https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/74c7d87ffbd282bc721281907e978426.pdf 397dd468bfeb3daa0863b3a217852bf7 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /‘information J -1- Michael Walma Defence and Security Relations Division 992-6205 Graeme McIntyre Middle East Division 944-5995 SECRET (Ct-O} 23 October 2002 IDR0360 Information Memorandum for: The Minister of Foreign Affairs c.c. Minister for International Trade c.c. Minister for International Cooperation and c.c. Secretary of State (Asia-Pacific) c.c. Secretary of State (Central and Eastern Europe and Middle East) c.c. Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa) (Francophonie) ISSUE: Memo on Iraq Policy Implications 1. This memo deals with Security Council scenarios and possible military contributions. It complements earlier broader analyses in memos GMR0595 (Aug 14) and GMR0589 (Aug 06). SUMMARY: 2. Indications that the Security Council may be nearing a decision on a draft resolution on Iraq will necessitate increased Canadian political and diplomatic management of the issue. Timelines for decisions will become shorter, the issues to be addressed more difficult and, equally important, the need for well-crafted communications lines more vital. This memo outlines four possible scenarios based on broad potential outcomes from the UN Security Council’s discussion of Iraq and identifies the legal, military, diplomatic and communications issues that each would present. The four potential outcomes are: A. B. C. D. No new resolution is adopted One or more resolutions are adopted but the authorisation of force is ambiguous; One or more resolutions are adopted, the authorisation of force is clear, but gridlock in the Security Council prevents a finding of Iraqi non-compliance; or There is a clear authorisation of force and the Security Council agrees that Iraq is in breach. With today’s indications that the Security Council may be close to agreeing on a resolution, outcomes B) and D) appear most likely, but outcome C) remains a lesser possibility. Should we face option B), we are almost certain to see the return of inspectors, which would delay the need for a decision on Canadian participation in military action for a short time. However, we would ultimately need to weigh the implication that participation could be seen as a weakened commitment to international law against the impact of non-participation on our relations with the United States. Clear evidence of non-compliance will factor heavily in our final decision. Option D), although unlikely to occur, would create the clearest conditions for Canada, politically and legally, as the Prime Minister has said that Canada will participate in a military campaign under these conditions. However, our ability to participate will be severely limited by short time lines and our non-participation in current US military planning. This memo reviews military options as comprehensively as possible, including that of 3. 000035 �4 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accis a I’information * -2backfilling for the US in the Balkans or Afghanistan as a substitute for or complement to, direct participation. While does not favour backfilling due to resource constraints and possible troop morale issues, DFAIT believes possible backfilling scenarios must remain on the table to maximise the government’s future policy flexibility. BACKGROUND: 4. To date, with President Bush’s 12 September speech to the UN General Assembly and in the absence of any overt US pressure to support and contribute to a unilateral military option, policy options and the communications strategy for explaining our approach have been easy - uncomplicated and free of difficult issues. 5. This will soon change. For Canada, the political, legal and diplomatic management of the Iraq issue is about to enter a new, more complex and increasingly unpredictable phase. Timelines for decisions and, equally importantly, well-crafted communications lines, will become shorter and the issues to be addressed, much more difficult. 6. Whilst the situation in NY is too dynamic to predict, reports today (Friday) indicate that the US may well be nearing agreement with France on a draft resolution. This would be the first step in a consultative process to be engaged by the US with the other P5 and then the E10. The draft resolution is likely to be officially tabled quickly. 7. The compromise between the US and French positions will probably be reflected in a single resolution that essentially contains within it (a) the two stages that had originally be requested by France and (b) language that gives the US the trigger or automaticity elements they had been seeking. However, the use of force language may be weaker than that originally sought by the US. Rather than using the usual terms of art for military action (e.g. all necessary means), it may instead refer to the need for full compliance....in order to restore international peace and security. It is already becoming apparent that the US and France are reading the resolution in two quite different ways. 8. Although it is dangerous to make predictions on the outcome of the consultative process and eventual language of the resolution, it seems that intense consultations took place over the weekend and on Monday with the prospect of a tabling of the resolution for consideration, but no agreement has been found. For Canada, an approved resolution will mean we will be moving into another level of ambiguity and complexity in managing Canadian policy responses to Iraq. The UN Security Council will likely be unclear in terms of the key issues of determination of breach and the decision-making process regarding the use of force. At the same time, the global political environment is becoming more obscured and complicated with, inter alia, Korean nuclear weapons programmes revelations, the Bali bombing and the Yemen and Kuwait attacks. 