ/(~ QC 31 (8»08) ^OC ° ^^r^ °'~ T("/U ^ ^ 7540-21-857-8809 000208 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00002 Title A name given to the resource Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Documents Often Used Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 05-Oct-70 to 19-May-72 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping, RG25, vol. 25741, 20-22-TFK DOCUMENTS OFTEN USED, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). 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