https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/028308a77eb93f5650c3244f0b31c8de.pdf 3c98eaa6de3bdb522a08d14b03211ce3 PDF Text Text ins - \ SECRET S I National Defence Document disclosed under the Access to Informdtion Act Document divulgue vertu de la Loi sur I'ac^^a /'information 33 34 ■■■■^^■■■■■■■1 aaa ' Defense nationale OP APoCO O ■ QoDCEPT OF OrONToD s N M I 01 Pel 0 2 ( P.A. RANGER • CIRCULATION REMARKS REMARQUES' e co£ — 3c AUG O3 Date Init. Date Init. B.F. RAPPEL Date Cancel Annuler REGISTRY ONLY DEPOT CENTRAL Inspected Inspects Date 1 48 U. C LL OC O __________ _________ __________ a o 5 —a is at 2 &8 DC.O O S LCcc 55u co -t> DND 705 (03-00) 7530-21-894-4101 Design: Forms Management 993-4050 - Conception : Gestion des formulaires 993-3778 (11-02) 000001 J �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information MERM"AAC. 21 Gr: 2Got *. 225 I CSEN. Protect all files and records as official property. Protdger tous les dossiers et les documents comme etant la proprit officielle. Clean records prior to adding them to files. Netloyer les documents avant de les ajouter el leur dossier respectif. Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous staples. Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papillons, etiquettes, pingles, trombones, attachesfeuilles, agrafes etc.). File papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Classer les documents en ordre chronologique, la date la plus recente sur le dessus. Prepunch holes at the top left corner of the papers. Percer des trous du coin supdrieur gauche du document. Attach papers to the file by a paper spike for easy handling. Pour faciliter la manutention, attacher les documents au dossier au moyen d’une attache-feuille. When a file becomes thicker than 2", a subsequent volume should be created. Lorsque le dossier a plus de 2" d'paisseur, order un nouveau volume. Destroy duplicate material. Keep a copy only if it has additional information. Detruire tous les duplicatas qui ne contiennent aucun renseignements supplementaires. Verify the security classification of new documents added to the file. Verifier la cote de security des nouveaux documents ajoute au dossier. Upgrade the file to the required level as required. Augmenter la cote de securite si necessaire. I I C i i — — 1 4 'I I I I I I 'k s 7 4. 9 000002 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information Documents Removed from RI 12 Accessions for Processing or Preservation Formerly: OFRC 2003-1109 Removed from: 2008-1183 6 3350-134-32 OP APOLLO - CONOPS Removed: 1 CD - J4 LCol Matheson UNCLASS pst files Created on 1/28/2010 5:12:00 PM Created by Marsden 000003 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information 33S0 -/34Vol ! 3/ AAG 03 CLOSED 000004 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL Canadian Joint Task Force South-West Asia Eagle Village 7115 South Boundary Boulevard MacDill Air Force Base Tampa, Florida 33621 United States of America 3350-134-32 (J3) 3 August 2003 Distribution List FRAG 0 135 - MISSION CLOSEOUT OF CA JTFSWA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A US CENTCOM LIAISON TEAM References: A. DCDS 147 291235Z Jul 03, Frag 0 46 Drawdown of the National Command Element (NCE) - Op APOLLO B. DDIO Revision One, 31 Jul 01 C. DCDS 094 170030Z May 03 - Op APOLLO Drawdown (NOTAL) D. 231547Z Jul 03 TAV Order - Op APOLLO NCE Drawdown Plan - Logistics Order E. 3350-4-Op APOLLO (J4 Log Ops) 21 Jul 03, Op APOLLO NCE Closure - Materiel Distribution Instruction F. CDS 095 282000Z Oct 01 CDS Op Order 800/005/2001 G. 3350-165/A27 (J3 Intl 2-3) Transition Op APOLLO NCE to an OEF/CENTCOM Liaison Team 15 Jul 03 H. JTFSWA Comd 128 070900Z Jul 03 - Frag O 128 - Camp Mirage (CM) Transition from Op APOLLO to Op ATHENA 1. SITUATION. LAW Refs A and G, the CA JTFSWA NCE and NCCIS Det in Tampa will draw down to reflect the reduced operational tempo in the South-West Asia Area of Responsibility. Some of the CA JTFSWA assets have previously been repatriated to Canada. The remaining theatre assets, except the naval contribution and the FLS, will be reassigned to Op ATHENA. In conjunction with this, the CA JTFSWA NCE and NCCIS Det assets at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida will draw down to a seven person CENTCOM Liaison Team (Ln Tm) by the end of August 2003. To effect this transition the CA JTFSWA NCE and NCCIS Det will be closed out and a new Ln Tm establishment created - Task Force Tampa (TFT). CA JTFSWA was tasked at Ref E to support the deployment of Op ATHENA forces through Camp Mirage (CM) to Afghanistan and therefore the NCE and NCCIS Det will continue functioning in Tampa until after the Task Force Kabul (TFK) NCE is declared OPRED for employment in mid-Aug 03. This Frag O gives direction regarding the transition to a CENTCOM Ln Tm. 2. MISSION. To close CA JTFSWA NCE and NCCIS Det and establish a CENTCOM Liaison Team. 1/16 CONFIDENTIAL 000005 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL 3. EXECUTION a. Concept of Operations. (i) I (2) General. CA JTFSWA assets in Tampa include both the NCE and a Detachment of the NCCIS Sqn. The NCE liaison officers will be transferred either to the Camp Mirage, HMCS Calgary or Op ATHENA TO&E; for further details see Ref H. The NCE and NCCIS Detachment will be closed out by our personnel, assisted by an NCE Mission Closure Team (MCT) from 3 CSG and CFJSR. The NCE MCT will deploy to Tampa 18-25 Aug 03 and assist OC Sp and OC NCCIS Det to pack up and prepare materiel for redeployment to CA. Ln Tm. The Ln Tm will consist of the following personnel: (a) Senior National Representative - BGen Tabbernor; (b) Army LO - LCol Willis; (c) Navy LO - LCdr Samoluk; (d) Air Force LO - Maj Bhaiwala; (e) Intelligence LO - LCdr Parkhouse; (f) Admin Offr - Capt Robinson; and (g) Chief Clerk - Sgt Mersereau. It is envisaged that the Ln Tm will be further reduced to a Col and two LOs in end-Oct. At 160001Z Aug 03 (TBC) the NCE will formally cease operations. The NCE and NCCIS Det will draw down to a Ln Tm, to be assisted by a number of personnel who are required to complete the closeout of CA JTFSWA, by 29 Aug 03. They will work out of trailer D-24; the remaining two trailers will be returned to US CENTCOM by OC Sp once they are no longer required. '(3) Closeout Tm. In addition to those personnel above, there may be a requirement for some personnel to remain in Tampa after 29 Aug to ensure the closeout of the mission. Personnel remaining beyond 29 Aug will include: (a) Capt Fraser to co-ordinate the completion of JTFSWA PERs, honours and awards, and hardship and risk; (b) Cpl Belanger to assist with the above; (c) WO di Domenico to co-ordinate closeout communications issues. 2/16 CONFIDENTIAL 000006 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information . I CONFIDENTIAL (4) Outline. The transition of the NCE to a Ln Tm will be conducted in two Phs as follows: (a) (b) Ph 1. To commence immediately. During Ph 1: i. CA JTFSWA will continue to support the initial deployment of Op ATHENA forces through Camp Mirage to Kabul; ii. The NCE and NCCIS Det will conduct a 100% stocktaking of supply accounts and process CF 152 materiel adjustment reports, including identification of stock by CF 942 conditioning tag, for signature by applicable authorities; iii. Materiel not required by the Ln Tm will be identified for shipment to CA by road; iv. Materiel required by the Ln Tm will be identified to NDHQ; v. Materiel and accountable items required by the Ln Tm will be identified by the Ln Tm Coord and transferred to new supply accounts by the MCT; vi. NCE and NCOS Det supply accounts will be zero balanced and closed in theatre, if possible; vii. NCE closure Board of Inquiry will be conducted; viii. A CA JTFSWA Op APOLLO end-tour / lessons learned report will be prepared; and ix. Surplus NCE and NCCIS Det personnel will be repatriated to CA if they are no longer required to support operations or the mission close out. Ph 2. To commence 16 Aug 03. During Ph 2: i. CA JTFSWA NCE will close and TFT will commence operations; ii. A CA JTFSWA Op APOLLO closure Board of Inquiry will be conducted; iii. Files, records and war diaries will be packed for return to Canada; 3/16 CONFIDENTIAL 000007 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL b. c. iv. Materiel not required by the Ln Tm and closeout team will be shipped to CA by road or disposed of locally as appropriate; v. Personnel other than the seven Ln Tm members will be repatriated to CA once their work is completed or on order of Comd TFT; vi. Theatre PERs will be completed; and vii. Trailer D24 will be reconfigured to support the Ln Tm. Task Organization Ph 2. (1) CO HMCS Calgary will become TF Comd Op APOLLO; (2) FLS and LO NAVCENT will become OPCOM CO HMCS Calgary; (3) CA JTFSWA NCE will transition to TFT and the Comd CA JTFSWA will become the Senior National Representative and Comd TFT; and (4) The FLS will remain in Camp Mirage as a lodger unit. Tasks. (1) (2) CFJOG. Ref D directs CFJOG to: (a) Identify by stock number and destination supply account the disposition of NCE materiel destined for return to Canada; (b) Provide MCpl Cane (911) as augmentation to the MCT; (c) Provide guidance to the J2 on the handling and escort required for the SCIF returning to CFJSR; (d) Assist NCCIS personnel in the conduct of technical inspections of equipment destined for return to CFJSR; and (e) Co-ordinate supply transactions for stock returning to CFJSR. 3 CSG. The J4 Log TAV order directs 3 CSG to: (a) Provide MWO Dufour (911) as team leader for the MCT; (b) Provide Sgt Champagne and MCpl Thibault (933) as traffic technicians for the MCT; (c) Provide Sgt Canuel (911) as supply co-ordinator for the MCT; and (d) Provide one Cpl/Pte/Civ supply (name TBC) for the MCT. 4/16 CONFIDENTIAL 000008 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL (3) (4) (5) All. (a) Prepare theatre PERs for personnel returning to CA; (b) Prepare draft theatre PERs/handover notes for the supervisor of personnel deploying forward to Camp Mirage or Kabul, and for personnel remaining with the Ln Tm; (c) Review all section files to determine which need to be retained by the Ln Tm, which need to be copied and sent to Camp Mirage or TFK, which need to be retained for archival purposes and which can be destroyed. (Note: A copy of all correspondence originated in Tampa must be retained for archiving); (d) Commence archiving and packing mission documents and electronic files not required by the Ln Tm; (e) Assist with the packing and loading of all mission documents, furniture and equipment; (f) Ensure that UAB are prepared for return to Canada and identified to LS Estey by 30 Aug 03; (g) Dedicate a team of 10 personnel to perform technical inspection, identification, packaging and preparation of equipment for return to Canada; and (h) Identify issues to finalize with NDHQ or to pass to Camp Mirage of the TFK NCE. Jl. (a) Co-ordinate the redeployment of NCE and NCCIS Det staff to CA, Camp Mirage or Kabul as required; (b) Co-ordinate the transfer of Ln Tm personnel from Op APOLLO to TFK; (c) Ensure handover of Camp Mirage J l responsibilities to TFK; (d) Finalize all outstanding CA JTFSWA honours and awards and PERs. J2. (a) Prepare SCIF for return to CFJSR by road; and (b) Ensure handover of Camp Mirage J2 responsibilities to TFK. 5/16 CONFIDENTIAL I 000009 �L Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL (6) (7) J3. (a) Co-ordinate the preparation of the CA JTFSWA Op APOLLO lessons learned/closeout report; (b) Complete war diary and forward it to NDHQ as required; (c) Co-ordinate the TOCA of Camp Mirage and HMCS Calgary to CDS on 16 Aug 03; (d) Determine the requirement to transfer any files to CO Camp Mirage and TFK NCE staff; (e) Co-ordinate the transfer of the LOs and embedded staff to Camp Mirage, TFK or HMCS Calgary as appropriate; (f) Transfer copies of all diplomatic agreements, MOU and LA to CO Camp Mirage and TFK NCE staff; (g) Ensure the final edition of TFSOs are forwarded to TFK, NDHQ and CFJOG; and (h) Prepare Comds presentation to DIOB and DEM for 11 Sep highlighting Op APOLLO lessons learned and a presentation to the DCDS on other issues. J4. (a) J4 is appointed OPI for the NCE/NCCIS Det closure; (b) Review all agreements in concert with J4 Log, J8 and OC Sp; (c) Provide Capt McKay to co-ordinate the supply portion of the drawdown, including: i. Co-ordinate the details of the MCT with NDHQ and 3 CSG; ii. Provide weight and cube estimate of all returning stores to J4 Mov Plans for movement planning purposes; iii. Provide J4 Log with a complete listing of C class materiel recommended for return to CA (furniture, filing cabinets, etc); iv. Provide J4 Log with a complete listing of C class materiel recommended for local disposal or donation to host nation, coalition partners, charities, etc; 6/16 CONFIDENTIAL 000010 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL v. (8) (9) Provide J4 Log with a list of materiel required to support the Ln Tm; (d) Ensure the handover of Camp Mirage J4 responsibilities to TFK; (e) Prepare to move the equipment and the SCIF back to Canada by road, including the requirement to escort sensitive items; and (f) Arrange to lift the SCIF by crane in preparation for the road move to Canada. J6. (a) Co-ordinate the planning and implementation of CIS support to the Ln Tm and those personnel remaining beyond the drawdown; and (b) Ensure the handover of Camp Mirage J6 responsibilities to TFK. J8. (a) Provide a final budget to D Fin Ops / J8 FCC; (b) Review all contracts and LPO documentation and ensure that all accounts payable are settled. Provide suppliers with D Fin Ops 6-3 forwarding address if required; (c) Liaise with mutual support IA POC and reconcile outstanding claims for support provided or received; (d) Settle all outstanding claims and process all outstanding pay vouchers; (e) Ensure appropriate financial accounts set up for Ln Tm; (f) Reconcile and close all cashier activity for Op APOLLO including the bank account; (g) Ensure URS action to transfer alt pay office number for NCE personnel as applicable for repatriation or migration to TFT; (h) Reconcile Op APOLLO working capital fund (WCF) including local bank accounts by 30 Aug 03; (i) Ensure the handover of Camp Mirage J8 responsibilities to TFK; 7/16 CONFIDENTIAL 000011 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL (10) (H) (j) Liaise with URS Kingston to cease all operational allowances and benefits as per individual departure dates. Ensure alt PON transactions are completed for each departing member to support base PON and a pay note is placed on each pay record. Adjust split allotments/pre-determined pay per individual requests; (k) Reconcile and return to URS Kingston the NCE standing advance including local bank accounts; (1) Co-ordinate the issue of a standing advance from TFT URS with local bank accounts by 29 Aug 03; and (m) Transfer any required documents FOR TFT to the URS at CFSU (Ottawa). MP Advisor. (a) Co-ordinate the security of the SCIF during the road move to Canada in conjunction with the J2; and (b) Ensure handover of Camp Mirage and LO force protection, security and policing responsibilities to TFK. Engr Advisor. I (12) , (13) (a) Chair NCE closeout board of inquiry; and (b) Ensure handover of Camp Mirage infrastructure responsibilities to TFK. PAO. (a) Develop news release for national media for the drawdown of the NCE to a Ln Tm; (b) Ensure handover of public affairs responsibilities for the Ln Tm to NDHQ J5 PA; and (c) Ensure handover of Camp Mirage public affairs responsibilities to TFK. PC Sp. (a) Conduct 100% stocktaking / verification and preparation of CF 152 material adjustment reports for all supply accounts as required; 8/16 CONFIDENTIAL 000012 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL (14) (b) Provide accommodation to support MCT augmentees and BOI members; (c) Co-ordinate a team to conduct technical inspection, identification, packaging and preparation of equipment for return to CA; (d) Appoint a supply account holder for the Ln Tm and ensure that items remaining in Tampa are transferred to the appropriate account; (e) Review all agreements in concert with J4 Log and J8; (f) Co-ordinate the return of rental cars and apartments as they become surplus to requirement; (g) Order packing material required for the move; and (h) Co-ordinate the transfer of welfare equipment to the Ln Tm. NCCIS Det Comd. (a) Co-ordinate the closure of the NCCIS Tampa communications account less those items remaining with the Ln Tm; (b) Conduct 100% stocktaking / verification (as part of the NCCIS Sqn BOI) and preparation of CF 152 material adjustment reports for all supply accounts as required; (c) In conjunction with MCT, conduct technical inspection on equipment destined for return to CFJSR; (d) Co-ordinate closure of NCE communications and assist MCT with the transfer of materiel on CFSS to destination accounts; (e) Provide communications to allow supply and traffic technicians to access CFSS and NMDS; (f) Establish Ln Tm communications and support; (g) Co-ordinate the return of cell phones when they are no longer required; (h) Co-ordinate the shredding of disks and CD-ROMs that are no longer required; and (i) Ensure that archival CD copies are made of each individual’s inbox, personal folder and hard drive for TITAN and DWAN accounts. 9/16 CONFIDENTIAL 000013 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL (15) d. Ln Tm Coord. Maj Bhaiwala is appointed the Ln Tm Coord. He is responsible to: (a) Co-ordinate the reorganization of trailer D-24 to meet the requirements of the Ln Tm; (b) Develop a furniture and equipment list for transfer to the Ln Tm account; (c) Determine if any additional furniture is required to properly support the Ln Tm; (d) Develop a CIS equipment list for transfer to the Ln Tm account; (e) Develop a handover plan for the Ln Tm; and (f) Develop Ln Tm terms of reference. Co-ordinating instructions. (1) Timings. (a) 7 Aug 03. Stocktaking of all NCE and NCCIS Det accounts complete and CF 152s actioned; (b) 15 Aug 03. NCE BOI complete and report delivered to Comd CA JTFSWA; (c) 16 Aug 03. Op APOLLO CM units TOCA to DCDS; (d) 16 Aug 03. CA JTFSWA NCE and NCCIS Det cease operations; (e) 18-22 Aug 03. CA JTFSWA mission closeout BOI conducted; (f) 18-25 Aug 03. MCT deploys to Tampa for the closeout of the NCE and NCCIS Det; (g) 20 Aug 03. SCIF departs for Canada by road; (h) 22 Aug 03. CA JTFSWA mission closeout BOI complete and report delivered to Comd CA JTFSWA; (i) 26-28 Aug 03. Vehicle(s) arrive and are loaded for the road move to Canada; a) 29 Aug 03. Vehicle(s) depart for Canada by road; (k) 29 Aug 03. CA JTFSWA NCE and NCCIS Det close; 10/16 CONFIDENTIAL 000014 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de-la Loi sur l'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL (1) 29 Aug 03. TFT commences; (m) 29 Aug 03. Road move of stores to Canada; and (n) 11 Sep 03. Comd CA JTFSWA mission closeout presentation to DIOB and DEM. (2) Disposal of Files and Records. OC Sp is responsible to ensure that all TF files and records are returned to Canada for forwarding to the Federal Records Centre IAW Ref D, Chapter 3 Annex B. NCE J staff sections are responsible to review all section files to determine which need to be retained by the Ln Tm, which need to be copied and sent to Camp Mirage or TFK, which need to be retained for archival purposes and which can be destroyed. A copy of all correspondence originated in Tampa must be retained. Section files and records which are being retained for archival purposes are to be sorted by file number and by date and then forwarded to the Central Registry for packaging for return to Canada. Electronic files will be compiled by section (i.e. Comd, COS, JI, J2, J3, etc) and copied onto a CD-ROM by the NCCIS Det. The CD-ROMs are to be marked and placed in the same boxes as the files and records. (3) Communication Security (COMSEC). NCE COMSEC material will be returned in accordance with INFOSEC 2A (formerly CIS 01/304) and INFOSEC 406 (STU HI). NCCIS Det COMSEC material will be turned over to NCCIS COMSEC custodian in accordance with INFOSEC 2A (formerly CIS 01/304) and INFOSEC 406 (STU III). (4) CIS Data and Hard Drives. (5) (a) All data contained on IS systems (Titan, DWAN, Stoneghost, Spartan, stand-alone) must be archived to CD-ROM. Where authorized by system security orders, CD-ROMs of the archived data/information will be prepared, classified appropriately, and shipped with mission archived data. The system security orders for Titan, Spartan, and Stoneghost will not permit the use of CD ROM backup. In these cases, the hard drive shall be classified appropriately and shipped with mission archived data. Each CD and hard drive will be labelled with the name of the system that the information was pulled from and the method of archiving that was used; and (b) Requests to close TITAN and DWAN accounts are to be passed to MCpl Wadge for action. Military Police (MP). 11/16 CONFIDENTIAL 000015 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL (a) All MP reports held by the NCE will be appropriately packaged and forwarded to NDHQ, attention DPM Police for retention. MP files shall not be combined with other files being returned to Canada for archiving. Any MP evidence being held will be properly packaged and forwarded to Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) Evidence Custodian (Central Region) for retention and subsequent disposal; and (b) Investigation responsibility for any ongoing investigations shall be transferred to the appropriate MP unit for further action. (6) SITREPs. The NCE will continue to provide daily SITREPS until 16 Aug 03 covering subordinate units. After this date, the daily SITREP will only cover the NCE and NCCIS Det in Tampa. Details of the requirement for SITREPs for the Ln Tm will be promulgated. Since the Ln Tm will cover the CENTCOM AOR, SITREPS will still be required from CA units and formations in the AOR in order to provide situational awareness to TFT. (7) Public Affairs. The PA approach is active. The MND and CDS are the lead DND/CF spokespersons. Initial announcements were made on 6 Jun 03. Because there will be no PAO assigned to TFT, J5 PA will provide PA support and co-ordinate external and internal PA activities for TFT as required. Subject to OPSEC restrictions, TFT personnel are authorized to speak to the media as much as practicable. J5 PA should be advised before interviews are conducted, or shortly after. LAW DAOD 2008, when communicating with the public and the media, TFT personnel will limit their statements to their areas of responsibility and expertise. J5 PA is available 24/7 to provide support and advice. PAO has the lead in dealing with anticipated media interest in the drawdown until his return to Canada. ■ (8) Mission Closeout BOL CA JTFSWA will convene a mission closeout BOI. Representatives from CA JTFSWA NCE and NDHQ J3 Intl/J4 Log/J8 Fin will sit as members on the board. Terms of reference for the closeout BOI will be issued separately. (9) Reintegration. There is no requirement for any special reintegration activities beyond the normal post-deployment administration. (10) Lessons Learned. J3, with assistance from all sections, will complete the J7 Lessons Learned database in accordance with Ref B for submission to NDHQ. The lessons learned will be included as part of the end tour/mission closeout report. 