https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1b1260482b131046b2fc0fdd017561eb.pdf 03ca541395cbc6ee6a4dcda9ef9bc499 PDF Text Text ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^uocumenttiscTosed under the Access to Information Act^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatic whihiiimih^ ft •rtxeees-00TS5 ; rr • ■ [DWH Pol). Cabinet du minist de la Defense nat Office of the Minister of National Defence mcu# MCU2003-00765 Doc #66450 SEChlI TEMPORARY DOCKET - DOSSIER TEMPORAIRE TEMPORARY DOCKETS ARE NOT TO BE TRANSFERRED OUT OF THE MINISTER'S OFFICE LES DOSSIERS TEMPORAIRES NE DOIVENT EN AUCUN CAS QUITTER LE BUREAU DU MINISTRE MINISTER'S VISIT WASHINGTON DC 8 10 JANUARY 2003 SUBJI SUJE' P.A. RANGER TO A c REMARKS REMARQUES Date Init. Date Inrt. B.F. RAPPEL Date Cancel Annuler in co o o co o o CM ZD o It z> o s . =■ 8 t5 * |aq —— = INSTRUCTIONS Temporary Dockets are to deal WITH ONE CASE ONLY. Les dossiers temporaires sont crees a regard d'un SEUL CAS. 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DND 51 000001 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces d /'information SECRET-CEO VISIT OF The Honourable John McCallum Minister of National Defence MND REGISTRY REGISTRE DU MDN ' Referred to J Transmis a_____________ FEB 1 2003 Z wxu i co-. ws Charged to Charge a TO Washington, DC 8-10 January 2003 Prepared by: DWH Pol 000002 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la toi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET-CEO VISIT OF The Honourable John McCallum Minister of National Defence Washington, DC 8-10 January 2003 Prepared by: DWH Pol 000003 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informotion VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON, DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 TABLE OF CONTENTS TAB1 ITINERARY TAB 2 SCENARIO BRIEF TAB 3 IRAQ TAB 4 CANADIAN FORCES CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM TAB 5 ENHANCING CANADA-US MILITARY COOPERATION TAB 6 NORAD TAB 7 BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE TAB 8 FOLLOW-UP TO PRAGUE SUMMIT SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL TAB 9 DEFENCE BUDGET TAB 10 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT TABU CANADA-US RELATIONS BACKGROUND PROVIDED BY CDN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TAB 12 BIOGRAPHY OF DONALD RUMSFELD 000004 �Document disclosedunder the Access to Informotil Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'inf 000005 ■I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON, DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 ITINERARY Canadian Embassy Contact: Francis Furtado First Secretary (Defence) Tel: 202-682-1740 (Ext 7451) Fax: 202-682-7792 Hotel: Four Seasons (Georgetown) 2800 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Tel: 202-342-0444 Fax: 202-944-2076 Wednesday. January 8 1330 Depart Shell Aerocentre Ottawa 1500 Arrive Andrews Air Force Base Minister and delegation arrive. -17:00 Minister and delegation check into hotel. 19:00 Dinner Minister with the Ambassador Transport: Minister to the Ambassador’s residence (18:30). Delegation with RAdm Mack Transport: Delegation to RAdm Mack’s residence (18:30). Transport: Minister returns to hotel. Delegation returns to hotel. Thursday. January 9 (9:00) Minister/delegation depart hotel for Embassy. 09:30 Embassy briefing Issues: Iraq Canada-US defence cooperation Missile defence NATO post-Prague Congress and interest groups 000006 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information (11:15) Minister and delegation departfor Pentagon 11:45-12:30 Meeting with US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (12:40) Minister/delegation/Pentagon guests depart for Embassy 13:00 -14:30 Lunch with US officials (Minister will participate for one hour, before holding a strategy session with some of his officials prior to making himself available to the media). 14:15 -15:15 Minister’s media interviews Capitol Hill (to be determined, pending availability) 19:00 Dinner (Location to be determined) Friday, January 10 Capitol Hill (to be determined, pending availability) 11:00 Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W. John Hamre (former Undersecretary of Defense, Clinton Administration) Kurt Campbell (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia) John Alterman (Director, CSIS Middle East Program) Celeste Wallander (Director, Russia/Eurasia Program) Christopher Sands (Director, Canada Program) Heritage Foundation (Timings and venue to be determined) 000007 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informat Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'in i I; i! 000008 11 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 SCENARIO BRIEF 8 January 2003 • You arrive in Washington at 1500 at Andrews Air Force Base and will be staying at the Four Seasons Hotel in Georgetown. • A private dinner with the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Michael Kergin, is scheduled for you at 1900. The Canadian Delegation will have dinner with Rear-Admiral I. Mack. 9 January 2003 • You will be briefed by Canadian Ambassador at the Embassy from 0930-1115. • You will meet Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon from 1145-1230. The briefing book contains a list of potential topics that we have confirmed with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The US added Afghanistan to our original list. • The Canadian delegation will include: o o o o o o o MND EA/MND DM ADM(Pol) Ambassador Kergin Francesco Del Bianco (will not attend meeting with SECDEF) Randy Mylyk (will not attend meeting with SECDEF) • The US side will be composed of: o o o o o o o SECDEF Senior Military Assistant to SECDEF (LGen Craedock) Undersecretary for Policy (D. J. Feith) Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy (J.D. Crouch) Deputy Assistant Secretary for NATO and Europe (I. Brzezinski) Joint Chiefs of Staff rep (uniformed) Notetaker (S. Sanok) 1/3 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information • The Embassy has scheduled a lunch with US officials at the Embassy from 13:00-1430. The following US officials have either confirmed or were invited: National Security Council Robert Joseph / Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Proliferation Counter-proliferation and Arms Control Stephen Hadley /Deputy National Security Advisor (TBC) Sam Brock /Director for Canada and Mexico (TBC) Department of State Mark Grossman / Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (TBC) John Wolf / Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation Lincoln Bloomfield / Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs Nancy Mason 7 Director, Office of Canadian Affairs Department of Defense Paul Wolfowitz / Deputy Secretary of Defense (TBC) (alternate: Douglas Feith / Under Secretary ofDefensefor Policy) J.D. Crouch / Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (TBC) Steve Cambone / Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (TBC) • 30 minutes has been allocated for you to have a strategy session with your officials prior to conducting media interviews for an hour, from 14:15-15:15. The Embassy is currently trying to organize meetings with the chair of the Senate Armed Services Committees and the Chair of the Senate Appropriation Committee on Capitol Hill. These meetings would happen either at the end of the afternoon or the next morning. A dinner/reception with senior American politicians is planned for the evening (timing and location to be confirmed). 10 January 2003 • You will visit the Center for Strategic and International Studies, John Hopkins University, at 11:00. A visit to the Heritage Foundation is also being organized. • You will depart Washington after the day’s events are complete. 2/3 000010 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Prepared by: Director: Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Updated on: Nigel Thalakada, DWH Pol 5,996-0063 Martin Benjamin, D/DWH Pol, 992-4423 Col R.M. Williams, DWH Pol, 992-3960 MGen C. Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Kenneth J. Calder, ADM(Pol), 992-3458 03 January 2003 i 3/3 000011 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informotii Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'inj I 000012 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 UPDATE ON POSSIBLE ACTION AGAINST IRAQ SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • Canada remains committed to the UN Security Council process and an effective UN weapons inspection and destruction program and will assist that process where possible. • Canada strongly prefers that Iraq be disarmed peacefully. • Should Iraq fail to meet its obligations and the Security Council explicitly authorizes the use of force, Canada will participate in a military coalition to enforce Council resolutions. • Should the UN process ultimately fail and no explicit authorization of force is given, Canada will at that time decide whether to participate in a proposed military coalition. • Notwithstanding our ultimate level of participation, Canada will leave exchange and liaison officers in their present positions. • The Canadian Forces will undertake military-to-military discussions with US planners to gather information and discuss possible Canadian contributions. Issues • Determine what kind of military contribution Canada could most usefully provide. • An early US decision to begin military action could limit Canadian participation to post-combat operations. SECRET 000013 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET Desired outcome • US is comfortable with Canada’s efforts to seek additional information about US military planning without a firm commitment to make a military contribution at this stage. SECRET 000014 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON, DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 UPDATE ON POSSIBLE ACTION AGAINST IRAQ BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To provide an update on the potential for unilateral or multilateral action against Iraq and the developing Canadian policy position. This remains a dynamic issue and events will continue to unfold rapidly. BACKGROUND • Iraq has thus far met the deadlines imposed by Security Council Resolution 1441: it has accepted the terms of the resolution and produced a 12,000 page declaration of its nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs. In discussions between the Canadian and Iraqi Permanent Representatives in New York, Iraq indicated that although it disagrees with many of the premises of Resolution 1441, it will cooperate with United Nations weapons inspectors. • Both the US and the UK have categorically emphasized that the resolution provides for “serious consequences” if Iraq is found in violation of its obligations. President Bush has said Resolution 1441 “presents the Iraqi regime with a final test”, and Prime Minister Blair indicated that the “consequences are clear”. The US has stated that while it will consult the Security Council before engaging in any action against Iraq, its position is that the US does not require UN approval for US-led military action if Iraq fails to disarm. Most allies will likely accept efforts to disarm Iraq of proven weapons of mass destruction capabilities as a basis for US-led military action. DISCUSSION • On 19 December, in their first formal briefing to the Security Council following Iraq’s declaration regarding its weapons programs, UN inspectors indicated that they still require “much more cooperation” from Iraq. The inspectors also said that the declaration leaves many unanswered questions and contains very little by way of evidence concerning weapons of mass destruction programs. This briefing was merely a preliminary assessment of the content of the declaration; a full UN assessment of all data provided by Iraq will likely be completed by mid- to lateJanuary. Following the briefing, the US administration reiterated its view that Iraq remains in “material breach of Resolution 1441”, but that this failure to comply does not yet constitute a trigger for the use of force. 