9. The Government of Canada will soon have to move beyond easy appeals to the US and others to use the UN, and will face questions regarding possible Canadian political support for or military involvement in an eventual US-led military operation which may - or may not - derive its mandate and legitimacy from a UN Security Council decision. The political and legal uncertainties in the current situation require us to think through the options, possible responses and the way in which Ministers speak publicly about this issue. The following paper outlines the cunent state of play, some of the possible scenarios that we may be 10. faced with in the coming weeks and draft communications lines for dealing with these questions. 1. CURRENT SITUATION: 000036 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -X -3- 11. ^p.t present, the scenarios presented in our August memo (Ref:GMR0595, 14 August 2002) still largely pertain. Canada has been able to assert that concerns about Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions must be considered the continuing responsibility of the Council and that all action be directed to, and through, that forum. We have even been able to say that we have seen some success in this approach - the US has engaged the UN process, at least to now. 12. Canada has been able to accompany this overall UN approach with an active bilateral diplomatic effort (at the level of Ministers, the PM and officials) aimed at: engaging the US and encouraging them to work through the UN; working with other key allies such as the UK; encouraging the other P5 to live up to their responsibilities; and, pressing influential regional partners in the Middle East such as Egypt to engage Iraq directly in dialogue to encourage full cooperation and compliance with its obligations. We have clearly stated at the UN that we need an unambiguous resolution that would contain serious consequences for Iraqi non-compliance. 13. US position: The US remains determined to depose Saddam Hussein, working from the premise that Saddam’s government poses a fundamental threat to US strategic interests. While the Bush Administration has focused in public on Iraq’s WMD capacity and ambitions (and sought to connect Iraq to al Qaeda), a broader case for regime change is being pursued in Washington. Military action will probably begin in January-February 2003, although an earlier campaign cannot be excluded. Only a coup d’etat or Saddam’s assassination would be likely to avert a war against Iraq. 14. Within the Administration, views differ on whether to focus narrowly on deposing Saddam and eliminating Iraq’s capacity to threaten its neighbours, or to opt for a highly ambitious plan that would turn Iraq into a second pillar of support for the US in the Persian Gulf and send a democratising shock wave through the Arab world; there appears to be increasing support in the US for the latter option. More cautious opinions are still being expressed, notably by Secretary of State Powell, but the general thrust of US policy is clear. American efforts to secure a new Security Council resolution on weapons inspectors should be seen in 15. this light. Washington has concluded that Iraq’s WMD programmes cannot be destroyed through inspections, and that the only way to reduce or eliminate this threat is to replace the government in Baghdad. In short, Washington is interested in the UN process mainly in so far as it can legitimise a war that will depose Saddam. Key partners: Our key partners are facing the same dilemma that is before us. UK PM Tony Blair has 16. come under considerable fire at home for his decision to back the US both politically and militarily. France and Russia are balancing their opposition to the current Anglo-American resolution against their broader bilateral relationships with the US; there are indications that both are nearing a deal with the US. China remains on the sidelines, and is expected to follow Russia and France. Germany is seen to have crossed a line during the recent election campaign. Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark are all fairly supportive of the US position, while other European states such as Belgium have voiced their opposition. Regional views: Arab states remain publicly critical of US moves toward a war with Iraq, seeing this 17. as unjust on its own merits and egregious given what they perceive as a double standard toward Israel. At the end of the day, pro-US states such as Jordan, Kuwait and Qatar will likely acquiesce to US use of bases or airspace in If a war against Iraq, though a new Security Council resolution emerges, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states may also provide quiet support. s.15(1) Regional impact: With or without the backing of a UN Security Council resolution, US action against 18. Iraq can be expected to provoke a strong backlash in the Arab world. Even if the US achieves a rapid victory with minimal Iraqi casualties, there will be a strong tendency in the Arab world to regard this as yet another “humiliation”. 000037 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -419. ^^NMOVIC situation: Talks held two weeks ago between UNMOVIC, the IAEA and Iraq went smoothly. Nevertheless, Dr. Hans Blix, the Head of UNMOVIC has said that he sees no point in returning to Iraq when the Security Council is still considering changing his mandate. Dr. Blix has been walking a careful line between asserting his own independence and maintaining good relations with the P5, especially the US. 20. He is known, however, to have serious reservations about some aspects of the initial US draft, including the question of armed escorts, the issue of removing Iraqi informants and their families from Iraq and the matter of direct P-5 participation in and tasking of the inspection teams. On the other hand, he does not underestimate the importance of resisting Iraqi duplicity and intransigence on key issues such as access to Presidential sites. Should a Security Council resolution be adopted, we would expect that UN and IAEA inspectors would be able to return to Iraq in short order, and begin their work. What is not clear, and will not be until a resolution is adopted, is how and on what timetable UNMOVIC will report to the Council; and, by whom and how a judgement of a breach of obligations will be reached. 2. SECURITY COUNCIL SCENARIOS: 21. We can foresee four broad possible outcomes from the UN Security Council’s discussion of Iraq: A. B. C. No new resolution is adopted One or more resolutions are adopted but the authorisation of force is ambiguous; One or more resolutions are adopted, the authorisation of force is clear, but gridlock in the Security Council prevents a finding of Iraqi non-compliance; or There is a clear authorisation of force and the Security Council agrees that Iraq is in breach. D. In considering each of these scenarios, we must bear in mind that US military planning is already well 22. underway. If Canada waits until the action in the Security Council is played out before deciding whether to participate in a US-led attack on Iraq, our decision will come so late as to severely hinder preparations for Canadian military involvement in a January campaign. However, the alternative, to begin participation in US planning now, or after the first of a two-resolution package is adopted, would commit us to joining a campaign regardless of the outcome of the UN process. This would be interpreted by the Canadian public as the discounting of diplomatic avenues. A. Negotiations in the Security Council break down and no new resolution is adopted. s.15(1) This could come about if the US loses patience with the slow process of adopting a new resolution or 23. fears a veto from another P5 state. In this situation the US would attack Iraq unilaterally, possibly with a limited “coalition of the willing”. The US would likely cite previous Council resolutions and/or (preemptive) selfdefence as a basis for its actions, while simultaneously criticising the Council for failing to rise to the present challenge. Factors influencing a Canadian decision: Previous policy statements: PM Chretien has said that Canada would not participate in a war against 24. Iraq without a new UN resolution. 000038 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s a I'information -5- 25. ^Lcgal: A legal right to use force in self-defence will only exist if there is evidence that Iraq poses an “imminent” threat. Any acceptance of Iraq’s WMD potential as a basis for using force in self-defence would require careful scrutiny of the evidence, including a study of Iraq’s current and potential WMD capacity and its future intentions viewed against context of past conduct. 26. Alternatively, the U.S. as in its 1993 and 1998 attacks against Iraq may seek to rely upon past Security Council Resolutions which have expressly authorized the use of force. In particular they may attempt to rely on Resolution 678 (1991) which authorized the “use of all necessary means” to implement “all subsequent relevant resolutions” relating to the restoration of international peace and security in the area. Resolution 678 would provide, at best, a weak legal basis upon which force could now be used. 27. Communications/domestic considerations: Our government would not be able to say that all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted. Canadian public opinion is firmly against attacking Iraq without a Council mandate, and could further harden if the US gives the appearance of having been indifferent to the UN. Depending on the circumstances of the breakdown, we would be able to suggest that Council had failed to live up to its obligations, as we have been insisting. From a legal perspective any public statements must not compromise Canada’s past and future actions. For legal reasons it would not be prudent to make definitive statements on the lawfulness of using force in self-defence or with respect to the sufficiency of evidence asserted in support of that basis. This includes reference to the evidence publicly disclosed by the UK or the Bush doctrine of preemptive self-defence. 