12/16 CONFIDENTIAL 000016 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL 4. SERVICE SUPPORT a. Personnel. Seven CA JTFSWA NCE personnel will be transferred to TFT. URS for TFT will be established with CFSU (Ottawa) effective 29 Aug 03. Personnel records currently held with the NCE URS in CFB Kingston will be moved to CFSU (Ottawa) Foreign Service Section. Current assignments will cease 29 Aug and new TFT assignments will commence 30 Aug. For purposes of compensation and benefits, the sequential assignments to Op APOLLO and TFT will be considered as one continuous assignment. b. Leave Policy. Leave policy for TFT will be in accordance with Ref B. c. Clearances. All ranks, less those personnel remaining beyond 30 Aug, are to complete the out-clearance routine through the NCE orderly room. The outclearance includes your NCE PLCC card and other documents you will need to clear out of Tampa. d. Unaccompanied Baggage (UAB). UAB customs forms, available from LS Estey, are to be completed by all personnel returning to Canada. Capt Usher has already sent out an e-mail detailing the requirement. A garage has been rented at Bay Isle for the quarantine of UAB. LS Estey will control access to that garage to ensure items are quarantined. CF materiel, other than personal issue clothing and equipment, will not be included with UAB. e. Apartments. Individuals are responsible to clean out their apartments. Hurricane kits are to be returned to LS Estey and will be stored in the Bay Isle Keys garage. Keys and gate access cards are to be left with roommate or returned to OC Sp prior to departure. If you apartment is being vacated, keys and gate access cards are to be returned to OC Sp. f. Vehicle Return. Vehicles designated for return are to be dropped off at USave on Cypress St prior to travelling to the airport. Individuals should then take a taxi onwards to the airport. Fuel keys are to be returned to OC Sp the day prior to departure. 8. Material Transfer Process. The intent is to minimize transactions, expedite the closure process and to maximize in transit visibility. All materiel will be transferred from the NCE and NCCIS Det in accordance with the Materiel Distribution Instruction (MDI) to be issued by NDHQ J4 Log. All materiel must be cleaned, identified by CF 942 conditioning tag and transferred on the CFSS. Deviations from this process must be authorized by J4 Log Ops. h. Supply. High priority requisitions will continue to be actioned until 1 Aug 03 at which time all outstanding demands (PDO/LPO/REF) will be cancelled by the NCE staff, less those items for the Ln Tm. 13/16 CONFIDENTIAL 000017 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL i. 5. Returns. Equipment returned to Canada will be issued to the following accounts: (11) 25 CFSD A601; (12) 3 CSG C603 Main; and (13) CFJSR AA3028. e. Cleaning, Pest Control and Fumigation. Fumigation is not required for stores returning from Tampa. f. Financial. (1) Out-theatre accounts will not be established for Op APOLLO. All closeout costs are to be charged to fund centre 4915AA, cost centre 4916AA, fund L101, applicable GL and 10 605240; (2) Budget. J8 will prepare budget/cost estimate for costs relating to the drawdown of Op APOLLO NCE with a projection to FY end. NDHQ J8 will ratify this cost estimate and make adjustments to the DCDS overall budget using the quarterly reporting process; (3) Outstanding Invoices Payable/Receivable. J8 will liaise with budget managers and suppliers to obtain, reconcile and pay all outstanding invoices for the NCE to the extent possible prior to close. Since invoices may not all be received prior to the transition date, Op APOLLO fund and cost centres will remain open until a date still TBC to enable Op APOLLO invoices received late to be applied to Op APOLLO accounts. J8 is to liaise with NDHQ to define responsibilities for Op APOLLO accounts after the JTFSWA mission closeout date; and (4) TFT FY 03/04 Budget. J8 will ensure that a FY 03/04 budget is prepared for TFT prior to departure for CA. COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Command. The CDS retains full command of CA JTFSWA NCE and TFT at all times. CDS will exercise command of the NCE and TFT through the DCDS. b. Transfer of Command Authority (TOCA). (1) The CDS will TOCA SWA TAL Unit, Theatre Support Base (formerly NSU), NCCIS Sqn and HMCS Calgary from Comd CA JTFSWA to the DCDS on 16 Aug 03; and 14/16 CONFIDENTIAL 000018 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL (2) The CDS will TOCA CM from the DCDS to Comd TFK on 16 Aug 03. d. Command Relationships. All elements of the MCT will be TACOM Comd JTFSWA and OPCON NDHQ J4 Log Ops. e. Message Addresses. (1) The following message address is not required after 29 Aug: (a) (2) CA JTFSWA NCE TAMPA; The following message addresses are not required after 16 Aug: (a) CA JTFSWA NSU CAMP MIRAGE; (b) CA JTFSWA TAL CAMP MIRAGE; (c) CA JTFSWA NCCIS SQN CAMP MIRAGE; and (d) CA JTFSWA LRP CAMP MIRAGE; (2) Comd TFK NCE will be responsible to have message addresses created for the Op ATHENA CM units effective 16 Aug 03; and (3) A message address will be required for TFT effective 16 Aug 03. XZ— D.C. Tabbernor BGen Commander Distribution List Action JTFSWA NCE - COS, JI, J2, J3, J4, J6, J8, OC Sp, Engr Advisor, MP Advisor, PAO JTFSWA NCCIS Det - Det Comd Information NDHQ Ottawa - COS J3, J3 Inti, J3 Intl 2, J3 Intl 2-2, Ji Coord, J4 Log, J4 Mov, J5 PA, J7 LL,J8Fin NCE Kabul - CO CA JTFSWA Camp Mirage - CO 15/16 CONFIDENTIAL 000019 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL CFJOG Kingston - J4 3 CSG Montreal - Ops O CFSU (Ottawa) - Foreign Service Section 16/16 CONFIDENTIAL 000020 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL National Command Element Canadian Joint Task Force South-West Asia Eagle Village 7115 South Boundary Boulevard MacDill AFB, FL USA 33621 3350-134-32 (J3) 22July2003 Distribution List FURTHER AURORA COMMITMENT TO WAR ON TERRORISM Reference: Briefing Note to CA JTFSWA COS, 10 Jul 03 (enclosed) 1. In late June, NCE Tampa was informally approached to determine if and when Canada could regenerate a Long Range Patrol (LRP) capability to support OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM within the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). The attached briefing note was prepared to examine the feasibility of a further Canadian LRP contribution to the continuing war on terrorism and to propose courses of action. 2. Given the Canadian LRP success and the experience gained during the three OP APOLLO rotations, US Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT) is keen to have our Auroras return to the USCENTCOM AOR. While it is well known that our past participation was a large drain on resources and that the Aurora Incremental Modernisation Program is reaching full demand with up to five aircraft withdrawn from service, the feasibility of deploying Auroras, even if less than previous rotations, merits further consideration. 3. It is recommended that the Air Force and in particular I CAD and the Maritime Air Advisory Group (CMAAG) be engaged to determine not only the force employment feasibility, but also the force generation benefits that could accrue from continued LRP participation in OP APOLLO. It is expected that USNAVCENT will make a formal request for forces by early September 2003. d D.C. Tabbernor Brigadier-General Commander 1/2 CONFIDENTIAL 000021 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL Enclosure: 1 Distribution List Action COS J3 Info D Air FE 2/2 CONFIDENTIAL 000022 �- Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces d l mformat.on CONFIDENTIAL BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF JTFSWA ISSUE 1. Canada’s willingness to provide further commitment of Long Range Patrol (LRP) aircraft in response to the NAVCENT & CENTCOM informal request for further contributions from Coalition Forces. AIM 2. The aim of this briefing note is to examine the feasibility of a Canadian LRP contribution to the continuing wax' on terrorism and to propose courses of action.---- BACKGROUND 3. CENTCOM has recently confirmed that to effectively conduct OEF maritime surveillance operations in the CENTCOM AOR (Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea), Coalition Forces require a minimum of 10 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). As of 27 June 2003, following the departure of the Dutch and Canadian MPAs, the total number of LRP aircraft was reduced to nine. In September 2003, the Germans will repatriate their three Atlantics, reducing the total number of MPAs in the CENTCOM AOR to six. This will be further reduced to five in November 2003, when New Zealand’s contribution ends. 4. In late June, NCE Tampa was informally approached to determine if and when Canada could regenerate an Aurora capability within the CENTCOM AOR. At that time we informed CENTCOM that we would conduct a feasibility staff check. If the results of the staff check are positive, CENTCOM will then formally ask for a further LRP contribution from Canada. i DISCUSSION I 5. Canada’s commitment to the war on terrorism continues on various fronts. Op Apollo remains active with our naval presence in the Persian Gulf. Camp Mirage (CM) will also remain as a base of operation for at least one year and could be used again as the Forward Operating Base (FOB) for Canadian Aurora Operations in the CENTCOM AOR. I i i i 6. CENTCOM will likely welcome any LRP contributions. These missions would be similar to those conducted by the LRP Det during Op Apollo. Should Canada decide to contribute further LRP resources, the Aurora could operate from CM, but likely on a reduced basis due to current constraints on CF budget and LRP community resources. These constraints are well known within the CP-140 community and include aircraft availability, YFR and personnel. They are exacerbated by the Aurora Incremental Modernisation Program (AJMP) and its impact on aircraft availability. 1/2 CONFIDENTIAL 000023 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL 7. Given these constraints, a contribution on a scale similar to the Op Apollo LRP Det, providing one Line of Tasking (LOT) per day for an extended period is not likely feasible. However, further contribution to Op Apollo would provide an opportunity to build on our success and to operate some of the new AIMP equipment in an operational environment. 8. To support any future LRP OEF operation in the CENTCOM AOR, the following options should be considered: a. Option 1. Deploy one Aurora and one crew to CM to provide one LOT every two days for a six-month period, as per normal DCDS rotation. The crew could be rotated every 56 days. b. Option 2. Deploy one Aurora and one crew to CM to provide one LOT every two days for one month. The crew will rotate after two weeks via Sustainment Flight and the second crew will fly back to Canada with the Aurora after their two weeks is over. This could be done once every six months. c. Option 3. Same as Option 2 but once every quarter, thus providing a total of three months in theatre. 9. Option 1 is not supportable due to YFR limitations, AIMP requirements and overall costs associated with a six-month rotation. Option 2 and 3 are both achievable, but the advantages/disadvantages of providing an extra one-month rotation per year will have to be looked at. CONCLUSION 10. Given the Canadian success and the experience gained during the three Op Apollo rotations, a return to the CENTCOM AOR merits further consideration. Despite current LRP constraints, both options 2 and 3 are manageable, but Option 3 would generate one more rotation over a year, thus providing greater support for the coalition. Prepared by: Maj J.V.M. Bouchard, J3 Air Input from: Maj A. Bhaiwala, J5 Air LCdr A. Samoluk, J5 Mar Reviewed by: LCol G.C. Szczerbaniwicz, J3 Date Prepared: 10 July, 2003 2/2 CONFIDENTIAL 000024 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information 000025 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Id L^^j^Tacces^l'T^ormation s.13(1)(a) s.15(1 j SECRET 3350-134-32 (J5) BRIEFING NOTE FOR COMD JTFSWA ISSUE: COMDS MEETING WITH BGEN TRAUTMAN 12 MAY 03 AIM 1. To update the Comd on the CA position and issues for discussion with BGen Trautman (Deputy Director CCJ5) at the 12 May meeting. BACKGROUND 1. Based on previous discussion with BGen Trautman, DISCUSSION 1/5 SECRET 000026 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a i'information s.13(1)(a) s.15(1) SECRET CONCLUSIONS Prepared by: LCol J. W. Willis, J5, (813) 827-1284 Assisted by: Mr G. Buchan, POLAD, (813) 827-1555 Reviewed by: Col R. V. Blanchette, COS, (813) 827-1089 Date Prepared: 10 May 03 2/5 SECRET 000027 1 | �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information s.15(1) . SECRET 3/5 SECRET 000028 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information s.151) SECRET 4/5 SECRET 000029 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information s.13(1)(a) s.15(1) SECRET TALKING POINTS Points to use if “synchronization of understanding” is required Main points 5/5 SECRET 000030 �Document disclosed under the Access to InformationAct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'informatlon Version 2.0 as of 091300 hrs May 03 Modified DART Organization DART - 174 DART LOs - 5 (5,0,0) MP SEC -2 (0,1,1) DART HQ - 27 (13,8,6) (26,32,116) DART Company -125 (7,21,97) Signals Troop -15 (1,2,12) Company HQ - 8 (3,2,3) Defence & Security (D&S) Platoon - 44 (1,5,38) I Medical Sect 8 - (1,3,4) 1 Engineer Troop 43 - (1,8,34) Logistics Platoon 22 - (1,3,18) 000031 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information.Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'infbrmatton 2:46 PM RECOMMENDED DART PERSONNEL ESTABLISHMENT OP IRIS Prepared 2 May 2003 RECOMMENDED DART TO&E OP IRIS VERSION 1 PROPOSED EST SOURCE POSN TITLE NUMBER SER DART HEADQUARTERS DART COMMAND SECTION COMD; JHQ 1 75203* COMD DRIVER/RAD OP JSR 2 75209 JHQ/DART DCO 75204 3 JHQ OPSO 4 75205 JHQ OPS NCO 75208 5 OPSNCO JHQ 6 JHQ ENGR 75207* 7 MED LO/ADJT JHQ 75219* 8 NDHQ LEGAL OFFR 9 JHQ CIMIC OFFR 10 CIMIC NCOXASSESSOR JSG 75245 11 LFA PADRE 12 75221 MP LFA 13 75210 LFA MP 14 75211 DART HQ ORDERLY ROOM CHIEF CLK JHQ 75213 15 JHQ RMS CLK 75214 16 POSTAL CLERK NDHQ 17 FINANCE CELL JHQ FIN OFFR 75212 18 JHQ FIN CLERK 19 PUBLIC AFFAIRS CELL SR PAFFO JHQ 75215 20 NDHQ PAFFO 75216 21 75217* NDHQ PHOTO TECH 22 LOGISTICS CELL JHQ/DART LOG OFFR 75220* 23 SUP SUPERVISOR LFA 24 LFA SUP TECH 25 INTELLIGENCE CELL JHQ TM LDR 75222 26 JHQ TM 2 IC 75223 27 MET TECH 75224 JHQ 28 JHQ TERA 75225 29 SIGNALS TP SIGS O / CP DUTY OFFR 75206 JSR 30 JSR SIGS TP WO 31 75226* HEADQUARTERS SIGNALS SECTION HQ DET COMD 32 75227 JSR JSR LCIS TECH 33 75228 JSR 34 75231 IS OP JSR IS OP 35 LINEMAN JSR 75230 36 RAD SECTION RAD DET COMD 37 75232 JSR RAD OP JSR 75233 38 RAD OP JSR 75234* 39 NCCIS SECTION NCCIS/RAD DET COMD 75240 JSR 40 NCCIS OP JSR 75235 41 1/5 10/05/2003 HIGH RANK LOW RANK MOC LCOL CPL MAJ CAPT WO WO CAPT MAJ MAJ MAJ MWO CAPT SGT MCPL LCOL PTE MAJ CAPT SGT SGT CAPT CAPT CAPT CAPT MWO CAPT MCPL CPL 02 215 46 02 972 972 24A 48A 81C OT 649 61A 811 811 SGT MCPL MCPL MCPL CPL MCPL 836 836 881 GATES COMEAU LEE MCPL CPL SGT CAPT MCPL CAPT MCPL 69G 836 COULOMBE SCOTT CAPT CPL MAJ CAPT MCPL MAJ CAPT CPL 66A 66A 541 MONIZ BERDAIS CAPT CAPT CAPT MWO MCPL CAPT WO CPL 69C 911 911 CAPT WO WO WO CAPT SGT SGT SGT 82A 111 121 152 CAPT WO LT WO 42B 215 SGT MCPL CPL CPL CPL MCPL CPL CPL PTE CPL 215 227 215 215 052 MCPL CPL CPL CPL PTE PTE 215 215 215 MCPL CPL CPL PTE 215 215 Assigned Rank COMMENT BERGSTRAND LCOL LAFAVE CPL GAUTHIER MAJ EASTON CAPT BEALE WO GROUSE i SGT MCRAE CAPT CAPT RIDGEWAY DAVIS CAPT CZICH MAJ DEBRIE MWO 000032 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information 2:46 PM RECOMMENDED DART PERSONNEL ESTABLISHMENT OP IRIS Prepared 2 May 2003 RECOMMENDED DART TO&E OP IRIS VERSION 1 EST NUMBER SER 42 43 75229 44 DARTLO’s 45 | 46 ___ 47 ___ 48 49 NCCIS OP NCCIS OP LCIS TECH HIGH RANK CPL CPL CPL LOW RANK PTE PTE CPL MOC 215 215 227 MED LO OPS LO OPSLO LOG LO INTLO MAJ CAPT CAPT CAPT MAJ CAPT CAPT MWO CAPT CAPT 48A 02 02 69C 82A MAJ CAPT CAPT MWO MWO MCPL CPL CPL MAJ CAPT CAPT MWO SGT CPL PTE PTE 02 02 02 972 972 836 215 215 ENGR TP COMD OPS WO____________ MAT CON SECT COMD MAT CON SECT 2 IC CAPT WO SGT MCPL CAPT SGT SGT MCPL 24A 041 1042 836 911 WATER SUP SECT COMD WATER SUP SECT 2 IC ROWPU OP ROWPU OP ROWPU OP SGT MCPL CPL CPL CPL MCPL CPL PTE PTE PTE 041/647 041/647 041 041 041 WATER SUP SECT COMD WATER SUP SECT 2 IC ROWPU OP ROWPU OP ROWPU OP SGT MCPL CPL CPL CPL MCPL CPL PTE PTE PTE 041/647 041/647 041 : 041 . 041 CONSTR SUPR CONSTR TECH SUPR CONST TECH ED TECH SUPR ED TECH PH TECH SUPR PH TECH EGS TECH SUPR EGS TECH WFE TECH SUPR WFE TECH RM TECH SUPR RM TECH WO MCPL CPL MCPL CPL MCPL CPL MCPL CPL MCPL CPL MCPL CPL WO MCPL CPL MCPL CPL MCPL CPL MCPL CPL MCPL CPL MCPL CPL 649 648 648 642 642 646 646 643 643 647 647 641 641 PROPOSED SOURCE JSR JSR JSR CF HS Gp JHQ JHQ LFAA JHQ POSN TITLE DART COMPANY DART COMPANY HEADQUARTERS COY COMD LFA 75236* 50 COY 2IC LFA 51 COY OPS O LFA 52 75238 LFA CSM 53 75239 LFA CIMIC NCO 54 COY CLK LFA 55 RAD OP LFA 56 75241 RAD OP LFA 57 75242 ENGINEER TROOP___________ ENGINEER TROOP HEADQUARTERS LFA 75243 58 LFA 75244 59 LFA 75247 60 LFA 75248 61 ROWPU SECTION 1 LFA 62 75251 75252 LFA 63 LFA 64 75253 LFA 75254 65 LFA 75255 66 ROWPU SECTION 2 LFA 67 | 68 7) LFA LFA 69 LFA 70 LFA 71 CONSTRUCTION SECTION LFA 72 LFA 75258 73 LFA 75260 74 LFA 75259 75 LFA 75261 76 LFA 75262 79 LFA 75263 80 LFA 75264 83 LFA 75266 84 LFA 75265* 85 LFA 75267 86 LFA 87 75268 LFA 88 75269 FIELD SECTION 2/5 10/05/2003 Assigned Rank PENNELL MAJ COMMENT CIMIC EXPERIENCE AND/OR TRAINING ROWPU DET 2 000033 �Document disclosed under the Access to lnformation_Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a i'information 2:46 PM RECOMMENDED DART PERSONNEL ESTABLISHMENT OP IRIS PROPOSED SOURCE POSN TITLE SER FD ENGR SECT COMD LFA 89 LFA FD ENGR SECT 2IC 90 SAPPER LFA 91 SAPPER LFA 92 LFA SAPPER 93 SAPPER LFA 94 LFA SAPPER 95 SAPPER LFA 96 LFA SAPPER 97 SAPPER LFA 98 LFA SAPPER 99 HEAVY EQUIPMENT SECTION LFA HVY EQPT SECT COMD 100 75280 LFA HVY EQPT 2IC 75281 101 LFA HVY EQPT OP 102 HVY EQPT OP LFA 103 FIREFIGHTER CAS | FIREFIGHTER 104 | MEDICAL PLATOON_______________ MEDICAL PLATOON HEADQUARTERS MED PL COMD 75282 CFMG 105 CFMG PL WO 75284 106 1 SECTION - PRIMARY CARE SECT COMD 75288 CFMG 107 1 DET COMD CFMG 75289 108 CFMG MED A 75290 109 MED A 75291 CFMG 110 MED A 75292 CFMG 111 PREVENTIVE MEDICINE SECTION CFMG PMED ADVISOR 112 | 75324 DART HEADQUARTERS UAS DEFENCE AND SECURITY PLATOON # 1 DEFENCE AND SECURITY PLATOON HEADQUARTERS SECUR PL COMD LFA 113 75326 LFA COMM/DVR 75327 114 LFA SECUR PL WO 75328 115 LFA GNR 75329 116 1-1 SECTION SECUR SECT COMD LFA 117 75330 LFA SECUR SECT 2 IC 118 75331 LFA RFLMN/DVR_______ 75332 119 RFLMN LFA 120 75333 LFA RFLMN 75334 121 LFA RFLMN 122 75335 RFLMN LFA 75336 123 75337 LFA RFLMN 124 LFA RFLMN 125 75338 LFA RFLMN 126 75339 1-2 SECTION LFA SECUR SECT COMD 127 75340 LFA SECUR SECT 2 IC 75341 128 RFLMN/DVR 75342 LFA 129 3/5 | | * - Prepared 2 May 2003 RECOMMENDED DART TO&E OP IRIS VERSION 1 EST NUMBER 75270 75271 75272 75273 75274 75275 75276 75277 75278 75279 10/05/2003 HIGH RANK SGT MCPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL LOW RANK SGT MCPL PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE MOC 041 041 041 041 041 041 041 041 041 041 041 SGT MCPL CPL CPL MCPL CPL CPL CPL 042 042 042 042 SGT | MCPL | 651 MAJ WO CAPT WO 55A 711 SGT MCPL CPL CPL CPL SGT MCPL CPL CPL CPL 711 711 711 711 711 WO WO 716 CAPT MCPL WO CPL LT CPL WO PTE 02 972 972 972 SGT MCPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL SGT MCPL PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 SGT MCPL CPL SGT MCPL PTE 972 972 972 Assigned Rank COMMENT 6 A Qualified - CAMP FIRE PROTECTION 000034 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information.Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information 2:46 PM RECOMMENDED DART PERSONNEL ESTABLISHMENT OP IRIS Prepared 2 May 2003 RECOMMENDED DART TO&E OP IRIS VERSION 1 PROPOSED EST POSN TITLE SOURCE SER NUMBER RFLMN LFA 75343 130 RFLMN LFA 75344 131 LFA RFLMN 132 75345 RFLMN LFA 133 75346 RFLMN LFA 75347 134 LFA RFLMN 135 75348 RFLMN LFA 75349 136 1-3 SECTION SECUR SECT COMD LFA 137 75350 SECUR SECT 2 IC LFA 138 75351 RFLMN/DVR LFA 75352 139 RFLMN LFA 140 75353 LFA RFLMN 75354 141 RFLMN LFA 142 75355 LFA RFLMN 143 75356 RFLMN LFA 144 75357 RFLMN LFA 75358 145 RFLMN LFA 146 75359 2-1 SECTION ( 4th section ) SECUR SECT COMD LFA 151 SECUR SECT 2 IC LFA 152 RFLMN/DVR LFA 153 RFLMN LFA 154 RFLMN LFA 155 RFLMN LFA 156 RFLMN LFA 157 LFA RFLMN 158 RFLMN LFA 159 LFA RFLMN 160 LOGISICS PLATOON LOGISICS PLATOON HEADQUARTERS LFA LOG PL COMD 181 75360 LOG PL WO LFA 182 75361 QM SECTION LFA SUP SECTCOMD 75362 183 JHQ/DART SUP SECT 2 IC 184 75363 LFA SUP CLK 185 LFA SUP CLK 186 MAINTENANCE SECTION JHQ/DART MAINT SECT COMD 75364 187 JHQ/DART VEH TECH 75365 188 VEH TECH LFA 75366 189 LFA VEH TECH 75367 190 LFA FCS TECH 191 75368 TRANSPORT SECTION TPT SECT COMD LFA 192 75373 LFA TPT SECT 2 IC/DVR 75374 193 194 195 196 197 198 4/5 75375 75376 75377 75378 75379 LFA LFA LFA LFA LFA DVR DVR DVR DVR DVR HIGH RANK CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL LOW RANK PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE SGT MCPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL SGT MCPL PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 SGT MCPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL SGT MCPL PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE PTE 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 CAPT MWO CAPT WO 69D 411 SGT MCPL CPL CPL SGT CPL PTE PTE 911 911 911 911 MCPL CPL CPL CPL CPL MCPL CPL CPL CPL CPL 411 411 411 411 432 MCPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL CPL MCPL CPL CPL CPL PTE PTE PTE 031 031 031 031 031 031 031 MOC Assigned Rank 10/05/2003 * - « COMMENT 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 000035 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information 2:46 PM RECOMMENDED DART PERSONNEL ESTABLISHMENT OP IRIS Prepared 2 May 2003 RECOMMENDED DART TO&E OP IRIS VERSION 1 EST NUMBER SER MCC DETACHMENT 75369 199 75370 200 COOK DETACHMENT 75371 201 75372 202 PROPOSED SOURCE POSN TITLE HIGH RANK LOW RANK MOC LFA LFA MCC TFC TECH MCC TFC TECH SGT MCPL SGT MCPL 933 933 LFA LFA COOK COOK HELPER MCPL CPL MCPL CPL 861 861 Assigned Rank 10/05/2003 • • - 4 . COMMENT AMMENDMENTS NOTES: 1. (*) Beside Position Number indicates member is on 9 Pers Recce Team 12 Hours NTM) 2. MAMS Team required to support DART is provided by CAS OP IRIS ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS Serial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Proposed Sourc LEA/4ESR LFA/4ESR LFA/4ESR LFA LFA LFA/4ESR : CAS CFJOG ITEM HLVW PLS HLVW PLS HLVW PLS HLVWREFULER: HLVWTCV ROWPU Fire Fighter Trailer LSVWCP Include extra PLS Pallet Include extra RLS Pallet Include extra PLS Pallet Back up, maintenance and Surg capabilty AE Eng Type ........... ......... TCCCS Capable (JSR to provide) 000036 5/5 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL (UNCL@LEss ENCLOSURE) National Command Element CA JTFSWA Eagle Village 7115S Boundary Boulevard MacDill AFB, Tampa FL 33621 3350-134-32 (2 April 2003 COS J3 National Defence Headquarters MGen George R. Pearkes Bldg 101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa ON KIA 0K2 V REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OP APOLLO USE OF FORCE SUMMARY CARDS Ref: CDS 007 201320Z Mar 03 OP APOLLO ROEAUTH 007 1. The four current OP APOLLO Use of Force Summary Cards have been reviewed by the NCE Legal Officer and J3 staff. They have been updated to reflect the changes contained at the ref and as recommended by J3 Intl and J5 Legal staffs. 