https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/24ddb69b70d5a74d22053dcaf3dd9a80.pdf 7afeb726742111320dc07a365547d018 PDF Text Text LRP Roto 2 -EMO TOUft R.EPORT •LESSONS L&AteMEb OI cfu L 03 ERGOGRIP KEB< oUtaoooooi �Document disclosed under the Acces^cHnformaUor^c^^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Documents Removed from R112 Accessions for Processing or Preservation Formerly: OFRC 2003-1109 Removed from: 2008-1183 1 LRP ROTO 2 END Tour Report [Black Binder] Removed: 1 CD APOLLO LRP Det SECRET Created on 1/28/2010 5:12:00 PM Created by Marsden 000002 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Documents Removed from R112 Accessions for Processing or Preservation Created on 1/28/2010 5:12:00 PM Created by Marsden 000003 ■ �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL less enclosures) Commanding Officer Long Range Patrol Detachment South West Asia Stn Forces Belleville Belleville, ON s.15(1) Def K8N 5W6 3180-1 (CO LRP DET) 1 July 2003 Distribution List 11 LRP DET END TOUR REPORT & LESSONS LEARNED References: A. 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) 1 July 03 LRP Det End Tour Report (encl) B. QR&O7.05 1.(U) Enclosed, please find subject Report and the 1 CAD MS Access Lessons Learned database. As this report represents a closeout document, key Det produced publications have been included as Annexes, thus this will serve as a starting point for the next major LRP deployment. Further, the Lessons Learned have been exported from the database and incorporated within Annex A to the report for ease of reference. 2.(U) Op APOLLO has been a tremendous experience for the LRP community. In short we safely and successfully accomplished our mission. Along the way we have learned lessons that span the Strategic to Tactical Levels of war. The following few are worth considering within the broader context. Dav Rotations. From a Force Employment perspective, the switch to Day 3.(U) rotations was entirely successful. We maintained the same ops tempo, yet with only two-thirds of the aircrew and four-fifths of the ground crew. The more frequent turnover did involve a greater admin and training burden, but this was taken in stride. Flying rates were high thus fatigue was a concern, though through close monitoring and spelling off individual members with HQ staff we kept risk in check. 4.(U) It remains to be seen how domestic Force Generators will comment on LRP However, as I will be trading in my FE “Woodland Green” hat for a FG blue wedge in four days, I should point out that one of the key benefits of Days is the “many hands make light work” approach to manning. Owing to the late (Jan 03) start to LRP a great many members had already been deployed, leaving a smaller pool from which to draw. Further, the low readiness levels at all units meant that the more frequent rotations incurred a high training bill, such that some units were simply unable to spread the work amongst the many. 5.(C) VANGUARD Force Package. 6.(C) OQTW and Asymmetric Threats. Traditional LRP employment assumed ops would take place from secure airfields, arrivals and departures would be flown in areas of air 1/3 SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL less enclosures) i 000004 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL less enclosures) s.15(1) Def supremacy, and threats on station would simply be avoided. APOLLO taught us that outside of the Simulator, real life presents threats that are much more difficult to observe, predict and avoid. Indeed, the asymmetric threats posed by terrorists were ubiquitous, exceptionally difficult to quantify and even more difficult to predict. Accordingly, current doctrine, procedures and equipment do not permit full spectrum employment of the CP 140. 7(C) Post-AIMP, it is even more likely we will see the fleet deployed in similarly threatening theatres, thus we must start now, working to develop our doctrine, tactics and procedures to meet these challenges. Further, the importance of maintaining the self-defence suite in AIMP cannot be overstated. 8(C) C4I. APOLLO reinforced the necessity to remain fully engaged in net-centric warfare. Over the course of APOLLO we gained access to without which we would have been severely hampered in our ability to carry out assigned missions. 9.(C) Presently, DDIOs make no reference to a deployed capability aside from national systems. From both air force and joint perspectives, planners should develop and maintain a able to respond to the needs ana reieasaomty or an emerging coalition. 10(C) Conclusion. Our participation made it clear to all throughout the CF and beyond that LRP can make an efficient, useful contribution that goes beyond traditional ASW, and do so reliably during peacetime and rising tensions. Notwithstanding our successes readers are cautioned that, from an LRP perspective, Op APOLLO was conducted in a relatively benign theatre. With care and attention, the LRP capability will be a flexible resource in great demand by warfare commanders both afloat and in the field F.G. Bigelow Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Officer DISTRIBUTION LIST Action CA JTFSWA NCE TAMPA FL//COMD// Information CA JTFSWA NCE TAMPA FL//COS/J3 AIR// WComd 14 Wing Greenwood WComd 19 Wing Comox 1 CAD HQ Winnipeg//A3 MAR// 2/3 SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL less enclosures) 000005 �uocument aisciosea unaer me Access io injormanon mu Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL less enclosures) CO 404 Sqn Greenwood CO 405 Sqn Greenwood CO 407 Sqn Comox CO 415 Sqn Greenwood CO MPEU Greenwood OC MPSET Greenwood CONSU CO TAL Det CO NCOS Enclosure: 1 3/3 SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL less enclosures) 000006 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1)Def LRP Operations PO Box 5113 Stn Forces Belleville Belleville, ON K8N5W6 3180-1 (CO LRP DET) 1 Jul 2003 Distribution List LONG RANGE PATROL DETACHMENT - ROTO 2 - END TOUR REPORT References: A. 3350-134-32 CA JTFSWA Commander’s Concept of Operations (COO) Long Range Patrol Detachment (LRP DET) dated 24 March 2003 B. 3180-1 (CO LRP DET) 10 Sep 02 Roto 1 TO&E and ICS/PSO Training Recommendations INTRODUCTION 1. (U) Planning for the crew composition of Long Range Patrol Detachment Rotation 2 began at 14 Wg Greenwood on 15 Oct 02. Final combat readiness training was completed and the Det was declared Op Ready for deployment on 20 Dec 02. Although the total length of the deployment was to cover a six-month term, line air and maintenance crews were to be rotated every "" days. The deployment was completed over three separate flights, one week apart. Personnel designated to deploy for the entire six-month commitment were deployed on the first two flights. The Det Change of Command coincided with the first ROTO 2 flight on 08 Jan 03. 2. (U) The detachment was comprised of a headquarters element, an Operations Flight that included two Combat-Ready aircrews, Operations, Mission Support, Intelligence/ Electronic Warfare sections, and a Maintenance Flight with three ground crews. ROTATION 3. (U) During early Dec 02, the CO and DCO conducted a recce visit to Camp Mirage, followed by in-briefings by NCE J Staff in Tampa. The CO and DCO, accompanied by associated HQ pers, deployed to Camp Mirage in late Dec 02 to familiarize themselves with the camp and its environs, and to prepare to conduct a command handover Board of Inquiry (BOI). Their early arrival in-theatre also allowed them to conduct a liaison visit to Bahrain to introduce themselves to CTF 57 command staff and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coalition representatives. 4. (U) A total of six aircrews and seven maintenance crews rotated through the LRP ' detachment during the six-month commitment (two of the maintenance crews completed 2 X day tours). There was no overlap between incoming and departing crews. Whereas previous ROTOs scheduled one no-fly day per month, ROTO 2 scheduled one per! day aircrew rotation, thus was able to accommodate the more frequent turnover while maintaining the same ops tempo. 5. (U) The no-fly day coincided with the arrival of each new crew in order to give them time to complete their in-routine and to allow for some adjustment to the considerable time zone difference. The first two aircrews received thorough area and mission familiarization under the 1/12 SECRET 000007 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET supervision of experienced ROTO 1 crews. Having the new crew leads fly with an experienced crew, presenting an opportunity to observe a complete mission oriented subsequent aircrews. The new crew, monitored by qualified headquarters staff, then conducted their first mission. 6. (U) The Maintenance Flight comprised three 8-person crews, three specialist personnel, and an MFC and D/MFC. The crews deployed via three regularly scheduled sustainment flights, one week apart. 7. (U) Initial draw down planning commenced in May, and official notification of Det termination was received 06 Jun 03. The final LRP mission was flown on 19 Jun 03. The two CP-140s redeployed to Greenwood on 20 Jun 03, each aircraft carrying one aircrew and one half of a maintenance crew. The second maintenance crew, accompanied by several non-essential staff, returned via the regularly scheduled sustainment flight on 26 Jun 03. The headquarters element and associated personnel remained in-theatre until 04 Jul 03 completing the detachment closeout. OPERATIONS Summary of Operations 8. (C) Comd CA JTFSWA held OPCOM of the LRP Det. IAW ref A, OPCON was assigned to Comd US CENTCOM and was exercised through CTF-57 (Forward), the maritime patrol and reconnaissance element of US 5th Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain. CTF-57, having air assets deployed throughout the AOR, primarily tasked the LRP Det to support operations in the Gulf of Oman and North Arabian Sea (GOO/NAS). Although the LRP Det’s primary oparea was the GOO/NAS, crews were routinely directed by the GOO/NAS Commander (CTF 151) to transit the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) in search for or to conduct surveillance on COI’s or HIV’s thought to be located in the CAG/SAG area. There were four occasions when the LRP Det was tasked to provide Direct Support (escort) to aircraft carrier battle groups transiting the SOH. On 20 Feb 03, LRP taskings were reduced to six hours on-station as crews had demonstrated the ability to provide 100% coverage of the assigned oparea in a shorter time than was initially assessed. 9. (C) The LRP Det flew a total of 158 operational missions and three maintenance test flights for a total of hours during the 189-day deployment. No pilot proficiency trainers were necessary thanks to the day rotation schedule. The sole 6-month Det pilot was able to maintain proficiency and complete Supervisory Training sequences coincident with routine missions. The average flight time was 7.5 hrs, with the longest and shortest were 9.8 and 3.1 hrs respectively. As mentioned, the day rotation schedule required five no-fly days in order to allow incoming air crews time for in-routine and to adjust circadian rhythms. Of the 160 scheduled operational missions, the Det failed to complete only two; the first due to a Flight Safety incident which resulted in an early RTB, and a second owing to ramp snags that delayed the launch to a point that precluded gainful employment. Thus, the mission completion rate for ROTO 2 was 99%. 10. (C) Post-mission reports were filed in “Rainform Purple” format through normal channels. This well established format included all relevant mission information, such as a detailed report of contacts investigated, communications and data-link reliability, area weather, significant events, stores expenditures, and a brief narrative that chronicled the on-station period. ■ The vast 2/12 SECRET 000008 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information s.15(1) Def SECRET majority of missions were At the OI Us discretion, crews were required to seek additional information by hailing vessels and conducting formal queries over marine VHF-FM radio. 11. (C) Standard maritime traffic consisted of large merchant vessels (oil tankers, bulk carriers, and general cargo), cargo dhows, fishing dhows, small open-hulled boats (“go-fasts”), and coalition and non-coalition warships. Air traffic consisted of coalition and non-coalition maritime helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft, and transiting commercial and military aircraft. On average, each event located, identified, photographed, and reported 30 merchant vessels and 10 fishing vessels. Typically, 5-6 merchant vessel queries were conducted on each flight using the VHF-FM radio. The standard query format covered some 20 vessel specific items, taking approximately 15 minutes to complete. Queries occasionally consumed even more time when vessels were slow to respond to the initial hail or when language difficulties slowed comms. 12. (C) Although the tasked surveillance area was normally in the GOO/NAS, crews were occasionally assigned to carry out Further, and perhaps more importantly, i . Notwithstanding the challenges and limitations, the Det worked to secure AG taskings, as they provided our crews with extremely valuable experience and built their confidence. When Canada's participation in OIF was still a possibility, it was imperative that our crews achieve the highest possible readiness, thus be able to operate safely throughout the theatre. 13. (C) Aside from SOH escort missions (during which the aircraft penetrated Iranian and Omani TTW under the terms of Transit Passage), all operations were conducted over High Seas. Once on station, the aircraft operated Due Regard in both uncontrolled and controlled airspace. For some crews, this was a new experience, having retained the misunderstanding that Due Regard only applies in Oceanic airspace. Further, many crews were not accustomed to exploiting civil ATS for flight following and receiving traffic advisories to assist with effective deconfliction while operating Due Regard. During the course of several missions, the aircraft 3/12 SECRET 000009 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET was challenged by Omani or Iranian air defence authorities or by Iranian naval vessels and aircraft. Crews were instructed to respond to these challenges in a courteous and professional manner. No significant incidents or problems were reported as a result of these challenges. Other taskings included tracking HIV's or other vessels suspected of illegal activity, and search and rescue. The detection and location of designated Contacts Of Interest (COI’s) was an important part of any mission. Potential COI’s included all vessel types thus crews monitored all traffic for any unusual or suspicious behaviour. Location Number of Missions Total Hours Purpose 149 4 j_______________ 4_____________ 3 (formed part of GOO missions) Table 1: Mission Statistics (8 Jan 03-19 Jun 03) Contact Merchant Vessels Fishing Vessels COI # Identified 4365 1739 42 9 10 CCOI HIV Table 2: Contact Statistics (8 Jan 03-19 Jun 03) Training 15. (U) In-theatre pilot proficiency training was not required during day rotations, except for a headquarters pilot who completed the requisite proficiency sequences at the end of missions and while on HLTA. 1 CAD quarterly proficiency requirements were conducted before and after each rotation for the remaining the pilots. No dedicated PPF’s were required nor scheduled. 16. (C) Similarly, routine crew operational readiness training (COREX) was not required during the 56-day rotation, unlike the previous 6-month rotations. However, crews were authorized to seek permission from their TACON to conduct training (no sonobuoy drops), if time permitted after the mission was complete. The OPCON authority retained authority for sonobuoy release. On two occasions, the crews conducted Search and Rescue Training (simulated SKAD drop) after completing their assigned mission for Det staff proficiency. 4/12 SECRET 000010 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information s.15(1) Def c SECRET Rules of Engagement 17. (S) Impact of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 18. (S) Although Canada did not support OIF, Australia, a local OEF coalition partner, was a participant. Throughout the war, the close working relationship that had developed with the RAAF Det continued, even as measures were introduced to ensure there was no direct or indirect Canadian support for OIF missions. The separate paths chosen had a significant impact on our Mission Support office. With of the RAAF Det, plans were made to build a Coalition Ops Centre, which would support CA, AS, NL, and eventually NZ LRP detachments. Such an Ops Centre would have paid dividends by pooling the expertise from each nation and provide manning relief to all concerned. Workable solutions had been developed to deal with issues such as releasability, information system access, and national rear-links. Once each nation declared their OIF intentions, planning for such combined ops centre ceased, save for the continued inclusion of the RNLN staff which shared our Mission Support spaces. However, the lessons learned during CF/RNLN/RAAF OEF cooperation proved invaluable when we assisted the RNZAF Det stand-up. 19. (C) At the onset of OIF, US authorities understandably restricted a considerable amount of information from CA units. Despite these restrictions, all operationally necessary and need-to-know OEF mission information was made available. Standoff Distances 20. (C) Various OTC’s imposed differing standoff distances. Generally speaking, the standoff distances in the Arabian Gulf (AG) were greater than those directed for use by Coalition aircraft employed in the GOO/NAS. The LRP Det raised this issue with CTF 151 staff 5/12 SECRET 000011 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET information gathered by LRP crews tor intelligence purposes was continually assessed to ensure that the procedures in place for obtaining high quality digital imagery respected the OTC’s stand-off policy. International Straits 21. (C) In the SOH, aircraft have the right of Transit Passage through Iranian and Omani waters. ( I I l • i ms oio noi prove to oe a great problem as, with careful positioning over International Waters, the Aurora could still maintain an effective lookout ahead of the force Threat Levels 22. (S) Promulgated threat levels in the AO ranged from low to high during the course of the deployment. We queried these threat levels through Intel staffs locally, at NCE Tampa, through National channels and from our OPCON, Most importantly, the threat to LRP aircraft on station remained ' 23.(S) EQUIPMENT STATUS 24. (S) Operations: a. 6/12 SECRET 000012 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def b. Self protection. c. Image transfer capability. d. Constant wear Life Preserver / Survival Vest (LP/SV). The constant wear LP/SV has been in use since Dec 02. LRPA crews have found it to be suitable. e. Digital Video Camera. f. Magnified Night Vision Goggles (NVG). A UOR submitted for An interim solution that involved g- Flying Clothing. NCE approval to purchase 100% cotton T-shirts for wear under flying shirts was granted for ROTO 2. All LRP Det aircrew wore the 2-piece TacHel flight suit and were very satisfied with the suitability of this garment. A number of newer 2 pc ‘Nomex’ flight suits were also issued. Early indications are that these were egually suitable for use in theatre. h. GPS. 25. (S) Mission support. The LRP Det relied on the ADDN message system to deliver the vast majority of critical message traffic Outgoing messages and SITREPs were often transmitted 7/12 SECRET 000013 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information s.15(1) Def SECRET authorities. Post-mission imagery packages were transmitted 26. (S) Intelligence: a. b. 27. (U) Maintenance. There were no significant changes to report with respect to equipment status from previous reports. PERSONNEL 28. (U) LRP Det ROTO 1 deployed with 69 people out of an establishment of 74 personnel. 