https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e8d9ff3875618ae8035df3b771062cfd.pdf 9e0ed838a2fc47770c5ac687343a25d1 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information S0^S1 • y S Ait ^ " 1* a SEW& jmtSECRET /\<v.tcA J* APPENDIX "B" THE SOVIET THREAT TO NORTH AMERICA This Estimate is agreed Canadian-United States intelligence for the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. General North America would be attacked by Soviet Forces only in the event of, or as the initial step of, general war. The Soviet leaders do not, in our view, intend deliberately to initiate general war; they wish on the contrary to avoid serious risk of such a war. Despite the acquisition of long-range missiles capable of striking North America, the Soviet leaders probably believe that the scale of damage they would suffer in a general war would be unacceptable. (This judgment presumes, among other things, the continued maintenance and improvement of allied armed strength and the absence of an unforeseen Soviet technological breakthrough.) The Soviet leaders would almost certainly not decide to precipitate general war unless they concluded that conceding a position to the West would sooner or later threaten the survival of their regime. They would undoubtedly initiate a general war if they were convinced that the United States was irrevocably committed to the early launching of an all-out nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. The following paragraph is the United States view only. The Soviet leaders evidently consider that 000546 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la LoisurJteielfrqji'inft'ormation Jit - 2 - H vr^wu*.. _ FEB 2 6 1905 their emerging long-range missile capabilities, added to their already substantial military forces, are producing a-new relationship of power in which both sides are deterred from resort to all-out nuclear war or actions involving serious risk of such a war. They probably see this situation, not as a stalemate, but rather as an opportunity for more vigorous non-military pressures, and possibly even for some limited forms of military action, not necessarily involving the employment of Soviet forces. Soviet programmes to build greater military power, as well as efforts in weapons research and development, will continue to be pushed vigorously with the object of further shifting the relation of forces to their advantage. If they remain convinced that their relative power is growing, we believe that the chance of their miscalculating risks - and hence the chance of general war - is likely to increase. Moreover, the risk of their becoming involved in a global conflict may be increased if Communist China follows adventurous policies. Attacks on North America would only be worthwhile if nuclear weapons were used. The nuclear weapons would include the largest size available to the Soviet Union and extend into the megaton range. North America would almost certainly not be attacked in isolation by the Soviet Union. Attacks on NATO forces and territory in Europe, on allied sea lines of communication., and targets in the Middle East and elsewhere would almost certainly be associated with attacks on North America. ...3 000547 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information JXW SECRET - 3 - DOWia^ A ZZA\A ^xSffi^l iB 2 6 1985; We do not believe that there is a possibility of receiving direct knowledge of the Soviet policy decision to initiate a general war or specifically to attack North America, nor of the operational plan of attack. However, under some circumstances, intelligence should be able to give a warning of a high degree of probability of attack on North America, based on intelligence interpretation of enemy activity. In addition, under most circumstances, intelligence will receive some evidence of preparations for hostilities on the part of the Soviet Union. Although it will rarely be able to make a firm judgment as to whether these preparations are for defence, for a show of force or for offensive action, it should be able to indicate a degree of risk of global war. In planning for an attack against the North American continent, the Soviet planners would undoubtedly seek to maximize as far as possible their chance of securing surprise, while maintaining the necessary weight of attack. It is believed that further preparations and deployment of Bloc forces beyond that which had already occurred as a result of the international situation would be kept to a minimum to avoid compromising the initial attacks; in addition, steps designed to reduce the fears and apprehensions of the West might be taken. For an operation against the North American Continent, the Soviet planners would probably select as objectives for attack the following (not necessarily listed in order of selection for attack): .(a) Nuclear retaliatory forces and facilities; • • »4 000548 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information REmiiT h sti* - r : — - 4 - ^ FEB 2 6 1985 (b) Control centres from which direction is provided for governmental actions, continental defence and retaliatory offensive operations;; (c) Population, transportation and communication centres. The Soviet planners would probably seek to achieve the maximum effect on targets listed in (b) and (c) as bonus effect from attack on nuclear retaliatory forces and facilities. From the standpoint of the daylight-darkness relationship for Soviet vs United States bombers over target areas, at the spring and fall equinoxes the advantage to the Soviet Union is the most pronounced. In the selection of a date and time for attack, it is expected that maximum advantage will be taken of weather and darkness. Aircraft, Missile and Submarine Threats During the earlier part of the 1960-61 period, the Soviet Union would place chief reliance for attacks against North America upon aircraft carrying nuclear weapons supplemented by such ballistic missiles and missile submarines as were available. Throughout this two-year period Soviet long-range attack capabilities will be augmented by growing numbers of ballistic missiles. We believe that the whole of the available heavy bomber force plus a substantial portion of the medium bomber force of Long-Range Aviation would be employed in operations against North America; and that • •••y 000549 �s«.fm Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Oog^rjffiiMdttnrljBEle en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information mm aai ft sWi h \ ECRET kr3(\j&l*\ FEB 2 6 1985 convertible bomber-tankers would be employed in a tanker role as a range extension measure. As an example for planning purposes it is estimated that (disregarding combat attrition) the Soviet Union in mid-1960 could put a combination of about 400 heavy and medium bombers over continental North America in an attack designed to achieve surprise. We believe that by the end of the 1960-61 period Soviet capabilities will allow increasingly extensive reliance on ICBM's for attack on North American targets. The Soviet Union is developing a peacetime operational pattern with its submarine force which would allow it to have stationed within range off the North American coastline a small number of submarines for use in the initial stages of general war. It is estimated that this force would be composed primarily of such missile submarines as were available, but would also include submarines capable of attacking naval forces and shipping soon after the initial attack was accomplished. During the 1962-63 period, the ICBM will be a principal weapons system for attack on North America. Manned bombers will still be available in sizeable numbers, however, and will probably be employed to supplement missile attacks, using air-to-surface missiles against the more heavily defended targets. Submarine-launched missiles will probably contribute to the Soviet assault. The effectiveness of Soviet submarine attacks, including those on shipping and naval .. .6 000550 �DouuinntWsclosed under the Access to Information Act •l^oJutSe^ifcli'lilgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information FEB 2 6 1985 forces in North American waters, will be increased by advances in weapons and nuclear propulsion. The timing of these diversified operations would pose extremely complex problems to the Soviet planners. During the 1964-1970 period the Soviet Union will have improved weapons systems and increased capabilities for reconnaissance, surveillance, communications, and electronic warfare. The likely form of a Soviet attack on North America would involve the launching of ICBM's as the primary means of attack, supplemented by missile submarines and aircraft. Other Threats It is estimated that the early stages of an attack on North America would entail little threat of amphibious operations beyond commando-type raids against selected targets in the Aleutians, the coast of Alaska north of Bristol Bay, and even possibly against parts of Canada and the continental United States. These raids would most probably be launched from submarines. It is considered unlikely that the Soviet, Union would attempt sizeable airborne operations against North America at least in the early stages of a nuclear war, although airborne operations on a small scale against isolated points in Alaska and the Aleutians would be a probable course of action. Similar airborne oper- ations against Northern Canada, Greenland and Iceland are within Soviet gross capabilities, but are not considered a likely course of action. 000551 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW06954 Title A name given to the resource Appendix B: The Soviet Threat to North America Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Canada-US Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence - Establishment and activities," RG25-A-3-b, vol 6049, file 50309-A-40, part 4-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Government of Canada Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource undated