2. Subject to DCDS approval of the enclosed cards, there will be four Use of Force cards in effect for Op APOLLO: a. Force Protection (FP) Summary Card: b. Visit and Search Operations (VSO) Summary Card; c. UN Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) Summary Card; and d. Soldier’s Card. 3. Your approval and forwarding to DCDS of the enclosed OP APOLLO Use of Force Summary Cards is solicited. /JOM&tal / W.A Watt — Brigadier-General Commander Canadian Joint Task Force South-West Asia Enclosures: 4 CONFIDENTIAL (UNCLASS LESS ENCLOSURE) 000037 �CUNFIDEN IIAL OP APOLLO - UN SANCTIONED MARITIME INTERDICTION OPS (MIO) SUMMARY CARD Ref: CDS ROEAUTH 007 20 March 2003 1. SELF DEFENCE. Nothing in the CDS authorized Rules of Engagement (ROE) limits your right to use force, up to and including deadly force, to protect yourself or other CF personnel from an immediate threat of death or serious injury. 2. MINIMUM FORCE. The use of authorized force must never be more than what is necessary and reasonable based on the prevailing circumstances. This is the overriding consideration in any use of force. In certain circumstances, deadly force may be the appropriate level of minimum force. 3. DEADLY FORCE. The use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized in self-defence as described above and to defend the following from an immediate threat of death or serious injury: a. Friendly Forces; Cb. Property with Designated Special Status (if ROE 81 implemented); c. Any person in or on Friendly Force property; and d. Detained persons. 4. NON-DEADLY FORCE. The use of non-deadly force is authorized: a. PROPERTY. To defend Friendly Force property from unauthorized access, theft or destruction. b. DETENTION. To detain anyone who attempts to interfere with the conduct of the MIO. C. SEARCH. To search any detained person for weapons or other items capable of posing a threat to the safety of anyone. d. MIO. (1) To prevent any detained person from escaping; (2) To disarm any person who has been detained; (3) To seize any cargo or vessel identified as being in contravention of the applicable mission sanctions; and (4) In other situations as necessary to complete the MIO. ONLY NON-DEADLY FORCE IS AUTHORIZED TO STOP A FLEEING ( DETAINEE. 5.STEPS IN APPLYING FORCE. Unless an attack comes so unexpectedly that even a moment’s delay could lead to death or serious injury, any force shall be applied, time and circumstances permitting, in the following sequence: a.. NON-DEADLY FORCE. (1) Presence - physical presence of disciplined and professional personnel; (2) Challenging/Warning - repeated verbal/visual warnings or challenges until it is clear you were seen or heard; (3) Empty Hand Control - use of unarmed physical means such as pushing, soft arm control, lesser forms of striking or restraining; (4) Use of Intermediate Weapons - ASP baton or pepper spray by trained personnel; and (5) Use of Mechanical Restraints - use of flex cuffs and handcuffs; CONFIDENTIAL Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information CAJIFSVA TINAL II AMKILU3 UNLESS YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE DEADLY FORCE YOU WILL NOT PROCEED BEYOND THIS POINT a. DEADLY FORCE. (1) Show of Armed Force - loading, making ready, and aiming of weapons to show resolve to use deadly force; (2) Warning Shots - fire at a safe point of aim; and (3) Deadly Force - if you are authorized and have to open fire, you shall: (a) Use only aimed shots, (b) Fire no more rounds than necessary, (c) Take all reasonable efforts to minimize collateral damage, and (d) Stop firing as soon as the situation permits. 6. WEAPON READINESS STATES. Weapon Readiness States shall be as ordered by the Commanding Officer or, in the CO's absence, the on-scene commander. 7. USE OF FORCE AND CF CODE OF CONDUCT VIOLATIONS. Report to your commander all known or suspected Use of Force or Code of Conduct violations. 8. FRIENDLY FORCES. Any forces belonging to nations participating in or providing support to the Campaign Against Terrorism (CAT), irrespective of the force’s mission, the International Assistance Force (ISAF) or conducting UNSCR sanctioned MIO against Iraq. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR CF PERSONNEL 1. 2. Engage only opposing forces and military objectives. In accomplishing your mission, use only the necessary force that causes the least amount of collateral civilian damage. 3. Do not alter your weapons or ammunition to increase suffering, or use unauthorized weapons or ammunition. 4. Treat all civilians humanely and respect civilian property. 5. Do not attack those who surrender. Disarm and detain them. 6. Treat all detained persons humanely in accordance with the standard set by the Third Geneva Convention. Any form of abuse, including torture, is prohibited. 7. Collect all the wounded and sick and provide them with the treatment required-by their condition, whether friend or foe. 8. Looting is prohibited. 9. Respect all cultural objects (museums, monuments, etc.) and places of worship. 10. Respect all persons and objects bearing the Red Cross/Red Crescent, and other recognized symbols of humanitarian agencies. 11. Report and take appropriate steps to stop breaches of the Law of Armed Conflict and these rules. Disobedience of the Law of Armed Conflict is a crime. 000038 �CONFIDENTIAL Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information CA JTFSWA FINAL 11 APRIL 03 OP APOLLO - VISIT AND SEARCH OPERATIONS (VSO) SUMMARY CARD Ref: CDS ROEAUTH 007 20 March 2003 1. SELF DEFENCE. Nothing in the CDS authorized Rules of Engagement (ROE) limits your right to use force, up to and including deadly force, to protect yourself or other CF personnel from an immediate threat of death or serious injury. 2. PROPORTIONAL FORCE. Any force used must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary to achieve the objective for which the force is used and no more. 3. DEADLY FORCE AGAINST TALIBAN AND AL QAIDA. When ordered, the use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized to: a. conduct attacks against Taliban and Al Qaida forces. THE CONDUCT OF SUCH ATTACKS WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE LOAC AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONAL FORCE b. to prevent confirmed Taliban and Al Qaida forces from escaping capture. 6 WHILE DEADLY FORCE IS AUTHORIZED, SUCH FORCE SHALL W CONSTITUTE AN EXTREME MEASURE WHICH WILL ALWAYS BE PRECEDED BY WARNINGS APPROPRIATE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES 4. DEADLY FORCE. The use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized in self-defence as described above, to prevent serious crimes and to defend the following from an immediate threat of death or serious injury: a. Friendly Forces; b. Property with Designated Special Status (if ROE 81 is implemented); c. Any person in or on Friendly Force property; and d. Detained persons. 5. NON-DEADLY FORCE. The use of non-deadly force is authorized: a. PROPERTY. To defend Friendly Force property from unauthorized access, theft or destruction. b. DETENTION. To detain anyone who attempts to interfere with the conduct of VSO. c. SEARCH. To search any detained person for weapons or other items capable of posing a threat to the safety of anyone. VSO. (1) To prevent a detained person from escaping; " (2) To disarm any person who has been detained; (3) To seize any cargo or vessel I AW the LOAC; and (4) In other situations as necessary to complete the VSO. EXCEPT FOR CONFIRMED TALIBAN OR AL QAIDA PERSONNEL ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE FROM CAPTURE, ONLY NON-DEADLY FORCE IS AUTHORIZED TO STOP A FLEEING DETAINEE 6. STEPS IN APPLYING FORCE. Except when attacking Taliban or Al Qaida forces and unless an attack comes so unexpectedly that even a moment’s delay could lead to death or serious injury, any force shall be applied, time and circumstances permitting, in the following sequence: a. NON-DEADLY FORCE. (1) Presence - physical presence of disciplined and professional personnel; (2) Challenging/Warning - repeated verbal/visual warnings or challenges until it is clear you were seen or heard; (3) Empty Hand Control - use of unarmed physical means such as pushing, soft arm control, lesser forms of striking or restraining; (4) Use of Mechanical Restraints - use of flex cuffs and handcuffs; UNLESS YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE DEADLY FORCE YOU WILL NOT PROCEED BEYOND THIS POINT b. DEADLY FORCE. (1) Show of Armed Force - loading, making ready, and aiming of weapons to show resolve to use deadly force; (2) Warning Shots - fire at a safe point of aim; and (3) Deadly Force - if you are authorized and have to open fire, you shall: (a) Use only aimed shots, (b) Fire no more rounds than necessary, (c) Take all reasonable efforts to minimize collateral damage, and (d) Stop firing as soon as the situation permits. 7. WEAPON READINESS STATES. Weapon Readiness States shall be as ordered by the Commanding Officer or, in the CO's absence, the on-scene commander. 8. USE OF FORCE AND CF CODE OF CONDUCT VIOLATIONS . Report to your commander all known or suspected Use of Force or Code of Conduct violations. 9. FRIENDLY FORCES. Any forces belonging to nations participating in or providing support to the Campaign Against Terrorism (CAT), irrespective of the force’s mission, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or conducting UNSCR sanctioned MIO against Iraq. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR CF PERSONNEL Engage only opposing forces and military objectives. In accomplishing your mission, use only the necessary force that causes the least amount of collateral civilian damage. 3. Do not alter your weapons or ammunition to increase suffering, or use unauthorized weapons or ammunition. 4. Treat all civilians humanely and respect civilian property. 5. Do not attack those who surrender. Disarm and detain them. 6. Treat all detained persons humanely in accordance with the standard set by the Third Geneva Convention. Any form of abuse, including torture, is prohibited. 7. Collect all the wounded and sick and provide them with the treatment required by their condition, whether friend or foe. 8. Looting is prohibited. 9. Respect all cultural objects (museums, monuments, etc.) and places of worship. 10. Respect all persons and objects bearing the Red Cross/Red Crescent, and other recognized symbols of humanitarian agencies. 11. Report and take appropriate steps to stop breaches of the Law of Armed Conflict and these rules. Disobedience of the Law of Armed Conflict is a crime. 1. 2. CONFIDENTIAL 000039 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL CA JTFSWA FINAL 11 APRIL 03 OP APOLLO - FORCE PROTECTION SUMMARY CARD (4) Use of Intermediate Weapons - ASP baton or pepper spray by trained REF: CDS ROEAUTH 007 20 March 2003 personnel; and 1. SELF DEFENCE. Nothing in the CDS authorized Rules of Engagement (5) Use of Mechanical Restraints - use of flex cuffs and handcuffs; UNLESS YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE DEADLY FORCE YOU WILL NOT (ROE) limits your right to use force, up to and including deadly force, to protect PROCEED BEYOND THIS POINT yourself or other CF personnel from an immediate threat of death or serious b. DEADLY FORCE. injury. (1) Show of Armed Force - loading, making ready, and aiming of weapons 2. MINIMUM FORCE. The use of authorized force must never be more than to show resolve to use deadly force; what is necessary and reasonable based on the prevailing circumstances. (2) Warning Shots - fire at a safe point of aim; and This is the overriding consideration in any use of force. In certain (3) Deadly Force - if you are authorized and have to open fire, you shall: circumstances, deadly force may be the appropriate level of minimum force. 3. DEADLY FORCE. The use of force, up to and including deadly force, is (a) Use only aimed shots, (b) Fire no more rounds than necessary, authorized in self-defence as described above and to defend the following from (c) Take all reasonable efforts to minimize collateral damage, and an immediate threat of death or serious injury: a. Friendly Forces; (d) Stop firing as soon as the situation permits. (b. Any person with Designated Special Status in Afghanistan; 6. WEAPON READINESS STATES. Weapon Readiness States shall be as c. Property with Designated Special Status (if ROE 81 implemented); ordered by the Commanding Officer or, in the CO's absence, the on-scene c. Any person in or on Friendly Force property; and commander. d. Detained persons. 7. USE OF FORCE AND CF CODE OF CONDUCT VIOLATIONS. Report to your 4. NON-DEADLY FORCE. The use of non-deadly force is authorized: commander all known or suspected Use of Force or Code of Conduct violations. a. PROPERTY. To defend Friendly Force property from unauthorized 8. FRIENDLY FORCES. Any forces belonging to nations participating in or access, theft or destruction. providing support to the Campaign Against Terrorism (CAT), irrespective of the b. DETENTION. To detain anyone who attempts, without authority, to force’s mission, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or conducting enter Friendly Force property or for the purpose of mission UNSCR sanctioned MIO against IRAQ. accomplishment. c. SEARCH. To search any detained person for weapons or other items CODE OF CONDUCT FOR CF PERSONNEL capable of posing a threat to the safety of anyone. 1. Engage only opposing forces and military objectives. d. OTHER SITUATIONS. 2. In accomplishing your mission, use only the necessary force that causes the i) To prevent any detained person from escaping; least amount of collateral civilian damage. ii) To disarm any person who has gained unauthorized access to 3. Do not alter your weapons or ammunition to increase suffering, or use Friendly Force property; and unauthorized weapons or ammunition. iii) To remove any person who has gained unauthorized access to 4. Treat all civilians humanely and respect civilian property. Friendly Force property. 5. Do not attack those who surrender. Disarm and detain them. NLY NON-DEADLY FORCE IS AUTHORIZED TO STOP A FLEEING 6. Treat all detained persons humanely in accordance with the standard set by the DETAINEE. DETAINEES ARE TO BE HANDED OVER TO THE Third Geneva Convention. Any form of abuse, including torture, is prohibited. APPROPRIATE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES ASAP 7. Collect all the wounded and sick and provide them with the treatment required 5. STEPS IN APPLYING FORCE. Unless an attack comes so unexpectedly by their condition, whether friend or foe. that even a moment’s delay could lead to death or serious injury, any force 8. Looting is prohibited. shall be applied, time and circumstances permitting, in the following sequence: 9. Respect all cultural objects (museums, monuments, etc.) and places of worship. a. NON-DEADLY FORCE. 10. Respect all persons and objects bearing the Red Cross/Red Crescent, and other (1) Presence - physical presence of disciplined and professional recognized symbols of humanitarian agencies. personnel; 11. Report and take appropriate steps to stop breaches of the Law of Armed Conflict (2) Challenging/Warning - repeated verbal/visual warnings or and these rules. Disobedience of the Law of Armed Conflict is a Crime. challenges until it is clear you were seen or heard; (3) Empty Hand Control - use of unarmed physical means such as pushing, soft arm control, lesser forms of striking or restraining; CONFIDENTIAL 000040 �CONFIDENTIAL CA JTFSWA FINAL 11 ARPIL 03 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information death or serious injury, any force shall be applied, time and circumstances permitting, in OP APOLLO - SOLDIER’S CARD the following sequence: Ref: CDS ROEAUTH 007 20 March 2003 a. NON-DEADLY FORCE. 1. SELF DEFENCE. Nothing in the CDS authorized Rules of Engagement (ROE) (1) Presence - physical presence of disciplined and professional personnel; limits your right to use force, up to and including deadly force, to protect yourself or (2) Challenging/Warning - repeated verbal/visual warnings or challenges until it other CF personnel from an immediate threat of death or serious injury. is clear you were seen or heard; 2. FRIENDLY FORCES. Any forces belonging to nations participating in or (3) Empty Hand Control - use of unarmed physical means such as pushing, supporting the Campaign Against Terrorism (CAT), irrespective of the force’s mission, soft arm control, lesser forms of striking or restraining; the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or conducting UNSCR sanctions (4) Use of Intermediate Weapons - ASP Baton by trained individuals; and against IRAQ. (5) Use of Mechanical Restraints - flex cuffs and handcuffs, etc; 3. PROPORTIONAL FORCE. Any force used must be limited to the degree, UNLESS YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE DEADLY FORCE YOU WILL NOT intensity, and duration necessary to achieve the objective for which the force is used PROCEED BEYOND THIS POINT and no more. b. DEADLY FORCE. 4. DEADLY FORCE AGAINST TALIBAN AND AL QAIDA. When ordered, the use (1) Show of Armed Force - loading, making ready, and aiming of weapons to of force up to and including deadly force is authorized to: show resolve to use deadly force; a conduct attacks against Taliban and Al Qaida forces. ■e CONDUCT o f SUCH ATTACKS WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE LOAC AND (2) Warning Shots - fire at a safe point of aim; and THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONAL FORCE (3) Deadly Force - if you are authorized and have to open fire, you shall: (a) Use only aimed shots, b. to prevent confirmed Taliban and Al Qaida forces from escaping capture. WHILE DEADLY FORCE IS AUTHORIZED, SUCH FORCE SHALL CONSTITUTE (b) Fire no more rounds than necessary, AN EXTREME MEASURE WHICH WILL ALWAYS BE PRECEDED BY WARNINGS (c) Take all reasonable efforts to minimize collateral damage, and APPROPRIATE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES (d) Stop firing as soon as the situation permits. 8. WEAPON READINESS STATES. Weapon Readiness States shall be as ordered 5. DEADLY FORCE. In Afghanistan, the use of force, up to and including deadly by the Commanding Officer or, in the CO's absence, the on-scene commander. force, is authorized in self-defence as described above, to prevent serious crimes 9. USE OF FORCE AND CF CODE OF CONDUCT VIOLATIONS. Report to your and to defend the following from an immediate threat of death or serious injury: commander all known or suspected Use of Force or Code of Conduct violations. a. Friendly Forces; b. Any person with Designated Special Status in Afghanistan; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR CF PERSONNEL c. Property with Designated Special Status (if ROE 81 implemented); 1. Engage only opposing forces and military objectives. c. Any person in or on Friendly Force property; and 2. In accomplishing your mission, use only the necessary force that causes the d. Detained persons. least amount of collateral civilian damage. 6. NON-DEADLY FORCE. The use of non-deadly force is authorized: Do not alter your weapons or ammunition to increase suffering, or use 3. a. PROPERTY. To defend Friendly Force aircraft, vessels, vehicles or materiel, unauthorized weapons or ammunition. other than property with designated special status, from theft or destruction. 4. Treat all civilians humanely and respect civilian property. . DETENTION. To detain anyone who attempts to interfere with the conduct 5. Do not attack those who surrender. Disarm and detain them. of Friendly Force operations. 6. Treat all detained persons humanely in accordance with the standard set by the c. SEARCH. To search any detained person for weapons or other items Third Geneva Convention. Any form of abuse, including torture, is prohibited. capable of posing a threat to the safety of anyone. 7. Collect all the wounded and sick and provide them with the treatment required d. OTHER. by their condition, whether friend or foe. (1) To prevent a detained person, other than a confirmed Taliban or Al Qaida, 8. Looting is prohibited. from escaping; 9. Respect all cultural objects (museums, monuments, etc.) and places of worship. (2) To disarm any person who has been detained; 10. Respect all persons and objects bearing the Red Cross/Red Crescent, and (3) To remove anyone who has gained unauthorized access to Friendly other recognized symbols of humanitarian agencies. Force aircraft, vessels, vehicles and defense establishments. 11. Report and take appropriate steps to stop breaches of the Law of Armed EXCEPT FOR CONFIRMED TALIBAN OR AL QAIDA PERSONNEL ATTEMPTING Conflict and these rules. Disobedience of the Law of Armed Conflict is a crime. TO ESCAPE FROM CAPTURE, ONLY NON-DEADLY FORCE IS AUTHORIZED TO STOP A FLEEING DETAINEE 7. STEPS IN APPLYING FORCE. Except when attacking Taliban or Al Qaida forces and unless an attack comes so unexpectedly that even a moment's delay could lead to CONFIDENTIAL 000041 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information FROM: BGen A. Watt National Command Element CAJTFSWA Eagle Village 7115S Boundary Boulevard MacDill AFB, Tampa FL 33621 TO: National Defence Headquarters MGen George R. Pearkes Bldg 12 Centre Block South * 101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa ON KIA 0K2 v Attention: CDR R. Hitesman J3 Intl 2 000042 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL c. Lack of Proper CFSS Procedures. CFSS transactions for the transfer of materiel were not actioned and supply discipline was not followed in terms of set procedures for deployed operations described at reference C and eight of the sixteen-supply customer account (SCA) files had out dated handover paperwork. 