1/3 SECRET 000015 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET • Open sources confirm that the US is proceeding with a build-up of forces and logistics in the Persian Gulf area. It is estimated that the US already have 50,000 land-based personnel in the region and all of the key elements necessary to begin an air campaign and light ground force operations will be in place by the beginning of January. If the ground forces build-up continues at the current rate, armored forces could be ready for action by mid- to late-January during what is known as the best “campaign season”. While the first official UN inspection report is not expected until mid-May, inspectors are scheduled to provide an interim report to the Security Council on 27 January (in accordance with Resolution 1441). • On 5 December, Canada provided a preliminary response to the US request for a contribution of military assets to any possible action against Iraq. As a first step, the Canadian Forces will seek information for use in developing options for the Government while at the same time discussing possible Canadian contributions in detail. A command and control exercise, INTERNAL LOOK, occurred from 9 to 16 December, but Canada’s decision to engage in military-to-military discussions occurred too late for a Canadian officer to observe the exercise. The Chief of the Defence Staff has since spoken with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; subsequently three Canadian Forces officers have deployed to Tampa to begin initial discussions with US planners. Any decision to commit Canadian Forces assets would be predicated on a Security Council authorization of the use of force or, absent such explicit authorization, would be decided according to the circumstances at the time. The US has indicated that other allies, including Spain and Italy, have placed similar caveats on their participation in a campaign against Iraq. • US officials have said that while they would prefer unconditional military commitments from allies at this stage, Canada’s position is “understandable” in light of the evolving international situation. The US is looking forward to moving ahead with military consultations and, as such, welcomed Canada’s decision to engage in discussions regarding possible military contributions in the event that use of force becomes necessary. In discussions with senior officials from National Defence and Foreign Affairs, the US political director indicated that the US is not committed to military action at this stage; the President has yet to take a decision. CANADIAN POSITION • The Canadian position on the Iraq situation has not changed. The Government has been very much in favor of a strong resolution that addresses the need for Iraq to comply with all of its obligations to UN resolutions and that indicates that there will be serious consequences for non-compliance. Resolution 1441 provides inspectors with the full backing of the international community to perform their duty without interference. It is now up to Iraq to fulfill its responsibilities without condition or delay. • The Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have noted Canada’s concern about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, but have indicated our preference 2/3 SECRET 000016 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET that the issue be dealt with through the UN (i.e., through the re-establishment of the present UN inspection mechanism). On 10 October, the Prime Minister indicated that if UN inspections determined that Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, Canada would support military action. • Canada is not privy to Iraq’s declaration of its weapons programs, which was submitted to the inspectors and the Security Council. As such, Canada looks forward to the Security Council’s full assessment of the documents. • Should Canada decide to participate in a military coalition against Iraq, Canada may contribute assets from among a range of sea, land and air capabilities, including, but not necessarily restricted to those currently dedicated to the coalition campaign against terrorism (2 ships, 2 maritime patrol aircraft and 2 to 3 transport aircraft). Prepared By: Responsible Director: Responsible Director-General Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Updated: 3/3 SECRET Corri Barr, D PK Pol 6. 996-1741 Col G. C6t6, DPK Pol, 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross. DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-3458 9 December 2002 2 January 2003 000017 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informal Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'ir I I I ! 4 I ! I o . i i 000018 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 CANADIAN FORCES CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • Canada supports the creation of a stable Afghan central authority capable of providing for its own security needs and preventing the resurgence of terrorist networks within the country. As such, Canada welcomes the establishment of training initiatives for the new Afghan army, police and border forces. • Canada has made significant military commitments to the campaign against terrorism, the Balkans and elsewhere. Decisions regarding additional commitments have not yet been taken and would require a careful assessment of Canada’s capacity to do more. Issues • How does the US view the transition from combat operations to stability operations unfolding? • Does the US see a new military role for the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan? Desired Outcome • US is reassured that Canada is committed to the coalition campaign against terrorism, but recognizes Canada’s desire to limit further military engagement in Afghanistan given competing demands elsewhere. CONFIDENTIAL 000019 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /’information CONFIDENTIAL VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 CANADIAN FORCES CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To outline Canada’s contribution to the US-led coalition campaign against terrorism. BACKGROUND • Beginning almost immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, the Canadian Forces (CF) began making a significant contribution to the international campaign against terrorism. On September 20, more than 100 CF personnel serving on exchange programs in the US and with other allied military forces were authorized to participate in operations conducted by their host units in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. On October 7, Prime Minister Chretien announced that Canada would contribute to the international coalition campaign against terrorism. Operation APOLLO was then established in support of the US initiative (nick-named Operation ENDURING FREEDOM). Approximately 960 maritime, land and air force personnel are currently assigned to Operation APOLLO. DISCUSSION • Maritime Forces - There are currently two Canadian ships conducting maritime interdiction operations in the region: HMCS MONTREAL and WINNIPEG. • Land Forces - In response to a request from the US for ground forces in Afghanistan, Canada deployed the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) Battle Group to Kandahar as part of the US Army task force. This Battle Group redeployed to Canada at the end of July after completing its six-month deployment. Canada’s special operations force, Joint Task Force 2, has also redeployed to Canada. • There are three CF members deployed to Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan with the US/Coalition Combined Joint Task Force headquarters. Canada also recently deployed a military adviser to Kabul in support of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). He will act as a liaison between International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), coalition forces and UNAMA, which is a civilian mission to support reform and reconstruction in Afghanistan. 1/3 CONFIDENTIAL 000020 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL • Air Forces - Two Aurora long-range/maritime surveillance and maritime patrol aircraft, crews and support personnel have been deployed to provide essential air surveillance in the area of operation and support the coalition with maritime surveillance and intelligence gathering. A tactical airlift detachment comprised of three Hercules transport aircraft has also been deployed to provide transport for coalition supplies and, if required, to support in delivery of humanitarian relief. A strategic airlift detachment with one Polaris (Airbus A310) strategic lift aircraft, three flight crews and one air-cargo handling team returned to Canada in May after having supported coalition operations in the Persian Gulf region for six months. • Command Assets - Approximately 55 CF personnel are now employed in the Canadian National Command Element (NCE) located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. The NCE is part of the Canadian Joint Task Force South West Asia (JTFSWA) and is commanded by Brigadier-General W.A. Watt. As Commander of the NCE, he exercises operational command of the various CF components assigned to Op APOLLO. CF assets always remain under Canadian command, operating under Canadian rules of engagement, and in compliance with Canadian and international laws. • ISAF - On 27 November, the Security Council authorized a one-year extension of the ISAF mandate and welcomed a joint letter for the Foreign Ministers of Germany and the Netherlands expressing their willingness to jointly assume command of the force, with some planning and force generation support from NATO. Canada had been approached by the US to consider a leadership role in the ISAF (and was also asked by Germany to consider a military contribution), but declined participation, in part, because of significant concerns regarding the operational challenges inherent in such a role as well as the absence of a clear exit strategy. The CF previously determined that there is no battle group available for deployment before June-July 2003; highly skilled enabling troops are also in short supply. In recent departmental discussions regarding strategic objectives for the CF, it has also been recommended that Canada limit further participation to operations in Afghanistan. • Joint Regional Teams - Although no expansion of the ISAF beyond the Kabul area has been authorized, CENTCOM is developing a novel concept for the deployment of small, mobile “Joint Regional Teams” to establish a more visible international presence outside of Kabul and assist in the coordination of a range of nation-building activities. This concept is likely to be the subject of a forthcoming Request for Forces from the US, however, following trilateral meetings between the US, the UK and Canada on 11 December, we understand that the plan has not yet received Pentagon support. An operational assessment of the feasibility and desirability of CF participation in Joint Regional Teams is being undertaken in anticipation of any eventual US request. • Security Sector Reform - Under Canadian chairmanship, the G-8, along with UNAMA and the Afghan Transitional Authority, is acting as a “contact group” on Afghan security issues to steer programs and strategies for security sector reform. A 2/3 CONFIDENTIAL 000021 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information CONFIDENTIAL number of G-8 countries have agreed to lead various aspects of security sector reform ranging from the UK’s assistance in counter-narcotics and German support to train Afghan police to US and French efforts to train new battalions for a national army. Canada has not been involved in any of these initiatives. The Canadian International Development Agency allocated $15 million for peacebuilding initiatives in Afghanistan, but this funding will not include any training or capacity building for military institutions. Instead, programs involving the RCMP (civilian police assistance), Elections Canada (support for democratic elections), and Justice/Corrections (prison reform) are being planned. CANADIAN POSITION • Canada supports the creation of a stable Afghan central authority capable of providing for its own security needs and preventing the resurgence of terrorist networks within the country. As such, Canada welcomes the establishment of training initiatives for the new Afghan army, police and border forces. • Canada’s contribution to the coalition campaign against terrorism, along with our other current commitments in Bosnia and to United Nations peacekeeping, raises sustainability issues that will have an impact on our ability to commit elsewhere. • Canada is currently considering possible modest follow on contributions to Afghanistan given the redeployment of the Battle Group. Any decision to deploy additional troops would be based on the requirement at that time, as well as Canada’s other military commitments. Prepared by: Director: Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Date prepared: C.Barr, DPKPol 6,996-1741 Col G. Cote, D PK Pol, 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. KJ. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-3458 18 December 2002 3/3 CONFIDENTIAL 000022 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informoti Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'ir 000023 i �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information VISIT OF MINISTER McCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 ENHANCING CANADA-US MILITARY COOPERATION SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • I have instructed my department to assign officers to the bi-national Planning Group as soon as possible. • I would be interested in your plans for implementing this agreement. • I would also be interested to know whether you have decided through whom the Head of the Planning Group will report to US authorities - ie, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or through Commander US Northern Command? Issue • Success of Planning Group will depend on a US commitment to fully support the bi-national Planning Group in information sharing, planning, and reporting/attack assessment to both governments. Desired outcome • Rumsfeld commits to support Planning Group activities and ensure rapid and adequate US staffing. 000024 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information VISIT OF MINISTER McCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 ENHANCING CANADA-US MILITARY COOPERATION BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To provide an update on the status of the creation of a bi-national Planning Group to enhance Canada-US military cooperation. BACKGROUND • Following the events of September 11th, 2001, Canada and the US examined existing military plans and structures to respond to major crises - such as a terrorist attack or natural disaster. Both governments found that bi-national cooperation is best enhanced by strengthening linkages, rather than relying on ad hoc arrangements. • Formal negotiations to enhance military cooperation began with Cabinet authority given in July 2002. The Canadian and the US negotiating teams reached an interim agreement in November 2002. The Government approved this military cooperation agreement on 03 December. • Key Provisions. The main features of the agreement are: o o o o o o o 1/2 Creation of a “Planning Group” to prepare contingency plans, conduct surveillance, share intelligence, provide governments with attack warning and threat assessment, and validate plans for potential maritime, land and civil support responses; Planning Group will be located at NORAD Headquarters in Colorado Springs, to take advantage of existing infrastructure, proven capabilities and expertise; Development of detailed decision-making arrangements clearly describing the process to be followed to seek governmental approval to act in the event of a crisis; No standing command and control structure or assignment of forces are included; The Planning Group will report to a Canadian, the Deputy Commander NORAD, who will in turn report to both governments; Both governments will exchange classified information pertaining to the missions of the Planning Group; Operational cooperation between respective military forces will occur only under conditions approved by both governments, on a case-by-case basis. 000025 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information o Regular meetings will occur between senior officials from both countries’ departments of defence, foreign affairs, and lead civil agencies (e.g. Solicitor General, Transport, PCO, OCIPEP and relevant US federal departments) to provide policy guidance to the Planning Group. DFAIT is the lead on implementing this provision. • These arrangements will ensure that Canadian sovereignty is protected and will at the same time strengthen military cooperation and support to civilian authorities. DISCUSSION • The initial Canadian participation in the Planning Group will consist of about 15 CF officers. These officers will be in place or posted no later than April 2003. Some positions (about 6-8 personnel) will be filled immediately by existing NORAD Canadian personnel that will be transferred from their current position or will be dual-tasked. A second group of officers will be posted during the summer 2003 period. Additionally, a small number of positions will be filled by Canadian or US contractors. The aim is to have the Planning Group operating by the end of summer 2003. • US plans regarding the implementation of this agreement are not known at the moment. We anticipate that it will not be a problem for the US as Northern Command Headquarters (about 500 in total) will support the Planning Group. We still do not know to whom the head of the Planning Group will report on the US side. It will either be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Commander of US Northern Command. • Initial activity in Colorado Springs includes an intensive three-day planning session on 7-9 January 2003. CONCLUSION • The Planning Group provides an opportunity to work together with the US as sovereign partners, to find ways of enhancing our security, based on our mutual interests, where it makes sense to do so. This initiative is a creative and necessary bilateral response to a heightened security environment that concerns both Canadians and Americans. Prepared by: Director: Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Date: 2/2 Mr Martin Benjamin, D/DWH Pol, 992-4423 Col Richard Williams, DWH Pol, 992-3960 MGen Cameron Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr Kenneth J. Calder, ADM(Pol), 992-3458 09 Dec 02 000026 �Document disclosed under the Access to Infocmatii Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'inj 000027 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 NORAD SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • Our decision to co-locate the Planning Group with NORAD reaffirms our commitment to bi-national defence of the continent, capitalizes on NORAD’s expertise and capabilities and reinforces a keystone of our defence relationship • Full employment of Canadians in senior NORAD positions is increasingly hampered by imposition of releasibility and disclosure limitations • To sustain effective Canadian participation in NORAD we must be vigilant of these limitations and work to resolve them expeditiously, respecting the laws and policies of our respective countries Issues • Canadian NORAD personnel are frequently being denied access to classified information required for their primary duties through the application of US National Disclosure Policy. • Such limitations are often administrative interpretations based on existing US or Canadian policies (or, in the case of information operations or missile defence, the lack of approved policies), access to information concerning US relationships with other nations (as in the case of theatre ballistic missile launch information), or increasing US sensitivity to Canadian policies on space. • In the past, partial resolution of these situations was possible due in part to the close relationship and collocation of NORAD and Space Command. But, with the reallocation of Space Command to Strategic Command in Omaha, 000028 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Nebraska, these limitations are increasingly evident and more difficult to resolve. And the problem will get more difficult: further development of the missile defence system will require closer integration of sensitive space and ground systems to support NORAD and Strategic Command missions. • Assignment of Canadian Forces officers to senior NORAD positions (including as Command Director in Cheyenne Mountain and Director of Operations for NORAD) is increasingly limited and could be threatened in the longer term if we do not resolve this problem. • More broadly, the Canadian Forces relies on information gained in part by this relationship for the conduct of its domestic and international operations wherein Canada can leverage US military space capabilities and policy, can integrate computer network defence planning, and can foster missile defence policy development. Desired outcome • Secretary Rumsfeld is aware that this problem has potential to hinder our close and effective NORAD and defence relationships • He recognizes that Canada is anxious to deal with such limitations expeditiously while fully respectful of US national disclosure policy. • He is potentially willing to influence US Strategic Command to work cooperatively with NORAD to resolve key issues. 000029 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information SECRET VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 NORAD BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To provide an update on classified information restrictions imposed by the US on Canadian NORAD personnel. BACKGROUND • Access to classified space-related information is critical to the NORAD surveillance mission. Owing to the previous close relationship between NORAD and US Space Command (Commander NORAD was dual-hatted as Commander US Space Command), Canadian NORAD personnel enjoyed unprecedented access to US space operations and information. Six Canadian NORAD personnel occupied dual-hatted positions in US Space Command. Canadians also occupy space-related positions at other US military installations, such as US Air Force Space Command headquarters, the 21st Space Wing, and various Space Warning Squadrons. • Canadian insight into US space operations and information is being curtailed for two reasons. The first is Canada’s non-participation in US missile defence plans, which relies heavily on space surveillance and communications assets. The second reason is the move of US Space Command from Colorado Springs to Nebraska, where it has been merged into US Strategic Command. The new US Strategic Command is expected to receive responsibility for global management of US missile defence assets. DISCUSSION • Canadian NORAD personnel rely on US space operations and information to carry out their bi-national mission. Canadian NORAD personnel are currently involved in a number of missile warning and space activities within the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, including the Missile Warning Center and the Space Analysis Center. • Canadian access to space operations and information has been diminishing, however. Four of the six Canadian personnel previously occupying US Space Command positions have been asked to return to NORAD. Canadians have been asked to leave the Space Control Center in the Cheyenne Mountain. Canadians stationed at US Air Force Space Command have already been moved or relegated SECRET • 1/2 000030 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET to positions of lesser importance due to US-imposed foreign disclosure restrictions. There is also a push by US Strategic Command to move the Missile Warning Center out of Cheyenne Mountain, which will likely have an impact on Canadian manning in the center. • As space-based infrared sensors and ground-based radars are upgraded by the US for the missile defence of North America, many of which will be controlled in Cheyenne Mountain, the rationale for Canadian positions at the radar sites and in Cheyenne Mountain may be questioned if Canada decides not to participate in missile defence. • If, as expected, the next US Unified Command Plan assigns global responsibility for missile defence to US Strategic Command, Canadian access to space-related information may be further reduced. Command and control for regional missile defence assets will be controlled by the respective regional unified commanders, eg, US Central Command. Command of missile defence assets in North America could go to either NORAD or US Northern Command. In either case, Cheyenne Mountain will house the necessary infrastructure. • It is difficult to predict how a missile defence mission placed in Cheyenne Mountain will affect future Canadian manning in the Command Center if Emergency Defence Operations are ordered post-September 2004, when a rudimentary missile defence capability is expected to become operational. In particular, it is unclear how Canadians will be affected by the existence of two separate chains of command - one for aerospace surveillance/missile warning and another for missile defence operations. • Canadian insight into US missile defence plans has also been reduced. By virtue of their role in space activities, Canadian NORAD personnel had access to the evolving US missile defence concept of operations. Canadian access has now been denied. Furthermore, Canadians involved in missile defence simulation at the Joint National Integration Center have been moved to the international programs office, resulting in reduced access to missile defence information. CONCLUSION • Reduced Canadian access to US space information could impede Canadian NORAD personnel in carrying out their bi-national mission. • There are signs that Canadians may be marginalized increasingly in the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center if Canada decides not to participate in missile defence. Mr. N. Thalakada, DWH Pol 5 996-0063 Mr M Benjamin, D/DWH Pol, 992-4423 Director: Col R. Williams, DWH Pol, 992-3960 Director General: MGen H.C. Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Responsible Group Principal: Kenneth J. Calder, ADM(Pol), 992-3458 Date: 17 Dec 02 Prepared by: Consulted: SECRET 2/2 000031 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informal! Document divulgue en vertu de la lai sur I'acces a /'ml J 000032 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET VISIT OF MINISTER McCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE SPEAKING POINTS Key Messages • Canada is ready to intensify discussions with the US with a view to reaching a decision soon. • In order to reach such a decision, we need answers from the US to some fundamental questions. Issues • General: What kind of commitments would be required to secure “insight and influence”? How much of a say is the US prepared to let us have in decision-making in the program? • Participation: What could the US need from Canada? • Industrial Model: Is a government-to-government agreement necessary for the participation of Canadian industries? • Command Arrangements: What role, if any, for NORAD? • Current Bilateral Activities: Are we in danger of being denied any and all access to US space information, technology and assets pending a decision on participation? Desired outcomes • The US is reassured that we will make a decision on participation soon. • The US agrees to provide answers on fundamental issues as well as insight into development of the program. SECRET 000033 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lai sur I'acces a /'information SECRET VISIT OF MINISTER McCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To provide an update on recent Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) developments. BACKGROUND • Free from ABM Treaty constraints, the Bush Administration has approached NATO and other US allies about participating in a possible global ballistic missile defence system. Over this past summer, United States delegations visited a number of Allied capitals, including Ottawa, with a view to increasing political support and opening the door to potential industrial participation, with briefings that were clearly aimed at European allies. The US has also tried to advance BMD within the Alliance writ large; at the Prague Summit, Heads of State and Government agreed to language suggested by the US supporting the need to “examine options to address the increasing missile threat.” • On 17 December, President Bush confirmed that the US would be deploying a BMD system within two years. While the President’s announcement has been widely reported in the media as a ‘new’ policy direction or a ‘major’ decision, he, in fact, merely reaffirmed his commitments to programs that have been underway for some years now. The President announced that the US would deploy 16 interceptors at the BMD test-bed under construction in Alaska, and would add a second site with 4 interceptors at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Twenty naval interceptors and short-range Army systems will be purchased as planned, and work on space and ground sensors will continue. The budget for BMD will be raised, with another US$1.5 billion being added over the next two years. Now standing at approximately US$9 billion annually, the BMD budget has been roughly tripled since Bush took office. • Although most of the 17 December announcement was unremarkable, there were two noteworthy pieces of information. Implicit in Bush’s commitment to deployment is a shift in emphasis away from research and testing - the time has come to begin deployment, albeit on an admittedly modest scale. The Administration has now publicly committed, at the highest level, to a deployment in 2004. While consistent with Pentagon plans, the US had never officially set an in-service date for BMD, perhaps fearing the political consequences of failing to meet that objective. Second, and more significantly, the US has officially SECRET 1/4 000034 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET requested the use of American radar warning facilities on British and Danish territory. • Reaction to the Bush announcement has been modest. Dmitri Rogozin, the head of the Russian Duma’s international affairs committee, succinctly noted that “in fact, this news is two years old.” Neither President Putin, nor his Defence and Foreign Ministers, nor any other senior officials chose to comment on the Bush announcement, although Russia’s Foreign Ministry released an unsigned statement expressing “regret.” This is the same language Moscow used in commenting upon the passing of the ABM Treaty, and may signal Russia’s tacit acceptance of a situation it has little influence over. The Russian statement also noted that Moscow is seeking “a noticeable role” for its industry in cooperative Theatre Missile Defence programs, either with the US bilaterally or through the Russia-NATO Council. China’s response was equally muted: its Foreign Ministry expressed “worry about the possible impact on regional stability.” In a message likely aimed at Taiwan, Beijing hoped that “relevant parties will act prudently.” Reaction throughout Europe was equally slight, prompting the New York Times to observe that “the most vociferous criticism came not from overseas, but from Canada” - a reference to Minister Graham’s comments quoted in the Canadian press. This follows last week’s statement in The Guardian that Prime Minister Chretien was “not interested” in BMD participation. DISCUSSION • Allied political support for BMD has increased; however, some NATO counties have expressed frustration that the US could not be more precise on such matters as architecture, timelines or command arrangements for this expanded global system. For its part, Washington seems taken aback that not every ally finds the case for joining BMD readily apparent. • While we have questioned US officials in a variety of fora, they have never clearly articulated how they wish to see Canada contribute to a BMD system for North America. For this reason, it remains uncertain what role Canadian territory and/or NORAD could play. The US does not explicitly need either. US Strategic Command and US Element NORAD operate many of the space and warning systems needed for BMD. Similarly, the US will be concentrating on upgrading existing sensor and radars which already provide missile warning, and any potential Canadian contribution would only be to supplement these systems down the road. However, should the US be unable to secure permission from Denmark to use the space-tracking radar at Thule Air Force Base in Greenland, • Assuming Canada agreed to participate in missile defence, our preferred option has always been that this mission should be assigned - or re-assigned - to s.15(1) SECRET 2/4 000035 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information SECRET NORAD. As we have it, however, current US thinking envisions Strategic Command having overall command of global BMD resources, with regional commanders exerting direct control over defending their own geographic areas of responsibility. If so, responsibility for continental missile defence could go to either US Northern Command or NORAD. A Canadian decision not to participate in missile defence would almost assuredly lead to a US decision to place continental missile defence responsibility in Northern Command. s.15(1) • The BMD model that Washington has been pitching to allies offers varying degrees of ‘insight and influence’ as well as The details, however, remain murky, partly as a result of the US Missile Defense Agency being a new organization which is still experiencing problems coordinating efforts within the US military. Establishing an international industrial framework under these circumstances will be no easy task. US Undersecretary for Acquisition Pete Aldridge has indicated that he will be writing to ADM (Mat) shortly to answer some questions raised on the margins of a NATO meeting in late October. CONCLUSION • Canada has not yet reached a decision on participation in a North American missile defence system, nor has Washington issued a direct invitation. Washington is likely to intensify its bilateral discussions with allies on this issue, however, notwithstanding its efforts to discuss BMD in NATO and a European context. Much of this attention could well focus on Canada, depending on how receptive we decide to be. Officials have begun delivering the message to the US that Canada is ready to intensify bilateral discussions on BMD, but that we need answers to some fundamental questions before such a decision can be reached recognizing full well that we may never have all the answers we want. • We must recognize that the US will proceed with deployment of a missile defence system regardless of any Canadian decision on participation. No matter what we ultimately decide, we must ensure that NORAD’s role is not diminished. NORAD’s evolving links with Northern Command and US Strategic Command remain of critical importance. Canada might already be in danger of being frozen out of some NORAD/Strategic Command activities, as the US waits for us to make up our mind. • Many in Europe have greeted the President’s 17 December announcement with little more than a “shrug”, in the words of The New York Times-, after all, construction of a global system to defend Europe remains entirely conceptual. The Canadian situation is different, by virtue of our geography and close defence relationship with the US. The construction of a North American system is already underway, and is picking up momentum. Decisions are being made - without Canadian input - which could shape our options for future participation. SECRET 3/4 000036 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur facets a /’information SECRET • An implicit invitation to participate in BMD has been open for some time, and some in Washington question why we continue to delay. Political signals from Ottawa may well have frustrated Washington even further. Setting out clear goals for Canadian policy on BMD and engaging the US as soon as possible will be essential if we are to have any leverage. Continuing to avoid a decision will have diplomatic costs, and will certainly alter how we are viewed as a partner in North American security. Prepared by: Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Corey Michael Dvorkin, DG Pol Plan/D Pol Dev 2, 995-2797 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol) 19 Dec 2002 SECRET 4/4 000037 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informatl Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'irl 000038 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I’acc&s a /'information NATO CONFIDENTIAL VISIT OF MINISTER McCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 FOLLOW-UP TO PRAGUE SUMMIT SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • Canada fully supports the Prague Capabilities Commitment. • We strongly support the concept of a NATO Response Force, which would provide an alternative to reliance on ad hoc coalitions. • Canada would be interested in contributing to a multi-national brigade. • Exercises and training should not only take place in Europe, but in North America as well. Issue • Our ability to meet the Prague Capabilities Commitment and contribute to the NATO Response Force will in part depend on a budget increase. Desired outcome • Rumsfeld notes our desire to do all we can afford to meet the Prague Capabilities Commitment. NATO CONFIDENTIAL 000039 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information NATO CONFIDENTIAL VISIT OF MINISTER McCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 FOLLOW-UP TO PRAGUE SUMMIT BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To provide an update on Prague Summit issues of particular interest to the CanadaUS defence relationship. BACKGROUND • The US has long been critical of the Alliance’s reluctance to commit the funding necessary to address critical operational deficiencies within NATO. These “gaps” were first identified at the Washington Summit in 1999 with the Defence Capabilities Initiative. A number of the most significant (and costly) of these were never addressed and had to be subsequently rolled over into a second program - the Prague Capabilities Commitment - which was approved at the NATO Summit last month. • While the 1999 Defence Capabilities Initiative has been credited with resolving 50 of the 59 “issues” identified for action, the program was also frequently criticized. In particular, the credibility of the Initiative was at issue since no defined measures of success were ever developed to determine if a gap actually had been closed. As well, timelines were exceedingly flexible and individual countries were not required to make concrete financial commitments to any of the goals. With the Prague Capabilities Commitment, both the Sec Gen and the US were very aggressive in their campaign for a smaller, more focussed approach. They also insisted that countries make firm fiscal commitments and agree to defined timelines. DISCUSSION • Neither the US nor the Sec Gen were pleased with the lacklustre response by most nations to the process leading up to the signing of the Capabilities Commitment at Prague in November 2002; nor were they shy in expressing their displeasure. Partially in response to this mediocre reaction, the US introduced the NATO Response Force concept at the Informal Defence Ministers’ meeting in Warsaw in September 2002. The Response Force was intended as a focal point for the Prague Capabilities Commitment as it offered the potential of bringing together a number of the individual initiatives and would provide a significant capability enhancement across the full spectrum of potential operational missions. 