29. (U) Three members were repatriated, one for administrative purposes surrounding an unforecast posting, and two compassionate cases. TAVs were not requested to backfill, owing to the short time remaining between the repatriation and the planned roto. Two other members were granted compassionate leave and then returned to theatre. A further two members were redeployed later than expected due to medical restrictions imposed in theatre. 30.(C) Two TO&E changes were completed during ROTO 2. The first was to reduce the number of AESOps per crew from four to three. This change took effect for the last two crews that deployed. The Det assessed the situation with respect to workload complexity and intensity and determined i ne uet maae a proposal to employ wmgs-stanaaro ANAVs and PLTs (those awaiting MOAT training) to augment the crews in lieu principally to assume responsibility for manipulating digital images on the laptop. Risk aversion by gatekeepers within the community precluded timely staffing of this proposal. Coincident with the reduction of was a shift in the mission profile, away from high contact density areas such as the Shark Fin, thus through good fortune the lack of 8/12 SECRET 000014 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information s.15(1) Def < SECRET augmentation had little effect on the performance of the Crews. The second change involved transferring all Intelligence and Electronic Warfare positions on the LRP TO&E to the TAL Det TO&E. This action was initiated to support unity of command, as the Int/EW members were split between TAL & LRP Dets. TAL was selected to accept the LRP positions when it became apparent that LRP’s future was uncertain, and the TAL Det was more likely to remain in theatre much longer. 31.(U) Annex B provides a more detailed review of the detachment’s personnel TO&E. Manning 32. (U) Maintenance Flight. a. The Maintenance Flight consisted of the Maintenance Flight Commander, the D/Maintenance Flight Commander, two AMCROs, and an ACS technician. There were three maintenance crews of eight technicians including the Crew Chief. Each crew worked a 12 on/24 off schedule (Day/Night/Off). Given the stable and predictable flying program and the lack of heavy maintenance (prop/engine changes) during this ROTO, there was surplus capacity to perform required maintenance. That said, the potential existed for the mission to switch to all sensor employment (i.e. under-sea surveillance) which would have significantly increased the workload. b. The manning level for the Maintenance Flight was predicated on a one flight per day mission schedule. As in the Ops Flight, only those personnel deployed for the full six-month rotation received the two 96 hr R&Rs and an HLTA period. There was a slight peak in activity when a swap aircraft arrived in theatre, but this was easily accommodated. 33. (U) Operations Flight. Aircrews generally flew every second day. As crews rotated in, schedule adjustments allowed the Det to continue flying routine missions concurrent with incoming crew training. The result was that the senior crew flew three times over a four-day period when an incoming crew arrived. Careful planning allowed the Det to avoid imposing an operational tempo that would have increased crew stress and fatigue by pushing flying hour limitations. The normal period was extended to allow of flying during the same time period. Crews were monitored closely for signs of fatigue, and HQ personnel were responsive to requests from crewmembers to replace personnel who needed a rest. Further, at the five to six week mark, individual crewmembers were directed to take a 3day rest period during which HQ staff replaced them. 34. (C) Intelligence & Electronic Warfare. The Air Tactical Intelligence Centre (ATIC) was formed by combining Intelligence and EW personnel from the LRP and TAL detachments. The section was The section supported both detachments and provided limited support to NSU and NCCIS. There was an excellent working relationship and the LRP Det was highly satisfied with the Intelligence and EW support we received. Although a minimum of personnel are required to maintain a 24/7 schedule, the additional personnel allowed the section to provide more background material and freed up personnel to collect imagery to brief crews on the threat at various airfields and deployed locations in the AO. 9/12 SECRET 000015 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Lol sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Morale 35. (U) During the period leading up to the outbreak of hostilities, the sense of anticipation kept everyone focused and morale high. Once hostilities commenced, the confinement of personnel to camp, except for approved duty, resulted in an expected drop in morale. While the primary reason for this dip in morale can be attributed to the uncertainty regarding when the walking out privileges would return, the fact that we watched our traditional Allies head off every day fight OIF led to confusing emotions. In any event, there were no serious morale issues in the Det, and the lockdown brought the best out of our personnel, as they were more than willing to work their beyond their regular shift periods to assist their mates, keep busy and maintain focus. SUPPORT 36. (U) The CF National Support Unit provided all domestic support requirements including force and airfield protection. Specific comments regarding C2 and Unit interaction are contained in Lessons Learned. 37.(U) During the close-out BOI, it came to the Det’s attention that while only two DA accounts were handed over during the Roto 1 to 2 BOI, there were an additional four DAs and an SPSL account that neither Roto 1 nor Roto 2 personnel were aware of. My immediate concern relates to two deficient laptop computers. In the broader context, I am deeply disturbed that these accounts could remain effectively ‘underground,” in the Det’s name, yet have no accountability attached to individual DA holders on my staff. I have ordered an SI and the results will dealt with in the close-out BOI. Spare Parts 38. (U) Minimum/Maximum levels - A careful review of the min/max levels was conducted upon handover and new levels were set. Close coordination with NSU supply ensured that additional parts were ordered to bring quantities up to a war-fighting stance. This resulted in increased aircraft serviceability, thanks to a reduced requirement to rob parts from the other aircraft. Infrastructure 39. (U) Maintenance infrastructure in theatre was limited to a maintenance trailer and a sea container. Lacking hangars to conduct maintenance and provide an escape from the heat and humidity, most heavy maintenance activities were delayed until sundown. Major spare parts (engine, prop, and APU) were stored under a tent for 16 months. A climate-controlled shelter/building would have provided protection for expensive aircraft components and limited the risk of damage to aircraft parts due to the harsh environment. As a result of having to store parts without adequate shelter the major components noted above will require a thorough inspection prior to aircraft installation. LESSONS LEARNED 40. (U) Reference B is a comprehensive review of DCDS and 1 CAD mandated ICS/PSO training requirements conducted by our predecessors on Roto 1. Much of this training was not applicable to CP140 operations in this theatre of operations. The document makes specific recommendations for changes/deletions based on APOLLO experiences and is fully supported by Roto 2. 10/12 SECRET 000016 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def 40. (U) Lessons Learned from Roto 2 have been captured using the 1 CAD MS Access database application for onward dissemination. Further, they have been divided by functional area, exported to MS Word, and are attached at Annex A for ease of reference. CTF-57 Liaison 41. (C) The Canadian MPA liaison officer at CTF-57 was an invaluable link between the LRP Det and the OPCON authority. Further, the Det Commander and Ops Flight Commander conducted liaison visits that helped strengthen an already excellent working relationship between the two units. However, it should be noted that while CTF 57 staff worked diligently to provide effective OPCON, their method could not be described as doctrinally compliant. Indeed, for forces expecting an Air Component construct, following a continuous Battle Rhythm to ensure that air resources are apportioned and allocated IAW the higher Commander’s intent, CONCLUSION 42. (U) Op APOLLO has been a tremendous experience for the LRP community. In the larger context, this was a relatively small and straightforward operation; a two plane Det conducting surface surveillance - merely a fraction of our total warfare capability. However, our participation made it clear to all throughout the CF and beyond that LRP can make an efficient, useful contribution that goes beyond traditional ASW, and do so reliably during peacetime and rising tensions. In short, we provide a flexible option to Strat Level planners assessing what Canada can offer an emerging Coalition. 43.(C) Notwithstanding our successes, readers are cautioned that, from an LRP perspective, Op APOLLO was conducted in a relatively benign theatre. vvitn care and attention, the LKH capability will be a flexible resource in great demand by warfare commanders both afloat and in the field. FG Bigelow LCol “ Commanding Officer 11/12 SECRET 000017 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET ANNEXES Annex A Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Appendix 3 Appendix 4 Appendix 5 Appendix 6 Appendix 7 Appendix 8 Appendix 9 Annex B Annex C Annex D Lessons Learned General Personnel Flight Ops Maintenance Logistics C4I Training GOO Gouge, Hot Weather, and Littoral SOPs TACNOTE - CP 140 Self Defence Tactics T.O.&E. LRP Det Flying Orders LRP Det Ops Directives DISTRIBUTION LIST Action CA JTFSWA NCE TAMPA FL//COMD// Information (Soft Copy via TITAN only) CA JTFSWA NCE TAMPA FL//COS/J3 AIR// WComd 14 Wing Greenwood WComd 19 Wing Comox 1 CAD HQ Winnipeg//A3 MAR/Aerospace Warfare Centre// CO 404 Sqn Greenwood CO 405 Sqn Greenwood CO 407 Sqn Comox CO 415 Sqn Greenwood CO MPEU Greenwood OC MPSET Greenwood CO NSU CO TAL Detachment CO NCCIS CF JOG Kingston CFMWC Halifax 12/12 SECRET 000018 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information s.15(1) Def UNCLASSIFIED Annex A - Lessons Learned Table of Contents Appendix 1 - General 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. SQUADRON DEPLOYMENT - VANGUARD PLANNING LRP VANGUARD FORCE PACKAGE MOUNTING WING COORDINATION AND SUPPORT DAY ROTO - IMPACT ON FLIGHT OPS 6 MONTH VS DAY DEPLOYMENT Appendix 2 - Personnel 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. TO&E - MISSION SUPPORT SHORTFALLS FLYING BILLETS FOR DET HQ BACKUP AIRCREW RESERVISTS EMPLOYMENT TECH TRAINING FLIGHT DECK MANNING UNTRAINED PERSONNEL NAVAL VPLO REQUIREMENT EMEDDING LN O WITHIN OPCON AUTHORITY NBCO REQUIREMENT ADMIN SUPPORT REQUIREMENT ALCOHOL POLICY WHILE ON R&R Appendix 3 - Flight Ops 1. 2. 3. 4. FLIGHT OPS IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT RISK LEVEL/STANDOFF DISTANCE/CONTACT IDENTIFICATION INSHORE OPS NAVIGATION HOT WEATHER AND LITTORAL SOPs Appendix 4 - Maintenance 1. MOUNTING WING (14 AMS) MAINT SUPPORT CELL 2. GROUND AIR CONDITIONING UNITS 3. HOT WEATHER TECHNICAL ORDERS A- 1 /2 UNCLASSIFIED 000019 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information UNCLASSIFIED Appendix 5 - Logistics 1. ACCOMMODATIONS - MINIMUM REQUIREMENT DEFINITION AND FLIGHT SAFETY 2. R&R ACCOMODATIONS 3. TRANSPORT OF PERSONNEL FROM BASE TO APOE 4. SHIPPING AIRCRAFT PARTS INTO THEATRE 5. DANGEROUS CARGO SHIPPING 6. ARMAMENT FACILITIES EVALUATION 7. SUPPLY STOCK 8. TECH TEST EQUIPMENT 9. AMSE 10. PARTS STORAGE SPACE Appendix 6 - C4I 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. CAMP MIRAGE COMMAND AND CONTROL PORTABLE WING LEVEL C2 DEPLOYABLE COALITION NETWORKING MESSAGE HANDLING AND DISSEMINATION LEGAL ISSUES - LAW OF THE SEA AND LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ATO ISSUES Appendix 7 - Training THEATRE SPECIFIC TRAINING -OPERATIONS HQ/MSO PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING PORTABILITY OF QUALIFICATIONS - COMBAT READY CREWS COMBAT READINESS DESIGNATION VS MISSION SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS 5. CTD AMMENDMENTS REQUIRED FOR NEW CAPABILITIES 6. SHALLOW WATER ASW - INCLUSION IN CTD 1. 2. 3. 4. A-2/2 UNCLASSIFIED 000020 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Annex C - LRP Det Flying Orders Part 1 - JTFSWA LRP DET ORDERS Part 2 - LRP DET CONTINGENCY PLANS SECRET 000021 �Document disclosed under tHe Access to Informattun Act— Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Appendix 1 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 Lessons Learned - General 1. (U) Issue - SQUADRON DEPLOYMENT - VANGUARD PLANNING Discussion - While there was support within the LRP community to deploy as a formed unit, a number of factors combined to preclude such an approach. Most noticeably, the requirement to maintain sufficient resources (aircraft and crews) on both coasts to meet standing CAS and CMS taskings, and the difficulty for the While there are advantages (stability being the principal one) to having a static det for the first six months, it is costly in terms of aircrew, i.e., three, vice two must be deployed to carrv out the same number of missions. Perhaps more important, the notion of a given Sqn assuming High Readiness (HR) for a given year effectively places that Sqn on Standby to deploy. To ensure domestic ops are maintained, and to provide the critical mass necessary for the Sqn to field not only a force restructuring would be essential. Quite simply, the operational Sqns. LRP community would need to be The principal benefits of this approach would be: a. The HR Sqn CO would have direct control over personnel selection. This one issue proved to be a significant challenge for this deployment, including the previous rotos, as Sqns and Units were forced to negotiate for personnel to populate the TO&E. This led to unnecessary nomination delays and uncertainty for the members concerned. b. The Det is already a Team - they have trained together, they have operated at home together, they know and offset each other’s strengths and weaknesses, and, finally, they deploy together. During our Roto we witnessed the advantages of this approach with formed air crews, who unlike our counterparts in TAL, arrived as cohesive teams that required less supervision and took challenges in stride. c. Given that current the VANGUARD plan fails to identify which Sqn will provide the air and ground crews to meet the notice to move deadline, it is a case of "everyone is responsible, thus no one is responsible." This leads units to pay less attention to critical readiness elements (such as individual qualifications and currency items - weapons, first aid, etc), such that the community as a whole is poorly, if not unprepared, to respond to an expeditionary tasking. A robust LRP Sqn (minimum 6 Line Air Crews and Organic (Sqn) Maint) could retain responsibility for a VANGUARD Det for a year, after which the ownership would transfer to the sister Sqn. When the Sqn deployed, key core staff positions (that would favour a six month approach) A1 - 1 /4 SECRET 000022 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'occes a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET could be shared by Sqn Exec and Support Staff. Eg, the Sqn CO would retain responsibility for ops both at home and deployed, alternating with his DCO. This would be to the benefit of both the deployed Det and the Sqn at home. Recommendations - Given that the LRP VANGUARD conops is currently under review, not to mention that the Project Transform results are coming together, now is the ideal time to reconsider VANGUARD force packaging and adapt it to a Sqn approach based on rotations. Lessons Learned - Effective VANGUARD planning and preparation is key to fielding a responsive LRP capability on short notice with minimum disruption to domestic ops and force generation. 2. (C) Issue - LRP VANGUARD FORCE PACKAGE Discussion - The detachment remains a proven force package for conducting deployed LRP Ops. It gives us the capacity to reliably generate yet does not impose undue strain on the LRP fleet. As a result, it presents a relatively cost effective, rapidly deployable option for Strat Level planners looking to provide forces to an emerging coalition, or a "stand alone" response to an activity requiring ISR. Attempts in the past to deploy a single aircraft have met with problems, principally owing to aircraft availability/serviceability. HSDN is a case in point. Further, the mission support/ops staff overhead associated with a single aircraft Det is only marginally smaller, thus efficiencies favour the two aircraft configuration. Lastly, having in theatre, augmented by provide redundancy in case illness/grounding or repatriation. While this package worked well for Roto 2, it must be noted that this was based on the Roto plan. If, for whatever reason, the decision was to return to a rotation, then the three Crews would be required, both to accommodate HLTA, and to mitigate the ops tempo (which could not be maintained safely for that longer period). Recommendations - VANGUARD planning should continue to be based on a two-aircraft/crew force package, using ’otations starting with the initial deployment. Lessons Learned - A Det is the minimum critical mass to deploy and provide a reliable force package for the gaining OPCON authority. 3. (U) Issue - MOUNTING WING COORDINATION AND SUPPORT Discussion - There were reports of concerns early on in APOLLO at the Op and Strat Levels that the Det should avoid direct contact and coordination with the Mounting Wing (14 Wg), owing to potential conflicts with the Chain of Command (DCDS-Comd JTF SWA-CO LRP Det). Such concerns were unfounded, and the Det enjoyed excellent support from 14 Wg, without any hint of interference with the Chain of Command. Among other reasons, the weekly teleconference between the Det Comd and the 14 Wg Branch Heads was key to the effective comms and timely resolution of issues. Recommendations - As poor comms are the root of almost every evil, Deployed Dets should continue to maintain regular, open communications with the respective Mounting Wing. Further, by conducting a teleconference with key players (WComd & Branch Heads), problems are dealt with more quickly and effectively than might otherwise be possible. A1-2/4 SECRET 000023 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Laisur I'acces a /'information s.15(1) Def SECRET Lessons Learned - Comms, comms, comms... 4. (U) Issue - ■DAY ROTO - IMPACT ON FLIGHT OPS Discussion - Overall, a -day deployment had no effect on the ability of the LRP Det to maintain the Ops Tempo previously achieved during six-month Rotos. However, some issues are worthy of consideration: had to be monitored carefully, despite the authorized increase First, the of From day most Crewmembers totalled in excess of hours. By the end of the Roto, the accumulated effects of fatigue began to show, individuals having flown a patrol every second day. Accordingly, at about week 5 or 6, HQ aircrew substituted for individuals to allow a three-day rest period. It should be noted that our trips were relatively short (7-8 hours). Had we flown to the capacity of the aircraft (10+ hrs), the 30 day totals would have been commensurately higher. However, such longer missions are usually associated with longer transits, thus they are not necessarily more demanding from a fatigue point of view. ■day schedule was force generation itself, because The major benefit associated with a in there were one third fewer aircrew deployed at any given time. Further, with only theatre, more demanding warfare and other flying proficiency skills did not atrophy to the same extent as when deployed for six months (especially considering the crews were limited to a single, rather uncomplicated, mission profile). While fatigue was a closely monitored concern, the day-on, day-off schedule encouraged strict sleep discipline, whereas the six month crews with two days between missions were more likely to allow their sleep patterns to vary widely. Recommendations - The Day Roto plan should form the basis for VANGUARD planning. Lessons Learned - With a steady schedule and option for no-fly days where required, a ; -day rotation option is well suited for LRP deployment. 