3. It is noted that full cooperation was given to the RSAT team and that much headway has been made, however there still needs to be proper due diligence with regards to material visibility and accountability for deployed operations in accordance with DCDS directives at reference C and the CF Supply Manual at reference D. The NSU is to: a. Take corrective action to rectify the deficiencies identified at paragraph 2; b. Develop a yearly stocktaking plan for first and second line stores based on a 100% verification of accountable material and 50% of consumables per roto and include the TAL, LRP and NCCIS accounts in this process; c. Report the results of these stocktakings to NCE HQ; d. Maintain an individual account file containing the handover certificate and inventory paperwork with records of all the action taken following the handover of the account; and e. Ensure key personnel with corporate knowledge are involved in the C of C BOI process, before their rotation out of the theatre of operations (TO). 4. It is recognized that systemic issues related to the control and accounting of materiel on deployed operations have contributed to some of the shortcomings identified in this report (reference E). Nevertheless, materiel accountability and CA JTFSWA administrative procedures at Camp Mirage must be improved to avoid a recurrence of the problems identified by the RSAT. This HQ expects updates on this progress in the NSU Weekly Logistics Report and in your mid-tour report. Meanwhile, the NCE J4 staff remains available to assist you in any way you may deem appropriate. /AubW-u W.A. Watt— Brigadier-General Commander Distribution List (3/3) CONFIDENTIAL 2/3 000043 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL Distribution List Action CA JTFSWA//NSU CO Information NDHQ OTTAWA//DCDS//J3 INTL//J4 Log CONFIDENTIAL 3/3 000044 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) Canadian Joint Task Force South-West Asia National Command Element Eagle Village 7115 South Boundary Boulevard MacDill Air Force Base Tampa, FL 33621 3350-134-32 (J5 Air) 24March 2003 Distribution List COMMANDER’S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (COO) LONG RANGE PATROL DETACHMENT (LRP DET) References: A. CDS 095 Op Order 800 (005/2001) Op APOLLO - Campaign Against Terrorism (CAT) dated 28200Z Oct 01 B. 3350-134-26 CA JTFSWA Op Order 01/01 dated 17 December 2001 C. DCDS 248 212200Z Dec 01 - Op APOLLO Tasking Order - Deployment of a Long Range Patrol (LRP) Det D. COS J3 FRAG O 029 - LONG TERM FORCE LEVELS - OP APOLLO dated 181840Z Jul 02 E. DCDS Intent for ROTO Two (CA JTFSWA) Op APOLLO dated 23 September 2002 F. Comd CA JTFSWA 077 ROEIMP LRP Det 220130Z Mar 03 G. CDS 025 182230Z Mar 03 Frag Order 039 - Op APOLLO CDS Direction for CA JTFSWA Employment in Light of Pending US-led Military Action Against Iraq H. CA UAE MOU 28 Dec 02 1. REVIEW OF THE SITUATION a. General Background. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the USA, NATO invoked Article V of the NATO Treaty indicating that these attacks are considered an attack on all NATO nations. The Government of Canada (GOC) has agreed to provide its full support to the US-led coalition in the Campaign Against Terrorism (CAT) including both military and non-military support. Although Article V has been invoked, Canada’s provision of forces has been provided under bilateral arrangements with the US and not specifically under NATO provisions. b. Strategic Conditions. Reference A authorized the CF contribution to CINC CENTCOM in support of the US-led CAT, called Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), in order to protect Canada and its allies from terrorist attacks and prevent future attacks. Reference B delineated the Canadian Joint Task Force South West Asia (CA JTFSWA) mission. Reference C directed the deployment of an LRP Det to Al Minhad, United Arab Emirates as part of CA JTFSWA. Reference D directed that the LRP Det would remain at two CP-140 aircraft, as long as the naval commitment is sustained. Reference E is the DCDS Guidance for Comd CA JTFSWA. 1/7 SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 000045 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) c. Friendly Forces. The US-led Global Counter Terrorism Force (GCTF) CAT consists of fifty-one nations. Coalition aircraft operate a variety of maritime air assets including P-3, Atlantiques, and Nimrod Long Range Patrol aircraft and embarked helicopters. d. Centres of Gravity. (1) The Coalition Centre of Gravity is the continuous support and active participation of Islamic states in Coalition actions against Al Qaida and proven associated states, non-state actors and terrorist organizations; and (2) The Terrorist Centre of Gravity is the international and national support for terrorist objectives and methods. 2. NDHO STRATEGIC GOALS a. b. NDHO Intent for Operations. The strategic aim, LAW reference A, is to protect Canada and prevent future attacks on Canada or its allies by eliminating the threat of terrorism: (1) Eliminate the Al Qaida organization as a continuing terrorist threat; (2) Take appropriate military action to compel the Taliban to cease all support, harbouring and cooperation with the Al Qaida; (3) Isolate the Taliban regime from all international support; (4) Bring Usama bin Laden and leaders of the Al Qaida organization to justice; (5) Address immediately the humanitarian needs of the Afghanis in the region, ensuring where possible, it complements existing humanitarian operations; and (6) Assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. NDHO Concept of Operations. Coalition forces will conduct sustained military operations within the US CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) to destroy the Al Qaida terrorist organization, supporting infrastructure and associated terrorist groups. Military actions will be aimed at convincing or compelling states and nonstate organizations to cease support of terrorism and at eliminating terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Once initial objectives are achieved, a capability to detect, deter, defeat/destroy the re-emergence of terrorism will be maintained. Coalition forces will be prepared to support humanitarian operations. In addition to the operations in support of the CAT LAW Ref A, the Canadian Forces are authorized to conduct Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) under United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) directed against Iraq. 2/7 SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 000046 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) c. Coalition Strategic Goals. IAW ref A para le to 1g, coalition actions within CENTCOM AOR aim to achieve the following objectives: (1) To destroy terrorist organizations with worldwide reach; (2) To deny terrorist organizations access to WMD; (3) To compel or convince states and non-state organizations to cease support to terrorism; and (4) Once these initial objectives are achieved, the follow-on objectives are: (5) (a) To cooperate with states in the CENTCOM AOR, to prevent the reemergence of the terrorism; and (b) In coordination with the Coalition, provide military support to Humanitarian Assistance (HA) as required. Coalition End-State. The Coalition strategic end-state is defined at ref A para Ih as follows: (a) Terrorist organizations in the AOR are defeated/destroyed; (b) Nations are convinced/compelled to cease sponsorship of terrorist organizations; (c) Access to WMD by terrorist organizations is eliminated; (d) Coalition capability to detect, deter, defeat/destroy the re-emergence of terrorism is maintained; (e) States in the CENTCOM AOR are willing to combat terrorism; (f) Military support to international ELA is provided; and (g) Support to international counter-terrorism is provided. 3. ASSUMPTION. One CP-140 aircraft will be unserviceable on a regular basis consequently two CP-140 aircraft are required to provide one mission per day. 4. MISSION. As part of the CF contribution to the elimination of the terrorist threat, the LRP Det will conduct surface/sub surface surveillance missions for CENTCOM/NAVCENT from Al Minhad, UAE in support of OEF. These missions will provide Commanders afloat complete Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) in order that they can discern any potential threats to their operation. a. Conduct of Operations. (1) LRP Det will be tasked by Commander Task Force 57 (CTF 57), a subcommand of CENTCOM/NAVCENT. These taskings will be consistent with current operational capabilities, national doctrine and international law; 3/7 SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 000047 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) b. (2) LRP Det will be employed IAW national direction within the US CENTCOM AOR, primarily in the Gulf of Oman (GOO), Arabian Sea and Arabian Gulf; (3) Daily taskings are received from CTF 57, using either the traditional Rainform tasking message (Green), or promulgated on an Air Tasking Order; (4) National taskings approved by Comd CA JTFSWA will be coordinated by NCE J3 Air directly with LRP Det; (5) The LRP Det will normally conduct one over-water unarmed patrol of up to ten hours duration per day in support of an afloat commander; (6) LRP Det operations, excluding flying operations, will normally be 24 hours per day and 7 days per week; (7) The second aircraft may be used as an additional resource as directed by CO LRP Det to maintain 1 CAD mandated currencies; (8) Crew composition for normal or surge operations will be determined by CO LRP Det for this COO while meeting the minimum requirements as defined by 1 CAD Orders; (9) CO LRP Det will assign Op APOLLO missions to crews with appropriate qualifications IAW 1 CAD Orders; and (10) LRP Det will operate under Rules of Engagement (ROE) implemented by Comd CA JTFSWA (Ref F). Threat. Due to the fluctuating nature of the threat, a daily update prior to any flying operations is required and will be provided by the intelligence section. In general, the threat to CF aircraft and crews in the air and on the ground in the Arabian Sea/Gulf region is assessed as low. The threat of foreign and local intelligence collection against CF operations in the Op APOLLO AOR is currently assessed as high. 5. TASKS a. b. Primary Tasks: Missions approved by Comd CA JTFSWA in order of priority: (1) CA national taskings in support of Op APOLLO; (2) Direct Support or Associated Support to an afloat commander for MIO, as directed, in support of CAT or UNSCR MIO directed against Iraq; (3) Area Operations - Surface and sub-surface surveillance and reconnaissance as tasked by CTF 57; and (4) RMP compilation. Secondary Tasks: Missions approved by Comd CA JTFSWA in order of priority: 4/7 SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 000048 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) (1) Over-water search and rescue; and (2) Limited logistic transport and support functions. 6. CONSTRAINTS/RESTRAINTS a. b. Constraints. (1) LRP Det operations will be undertaken in accordance with international and Canadian national law, including the Law of Armed Conflict and Canadian rules of engagement; (2) LRP Det Air Interdiction Operations against Taliban and Al Qaida is authorized in airspace over international waters or in territory or territorial airspace of consenting states; (3) LRP Det will operate within the limitations contained in the CA/UAE MOU; (4) LRP Det will operate in the CENTCOM AOR; (5) LRP Det will provide Direct Support or Associated Support to the afloat ’commander, or Area Operations, by conducting one over-water unarmed patrol per day up to ten-hours in duration; (6) LRP Det will be capable of completing its primary roles with the current sensor suite that includes, but not limited by, non-imaging radar, infrared identification, digital camera, high resolution black and white wet film photography, commercial SATCOM, secure voice, teletype and Data Linkll capabilities; (7) LRP Det will also provide a subsurface search, localization and tracking capability during the patrols based in concert with CTF 57 mission requirements; (8) LRP Det will maintain a capability to provide post-flight analysis of photographic imagery; and (9) If tasked with sub-surface operations, LRP Det will initiate the process to unrestrict associated TO&E positions, in order to provide post-flight acoustic analysis capability. Restraints. (1) Pending promulgation of a higher authorised Risk Level, missions are limited to Risk Level One - No Risk. Notwithstanding the lack of a selfdefence suite, this restraint will have no impact to operations unless the threat level increases from low; and (2) LRP Det, LAW Ref G, will operate in the Op APOLLO/CTF 151 AOR south of 28 degrees 30 minutes latitude. 5/7 SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 000049 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 7. COMMANDER’S ANALYSIS a. Commander’s intent. (1) General. To support the international CAT for as long as the GOC commits military forces to OEF; and (2) Employment. LRP Det employment will remain consistent with Canadian objectives detailed in paragraph 2a and 2b. Any suspected deviation from these objectives must be reported to Comd CA JTFSWA for national authority approval. b. End-State. The CA JTFSWA end state will be the defeat of stipulated terrorist groups in the USCENTCOM AOR or the re-deployment of Canadian Forces assets. c. Centres of Gravity. The CA JTFSWA Operational centre of gravity is the maintenance of national command and control in the CENTCOM AOR. d. Service Support. e. (1) Logistics concept. The LRP Det will be supported by one sustainment flight per week augmented by commercial courier services, when required, to get critical items into theatre quickly. As well, scales for repair parts holdings in theatre will be increased where necessary. (2) Movement. CC-150 sustainment flights once per week, augmented by commercial airlines when required, are scheduled into the theatre for Op APOLLO units including the LRP Det. (3) Medical support. Health Service Support (HSS) and dental services will be provided by the NSU. (4) Host Nation (HN) support. Ref H outlines HN support. Command and Signal. (1) Command and Control. CDS retains full command throughout exercised by the DCDS. Commander CA JTFSWA has been delegated operational command (OPCOM) of the LRP Det. US CINCCENT has been assigned operational control (OPCON) of LRP Det. 6/7 SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 000050 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) (2) Communications. Tactical air-ground-air communications will be inherent with LRP Det in accordance with international protocols for airspace control networks. All Communications and Information Systems required for the conduct of LRP operations will be provided and maintained by CO NCCIS Sqn. LRP Det through CA JTFSWA NCE will submit any requirements for frequency assignments. /MMAaA 7 W.A. Watt — Brigadier General Commander Distribution List Action External LRP Det /CO Internal COS JI J2 J3/J5 J3 Air J5 Air J4 J6 J8 LEGAD PAffO Eng Adv MP Adv POLAD Information NDHQ/DCDS/CAS/COS J3/J3 Intl l CAD HQ/Comd/A3 7/7 SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 000051 �SECRET (CAN/US E@ONLY 0 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sii^a^^s^^iformation Canadian Joint Task Force South-West Asia National Command Element Eagle Village 7115 South Boundary Boulevard MacDill Air Force Base Tampa, FL 33621 3350-134-32 JTFSWA (J5 Air) 0 December 2002 COMMANDER’S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) TACTICAL AIRLIFT DETACHMENT (TAL DET) References: A. CDS 095 Op Order 800 (005/2001) Op APOLLO - Campaign Against Terrorism (CAT) dated 28200Z Oct 01 B. 3350-134-26 CA JTFSWA Op Order 01/01 dated 17 December 2001 C. DCDS 141409z Jan 02 Frag O 013 OP APOLLO Tasking Order Deployment of CC-130 Tactical Airlift (TAL) Det D. DCDS Intent for ROTO Two (CA JTFSWA) Op APOLLO dated 23 September 2002 E. DCDS 123 091400Z Jul 02 Employment Of TAL Det ATAT And BTAT Crews F. COS J3 062050Z DEC 02 - Guidance - In Theatre Airlift of Weapons/Ammunition G: A-LM-117-001/FP-001 - Transportation of Dangerous Goods by CF Aircraft 1. @ 54 Opo 4 54 V REVIEW OF THE SITUATION a. Jwn a&ute—/—8o 54 rhov General Background. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the USA, NATO invoked Article V of the NATO Treaty indicating that these attacks are considered an attack on all NATO nations. The Government of Canada (GOC) has agreed to provide its full support to the US-led coalition in the Campaign Against Terrorism (CAT) including both military and non-military support. Although Article V has been invoked, Canada’s provision of forces has been provided under bilateral arrangements with the US and not specifically under NATO provisions. b. Strategic Conditions. Reference A authorized the CF contribution to CINC CENTCOM in support of the US-led CAT, called Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), in order to protect Canada and its allies from terrorist attacks and prevent future attacks. Reference B delineated the Canadian Joint Task Force South West Asia (CA JTFSWA) mission. Reference C directed the deployment of a TAL Det to Al Minhad, United Arab Emirates as part of CA JTFSWA. Reference D is the DCDS Guidance for Comd CA JTFSWA. c. Friendly Forces. The US-led Global Counter Terrorism Force (GCTF) CAT consists of forty-three nations. Intra-theatre air mobility assets in the Gulf region consist of US C-130, C-141, and C-17 aircraft. Coalition countries operate C-130 and C-160 aircraft. I 1/7 SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 000052 | �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET (CAN/US d. ONLY) Centres of Gravity. (1) The Coalition Centre of Gravity is the continuous support and active participation of Islamic states in Coalition actions against Al Qaida and proven associated states, non-state actors and terrorist organizations; and (2) The Terrorist Centre of Gravity is the international and national support for terrorist objectives and methods. 2. NDHO STRATEGIC GOALS a. NDHO Intent for Operations. The strategic aim, LAW reference A, is to protect Canada and prevent future attacks on Canada or its allies by eliminating the threat of terrorism: (1) Eliminate the Al Qaida organization as a continuing terrorist threat; (2) Take appropriate military action to compel the Taliban to cease all support, harbouring and cooperation with the Al Qaida; (3) Isolate the Taliban regime from all international support; (4) Bring Usama bin Laden and leaders of the Al Qaida organization to justice; (5) Address immediately the humanitarian needs of the Afghanis in the region, ensuring where possible, it complements existing humanitarian operations; and (6) Assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. b. NDHO Concept of Operations. Coalition forces will conduct sustained military operations within the US CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) to destroy the Al Qaida terrorist organization, supporting infrastructure and associated terrorist groups. Military actions will be aimed at convincing or compelling states and nonstate organizations to cease support of terrorism and at eliminating terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Once initial objectives are achieved, a capability to detect, deter, defeat/destroy the re-emergence of terrorism will be maintained. Coalition forces will be prepared to support humanitarian operations. c. Coalition Strategic Goals. Coalition actions within CENTCOM AOR aim to achieve the following objectives: (1) To destroy terrorist organizations with worldwide reach; (2) To deny terrorist organizations access to WMD; (3) To compel or convince states and non-state organizations to cease support to terrorism; (4) Once these initial objectives are achieved, the follow-on objectives are: 2/7 SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 000053 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET (CAN/US E@oNLY (5) (a) To cooperate with states in the CENTCOM AOR, to prevent the reemergence of the terrorism; and (b) In coordination with the Coalition, provide military support to Humanitarian Assistance (HA) as required. Coalition End-State. The Coalition strategic end-state is as follows: (a) Terrorist organizations in the AOR are defeated/destroyed; (b) Nations are convinced/compelled to cease sponsorship of terrorist organizations; (c) Access to WMD by terrorist organizations is eliminated; (d) Coalition capability to detect, deter, defeat/destroy the re-emergence of terrorism is maintained; (e) States in the CENTCOM AOR are willing to combat terrorism; (f) Military support to international HA is provided; and (g) Support to international counter-terrorism is provided. 