1/3 NATO CONFIDENTIAL 000040 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s d /'information NATO CONFIDENTIAL • Further pressure to support the Prague Capabilities Commitment came in the form of a “Signing Ceremony” which the Sec Gen set up at the last minute at the Summit to cajole members nations to sign up to possible multinational solutions to some of the most pressing operational shortfalls under the aegis of a volunteer lead nation. Germany was lead nation for strategic airlift; first Denmark and then Norway led assured strategic sealift; Spain directed the strategic air-to-air refuelling initiative and the Netherlands’s acted as lead country for F-16 Precision Guided Munitions. Canada signed both the German strategic airlift and the Norwegian strategic sealift Statements of Intent to explore particular options. • In addition to the 12 deficiencies identified in the Prague Capability Commitment, the Sec Gen also urged each Defence Minister to commit to providing additional capabilities at Prague. Canada’s response to this request was as follows: o Acquire new generation support ships (Fully accepted)-, o Fund Canada’s share of the design and development phase of the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance to ensure completion by 2005 (Fully accepted)-, o Acquire tactical Unmanned Air Vehicles for the army by 2004 (Partially accepted)-, and o Stand up a Special Operations Task Group by 2003 (Partially accepted). CANADA’S POSITION • While Canada has been a strong, vocal supporter of both the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the NATO Response Force, tangible commitments are another matter. Until the NATO staffs develop a concept of operations for the NATO Response Force, any commitment of actual forces would be premature. That said, a “quicklook” by DGSP in November suggested Canada might be in a position to commit the following: o Air - 2 x Strategic Air-to-Air Refuelling Aircraft & 6 x CF-18 fighters with Precision Guided Munitions o Land - Light Infantry Battalion Group; Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition Squadron; and Tactical Air Defence or Land Electronic Warfare elements o Sea- Frigate • Canada’s national commitment to the Prague Capabilities Commitment is outlined in the attached list (together with the US commitment). Most of the Canadian commitments reflect projects and/or activities currently in progress. With the matter of the Defence Review/Update still unresolved, Canada is not in a position to make the longer term commitments that the US and the Sec Gen have been pressuring allies to make. 2/3 NATO CONFIDENTIAL 000041 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information NATO CONFIDENTIAL • The goal of the review will be to ensure that Canada’s defence programme is affordable, sustainable and effectively structured to carry out its defence missions. In particular, the review will assess current defence capabilities with a view to ensuring that readiness levels and force structure are in line with available, and with any luck, new resources. Prepared by: Director: Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Cdr C.D. Gunn, D NATO Pol 3,995-9172 Col J M Snell, DNATO Pol, 995-9155 MGen Cameron Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr Kenneth J. Calder, ADM(Pol), 992-3458 4 December 2002 3/3 NATO CONFIDENTIAL 000042 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informal^ Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'inl b 000043 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information VISIT OF MINISTER McCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 DEFENCE BUDGET SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • Our recently completed defence update concluded that basic policy assumptions remain valid, but the CF require additional funds. • lam optimistic that government will provide new money in this February’s budget. Issues • US pressure on all allies to make a greater effort. • What the US sees as an insufficient effort may be perceived as a Canadian s.15(1) decision not to help the US defend itself. • US focused on North American defence; it is very aware of what we lack and will do by itself what we cannot help with. • It is no secret that Canada is facing defence budget pressures, the result primarily of Government efforts to reduce public sector debt in the 1990s. • Many critics focus on defence spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product. However, there is another side to the story. • Not all comparisons are unfavourable to us, particularly if one considers that in terms of actual spending, Canada ranks 6th among NATO countries, right after the US, UK, France, Germany and Italy. In fact, Canada ranks 14th in the world by this same measure, after other countries with significantly greater ambitions than us - or neighbours who give them greater cause to spend on defence than Ambassador Celucci’s speeches! 000044 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information • We must also remember that the Government will invest $5.1 billion in National Defence from December 2001 to 2006-07. These additional funds have been most welcome. • Nevertheless, I have made the point publicly that I would like to see us spend more than we do - to take care of our people and allow the Canadian Forces to continue operating as they are today. I have also said that we need to spend more on transformation initiatives to ensure that we do not mortgage our future. • I believe the time is right to address this problem and, to that end, I have asked the Government to provide defence with additional resources. I am optimistic that we’II receive some good news with the next federal budget in February 2003. • In the meantime, the Canadian Forces continue to examine what they do in terms of capabilities and how they can redirect resources to high priority areas. Desired outcomes • US acknowledges that Canada is making efforts to increase defence spending and enhance military capabilities. • US is satisfied that Canada is a reliable partner in defence of North America. • US is satisfied that Canada is a solid ally in NATO and the world. 000045 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 DEFENCE BUDGET BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • MND’s meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld on 9 January 2003. BACKGROUND • The need to address the problem of public sector debt led to significant cuts in most areas of Canadian Government spending after the Liberals came to power in 1993. National Defence did its part in contributing to this overriding government priority. • The Defence Services Program incurred significant budget reductions as a result of Budget 1994 as well as Program Reviews I and II. As part of the Government’s deficit-reduction plan, National Defence’s funding envelope was cut by $10.8 billion between 1994/95 and 1998/99. In real terms, defence funding declined by 22% over this period. • Canada was certainly not alone in cutting defence spending. Many allies, including the United States, reduced defence expenditures in the early 1990s in anticipation of a post-Cold War “peace dividend”. More recently, some countries have increased spending in response to emerging security threats, including the events of 11 September. The U.S., for example, has recently increased its defence budget for FY2003 to just under US$400 billion, up from about US$354 billion in FY2002. (Since taking office, the Bush Administration has added US$96B to its annual military spending - more than two and a half times the total budget of any NATO ally. In fact, the US spends about twice as much as all of the rest of NATO combined). The U.K. and France have also announced spending increases. At the same time, other countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, are cutting their defence spending. • Although Canada faces budget pressures, it is one of the countries increasing its military budget. The Government will invest $5.1 billion in National Defence from December 2001 to 2006-07. As part of the Defence Update, of course, you have also requested additional funds from the Government in order to stabilize the defence program over the short to medium term. 1 000046 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information DISCUSSION • The U.S. has widely criticized allies over defence spending. American embassies in many countries have been instructed to press governments on this issue, and US officials have done the same in NATO meetings. Given our proximity to the U.S. and our close defence relationship, Canada’s defence spending has been of particular concern to the U.S. post-11 September. Ambassador Celucci has spoken out on the subject on numerous occasions. Secretary Rumsfeld, while very complimentary of Canada’s role in the war on terrorism, stated in November that “there isn’t a country on the face of the earth that can’t afford to spend 2 or 3 (or) 4 per cent of their GDP to contribute to peace and stability in the world”. • U.S. criticism in this area has reflected the views of commentators at home. Many newspaper editorials, for example, have echoed U.S. concerns, while various polls have shown that the Canadian public supports increased defence spending. The House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence and a host of stakeholder groups have also called for increases to the defence budget. The Senate Committee, for example, has called for an additional $4 billion for defence. These reports have tended to focus on increasing defence spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product or per capita. Canada currently ranks 17lh in NATO as a percentage of GDP, while the U.S. ranks 3rd ‘ (see attached tables for more details). • Not all comparisons are unfavourable, particularly if one considers that, in terms of actual spending, Canada ranks 6th among NATO countries, right after the U.S., UK, France, Germany and Italy. By the same measure, Canada ranks 14th in the world after countries with significantly greater ambitions — or more hostile neighbours — than us (the US ranks first in actual spending, but only 53rd as a percentage of GDP). Responsible Group Principal: Prepared by: Consulted: Date: Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-3458 Vincent Rigby, DG Pol Plan/D Pol Dev, 995-2894 Capt (N) E.M. St-Jean, D Budget/DG Fin, 992-4646 19 December 2002 2 000047 �. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information TABLE I Defence Expenditure, 2001 - Top Twenty Countries (US$bn at 2000 constant prices) Rank Country Defence Exp. 1st U.S. 322.365 nd Russia 63.684 ord D China 46.049 4<h Japan 39.513 5 th U.K. 34.714 6Ih France 32.909 •7 th Germany 26.902 8th Saudi Arabia 24.266 The source for these figures is The Military Balance 2002/2003. For consistency in the estimating process, the IISS applies the NATO definition of military spending to all its defence­ expenditure estimates. Although in some cases the figures represent only approximations, it is our view that they provide a reasonable depiction of the order of magnitude of defence expenditures. Comparisons with figures cited in previous editions are difficult because the IISS continually updates its numbers from year to year. Figures can also differ from one source to another (e.g., SIPRI) depending on their definition of terms. 9<h Italy 20.966 NOTES 10th Korea, South 11.165 11th Brazil 10.511 1) U.S. expenditures were roughly equivalent to expenditures of the next 11 highest-spending countries. 12lh Taiwan 10.432 2) NATO’s total was $472.9 bn. Canada ranked 6th. 13th Israel 10.375 14h Canada 7.745 3) U.S. share of NATO expenditures totals about 64.7%. 15th Turkey 7.219 16th Spain 6.938 17th Australia 6.752 18th Netherlands 6.257 19th Mexico 5.733 20th Greece 5.517 4) OECD’s total was $562.3 bn. ranked 8th of 30 countries. Canada 5) “Western” military spending (OECD countries) continues to represent about 67.3% of global defence expenditure as estimated by the IISS for 2001. Source: “The Military Balance 2002-2003", IISS, Oct 02 (Table 26) 000048 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /’information TABLE II Defence Expenditure as % of GDP, 2001 - Top Twenty Countries (2000 constant prices) Rank Country % of GDP 1st Eritrea 20.9 7 nd Angola 17.0 3 rd Oman 14.4 4th Saudi Arabia 14.1 5th Afghanistan 12.2 6th Kuwait 12.1 7th Korea, North 11.6 8th Syria 10.9 9th Ethiopia 9.8 10th Israel 9.5 11th Iraq 9.3 12th DROC 8.9 13th Jordan 8.5 14th Yemen 8.1 15th Vietnam 7.2 16th Qatar 7.1 17th Maldives 6.7 18th Armenia 6.5 19th Algeria 6.3 FRY (Serbia/Montenegro) 6.3 The source for these figures is The Military Balance 2002/2003. For consistency in the estimating process, the IISS applies the NATO definition of military spending to all its defence-expenditure estimates. Although in some cases the figures represent only approximations, it is our view that they provide a reasonable depiction of the order of magnitude of defence expenditures. Comparisons with figures cited in previous editions are difficult because the IISS continually updates its numbers from year to year. Figures can also differ from one source to another (e.g., SIPRI) depending on their definition of terms. NOTES 1) Canada ranked 138th of 170 countries at 1.1% (tied with Haiti, Nicaragua and Paraguay). 2) The U.S. ranked 53 rd at 3.2% (tied with Turkmenistan). 3) Russia ranked 38 th at 4.3% (tied with Sudan). 4) China ranked 43rd at 4.0%. 5) NATO’s average was 2.2%. Canada ranked 17th (out of 18; Iceland not included in data). 6) OECD’s average was 1.8%. Canada ranked 24th of 30 countries. Responsible DG: Daniel L. Bon, DG Pol Plan Prepared by: LCol J.E. Vos, D Pol Dev 3,995-2790 Date: 14 Nov 02 Source: “The Military Balance 2002-2003", IISS, Oct 02 (Table 26) 000049 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information NATO Rankings by Defence Ex ure and % of GDP on Defence (using NATO and IISS data) NATO RESTRICTED Ranking of NATO Countries on Defence Spending in 2001 Ranking of NATO Countries on Defence Spending in 2001 (Data extracted from NATO Semestrial Statistical Memorandum, 21 Jun 02 ($BY)) (Source: "The Military Balance 2002-2003”, IISS, Oct 02 (Table 26)) Rank Country 2 U.S. 2 U.K. 3 France________ 4 Germany______ 5 Italy___________ 6 Canada_______ 7 Turkey________ 8 Spain_________ 9 Netherlands 10|Greece 11 Poland________ Belgium_______ Norway________ Denmark______ Portugal_______ Czech Republic 17 Hungary_______ 18| Luxembourg 12 13 14 15 16 Total Spending 2001 Def Exp ($M US) $305,886 $34,225 $33,496 $27,387 $21,263 $7,368 $7,007 $6,327 $5,590 $3,490 $3,074 $2,986 $2,458 $2,252 $1,190 $926 $148 %of NATO Spending in 2001 Rank 2 Turkey 64.7% 7.2% 7.1% 5.8% 4.5% 2| Greece 3 4 5 6 7 1.6% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% Country U.S. France U.K.___________ Czech Republic Portugal_______ 8 Poland 9 Italy___________ To Norway 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% $472,933 11 Hungary 12 Netherlands 13 Denmark 14 15 16 17 18 2001 Def Exp as a % of GDP Country Rank 5.12 4.79 1 U.S. 2|U.K. 3.00 3 France 4 Germany 5 Italy 2.57 2.40 2.11 2.05 1.97 1.95 1.82 1.79 1.67 1.51 1.48 1.34 Germany Belgium Spain______ Canada Luxembourg 1.12 0.75 .Average % GDP 2.52 1.20 6 Canada 7 Turkey________ 8 Spain_________ 9 Netherlands 10| Greece 11 Poland________ 12 Belgium_______ 13 Norway______ 14 15 16 17 18 Denmark______ Portugal_______ Czech Republic Hungary_______ Luxembourg Total Spending 2001 Def Exp ($M US) %of NATO Spending in 2001 $322,365 $34,714 $32,909 $26,902 $20,966 66.1% 7.1% 6.7% 5.5% $7,219 $6,938 $6,257 $5,517 $3,408 $3,017 $2,967 $2,409 $2,226 $1,167 $909 $145 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% $487,780 4.3% 1.1% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% Rank 1 2 3 4 Country Turkey________ Greece________ U.S.___________ France________ 5 U.K.___________ 6 Czech Republic 7 Italy 8 Poland________ 9 Portugal_______ 10|Hungary 11 Norway________ 12|Netheriands 13 Denmark______ 14 Germany______ 15 Belgium_______ 16 Spain_________ 17 Canada 18 Luxembourg Average % GDP 2001 Def Exp as a % of GDP 5X £8 Z2 Z6 Z£ Z2 ZC ZO ZO 1.8 1.8 12 JI _L5 JI JI JI 0.8 2.2 NATO RESTRICTED Updated 14 November 2002 World Stats 1/2/2003 - 3:56 PM by LCol J.E. Vos, DG Pol Plan/D Pol Dev 3 000050 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lolsur I'acces a I'informotion International Comparison of Defence Expenditures for 2001 - in Constant 2000 $US Billions (Source: IISS Military Balance 2002/2003) $B = $Billion USA (38.6%) S322.4B Russia (7.6%) S63.7B 1 REST OF NATO: NATO minus USA. \ China (5.5%) $46B \ Other (14.1%) S117.5B LIKE-MINDED: Rest of OECD (Australia, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, South Korea, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland), Israel and Saudi Arabia. STATES OF CONCERN: Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria and Sudan. OTHERS: Includes all others not listed above. NATO (USA + REST OF NATO): 58.4% r States of Concern (1.3%) $11.IB JAPAN: 4.7% V USA + REST OF NATO + LIKE-MINDED: 71.5% ( Like-Minded (13.1%) S109.1B Rest of NATO (19.8%) S165.4B Updated 26 November 2002 By LCol J.E. Vos, DGPol Plan/D Pol Dev 3 000051 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT BRIEFING NOTE ISSUE • To provide an update on US efforts to engage Canada in a bilateral agreement seeking exemption from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. BACKGROUND • Based in The Hague, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for the most horrific of crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. These crimes are carefully defined under international law and are recognized by the entire international community. Canada provided leadership to international efforts to create the International Criminal Court and was the first country to adopt comprehensive implementing legislation - the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act. • Very clear safeguards are written into the Rome Statute to provide appropriate checks and balances that will preclude politically motivated prosecutions. Nevertheless, fearing that its troops and officials abroad could be tried in a court that is not accountable to US laws or officials, the US is seeking to negotiate agreements to exempt US personnel from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. DISCUSSION • On 24 July, the US Embassy in Ottawa demarched Foreign Affairs, proposing that the US and Canada enter into a bilateral agreement to preclude the surrender of both countries’ nationals to the Court. The US has similarly approached every state in the world with which it has relations; while fifteen smaller states have signed agreements, many European allies and like-minded countries, including Finland, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, have refused. • On 28 October, Minister Graham decided that Canada would not enter into any new agreement with the US. This decision has been relayed through appropriate Foreign Affairs channels. Canada believes that existing bilateral agreements, including the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, provide sufficient protection and that the US proposal, as drafted, was inconsistent with the International Criminal Court Statute. 1/2 000052 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /’information • Canada’s position was determined in light of Canada’s obligations under the International Criminal Court Statute, international law and the views of allies. In addition, Canada believes that launching negotiations with the US to reach a mutually acceptable agreement are unlikely to be successful and would send the wrong signal internationally about Canada’s leadership role in establishing the International Criminal Court. • The US has rejected this line of reasoning and would prefer a separate arrangement that refers directly to international tribunals, including the International Criminal Court. The US will likely continue to seek a bilateral agreement by engaging in discussions on the issue in a variety of forums. The US Ambassador on the International Criminal Court met with Foreign Affairs and Defence officials on 19 December. Canada again indicated that it would not enter into any new agreement with the US. No further discussions are planned at this time. Drafted by: Consulted: Responsible Director: Responsible Director General: Responsible Group Principal: Date Prepared: Updated: Corn Barr, DPK Pol 6, 996-1741 D Law I Col G. Cotd, DPK Pol, 992-1872 MGen H.C. Ross, DGIS Pol, 992-2769 Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, ADM (Pol), 992-3458 9 December 2002 30 December 2002 2/2 000053 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informatit Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'ini 101 I i 000054 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information VISIT OF MINISTER MCCALLUM TO WASHINGTON. DC 8-10 JANUARY 2003 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT SPEAKING POINTS Key messages • Canada believes law-abiding states have nothing to fear from the court, which has rigorous safeguards to protect against any frivolous investigations. • We believe that existing Status of Forces Agreements provide US forces in Canada sufficient protection. As such, Canada will not sign a new bilateral agreement. Issues • The US has rejected the Canadian position and would prefer a separate arrangement to exempt US personnel from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. • Washington may ask Ottawa to sign ad hoc pledges of immunity for US forces before joint operations are approved. Desired outcome • The US agrees to continue to engage in broader dialogue regarding the International Criminal Court, but accepts Canada’s decision not to enter into a bilateral agreement. 000055 �K. Document disclosed under the Access to Informoti] Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /7nl 000056 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'inforeflation FURTADO Francis -WSHDC -GR -C4 December 4,2002 11:13AM -EXTOTT -MML -C4 -EXTOTT -USS -C4; -EXTOTT -DMT -C4; -EXTOTT -DMA -C4; EXTOTT -MDM -C4; -EXTOTT -MJW -C4; -EXTOTT,-MDW -C4; EXTOTT -MJM -C4; -EXTOTT -CPP -C4; -EXTOTT -CPD -C4; EXTOTT -NAD -C4; -EXTOTT -IDD -C4; -EXTOTT -NUR -C4; EXTOTT -NUE -C4; -EXTOTT -NUB -C4; -EXTOTT -EAD -C4; EXTOTT -EAI-C4; -EXTOTT -EAT -C4; -EXTOTT -EAR -C4; EXTOTT -EPS -C4; -EXTOTT -IMD -C4; -EXTOTT -IMO -C4; EXTOTT -ISD -C4; -EXTOTT -ISI-C4; -EXTOTT -IDR -C4; -EXTOTT IDC -C4; -EXTOTT -IDA -C4; -EXTOTT -GMR -C4; -EXTOTT -GMD C4; -NDHQ OTT ADM (POL) -C4; -NDHQ OTT DG POL PLAN -C4; NDHQ OTT DGISPOL -C4; -NDHQ OTT D POL DEV -C4; -NDHQ OTT DWH POL -C4; -NDHQ OTT D Cabinet Ln -C4; Privy Council Office -C4R; Privy Council Office I Foreign & Defence Policy -C4R; BFALO -SFAX DE OTT; -CHCGO -SFAX DE OTT; -DALAS -SFAX DE OTT; -DTROT -SFAX DE OTT; -LNGLS -SFAX DE OTT; -MIAMI SFAX DE OTT; -MNPLS -SFAX DE OTT; -CNGNY -SFAX DE OTT; SEATL -SFAX DE OTT; -PRMOAS -HOM -C4; -PRMOAS -C4; KERGIN Michael -WSHDC -HOM -C4; COTE Berlin -WSHDC D/HOM -CDM/A -C4; BOEHM Peter -WSHDC -GR -C4; FORTIER Patricia -WSHDC -GR -C4; -WSHDC -CDLS(W) -DR -C4; -WSHDC EC -C4; -WSHDC -IM -C4; -WSHDC -PA -C4; -WSHDC -PL -C4; WSHDC -TD -C4; -WSHDC -GR -C4; CCATS UNGR0341: Canada-US Relations - Background Material From: Sent: To: Co: Subject: CONFIDENTIAL (CEO) DND: Please pass to DM/Bloodworth/Vigneault, Assoc. DM/Purdy PCO: Please pass to Assoc. Clerk/Bilodeau, Ops/Fonberg, Borders Task Force/Flack/Wiebe We have attached some background material on Canada-US relations that was prepared in advance of Ambassador Kergin's presentation to Cabinet on November 19th. CDA-US.1page.wpd Drafted/Consulted: Approved: CDA-US.text.wpd Embassy sections P. Fortier 000057 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /’information CANADA-US RELATIONS - OVERVIEW The mid-term Congressional elections were a triumph for the Republicans, underwritten by ongoing concerns about security, coupled with the voter’s endorsement of George Bush as a wartime leader. • The