https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/63feba91843434e4a317e651132c466f.pdf 650c4f310a4a66677395e5ef28a999dd PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Ac^^mW Document divulgue divulgue en en vertu vertu de la Loi Loi sur Document de la sur I'acces I acces a /'information/ COPY HO.* OF 10 COPIES ^ % > T ' ^ T3 SECR2I TOP SECRET £yUa * SECRET ; March 22, 1950. * ADVISORY PANEL ON ATOMIC SNERQY Minutes of Meeting held In Privy Council Committee Room on Tuesday, March 21, 1950, at 11 a. m. Present: Mr. N. A. Robertson - In the Ghalr (Secretary to the Cabinet), Honourable L. B. Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs), General the Honourable A.G-.L. McNaughton (Canadian Permanent Delegate to the Atomic Energy Commission), Dr, G. J. Mackenzie (President, National Research Council), Dr. 0. M. Solandt (Chairman, Defence Research Board), Mr. Escott Held (Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs). James £eorge - Acting Secretary J- INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERflY 1. The Pftnel considered a wording paper dated March 18 prepared in the Department of External Affairs reviewing the Canadian Government's position on the international control of atomic energy. 2. General McNaughton thought that the Panel should begin with an examination of the technical factors involved before considering far-reaching recommendations* He asked in the first place for the opinion of Dr. Mackenzie and Dr. Solandt on the hydrogen bomb, and how it might be expected to effect the prdblem of international control* had 3« Dr. Mackenzie and Dr. Solandt/formed the general impression from talking to both U.S. and U.K. officials and scientists, that, while President Truman*s decision that the United States would endeavour to make a hydrogen bomb had radically affected public opinion on the subject of international control and might have created a new "political eraw, a new technical era had not In fact begun, as the United States Atomic Energy Commission had been working for many months on the problem of a fusion bomb and there was no indication that there had been a radical change in their programme or budget, but only a greater emphasis on this aspect of their programme* There was, in fact, some indication that U.S, thinking on the problems of fusion hade not advanoed very far, and there were certainly very great difficulties to be overcome before a fusion reaction could be achieved. The scientists did not, in any case, foresee the sudden development of a hydrogen bomb with a release of energy enormously greater than that of a fission reaction: rather, they expected the development of a series of bombs, all with a core of fissionable material, using progressively larger quantities of fuslonable material. **• In these circumstances, Mr. Pearson said, it appeared unlikely that the United States could re-establish, by ../2 n /j 000116 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2TOe development of hydrogen bombs, the same sort of lead in atomic weapons which had acted as a deterrent while the U.S. monopoly remained unbroken. Insofar as U.S. policy was based on the assumption of the continuing deterrent value of atomic superiority on the side of the United States, it might prove to be ill-founded. 5. * Qnneral McNaughton said that all his conversations with U.S. scientific and military people had led him to the conclusion that the U.S. margin of superiority in atomic weapons was today greater than it had ever been, and that the Russians had a very long way 'to go, from their nuclear explosion, to the production of a stockpile of bombs* 6. Mr. Reid observed that the deterrent value of atomic superiority on our side was based on the Russian assessment of our stockpile and. potential, as against theirs, and it was just as important as a deterrent for the Russians to believe that the United States had a great margin of superiority as it was to possess such a margin in fact. Dr. Mackenzie pointed out, however, that if Fuchs had told the Russians all he knew, they would have had a very good appraisal of the U.S, atomic position at the end; of the war* 7. Mr. Pearson concluded that there was no technical information which would lead to any radical change in government policy on international control* Although the technical position may not have changed, he said, public opinion believed that it had, and was exerting pressure on governmentsfeo,do something towards reaching international agreement as soon as possible. At the last Assembly, Mr. Vishinsky had made many ambiguous statements — about the veto and about inspection, for example — b y means of which the Russians had been cultivating the impression that they were making concessions which &e had turned down. We should be playing into their hands If we allowed the issue of atomic energy control to lie dormant* The only way to pin down the Russians and expose their position was to get them to resume negotiations. - He wondered whether it would not be wise to suggest that, if the Six-Power Talks in the United Nations oould not be resumed until the question of Chinese representation had been settled, the other five permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission, including the Soviet representative, should meet informally, in much the same way as the representatives of the five Western countries had been meeting ad hoc throughout the Six-Power Talks* 8# General McNaughton said that before any decision was taken on this suggestion, we should consult with our partners in London and Washington. He added that he did not see how we could retain the support, at the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, of all the States that had gone along with us at"the Fourth Session, unless the Atomic Energy Commission had met and brought up to date the majority plan. He thought it was essential to write into the plan the revisions which he had indicated at the last Assembly were generally accepted by the leaders of the majority, so that the plan would reflect the latest thinking on this subject and be • completely up to date* 9* Mr. Pearson doubted that the Soviet Union would accept the majority plan, even if it were somewhat revised as General McNaughton had In mind. He suggested that we should .../3 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a finformation - 3J R e another serious look at (i) our conception of international ownership and (11) at ways and means of gaining international agreement for a qualified prohibition on the use of atomio weapons.* As regards ownership, he wondered whether we could not abandon the concept Altogether If we were to get a satisfactory system of Inspection. 10• Oeneral MoNauefoton agreed that the term "ownership" was undesirable and was broader In Its meaning than what the majority now had in mind, which was perhaps better expressed by his term *hold in trust". However, he did not see how any system of inspection could be satisfactory If control of major Installations were not vested In the international agency. 11. Mr. Held wondered whether, If we believe that the Russians would not accept the majority plan and the United States oould not safely give up her stockpile of bombs for anything less, some more limited bargain might not be reached In the interim in exchange for Soviet acceptance of a scheme that went no further than inspection. Would the U.S. be prepared, for example, Mr. Pearson added, to give up direct control of its stockpile of bombs In exchange for agreement on International inspection alone? 12. Mr. Reid said that he felt any proposal for some sort of self-denying ordinance would be very difficult for the United States to oppose and that It was, therefore, desirable to have more to show to the next General Assembly than simply a majority plan brought up to date. If we did not propose something that we would be prepared to accept, others might seriously embarrass us by asking us to go much further than we could. 13. After further discussion, the Pa.nel agreed that:• (a) Mr. Pearson would ask Mr. Wrong and Mr. Wilgress to.sound out the U.S. and U.K. authorities as to the desirability of suggesting that, until the Six-Power Talks could be resumed with Chinese representation acceptable to all, the Five-Powers should meet Informally to discuss atomic energy control: If the Soviet Union were to turn down such an invitation, we should at least have shown out good faith in wanting to resume negotiations; if the Russians were to accept, we should have an opportunity of exposing their so-called "concessions". (b) % should also suggest to the U.S. and U.K. authorities the desirability of planning to hold meetings of all members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, commencing early In the summer, so that we should have had an opportunity of bringing the majority plan up to date before the next General Assembly, J* George, Acting Secretary. 000118 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW05764 Title A name given to the resource CDNW05764 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Atomic energy - Advisory Panel on Atomic Energy - Agenda," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5954, file 50219-A-40, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). 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