3. MISSION. As part of the CF contribution to the elimination of the terrorist threat, the TAL Det will conduct airlift missions for CENTCOM/CENTAF from Al Minhad, UAE in support of OEF. a. Conduct of Operations. (1) TAL Det will be tasked by Air Mobility Directorate (AMD), a subcommand of CENTCOM Director Mobility Forces (DIRMOB), at CENTAF, Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB). These taskings will be consistent with current operational capabilities, national doctrine and international law; (2) TAL Det will normally be employed within the US CENTCOM AOR. Occasionally, Comd CA JTFSWA will authorize the TAL Det to execute missions outside the CENTCOM AOR in support of OEF; (3) Daily taskings will be coordinated through the CA JTFSWA CENTAF LO. Missions will be tasked up to two days in advance via the Aircraft Tasking Order process. Missions will be flown in accordance with OEF Special Instructions and Airspace Coordination Orders. CA CC-130 aircraft, when conducting OEF missions, will fly under the umbrella of US OEF “Flash” callsign and will be entitled to existing blanket diplomatic over flight and landing clearances for those countries where these procedures apply; (4) National taskings approved by Comd CA JTFSWA will be coordinated by CENTAF LO with AMD; (5) TAL Det will conduct two major lines of tasking per day consisting of up to 10 hours per day per aircraft for each 30-day period. Normal crew day is up 3/7 SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 000054 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET (CAN/US EEoNLY to 14 hours including briefing and debriefing time. CO TAL Det can authorize extended crew day for operational reasons; b. (6) A periodic seven-day surge capability will be maintained. The surge period is defined as extended hours per day and not additional aircraft or lines of tasking. Surge operations will be up to 18 hours per day for a period of seven days. A regeneration period will follow any surge operation. Examples of surge operations include AOR evacuation, combat operations, medical evacuations and non-combatant evacuation operations; (7) TAL Det operations, excluding flying operations, will normally be 16 hours per day and 7 days per week but maintain a capability of 24/7 operations; (8) The third aircraft may be used as an additional resource as directed by CO TAL Det to maintain 1 CAD mandated currencies; (9) Crew composition for normal or surge operations will be determined by CO TAL Det in the employment of CONOPS; (10) CO TAL Det will assign Op APOLLO airlift missions to crews with appropriate qualifications LAW air force doctrine (11) Aircraft loading/off loading will be conducted by CA MAMS teams at TAL staging bases, by US and/or Coalition military or authorized local civilian contractors at all other airfields within AOR; (12) In-theatre operations will normally plan to recover at normal base of operations, with remaining overnight by exception only; and (13) TAL Det will operate under CA JTFSWA Rules of Engagement. Threat. Due to the fluctuating nature of the threat, a daily update prior to any flying operations is required and will be provided by the intelligence section. In general, the threat to CF aircraft and crews in the air and on the ground in the Arabian Sea/Gulf region is assessed as low. The threat to low-flying, fixed-wing aircraft and crews, in and over Pakistan, is assessed as medium. The threat to low flying, fixedwing aircraft and crews in or near Afghan airspace is assessed to be high. The main threat to air transport aircraft is Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS). The threat of foreign and local intelligence collection against CF operations in the Op APOLLO AOR is currently assessed as high. 4. TASKS a. Primary Tasks: Missions approved by CA JTFSWA in order of priority: (1) First line aeromedical evacuation; (2) CA national taskings in support of Op APOLLO; (3) Intra-theatre airlift tasks in support of OEF in US CENTCOM AOR; 4/7 SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 000055 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information P SECRET (CAN/US EEoNLY b. (4) Intra-theatre OEF pax lift; (5) OEF assistance to Afghan National Army (ANA) as arranged by CENTCOM; and (6) HA missions. Secondary Tasks: Missions approved by CA JTFSWA in order of priority: (1) Quick response to airlift tasks in support of Theatre Evacuation Plan; (2) Non-Combatant Evacuation within the AOR; and (3) Operations outside the CENTCOM AOR in support of OEF. 5. CONSTRAINTS/RESTRAINTS a. b. Constraints. (1) TAL Det operations will be undertaken in accordance with international and Canadian national law, including the Law of Armed Conflict and Canadian rules of engagement; (2) TAL Det must operate within the limitations contained in the CAN/UAE MOU; and (3) TAL Det will fully comply with Canadian dangerous cargo regulations. Restraints. (1) TAL Det will not carry weapons and ammunition that will be delivered to the Afghan National Army. 6. ASSUMPTIONS a. TAL Det will operate from Al Minhad, UAE; b. NSU will provide administration and logistics support to the TAL Det; and c. One CC-130 aircraft will be unserviceable on a regular basis and three CC-130 aircraft are required to provide two lines of tasking. 5/7 SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 000056 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 7. COMMANDER’S ANALYSIS a. Commander’s intent. (1) General. To support the international CAT for as long as the GOC commits military forces to OEF; (2) Employment. TAL Det employment will remain consistent with Canadian objectives detailed in paragraph 2a. Any deviation from these objectives must be coordinated by Comd CA JTFSWA to the CDS for national authority approval; and (3) HA Operations. The immediate objective of HA is to move necessary food, clothing and emergency assistance to Afghanis in the region, where possible complementing existing humanitarian operations. b. End-State. The JTFSWA end state will be the defeat of stipulated terrorist groups in the USCENTCOM AOR and the re-deployment of Canadian Forces assets. c. Centres of Gravity. The JTFSWA centre of gravity is the maintenance of national command and control in the CENTCOM AOR d. Service Support. e. (1) Logistics concept. The TAL Det will be supported by one sustainment flight per week augmented by CAL, when required, to get repair parts into theatre quickly. As well, scales for repair parts holdings in theatre will be increased where possible; (2) Movement. CC-150 sustainment flights once per week, augmented by CAL when required to the theatre for Op APOLLO units including the TAL Det. (3) Medical support. Health Service Support (HSS) will remain unchanged. All medical and dental services will be accessed through the NSU HSS COY. (4) Host Nation (HN) support. The CA/UAE MOU outlines the HN support. Command and Signal. (1) Command and Control. CDS retains full command throughout (exercised by the DCDS). Commander CA JTFSWA has been delegated operational command (OPCOM) of the TAL Det. US CINCCENT has been given operational control (OPCON) of TAL Det. 6/7 SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 000057 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET (CAN/US EEoNLv (2) Communications. Tactical air-ground-air communications will be inherent with TAL Det in accordance with international protocols for airspace control networks. TAL Det through CA JTFSWA NCE will submit any requirements for frequency assignments. /uylma W.A. Watt Brigadier General Commander Distribution List Action External TAL Det /CO Internal COS JI J2 J3/J5 J3 Air J5 Air J4 J6 J8 LEGAD PAffO Eng Adv MP Adv POLAD Information NDHQ/DCDS/CAS/COS J3/J3 Intl l CAD HQ/Comd/A3 in SECRET (CAN/US EYES ONLY) 000058 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information I! Miso 3450-1 (J4 Log Ops) J4 Logistics Operations National Defence Headquarters 101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, Ontario K1A0K2 3/ Oct 02 Distribution List OP APOLLO SUPPORT CONCEPT MEETING POST CFSSU ROLL OUT RECORD OF DECISIONS References: A. 3450-1 (Op Apollo) 23 Oct 02 (encl) B. OP APOLLO Concept of Ops Meeting, 28 Oct 02 C. COS J3 2284, 2227231 Oz Feb 02, Annex H to CDS Op Order 800 (005/2001) - Op Apollo, 1. On 18 Nov 02, CFSSU Stream 2 will be "rolling out” to the NICP, the CFSDs, to deployed operations and 3 CSG. This procedure will complete the CF transition from the legacy CFSS to the new CFSSU. To address the impact of this change in supply systems, J4 Log called a meeting between J4 Log Ops, 3 CSG, DLERM, 8 Wing Trenton Sup Sqn and DMMD to discuss CFSSU implementation and consequent changes to the current sp concept to OP APOLLO. Specifically, the aim of the meeting was “To discuss and recommend future strategic support concepts for OP APOLLO”, with recommendations to be passed at a later date to J3 Inti, CAS/CAD and the OP APOLLO NSE/NSU for review. 2. Note that representation from J3 Inti, CAS and the OP APOLLO NCE was not canvassed, as J4 Log’s intention was to address the finer details of the CFSSU roll out and then distribute recommendations for review. 3. Annex A details the meetings final Record of Decisions. 4. Action Addressees are requested to review the Record of Decisions and pass comments to Capt Richardson, J4 Log Ops 2-4. J4 Log Ops will compile the comments with the intent for COS J3 to release a new Annex H by Mon 16 Dec 02. oo8% c. R L C.D. Hobbs LCol A/J4 Log 992-4740 Annex ( , ge, . ( q 0C ad.P 0A c0 5H 16/ ‘as prooleo Annex A - OP APOLLO Concept of Ops Record of Decisions 28 Oct 02 000059 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information Distribution List (by email) Action DMMD OP APOLLO NCE J4 CO 3 CSG J6 Ops Information J3 Intl 2-2 DLERM 4-2 CAS D Air FE 1 CAD HQ A4 Log Ops CF JSR J4 Encl: 1 000060 �k Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information Annex A 3450-1 Oct 02 OP APOLLO Concept of Ops Record of Decisions 28 Oct 02 Serial 1 Issue LPO - 8 Wing Trenton Sup Sqn is currently designated as the OP APOLLO support base for LPO requirements in Canada. This practice deviates from doctrine where 3 CSG is responsible for this function. OPI NCE J4 OCI CO 3 CSG NCE NSU 8 Wg Sup Sqn 2 Repairable Material Accountability Examples of n/s aircraft spare parts being shipped “No Voucher Activity” (NVA) are being discovered in Trenton. This practice deviates from the DCDS's intent to maximize asset visibility on deployed operations. NCE J4 CAS CAD NSU 8 Wg Sup Sqn Recommended Action On Mon 13 Jan 03, 3 CSG will assume responsibility for the procurement of locally managed items that are originated from the NCE or NSU. 2. 3 CSG will use the CFSSU to action LPO requirements (email, fax and voice methods are to be considered secondary means of communication). 3. 3 CSG will send an LPO Team to 8 Wg Trenton for OJT purposes (SOA review, CFSSU Procedures, etc) 4. NCE J4 to advise if problems foreseen with this COO. NCE J4 requested to review the NSU SOP on repairable returns and confirm that n/s items are returned from the customer to the NSU R&D Section for furtherance to a repair facility or quarantine pending identification of a repair facility. DMMD J4 Log CO 3 CSG DMMD to ensure that OP APOLLO CFSSU accounts allows for direct delivery to theater via 2 Air Mov Sqn in Trenton. NCE J4 J4 Log 8 Wg Sup Sqn NCE J4 is requested to review the NSU SOP on R&I procedures and confirm that the COI NSU, CO Tal Det and CO LRP Det are aware of the financial consequences of allowing the “Tech Net” to function as a means of reprovision. 3 4 Ref: A-LM-007-014-AG-001, Ch 21, Section 3, para 2115 Consolidation of CFSD Material Issues - Proposal for 3 CSG to consolidate all issues from 25 and 7 CFSD to theatre was discussed and not supported. However, with 3 CSG coming online with CFSSU, DMMD should review account mapping post CFSSU roll out to confirm the direct delivery of stores. NSU R&I Section - To maintain the integrity of material passing into theatre, it is important that NSU Tfc Techs are the first and only pers auth to handle the flow of mat into the AOR. There is an impression at the 1. Swopl vS OPI Comments Cauas . A-1/3 000061 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'infoffnation Annex A 3450-1 Oct 02 OP APOLLO Concept of Ops Record of Decisions 28 Oct 02 strategic level and 8 Wg level that some spare parts and other material are making their way into theatre without the knowledge of theatre Tfc and Sup Techs. This practice will lead to CFSS deficiencies in Canada and CFSS surpluses in theatre resulting in CF152 action upon mission closure. If cartons / containers that are unloaded from the aircraft are accessed by pers other than Tfc or Sup Tehs (or other auth pers), this activity should be considered theft and the MPs contacted accordingly. 5 6 7 Ref: A-LM-007-014-AG-001, Ch 20, Annex A Monthly Push - The concept of 3 CSG providing a monthly push of G&T to theater by sea was discussed. However, due to the comments from the NSU that the AGO possesses a “robust economy” that allows for competitive pricing on LPO activity, the proposal was dropped. Lack of Tech Inspectors and Test Benches in AOO - Even though the AGO may lack TI and/or test benches, repairable mat shall still be brought on charge by Sup Techs and returned to the CFSS as per ref. Ref: A-LM-007-014-AG-001, Ch 21, Section 3, para 2122 Pre-deployment Trg - Key NSU Sup Techs should receive pre-deployment Nil Nil NCE J4 8 Wg J4 Log Ops NCE J4 requested to review the NSU SOP on repairable returns and confirm that n/s items are returned from the customer to the NSU R&D Section for furtherance to a repair facility or quarantine pending 7 identification of a repair facility (usually a unit in 8 Wg Trenton). NCE J4 CO NSU CO 3 CSG NCE J4 requested to liaise with CO NSU to obtain sitrep on the future NSU rotation concept including trg. DAACA Nil Nil - A-2/3 000062 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'infommation Annex A 3450-1 Oct 02 OP APOLLO Concept of Ops Record of Decisions 28 Oct 02 7 8 trg / briefings to familiarize themselves with DDIO Ch 13 and deployed ops CFSSU procedures. This trg would situate future Sup Techs that would assist them in their preparations for deployment. CFSSU Operability - J4 Log Ops personally revealed on the last NSU J3 SIV that it took minutes to complete CFSSU transactions when the transactions should take seconds. NCCIS Sp Ref: Telecon NCE J4 Sup / J4 Log Ops 2-4, 28 Oct 02. The following observation was not discussed at the meeting but was raised immediately after between the NCE J4 Sup and the J4 log Ops APOLLO Desk Officer. IAW ref, OP APOLLO NCCIS accounts are in poor shape. For example: a) items are on charge in Kingston but are physically in OP APOLLO; and b) items are on charge in OP APOLLO but are physically in Kingston; and c) items are in theater but are not on charge at all. J4 Log Ops DMMD J4 Log CO NSU NCE J4 J4 Log Ops NDHQ J6 Ops NCE J4 NCE J6 DMMD is requested to liaise with the NSU to confirm that no delays in processing CFSSU transactions still exist. J4 Log Ops shall liaise with J6 Ops and determine a COO for support to NCCIS (ie material transfer process). A-3/3 000063 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information J4 Logistics NDHQ MGen George R. Pearkes Bldg 101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, Ont, K1A0K2 4Mat/DGlOg 3450-1 (Op Apollo) 23 Oct 02 Dist List AGENDA FOR AN OP APOLLO SUPPORT CONCEPT MEETING TO BE HELD IN THE J4 LOG OPS CONF RM, 1100 HRS 28 OCT 02 Agenda Item Sponsor 1. Intro Maj Hendrigan, 1100 hrs 2. Current Sp Concept Maj Hendrigan, 1102 hrs 8 Wg Comments 3. a. b. c. 4. LPO Procedures A/C Spares Routing Consolidation of Shipments 3 CSG CFSSU Implementation a. b. Capt Austin, 1115 hrs LCol Boivin, 1140 hrs LPO District / Warehouse Construction 5. Break / Lunch (8 Wg Member released) All, 1200 hrs 6. Mounting Procedures LCol Hobbs, 1300 hrs 7. a. Account Structure / Classes of Supply b. Batch Txns c. Scaling/TOE Open Discussion All, 1330 hrs, 8. Recap of Decisions Made LCol Hobbs, 1355 hrs. C. Hobbs LCol J4 Log Ops 992-4740 Dist List Action J4 Log Ops 2 and 3 DLERM 4-2 DMMD2 8 Wg Sup O Info J3 Intl 2-2 Version 2, 25 Oct 02 000064 �s.15(1) SECRET (CAN/US/UK/A z) Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi^r^acces a I'info^ation Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group P.O Box 17,000 Station Forces Kingston ONK7K7B4 3350-138 (NEO) 31 July 2002 Distribution List COMMANDER’S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO) - INDIA AND PAKISTAN References: A. CA JTFSWA NCE 1065, 011914Z Jun 02 (Preliminary Warning Order for Possible JTFSWA NEO in INDIA/PAKISTAN) B. NDHQ DCDS 092, 011515Z Jun 02 (Warning Order for CF NEO in INDIA/PAKISTAN) C. B-GG-005-004/AF-00, 1996 (CF Operations - Chapter 10) D. Joint Pub 3-07.5, 30 Sep 97 (US Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures - NEO) E. CFJOG 3120-11 (J3 Plans), May 01 (CFJOG COP AGILE - Draft 1) F. Consular Emergency Contingency Plan, Canadian High Commission, ISLAMABAD, 5 Jun 02 G. Consular Emergency Contingency Plan, Canadian High Commission, New DELHI, 30 May 02 H. JTFSWA 3350-134-1 (J5), 5 Jun 02 (NEO Contingency Planning) 1. NDHQ COS J3 347 dated 271306z Jun 02 1. REVIEW OF THE SITUATION. a. General Background. (1) Both INDIA and PAKISTAN maintain significant forces deployed along the line of control (LOC) and along the INDIAN-PAKISTAN international border, however, recent news and intelligence reports suggest that INDIA is relaxing its stance along the border and internally. (2) Since Jan 02, INDIA and PAKISTAN have attempted to balance military preparedness with political resolution. Both sides have offered diplomatic gestures and have achieved limited success. INDIA has lowered its security posture and the INDIAN Prime Minister has stated publicly that he has ruled out war with PAKISTAN over disputed KASHMIR. For its part PAKISTAN has indicated support of the diplomatic gestures and has indicated support of the initiatives currently in place. Despite the easing of tensions violence continues to flare up and verbal posturing continues with INDIA claiming that PAKISTAN is not doing enough to stop cross border incursions. (3) INDIA. On 31 May 02, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) announced that it was evacuating all non-essential High Commission staff and dependants from the Canadian High Commission in New DELHI. This left a staff of approximately 20 personnel in New DELHI and two in MUMBAI. The number of Canadian citizens in INDIA is estimated at 7000. DFAIT estimates that approximately 2000 of these personnel would want to be evacuated in the event of a conflict. Should an evacuation be warranted, DFAIT plans to utilise commercial airlift out of evacuation points in 1/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000065 �" s.15(1) SECRET (CAN/US/UK/A @z) Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a J'infogpation Should airspace become restricted to civilian airlines, military airlift may be required. (4) The UN has recently lowered its security posture in INDIA to “Phase II” restricted movement to enable the UN to effectively deliver development programs. On 26 Jun 02 DFAIT amended its travel advisory and now recommends that travel to INDIA be deferred unless there are critical or compelling business or family reasons. (5) On 11 Jul 02 the Canadian High Commission in DELHI received a bomb threat forcing the evacuation of the compound and a detailed search of the embassy grounds. No bomb was found but the threat is an indication of the instability of the region and is the first indication of terrorists targeting Canadian interests in the region. (6) PAKISTAN. In Apr 02, DFAIT directed that all PAKISTAN postings be restricted and ordered the repatriation of all non-essential staff and dependants. A staff of 23 remains in ISLAMABAD. There are currently 1077 registered . Canadians in PAKISTAN with an estimated 1000 more unregistered. The Canadian Consulate in PAKISTAN estimates that in the worst case, up to 1200 designated persons will want to leave in event of conflict, however, the exact number is unknown. Factors influencing evacuation numbers include cost, as this must be borne by the evacuee, and the safety of personal assets in country. (7) Assessment. The likelihood of an imminent and significant INDIAN/PAKISTAN conflict in the KASHMIR region is assessed as medium. INDIA will likely continue to conduct limited operations across the LOC. It is assessed that PAKISTAN'S actions will be defensive in nature and that its forces will respond in kind. It is also assessed that this ongoing level of conflict will be successfully contained within KASHMIR. The possibility of either a general conventional war or a nuclear exchange between INDIA and PAKISTAN is assessed as medium. Nonetheless, and despite President Musharrafs assurances that PAKISTAN would not escalate to a nuclear conflict, it is nearly impossible to gauge the level of a PAKISTAN response to an attack. There are two triggers that may be the basis for NOE in the PAKISTAN and INDIA region; internal conflict (within one or both countries) and international conflict. b. Strategic Conditions. Given the evolving crisis between INDIA and PAKISTAN, NDHQ in concert with DFAIT has undertaken preliminary planning in the event that NEO is required. The extent to which CF assistance may be required is still being assessed, and will undoubtedly evolve as events in the region unfold. In the worst case, CF forces currently committed to Op APOLLO, as well as other CF assets, may need to be committed in support of NEO in the region. c. Scope. (1) DFAIT will be the Supported Agency for NEO. The CF and other government departments (OGD) will be Supporting Agencies. (2) The Joint Operations Area (JOA) will consist of INDIA and PAKISTAN and their contiguous airspace and recognised waters and will include same for the Forward Mounting Base(s), Forward Operating Base(s) (if not in INDIA or PAKISTAN), and safe havens (SHs). 2/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000066 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'infq^iation s.15(1) SECRET (CA IT TP ur' ‘ 10 - d. e. f. Threat Assessment. (l) Terrorism. The terrorism threat is high. (2) Civil Disturbances. The likelihood of civil disturbances that may disrupt/impede the evacuation in the event of a NEO is high. Centres of Gravity. (1) DFAIT. Rapid and orderly evacuation of those willing Canadian designated personnel remaining in INDIA and PAKISTAN. (2) Military. The availability of airlift to support the operation, the readiness of Canadian-based assets, and a timely government decision to support the mission. Friendly Forces. (2) UK and AUSTRALIA were prepared to evacuate non-essential High Commission staff and dependants as early as 03 Jun 02. US government has announced a voluntary evacuation of all embassy staff and dependants in INDIA. (4) INDIAN Government forces can be expected to provide limited security of Canadian High Commission staffs and local policing. (5) PAKISTANI Government Forces and local security firms can be expected to provide security at all PAKISTANI assembly points and evacuation points. (6) Canadian Consuls in DELHI/ISLAMABAD are responsible for the promulgation of the evacuation plan, administering the evacuation effort, and requesting military support through DFAIT. Specific responsibilities include the identification of designated personnel for evacuation, administration at assembly points and delivery of evacuees to the evacuation points. (7) Customs and Immigration personnel at the Canadian Consuls are responsible for the validation of Canadian evacuees at the assembly areas and facilitating their furtherance upon arrival at the designated safe haven/transit point. 3/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000067 �s.15(1) Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'info^ation- SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AWZ) 4/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000068 �s.15(1) Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'inforgiation SECRET (CAMTTT* n g 8) MISSION. On order, CA JTFSWA will support the Canadian High Commissions in INDIA and/or PAKISTAN to assist in the evacuation of willing designated personnel to identified safe areas/havens. 