5. (U) Issue - 6 MONTH VS 56-DAY DEPLOYMENT Discussion - LRP Det went from a six-month rotation schedule to a -day plan. Although there are arguments that support either tour length, the impact of switching tour lengths well into the deployment was significant. day roto had many advantages and From a Maint Fit perspective, the introduction of the disadvantages. Advantages: 1) Reduction of TO&E. Maint Fit was able to reduce the number of personnel from 35 to 29. 2) With rotations, technicians remained focused and morale remained high. 3) Deployment experience was shared amongst a greater number of technicians. A1 -3/4 SECRET 000024 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET However there were some disadvantages: 1) Although not a direct impact on Op Apollo, the additional training and leave bill associated with an increased number of technicians and rotations created a shortage of trained, authorized technicians at home units. ■i 2) Increased rotations (every caused a significant rise in administrative responsibilities of the HQ staff (briefs, duty lists, training, explanation of procedures, etc). 3) There was little information available WRT entitlements such as pay, leave, UAB etc. This was a dissatisfier amongst many technicians. 4) The technicians that were scheduled for 3 rotations were effectively tied-up for a year with no consideration for courses or appointments. 5) The two in, two out etc, schedule was actually harder on some families with small children, as saying good-bye to the family on multiple occasions proved difficult with the kids. Recommendations - The day roto concept would be an overwhelming success if implemented at the start of a roto (with enough lead time) instead of a year into a deployment. Successful implementation demands: a. Deployable units ensure their members maintain their qualifications (eg weapons, first aid, etc), so that when preparing to deploy the training bill is not excessive. Our VANGUARD planning lessons learned refers. b. Units do not adopt the 2-in/2-out approach. Indeed, one of the principal benefits of day rotos is the concept "many hands make light work." 2-in/2-out fails to spread the burden amongst potential deployable pers, and negates the flexibility to complete career courses or prepare/complete postings, not to mention the impact on family stability. Lessons Learned - The tour length ( -day / -month) should not change during the deployment. A1 -4/4 SECRET 000025 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET Appendix 2 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 Lessons Learned - Personnel 1. (C) Issue - TO&E - MISSION SUPPORT SHORTFALLS Discussion - TO&E establishment flexibility. The establishment for LRP Det was set at the correct figure, but a particular restricted position caused a great deal of difficulty. The Mission Support Office was planned for ROTO 2 to have 1 Chief Mission Support Officer (CMSO), 1 Mission Support Analyst (MSA), and 4 Mission Support Officers (MSO), with 1 of the MSO positions restricted. The Det made the wrong decision to continue to restrict this position in Roto 2. The restriction was made during ROTO 1 based on the lack of a dynamic range of mission taskings (crews were employed exclusively in the same area conducting the same task). The mundane nature of the operation led to the appropriate decision to restrict a position. ROTO 2 HQ staff accepted the resultant situation, perhaps naively believing that, if there was a need to unrestrict that position due to an increase in Op tempo or intensity, or to cover off extended periods of manning shortages, such as HLTA or backfilling other positions, relief would be forthcoming. This was not the case. As the early months of 2003 proved to be an extremely intense period in the AOR, MSOs were task saturated attempting to cope with the volume and complexity of message traffic and mission preparation, not the least important being airspace deconfliction. HQ staff were more directly involved in the mechanics of MSO duties rather than maintaining a distance to allow for a clear overview. Making matters more difficult was the fact that the CMSO dagged red at the last minute, with no suitable backup. A series of stopgap measures were implemented by the Mounting Wing (short duration MSO TAVs) that were challenged by the LRP Det, but directed nonetheless, the MSO section was faced with a near constant rotation of personnel who did not necessarily have the skill sets to deal with the intensity of the operation. Further, requests for relief during the HLTA period that were absolutely essential if Mission Support personnel were not to burn out were put off and delayed, ultimately being approved at the last possible moment creating undue stress on all the staff. The lack of timely action on the part of tasking agencies directly led to a situation that was ripe for errors and mishaps. Recommendations - Bona fide backup personnel must be identified for key personnel to alleviate last minute scrambles and to avoid sending less than ideal replacements. HHQ must be reactive to requests from the field for replacement personnel, and must take timely action to fill requirements accordingly. Lessons Learned - Presumably TO&Es must be robust enough to carry on through a whole spectrum of operational intensities. The cost to FGs is that personnel may be underemployed as a guard against the time when their presence is needed, as the system has proven not to react quickly enough when the call for assistance goes out. 2. (U) Issue - FLYING BILLETS FOR DET HQ Discussion - Det HQ positions-use of other than current aircrew. Refinement of the core Det HQ positions with respect to hard flying billets is required for the long-term viability of Op Apollo. Non­ flying billets can then be filled by other than current aircrew on the squadrons as long as the required skill sets are there. This becomes even more critical for related positions such as LO in Bahrain, and the Staff position on the NCE in Tampa. A2 -1 / 6 000026 �Document disclosed under the Access to IhformattOrrAct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET Recommended Action - If Op Apollo is to continue past the suggested Oct timeframe, help in filling the non-flying positions from the greater AF community will be required. 3. (C) Issue - BACKUP AIRCREW Discussion - HQ staff as backup aircrew. The Det HQ staff was built bearing in mind that these personnel would represent the Det's sole ability to provide backup aircrew in the event of grounding or fatigue affecting line aircrew. Recommendations - Lessons Learned 4.(U) Issue - RESERVISTS EMPLOYMENT Discussion - Use of Reservists in support of Op Apollo. Reservist volunteers have and will continue to support Op Apollo. LL for ROTO 1 and 2 indicate it is imperative that decisions on individuals being eligible for nomination as candidates are made very early (6 months) in order to facilitate processing for contract extensions and upgrading of security clearances. Recommendations - Decisions on the use of individual Reservists must be made very early (6 months) in order to facilitate processing for contract extensions and upgrading of security clearances. Lessons Learned - While reservists can provide an excellent contribution to a deployed force, admin requirements demand timely nomination and processing. 5. (U) Issue - TECH TRAINING Discussion - Although the Maintenance crew structure was adequate to support operations, the CP 140 community lost a great opportunity to train technicians. Two training positions on each crew (6 pers total) would have helped ease the workload, as well as provide a meaningful venue for training. This would have relieved some of the training burden at the home units, and helped the techs gain qualifications, faster. Recommendations - Future long-term deployments should make allowances for the training of technicians. Lessons Learned - Deployed operations provide an excellent venue for training. A2 - 2 / 6 SECRET 000027 �s.15(1) Def Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Laisur faeces a I'information SECRET 6. (U) Issue - FLIGHT DECK MANNING Discussion - The five-man Flight Deck was maintained for Roto 2. While the missions were relatively short (six hour planned on-station period), the aircraft was rarely flown above 1000 MSL, owing to the requirement to visually ID and photograph all surface contacts. Had the contact density been light, or if Stand Off sensors were available, then there would have been greater opportunity for Flight Deck members to take much needed breaks, however, this was not the case. Further, the repetitive nature of the mission tasking, combined with the high flying rate (120 - 130 hours per 30 day period, maintained from day , meant that the risks of complacency and fatigue were ever present. Recommendations - Deployments with the same mission profiles and ops tempo should maintain the five-man Flight Deck. Redundancy for illness/grounding can be achieved by either ensuring that at least three of the four line FE's are A Category, or by filling a Core (6 month) Staff position with an A Cat FE. An A Cat on staff provides greater flexibility for the Force Generator, in that B Cat FEs can be employed on all Day Crews. Lessons Learned - Intensive low-level flying requires a five-member Flight Deck. 7. (C) Issue - UNTRAINED PERSONNEL Discussion - Untrained personnel. The Det was able to effectively employ personnel who had attained wings status but not yet achieved aircraft type qualifications. Certain positions within the Det had Terms of Accountability that allowed for personnel that had yet to achieve qualification on the CP140 to be effectively employed. These positions were typically within the Ops section dealing with matters that are common to all aircraft fleets, and the duties and tasks were normally a matter of central communications for the Det. Two main benefits accrue: first, the FG is not obligated to deploy another fully qualified aircrew member during times of chronic shortages; second, the deployed untrained person gains invaluable experience that can only serve to make them more valuable to the home unit when aircraft qualifications have been received. In our case, we selected a Lt awaiting ANAV MOAT training and her employment was an unqualified success. Recommendations - Make use of untrained personnel whenever prudent. Lessons Learned - Not all deployed personnel need to be top category to be of value to the Det. 8. (C) Issue - NAVAL VPLO REQUIREMENT Discussion - VPLO requirement. There is a requirement to have a VPLO embedded in CTG/CTF staff in order to ensure seamless integration and employment of LRP assets. The level of expertise WRT LRP capabilities and limitations as well as SOPs normally present in CTG/CTF staff varies widely, wholly dependent on the background and experience level of the Air O (normally an MH officer). The lack of embedded LRP expertise creates a great deal of unnecessary discussion and crisis management. Issues such as Maritime Campaign Planning and Level of Effort required to produce effective surveillance for the Commander afloat would be more efficiently A2 - 3 / 6 S EC R ET 000028 �Document disclosed under the Accesslo'fnJorMOtion Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET addressed with an LRP representative on the CTG/CTF staff. Major Maritime exercises make use of a VPLO within the Command staff to ensure that all assets are utilized effectively, thus gaining the optimum training value at the unit, group, and force level, and maximizing interoperability opportunities. Recommendations - Embed a VPLO within CTG/CTF staff. Lessons Learned - Scores of major Joint operations exercises have proven the effectiveness and necessity of a VPLO as part of the Commander's staff if sorties are to provide a high degree of value for the Commander. 9. (C) Issue - EMEDDING LN O WITHIN OPCON AUTHORITY Discussion - The CTF 57 LNO was part of the F2C2 (Friendly Force Coordination Centre) and not part of CTF 57 (the LRP Det OPCON authority). The CTF-57 Air LNO position was part of the F2C2 having only a liaison relationship with CTF57. Although the CTF-57 organization chart showed that the LNO was under the command of the CTF 57 N3, this was not the case. The N3 provided no direction to any of the Coalition LNOs but merely acted as a conduit for addressing problems specific to each MPA detachment. As a result, Coalition LNOs had little input into the day-to-day functioning of CTF-57. They were briefed 5 times a week and had the opportunity to discuss issues at those fora, however, these discussions rarely resulted in satisfactory action being taken. Most problems were dealt with through the N3 in groups of ones or twos. Global solutions were not readily achievable, if at all. Some of CTF 57 staff were relatively inexperienced (compared to the LNOs) and in theatre for short periods. This sometimes made it more difficult for them to recognize potential problems. It took longer to reach viable solutions once they had been identified. Also, CTF 57 was undermanned for the workload. During Op Apollo, the staff was required to task up to 28 aircraft, from 9 nations, some with more than one platform type with varying capabilities and ROE. On top of this, there were at least three distinct missions on going, MIO, OIF, and OEF. This undermanned and somewhat inexperienced staff had difficulty coping with the workload. If the LNOs were embedded within CTF 57, the OPCON would have had more manpower and experience to draw from and would be better able to employ those assets. The LNOs would have been able to devote more of their energies toward planning operations and less toward correcting mistakes. Most importantly, the LNO would have had a much more direct effect on how CTF conducted its business, thus better able to encourage doctrinally compliant execution f its OPCON responsibilities. Recommendations - In future operations the LRP LNO should be embedded within the MPA OPCON authority. The position should fall under the N3 section and deal primarily with plans. Lessons Learned - LRP LNOs could more effectively meet the requirements of the LRP Detachment if he was embedded in the organization than if employed strictly in the liaison role. 10. (C) Issue - NBCO REQUIREMENT Discussion - There was an insistence from HHQ planners that each Det have an NBCO, NBC NCM, and a RADSO, yet these were all secondary duties. Due to the difficulties encountered by FG to produce qualified personnel to fill these positions, a great deal of negotiation between Sqns was required to ensure these positions were filled. Additional positions were not added to the Det's TO&E A2 - 4 / 6 SEC RET 000029 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'occes a /'information SECRET to cover off this requirement, so, in effect, the Det was directed to deploy a specific individual into the core staff. This situation that could have led to having the wrong skill set for the primary duty but the appropriate skill set for the secondary duty. I will not suggest there is no requirement for an NBC staff to be deployed. However, if the need is truly as great as the pressure to deploy someone into this secondary duty suggests, then perhaps this should be something more than a secondary duty. A small cell of expertise within the camp under the command of the camp Commandant, with each unit offering up an individual to provide redundancy in each of the positions, would fill the operational need. It would also relieve the Det from possibility of deploying an individual who might not have the appropriate skill set to excel at their primary task. Recommendations - Create a single NBC organization for the camp. With each operation, fill the operational need and relieve the Det from possibility of deploying an individual unit supplying one individual to allow redundancy. Lessons Learned - The Camp TO&E as whole must be rationalized to allow for correct manning of important secondary duties. 11.(U) Issue - ADMIN SUPPORT REQUIREMENT Discussion - This ROTO faced difficulties with document control due to the lack of an Admin clerk as part of the TO&E. Part time support was the routine on previous ROTOs, however, during ROTO 2, we did not have any Admin support early in the ROTO and had only a part time Admin clerk for the last four months. This clerk worked two afternoons per week in LRP. This Det, like all operations, needs to have the ability to effect suitable document control and file keeping measures. Recommendations - The TO&E for this and all other Dets should include embedded Admin support. Lessons Learned - LRP's document control was difficult throughout the ROTO this problem could have been overcome by the proper level of Admin support. 12.(U) Issue - ALCOHOL POLICY WHILE ON R&R Discussion - The alcohol restriction (2 can rule) posed significant enforcement challenges and was a serious dissatisfier for members proceeding on well-deserved R&R breaks. In essence, certain members felt that given the requirement to observe the alcohol limit, then they would rather remain on Camp, rather than pay out of pocket for Hotel accn. Recommendations - Identify a suitable R&R center (eg a resort) where the alcohol policy could be relaxed. Ideally, we would locate a safe resort that caters to westerners (so our personnel would not stick out, for both FP and image concerns). Further, an MP or Senior NCM could stay on duty at the same resort while members enjoy R&R and: a. conduct overt presence patrols (a la Shore Patrols) to deter unwanted/embarrassing behaviour. b. be known to resort staff and be the first to respond if management had any concerns regarding inappropriate behaviour. A2 - 5 / 6 SECRET 000030 �Document disclosed unaer the Access lu InfurHiuliun-Act----Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information I SECRET Lessons Learned - DDIO alcohol limitations and in-theatre R&R pose challenges that could be overcome with some careful planning and execution. A2 - 6 / 6 SECRET 000031 �»> Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET Appendix 3 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 Lessons Learned - Flight Ops 1. (C) Issue - FLIGHT OPS IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT Discussion - Traditional LRP employment has assumed ops would take place from secure airfields, arrivals and departures would be flown in areas of air supremacy, and threats on-station would simply be avoided, primarily through the application of Risk Level doctrine. APOLLO taught us that a Det may face threats that were not so easy to observe or predict. Indeed, the asymmetric threats posed by terrorist organizations were ubiquitous and exceptionally difficult to predict. Accordingly, it is prudent to adopt measures to mitigate such risks, both around the airfield, enroute and on station. Lastly, the importance of incorporating a self-defence suite into AIMP cannot be overstated. Given the difficulty predicting a hostile act against an Aurora anywhere during the mission, the SDS provides one last opportunity to mitigate a potential risk factor. Recommendations - Develop and implement tactics and procedures to deal with these threats. Attached to the end of the Roto 2 LRP End Tour report is a TACNOTE designed to form the basis of these tactics. Ensure that the self-defence suite is not removed from AIMP, and, should the Aurora be deployed into a similar theatre before AIMP completion, serious consideration should be given to accelerating the incorporation of an interim SDS capability. Lessons Learned - The simple Cold War approach to hostilities (Yes/No) does not recognize the realities of smaller scale regional conflicts and asymmetric threats. Our tactics and procedures must change with the times. 