https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c87696d79ab347e703a7e7b9ae320716.pdf da1d007bebda91a5024e7d789f8c8242 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Defence L i a i s o n / J . G e o r g e / b w TOP SECRET Ottawa, J a n u a ry 3 1 , 1950. MEMORANDUM FOR MR*xf?EENEY \y " M \ ting of Advisory Panel on Atomic Energy 1 ^^^^> Wednesday, February 1, 11:00 a. m. 'tfgk*$0 Privy Council Chamber ^=g» C^> 1. As you will see from Mr. Robertson's letter or "Q^ January 30, attached, tomorrow's meeting of the Advisory %P Panel has been called to discuss the U.K. proposals for */& tripartite co-operation which were sent to Mr. Robertson i^t with Mr. Wrong's letter of January 3> forwarded to you with^^, QJ& Mr. George's memorandum of January 5> also attached. IPrfc vii 2. We have a number of minor comments to make on the U.K. proposals, but the only one of importance from the ri Canadian po'int of view is the wording_j?f.,,the,U«K..,B.ectlon I dealing_with _s to rage, of bombs, in Cajiada. However, I propose to^faTTe^ach point in turn, in the order set out in the U.K. memorandum. ^pf\ «^ Section A Re 3* - We are evidently expected to fill in the gap in the U.K. memorandum opposite "Canada" in paragraph 3 under the heading of "large scale production" programmes. Although our present pile at Chalk River is a producer, it is primarily for research; the second and larger pile whieh we may build would be in producer category. We might, therefore, state that Canada has "one heavy water pile" and this could be interpreted as referring to our present pile until our production pile, properly speaking, is constructed. Re 5» - T he statement at the end of paragraph 5 that the next three years' will be the critical period, might be taken to imply more than it does, and might perhaps be softened by saying "the next three or four years". 000171 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - Section A - (Cont'd) Re 10. - The term of the agreement, for five years from the 1 of January, 1950, seems appropriate. Section B Re 6. - We agree with this paragraph concerning Canadian raw material requirements being provided by arrangement between the U.S.. and Canada, as we have always maintained that our supplies are not subject to allocation. Section C We are presumably not interested having our scientist's integrated joint atomic weapons programme. are, a paragraph should be added .section. in in a If we to this Section D Here again the U.K. memorandum deals with the problem of U.K./U.S. exchanges almost exclusively. The Canadian position might be better protected if we were to suggest that (j) of paragraph 1. (Defensive measures against atomic weapons) Should be taken out of paragraph 1., which refers chiefly to U.S./ U.K. exchanges, and paragraph 3» should be rewritten as follows: "It is agreed that there should be full co-operation between the appropriate U.S., U.K. and Canadian staffs in the field of intelligence of atomic energy and also as regards defensive measures against atomic weapons." 000172 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 3Section D - (Contrd) Re k - The U.K. proposal is more specific than we should wish, as it says that after the U.K. stock-pile has reachecja certain level (which it may in about three years1 time), "the remainder of the U.K. stock of weapons will be stored in Canada and. held there at U.K. disposal." Instead, we might suggest, as the Prime Minister said at the meeting of the Advisory Panel on November 9, that the phrase to be used in any tripartite agreement should be that the remainder of the U.K. stock of weapons will be stored "in accordance with agreed strategic concepts", it being understood that we could consider a specific proposal from the U.K. and U.S* Governments when the time comes. The Prime Minister specifically did not want Canada designated in the agreement as a custodian of bombs for the other two countries. Section E As we shall not be taking part in the joint weapons programme, Canada will stand to gain more from the implementation of a tripartite agreement to exchange information in the field of basic research, which is covered in this section, and Dr. Mackenzie may therefore wish to make some of the paragraphs of this section more precise, so that it might be clearly understood that we are to exchange basic research information over the whole field of atomic energy, including industrial application, which is at present prohibited in the McMahon Act, so far as U.S. officiaU are concerned. Section F Re 3 - We should support the U.K. proposal that security standards. rqther than procedures, should be identical. 000173 �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information 'Am Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informi tion m» H' mm Section G We have no comments on the U,K, proposals for co-operation with other members of the Commonwealth and with other friendly countries: we can happily agree with any provisions that may be agreed between the U.S. and U.K. in this field. Section H Under the heading of "General Arrangements" the U.K. have proposed writing into the present agreement nearly all of-the provisions of the modus vivendi of January 1948. It may be desirable for us to reaffirm the stand we have always taken on raw materials - that our uranium is not subject to CDA allocation but that we are free to sell it, at least in , theory, to whatever buyer we choose. .,,. The proposed arrangements would be the same as those of the modus vivendi as regards our membership on both the CPC and the CDA. Before January 19^8, we had not taken part officially in meetings of the CDA, but Mr. Bateman had attended in a personal capacity as an expert rather than as a representative of the Canadian Government. Even in the CPC we had been shown, in the official minutes of the January 19^8 meetings, as attending "by invitation", and it was not until the modus vivendi was negotiated at that time that we were taken into full partnership in both the CPC and the CDA. As we accepted the modus vivendi, of which a copy is attached for purposes of comparison, there is presumably no reason why we should not accept the general arrangements proposed in the U,K. paper. 3« There are two points of possible Canadian interest that have been omitted from the U.K. proposals entirely. In the Quebec agreement it was specified that the bomb, if developed, would not be used.jE&thj3ut^prlpr^^^ any one of the three^participants. This provision was not , • "5 000174 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a finformatioi » • 5- included in the modus vivendi, as it was known that certain members of the Congressional Committee, including Senator Vandenburg, strongly objected to it. 4. The other point that might be of sufficient importance to Canada to include is perhaps too technical to be written into a tripartite agreement. We are selling all our uranium oxide to the United States and they are at present only able to extract a small proportion of its useful,content. In 19^7 Dr. Mackenzie suggested at a meeting of the Advisory Panel 'that we might protect our position in the future by negotiating with the Americans an agreement that would give us rights over uranium sludge once we knew how to re-cycle it; otherwise we may^fTnS^BTat a very Important raw material has been lost to future generations of Canadians. 5. International Control. As General McNaughton will be unable to attend tomorrow's meeting as he must be in Nextf York for the Security Council discussion on Kashmir, and as the Russians have walked but of the Six-Power talks, we have a little more time than we had expected to initiate a serious review of our policy on international control, which I think should be done with all the resources of knowledge at the disposal of the Government. Perhaps the Panel would authorize Mr. George to draft a paper for subsequent discussion ahlTlfSmment. """" 'f'he'^aim of the"*p=ap^r would be to determine wheth§2^here_jfas„any„wpps.slM in any xray, consistent with our national security, thV'provi'sTonF of the majority plan o f the""United Nations, so as ""to "open the way for real negotiations with the U*S..S.R, before they build up a stock-pile of bombs of serious proportions. Mr. George's paper would, of course, be based upon the comments which we have already received from New York and Washington and from Dr. Mackenzief on Mr, Kennan's proposals, R.A. MacKay 000175 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW05739 Title A name given to the resource CDNW05739 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Atomic energy - Advisory Panel on Atomic Energy - Agenda," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5954, file 50219-A-40, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Government of Canada Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF