https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c8ad8e91f68b51b6dae8f9f71d589300.pdf f043a94a3edd15970c39873a75b6b221 PDF Text Text — Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act _______ CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIEL FILE No. DOSSIER ir~=2G 8C0001 1812D-18-8 2 Sec CON DEPUTY MINISTER CORRESPONDENCE - MS International Plans and Operations Iraq .. .. ’.... W Plans et operations int Iraq 8 gU RA. RANGER CIRCULATION TO A O cl REMARKS REMARQUES Date Init. Date B.F. RAPPEL Init. Date REGISTRY ONLY DEPOT CENTRAL Cancel Inspected Annuler Inspects Date CM cr £ 9 o QO I 00 . X ° § N O H CM 0© 43 ? § 9 E S O c o O CM ■ OO == DND 703 (07-00) 7530-21-876-1638 Design: Forms Management 993-4050 - Conception: Gestion des formulaires 993-3778 (05-03) 000006 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information FILE MAINTENANCE CHECKLIST LISTE DE CONTRdLE POUR L’ENTRETIEN DU DOSSIER □ □ □ □ Protect all files and records as official property. Protoger tous les dossiers et les documents comme dtant la propriety offidella Clean records prior to adding them to files. - Nettoyer les documents avant de les ajouter & leur dossier respectit Remove all envelopes, flags, tags, pins, spikes, clips and superfluous staples. . ° Enlever tout articles inutiles (enveloppes, papillons, etiquettes, eplngles, trombones, attachefeullles, agrafes etc.). Hie papers and TDs chronologically, the latest date on top. Classer les documents en ordre chronologique, la date la plus r6centesurle dessus. 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' ■ 000007 �Document disclosed urjfia- tb^Accfss tadnforfnatipaAct Document divulgue en vertMe'J^La^Jr,l^^e(j^'igI$rmation CONFIDENTIAL " I 7 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) CDN EYES ONLY ADM(POL) TRANSMITTAL SHEET BORDEREAU D'ENVOI DE SMA(POL) Subject/Objet: Possibel Press Article on Location of Camp Mirage File # I Numero de reference:) J? aI ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) I 05 1§ DGIS Pol/DG Pol SI Date: Apr 04 DM/SM Xto c<yvYvrHvv^.a*.- |_jt_ ADM(Pol)/SMA(Pol) Date: «TYAo <Aa a _ Apr 04 CONFIDENTIAL CDN EYES ONLY CDN EYES ONLY CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) WJDENHAL ATN0SM3W yfr000008 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) POSSIBLE PRESS ARTICLE ON LOCATION OF CAMP MIRAGE BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE DEPUTY MINISTER ISSUE • The intention of the Globe and Mail to publish an article that includes information about the UAE being the country in which Camp Mirage is located. BACKGROUND • In reaching an agreement with the UAE for the establishment of Camp Mirage, the Government of Canada officials assured the UAE that Canada would not disclose the location of Camp Mirage. While this condition is not recorded in the cunent Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), or the draft Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), it is the UAE expectation that we will continue to avoid public linking of the UAE and their support to the Operation Enduring Freedom forces, including by not revealing our camp’s location. • Canadian policy is to respect the UAE’s wish. The success of the CF in the campaign against terrorism and in ISAF owes much to the UAE’s generous provision of bases and port facilities, and to the excellent relations we have enjoyed at all levels in our dealings with the UAE Armed Forces. For the foreseeable future, the Arabian Gulf will present significant challenges to Canadian security interests, likely requiring a continued ability to operate or be based in the region, principally from the UAE. • On 23 April 2004, a reporter from the Globe and Mail enquired why Canada, in spite of what he described as the many slips and mistakes made by senior Government of Canada officials that revealed Camp Mirage’s location, still refused to disclose that Camp Mirage is in the UAE. This inquiry was made in the course of writing an article about those occasions when the camp’s location has been accidentally revealed. • Also on 23 April 2004, the MND spoke to the Globe and Mail’s Foreign Editor to encourage the paper to refrain from publishing the camp’s location. The reporter still intends to see his article published. Although as of 30 April the article has yet to be published, it most likely will be in the near term. DISCUSSION • Deliberate public disclosure of the UAE’s support by the Government of Canada would likely have a negative impact on ongoing relations, especially if publicized by the Government of Canada in the region. Such revelations might negatively impact the renewal of the MOU (every six months at NDHQ’s request), the negotiation of the SOFA and the continued presence of CF members in the UAE. • On the other hand, the UAE understands that Canada cannot prevent public disclosure of the UAE’s ongoing support by the media in Canada. Over the last week our 1/2 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) embassy in Abu Dhabi briefed the UAE General Headquarters, and FAC briefed the local UAE embassy, about the possibility of a national newspaper article revealing the location of Camp Mirage. The UAE officials indicated their appreciation for our efforts to prevent the information from being published, and for our having kept them informed. They appeared unconcerned by the possibility of such an article at this time. CONCLUSION • Canada should continue to respect the UAE’s desire that we avoid having any Government of Canada official link the UAE with our operations in the region. Prepared by: Director: Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Date prepared: J. Cloutier. DPK Pol 6.996-1741 Col R.V. Blanchette. D PK Pol, 992-1872 RAdm D. Robertson. DG1S Pol. 992-2769 Dr. KJ. Calder, ADM (Pol). 992-3458 29 April 2004 2/2 CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) 000010 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00007 Title A name given to the resource Deputy Minister Correspondence - Ms. M. Bloodworth - International Plans and Operations - Iraq Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2004-01-01 to 2004-07-31 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24-G-31, Accession 2012-00351-6, Box 20, File 1812D-18-8, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10028 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en