2. (C) Issue - RISK LEVEL/STANDOFF DISTANCE/CONTACT IDENTIFICATION Discussion - During the course of operations, each Sector Commander afloat published a stand-off distance for his AO. There were not necessarily equal distances in each AO. Stand-off distances were published for warships, friendly and neutral, along with merchant vessels; actual distances were nn the AAW caoabilitv of the warships, It must be noted that throughout the course of Op APOLLO, no civilian vessels oi any size or type proved to have any anti-air weaponry on board, despite numerous boardings carried out by CTG 307 assets alone. A3 -1 / 5 SECRET 000032 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information s.15(1) Def SECRET The very nature of the contact identification information required The implemented procedures when compared with published doctrine on this subject resulted in a very confusing situation for LRP crews to deal with on a daily basis. If one accepts that the standoff distance was valid, then any relief given to the LRP crews The TACON (OTC) does not have the authority to reassign Risk Levels. At first qlance, it appears we did not technically follow published doctrine, though practically speaking the vice provide for the safety of our aircraft from attack. It was assessed the likelihood that any Coalition aircraft would be engaged was very low. By closing contacts within published distances, LRP crews could accomplish assigned tasks and provide Commanders afloat with the required level of contact identification. LRP Det maintained a very close watch on the published threat levels, and, working closely with Intel staff, we monitored all sources that might indicate that the threat to our crews was on the increase. Discussions between LRP and Command Staff afloat resulted in LRP has received copies of proposed TACNOTES 3550 and 3555 that deal with these topics. As has been identified in previous major exercises, current Risk Level doctrine fails to adequately address those situations in which it is unlikely surface units would engage friendly aircraft. Recommendations - Doctrine which specifies procedures and limitations WRT Risk Levels, Stand-off Distances, and Contact Identification requirements, need to be re-written in a coherent fashion. Fuse these related topics so that clear and unequivocal direction can be given to aircrews and gaining commanders (eg OTCs) throughout the spectrum of operations from peace to war. Lessons Learned Coherent doctrine enveloping Risk Level, Stand-off Distance, and Contact Identification requirements must be published. A3 - 2 / 5 000033 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a /’information S E C R ET 3. (U) Issue - INSHORE OPS NAVIGATION Discussion - Current method of employing the aircraft fitted GPS for precise navigation (eg when attempting to close but not penetrate TTW) is very awkward, resulting in far less than ideal situational awareness and crew coordination, thus aircraft control suffers. Presently, a "MapNav" with unspecified qualifications, sits to the right of the NavCom, and, without knowledge of the accuracy of our somewhat dated GPS receiver, with an unknown time lag of the GPS itself, reads the scrolling lat/long digits off the display. The time lag, and therefore positional inaccuracy, is increased depending on the time it takes the MapNav to manually plot the position and determine the relative distance from TTW (again, with unspecified accuracy, dependant on both the operator's ability/mental dexterity and the chart he or she is using). Then, one must add the time lag between the MapNav communicating that info via intercom (which can be a little hectic, further complicated by busy radio circuits) to the Pilot, who must then interpret the information and physically input steering corrections. If the intent was simply to stay well away from TTW (like we avoid land in IMC/night conditions on peacetime patrols at home), it works just fine, especially in places like the North Arabian Sea. On the other hand, if the aim is to get in tight (eg where bad guys lurk, playing games as they dart in & out of TTW, especially in confined waters (SOH, Arabian Gulf), the current method, with the associated lag times, is difficult at best. If we simply plugged a Garmin into the existing antenna at the NO Station, the MapNav would have immediate graphical depiction of proximity to TTW (using waypoints plotted in a route to identify TTW). Now, the only lag we are dealing with is the voice comm link to the pilot - a very significant improvement. For this reason, an intermediate and quicker fix might be to shoot for just that authorization. Recommendations a. While we await a technical fix, the techniques and procedures that have been developed and fine-tuned during APOLLO should be incorporated into OJT syllabi for appropriate trades (not just ANAV, but probably pilots as well, possibly AESOPs). Only Crew members appropriately trained and qualified should be employed when closer than about 5nm from the border to be protected. Only through a structured trials procedure would the accumulated errors of this method of navigation be quantifiable, but experience has shown that a trained crew should be comfortable approaching to 1 nm from TTW without great concern for penetration (assuming a fairly regularly shaped coastline. For obvious reasons, irregular coastlines or confined maneuvering space will make this more difficult). b. As an interim measure, the current GPS could be easily replaced with a slightly more modern unit at very low cost (if not for free, if we utilize the CF's current inventory of CT-133 Garmin 90 receivers). The key advantage is the graphical display which eliminates a number of the steps in the current process, and does away with manual plotting altogether. Although a simple unit such as the Garmin 90 lacks a moving map display, it is a simple matter to manually plot waypoints that approximate TTW (essentially, this is a curve fitting exercise - more points, better fit). These points could be inserted manually, but by using a simple GPS application such as GARTRIP ™, a shareware program available on the Internet, one can type the waypoints in A3 - 3 / 5 SECRET 000034 �s.15(1) Def Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET on a PC, and download them directly to the GPS. Aside from the ease of waypoint entry (vice using the receivers awkward toggle switch entry method), the waypoints may be printed out to crosscheck against the raw chart data. As a second check, they can be printed out to scale and by overlaying the printout on a suitable chart and can be visually compared with the TTW in question. Assuming our aircrew understand the importance of selecting the appropriate chart Datum, one has an almost pilot­ proof method of waypoint entry and confirmation. The same software application can also be used to build a route, following the TTW waypoints. As most receivers will limit the number of waypoints in a given route, it may be necessary to build more than one route to describe an AOR's TTW. These routes are then downloaded in the same manner directly to the GPS. With the waypoints and routes safely downloaded, it is a very simple matter to activate the desired route, which will then be drawn on the GPS graphical display. As one zooms in to a smaller and smaller scale, the aircraft's distance from TTW is immediately apparent, as is the aircraft's orientation. This information can then be relayed directly to the pilot. While the cheapest and easiest solution would be to install a single GPS at the NavCom station, using the existing power source and antenna, ideally the Fit Sta would also have a GPS so they could maintain SA directly (with the usual cautions about channelized attention on a nav display). However, the technical requirements (and airworthiness clearances required) for using even a portable, battery operated GPS with an antenna in the overhead window may prove too challenging. The final logical step in this interim capability would be to draw the positional feed from the GPS and input it to a laptop at the NavCom station with either C2PC, or perhaps a commercial (COTS) navigation application. The advantages are, of course, the ability to plot key information, such as operating, restricted areas, mission specific waypoints, in effect giving true moving map display well before the fleet will receive the same during AIMP. Lessons Learned - The current navigation suite is poorly suited to inshore operations. Structured training results in crews qualified to exploit existing capability, yet a modest investment in technology would result in a significant increase in operational capability. 4. (U) Issue- HOT WEATHER AND LITTORAL SOPs Discussion - Operations in the SWA theatre, particularly in the Eastern approaches to the Straits of Hormuz (Sharkfin) presented specific challenges owing to both the proximity to land, and the extreme temperatures. Rotos 0, 1, and 2 all developed procedures and techniques to deal with these challenges. With the introduction of Day rotations, it became critical to encapsulate and standardize the direction to incoming crews, owing to the frequent rotations. Accordingly, the "GOO GOUGE" was produced, using the familiar SMM format. This document is included as an Annex to the Roto 2 End Tour report. While these techniques were considered theatre specific, they should form the basis for normal hot weather or littoral ops, such that the next time we deploy to a similar region, this will all be old hat. Further, even routine deployments to "warm" (in comparison to bloody hot) locations such as Hawaii would benefit from application of these newfound techniques and procedures. A3 - 4 / 5 SECRET 000035 �Document disclosed under the Access io information mci Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET Recommendations - The LRP community, and specifically 404 (MP &T) Sqn, should review the GOO GOUGE and extract those elements suitable for inclusion into existing pubs (SMM, AOI, etc). Lessons Learned - The CP-140 is capable of operating effectively in hot weather in the littoral, with minor changes to current techniques and procedures. A3 - 5/5 SECRET 000036 �Document disclosed under the Access to information net Document divulgue en vertu de la Lai sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Appendix 4 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 Lessons Learned - Maintenance 1. (U) Issue - MOUNTING WING (14 AMS) MAINT SUPPORT CELL Discussion - A dedicated Maintenance Support Cell at the main support base (14 AMS) provided an invaluable service to the LRP Det. Having personnel designated at the home unit to assist in the tracking of parts, engineering support, and in a general support role was instrumental in the smooth operation of the Maintenance Detachment. Given the time change between Greenwood and Camp Mirage (7-8 hrs), personnel in Greenwood who were working on the significant issues / problems of the LRP Maint Det could easily contact the AEG (in Ottawa) on our behalf and have a solution to us by the next morning. Recommendations - Future deployed ops should continue to have a dedicated maint support embedded within the mounting wing. Lessons Learned - A dedicated cell of personnel should be assigned responsibility to assist the Maintenance Detachment when required (usually in emergencies). 2. (U) Issue - GROUND AIR CONDITIONING UNITS Discussion - The Ground Air Conditioning Units (GAUs) initially used in theatre were inadequate for operating in the extreme temperatures of the desert. Given the extreme daytime temperatures (50 degrees Celsius) and ramp temperatures of 80 degrees Celsius, the air conditioner units from Canada were not able to produce enough cooling power. These units were replaced by larger, more powerful ACE 802s on a trial basis. During the trial, it was determined that smaller GAUs (ACE 804s) were sufficient, and they were eventually procured and are currently being used in theatre. Recommendations - Units should procure GAUs that can handle all types of operating environments (ACE 804s). Lessons Learned - To be a more effective operating force, and in essence to be able to operate anywhere, anytime, proper equipment is required. 3. (U) Issue - HOT WEATHER TECHNICAL ORDERS Discussion - Currently no hot weather technical procedures / orders exist detailing the effects of hot weather on critical aircraft systems (powerplant / EDC etc). Without documented parameters (temperature I pressure etc) of the powerplant of the CP-140, and how the values are affected by hot weather operations, the technician is left to his/her experience and word of mouth to determine if the readings are normal, although the readings may be out of limits (for normal operation). Recommendations - Hot weather parameters I procedures must be defined in a hot weather technical publication. Lessons Learned - Powerplant parameters will change during hot weather operations which, under normal conditions, would render the aircraft unserviceable. A4 SECRET 000037 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET Appendix 5 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 Lessons Learned - Logistics 1. (U) Issue - ACCOMMODATIONS - MINIMUM REQUIREMENT DEFINITION AND FLIGHT SAFETY Discussion - When pers were originally billeted at Camp Mirage, Units were allocated a fixed number of rooms within specific barrack blocks. This allocation allowed the Dets to meet their needs, promote unit cohesion, and minimize room changes as individuals rotated or TAVs were accommodated. The arrival of the D&S platoon and the ever-present TAVs made the practice of Unit allocation of barracks/rooms no longer possible. Compounding the problem was the roto shift, as both LRP and TAL Dets adopted the -Day Roto Plan, thus the makeup of these Det’s changed monthly. Owing to a stated insistence that there is no correlation between Flight Safety and room allocation, CO NSU refused to discuss, let alone agree to allocation criteria proposed by the COs of LRP and TAL Dets. While this speaks to the dysfunctional C2 arrangement at Camp Mirage (dealt with separately under C4I), it also identifies the challenges faced by CO NSU, who was been caught between NCE direction to accept more personnel on Camp, and the flying Dets Flight Safety concerns. It also highlights a shortcoming in the higher orders (including DDIOs) that fail to identify the bed down requirements (ie specify room allocation criteria) for flying units. In the case of TAL & LRP, Flight Safety was considered in the strict sense of the definition, as it deals with the Accidental (thus preventable) loss of personnel or aircraft. Operational factors and associated losses were not considered, given that we were involved in Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Indeed, if we were at war or engaged in hostilities, then the operational imperative might drive us to adopt measures that increased the risk of an accidental loss to achieve mission success. Thus for OOTWA, Flight Safety considerations should receive the same importance as they would for routine domestic operations or force generation. In the absence of published guidance on Crew Rest versus Accommodation entitlement, and the resulting affect on Flight Safety, two main factors should be considered: the consequence of error, and ability to withdraw from the workplace. Put simply, while almost every member of Camp Mirage can enhance or detract from Flight Safety, certain members, because of their occupation or workplace, have a more significant impact. To this end, three occupations warrant special consideration: a. Aircrew. Owing to the consequence of error, and the obvious inability to withdraw from the workplace, orders exist to provide aircrew with adequate crew rest before a mission. In APOLLO, the situation is exacerbated by the high flying rates (approximately 130 hours per month) and the nature of the work. In the case of LRP, crews spend the vast majority of the on-station period below 1000 feet. TAL crews fly varied schedules, often into potentially hostile, remote airfields that require the complete coordination of a tactically trained crew. Neither TAL nor LRP crews may take R&R during their Day Rotations, thus the potential for cumulative fatigue exists. Finally, of all the crew members, the importance of the Aircraft Captains remaining fully alert until engine shutdown, while obvious, cannot A5 -1 / 5 SECRET 000038 �Document disclosed under the Access td InforiYidtion Act Document divulgu4 en vertu de la Loi sur I'accds a I'information SECRET be overstated. Accordingly, aircrew and, in particular, Aircraft Captains, are afforded the highest priority for ensuring that adequate, uninterrupted sleep can be attained. b. Ground Crew. While it is obviously much simpler for the Ground Crewman to withdraw from the work place (yet all to often the member does not, owing to pride, resulting in a Human Factors assessment of "Pressing" following an incident or accident), the consequence of error is equally significant to that of the Aircrew. Further, the environmental conditions at Camp Mirage increase the potential for early fatigue onset. Temperature extremes can be mitigated somewhat by scheduling maintenance activities after dark, yet this affects circadian rhythms and associated impairment to functioning. Thus, while perhaps less critical than for Aircrew, it is imperative that Ground Crew are afforded with accommodation that will permit adequate, uninterrupted rest before going on shift. c. LRP Mission Support Officers/TAL Ops Officers. While perhaps not self-evident, these individuals work alone on extended shifts overnight and have no ready backup. The volume and complexity of operational message traffic demands they remain fully alert and able to plan comprehensive Mission briefings and flight profiles. Looking at these groups, the principal concern is to provide these members, in order of priority, with uninterrupted rest to avoid accumulated sleep deficit and fatigue. This does not necessarily require single rooms for all, though members sharing rooms should be on the same crew, thus maintain the same shift/sleep cycle. Recommendations - The simplest approach would be to publish criteria for accn footprint (perhaps based on the considerations discussed above) that would apply to future Joint Ops. However, requirements will differ, as will physical realities (eg for embarked HELAIRDETs, TACHEL units in the field, etc) thus some options may be simply impossible to achieve. Further, some flying operations, owing to the duration and hazards of particular missions, will dictate more or less stringent concerns for the quantity and quality of rest. In lieu of attempting to write a set of standards that will satisfy every potential DCDS operation, it is recommended that DDIOs simply direct that Flying Unit COs are responsible for determining what accommodations are required to meet the demands of their respective operation. In the final analysis, accommodations are just another resource that COs are expected to manage, and should be treated no differently. Lessons Learned - Commanders at all levels must be empowered to exercise their best judgment, husband resources, always with a view to ensuring safe and effective operations. 2. (U) Issue - R&R ACCOMODATIONS Discussion - Owing to a lack of suitable subsidized accn, a number of Camp Mirage personnel did not take advantage of R&R in the manner or spirit the orders intended. For members deployed for 6 months, the importance of meaningful R&R on the well being of our members cannot be overstated. Although the orders allow for two 96-hour R&R periods per deployment, the lack of funding caused some members to simply take time off, but remain at the Camp. While this sort of rest is helpful, it does not provide anywhere near the rejuvenating effects, as a stay away would have. A5 - 2 / 5 SECRET 000039 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /‘information SECRET s.15(1) Def Recommendations - Increase R&R benefits to meet the basic accommodation (2 per room) and per diem requirements of the local R&R destinations. Lessons Learned - If R&R benefits are insufficient to meet basic accn & meal requirements, some members will not take advantage of this essential break from Ops, thus degrading the effectiveness of the Unit as a whole. Further, by ensuring the member is not out of pocket, COs can order members on R&R without causing financial distress. 