results reflect the lasting impact of September 11th on the US psyche. The US is a country already at war, and may be about to expand the conflict to Iraq. • At home, a far-reaching sense of insecurity pervades the US body politic, and the Administration is about to proceed with the most significant changes to US government since the Second World War to address this threat. • As far as Canada-US relations is concerned, Secretary Powell’s visit to Ottawa was encouraging in that it reflected a US desire to engage Canada, and resulted in usefully clarifying both sides’ understanding of key issues. • Nevertheless, the prevailing environment in the US dominated by the campaign against terrorism abroad and sweeping measures to strengthen security at home stands to challenge long-standing assumptions that have governed the way in which we manage our relationship with the US, both in North America and in terms of our approach to international issues. • The US no longer automatically factors allied concerns into its decisions simply because they are traditional allies. Influential allies will be those which self-select. We can choose to partner with them ^or not, but they will take note of our decisions. Our decisions on Iraq stand to shape US perceptions of ^Canada as a dependable ally. • At home, the US focus on homeland security has major implications for the border, and each country’s each country’s conception of the border may be diverging. For us, it is about preserving access for Canadians as well as Canadian goods, services, and investment. For the US, it is about ensuring security from the potential threats that come with access. • The prospect of the US taking action across a wide variety of sectors (immigration, law enforcement, defence) to support the strategic goal of strengthening homeland security could have far-reaching implications for Canada. Considered of itself, each US initiative might look like an incremental change in a discrete area. However, the initiatives will be part of a broader agenda, the cumulative effect of which could recast our personality as a North American country. • In the area of trade and energy policy, the advent of the 108th Congress may provide reasons for guarded optimism, allowing for the fact that our terms of reference are the outgoing 107th Congress. We should not expect the Administration or Congress to reverse itself on major environmental issues (Kyoto, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge), but we may see progress taken at the local level and, to a lesser extent, by private enterprise. • Managing the operational aspects of the bilateral relationship in the post-election environment will require us to stay out in front of the issues, define our objectives, s.15(1) 000058 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information CONTEXT The political scene. The mid-term Congressional elections were a triumph for the Republicans, underwritten by ongoing concerns about security, coupled with the voter’s endorsement of George Bush as a wartime leader. Although the Republicans do not have a completely free hand with the social and economic aspects of their agenda, Americans have united behind Bush and the Republicans on security, which remains the dominant political issue. The election results were a remarkable achievement for the Republicans. Yes, voter turnout remained low (39%), and after the most expensive congressional election in US history (approximately $1 billion), less than two percent of the seats to be contested in the House, and 15 percent in the Senate, changed hands. Nevertheless, for the first time in over 100 years, the party of an incumbent Administration regained control of the Senate. The Republican win is all the more remarkable given the economic downturn, and financial scandals that have prompted questions about important aspects of the US economy - particularly in the area of corporate governance. Against this backdrop, the election clearly demonstrated the considerable political strengths of President Bush who made an exceptional effort -- in terms of time and fund-raising - on behalf of Republican candidates. In the electoral game, the Democrats chose not only the wrong plays (absenting themselves from the debate on Iraq), but the wrong game plan, by highlighting issues, (the economy or the future of social programs) where there was little in the way of policy to distinguish them from the Republicans. Policy Issues: Security First The elections underscored the abiding importance of security — domestic and international - on the US political scene. This is the issue that the Republicans on which the Republicans won, and one that will remain a key focus for at least the next two years. It is also the prism through which the country at large has come to view many issues. International security. Sometimes, it is strangely easy to forget this, but the US is at war. Its military personnel are engaged in ongoing operations in Afghanistan, other parts of South Asia, and the Hom of Africa, and Iraq may be next. All of this has produced a wartime mentality that is often lost on other countries. Eighteen months ago, it would have been fashionable to say that the US was ‘unilateralist’ - quite willing to impose its will on the world. Since then, the US has demonstrated a willingness to work with other countries. They have done this bilaterally (with various partners in the campaign in Afghanistan) and multilaterally (as evidenced by a 15-0 vote on the question of Iraq at the UN Security Council). All of this is encouraging, but we should bear in mind that the Administration (supported by sentiment in Congress and the public at large) continues to the evaluate the international response to current issues very carefully. Who is with us? Who isn’t? 000059 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgu# en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s a I'information Iraq will bring this way of looking at the world to the forefront. The US (led, within the US government, by Colin Powell) worked hard to gain a UN Security Council resolution that makes clear Iraq’s obligation to divest itself of any weapons of mass destruction, or face the prospect of being disarmed by force. The US regards us not only as a potential ally in this campaign, but as one of the countries that urged it to work for a UN resolution. So they are looking to us to support them, whether the resolution brings about the peaceful disarmament of Iraq or not. At the end of the day, our decisions on Iraq may have a significant impact on US perceptions of Canada as a dependable ally. Defence. The US is on a campaign to get all of its allies to spend more on defence. This may be less a matter of specific dollar figures (although more money is always nice) than the level of useful military capability that the US can count on allies to field. The US will be watching for indications that we will make the investments that will enable us to continue to play our historic role in international security. The new focus on homeland security has also raised the salience of Canadian geography as potential avenue of attack against the US - so the US will want us to be a reliable partner there too. Missile defence is the other major bilateral defence issue on the horizon. Although the deployment of a system is several years away, planning is underway now, and decisions on command and control are not far off. If we want to influence the development of a system that will have the potential to defend Canadian territory, the time is drawing near for us to indicate our interest in participation. Domestic security. Quite apart from the memory of September 11th and the possibility of war with Iraq, the ensuing anthrax scares, periodic security alerts, heightened security at all ports of entry, and the sniper attacks in Washington have produced a situation where domestic security has become a prominent, pervasive influence on the US agenda. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and Northern Command, the US government is poised to embark on the most significant reorganization of itself since the end of the Second World War. With the founding legislation of the DHS now signed into law - and the resources there for the asking - the DHS stands to become a juggernaut that will sweep a lot of other interests, national and bilateral, aside. The Border. Canada and the US have a shared interest in the co-management of the border, and we’ve worked well on the issue so far. But the days of the ‘undefended border’ are over. What stands to become more significant, however, are the divergent conceptions that the two countries appear to be developing about what the border means. For the Americans, successful border management is increasingly about containing the potential threats that integration poses to their safety. For Canada, successful border management is about preserving the access that Canadians and Canadian goods, services, and investment have to the US. The first impulse of US officials when it comes to our border issues is to liken it to those which they face on their southern frontiers (Mexico). Moreover, there are competing views within the executive and legislative branch as to whether the border is about ensuring the free 000060 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information movement of people and goods (which benefits both countries) or about law enforcement and immigration policy. Taken together, this suggests that, as much as has already been done to tighten control of the border, the prospect of additional measures will remain on the agenda. With security holding the edge over trade in the battle for priorities, it is not at all clear that we will be able to secure exemptions from NSEERS or similar additional measures to come (as illustrated by the recent Congressional initiative to have a full-scale entry/exit program in place by 2005, which threatens the progress achieved on the Smart Border Accord, and the nature of border access as a whole). The need to ensure the safe and efficient movement of people and goods across the most economically valuable border is obvious - as are our shared objectives with respect to countering terrorism and crime. The individual sectors (customs, immigration, intelligence) work well together, and have done so for years. However, the current US political dynamic (security first) and growing bureaucratic momentum (the creation of the leviathan Department of Homeland Security) confronts us with a new situation. Indeed, the prospect of the US taking action across a wide variety of sectors (immigration, law enforcement, defence) to support the strategic goal of strengthening homeland security could have far-reaching implications for Canada. Considered of itself, each US imitative might look like an incremental change in a discrete area. However, the initiatives will be part of a broader agenda, the cumulative effect of which could recast our personality as a North American country. Economic, Trade, Energy and the Environment: Room for Guarded Optimism? Economic policy. President Bush has promised a new “economic stimulus” package early next year, which was widely expected to include significant tax cuts. Republican leaders have suggested that this package will include a number of relatively modest tax measures. While tax cuts remain high on the GOP agenda, they are competing with demands for higher spending on defence and homeland security as well as a politically-popular prescription drug benefit for seniors. The Republican tax strategy will have two key elements. The first will be a political push to make last year’s SI.35 trillion tax cut package permanent. The second will be a stimulus package tied to economic recovery. This could include an immediate increase in the child tax credit, a rise in contribution limits for retirement savings accounts and an expansion of tax breaks for business investment. Strategically, the Republicans will try to shoehom many of these tax cuts into the budget reconciliation exercise, which requires only a simple majority in the Senate rather than the 60 votes that are required for most measures. Even with modest tax cuts, private sector forecasters expect that the US budget deficit will rise from SI60 billion this year to S200250 billion in fiscal 2003. Trade policy. It will be useful to remember that the 108th Congress will not be more willing than the 107th to endorse changes to US trade laws. Nor will it deal away protections for entrenched agricultural sectors, the steel trade, textiles and lumber. And a Republican Administration will be anxious to demonstrate that the system of trade agreements is serving US interests and to show its determination to enforce those agreements. That said, the starting point for debate will be more positive than what we saw with the 107th Congress. 