https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b46aee68f275319276235dbc97c6547c.pdf 83520ff4ba58ee325f5f60419290639b PDF Text Text SECRET May 24, 1957 MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER Subject: Exchange of Security Information with the United States Although it was expected this week we have not yet received the United States reply to our note of April 10 regarding the exchange of security information between the Canadian and United States Governments._::·,:,-:,· _This memorandum has been prepared at your request to examine what courses of action are open to us, should the United States note when it arrives fail to provide the, assurance we have requested of the United States Goverl;lment, 11 tha t none of its agencies or departments will pass su·ch information to any committee, body or organization in_the United States over which the executive branch of the United States Government has no executive control without the express consent of the Canadian Government in each case. 11 You will remember that rur April 10 note went on to say that, were such an assurance not given, 11the Canadian Government must reserve the right in future not to supply security information concerning Canadian ,citizens to any United States Government agency." 2. It is relevant to this problem that when Mr. Heeney presented this note he explained, on instructions, "that although we had found it necessary to take this step, we had no desire to upset the long-standing and friendly relations between the FBI and the ROMP, nor the new and satisfactory arrangements between the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service and the ROMP, to both of which we attached importance. Further, we considered it. important in our joint interest to maintain this close co-operation in.the security field, as in other fields." 3. about , The ROMPhave_ been passlng., security information Canadian citizens to agencies of the United States 000544 -- ::, �SECRET - 2 - Government Canadians, category): in the following categories of cases (some of course, are affected under more than one (a) Canadians applying for employment by the United States Government in sensitive positions either in the United States (information passed to the FBI) or at United States bases in Canada; (b) Canadians applying for immigration visas to enter the United States (information passed to the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service); ( c) Canadians with a subversive record, where United States interests ~re involved, e.g. Canadian Communists visiting the United States (information passed to the FBI); and (d) Canadians engaging in espionage, where United States interests are involved (information passed to the FBI). 4, In addition, of co\X'se, the RCMPwhen required pass security information about United States citizens resident in Canada. 5. In return for this the RCMPreceive from the FBI an enormous amount of security information about Canadians, and about United States citizens where Canadian interests are involved, in all four categories listed in paragraph 3 above. The RCMP consider that in category (a) they get much more than they give, because there are far more · Canadians with a record of residence in the United States seeking sensitive employment in Canada than there are Canadians seeking such employment in the United States or at United-States bases in Canada. In category (b), again, we get at least as much as we give, and perhaps more, While •• 3 000545 �- 3 1 SECRET ' ;}' it is true that more Canadians immigrate to the United States than vice v.ers'S,, the return here lies in the assistance given by United States consular authorities in Europe and South America to,the RCMPimmigration screening programme. In categories (c) and (d) the RCMPget quite as much from the FBI as they give. 6. Should the United States note prove unsatisfactory, and should the Canadian Government decide to implement its threat to withhold security ini'ormation from United States agencies, the following courses of action appear to be open to us: (a) The RCMP could be instructed to pass no information whatever in any of the categories listed in paragraph 3; (b) They could be instructed to pass information in some categories and not in others; ( C) They could be instructed to pass less information in all categories, e.g. make a simple statement of fact such as "so-and-so is not clear for security," or "so-and-so is a member of the Communist party," without adding any further details of the case; (d) They could be instructed to pass information to one United States agency, e.g. to the FBI, and not to the others - .t·he United Stat es agency selected could be requested, and if it were the FBI it would probably comply with such a request, to keep the information for its own use; (e) Some other agency could. screen RCMPinformation United States agencies, suitable criteria or by each case. be found or set up to before it is passed to either by establishing actually examining .