3. (U) Issue - TRANSPORT OF PERSONNEL FROM BASE TO APOE Discussion - Comox has a definite disadvantage when it comes to transporting personnel from/to home base to the APOE in Trenton during ROTO changeovers. For a person deploying from Greenwood the average travel time to/from theatre is 4 days. For Comox personnel it doubles to 8 days. In effect, the time spent in transit increases from 2 days if CAL was used from Comox to 8, thus 6 days were wasted. For 407 personnel on the day rotation, this waste equates to a loss of 2.7 person years per year of operation. Further, added travel, accn and per diem costs accrued, thanks to the circuitous and fractured travel itinerary. While a detailed business case has not been completed, initial estimates indicate that had west coast personnel traveled via CAL alone, it would have been roughly cost neutral, yet would have saved the significant time wasted in transit For 407 pers on the day rotation, this waste equates to a loss of 2.7 person years per year of operation. Recommendations - CAL only, in lieu of a CAL & SF mix should be considered when developing movement plans, both as a means to save travel costs and to limit time wasted. Lessons Learned - Service Air is often not the most resource efficient option. 4. (U) Issue - SHIPPING AIRCRAFT PARTS INTO THEATRE Discussion - Given the limited number of spares held by the deployed unit, the Supply System (and Sustainment Flights) must be able to react to an immediate part requirement. Weekly sustainment flights were normally sufficient to meet the needs of the unit for parts. However, on occasion, FEDEX was employed to get a part from Canada into theatre in 2-3 days. Items that were FEDEXed were addressed to "Mr." instead of rank specific individuals in order to avoid lengthy Custom delays. This was an overwhelming success as it proved a reliable method to get AOGs into theatre quickly and saved missions from being lost. Recommendations - Ensure a responsive Supply system (that uses other methods of shipping parts i.e., a commercial courier) is in place to properly support the requirements of flying operations. Further, when setting up contracts, host nation advice should be sought to determine techniques (such as not addressing packages to Rank/Name/Unit) that facilitate expeditious movement of packages. Lessons Learned - Couriers such as FEDEX are effective and reliable way to quickly obtain urgently required parts in theatre. A5 - 3 / 5 SECRET 000040 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lai sur I'acces d I'information SECRET 5. (U) Problem - DANGEROUS CARGO SHIPPING Discussion - The requirement for the transport I packaging I shipping of Dangerous Cargo (DC) was not fully supported by the NSU. DC could only be shipped from Canada via the weekly sustainment flight. In addition, a TAV had to be called in because NSU had no qualified DC packer, even though the requirement had been identified. Recommendations - Given the constant requirement for the handling / shipping of DC (batteries/gases etc), a fully DC qualified individual must be in theatre. In addition, a reliable non-DND (ie. Commercial) method of transporting DC into theatre (for urgent requirements) must be provided. Lessons Learned - NSU must have a fully DC qualified individual available to process our DC requirements, and the system used to transport the DC must be responsive to our needs. 6. (U) Issues - ARMAMENT FACILITIES EVALUATION Discussion - A proper evaluation of existing Armament facilities / capabilities and requirements was not adequately conducted before the deployment of the LRP Det into theatre. There were numerous difficulties experienced with respect to armament (improper safety distances, improper storage of munitions etc) as a result of inadequate site plans and the fact that a proper armament inspection was not performed. In addition, there was no initial study conducted on the feasibility of storing and use etc. of Mark 46 torpedoes. Recommendations - A full, proper inspection of existing armament facilities, assessing current as well as possible future requirements must be conducted prior to the arrival of the deploying unit. Lessons Learned - Armament requirements can change significantly during a deployment. An improperly conducted, or incomplete armament survey may have limiting and drastic effects on the operation. 7. (U) Issue - SUPPLY STOCK Discussion - There was an inadequate supply of C class (consumable) items gaskets / O rings etc. There was a shortage of C class items in theatre that led to the borrowing of these items (when available) from other Coalition members, and, on occasion, this led to the unserviceability of the aircraft. Recommendations - A rationalization of required consumables for all B class items (part lists) should be conducted, for what items are required (gaskets, O rings, packing etc) on replacement/repair. Lessons Learned - Insufficient consumables led us to rob serviceable major components (engine I prop IAPU) rendering them unserviceable for significant periods. The shortage of even the smallest, inexpensive parts will render the aircraft unserviceable. 8. (U) Issue - TECH TEST EQUIPMENT Discussion - There was not enough test equipment available in the Supply System / Greenwood to fully meet the deployed unit’s requirements. Test equipment is used to quickly fault find aircraft avionics equipment such as RADAR, TACAN, IFF, AFCS, RADALT, PITOT STATIC etc. A5 - 4 / 5 SECRET 000041 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET On more than one occasion, LRP Det was left without the capability to diagnose a snag as a result of a shortage of Test equipment in the Supply System. Often there would only be two serviceable sets of test equipment (one at 407, one at 14 AMS). Recommendations - A review of holdings of test equipment should be conducted to ensure that there are adequate quantities for use at the main operating bases, as well for deployed units. Lessons Learned - Test equipment provides a vital service because it can prevent hours of fault finding of unserviceable systems. Test equipment should be considered critical equipment for deployments, spared accordingly, and included in the TO&E. 9. (U) Issue-AMSE Discussion - A great deal of AMSE used on the deployment was unreliable as it often broke down due to its shoddy condition. Most AMSE was shared amongst the Coalition members operating from Ramp 2. The majority of the AMSE needed constant attention / repair from the EME techs. Recommendations - The CF holding of AMSE needs to be updated (new items purchased/ or existing items reconditioned). Lessons Learned - AMSE is critical in the performance of servicing and maintenance on the aircraft and reliable equipment is required. 10. (U) Issue - PARTS STORAGE SPACE Discussion - Given the length of the deployment, there was insufficient infrastructure in place for the storage of spare parts and equipment. LRPs spare engine, prop and APU were stored under a mod tent for 18 months. With the high temperatures and humidity of the operating environment, this equipment will likely experience rust out prematurely. In addition, the mod tent was damaged, and the spare parts exposed during a severe rain I wind I lightning storm in April 2003. All major aircraft spares had to be tagged unserviceable and will require a shop inspection before installation. FLIRs (and their associated shipping containers) return to Canada with significant signs of corrosion from exposure. Recommendations - A climate controlled shelter/building has to be made available for the storage of critical / expensive items. Lessons Learned - Temporary shelters are not suitable for the storage of aircraft parts. The exposure to sand / rain / wind leads to premature corrosion of the components. A5- 5 / 5 SECRET 000042 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Appendix 6 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 Lessons Learned - C4I 1. (U) Issue - CAMP MIRAGE COMMAND AND CONTROL Discussion - The C2 arrangements for Camp Mirage did not support the long-standing principal of "Ops Primacy," thus detracting from safe and effective mission completion. Four independent units (NSU, TAL, LRP and NCCIS) shared Camp Mirage and each reported directly to Comd JTF SWA. The CO of NSU was designated Camp Commandant (as a full Colonel, he out-ranked all other COs on Camp). This relationship divorced the responsibility for resources and Camp focus from the Chain of Command. TAL and LRP COs were responsible for safe and effective operations, yet they lacked sufficient control over the resources to support it. CO NSU had authority to direct the application of resources, thus he occasionally found himself caught between the direction from Higher Headquarters, and the requests from the air Det CO's. However, CO NSU had no responsibility for the mission success (or failure), nor for the safety of the flying operation. Quite simply, it was a case of authority without responsibility. Recommendations - In the future, such Camps should be commanded by an Operational Commander. Within 1 CAD, the Wing concept exemplifies this very notion: the Commander fights his Wing. While APOLLO was a Joint operation, this Air Force model remains valid, as the Camp Commander could be an Operator (who would be better able to appreciate the Operational Imperatives and weigh against safety or mission risk) from any service. Indeed, there are examples in Canada where a Wing Commander has non- Air Force forces under his command. 19 Wing is a case in point, where the WComd commands a marine unit as well as the Sqns. It is not the intent to exploit this lesson learned to point fingers over relatively minor incidents. Quite simply, there were occasions where NSU's requirements and priorities were inconsistent with those of the Operational Units (TAL and LRP), and ops suffered as a result. Lessons Learned - Ops primacy must remain the cornerstone of Command and Control arrangements, and Command authority must never be severed from the responsibility for mission accomplishment. 2. (C) Issue - PORTABLE WING LEVEL C2 Discussion - Once the crew briefing was completed and the aircraft was out of UHF radio range, Mission Support had limited accessibility to the mission being conducted. Unclassified communications were sent and received via Iridium, and other than the real-time chat network with certain coalition ships so-fitted, no secure comms were available. Traditionally secure comms were maintained through use of CRATT, yet there was no provision for this service in theatre. Recommendations - A portable data interpretation analysis center (P-DIAC, or WOPS) is required to execute Wing-level control of operations from austere locations, and to provide effective mission support. This would include a secure link directly to the aircraft. If HF (either for CRATT or Datalink) is to be considered, emissions security to transmit HF frequencies in the vicinity of a secure Ops Office would need to be accounted for in the system design. Lessons Learned - A portable Wing level C2 (P-DIAC) is required to maintain a secure link with aircraft during missions. A6 -1 / 5 000043 �s.15(1) Def Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET 3. (C) Issue - DEPLOYABLE COALITION NETWORKING Discussion - The move away from traditional message based C2 towards net-centric warfare is a well developed trend. However, DDIOs simply direct NCCIS to provide DWAN, TITAN and STU III capabilities. These National systems fell short of our requirements. Over the course of APOLLO we gained access to without which we would have been severely hampered in our ability to carry out assigned missions. To their credit, NCCIS responded to every request for assistance and saw that these systems were well maintained. However, this was all done on an ad hoc basis. When it was determined that LRP Det was to operate from an austere location, initial planning should have foreseen these requirements, and the TO&E adjusted accordingly. Recommendations - The Air Force should develop and maintain a secure, deployable networking capability, able to respond to the needs and releasability of an emerging coalition. Eg, while AFCCIS/TITAN may meet the needs of routine peacetime ops, we should have the capability to deploy and support at least a Wing Level networking capability, able to be adapted to the coalition network of the day. Accordingly, while the system would likely be based on traditional COTS products (eg MS Office), the releasability of the system would not be determined until the members of the Coalition are named. Further, aside from the hard and software, plans should include the means to achieve sufficient bandwidth to ensure effective communications. In the context of this discussion, Wing Level implies While each community (Ftr/LRP/TAL, etc) will have differing requirements, a centrally controlled 1 CAD capability should be able to respond to each in kind, and would provide the basis for a Op Level CFACC/CAOC should that be required to meet a National or Coalition emergency. In the National context, Op Level planners (CFJOG?) should likewise prepare to field an Op Level secure networking capability to meet the needs of Coalition warfare. Along the same vein, while the Air Force should take responsibility for fielding an organic capability, DDIOs should direct that NCCIS support this capability when the CF deploys joint forces. Lessons Learned - Net-centric warfare is here to stay, thus we must be prepared to operate in this environment if we are to stay relevant. 4. (C) Issue - MESSAGE HANDLING AND DISSEMINATION Discussion -1 A6- 2 / 5 S EC R ET 000044 �s.15(1) Def Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'occes a I'information S E C R ET In effect, the MSOs spent more time on clerical duties than they did maintaining SA. Given the very basic systems NCCIS deployed with, they provided the best support they could with However, the messaging system was simply inadequate to meet tne needs of our operation. The detachment requires Recommendations - Lessons Learned - The volume of information in modern warfare demands that automation be exploited to ensure decision makers have the right facts when they need them. 5. (C) Issue - LEGAL ISSUES - LAW OF THE SEA AND LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT Discussion - The current Use of Force manual lacks clear guidance on basic and theatre specific LOS issues, forcing deployed Commanders to repeatedly seek direction from AJAG, HHQ and DFAIT. Although Canadian forces have been operating in the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman for well over ten years, this Unit could not find a standing document or publication to describe what territorial waters Canada respects in the AOR. Likewise, there is no published direction regarding which waterways are considered International Straits by Canada, and subsequently no direction on how such Straits should be treated by ships aircraft. Further, this Unit was unable to obtain charts suitable for navigation that had TTW boundaries pre-plotted, thus individual Crews were forced to manually plot same, raising the potential for an error and subsequent TTW violation. Further, basic definitions such as "Innocent Passage” and "Transit Passage" are not included in the Use of Force Manual. Of great concern was the discovery of a previous Roto's briefing package that indicated Innocent Passage was acceptable for aircraft. Needless to say, this was immediately corrected. The lack of this published direction leads to unnecessary queries, and worse yet, the potential for subordinate Commanders to apply ROE inconsistently. A6 - 3 / 5 000045 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Recommendations - To ensure all deployed forces are operating with the same set of basic facts and thus interpreting ROE in the same manner, suggest that the following items should be included as an Annex within the Use of Force Manual: a. Definitions of Innocent Passage and Transit Passage, including which units (ships vs aircraft) may exercise which. b. A list of countries by AOR, indicating what limit Canada recognizes or respects regarding TTW. c. A list of Straits which Canada recognizes as International Straits for the purpose of exercising Transit Passage. d. The production of suitable plotting charts (1:500,000 and 1:1,000,000) scale with TTW boundaries pre-plotted by Hydrographic Services. These should be of a quality that allows them to be used for navigation. Lessons Learned - ROE direction must be clear and complete, with HHQ providing amplifying guidance to ensure same. For regions such as SWA, which has seen on-going CF operations for over a decade, and will likely for some time to come. It would be much more efficient to have this direction published in a standing document than having to re-invent the wheel each time a force is dispatched to the theatre. 6. (C) Issue-ATO ISSUES Discussion - During the start of hostilities against Iraq (OIF), the OEF CFACC used an ATO in the Arabian Gulf, while operations over water in the Gulf of Oman were still using the Green rainform to task missions. In order to prepare for the possibility that we might be tasked via ATOs, we initiated a search for methods to obtain, parse, and disseminate the information in the ATO database. Problems arose with all three of these tasks. The ATO, as a whole, was over 250 pages of information, and was sent electronically. Bandwidth coming into the Camp would not be able to handle such a large file. Our U.S. Liaison officer was, for a time, walking over to the American operations to download the ATO onto a zip disk from jNext, we were unable to parse the information into useful information for specific LRP flights. Problems and delays arose with trying to obtain software for this use, and the classified (TITAN) computers themselves did not have updated versions of office software to install the programs. Finally, training of the ATO process and manipulation was needed, however, none of the MSOs had previous experience in working with an ATO. Recommendations - Ideally, all 1 CAD units will switch to an ATO based tasking system, thus it will be second nature to our personnel. Until such time, ATO manipulation should be included in MSO training prior to deployment. It is also recommended that there be sufficient bandwidth capabilities to up and download large amounts of information. A6 - 4 / 5 SECRET 000046 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET Lessons Learned - Had the ATO process been implemented for LRP operations, mission effectiveness and preparation would have suffered. In addition, there was potential for incidents to occur due to the inability to receive and integrate ATO information into briefings. A6 - 5 / 5 SECRET 000047 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET Appendix 7 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 Lessons Learned - Training 1. (U) Issue - THEATRE SPECIFIC TRAINING -OPERATIONS Discussion - The training value of the QMS scenarios was very poor for theatre operations. While it was expected that the initial serials would be rather generic, owing to a lack of awareness of the theatre and the missions, subsequent training should have adapted more quickly to the evolving mission. In an attempt to assist in this process, the LRP Det passed up to date briefings and packages back to Canada. The mission and the players changed significantly during the early part of our Roto, but it was a simple matter to transmit these materials via TITAN, thus ensure the Crews had the latest and best info shortly before departure. Recommendations - A briefing binder from the theatre should be sent to units as a training tool to prepare the incoming crews. This would include Operations Directives and current message traffic. This was done twice during ROTO 2 and allowed for the familiarization of message traffic and specific operations procedures. In addition, an aircrew "gouge sheet", pertinent information that may not otherwise be communicated to new crews, should be sent to incoming crews in order to prepare for deployment. Lessons Learned - Crew preparation for missions in theatre can be greatly enhanced by timely input from the deployed Det. Briefings, messaging, and notes should be sent continually to the squadrons. 