28. Military: While highly problematic from many perspectives, an early end to diplomatic manoeuvring could, in theory, allow us to join current US planning early enough to make a direct military contribution. Alternatively, we could backfill for the US elsewhere (for example Afghanistan), freeing up US forces for the attack on Iraq. These assignments tend to be low on recognition and long-term. 29. Diplomatic: With the possible exception of the UK, our key partners would likely not support US action. Short-term implications: A decision to participate militarily would instantly relieve US pressure on us. 30. Joint planning could begin immediately. Communicating a rationale for this course of action to the Canadian public, Parliament and to our non-US allies would prove a challenge. A decision to not participate would not pose these challenges, and should also be manageable with respect to the United States as it will be expecting this decision in view of the Prime Minister’s stated position. Longer-term implications: In the absence of clear evidence demonstrating an imminent threat, a decision 31. to participate could be viewed by some as a weakened commitment to international law. It would also signal a lessened commitment to the UN and to the multilateral system. A decision to not participate would leave us on firmer footing, but could exacerbate the view of some within the United States that Canada cannot be relied upon. This problem could be attenuated to some extent by the offering of political support and by providing military assistance in other areas (backfilling) to free up US forces for its campaign. Any Canadian support would gamer some respect from the US Administration and Congress, who would appreciate that Canada was an ally willing to take political risks. B. Authorisation of force is ambiguous. 32. The Security Council could adopt a resolution that only implies an authorisation of force, as it did in Kosovo. Council members could deliberately seek this outcome in order to avoid a confrontation. The US would use this resolution to justify an attack on Iraq. 000039 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -6- Factors^^fluencing a Canadian decision: • Previous Policy Statements: In the Iraq context, we have been careful to avoid publicly addressing this scenario, except to reiterate the need for the Security Council to live up to its responsibilities. This scenario resembles that of the Kosovo war and the use of force against Iraq in 1993 and 1998 in the sense of the ambiguity, but not from the overwhelming humanitarian need. Legal: Unlike a resolution which expressly authorized “all necessary means”, the legal foundation for an enforcement action would be questionable and be based upon a weak controversial doctrine of “implied” authorization. In 1993 and 1998 various Security Council statements and resolutions used phrases such as “gravest consequences” and “serious consequences” in place of the familiar “all necessary means”. The US is currently using similar diplomatic code as possible wording within a new resolution. Communications/Domestic considerations: A great deal will depend on the wording of the resolution and any evidence of continued Iraqi non-compliance. Clear evidence of Iraqi non-compliance could make a decision not to participate difficult to explain. Similarly, if the evidence is not clear, a decision to participate would not be well understood. The legal problems that such an ambiguous resolution would pose would not likely be well understood. Once again, we will have available to us the message that we believe that the Council has failed to meets its obligations. From a legal perspective public statements on the type of resolution Canada is seeking should avoid use of terms such as “gravest consequences” or “serious consequences” given that the Government of Canada has not decided to support the use of force on the basis of an implied authorization. Military: Under this scenario, military action would likely following very quickly on the heels of a finding, whether by the US or UN, that Iraq is in breach. It would be extremely difficult for proper planning to take place in time for Canada to be able to make an extensive contribution. Diplomatic: Such a resolution would allow countries a much larger degree of flexibility in determining their positions, as each could interpret the resolution as it chooses. At the same time, US pressure on Canada and other allies would be much stronger in this scenario, as it would be looking for support in order to justify its own position. We would need to take into account the positions of others, especially of the P5, and should consult them as soon as possible following the adoption of such a resolution. Short term implications: Adoption of a resolution would