000061 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information In terms of the forward trade agenda for the 108th Congress, there are three dimensions of interest to Canada. First, the impact on bilateral trade files. Second, the implications for US compliance with WTO decisions. Finally, the prospects for future trade deals requiring Congressional approval. We anticipate that the prospects for a negotiated, long-term, policy-based solution to the softwood lumber dispute will improve. The results of the election help to create an environment in which the Administration is better able to defy extremist demands from the US Lumber Coalition in Congress. The change in Congressional leadership will assist an Administration that is eager to demonstrate its free-trade credentials, including a message that US trade laws do work to achieve market-opening and “fair trade”. Other contentious issues -- such as agriculture and steel — may also be easier to address. On wheat, the Administration’s earlier promises to pursue a WTO case against the Canadian Wheat Board will not have the same urgency. On steel, the US industry can continue to count on influential supporters in Congress. Canada’s decision on safeguard actions against steel imports will be watched closely, and we can expect a swift negative reaction from Congress if US exports are included in the action. That said, the Parliamentary Steel Caucus has established a good working relationship with its Congressional counterpart and this will generate support for a North American initiative on steel. Creation of a government-led, North American forum to discuss issues relating to the steel trade may help to shield Canadian producers from the numerous protectionist actions promoted by the US industry. Apart from bilateral trade issues, we will watch how the new Congress deals with major WTO decisions. These disputes will put to the test Congressional willingness to uphold the US Government position since the establishment of the WTO that the US will abide by WTO dispute settlement decisions. The 107th Congress saw much criticism of specific WTO decisions and the Trade Promotion Authority bill contains a negotiating objective calling for the Administration to “rein in” the WTO Appellate Body in instances where it is considered to have overstepped its authority (particularly in relation to decisions finding against US trade law). Looking ahead to further negotiations to liberalize trade, Ambassador Zoellick will see the new Republican-controlled Congress as more receptive to the Administration’s ambitions for trade agreements with a growing list of bilateral partners (Chile and Singapore first, followed by Central America, Morocco, Southern Africa, Australia and down the road, the ASEAN countries). Similarly, US leadership in WTO and FTAA negotiations is more likely in a Republican-controlled Congress with an Administration that has nailed its colours to the mast of open markets as the best hope to achieve economic, political and social development at home and abroad. Energy. Aided by a Republican-controlled Senate, an energy bill will be vigorously pursued in the new Congress and we are likely to face challenges to our interests similar to those found in the last bill (Alaskan pipeline subsidies, electricity policy). Advancing Canadian energy interests will benefit from a pro-active strategy that engages 000062 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information the Administration on our mutual energy objectives. More intensive work with the US on energy (whether in bilateral or trilateral fora) offers an opportunity to underscore Canada’s special relationship with the US in a vital economic sector and will assist in managing the inevitable problems that re-emerge in an energy bill. Environment. At first blush, the elections would not seem to have handed us a propitious climate for forward-looking environmental policy. And, to an extent, that’s true: we will not see the U.S. ratify Kyoto, and any future energy bill is likely to contain provisions for drilling in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge. The Administration and Congress are also likely to move in favour of reducing the environmental regulatory burden on private enterprise and devolve more of the responsibility for environmental stewardship to the state and local level. That said, this dynamic could yield limited progress - at the state and/or local level (to which most eyes will be turned, as little is expected at the federal level) and possibly in terms of limited government funding for S&T or R&D advances by private enterprise (which may see money to be made in environmentally-friendly technologies). MANAGING THE RELATIONSHIP The ongoing challenge will be to manage the relationship in a way that balances security and prosperity, and shores up our image as one of a select group of American allies. Secretary Powell’s visit to Ottawa was encouraging in that it reflected a US desire to engage Canada, and resulted in usefully clarifying both sides’ understanding of key issues. However, the new environment challenges long-standing assumptions that have governed how we manage our relationship with the US. The US no longer automatically factors in the views of traditional allies when it makes its decisions on foreign and security policy. The countries that will influence US policy will be those that choose to engage with them - effectively, self-selecting allies and partners. We can choose to engage or not - but they will take note of our decisions, and deal us in or out of future decisions accordingly. In North America, the comfortable era of Canadian exceptionalism may well be over. The emergence of these factors will confront us with fundamental questions about how we manage the bilateral relationship, and what type of country we want to be. We will also be dealing with new partners (nine new border state governors, a leviathan Department of Homeland Security). The key for us will be to stay out in front of emerging problems, identify our interests, and take advantage of our small size to exploit our power of proposal: the opportunity that we have to be the first to propose solutions and set the agenda s.15(1) 000063 �Document disclosed under the Access to Informail Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a l'in\ i i 12 ■ 000064 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'occis a I'information THE HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD f S' Secretary of Defense r<--— £. I Donald H. Rumsfeld was sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense on January 20, 2001. Before assuming his present post, the former Navy pilot had also served as the 13th Secretary of Defense, White House Chief of Staff, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, U.S. Congressman and chief executive officer of two Fortune 500 companies. Secretary Rumsfeld is responsible for directing the actions of the Defense Department in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The war is being waged against a backdrop of major change within the Department of Defense. The department has developed a new defense strategy and replaced the old model for sizing forces with a newer approach more relevant to the 21st century. Secretary Rumsfeld proposed and the President approved a significant reorganization of the worldwide command structure, known as the Unified Command Plan, that resulted in the establishment of the U.S. Northern Command and the U.S. Strategic Command, the latter charged the responsibilities formerly held by the Strategic and Space Commands which were disestablished. The Department also has refocused its space capabilities and fashioned a new concept of strategic deterrence that increases security while reducing strategic nuclear weapons. To help strengthen the deterrent, the missile defense research and testing program has been reorganized and revitalized, free of the restraints of the ABM treaty. Mr. Rumsfeld attended Princeton University on academic and NROTC scholarships (A.B., 1954) and served in the U.S. Navy (1954-57) as an aviator and flight instructor. In 1957, he transferred to the Ready Reserve and continued his Naval service in flying and administrative assignments as a drilling reservist until 1975. He transferred to the Standby Reserve when he became Secretary of Defense in 1975 and to the Retired Reserve with the rank of Captain in 1989. In 1957, he came to Washington, DC to serve as Administrative Assistant to a Congressman. After a stint with an investment banking firm, he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Illinois in 1962, at the age of 30, and was re-elected in 1964, 1966, and 1968. Mr. Rumsfeld resigned from Congress in 1969 during his fourth term to join the President's Cabinet. From 1969 to 1970, he served as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity and Assistant to the President. From 1971 to 1972, he was Counsellor to the President and Director of the Economic Stabilization Program. In 1973, he left Washington, DC, to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, Belgium (1973-1974). In August 1974, he was called back to Washington, DC, to serve as Chairman of the transition to the 000065 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information Presidency of Gerald R. Ford. He then became Chief of Staff of the White House and a member of the President's Cabinet (1974-1975). He served as the 13th U.S. Secretary of Defense, the youngest in the country's history (1975-1977). From 1977 to 1985 he served as Chief Executive Officer, President, and then Chairman of G.D. Searle & Co., a worldwide pharmaceutical company. The successful turnaround there earned him awards as the Outstanding Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical Industry from the Wall Street Transcript (1980) and Financial World (1981). From 1985 to 1990 he was in private business. Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Instrument Corporation from 1990 to 1993. General Instrument Corporation was a leader in broadband transmission, distribution, and access control technologies. Until being sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman of the Board of Gilead Sciences, Inc., a pharmaceutical company. Before returning for his second tour as Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld chaired the bipartisan U.S. Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, in 1998, and the U.S. Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization, in 2000. During his business career, Mr. Rumsfeld continued his public service in a variety of Federal posts, including: • • • • • • • • • • Member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control (1982 - 1986); Special Presidential Envoy on the Law of the Sea Treaty (1982 - 1983); Senior Advisor to the President's Panel on Strategic Systems (1983 - 1984); Member of the U.S. Joint Advisory Commission on U.S./Japan Relations (1983 - 1984); Special Presidential Envoy to the Middle East (1983 - 1984); Member of the National Commission on Public Service (1987 - 1990); Member of the National Economic Commission (1988 - 1989); Member of the Board of Visitors of the National Defense University (1988 - 1992); Member of the Commission on U.S./Japan Relations (1989 - 1991); and Member of the U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission (1999 - 2000). While in the private sector, Mr. Rumsfeld's civic activities included service as a member of the National Academy of Public Administration and a member of the boards of trustees of the Gerald R. Ford Foundation, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the National Park Foundation, and as Chairman of the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, Inc. In 1977, Mr. Rumsfeld was awarded the nation's highest civilian award, the Presidential Medal of Freedom. http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/secdef_bio.html 000066 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIQ00002 Title A name given to the resource Minister's Visit Washington DC 9-10 January, 2003 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource January 8-10, 2003 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived BAN 2014-01289-X, Box 12, File no. MCU2003-00765 – Ministers Visit Washington DC 8-10 January 2003, Library and Archives Canada Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2022-10029 LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Iraq Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en