2. (C) Issue - HQ/MSO PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING Discussion - There is a requirement for key HQ staff and Mission Support personnel to have Battle Staff Training prior to deployment. For example, throughout the course of this ROTO there were unending discussions between the Det and the OPCON authority on the need for missions to be tasked via an ATO. One of the larger drawbacks in the event missions would be tasked via an ATO was the lack of organic expertise within the Det. There was a large variance in the exposure to and expertise in working in these fields, i.e., some had had Battle Staff courses or had experience in major exercises, and some had no previous experience. This lack of a standard knowledge and skill level directly resulted in certain personnel being forced to assume a greater workload. If pre-deployment Battle Staff training had been conducted in these areas all ops support personnel could have been employed to their full potential. Additional problems associated with this topic relating to hardware and software requirements can be found in the C4I appendix. Training in related areas such as ROE and Air Ops law issues such as TTW must also be addressed in the same manner. This Det relied on the expertise provided by the Legal Advisor to brief our crews appropriately but these topics are best discussed over long periods so that a variety of scenarios and possible course of action are well known and understood by all Flight Ops personnel. Opportunities exist during exercises to ensure that additional personnel get at least a basic understanding of some of these issues. There are also cadres with expertise in the Warfare Centres that may be utilized. TraditionaIly this type of training is provided to a select number of senior officers, however, in practice, it is the junior officer that must apply the principles and procedures. A7 - 1 / 4 SECRET 000048 ■ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'informotion s.15(1) Def SECRET Recommendations - Units, Squadrons, and the Air Force as a whole, should make Battle Staff training available to a wider range of personnel. In addition, they should implement quotas to ensure that personnel deployed either in a similar situation to Op APOLLO or in a Vanguard scenario are fully trained to provide complete mission support. Lessons Learned - HQ and Mission Support personnel need to receive Battle Staff training. 3. (U) Issue - PORTABILITY OF QUALIFICATIONS - COMBAT READY CREWS Discussion - The CTD directs that crew qualifications are not portable when a crew reaches Combat Ready (CADM 30-300, Chap 3, para 9d). It also states that crews are only qualified for operations outside of Canada in Times of Tension and War if they hold that qualification (CADM 30-300, Chap 2, para 5). This means that should any key member of the crew be unable to fly a given mission the crew would degrade to Operations Ready readiness state at best. The CTD implies that the crew would then no longer be capable of participating in missions. Experience during Op Apollo has shown that it is possible to substitute personnel of similar training and experience and still maintain an effective, combat capable crew. It was also noted that it would not have been possible to maintain the mission completion record if it had been necessary to use only crews that met the strict guidelines for Combat Ready. This section of the CTD is unnecessarily restrictive. Adherence to this rule will significantly increase administration burden without providing any significant benefit in performance. Recommendations - The CTD should be amended to allow for the substitution of similarly qualified key crewmembers for operational missions at the discretion of the Det commander while maintaining the Combat Ready status. Lessons Learned - While crew integrity is a vital part of the readiness equation for LRP crews, it is both practical from a personnel management point of view and effective from a readiness standpoint, to have qualified personnel fill in for key crewmembers. 4. (U) Issue - COMBAT READINESS DESIGNATION VS MISSION SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS Discussion - The readiness requirements necessary to achieve Combat Ready were excessive and unnecessary for successful employment in Operation Apollo. To achieve Combat Ready status,, and therefore become employable on operations outside Canada in Times of Tension and War (CADM 30-300 Chap 2, para 5), crews have to achieve all seven Readiness Qualifications, which included skills that were extremely unlikely to be used in Operation Apollo. These included By preparing for missions that were unlikely, the training period was lengthened and resources were unnecessarily expended without a resultant increase in mission effectiveness. Recommendations - The CTD readiness definitions should be modified to allow the Force Employer to determine those Readiness Qualifications that are essential to the operation. Those would then form the minimum for a crew to be considered Combat Ready and therefore deployable. A7 - 2 / 4 S ECRET 000049 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information s.15(1) Def SECRET Lessons Learned - The CTD should be flexible enough to allow for tailoring of readiness requirements to the operation in order to keep training costs to a minimum. A word of caution: ideally all our crews will strive to achieve and maintain qualifications in all warfare areas, yet, at times, this is neither practical nor possible. However, the LRP community must learn from the Airlift experience, in which the number and complexity of crew qualifications unduly restricted employment during APOLLO. Put simply, the Readiness system should support the generation of Crews that can be employed in any reasonably foreseeable mission during the deployment in question. If there is very little/almost no likelihood that a given capability will be required, then the FG should not be required to see that qualification is achieved before declaring the force Op Ready. However, if there is a reasonable chance the capability will be required during the deployment, we definitely do not want to see lame duck crews arrive in theatre. 5. (C) Issue - CTD AMMENDMENTS REQUIRED FOR NEW CAPABILITIES Discussion - The CTD did not require the demonstration of proficiency of some new equipment, such as the Digital Camera and the Iridium Satellite phone, which were used in Op Apollo. Although individuals were trained in their use, the CTD did not demand the crews to train or qualify with the new equipment. This effectively meant that crews became proficient on the new equipment "on the job," resulting in reduced mission effectiveness. Not all the new equipment will have a requirement for inclusion in the CTD as it may already be encompassed by the existing Readiness Qualifications or individual proficiency requirements. Each new piece of equipment should be examined separately to determine if crew training is required. If such a requirement exists the CTD should be amended to reflect the new readiness requirement. The digital camera is a classic case in in point, in that crews were required to achieve Combat Quals using wet film (35mm and Belly Camera), yet used neither of these cameras in theatre - only the digital camera was employed operationally. Recommendations - The CTD should incorporate new equipment into the Readiness Qualifications as soon as there is a demonstrated crew proficiency requirement in excess of that for the individual operators. Lessons Learned - All skills that require a crew proficiency vice an individual proficiency should be included in the CTD. New equipment must be included a soon as a crew training requirement beyond that already found in the CTD is identified. 6. (C) Issue - Discussion -' A7 - 3 / 4 SECRET 000050 I 1 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Recommendations - Modify the CTD as a readiness qualification. This can be done by modifying the existing MP qualifications or adding additional ones. versus Lessons Learned - The CTD must recognize the different skills required for and the possibility that LPR crews may be required to exercise those skills. A7 - 4 / 4 SECRET 000051 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information UNCLASSIFIED Appendix 8 to Annex A - LRP ROTO 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 July 2003 GOO Gouge Departure: As the FE reaches the plane, he should be following the Hot Weather Ops section of the AOIs. The new procedure will be to pull the Circuit Breakers for the Radar Altimeters and the Radiant Floor Heaters; the floor heaters will most likely be pulled and tagged while the planes are in the gulf. Each morning a met brief will be ready for pick up at the met section. They will have a printed copy of the forecasts/actuals as well as the NOTAMs for the various FIRs that you may be flying in. This is fairly important as you have to scan these to check for various activations of restricted/danger areas. They are fairly easy to plot out. We normally sent one pilot to do the MET/Flight Plan and the other two pilots went to start reading message traffic. The brief is not what we get back home, surprise surprise. They have skimmed through most of the message traffic can come up with a Cliff Notes version. Sometimes the join does not arrive on time, but if you are in the DIMMS, it is usually a safe assumption that it is the same as the day before and the zeros and ones never aligned to get the message here in time. As I am sure you already know, the most important thing here is the onsta time and not the briefed take off time, therefore, you will need to adjust your t/o time to ensure that you are not late, otherwise, same procedure for a dev as back home. As for your flight plan, it needs to be faxed to both Dubai and Minhad tower, and usually followed by a phone call to Dubai. The numbers are all on speed dial in ops. There are a bunch of canned routes on a disk that you will probably get. As per the UAE AIP, “the flight plan for a controlled flight should be amended or a new flight plan submitted in the event of a delay of more than 30 minutes in excess of the estimated off-block time. Failure to amend the flight plan within 45 minutes will result in automatic flight plan cancellation.” Trust me, this is a pain. This must be done with Dubai, either by phone or radio. If this is not done, a new plan must be filed and this will result in a 40 minute delay. (10 minutes to walk in, fax and 30 minutes for the new time). Not too great when the CO is breathing down your neck. And many times, they will still require you to fax a new flight plan anyways. A8 - 1 / 5 UNCLASSIFIED 000052 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information UNCLASSIFIED • • • • • Arm the SKAD first (this keeps it quiet in the Bomb Bay - and the ground crew are not in your way while doing it) Start the APU (this is the signal for the ground crew to show up) Close the Bomb-Bay Doors (we have been losing power carts at the most inopportune time by turning on the hydraulic pumps - does not make sense) Disconnect ground power Disconnect ground air (do this last - I don’t think I need to say why) For starting engines, I recommend you call ground prior to the on board check. Sometimes it takes them 10-20 minutes to give you start clearance, and some times they even forget to call you back. Be aware, if you call during prayers, it could take 20 minutes. They are very polite. Telling you how to suck eggs. “Minhad ground, this is MD302, request engine starts 14, souls on board" From the CO, always try to use the word request... "Request clearance for...” You can expect them to mumble back stby, and eventually, cleared engine starts, with the altimeter setting. Normally, you can get your clearance from ground during taxi. "Minhad ground MD302 ready to copy IFR clearance” If you use the old standing by airways, he will most likely leave you standing... IFR Clearance: will normally be “cleared to destination Minhad 09 departure, squawk, contact Dubai 124.45 airborne” On departure, you will be glad to hear a Brit on the radios, very easy to understand. If departing rwy 09, they usually keep you on rwy heading until a few miles out, and then they clear you to your next point. If on rwy 27, it can get busy as they will turn you towards Dubai (from what we have seen) and then back towards TONVO. When level, you will contact UAE Control on 124.85 and approaching TONVO, Muscat on 128.15 prior to chopping. Muscat is a bit harder to understand, basically all they want from you is when you are going "tactical”. Sometimes they will ask you to remain that freq, all you have to tell them is “sorry, we have to change radio freqs” Transition altitude in the UAE is FL 145, and they will not (in the time we tried) approve 14,000 as an altitude. IN THE AREA: You have most likely plotted out the airspace that has showed up in the NOTAMs. There has been much discussion on what to do with areas that are not in the NOTAMs. Basically, the concept of DUE REGARD applies here, as these are international waters, ie 12 miles. However due regard means just that, it is not a licence to fly around blindly without talking to people. Typically in the GOO, we put a 30 mile MEZ around Fujiharah and a 50 mile MEZ around Muscat. For Fuj, the American and British charts generally depict the same thing Class C airspace above 1500 feet. They do differ though, one says it tops at 7500 the other at 9500 feet. So, just ensure you are outside 30 nm prior to going tactical and descending. As for Muscat, the base does differ. On the British A8 - 2 / 5 UNCLASSIFIED 000053 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information UNCLASSIFIED chart, they divide the TCA into sectors. Inside 50 miles, the base is 4500 ft and inside 25 miles the base is 2500 feet. On the American charts, they depict the base as 1500. Both depict the top as FL250. As for in the GOO, most of your time will be spent in Muscats FIR which starts at the surface. They understand you will be off their freq, and it is no problem to call them up asking for flight following. You may be called by the Royal Omani Air Force on guard. Usually all they want to know is that you are a coalition aircraft - then they leave you alone. As for the restricted/danger areas, when we showed up we were told, if it is not in the NOTAMs, don’t worry about it. Great information, mostly correct. Remember we talked about 12 miles, high seas -> due regard... -> Legally we can go in these restricted areas without talking to anyone, but do we want to? Some are in the NOTAMs, some are not. GOO Areas: OOD37 - This airspace is typically seen in the NOTAMs, we avoide it when active. OID80 - never saw it in the NOTAMs, always flew in it. OID55 - Same as D37 - stayed out when active OOD 38 - Should be about 5 or 6 to the east while in Shark Fin. Straits of Hormuz: OOD38 - You should be about 8 miles to the east on a straits passage. OID18 - never saw it in the NOTAMs - Should be on the edge during a straits passage. OOR15 - You will be a couple miles to the North of this area on a straits passage. However a Sea King had problems while operating in this area - they were called on guard...-Awaiting further instruction from NDHQ. OID53 - You will skirt the bottom edge on a straits passage. OID44 - activated by NOTAMs - Straits passage will go through this. OMR 57,58,60 - These 3 areas are extensive helo ops from sfc to 3500 and 4500 feet depending on the are you are in. I recommend checking in with Dubai on 124.45 for some sort of flight following. There is a freq that you will get from ops, 126.4. I have not tried that freq and unsure how it works - It is like 126.7 back home. Use the centre NAG/CAG/SAG Further up in the gulf, there are not many areas that are of concern. The furthest we got was 28N, so I will not comment past there. Bahrain’s TCA needs to be avoided. We treated it like Fuj and Muscat and put a 40 mile MEZ around it. The British charts depict it from 1000 agl to FL 170, which matches the American charts. Another crew said they were happy if you were below 2000 feet in A8 - 3 / 5 UNCLASSIFIED 000054 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a /'information UNCLASSIFIED international water. Again, if you must enter under due regard, keep comms with centre for flight following. When searching in the vicinity of oil rigs/fields, stay on top > 1500 ft unless well clear, or if it is only an isolated rig. (From the CO) Coming Home: When returning from the GOO, we have not had much luck calling up Muscat and getting cleared back to MINHAD via FUJ. They always want us to follow our filed flight plan. One thing to make sure is that you do not come over Omani (land) airspace on the way home. By the way, this is near impossible. They always fly you over Omani territory on they way home. We have tried many times, no luck. Avoid if possible. While at altitude, the plane must be vacuumed. When returning from the SAG, Dubai will give you a very straight forward clearance. Local Weather will be text messaged to the plane 30 minutes prior to off station time. A handy feature.... Landing: Upon landing, you will need to watch the temps in reverse. The CO does not want us to use brakes on the landing roll out, for 2 reasons. 1. Hot Brakes, 2. Tough to change them here. You may be wondering Hot Brakes? Well, if they are already warm to begin with.... Once at a good speed, we roll the flaps up for the taxi back in. We shut the landing lights off around the “your yolk call” This should help them from overheating on the ground. Roll the flaps down again when in the final parking spot. When stopped. The aircraft must be emptied. This includes all rations, garbage and lavatory items (yes the shitter is your responsibility. - recommend telling all pax - they use it, they clean it, prior to flight) Calling the Camp from the Plane 0016139967811 Trunk 2162 Local 00971502284000 ext 40177 gets Camp Operator and then the local 42 or 43 or 48 instead of 50 A8 - 4 / 5 UNCLASSIFIED 000055 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information UNCLASSIFIED Calling a Cell 0097150 and then the Cell MSP OFC MFC CO____ CWO INTO LRP WO Local 4104 4101 4061 4100 4102 4105 4204 Cell 624- 5627 625- 0878 624-5592 624-5621 644-5863 624-0850 Calling Bahrain 00973 and then the 7 digit number. A8 - 5 / 5 UNCLASSIFIED 000056 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Appendix 9 to Annex A - LRP Roto 2 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 Jul 2003 Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre FMO Halifax, NS B3K 2X0 MTA: 3250-6 (TAC) 13 June 2003 Applicable to: AWC Distribution List MARITIME TACTICAL NOTE XXX SELF PROTECTION MANEUVRES - CP140 AURORA Reference: A: NIMROD Tactics Manual Section 8 B: Liaison LRP Det SWA/RAAF P3 Det SWA INTRODUCTION Traditionally it was assumed that the CP140 would always remain clear of threats during a conflict due to its - Conflicts, such as the Gulf War and the Campaign Against Terrorism have proven that LRPA may have to enter areas where friendly air superiority is not established. When asymmetric threats are present in the theatre, such as a terrorist threat, the tactical problem becomes that much more difficult to deal with when applying traditional self-defence procedures, such as Normally a CP140 would not be expected to probe too far inside however if the threat to the surface force was immediate with no other assets avaiiaoie, it is conceivable that LRPA would be put at risk. Whereas the CP140 normally operated from secure aerodromes, the move away from Cold War scenarios and with the transition from MP to LRP raises the spectre of facing threats overhead home plate, during transit and throughout the on station period. This TACNOTE provides suggested self protection maneuvers for areas of operation that would make the CP140 most vulnerable to attack. 