almost certainly mean a return of inspectors to Iraq, which should push the need for a decision off by a short period of time. A decision to participate would be warmly received by the US and would be justifiable to others. A decision not to participate would not please the US but would still be justifiable to others. Clear evidence of non-compliance will factor heavily. Longer term implications: In the absence of clear evidence demonstrating an imminent threat, a decision to participate could be viewed as a weakened commitment to international law. It would also signal a lessened commitment to the UN and to the multilateral system. A decision to not participate would leave us on firmer footing, but could exacerbate the view of some within the United States that Canada cannot be relied upon. This problem could be attenuated to some extent by the offering of political support and by providing military assistance in other areas (backfilling) to free up US forces for its campaign. Any Canadian support would gamer some respect from the US Administration and Congress, who would appreciate that Canada was an ally willing to take political risks. C. Gridlock in Council 000040 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -733. ^In this scenario, the Council adopts a resolution which would clearly authorise force (or states that the Counci^pil authorise force in the face of continued non-compliance) but balks at finding Iraq in breach or at adopting the follow-on resolution. Of the scenarios which would place Canada in a difficult position, this is the most likely. Factors influencing a Canadian decision: Previous Policy Statements: We have been careful to avoid publicly addressing this scenario, except to reiterate the need for the Security Council to live up to its responsibilities. Legal: The legal foundation for military action would be controversial. The clarity of the language, in particular regarding the “reporting” and “trigger” mechanism and the way in which any authorized force is delegated to member states will be crucial. In the absence of express language the Security Council’s failure to act does not provide a clear legal basis to use force. Communications/Domestic considerations: A great deal will depend on the wording of the resolution and any evidence of continued Iraqi non-compliance. Reporting from New York suggests that the Council may adopt ‘one and a half resolutions, that is, it would authorise force on recognition of a breach, but would be unclear as to how and by whom that determination would be made, opening the door to the US deciding for itself. Clear evidence of Iraqi non-compliance could make a decision not to participate difficult to explain. Similarly, if the evidence is not clear, a decision to participate would not be well understood. The legal problems that gridlock would pose would also not likely be well understood. Once again, we will have available to us the message that we believe that the Council has failed to meets its obligations. In order to avoid communications difficulties, our messages from the beginning of a two-stage process should emphasise our insistence that the Council must live up to its responsibilities to find Iraq in breach of its obligations if that is what the evidence indicates. Military: Under this scenario, military action would likely follow very quickly on the heels of a finding, whether by the US or UN, that Iraq is in breach. It would be well-nigh impossible for proper planning to take place in time for Canada to be able to make any real contribution. Diplomatic: Such a resolution would allow countries a much larger degree of flexibility in determining their positions, as each could interpret the resolution as it chooses. At the same time, US pressure on Canada and other allies would be much stronger in this scenario, as it would be looking for support in order to justify its own position. We would need to take into account the positions of others, especially of the P5, and should consult them as soon as possible following the adoption of the first resolution. Short term implications: Adoption of a resolution would almost certainly mean a return of inspectors to Iraq, which would push the need for a decision off by at least two weeks. A decision to participate would be warmly received by the US and would be justifiable to others. A decision not to participate would not please the US but would still be justifiable to others. Clear evidence of non-compliance will factor heavily. Longer term implications: This scenario could be considered 'worst-case' since it could see Canada having to choose between helping to discredit the UN or vainly attempting to maintain its credibility, risking the anger of the US. A decision to participate may be viewed as a weakened commitment to international law and could leave us open to further legal challenges. It would also signal a lessened commitment to the UN and to the multilateral system. A decision to not participate would leave us on firmer footing, but could exacerbate the view of some within the United States that Canada cannot be relied upon. This problem could be attenuated to some extent by the offering of political support and by providing