• 4 000546 �·.;· - 4- ·•·-. "''"" SECRET t 7. are the dangerous exception criticisms If the RCMPpass no information whatever we run the risk that Canadians will be denied sensitive employment in the United States and at United States bases in Canada; they will encounter serious difficulties if they wish to emigrate to the United States; subversive and espionage agents will'·-ha:ve a field day; the interested United States agencies will seek security information about Canadians through devious and unreliable channels; United States confidence in our security arrangements will decline, and the flow of classified United States information to Canada will dwindleJ (b) If they passed no information in selected categories the damage would be I.imi:ted, t.o,,.that category initially but would have a.generally bad effect before long; (c) If they passed only a bare statement in security cases, without any supporting information, in many important cases it would be as unsatisfactory to the United States agencies as if they passed no information whatever, and in those cases least there could be the same unfortunate consequences; I I '\ i ' ' \ \ of action, which to me so far, seem the possible last one. My (a) ' \ All the foregoing courses only ones which have occurred or at least unhelpful, with of some modification of the of each course of action: (d) at If they passed information only to the FBI, and perhaps to the INS, the dangerous consequences of courses (a), (b) and ( c) would be avoided to a great extent: it is unlikely, however, that the Canadian public would consider that this represented any tightening up at all, as the danger of leaks from the FBI and the INS could not be entirely ruled out; •• ·5 000547 �SECRET - 5- •. (e) The suggestion that some other agency could screen the flow of RCMPinformation, case by case, appears to reflect on the RCMP1 s good judgment, would impose intolerable delays in the processing of vetting and immigl!'B.tion cases, and would probably completely inhibit an effective co-operation between the RCMPand the FBI in operations against subversives and spies. 8. It seems to me that the best course for the Canadian Government to pursue, in the event that the United States . note is found unsatisfactory, is simply to refer the JlM/.... question to the Security Panel for study. It could be (JI. announ.ced that the problem. s posed by the United States note were complex and important and that the Government had instructed its security advisers to study them carefully and report back as a matter of highest priority. At this .ffe'-~tage I could not predict what sort of recommendation the ,fl' ~-~ Security Panel would find it possible to make. It seems :~· ~ likely, however, that it could re-examine. the cri·teria 1 used by the RCMP in determining whether or not to pass .) .-/,~information, the extent to which details should be supplied 1 (IF'. /,,;J in the various categories of cases, the choice of United r . States agencies to which to pass information, and the G/ conditions under which it should be' passed to them. I should not~ be surprised if the Security Panel found it necessary to recommend an increase in the RCMP·establishment if the procedure for passing security information to the United States were to be effectively tightened up. ' r 9. You asked me, incidentally, whether the RCMP•s relationship with the United Kingdom security people was as close.as their relationship with the FBI. After consulting Superintendent Hall I am able to confirm that this is the case. RCMPdealings with M.I.5 are quite as full, frank and mutually helpful as they are with the FBI. For obvious geographical reasons the volume of this correspondence with the FBI happens to be greater but that is the only difference. (.,(> ..., -o..., 0-,..-~ ~ .,t,....,, ~ ____,., ~"=1' j-11=- ~-' r::---"'-"-' .e.......... 1 A • H t,,C; - ' , l .. , ... t.J "-~ a..:;~J.-....u,- ~ ~c..,,r,.,~c. ..,c, 1--- 1011 • ....-.. t ..,t,,:::..,, ;;;I;_:::., c.:;;.• ~0548 . • �;•1 ,,.,,..•. DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS J>··,~ ,._ -~ TO: MEMORANDUM Mr. . Crean &te FROM: ..... \}.~?.• .. ~'??.~~~1:1 ........................................ REFERENCE: ....................................... .. . .. ... . "Ex°pe'c ted."un'f tea"$ta te s"t eply. SUBJECT: ... SECRET Security . , ................. ........................ . 24, . May 19.57 ............................ File No. . tci "ciur.A:p±'il' LI note on ~Y.l?-~!!g~ .. !'.f'.. ~~~-~~-~ ~.Y.. :C.l'!-t~~!';".-~.~?.~: .............................................. Mr. Leger told me this morning that Mr. Robertson, learned from Governor Herter yesterday afternoon that the United States reply to our April 10 note was practically r·eady. The State Department had finished work on it, and were planning to clear it today with the appropriate Congressional Committee (unspecified). It will probably arrive, therefore, early next week. Mr. Pearson is leaving Ottawa to-night and, therefore, will not have an opportunity of seeing it before his departure. Governor Herter asked Mr. Robertson's views as to the timing of publication of the United States note. Mr. Leger discussed this point with Mr. Pearson this morning. The latter refused to commit himself before he had seen the text of the note. 2. · On Mr. Leger's instructions I prepared the attached memorandum, dated May 24, for the Minister on this subject. I found it a highly hypothetical exercise, but the Minister ordered it done. I consulted Supt. Hall and Mr. Glazebrook _C_I_R_C_U_L_A_T_I_O_N_ before preparing it, and cleared it with Supt. Hall and · Mr. Wall (in Mr. Dwyer 1 s absence) before submitting it to Mr. Leger. You should note the latter's comment added at the end. Ext. 326 (6/56) ~- 000549 .. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Espionage Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource US Investigation of Canadians / 24 MAY 1957, MEMO FOR THE MINISTER Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957-05-24 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00133 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Memorandum for the Minister, ‘‘Exchange of Security Information with the United States,’’ 24 May 1957, LAC, RG 25, vol. 8561, file no. 50303-40, part 1.1.