1. This TACNOTE is divided into two sections as follows: a. Section 1.1 - Surface Threats and Evasion 1.2 - IR Threats b. Section 2.1 - Airborne Threats and Evasion 2.2 - Defensive Action Plan 2. Comment on this TACNOTE is invited IAW TACNOTE ONE. 3. This TACNOTE was submitted by LRP DET SWA ROTO2. A9- 1/20 SECRET 000057 �Pages 58 to I a 76 are withheld pursuant to section sont retenues en vertu de Particle 15(1) Def of the Access to Information Act de la Loi sur I'acces a ('information �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information UNCLAS Annex B to 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 TO&E - PERSONNEL ESTABLISHMENTS 1. Authorized Establishment: a. ROTO 2 deployed 70 personnel from an establishment of 74. The four shortfall positions are described in para 2. a. of this section. b. Of the 70 personnel initially deployed, two AESOps positions were restricted (14 Mar 03) due to manageable ops intensity. Further, five positions were transferred to TAL's TO&E (19 Jun 03) due to the requirement to maintain a robust ATIC combined with LRP closure. The recommended TO&E changes were developed and forwarded to NCE TAMPA J1. c. Therefore, the current authorized establishment for the LRP Det is 67 military members. Details of the TO&E can be found at Annex C. 2. Posted Strength: On the Detachment's last day of Operations, 19 Jun 03, the posted strength was 63 personnel as delineated below: HQ Ops Crews MSO MAI NT HQ MAI NT Crews 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 8 X LCol XCWO X Maj X Capt X Lt XWO X Maj/Capt/Lt X Maj/Capt/Lt 6 X WO/Sgt/MCpI 4 X WO/Sgt 3 X Capt 1 XSgt 1 X Maj/Capt 1 XMWO 1 XCpI 2 X MCpI/CpI 3 XSgt 21 X MCpI/CpI Det CO Det CWO Ops Fit Comd D/Ops Fit Comd Ops O Ops Fit WO Pilots Tacnavs/Navcoms/ ASOs AESOPs Fit Engineers CMSO/MSO MSA MFC D/MFC ACS Tech AMCRO Crew Chiefs Techs 3. Attachments and Detachments: Not Applicable B1/2 UNCLAS 000077 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information UNCLAS Annex B to 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 TO&E - PERSONNEL SHORTAGES Three LRP ROTO 2 positions were restricted as they were originally assessed to be required only if the detachment was tasked consistently in an ASW role: one D/Ops O, position 243113; one Mission Support Officer, position 243050; and one EW Analyst, position 252652. Upon deployment, one CMSO, position 243047, was not filled due to medical restriction. This position number was ultimately left vacant after administrative repatriation of replacement member on 31 May 03. B2/2 UNCLAS 000078 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'ac'ces a I'information PROTECTED A Appendix to Annex B 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 PERSONNEL s.19(1) POSITION ID DESCRIPTION SOURCE 243028 243031 243029A000 243029B000 243032 243107 243113 243123. 243030A000 24303QB000 243030C000 243030D000 243228A000 243228B000 243228C000 243228D000 243223A000 243223B000 243223C000 243223D000 243221A000 243221B000 243221C000 243221D000 243218A000 243218B000 243218C000 243218D000 243161A000 243161B000 DET COMP DET CWO OPSO OPSO OPS FLIGHT WO OPS FLT COMP D/OPS FLT COMP D/OPS O _TN_ ______ TN_ _ TN ______ TN______ AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP___ AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP L/AESOP L/AESOP L/AESOP L/AESOP FLT ENGR FLT ENGR AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG START DATE 28-Dec-02 28-Dec-02 4-Jan-03 9-Mar-03 4-Jan-03 30-Dec-02 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG END DATE SN SURNAME INIT RANK MOC UIC IA CA LCol 32 CWO 526 Capt 31 Lt 31 WO 81 31 Maj Capt 31 2552 2552 2552 2552 2555 2561 2561 OUELLET SMITH JLR CR Capt Capt 31 31 2555 2552 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 DESROCHES BEDFORD JT KA Sgt MWO 81 81 102 2552 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 BULL TD MCpI 81 2555 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 KING HATFIELD FR LR MCpI WO 81 81 2555 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 LERETTE GILFILLAN SHP GM Sgt Sgt 81 81 2555 2552 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 GALLANT AD Sgt 91 2555 4-Jul-03 4-Jul-03 11-Mar-03 4-Jul-03 4-JUI-03 ~4-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 BIGELOW BROWN BERTRAND FORGET DOUCETTE MCLEOD STEPHENSON FG TN RA L JR B1-1/9 PROTECTED A 000079 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information PROTECTED A Appendix to Annex B 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 PERSONNEL FLT ENGR 243161C000 243161D000I FLT ENGR 243160A000 FLT ENGR 243160B000 FLT ENGR FLT ENGR 243160C000 243160D000 FLT ENGR 243140A000 FO FO 243140B000 FO 243140C000 243140D000 _FO _ 243139A000 FO 243139B000 FO FO 243139C000 243139D000 FO 243138A000 MPC/MPCC 243138B000 MPC/MPCC MPC/MPCC 243138C000 243138D000 MPC/MPCC 243117A000 ASO B 243117B0Q0 ASO B 243117C000 ASO B_ ASOB 243117D000 ASO A 243115A000 243115B00Q ASO A ASO A 243115C000 243115D000 ASO A 243112A000 NC 243112B000 NC 243112C000 NC 243112D000 NC AESOP 243483A000 243483B000 AESOP s.19(1) AIRCOM/19 WG 25-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 TRUESDELL SW Sgt 91 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 JENKINS CASHMAN LF PL Sgt MWO 91 91 2555 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 DUMONT SHAWAGA JRP TD Capt Capt 32 32 2555 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 BACKHOUSE HENDRICKS Capt TR Capt 32 32 102 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 WAGSTAFF REAUME _JD GF Maj LCol 32 32 2555 133 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 FUGGER FAULKNER KO JR Lt Capt 31 31 2555 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 JUTRAS WRIGHT JPM JA Capt Capt 31 31 2555 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 PENNER CASTONGUAY EJ JRP Capt Capt 31 31 2555 2552 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 ___!INMAN MACDONNELL DL JH CpI MCpI 81 81 2552 2561 B1-2/9 PROTECTED A 000080 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information PROTECTED A Appendix to Annex B 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 PERSONNEL 243483C000 243483D000 243238A000 243238B000 243238C000 243238D000 243236A000 243236B000 243236C000 243236D000 243234A000 243234B000 243234C000 243234D000 243163A000 243163B000 243163C000 243163D000 243162A000 243162B000 243162C000 243162D000 243143A000 243143B000 243143C000 243143D000 243142A000 243142B000 243142C000 243142D000 243141A000 243141B000 AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP AESOP L/AES OP L/AES OP L/AES OP L/AES OP FLT ENGR FLT ENGR FLT ENGR FLT ENGR FLT ENGR FLT ENGR FLT ENGR FLT ENGR FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO MPC/MPCC MPC/MPCC s.19(1) AIRCOM/14 WG 9-May-03 8-Jul-03 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 SCHNABEL TETU FRASER AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 CHISLETT ASTLES LAPORTE VC JC JLM AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 RAITHBY MURPHY NELSON WW DE GD AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 NEVETT SEABROOK DERHAK AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 LEVESQUE BALOGH LECLERC AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 FORD HUMBER PUBLICOVER AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 81 81 81 2552 2561 102 WO WO WO 81 81 81 2552 2561 2555 Sgt Sgt Sgt 81 81 81 2552 2554 2555 PE Sgt RW WO KP MWO 91 91 91 2552 2552 2555 JF Sgt FA CWO JWD Sgt 91 91 91 2552 102 2555 DR LJ DB Capt Maj Capt 32 32 32 2552 2555 2555 DESILETS LOURME REIMER AKH GP LG Capt Maj Capt 32 32 32 2552 2561 2555 MAELAND WIGHT BF KE Capt Capt 32 32 2552 2561 M WO JRRJ MCpI MWO B1-3/9 PROTECTED A 000081 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information PROTECTED A appendix to Annex B 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 PERSONNEL MPC/MPCC 243141C000 243141D000 MPC/MPCC 243126A000 243126B000 243126C000 243126D000 243124A000 243124B000 243124C000 243124D000 243120A000 243120B000 243120C000 243120D000 243110A000 243110B000 243110C000 243110DQ00 243119 243128 243133 243136 243157 243158 243159 243164 243240 243242 243245 243247 244370 243047 s.19(1) 3AMERONKELLY MR Capt 32 2555 LITTLE COUTURE MATHESON CE JLG KM Capt Lt Lt 31 31 31 2552 2561 2555 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 ROMANS PARISIEN DEBRUYN ER SV RJ Capt Capt Capt 31 31 31 2552 2561 2555 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 NEGENMAN NYCHOLAT ALBERT RH DE RF Capt Capt Capt 31 31 31 2552 2561 2555 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 14-Mar-03 9-May-03 18-Mar-03 13-May-03 20-Jun-03 ROBERTSON VINET COOPER AM RJ DG Capt Capt Capt 31 31 31 2552 2561 2555 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 19-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 20-Apr-03 HONE PLOURDE MOORE KENNEY BOURGON COTE MACDONALD GIGNAC DONEGAN KEEPING LEGERE SMART OKEEFE FENSKE JRR JRS DM KC JGJP GJE SD KD MG RWT RJ BK LA JP Capt Capt Capt Capt Maj Capt Capt WO Sgt MCpI MCpI MCpI Sgt Capt 31 31 31 31 32 32 32 91 81 81 81 81 91 31 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2561 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG 9-May-03 20-Jun-03 ASO B ASO B 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4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 20-Dec-02 30-Dec-02 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 31-May-03 8-Jul-03 26-Jun-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 19-Jun-03 19-Jul-03 12-Jun-03 19-Jun-03 26-Jun-03 17-Jun-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 26-Jun-03 8-Jul-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 GOULD MCDONNELL MACMILLAN 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 GOGUEN BRUMSEY NEALE 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 TUOHY HEITMANN FROST MCLEAN TURPIN COBB HOWLETT FOWLER WESTERN WARR BERNARD VICTOR CHEMIJ WALDNER REID ' BISHOP RIDGEWAY OR _D_ RA CpI CpI B1-5/9 PROTECTED A 000083 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information PROTECTED A Appendix to Annex B 3180-1 (CO LRPDet) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 PERSONNEL AVN 243356C000 AVN 243356D000 PROPULSION 243286A000 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3233 3233 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 CHILDS VIDITO CHILDS WS BL WS Sgt Sgt Sgt 514 526 514 3233 3233 3233 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 28-Feb-03 25-Apr-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 4-Mar-03 29-Apr-03 24-Jun-03 KRESKY GREENING DURETTE HASKELL WOOLRIDGE DB SK JP HF IC CpI CpI MCpI MCpI CpI 526 526 514 514 514 3233 3233 3233 3233 3233 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 2-May-03 8-Jul-03 4-Mar-03 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 1-Jul-03 CpI 526 3233 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 2-May-03 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 MACDONALD OLIVER CROZIER RR SJ MCpI CpI 526 514 3233 3233 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 1-Jul-03 DILLON WHEATON GOGUEN AC SA JR MCpI 526 CpI 526 MCpI 526 3233 3233 3233 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 BUGLAR SMITH CJ 514 526 3233 3233 CpI CpI B1-6/9 PROTECTED A 000084 �Document 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CJ MCpI Sgt CpI 514 565 514 3233 3233 3233 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 1-Jul-03 PAYNE COLE KRESKY WM _RA DB MCpI 514 MCpI 514 CpI 526 3233 3233 3233 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 2-May-03 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 1-Jul-03 NESBITT TEILLET NESBITT PA MP PA Sgt Sgt Sgt 526 514 526 3233 3233 3233 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 25-Mar-03 20-May-03 4-Jul-03 OUWENDYK DT CpI 514 2552 STEEL SNELL TH AK CpI CpI 514 514 2552 2552 AIRCOM/19WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 25-Mar-03 20-May-03 4-Jul-03 GAUTHIER LILLIE PRIOR JYR BW PP CpI CpI MCpI 526 514 514' 2552 2552 2552 AIRCOM/14 WG 2-May-03 1-Jul-03 YOUDEN LL AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 2-May-03 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 1-Jul-03 FOX MACLEOD FOX DA DA DA AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 2-May-03 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 1-Jul-03 CROZIER WARD MACDONALD AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 2-May-03 11-Mar-03 6-May-03 1-Jul-03 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 7-Mar-03 2-May-03 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG I B1-7/9 PROTECTED A 000085 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information PROTECTED A appendix to Annex B 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 PERSONNEL NAVIGATION 243396A000 243396B000 NAVIGATION NAVIGATION 243396C000 NAVIGATION 243396D000 TACTICAL 243392A000 243392B000 TACTICAL TACTICAL 243392C000 243392D000 TACTICAL 243390A000 NAVIGATION 243390B000 NAVIGATION NAVIGATION 243390C000 NAVIGATION 243390D000 243388A000 TACTICAL 243388B000 TACTICAL TACTICAL 243388C000 243388D000 TACTICAL 243382A000 PROPULSION PROPULSION 243382B000 PROPULSION 243382C000 243382D000 PROPULSION 243262A000 CREW CHIEF CREW CHIEF 243262B000 CREW CHIEF 243262C000 CREW CHIEF 243262D000 DET COMP LRP001 DET CWO LRP002 OPSO LRP003 OPS FLIGHT WO LRP004 OPS FLT COMP LRP005 D/OPS FLT COMP LRP006 D/OPS O LRP007 LRP008 CMSO s.19(1) 526 526 526 3233 2552 2552 MCpI 526 CpI 526 CpI 526 2552 2552 2552 514 514 514 2552 2552 2552 SD AS RR CpI 514 MCpI 526 MCpI 526 2552 2552 2552 KEITHMURRAY EDGETT LEWIS DA JG RG MCpI 514 MCpI 514 CpI 514 3233 2552 2552 WALLACE WETMORE PENNEY WT GM MJ 526 526 526 2552 2552 2552 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 11-Mar-03 . 20-May-03 i 4-Jul-03 MCVEIGH KASSAY COMEAU VLD BJ AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 25-Mar-03 20-May-03 4-Jul-03 NORMAN AKMENS WALLACE HD EA AD AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 25-Mar-03 20-May-03 4-Jul-03 SYKES PIEC SELLSTED SA ML SJ AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 25-Mar-03 20-May-03 4-Jul-03 ARCAND WILSON KAZIMER AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 25-Mar-03 20-May-03 4-Jul-03 AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG AIRCOM/19 WG 4-Jan-03 21-Mar-03 16-May-03 25-Mar-03 20-May-03 4-Jul-03 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 AIRCOM/14 WG CpI CpI CpI CpI CpI CpI Sgt Sgt Sgt B1-8/9 PROTECTED A 000086 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I’accis a I'information PROTECTED A Appendix to Annex B 3180-1 (CO LRP Det) dated 01 Jul 03 LRP DET ROTO 2 PERSONNEL MSP LRP009 LRP010 MSP LRP011 ESS INTO LRP012 LRP013 INT OP INT OP LRP014 LRP015 INT OP MSP LRP016 EWC SP ANALYST LRP017 QIC MAINT LRP018 NCO l/C LRP019 TSS LRP020 TSS LRP021 AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AI RCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG MSP LRP DET TACNAV AIRCOM/14 WG AIRCOM/14 WG 260636 260922 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 4-Jan-03 8-Jul-03 _______ TAVS 18-May-03 23-Mar-03 4-Apr-03 27-Apr-03 VENNE MCBEAN JRRD| Capt 31 JD Maj 31B 102 2561 s.19(1) B1-9/9 PROTECTED A 000087 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET Annex C - LRP Det Flying Orders Part 1 - JTFSWA LRP DET ORDERS Part 2 - LRP DET CONTINGENCY PLANS SECRET 000088 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information JTFSWA LRP DET ORDERS <0 O ' __ : a'A >» s 0*> o Q 0° SOUTH WEST ASIA ROTO ONE ROTO / 1/32 Ch 3 000089 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /‘information RECORD OF AMENDMENTS AL NO Original Ch 1 Ch 2 Ch 3 AMEND DATE DATE ENTERED SIGNATURE 12 Mar 02 10 Oct 02 19 Mar 03 01 Feb 02 12 Mar 02 10 Oct 02 19 Mar 03 Marley Hogan McLeod 2/32 Ch 3 000090 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information LONG RANGE PATROL DETACHMENT ORDERS TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME 1 - LOCAL FLYING ORDERS VOLUME 2 - CONTINGENCY PLANS (Held in MSO Lockup) VOLUME 1- LOCAL FLYING ORDERS SECTION 100 - GENERAL 100.1 — LRP Detachment and Crew Organization 100.2 - Correspondence 100.3 - Handling of Classified Mail 100.4 - Security 100.5 - Dress 100.6 - Crew Administration 100.7 - Leave Procedure 100.8 - Static Displays - Non-Service Personnel 100.9 - Flight Information Publications (FLIPS) 100.10 - Aviation Credit Card Policy & Directives 100.11 - Telephone Use 100.12 - Critical Incident Stress Management SECTION 101 - AIRCREW ORDERS/FLIGHT OPS 101.1 - Alcoholic Beverages - Consumption 101.2 - Aircrew Information File 101.3 - Monthly/Quarterly Reading File 101.4 - LRP Detachment Weekly Flying Program 101.5 - LRP Detachment Daily Flying Program 101.6 - Operational Flights - Briefing - Debriefing 101.7-CPI/ELT Testing 101.8 - Refuelling Priorities and Safety 101.9 - Operational Flights - Delay 101.10- Operational Flights - Cancellation 101.11- Hot Weather Pre-Flight Procedures 101.12- Engine Start Procedure 101.13- Engine Run 101.14- Landing Lights - Collision Avoidance 101.15 - Post Flight Requirements - Inbound Report 101.16- Vacuuming of Aircraft 101.17 - Flaps after Landing 101.18- Standby 101.19- Authorization and Conduct of Flights 101.20 - MP Crew Commander Authority 101.21 - Mission Reports 101.22 - LRP Detachment Daily Routine 101.23 - Rations and Rations Handling 101.24 - Aircrew Logbooks 101.25 - Personal Equipment/Dual Layer Clothing 101.26 - Aircraft Accidents or Incidents 101.27 - Conduct of OJT Programs 3/32 Ch 3 000091 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information 101.28 - Crew Pubs Bag 101.29 - Iridium Telephone 101.30 - Digital Imagery Upload 101.31 -Emergency Diversion Airfields SECTION 102 - TERMINAL AERODROME - DESCRIPTION 102.1 - Minhad Military Air Traffic Zone 102.2 — Airspace Coordination 102.3 - Radio, Navigation, Radar and Lighting 102.4 - Airfield Information 102.5 - Flight Planning Centre (FPC) 102.6 - VFR Circuit Procedures 102.7 - Special VFR (SVFR) 102.8 - Traffic Pattern 102.9 - Circuit Procedures 102.10 — Go Around and Fly Through Procedures 102.11 - Vehicle Traffic and Aerodrome 102.12 - Radio Frequencies 102.13 - Fuel Dumping - Area and Procedures 102.14 - DICP Review of OMDM 102.15 - Approach Plates Modified iaw DICP Review SECTION 103 - EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES 103.1 - Emergency Response Plan (ERP) 103.2-Crash Equipment SECTION 104 - ARMAMENT SAFETY ORDERS - AIRCREW 104.1 - Armament Safety Orders 104.2 - Parking/Loading Area for Aircraft Loaded with Bomb Bay Stores 104.3 - Loaded Aircraft - Security 104.4 - Sono Launch Tube Restrictions 104.5 - Armament Load - AMRS Certification 104.6 — Signal Underwater Sound (SUS) Charge - Safety Precaution 104.7 - ASW Stores Safety Precautions 104.8 - Action in Event of Hang-up or Misfire 104.9 - Emergency Jettison of Stores 104.10 - Ditching/Crash Landing with Explosives 104.11 - Accident Investigations 104.12- Munitions Handling 104.13 - Uploading/Downloading of Aircraft 104.14 - Arming/De-arming of Aircraft 104.15 - Touch and Go Landing With Ordnance 104.16 - Air Weapons Occurance Reporting 104.17 - Small Arms Procedures On-Board Aircraft 104.18 - Fuel Dump Procedure SECTION 105 - MARITIME PATROL IMP) STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 105.1 - Six-Hour Standby 105.2 - Two-Hour Standby Launch Procedures 105.3 - One-Hour Standby Requirements 105.4 - One and Two-Hour Standby Aircraft Designation/Use SECTION 106 - AIRCREW PROFICIENCY 106.1 - All Trades 4/32 Ch 3 000092 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc&s a /'information 106.2-Pilots Attachments (1): 1. JTFSWA LRP Det Flight Safety Program 1010-2 (UFSO) Jun 02 (2) : Aircraft Crash I Significant Incident Response (3) : JTFSWA LRP Det NBC Concept of Operations 3472-2 (NBCO) Sep 02 VOLUME 2 -LRP CONTINGENCY PLANS- (Held in MSO Lockup) 5/32 Ch 3 000093 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information JTFSWA LRP DET ORDERS z^'0N % _)C i > ->2 • « •«. V ■ i .• . ■Jtf ?-*. D° 2 o Q SOUTH WEST ASIA R0T00NE * r /' **V-. VOLUME ONE FLYING ORDERS 6/32 Ch 3 000094 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information 7/32 Ch 3 000095 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information Section 100 GENERAL 100.1 - LRP Detachment and Crew Organization 1. LRP Detachment Organization | COMMANDING OFFICER [ scwo I IF OFC/DCO MFC I | DEP OFC |P D/MFC 1 - Maint Support OPS/O CMSO INTO A CREW CREW 1 MSO’s 4 CREW 2 - OPS WO MSA INT 2/IC J || I EW Supr~]| J[ B CREW C CREW Int Ops | EW Ops | 8/32 Ch 3 000096 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information 2. LRP Det Recall Chart Commanding Officer 4100 624-5592 I Maint Fit Comd 4061 625-5621 I A Crew Chief 4140 552-4948 D/MFC 4140 624-5621 I I B Crew Chief 4140 624-6318 I C Crew Chief 4140 552-4135 Det CWO 4102 458-0122 I I AMCRO ACS 4123 I Ops Fit Comd 4101 624-5627 I OpsO 4109 624-5781 Crew 9 455-3003 Crew 10 655-2513 D/Ops Fit Comd 4109 552-3098 I I CMSO 4104 655-1540 I I ~1 MSO's MSA 4104 4104 I IntO 4105 644-5863 I I lnt2/IC 4105 453-3724 I EW Supr 4129 457-8043 IntOps EW Ops Ops WO 4204 624-0850 9/32 Ch 3 000097 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 10/32 Ch 3 000098 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 100.2 - Correspondence 1. All correspondence will be received, recorded and dispatched through the Camp CR. Addressees are to action official correspondence quickly and return the documents to the LRP clerk for filing. 