military assistance in other areas (backfilling) to free up US forces for its campaign. Any 000041 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -8Canadian support would gamer some respect from the US Administration and Congress, who would ^^ppreciate that Canada was an ally willing to take political risks. D. Council unanimity on the need for force Should the UNSC adopt a resolution authorising force and if it then finds Iraq in breach, the matter is 34. simple for Canada, politically and legally. Under these circumstances, the Prime Minister has said that Canada will participate in the military campaign. We would not find ourselves internationally isolated, and the legal basis would be clear. Domestically, the implications for the government will focus on explaining its position to the public and deciding on the role of Parliament. Our ability to participate will be severely limited by short times lines (we would expect an attack in these circumstances to follow very shortly after the finding Iraq in breach) and our non-participation in current US planning. 3, Options for military contributions (prepared by National Defence) A. Direct military support 35. Should the Government of Canada elect to provide direct military support, it could contribute the assets currently dedicated to Operation APOLLO: two ships, three Hercules transport aircraft and two Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. These assets are already in theatre and, with appropriate diplomatic clearances, could be maintained until December 2003. Deployment of additional military resources for operations in the Iraqi theatre would be dependent on 36. time as follows: Short term (Jan-Feb 2003): The resources dedicated to Op APOLLO plus six CF 18 fighters 37. (incremental cost of $50M) and two additional ships (incremental cost of S60M); Medium Term (March-April 2003): A squadron of Special Operations Forces (JTF2 would be 38. available by 15 March 2003, costs TBD); and 39. Long Term (June-July 2003): An infantry light battle group (incremental cost of S122M) or a mechanized battle group, complete with tanks, mine clearing equipment, etc., (incremental cost of S166M). A June-July deployment will alleviate the requirements for personnel waivers. Early access to joint planning with the US and other coalition partners is considered key in being able to 40. determine an appropriate Canadian contribution within an overall coalition force package. Although Canada has no detailed knowledge of US planning, a campaign would likely begin sometime in January or February 2003. Depending on the force package selected by the Canadian Government, varying degrees of warning time will be required to ensure timely and effective deployments. Sufficient time will need to be allotted for the negotiation of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) or Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and acquisition of the necessary equipment and supplies. v 41. Combat operations would also require the support of other high value CF assets that are always in short supply. These include engineers; a nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) countermeasures capability; medical support; linguists; and command and control assets. Operations against Iraq within the next two to three months would pose substantial logistical risk given the CF’s dependence on materiel already deployed in support of Operation APOLLO and the long lead-time for the procurement of materiel and ammunition. Problem areas range 000042 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accis a I’information -9- from Unavailability of vehicle spare parts to a limited stock of precision-guided munitions and targeting pods for the CF^s. B. Indirect military support 42. One option could be for Canadian troops to backfill US (or possibly other coalition) troops that could be redeployed to support a campaign against Iraq. If the CF were to be used in a backfill role, Canada would risk an increased commitment in areas such as the Balkans or Afghanistan (with contributions to the International Security Assistance Force, a Battalion/Battle Group combat operation, such as in Khandahar and possibly further staff support to Headquarters such as Coalition Joint Task Force 180 in Bagram) for longer periods than we might wish. Moreover, such a measure could have a profoundly negative impact on the morale of CF members should the repetitive, low-intensity deployments to Bosnia-Herzegovina, or other such missions, increase. As well, “backfilling” troops would be from elements of the CF that are already under stress due to the personnel deployment tempo, which would be compounded by these traditionally longer duration missions with no clear exit strategies. Backfilling is, therefore, not recommended by National Defence. James R. Wright Assistant Deputy Minister Global and Security Policy Deputy Minister 000043 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00011 Title A name given to the resource Memo on Iraq Policy Implications Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23-Oct-02 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10025 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en