2. 3. EXECUTION. a. 5/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000069 �s.15(1) Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'infq^iation SECRET (CATTTITTT"* 0 6/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000070 �s.15(1) Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'info^iation SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AWZ) 7/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000071 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'infor^ation s.15(1) SECRET (cAmrTO 8/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000072 �s.15(1) Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'inforgiation SECRET (CAN/US/UK/A Z 9/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000073 �s.15(1) Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'infor^pation SECRET (CATTTT TT ' 1 09 Pi e. 10/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000074 �s.15(1) Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'infg^iation SECRET (CA TTT TT ' i O 11/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000075 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'infor^ation * s.15(1) SECRET (CATTTTI"‘T 12/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000076 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a l'info_rgpation s.15(1) SECRET (CATTTTTI"’TE 13/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000077 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information s.15(1) SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AWZ (4) 4. . P Over Flight Clearance. DFAIT and ADM Pol must be prepared to expedite clearances from all countries that could be involved depending on aircraft routing. SERVICE SUPPORT a. Logistics Concept. The primary responsibility of the CF is the movement of personnel that have been processed by DFAIT - from designated Evacuation Points (EP) to designated Safe Havens (SH) or Safe Areas. DFAIT will be responsible for processing all evacuees at designated Assembly Points (AP) and preparing those personnel for movement to the designated EP. Once at the EP, the CF will be responsible to move the evacuees primarily via airlift to the SH/Safe Area or a transit point from which civilian charter aircraft may be used for the final leg to a SH/Safe Area. At the EP and during transit to the SH/Safe Area, the CF will be responsible for the reception and accounting of evacuees, after which DFAIT will become responsible for their administration. CF personnel deployed in the evacuation area must be prepared to be self sufficient for the duration of the operation; although every attempt should be made to utilise HNS, this will likely be unreliable. b. Logistic Elements. The CF will deploy the following elements: Liaison/Advisory personnel, Movement Control Detachments (MovCon Dets), Mobile Air Movements Sections (MAMS), communications, force protection, medical personnel and Military olice. 14/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000078 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'info^ation SECRET (CATTTTTTT 1 s.15(1) 15/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000079 �s.15(1) Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'inforgiation SECRET (CA mTT TT ' i mn . 8 16/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000080 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en-vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'inftji^ation s.1501) SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUOZ) Original signed by M.M. Cessford Colonel Acting Commander Joint Operations Group Annexes: Annex A - Capability Component Estimate Annex B - Force Structure Annex C - Course of Action Comparison Annex D - Evacuation Flow Diagram Annex E - NEO Concept of Operations - INDIA Annex F - NEO Concept of Operations - PAKISTAN Distribution List (next page) 17/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000081 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'info^ation SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AU@z) Distribution List External COS J3 Internal List GB J3 Plans J5 Coord File Web Master War Diary 18/18 SECRET (CAN/US/UK/AUS/NZ) 000082 �Pages 83 to / a 100 are withheld pursuant to section sont retenues en vertu de ‘article 15(1) of the Access to Information Act de la Loi sur l'acces a ‘information �s.13(1)(a) s.13(1)(b) Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information - 32 SECRET Canadian Joint Task Force South-west Asia National Command Element TAMPA FL 3350-134-1 (Comd) 3 May 2002 CONTINGENCY OPERATION PLAN (COP) JTFSWA EVACUATION AND WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS References: A. DCDS Direction for Internationa Operations, Revision One, 31 July 01 B. C. Briefing Note for CA JTFSWA NCE, 21 Feb 02 D. CDS Operation Order 800 (005/2001) 282000Z Oct 01- Operation APOLLO - Campaign Against Terrorism (CAT) E. Annex C to CDS Op Order 800 (005-2001) - Intelligence, 082200Z Nov 01 F. CA JTFSWA NCE Operation Order 01/01, 3350-134-26 (J3), December 01 G. H. I. Briefing Note for COS CA JTFSWA on CSAR dated 7 March 02 J. 3350-134-1 (Comd) - CA JTFSWA Concept of Operations (CONOPS) - CA JTFSWA Evacuation and Withdrawal Operations K. L. J3 Intl 2-1 Email dated 26 April - DCDS Approval of CONOPS M. COS J3 2284 272310Z Feb 02 - Annex H to CDS Op Order 800 (05/2001) - Logistics Time Zone: ZULU - 5 1. SITUATION a. General. Joint Task Force South-west Asia (JTFSWA) has personnel deployed throughout the UNITED STATES Central Command (US CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) under the auspices of Operation APOLLO in support of the US led Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). Although unlikely, the situation in the CENTCOM AOR, or portions thereof, may deteriorate, which may necessitate the evacuation and withdrawal of all or some JTFSWA personnel and equipment. In accordance with reference A, a CONTINGENCY OPERATION PLAN (COP) for evacuation and withdrawal of JTFSWA has been developed. b. JTFSWA Force Disposition. There are approximately 2000 Canadian Forces personnel deployed in the US CENTCOM AOR and their current command relationships are listed below: (1) Third Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group (3 PPCLIBG), including a Forward Support Group (FSG), consisting of approximately 800 personnel in QANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN (operational control to Coalition Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC)). 1/10 SECRET 000101 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information s.13(1)(a) SECRET (2) Canadian Task Group (CTG) 307.1, consisting of HMC Ships OTTAWA (FFH), TORONTO (FFH), ALGONQUIN (DDH) in the ARABIAN GULF/GULF of OMAN/STRAIT OF HORMUS/NORTH ARABIAN SEA with approximately 715 persons on board (operational control to Coalition Forces Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC)). HMC Ships St JOHNS (FFH) and PROTECTEUR (AOR) will arrive in theatre on 21 May and 7 July respectively. (3) CC130 Tactical Airlift Detachment (TAL Det) operating out of AL MINHAD, U.A.E. with approximately 70 personnel (operational control to Coalition Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC)). (4) CP 140 Long Range Patrol (LRP) Det operating out of AL MINHAD, U.A.E. with approximately 75 personnel (operational control to CFMCC). too (5) CC150 Strategic Airlift (SAL) Det operating out of FUJAYRAH, U.A.E. with approximately 20 personnel (operational control to CFACC). (6) National Support Unit (NSU) operating out of AL MINHAD, U.A.E. with approximately 170 personnel (operational control retained by Commander CA JTFSWA). Other elements of NSU include: (a) Forward Logistics Site (FLS) operating out of FUJAYRAH and DUBAI, U.A.E. with approximately 14 and 10 personnel respectively. (b) A Strategic Line of Communication (SLOC) detachment in DOHA, QATAR and QANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN with approximately 44 and three personnel respectively. (c) Aircraft Service Support elements operating out of FUJAYRAH and AL MINHAD, U.A.E., with approximately five and 45 personnel respectively. (d) A Force Protection Det of two persons operating out of DUBAI, U.A.E.. (7) National Command and Control Information Systems (NCCIS) Dets in QATAR with approximately seven personnel, AL MINHAD, U.A.E. with 18 personnel, BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN, and QANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN with 15 personnel (operational control retained by Commander CA JTFSWA). (8) A small number of personnel deployed as liaison officers in KUWAIT (CFLCC); BAGRAM (Task Force (TF) MOUNTAIN); BAHRAIN (CFMCC); AL MINHAD, U.A.E. (CFACC); AL UDEID, QATAR (Regional Air Movement Coordination Centre (RAMCC)); and Canadian Embassy at ABU DHABI, U.A.E. (operational control retained by Commander CA JTFSWA). c. 2/10 SECRET 000102 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET d. e. Scope. (1) This COP will provide direction regarding a situation that results in a withdrawal or evacuation of some or all of JTFSWA forces in the US CENTCOM AOR. (2) This plan does not specifically deal with the following situations: (a) Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Operations. Emergency extraction effected through CSAR will be conducted in accordance with reference H. Reference I provides further CA context. (b) Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). NEO is not included in this COP. Objectives. (1) Ensure safe withdrawal and evacuation of affected CF personnel. (2) Ensure safety of CF combat forces involved in the withdrawal and evacuation. (3) Render inoperable/destroy abandoned vehicles, aircraft, and materiel. (4) Minimize impact on OEF operations, if possible. f. Threat Assessment. There is currently no specific threat that would precipitate an evacuation and withdrawal of JTFSWA in US CENTCOM AOR. See reference D for a general threat assessment. Periodic ASSESSREPs, INTSUMs, and Force Protection Updates from the NSU Force Protection Detachment in US CENTCOM AOR will provide further updated threat assessments, as required. g. Centre of Gravity. The availability of transport resources to effect early response and rapid evacuation and withdrawal of JTFSWA forces from the area of unacceptable risk or danger. h. DCDS Intent. The Task Force Commander shall prepare and maintain a Task Force evacuation and withdrawal plan which shall be updated semi-annually, in September and February, or as required. The plan should normally be completed within 30 to 60 days of mission set-up. If the Task Force evacuation and withdrawal plan is contained in the mission evacuation plan, a copy of the letter shall be forwarded to NDHQ/COS J3 in lieu. Updated plans, after being reviewed by J3 Inti, will be forwarded to the applicable mission desk officer. i. Attachments and Detachments. National assets (military and civilian) will be requested dependent upon the situation. j. Assumptions. (1) Political Assumptions. (a) An evacuation and withdrawal (especially unilateral) of Canadian forces from OEF will require political approval of the Government of Canada (GOC) to initiate. 3/10 SECRET 000103 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET (b) (2) k. Should this COP be implemented, NDHQ will coordinate with Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)/GOC officials to ensure all host nation and diplomatic restrictions are addressed, although the expeditious withdrawal and evacuation of the force should drive all activities. Military Assumptions. (a) Canadian participation in some or all aspects of OEF operations could be terminated, especially in the event of unilateral evacuation and withdrawal operations. CF military assets in theatre or portions thereof may revert to operational control of the Commander CA JTFSWA. (b) Canadian special operations forces (SOF) will likely be required to support such operations. (c) The evacuation and withdrawal may not be AOR wide and/or occur at the same time throughout the AOR. (d) Vehicles, equipment, and materiel will likely be left behind. (e) Limited warning will be received. (f) The risk associated with executing the evacuation and withdrawal must be less than the risk if it were not conducted. (g) Commander CA JTFSWA will have priority for national assets, if required. Limitations. (1) All aircraft/vehicles, equipment/materiel, and communication security (COMSEC) materiel left behind must be either rendered inoperable or destroyed. (2) The number, capacity, and maximum range of aircraft, as well as landing clearances, may be limited. (3) The availability of contract airlift will be limited. (4) The capacity and range of vehicles will be limited. (5) The capacity of ships will be limited. (6) Heavy lift aircraft is limited to CC-130 and C-17 (and equivalents). AN-24 Anotonov, IL-76, and C5 (and equivalents) cannot land at QANDAHAR, and there are no plans to upgrade the runways to accommodate these aircraft. (7) Time may be required to acquire combat forces or strategic lift assets. May need time to disengage from OEF tasks. (8) Diplomatic clearances - over-flight, territorial water, border clearances - may be required in a short time frame. 4/10 SECRET 000104 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information s.13(1)(a) SECRET 1. Kev Tasks. (1) Ascertain threat. (2) Ascertain OEF support to any evacuation and withdrawal operations. (3) Obtain authority from US airspace control to support Canadian intentions for flight through established corridors. (4) Obtain timely intelligence on conditions of airstrips, roads and ports. (5) On notification of a potential evacuation and withdrawal, obtain diplomatic clearances for over-flight, territorial waters, border crossings, as applicable. (6) Determine assets required for evacuation and withdrawal and submit request for any additional forces to NDHQ. Effect transfer of command authority relationships with US for necessary Canadian forces assigned to OEF. 2. MISSION On order, CA JTFSWA will conduct evacuation and withdrawal of JTFSWA forces in immediate danger in US CENTCOM AOR in order to move to a safe area. 3. EXECUTION a. b. Planning Assumptions. (1) There is no OEF “mission evacuation plan” (2) The worst case scenario sees a CA evacuation and withdrawal operation being conducted separately from OEF forces. (3) Elements of this COP are applicable to situations of evacuation and withdrawal operations both unilaterally, and with the support of OEF forces. (4) Only land-based forces will need evacuation and withdrawal to a safe area. Commander’s Analysis. This planning effort addresses the contingency of an evacuation and withdrawal by CA JTFSWA in the US CENTCOM AOR and can be applied to instances of unilateral CA operations or operations conducted in conjunction with OEF forces/support. CA JTFSWA is limited by the amount of tactical and strategic airlift and combat power currently located in theatre. It is assessed as unlikely that the Canadian Forces will conduct an evacuation and withdrawal independent of US CENTCOM since the basis for the decision to evacuate and withdraw personnel in a given area will likely exist for all forces. Given the number of resources available for a unilateral Canadian operation, it would also be very difficult, and it is likely that only personnel could be withdrawn and evacuated, leaving vehicles and equipment. 5/10 SECRET 000105 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET c. Commander’s Intent. Commander CA JTFSWA intends to conduct evacuation and withdrawal operations to remove JTFSWA from unacceptable risk situations to safe areas. Assigned military resources and any available diplomatic resources will be used to that end. Given the unlikeness of an evacuation and withdrawal situation occurring, risk associated with a lack of JTFSWA combat power and transportation resources will have to be accepted. The end state sees all CF personnel withdrawn and evacuated safely from the affected area while minimizing the risk of capture of personnel, vehicles/aircraft, equipment, and COMSEC materiel. d. Concept of Operations. Commander CA JTFSWA will set the conditions necessary for a successful evacuation and withdrawal of the endangered unit(s) or personnel. Commander CA JTFSWA will make maximum use of intelligence and liaison assets to gain early warning of potentially dangerous situations that could lead to evacuation and withdrawal operations. All necessary JTFSWA forces will be synchronized with any assigned national military assets (including Canadian SOF), civilian resources, and diplomatic pressure to support evacuation and withdrawal operations. Required JTFSWA units, on order, will revert to operational control of Commander CA JTFSWA and will immediately be tasked to support an evacuation and withdrawal of CF personnel from the area of unacceptable danger to a safe area. Any evacuation and withdrawal operation will be the Task Force main effort. The first priority in withdrawal and evacuation will be personnel followed by materiel items. Materiel that must be left behind will be destroyed. JTFSWA forces will evacuate and withdraw using the most expeditious means via land, sea, or air, or a combination thereof, dependant upon the situation. Commander JTFSWA will designate supported and supporting commanders at the time of the crisis. Detachments from NCCIS element and NSU are under tactical control of supported elements for local defence. Operations will likely be conducted in three phases. e. (1) Phase 1 - Assembly of Forces/Assets. Commander CA JTFSWA may take operational control of necessary units, request additional military and civilian resources through NDHQ, request diplomatic clearances, and designate supported and supporting commanders, while forces assemble in defendable locations - ideally at airports. (2) Phase 2 - Combat Operations. Conduct of combat operations necessary to evacuate and withdraw Canadian elements to a safe area. (3) Phase 3 - Reconstitution. On order of Commander CA JTFSWA, elements will either be reconstituted for further operations or repatriated to CANADA in accordance with national direction. Force Capability Requirements. This is an assessment only and would be contingent upon the situation and limited by availability of resources. The assessment is based on the evacuation and withdrawal of all JTFSWA land-based elements from the AOR. Attached as annex A is a “strawman” statement of requirement of the forces that may be necessary to carry out evacuation and withdrawal operations. 6/10 SECRET 000106 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET f. Tasks. (1) (a) Designate supported and supporting commanders. (b) Provide timely intelligence and threat assessment on situations that could lead to evacuation and withdrawal. Provide intelligence support. (c) Be prepared to provide engineer analysis of roads/airfields/ports in CENTCOM AOR that could be used by JTFSWA forces. (d) Be prepared to provide command, control, and/or coordination of evacuation and withdrawal operations. (e) In conjunction with NDHQ, identify responsibilities for strategic lift contracting. (2) Naval Units. Be prepared to assist in evacuation and withdrawal of land-based forces. (3) 3 PPCLI BG/Aircraft Dets/NSU. (4) 8. NCE. (a) Prepare a unit contingency plan to conduct evacuation and withdrawal operations. Must include intended routes to assembly areas and to nearest airports/seaports/friendly borders. (b) Be prepared to assist in evacuation and withdrawal of other land-based forces. (c) Review standard operating procedures for destruction of aircraft/vehicles, weapons, equipment and materiel, and COMSEC materiel. Liaison Elements. (a) Prepare a contingency plan for evacuation and withdrawal of liaison elements. Must include intended routes to assembly areas and to nearest airports/seaports/friendly borders. (b) Review standard operating procedures for destruction of vehicles, weapons, equipment, and COMSEC materiel. Coordinating Instructions. (1) Timings. On order of Commander CA JTFSWA. (2) Unit Withdrawal and Evacuation Plans. Due within 30 days of issue of this COP. This COP is effective for planning only. (3) Reconnaissance. Not authorized. 7/10 SECRET 000107 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET (4) Movement. The CA JTFSWA LO at the RAMCC will coordinate airflow of CA assets in theatre. NDHQ J4 will have to muster any additional sea and airlift assets required. (5) Emergency Destruction. Units will not likely have the time nor will the resources likely be available to extract all materiel and equipment. Materiel and equipment that is abandoned must be rendered inoperable or destroyed, if practical. Authority for destruction is Commander CA JTFSWA, unit commanders if capture is imminent, or appropriate authority, if delegated. Any destruction is to be conducted in accordance with appropriate directives and standard operating procedures and reported through normal command channels. The priority for destruction of CA JTFSWA materiel that must be abandoned is (note that medical equipment and supplies are not authorized to be destroyed): (a) Classified documents (electronic and written), COMSEC equipment, and associated materiel. (b) Weapons, weapon platforms, explosives, and ammunition. (c) Combat vehicles and aircraft. (d) Support vehicles and air maintenance support equipment. (e) Petroleum, oil, and lubricants. (f) Any other military stores, equipment, and supplies which might be of use to the enemy. (6) Use of Force/ROE. No change. (7) Force Protection Measures. No change. (8) Nuclear, Biological, Chemical. No change. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT a. Logistics Concept. Flexibility will be paramount, depending on the mode of evacuation and withdrawal. CA JTFSWA J4 will provide liaison and coordination with NDHQ and NSU/tactical units to facilitate logistics flow. There is no change to existing holdings of combat supplies as directed in appendices 1,3, and 4 of reference L (and summarized in annex B). Draw down or surge of combat supplies, as applicable, may be made if circumstances demand, on authorization of Commander CA JTFSWA. Movement may be accomplished by using a combination of road, sea, and airlift assets depending upon the situation. Commander CA JTFSWA will designate supporting units for logistics and movement, who will arrange transient accommodation, feeding, etc. in a safe area. b. Materiel Accountability. To the extent possible, units will record all materiel destroyed in location or abandoned. Upon arrival in a safe area, units will conduct a 100% stocktaking to determine actual holdings. c. Medical Support. It is expected that all casualties will be evacuated by role one resources. Role two or three support should not be expected until evacuation to a safe 8/10 SECRET 000108 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET area. CA JTFSWA NCE J l Med will coordinate any host country medical support in the safe area. d. Host Nation Support (HNS). The requirement for HNS will be identified to NDHQ for expeditious diplomatic efforts to gain necessary permissions throughout all phases. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. b. Command and Control. (1) Commander CA JTFSWA will retain operational command throughout. Transfer of command authority will be initiated for required forces whose operational control has been assigned to OEF and operational command of Canadian SOF in US CENTCOM AOR will be requested. (2) Commander CA JTFSWA will designate the supported commander and supporting commanders. (3) Detachments from NCCIS elements and NSU are under tactical control to supported units for self defence. Locations. (1) CA JTFSWA NCE - TAMPA. (2) CTG 307.1 - ARABIAN GULF/GULF OF OMAN/STRAIT OF HORMUS/NORTH ARABIAN SEA. (3) 3 PPCLIBG - QANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN. (4) TAL Det - AL MINHAD, U.A.E.. (5) SAL Det - FUJAYRAH, U.A.E.. (6) LRP Det - AL MINHAD, U.A.E.. (7) NSU - AL MINHAD, U.A.E.. (8) Force Protection Det - DUBAI, U.A.E.. (9) ACSS - FUJAYRAH and AL MINHAD, U.A.E.. (10) FLS - DUBAI and AL MINHAD, U.A.E. (ID SLOC Unit - DOHA, QATAR. (12) LO CFLCC - KUWAIT. (13) LO TF MOUNTAIN - BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN. (14) LO CFMCC - BAHRAIN. (15) LO CFACC - AL MINHAD, U.A.E.. (16) LO Canadian Embassy - ABU DHABI. 9/10 SECRET 000109 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET (17) LO RAMCC - AL UDEID, QATAR. Acknowledge Instructions: ACTION ADDRESSEES ACKNOWLEDGE VIA MESSAGE/TITAN EMAIL TO CA JTFSWA NCE/J3 WATCHKEEPER NLT 24 HOURS AFTER RECEIPT QUOTE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF CA JTFSWA EVACUATION AND WITHDRAWAL COP UNQUOTE CAael J.P.Y.D. Gosselin Colonel Acting Commander Authentication: M.M. Minor Lieutenant-Colonel J5 Annex: Annex A - “Strawman” Statement of Requirement Annex B - Summary of DCDS Directed Holdings DISTRIBUTION: UNITS Action_____________________________ CA JTFSWA NCE//AI1 Branches/Advisors CTG 307.1 //Commander__________ 3PPCLI BG//CO________________ SALDF.T//CO__________________ TAT. DFT//CQ__________________ LRPDRT//CO__________________ _______________________________ CJCMOTF//LO_________________ CFLCC//LO____________________ TF MOUNT ATN//LO_____________ _ _____________________________ _ _____________________________ Canadian Embassy ABU DHABI//LO _ _____________________________ NC.CTS Element//CO Information________________ NDHO DCDS//COS J3/J3 INTL 10/10 SECRET 000110 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET Annex A - “Strawman” Statement of Requirement Assets Capacity Location Remarks Qty CA JTFSWA assets that are deployed 1 Approx ARABIAN In case of evacuation of land-based CTG 800+ pers GULF/STRAIT OF elements by sea. HORMUS/GULF OF DDH 280 (ALGONQUIN), FFH OMAN/NORTH (TORONTO), FFH (OTTAWA), AOR (PROTECTEUR) (7 July 02), ARABIAN SEA FFH (ST JOHNS) (21 May 02) OMAN QANDAHAR May be required for combat 3 PPCLIBG N/A N/A operations____________________ FUJAYRAH, More room available for standing CC-150 1 58 pers per chalk U.A.E. Combi ALMINHAD, Approx 12 chalks may be required 3 70 pers CC-130 for personnel in Afghanistan per chalk U.A.E ALMINHAD, 2 13 pers CPI-40 per chalk U.A.E Assets that may be required through national or civilian agencies SOF assigned to Op APOLLO may N/A N/A AFG AOR/ SOF be required for combat operations. CANADA Will be requested if required. 93/chalk CANADA CC-150 1 Combi 150/chalk CANADA CC-150 Pax 2 Primarily applicable to BG. contract Heavy airlift Appro Required only if equipment, etc. is x75 being redeployed. Approx 75 X C17 chalks chalks were required to deploy BG toQANDAHAR (ANTONOV/C5/IL76 cannot land in QANDAHAR). Redeployment of equipment will be dependent on threat and resources available._____ If situation demands, LOs may need N/A N/A tickets Civilian to purchase tickets on local airlines Airline to evacuate in an emergency.______ Close air support may be required N/A N/A TBD CAS for combat operations (either from CANADA or friendly elements) dependant on the situation. It may take from 7 days (best case) to 21 days (worst case to have planes deploy from Canada._____________ Approx 7 chalks were required to contract 7 747 deploy BG to QANDAHAR. chalks Dependant upon threat. May be required after tactical lift transports to a safe area. SECRET 000111 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET Annex B - Summary of DCDS Directed Holdings Unit 3PPCLIBG Combat Supplies Water IMPs__________ Packaged POL Ammunition Days of Supply (DOS) _________ Remarks________ 3 DOS______________ No change to DCDS directed 7 DOS______________ holdings identified at COS J3 15 DOS_____________ 2307 072344Z Mar 02 19 DOS (including basic Appendix 3 to Annex H to CDS Op Order 800 (05/2001) - Op load) APOLLO - Battle Group NSU Packaged POL 30 DOS No change to DCDS directed holdings identified at COS J3 2305 072340Z Mar 02Appendix 1 to Annex H to CDS Op Order 800 (05/2001) - Op APOLLO - Joint Elements Air Elements Ammunition 7 DOS No change to DCDS directed holdings identified at COS J3 2308 072346Z Mar 02 Appendix 4 to Annex H to CDS Op Order 800 (05/2001) - Op APOLLO - Air Elements SECRET 000112 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi3 l^cces a /'information w s.13(1)(a) SECRET Canadian Joint Task Force South-west Asia National Command Element Eagle Village 7115 South Boundary Boulevard MacDill Air Force Base Tampa FL 33621 3350-134-1 (Comd) 3 May 2002 Distribution List CONTINGENCY OPERATION PLAN (COP) CA JTFSWA EVACUATION AND WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS References: A. DCDS Direction for International Operations (Rev 1), Jul 01 B. CDS Operation Order 800 (005/2001) 282000Z Oct 01 - Op APOLLO - Campaign Against Terrorism (CAT) C. 3350-134-1 (Comd) 19 March 2002 - Concept of Operations (CONOPS) CA JTFSWA Evacuation and Withdrawal Operations D. J3 Inti 2-1 email 26 April 2002 - DCDS Approval of CONOPS 1. In accordance with reference A, CA JTFSWA must have a plan for evacuation and withdrawal of the Task Force from the theatre of operations. Enclosed is a COP for evacuation and withdrawal of CA JTFSWA land-based forces operating in the US Central Command Area of Responsibility (US CENTCOM AOR). The COP allows units of CA JTFSWA to plan for potential evacuation or withdrawal operations. A separate implementation order will be issued to activate the COP. 2. Accordingly, the CA JTFSWA plan cannot specifically incorporate any expected support from OEF forces. The ability for Canadian forces to conduct a unilateral evacuation and withdrawal is limited and would be difficult to execute given the lack of integral resources. As a result, the enclosed COP is general in nature, providing guidance to Commanding Officers and Detachment Commanders for the development of their own contingency plans for either a unilateral operation or an operation in concert with OEF, should that occur. 3. Unit evacuation and withdrawal plans are due to CA JTFSWA NCE within 30 days of receipt of this COP. Acknowledge in accordance with acknowledge instructions on enclosed COP. J.P.Y.D. Gosselin Colonel Acting Commander Enclosed: 1 Distribution List (page 2/2) 1/2 SECRET 000113 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET Distribution UNITS Action_____________________________ CA JTFSWA NCE//A11 Branches/Advisors CTG 307.1 //Commander__________ 3 PPCT J BG//CO________________ SAT, DET//CO__________________ TAT, DET//CO________________ LRP DET//CO_________________ NSU//CO____________________ CICMOTF//LO________________ CFLCCI/LO__________________ TF MOUNTAIN//! ,O_____________ CFMCC//L.O____________________ CFACCI/LO____________________ Canadian Embassy ABU DHABI//LO RAMCC//LO___________________ NCCTS Element//CO Information_________________ NDHODCDS//COSJ3/J3INTL 2/2 SECRET 000114 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information 13 — 32. SECRET Copy Number of Canadian Joint Task Force South West Asia National Command Element TAMPA FL 011355 2* Apr 02 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) 3 PPCLI BATTLE GROUP (BG) REST AND RECREATION (R&R) References: A. BN to COS CA JTFSWA NCE on Issue of R&R Leave for 3 PPCLI BG, 14 Mar 02 B. 3350-134-26 (CO), Task Force Standing Order 200 - Leave (Rev 1), Dec 01 C. MOU - GHQ UAE/DND Concerning the Temp Positioning of CF Dets in the UAE, 27 Jan 02 D. 3350-134-1 Op APOLLO - Mitigation of Risk to JTFSWA units and Pers Deployed to BAHRAIN, KSA, KUWAIT, QATAR and UAE, 281817 Z Jan 02 E. CO NSU 009 - Restrictions for Deployment to UAE via AL MINHAD, 081130Z Mar 02 F. Various emails datedlO Mar G. CO NSU Briefing Note on R&R Programme in support of BG H. CO NSU Op APOLLO In Brief 1. DCDS Direction for International Operations (Rev 1), Jul 2001 J. CO NSU 027 NSU Daily SITREP, 211315Z Mar 02 K. Task Force Standing Order 1000, January 2002 (JTFSWA Alcohol Policy) Time Zone: ZULU - 5 1. SITUATION a. General. Given the unique circumstances of 3 PPCLI BG in AFGHANISTAN, it is necessary to provide further guidance and direction to reference B on the issue of R&R leave (compensatory time off) for 3 PPCLI BG. Based on options presented by CO NSU, there are two locations in U.A.E. (ABU DHABI and DUBAI) which offer suitable resorts. A location will be confirmed by 3 PPCLI reconnaissance currently underway in consultation with CO NSU; b. Scope. This plan will apply to 3 PPCLI BG and all CA JTFSWA elements currently in AFGHANISTAN in support; c. Objectives. (1) Provide for the R&R needs of 3PPCLI BG soldiers and support elements, while minimizing the cost to individual soldiers, travel time from AFGHANISTAN, and impact on Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) operations, and (2) Minimize potential for clash of cultures/local customs; 1/4 SECRET 000115 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET d. Threat Assessment. The primary threat in UAE is from intelligence sources targeting foreigners. There is also a risk of a clash of cultures, if personnel are not cognizant of differences of local customs from Western customs. References D and H provide further amplification and mitigation; e. Centre of Gravity. Rapid and reliable transportation to R&R Centre; f. DCDS Intent. Reference I; and g- Key Tasks. (1) Determine R&R intra-theatre transportation concept, which minimizes the impact on operations, (2) Resolve any host nation/visa issues, (3) Make necessary contractual arrangements and build R&R programme, (4) Select and indoctrinate R&R staff, and (5) Brief personnel on R&R upon arrival in UAE. 2. MISSION CA JTFSWA will provide an R&R programme to meet the unique needs of 3 PPCLI BG and support personnel in order for the BG to maintain its operational effectiveness. 3. EXECUTION a. Commander’s Intent. Commander CA JTFSWA intends to provide an R&R programme for 3 PPCLI BG personnel, which offers individual soldiers an opportunity for rest away from combat operations in a safe and relaxing atmosphere. Travel time must be minimized in order to gain maximum rest at the R&R destination. It is paramount that commanders and staff involved at all levels facilitate this important programme. Every effort will be made to reduce out-ofpocket costs to the individual soldier. Any proposed changes to force protection restrictions outlined in reference D will be forwarded to Commander CA JTFSWA; b. Concept of Operations. CO NSU will have the lead on planning the R&R programme, with input and consultations from 3 PPCLI BG and TAL Det. The R&R programme will use existing lines of communication (LOC) and regularly scheduled CA flights to minimize fuss. The leave centre will be at an appropriate resort in UAE. This resort will be the main focus of efforts to resolve all outstanding host nation issues and contractual arrangements for R&R programme completion. R&R staff will be under the operational command of CO NSU. TAL Det will provide transportation based on 3 PPCLI rotation schedule; c. Force Capability Requirements. The R&R staff will be manned by PPCLIBG; 2/4 SECRET 000116 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET d. Tasks. (1) (2) (3) e. NSU. (a) Coordinate and administer R&R programme; (b) Finalize site selection and contracts; (c) Resolve any outstanding host nation/visa issues; (d) Indoctrinate the R&R staff and ensure personnel on R&R are briefed on policy, customs and force protection issues; (e) Negotiate, as required, with local Host nation police and prosecutors pertaining to the practical application of reference C; (f) Develop, with the TAL Det and 3 PPCLI, an R&R transport concept/plan; and (g) Back-brief the Commander JTFSWA on the R&R plan once it has been finalized. 3 PPCLI BG. (a) Provide R&R support staff; (b) Devise R&R rotation schedule in consultation with CO NSU; and (c) Provide input to CO NSU for R&R programme; and TAL Det. Support the R&R programme using existing TAL assets in order to make it as responsive as possible to the needs of 3 PPCLIBG without impacting on OEF operations. Coordinating Instructions. (1) Timings. (a) R&R programme to commence as soon as possible on agreement of CO NSU and 3 PPCLI BG; and (b) R&R staff in location at R&R destination soonest; (2) Force Protection Measures and Cultural Awareness. CO NSU will outline guidelines for R&R centre. R&R staff will be fully conversant with force protection measures and culture awareness issues. BG personnel will be fully briefed on arrival to R&R centre, (3) Visas. CO NSU to coordinate requirements and procedures, 3/4 SECRET 000117 1 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET (4) Coordination. CO NSU will have the lead for planning, implementation, and execution, and will conduct necessary coordination with 3 PPCLIBG, TAL Det, and NCE staff, (5) implementation. This CONOPS is to be taken for action on receipt, and (6) Alcohol Policy. Reference K remains in effect. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT. No change. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL a. Command and Control. CO NSU will have OPCOM of R&R staff and OPCON of soldiers who are on R&R; and b. Locations. No change. Acknowledge Instructions: ACKNOWLEDGE ZZoUAA J.P. ThiffaultCommodore Commander Authentication: M.M. Minor Lieutenant-Colonel J5 DISTRIBUTION: UNITS COPY NUMBER 3PPCLIBG TAL DET NSU CFLCC HQ//LO NCCIS Element NDHQ//COS J3/J3 INTL 4/4 SECRET 000118 �l Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act 1 Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information i 1*1 SECURITY CLEARANCE - COTE DE SECURITE DESIGNATION - DESIGNATION National Defense Defence nationale MINUTE SHEET - NOTE DE SERVICE FILE NO. ■ N° DE DOSSIER 3350-134-$ 22 (Comd) SUBJECT - SUJET DATED - DATEE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) JTFSWA EVACUATION AND WITHDRAWAL PLAN REMARKS - REMARQUES (To be signed in full showing appointment, telephone number and date) (Attach de signature, fonction, numero de telephone et date) REFERRED TO TRANSMISE A Comd (throu 19 Mar 2002 COS) ^1. This plan had been underway for sometime before my arrival. It is required under DCDS Direction for International Operations (DDIO) and should normally be produced within 30 to 60 days of mission set-up. The Branch has produced the enclosed CONOP for the approval of DCDS prior to being issued by Commander JTFSWA. Upon approval, we should issue it as a Contingency Operation Plan (COP) to subordinate HQs so that they can get on with their own planning. CONOP and covering letter to DCDS are submitted for approval. MM Minor LCol • J5 1284 @)Cos . Yt RisiwS $Mavc ton M . W vof LCW K/o3 CO5 12/3 DND 317 (3-90) 7530-21-904-3144 / AETE (9-94) 000119 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act *icHebe®tion sur ".g Government™ &erkement VACri REQUEST H *T • of Canada SERVICE du Canada Date To-A . Time - Heure From - De Telephone No. - N° de telephone Language spoken - Langue utilisee English Anglais French Please call Mere d’appeler Returned your call Vous a rappele Extension Poste Francais Wants to see you Desire vous voir Will call again Vous rapellera Action Donner suite Approval Approbation Note and return Noter et retourner Comments Commentaires Draft reply Projet de reponse Note and forward Noter et faire suivre As requested Com me demands Signature Note and file Noter et classer File No. - N° de dossier Message taken by - Message recu par Note ‘ Fozed 4o NVCC (4 M/a 6 malle3 ho Cos 33/ D 64*lC1s. GC 218(89/08) 7540-21-907-5351 000120 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information s.13(1)(a) SECRET Canadian Joint Task Force Southwest Asia National Command Element Eagle Village 7115 South Boundary Boulevard MacDill Air Force Base Tampa FL 33621 3350-134-1 (Comd) 1 March 2002 Distribution List CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) JTFSWA EVACUATION AND WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS References: A. DCDS Direction for International Operations (Rev 1), Jul 01 B. CDS Operation Order 800 (005/2001) 282000Z Oct 01 - Op APOLLO - Campaign Against Terrorism (CAT) 1. Enclosed is a CONOPS for evacuation and withdrawal of CA JTFSWA land-based forces in the US Central Command Area of Responsibility (US CENTCOM AOR). 2. Accordingly, the CA JTFSWA plan cannot specifically incorporate any expected support from OEF forces. The ability for Canadian forces to conduct a unilateral evacuation and withdrawal is limited and would be difficult to execute given the lack of integral resources. As a result, the enclosed CONOPS is general in nature providing guidance to Commanding Officers and Detachment Commanders for the development of contingency plans for either a unilateral operation or an operation in concert with OEF, should that occur. 3. The intent is to issue this as a Contingency Operation Plan (COP) to all units under command of JTFSWA, subject to your approval of the enclosed CONOPS. J.P. Thiffault Commodore Commander Enclosed: 1 Distribution List NDHQ Ottawa//DCDS/COS J3 SECRET 000121 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information s.13(1)(a) s.13(l)(b) SECRET Copy Number of Canadian Joint Task Force South West Asia National Command Element TAMPA FL March 2002 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) JTFSWA EVACUATION AND WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS References: A. DCDS Direction for International Operations, Revision One, 31 July 01 B. C. Briefing Note for CA FSWA NCE, 21 Feb 02 D. CDS Operation Order 800 (005/2001) 282000Z Oct 01- Operation APOLLO - Campaign Against Terrorism (CAT) E. Annex C to CDS Op Order 800 (005-2001) - Intelligence, 082200Z Nov 01 F. CA JTFSWA NCE Operation Order 01/01, 3350-134-26 (J3), December 01 G. H. 1. Briefing Note for COS CA JTFSWA on CSAR dated 7 March 02 Time Zone: ZULU - 5 1. SITUATION a. General. Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (JTFSWA) has personnel deployed throughout the UNITED STATES Central Command (US CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) under the auspices of Operation APOLLO in support of the US led Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). Although unlikely, the situation in the CENTCOM AOR, or portions thereof, may deteriorate, which may necessitate the evacuation and withdrawal of all or some JTFSWA personnel and equipment. In accordance with reference A, a CONOPS for evacuation and withdrawal of JTFSWA. has been developed; b. JTFSWA Force Disposition. There are approximately 2400 Canadian forces deployed in the US CENTCOM AOR and their current command relationships are listed below: 12 (1) Third Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group (3 PPCLIBG) consisting of approximately 800 personnel in QANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN (operational control to Coalition Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC)), (2) Canadian Task Group (CTG) 307.1, consisting of HMCS PRESERVER (AOR), IROQUOIS (DDH), and TORONTO (FFH) in the ARABIAN GULF/GULF of OMAN/STRAIT OF HORMUS/NORTH ARABIAN SEA with approximately 835 persons on board (operational control to Coalition Forces Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC)), (3) HMCS VANCOUVER (FFH) operating in the ARABIAN GULF/GULF OF OMAN/STRAIT OF HORMUS/NORTH ARABIAN SEA, with approximately 1/10 SECRET 000122 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET 230 personnel on board (operational control to Commander JOHN C. STENNIS BATTLE GROUP), (4) — (5) CP 140 Long Range Patrol (LRP) Det operating out of AL MINHAD, U.A.E. with approximately 96 personnel (operational control to CFMCC), (6) CC150 Strategic Airlift (SAL) Det operating out of AL FUJAYRAH, U.A.E. with approximately 30 personnel (operational control to CFACC), (7) National Support Unit (NSU) operating out of AL MINHAD, U.A.E. with approximately 160 personnel (operational control retained by Commander CA JTFSWA). Other elements of NSU include: d. (a) Forward Logistics Site (FLS) operating out of AL FUJAYRAH and DUBAI, U.A.E. with 14 and 10 personnel respectively; and (b) A Strategic Line of Communication (SLOC) detachment in DOHA, QATAR and QANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN with 44 and three personnel respectively, (8) NCCIS Dets in QATAR with seven personnel, AL MINHAD, U.A.E. with 14 personnel, and QANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN with 26 personnel (operational control retained by Commander CA JTFSWA), and (9) A small number of personnel deployed as liaison officers in KUWAIT (CFLCC); BAHRAIN (CFMCC); PSAB, SAUDI ARABIA (CFACC); AL UDEID, QATAR (Regional Air Movement Coordination Centre (RAMCC)); and Canadian Embassy at ABU DHABI, U.A.E. (operational control retained by Commander CA JTFSWA); 1: C. CC130 Tactical Airlift Detachment (TAL Det) operating out of AL MINHAD, U.A.E. with approximately 141 personnel (operational control to Coalition Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC)), Strategic Conditions. From a strategic perspective, US CENTCOM views the probability of an evacuation and withdrawal in the AOR as non-existent and CENTCOM/coalition planners are not considering it as a planning requirement. In the event of a need to evacuate personnel, US CENTCOM’s intention is to use available airlift in theatre; Scope. (1) This CONOPS will provide direction regarding a situation that results in a withdrawal or evacuation of some or all of JTFSWA forces in the US CENTCOM AOR, (2) This plan does not specifically deal with the following situations: (a) Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Operations. Emergency extraction effected through CSAR will be conducted in accordance with reference H. Reference I provides further CA context; and 2/10 SECRET 000123 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET (b) e. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). NEO is not included in this CONOPS; Objectives. (1) Ensure safe withdrawal and evacuation of affected personnel, (2) Ensure safety of combat forces involved in the withdrawal and evacuation, (3) Render inoperable/destroy abandoned vehicles, aircraft, and materiel, and (4) Minimize impact on OEF operations, if possible, f. Threat Assessment. There is currently no specific threat that would precipitate an evacuation and withdrawal of JTFSWA in US CENTCOM AOR. See reference D for a general threat assessment. Periodic ASSESSREPs, INTSUMs, and Force Protection Updates from the NSU Force Protection Detachment in US CENTCOM AOR will provide further updated threat assessments, as required; g- Centre of Gravity. The availability of transport resources to effect early response and rapid evacuation and withdrawal of JTFSWA forces from the area of unacceptable risk or danger; h. DCDS Intent. The Task Force Commander shall prepare and maintain a Task Force evacuation and withdrawal plan which shall be updated semi-annually, in September and February, or as required. The plan should normally be completed within 30 to 60 days of mission set-up. If the Task Force evacuation and withdrawal plan is contained in the mission evacuation plan, a copy of the letter shall be forwarded to NDHQ/COS J3 in lieu. Updated plans, after being reviewed by J3 Inti, will be forwarded to the applicable mission desk officer; i. Attachments and Detachments. National assets (military and civilian) will be requested dependent upon the situation; j. Assumptions. (1) (2) Political Assumptions. (a) An evacuation and withdrawal (especially unilateral) of Canadian forces from OEF will require political approval of the Government of Canada to initiate; and (b) Should this CONOPS be implemented, NDHQ will coordinate with DFAIT/GOC officials to ensure all host nation and diplomatic restrictions are addressed, although the expeditious withdrawal and evacuation of the force should drive all activities; Military Assumptions. (a) Canadian participation in some or all aspects of OEF operations could be terminated, especially in the event of unilateral evacuation and withdrawal operations. CF military assets in theatre or portions thereof may revert to operational control of the Commander CA JTFSWA; 3/10 SECRET 000124 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET k. Canadian special operations forces (SOF) will likely be required to support such operations; (c) The evacuation and withdrawal may not be AOR wide and/or occur at the same time though-out the AOR; (d) The risk associated with executing the evacuation and withdrawal must be less than the risk if it were not conducted; and (e) Commander CA JTFSWA will have priority for national assets; Limitations. (1) All aircraft/vehicles, equipment/materiel, and COMSEC materiel left behind must be either rendered inoperable or destroyed, (2) The number, capacity, and max range of aircraft, as well as landing clearances, may be limited, (3) The availability of contract airlift will be limited, (4) The capacity and range of vehicles will be limited, (5) The capacity of ships will be limited, (6) Neither Antonov nor C5 can land at QANDAHAR, (7) Time may be required to acquire combat forces or strategic lift assets. May need time to disengage from OEF tasks, and (8) Diplomatic clearances - over-flight, territorial water, border clearances - may be required in a short time frame; and V 1. (b) Key Tasks. (1) Ascertain threat, (2) Ascertain OEF support to any evacuation and withdrawal operations, (3) Obtain authority from US airspace control to support Canadian intentions for flight through established corridors, (4) Obtain timely intelligence on conditions of airstrips, roads and ports, (5) On notification of a potential evacuation and withdrawal, obtain diplomatic clearances for over-flight, territorial waters, border crossings, as applicable, and (6) Determine assets required for evacuation and withdrawal and submit request for any additional forces to NDHQ. Effect transfer of command authority relationships with US for necessary Canadian forces in assigned to OEF. 4/10 SECRET 000125 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information s.13(1)(a) SECRET 2. MISSION On order, CA JTFSWA will conduct evacuation and withdrawal of JTFSWA forces in immediate danger in US CENTCOM AOR in order to move to a safe area. 3. EXECUTION a. Planning Assumptions. (1) There is no OEF “mission evacuation plan” (2) The worst case scenario sees a CA evacuation and withdrawal operation being conducted separately from OEF forces, (3) Elements of this CONOPS are applicable to situations of evacuation and withdrawal operations both unilaterally, and with the support of OEF forces, and (4) Only land-based forces will need evacuation and withdrawal to a safe area; b. Commander’s Analysis. This planning effort addresses the contingency of an evacuation and withdrawal by CA JTFSWA in the US CENTCOM AOR and can be applied to instances of unilateral CA operations or operations conducted in conjunction with OEF forces/support. CA JTFSWA is limited by the amount of tactical and strategic airlift and combat power currently located in theatre. It is assessed as unlikely that the Canadian Forces will conduct an evacuation and withdrawal independent of US CENTCOM since the basis for the decision to evacuate and withdraw personnel in a given area will likely exist for all forces. Given the number of resources available for a unilateral Canadian operation, it would also be very difficult, and it is likely that only personnel could be withdrawn and evacuated, leaving vehicles and equipment; C. Commander’s intent. Commander CA JTFSWA intends to conduct evacuation and withdrawal operations to remove JTFSWA from unacceptable risk situations to safe areas. Assigned military resources and any available diplomatic resources will be used to that end. Given the unlikeness of an evacuation and withdrawal situation occurring, risk associated with a lack of JTFSWA combat power and transportation resources will have to be accepted. The end state sees all CF personnel withdrawn and evacuated safely from the affected area while minimizing the risk of capture of personnel, equipment, and communication security (COMSEC) materiel; d. Concept of Operations. Commander CA JTFSWA will set the conditions necessary for • a successful evacuation and withdrawal of the endangered unit(s) or personnel. Commander CA JTFSWA will make maximum use of intelligence and liaison assets to gain early warning of potentially dangerous situations that could lead to evacuation and withdrawal operations. All necessary JTFSWA forces will be synchronized with any assigned national military assets (including Canadian SOF), civilian resources, and diplomatic pressure to support evacuation and withdrawal operations. Required JTFSWA units, on order, will revert to operational control of Commander CA 1* 5/10 SECRET 000126 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET JTFSWA and will immediately be tasked to support an evacuation and withdrawal of CF personnel from the area of unacceptable danger to a safe area. Any evacuation and withdrawal operation will be the Task Force main effort. The first priority in withdrawal and evacuation will be personnel followed by materiel items. Materiel that must be left behind will be destroyed. JTFSWA forces will evacuate and withdraw using the most expeditious means via land, sea, or air, or a combination thereof, dependant upon the situation. Commander JTFSWA will designate supported and supporting commanders at the time of the crisis. Detachments from NCCIS element and NSU are under tactical control of supported elements for local defence. Operations will likely be conducted in three phases: e. 1 f. (1) Phase 1 - Assembly of Forces/Assets. Commander CA JTFSWA may take operational control of necessary units, request additional military and civilian resources through NDHQ, request diplomatic clearances, and designate supported and supporting commanders, while forces assemble in defendable locations - ideally at airports, (2) Phase 2 - Combat Operations. Conduct of combat operations necessary to evacuate and withdraw Canadian elements to a safe area, and (3) Phase 3 - Reconstitution. On order of Commander CA JTFSWA, elements will either be reconstituted for further operations or repatriated to CANADA in accordance with national direction; Force Capability Requirements. This is an assessment only and would be contingent upon the situation and limited by availability of resources. The assessment is based on the evacuation and withdrawal of all JTFSWA land-based elements from the AOR. Attached as annex A is a “strawman” statement of requirement of the forces that may be necessary to carry out evacuation and withdrawal operations; Tasks. (1) NCE. (a) Designate supported and supporting commanders; (b) Provide timely intelligence and threat assessment on situations that could lead to evacuation and withdrawal. Provide intelligence support; (c) Be prepared to provide engineer analysis of roads/airfields/ports in CENTCOM AOR that could be used by JTFSWA forces; (d) Be prepared to provide command, control, and/or coordination of evacuation and withdrawal operations; (e) In conjunction with NDHQ: i. Identify priority of destruction and authorization for destruction of materiel and equipment, and ii. Identify responsibilities for strategic lift contracting, 6/10 SECRET 000127 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET (2) Naval Units. Be prepared to assist in evacuation and withdrawal of land-based forces, (3) 3 PPCLI BG/Aircraft Dets/NSU (4) g- (a) Prepare a unit contingency plan to conduct evacuation and withdrawal operations. Must include intended routes to assembly areas and to nearest airports/seaports/ffiendly borders; (b) Be prepared to assist in evacuation and withdrawal of other land-based forces; and (c) Review standard operating procedures for destruction of aircraft/vehicles, weapons, equipment and materiel, and COMSEC materiel, Liaison Elements. (a) Prepare a contingency plan for evacuation and withdrawal of liaison elements. Must include intended routes to assembly areas and to nearest airports/seaports/friendly borders; and (b) Review standard operating procedures for destruction of vehicles, weapons, equipment, and COMSEC materiel; Coordinating Instructions. (1) Timings. On order of Commander CA JTFSWA, (2) Unit Withdrawal and Evacuation Plans. Due within 30 days of issue of this CONOPS, (3) Reconnaissance. Not authorized, (4) Movement. The CA JTFSWA LO at the Regional Air Movement Control . Centre (RAMCC) will coordinate air flow of CA assets in theatre. NDHQ J4 will have to muster any additional sea and airlift assets required, (5) Emergency Destruction. Units will not likely have the time nor will the resources likely be available to extract all materiel and equipment. Materiel and equipment that is abandoned must be rendered inoperable or destroyed, if practical, on order of Commander CA JTFSWA or appropriate authority, if delegated. In the absence of strategic direction, the interim priority for destruction of CA JTFSWA materiel that must be abandoned is: V (a) COMSEC equipment and materiel; (b) Crew-served weapons and weapon platforms; (c) Ammunition; (d) Vehicles, aircraft, and air maintenance support equipment; (e) General stores; and 7/10 SECRET 000128 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET (f) Excess personal kit, (6) Use of Force/ROE. No change, (7) Force Protection Measures. No change, and (Sy Nuclear Biological Chemical. No change. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT a. Logistics Concept. Flexibility will be paramount, depending on the mode of evacuation and withdrawal. CA JTFSWA J4 will provide liaison and coordination with NDHQ and tactical units to facilitate logistics flow. Units will be expected to be self-sufficient with combat supplies for the duration of operations. Movement may be accomplished by using a combination of road, sea, and airlift assets depending upon the situation. Commander CA JTFSWA will designate supporting units for logistics and movement, who will arrange transient accommodation, feeding, etc. in a safe area; b. Materiel Accountability. To the extent possible, units will record all materiel destroyed in location or abandoned. Upon arrival in a safe area, units will conduct a 100% stocktaking to determine actual holdings; c. Medical Support. All casualties can be expected to be evacuated by role one resources. Role two or three support should not be expected until evacuation to a safe area. CA JTFSWA NCE JI Med will coordinate any host country medical support in the safe area; and d. Host Nation Support (HNS-). The requirement for HNS will be identified to NDHQ for expeditious diplomatic efforts to gain necessary permissions throughout all phases. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL 1 a. b. Command and Control. (1) Commander CA JTFSWA will retain operational command throughout. Transfer of command authority will be initiated for required forces whose operational control has been assigned to OEF and operational command of Canadian SOF in US CENTCOM AOR will be requested, (2) Commander CA JTFSWA will designate the supported commander and supporting commanders, and (3) Detachments from NCCIS elements and NSU are under tactical control to supported units for self defence; Locations. (1) CA JTFSWA NCE - TAMPA, (2) CTG 307.1/HMCS VANCOUVER - ARABIAN GULF/GULF OF OMAN/STRAIT OF HORMUS/NORTH ARABIAN SEA, (3) 3 PPCLIBG - QANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN, 8/10 SECRET 000129 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET (4) TAL Det - AL MINHAD, U.A.E., (5) SAL Det - AL FUJAYRAH, U.A.E., (6) LRP Det - AL MINHAD, U.A.E., (7) NSU - DUBAI, U.A.E. (SLOC-QATAR; FLS/ACSSS-AL MINHAD), (8) Force Protection Det - DUBAI, U.A.E., (9) LO CFLCC HQ - DOHA, KUWAIT, (10) LO CFMCC HQ - BAHRAIN, (11) LO CFACC HQ - PS AB, SAUDI ARABIA, (12) LO Canadian Embassy - ABU DHABI, and (13) LO RAMCC - AL UDEID, QATAR. Acknowledge Instructions: ACKNOWLEDGE J.J.P. Thiffault Commodore Commander Authentication: M.M„ Minor Lieutenant-Colonel J5 Annex: Annex A - Proposed Statement of Requirement DISTRIBUTION (Next Page): 9/10 SECRET 000130 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information SECRET DISTRIBUTION: UNITS COPY NUMBER CA JTFSWA NCE CTG 307.1 HMCS VANCOUVER 3 PPCLIBG SAL DET TAL DET LRPDET NSU CJCMOTF HQ//LO CFLCC HQ//LO CFMCC HQ//LO CFACC HQ//LO Canadian Embassy ABU DHABI//LO RAMCC//LO NCCIS Element NDHQ DCDS//COS J3/J3 INTL 10/10 SECRET 000131 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information SECRET Annex A - Statement of Requirement Assets CTG FFH 3 PPCLIBG CC150 CC130 CP 140 SOF CC150 Heavy airlift Civilian Airline CAS p 747 Capacity Location Remarks JTFSWA assets that are deployed 1 800+ pers ARABIAN AOR (PRESERVER), DDH 280 GULF/STRAIT OF (IROQUOIS), FFH (TORONTO) HORMUS/GULF OF VANCOUVER (CVBG John Stennis) 1 200+ pers OMAN/NORTH ARABIAN SEA OMAN N/A N/A QANDAHAR Self sufficient for ground transport. May be required for combat operations 1 58 pers per FUJIARAH, U.A.E. More room available for standing chalk 3 70 pers per AL MINHAD, U.A.E chalk 2 13 pers per AL MINHAD, U.A.E chalk Assets that may be required through national or civilian agencies N/A N/A AFGAOR/ SOF assigned to Op APOLLO may be CANADA required for combat operations. Will be requested if required. 4 195/chalk CANADA 90 If equipment is being redeployed. contract chalks Approx 90 X C17 chalks were required to deploy BG to QANDAHAR (ANTONOV/C5 cannot land in QANDAHAR).___________________ N/A N/A tickets LOs may need to purchase tickets on local airlines to evacuate in an emergency. TBD N/A N/A Close air support may be required for combat operations (either from CANADA or friendly elements). 6 contract 6 chalks were required to deploy BG to chalks QANDAHAR Qty SECRET 000132 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information nan National Wense —L Defence nationale Canadian Joint Task Force South-West Asia National Command Element Eagle Village 7115 South Boundary Boulevard MacDill Air Force Base Tampa FL 33621 3350-134-32 (J5 Air) 21 February 2002 Distribution List OP APOLLO ROTO TWO END-TOUR REPORT References: A. Annex A to Chapter 3 to DDIO, Revise One, 31 July 2001 (enclosed) B. 3350-134-1 (Comd) Op Apollo Roto 2 Mid Tour Report 2 Jan 2003 1. In accordance with reference A, Commander CA JTFSWA is required to submit a report to DCDS, upon completion of the appointment. For Roto 2, this report will cover the period 1 January to 31 March 2003. To that end, sub-units and NCE staff principals are required to provide submissions for inclusion in the report. Although reference A refers specifically to the requirements for the report, it provides a suitable format and description of the information required from sub-units, adjusted as appropriate for each sub-unit’s particular situation and addressed to CA JTFSWA NCE. Reference A is enclosed for guidance. For NCE staff, the J5 branch holds a copy of reference B as an example of the required information. 2. The development and submission of this report is a vital tool in allowing the CF to ensure that timely and accurate information is available for the exercise of command, the rectification of deficiencies and to allow lessons learned to be disseminated and applied. It will ensure that information is captured and considered over a relatively short period of time in order that issues may be tracked effectively over the entire period of the rotation and that NDHQ can effectively monitor trends over the life of the operation. 1/2 000133 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information 3. In order to allow for collation, review, and time for drafting and finalization of the report by the end of March, sub-unit and NCE branch reports are to be submitted to CA JTFSWA NCE J5 Air no later than 15 March 2003. R.V. Blanchette Colonel Chief of Staff Enclosure: I Distribution List Action CONSU CO TAL Det CO LRP Det CO NCCIS Squadron CTG 307.1 CA SLO CJTF-180 CA LO Det Bahrain CA JTFSWA Liaison Team to CENTCOM Forward Qatar NCE J1/J2/J3/J4/J5/J6/J8/PAFFO/LEGAD/PM/TF Eng Info Comd 2/2 000134 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information Annex A to Chapter 3 of DDIO Revise One TASK FORCE COMMANDER’S REPORTS 1. The report should be prepared as a military letter and addressed to: J3 International National Defence Headquarters MGen George R. Pearkes Building Ottawa, Ontario K1AOK2 2. The report will include the following: a. Introduction. The introduction will provide a summary of the events leading to the mission and will refer to the TF in question and the period during which the operation was conducted; b. General Overview. This section will provide an overall description of the mission, an outline of the TF’s composition including contribution from other nations and summary of major mission events; c. Summary of Canadian TF Activities. This section will include a description of the mission, tasks and composition of the Canadian TF and the TFC’s assessment of the Canadian TF’s contribution to the overall mission. A summary of events from a Canadian TF perspective will also be included; d. Operations. This section will include any information regarding operations, including lessons learned, which could be of use to future TFs, or which would be of interest to the senior executive at NDHQ. Also to be included are comments on ROE and the readiness of personnel assigned to the TF as well as mission-unique training requirements undertaken; e. Rotation or Handover. If applicable, include any information that could be helpful in improving TF rotations; f. TF Organization and Manning. This section will identify surplus and deficient positions and will provide recommendations for changes in the MOC, special qualification requirements, tour lengths and/or rank levels; g. Personnel Administration. This section should include any pertinent information relating to personnel administration (pay, allowances and medical support). Comments regarding leave, welfare and amenities should also be included; h. Intelligence. This section will include comments on intelligence support provided to the mission; 3A-1/2 000135 ’ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information Annex A to Chapter 3 of DDIO Revise One i. Security. This section should include comments on the adequacy of personnel, communications and equipment security, if applicable; j. Logistics/Finance/Movement . This section should include any pertinent logistics information (supply, maintenance, transport, MOUs, etc), finance information (mission-operating budgets and NPF) and movement information; k. CIMIC. This section should include information on CIMIC activities and its contribution to the mission; I. Engineering. This section should summarize engineering issues and information pertaining to infrastructure (accommodations, utilities, etc) mines/UXO and so on as they impact on TF operations; m. Legal. This section should include legal issues such as, Status of Forces Agreement, MOUs and overall legal support; n. Public Affairs. This section should include information on Public Affairs issues and the contribution of Public Affairs on the mission. o. CIS. Comments on communications and information systems should be included in this section; P- Commentary on the Operation. This section should be used to candidly describe the major problems being experienced by the mission as a whole, along with the impact of such problems on the Canadian contribution to the operation. While it may not be possible to rectify such problems, it is important that the DCDS and J Staff be kept informed of their existence; and q. Outlook/Summary. This section, intended as a conclusion, should include the TFC’s assessment of the current situation and the way ahead as well as his opinions regarding the outlook for the mission. As a final note, this section should include recommendations regarding the continued or future participation of Canada in the operation. 3A-2/2 000136 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDAF (Operation APOLLO) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDAF00015 Title A name given to the resource OP APOLLO - CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource February 1, 2002 - August 31, 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Library and Archives Canada, RG24, 3350-134-32, vol. 1. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC A-2023-01183 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Global War on Terror Description An account of the resource LAC ATIP A-2023-01183 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en