2. The LRP clerk is to retain and file correspondence of a routine nature and of concern to LRP Det members only. 3. Authority to release messages or letters is vested in the Comd LRP Det and members of his executive only. No LRP Det member is to initiate unauthorized official correspondence with external agencies. 100.3 - Handling of Classified Mail 1. All incoming classified mail will be registered by the Camp CR. The Camp CR, if required, will obtain signatures for classified mail passed to LRP Det sections or individuals. 2. When a classified document is passed by hand from one section or individual to another, the Camp CR must be advised. 3. No other badges are to be wom on flying clothing without the consent of the Comd LRP Det. 4. Metal or plastic name tags or insignia of any kind shall not be wom on flying clothing. 5. Ball caps may be wom on board aircraft only. The ball cap is not an official headdress and shall not be wom while in uniform, within the confines of the base. 6. 1AW Refs : A. 1 CADORD 2-007 and B. 1 CAD COMD 025 241545Z Feb 03 LRP Det Mbrs will either wear the one piece flight suit, or both the shirt and trousers. For all Take-offs and Landings, and at all other times when, in the opinion of the Aircraft Captain, the risk to aircraft in flight warrents a higher level of individual protection. Dress for aircrew personnel while not performing flying duties shall be either the one or two-piece combat flying suit or combat fatigue clothing. 100.6 — Crew Administration 1. Personal Development Reports. MPCCs are responsible for ensuring that PDRs are completed on each crew member. In exceptional circumstances a letter of assessment will be produced. 100.4 - Security 100.7 - Flight Information Publications (FLIPS) 1. The Mission Support Office must be secured when no one is present. 1. FLIP allocation and distribution are determined by consultation between the Ops O/MPC. The Ops O approves FLIP requirements and ensures that sufficient quantities, including spares, are procured through the Supply system. 2. The flight line, Operations Flight Office, Mission Support and the Comm Centre are restricted access areas. Aircrews are permitted access to all areas except the Comm Centre. 100.5 - Dress 1. The dress and appearance of all aircrew personnel is to be of the highest standard at all times. 2. The following badges only are authorized on flying clothing: a. a LRP Det badge worn on the left sleeve with the centre top of the crest 3 cm below the shoulder seam; b. cloth issue name tags are to be worn above the right breast pocket; c. flying badges are to be worn above the left breast pocket; and d. camouflage squadron crest on right sleeve. 2. The Ops O will provide FLIPs to users as required. The Ops O will advise the crews ASAP when new FLIPs are available for pick-up. . 3. FLIPs for the LRP Det AOR are carried onboard the Aurora . It is the responsibility of the MPAC/MPC to ensure before flight that the aircraft contains the required pubs for the flight. 4. After the last flight of the day, the standard FLIPs should be folded and placed in the pubs holding bins by the pilot and co-pilot's seats. 5. As FLIP quantities are limited and difficult to obtain, users must exercise due care to minimize wearand-tear. Aircraft Captains shall advise the Ops O of any discrepancies or deficiencies with enough time to obtain the necessary FLIPS. 100.8 - Aviation Credit Card Policy & Directives The following procedures shall be used for all aviation credit cards: 11/32 Ch 3 000099 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information a. the person signing the credit card purchase shall annotate the purchase slip with the aircraft serial indication and his own identity; b. the MPAC/MPC shall confirm that all credit card purchase slips were for the services rendered/matcrial received in the public interest; and c. report the loss of any credit card to the Ops O by the quickest means possible. 5. Activation. A request to activate a CISRT will be passed to the MO or Chaplain. 6. Participation. The CO could order LRP Det personnel to participate in a critical incident stress debriefing or defusing. However, it is emphasized that a debriefing or defusing can be extremely beneficial and all personnel involved in an incident will be strongly encouraged to participate. Confidentiality is strictly maintained for CISRT members and those receiving CIS interventions. 100.09- Telephone Use 1. Any long distance phone calls should be made through LRP Operations or Mission Support. If possible, AVN access should be attempted before commercial lines are utilized. 100.10- Critical Incident Stress Management Ref: CFAO 34-55 1. Description. The purpose of this SOP is to establish the basis whereby a Critical Incident Stress Response Team (CISRT) could be activated on the request of LRP Det management. The objective of the CISRT is to intervene early in a post-traumatic situation for the psychological well-being of LRP Det personnel. 2. General. Critical incidents would include an aircraft crash or accident, death or suicide of a LRP Det member, or any other significant or traumatic event. The effect of post incident stress of the nature described can have potentially devastating psychological implications on our LRP Det personnel. The LRP Det does not have a CISRT to deal with issues such as these. If a situation arises the MO and Chaplain will be the lead personnel, until a CISRT can be formed. The goals of a CISRT are to conduct a debrief or defuse service personnel involved in such an incident. The debrief is not an operational critique but rather a structured format to assist people who are having normal reactions to an abnormal and devastating situation. 3. Requirement. A request for CISRT intervention on the behalf of LRP Det personnel will be the result of a LRP Det leadership evaluation of the critical incident and post-incident effects. 4. Authority. Authority to request CISRT intervention rests with CO LRP Det or MPCC in consultation with the CO. In their absence, the Acting CO shall have the authority to activate the team. 12/32 Ch 3 000100 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information s.15(1) Def Section 101 101.1 - Monthly/Quarterly Reading Requirements 1. All LRP Det aircrew shall read the following publications within the first seven days of each month or quarter (as applicable) or prior to commencing flying duties during the month/quarter. LRP Det aircrew shall “initial as having read” monthly/quarterly required reading on the AIF file: a. Monthly or as amendments are published: 1. If takeoff for an operational mission is not possible within six hours of briefing, the crew should normally be released. The type of mission, time of day, previous duty and length of patrol will be considered. If mission priority is such that the flight must be flown and a replacement crew is not available, the MPCC is to advise the tasking authority to amend the mission parameters to meet an 18-hour crew duty day. 2. The decision to release a crew and assign another will be made by the LRP Det Comd, Ops Fit Cdr or Ops O as applicable. (1) LRP Det Flying Orders; b. Quarterly: (1) CF Flying Orders, B-GA-100-001 /A A-000; (2) 1 CAD ORD Vol 2; (3) 1 CAD ORD Vol 3; (4) 1 CAD ORD Vol 5; and (5) 1 CAD SMM. 2. The LRP Det Operations Officer (Ops O) shall provide up-to-date copies of the above publications on CD or access to the pubs via intranet DIN. 101.2 - LRP Det Weekly Flying Program I. The Ops O will promulgate a weekly flying program. 101.3- LRP Det Daily Flying Program 1. A daily flying program will be published by LRP Det Ops. The Ops Fit Cdr is to be advised of any changes to the daily program. 2. MPCCs are to make arrangements with LRP Det Ops for fuel load or any other specific requirements at least 24 hrs prior to intended departure time. 101.4-CPI/ELT Testing CPI/ELT Testing should take place within the first five minutes of any hour for a duration not to exceed five seconds. CPIs/ELTs may be tested at other times if necessary. Base ATC approval is required for all tests. 101.5-Onerational Flights - Cancellation 1. The authority for the amendment or cancellation of a mission rests with the tasking authority. 101.6 - Engine Runs 1. The primary CP 140 high power engine run-up area will coordinated with Minhad Ground. 2. Low power engine runs must also be coordinated with Minhad Ground. 3. Aircraft Captains and Crew Chiefs are to ensure that aircraft conducting engine runs are positioned to ensure that the wake turbulence created by the engines will not cross any runway. 101.7 - Post-Flight Requirements - Inbound Report 1. Approximately 30 minutes prior to landing, aircraft are to advise callsigns Icy Ops and Eskimo, on UHF 295.0 MHZ of their ETA, fuel and services required on landing. 101.8 - Vacuuming of Aircraft I. Due to excessive amounts of fine dust and dirt, crews are required to vacuum to the aircraft on the return leg of each flight. 2. Due to the dust clogging the filter, crews should clean the filter during pre-flight, periodically during flight and shall clean it before landing. 101.9-Standby 101.4- Operational Flights - Delay Refs: A. 1 CAD ORD 2-004 Section 4 13/32 Ch 3 000101 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 1. From time to time it may be necessary to place crews on increased standby readiness. 2. Standby liability periods are accepted by the LRP Det in 24-hour increments from 0800 hrs (local) until the following day at 0800 hours. The standby crew shall work toward becoming airborne and mission capable as soon as possible after the initial alert. 3. The standby crew will not normally be tasked during their standby period. During the standby period crew members shall remain on the Base, and keep their MPCC advised of their whereabouts at all times. The MPCC shall initially check in with the LRP det Duty Ops Officer and keep him/her advised of his/her whereabouts for the duration of the liability period. Activities must be governed by the principle that becoming airborne as soon as possible remains the first priority. 4. Crew members scheduled for standby duties shall not consume alcoholic beverages after 2000 hrs the night prior to commencing the liability period, until the standby period is terminated. 101.10- Authorization and Conduct of Flights Refs: A. B-GA-100-003/AA-GDO (CF Flying Orders) B. 1 CAD ORD 2-002 C. 1 CAD ORD 2-006 D. 131903Z Oct 01 1CAD HQ Comd 259 FDI Risk Mitigation Plan/Op Apollo 1. Flight Authorization - Scheduled Flights. The daily flying program will be recognized as the initial direction for all flights scheduled therein and, as such, shall be approved and signed by either the LRP Det Comd or an FAO. All other flights require authorization by an FAO. A change of tasking, MPCC or MPC represents a change to the Daily Flying Program and will, therefore, require authorization by an Authorizing Officer. MPCCs and MPCs are self-authorizing on Form CF-773 for the specific flights scheduled on the Daily Flying Program as detailed below: a. Operational Missions. An MPCC is self­ authorizing for operational and standby operational/SAR missions; b. Local PPF. All local PPF require authorization by an FAO; and 2. Flight Authorization - Unscheduled Flights. An FAO must authorize any flight not promulgated by the Daily Flying Program. 3. Special Take-off Limits. Below landing limit take-offs are authorized IAW ref D, with the following exception: The LRP Det Comd, OFC or a designated FAO must authorize the take-off when the visibility is less than one half statute mile or RVR 2400 (800 meters). 101.11 - Mission Reports 1. The MPCC will submit to Mission Support a Mission Report following operational flights. 2. The Aircraft Captain will submit to LRP Det Ops a Captain's Report following all flights. The report should include any significant observations or deviations from the assigned task. 3. MPCCs are encouraged to submit special reports regarding tasking, equipment, etc, when this information is deemed beneficial to the LRP Det. 101.12 - Aircrew Logbooks 1. The end-month summary of flying times including all subtotals, shall be entered in the individual's logbook. Crew logbooks shall be submitted monthly to the appropriate MPCC for signature. MPCCs will submit their logbooks to the Ops Fit Comd. The Ops Fit Comd and Det CWO shall submit their logbooks to the LRP Det Comd. 2. Aircrew shall make use of the official LRP Det logbook stamp. All logbooks shall be left in the designated space accessible to supervisory staff. 101.13- Personal Equipment/Dual Laver Clothing Ref: 1 CAD Orders, Vol 2, 2-007 para 19. 1. A double layer of clothing shall be worn by all aircrew to the maximum extent practicable. In hot weather, any decision not to wear a double layer of clothing will be based on loss of protection versus adverse effects of heat stress. 2. It is prohibited to carry any personal equipment outside flying suit pockets. The Gerber multi-tool may be carried as long as it is secured on the belt or within a flight suit pocket, and is appropriately marked with the individuals name and service number. 3. In order to prevent FOD only controlled tools are to be used on the aircraft. Gerber multi-tools and non-issue MAG light may be carried on the aircraft for personal emergency/survival purposes provided they are secured in a closed zippered pocket. Use of these tools for maintenance action on the aircraft is strictly 14/32 Ch 3 000102 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information s.15(1) Def prohibited. Aircrew must take precautions to ensure equipment is secured and accounted for on de-planing. b. AirSat CB shall be powered off (CB pulled) when not in use during covert or on emcon restricted missions; and 4. The Following standard greeting shall be used by crews when answering the Iridium Telephone: 101,14 - Aircraft Accidents or Incidents 1. The LRP Det Comd and OPS Fit Cdr shall be informed of aircraft accidents or incidents as quickly as possible. 2. Aircraft accident/incident reports are to be filed within 12 hours of the occurrence. Guidelines for accident/incident reporting are contained in the GPH 204. Aircraft Occurrence Reports (CF 215) will be filed through the LRP Fit Safety Officer. Flight Safety reports will also be sent to Minhad Base Operations. 3. Aircrew involved in an aircraft accident or physiological incident are required to undergo medical examination by a medical officer as soon as possible after the occurrence. “Canadian Forces Patrol Aircraft XXX (tail #) This is an unsecure line, how may I help you?" 101.17 - Digital Imagery Upload 1. There are several modem equipped AirSats that are able to connect to the internet and e-mail digital images to required e-mail addresses. The following shall apply: a. b. c. No classified data shall be sent; Pictures shall be saved as small as possible in JPEG format; and Data transferred shall be of significant operational value, and a log shall be kept of all transmitted pictures. 101.15- Crew Pubs Bag 101.18- Emergency Diversion Airfields 1. Ata minimum, each crew shall carry the following publications, including the latest amendments, on all operational missions: 1. Airfields in the United Arab Emirates, such as Al Dhaffa, Fujairah and Abu Dhabi, are suitable diversion airfields if unable to return to Al Minhad. a. 1 CAD SMM, b. JTFSWA LRP Local Flying Orders, and c. SAR Manual. 101.16 - Iridium Telephone Ref: C-12-140-000/MB-002 AO1 Section 52 1. The Iridium telephone is cleared for use on Op Apollo aircraft by an AirSat trained NavCom. 2. Crews should ensure the Iridium Telephone system is turned on during all missions. Periodically, crews should conduct an Iridium test with LRP Mission Support (001-613-996-7811 trunk 2162 - Local 4104). 3. The following restrictions shall be followed: a- 2. Airfields in other Gulf states including Bahrain (Manamah Intnl), Qatar (Doha), Kuwait (Kuwait Intnl), Oman (Masirah) are suitable as emergency diversion fields. 3. Unless an emergency is so extreme that a crew cannot make land at one of the aforementioned airfields, crews should not divert to airfields in the following nations: Oman (other than Masirah), Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India. 4. Under no circumstances shall crews divert to airfields in Iraq, Yemen or Somalia. 5. Other suitable diversion airfields, outside the Gulf Region, include: Diego Garcia, Djibouti, Kenya (Mombassa), the Maldives (Male Intnl) and the Seychelles (Victoria Intnl). 6. Crews must be aware that in case of emergency, and they are attempting to gain permission to land at the nearest suitable aerodrome, that this request could be denied. 15/32 Ch 3 000103 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Section 102 TERMINAL/AERODROME - DESCRIPTION. OPERATION Ref: Minhad Airbase Local Operating Procedures. Ref: AFM 11-17 Minhad Local Operating Procedures 1. Reduced weather minima for VFR flights within the Minhad MATZ shall apply to all Minhad based aircraft. VFR flight will be permitted down to a reported visibility of 3000M and I or cloud ceiling of 1000 ft. 102.1 - Minhad Military Air Traffic Zone 1. The Minhad Military Air Traffic Zone vertical dimensions are from the surface to FL145 and is bounded by the following points: a. 25 06 00N-055 18 40E; b. 25 00 40N-055 38 30E; c. 24 56 30N-055 11 55E; d. 25 06 00N-055 27 50E; e. 24 50 19N-055 38 10E; and f. 25 02 55N-055 11 50E. 2. The traffic pattern and circuit may be flown when the MATZ is under reduced weather minima. Should the cloud ceiling be 1000ft then the pilot should fly the traffic pattern at an altitude of 700 feet MSL in order to remain clear of cloud. 102.5 - Special VFR (SVFR) 2. Approach control service in the Minhad MATZ is provided by Minhad Radar/Dubai Radar unless delegated to Minhad Tower. 3. Minhad Tower will provide aerodrome control service to traffic operating in the Minhad MATZ up to 1500 feet MSL or higher if airspace is delegated to the aerodrome controller. 102.2 - Radio. Navigation. Radar and Lighting 1. Radio equipment includes primary and backup VHF/UHF transmitters and receivers; navigation equipment includes a VOR/DME, an NDB and an ILS. 2. UHF Frequencies. The primary radio for local traffic is VHF, with UHF available as a backup. UHF frequencies must be requested from Tower for back-up. 102.3 - Airfield Information 1. The Airfield elevation is 174 feet and Magnetic Variation is 1 East. 2. Marking aids arc standard on runway and taxiways. 3. The aerodrome reference point is: 25 01 31N-055 22 12E, which is the mid-point of runway on the centre line. 102.4 - VFR circuit procedures 1. When the reported visibility is less than 3000 meters, but not less than 1500 meters, aircraft are permitted to operate on Special VFR clearances (SVFR). Geographical separation shall be provided between each aircraft, and from all IFR flights. 2. For SVFR for local helicopters refer to AFM 11-17 Minhad Local Operating Procedures. 102.6 - Traffic Pattern 1. The traffic pattern is located to the south of the airfield and consists of a crosswind leg, downwind leg, base leg and final. The final leg is eliminated if the aircraft flies a base leg to initial. Circuit altitude is 1500' MSL. 102.7 - Go Around and Fly Through Procedures 1. If not cleared to land or for a touch and go, aircraft are to go around at a minimum of 100 ft AGL. The following procedures are to be followed: a. Go Around. Aircraft captains may go around at any time for flight safety reasons, operational reasons or when instructed to do so by ATC. Pilots initiating a go around are to advise ATC as soon as possible. A go around instruction from ATC must be acknowledged as soon as it is safe to do so. When going around, aircraft are not to climb above 1000 feet MSL before the departure end of the runway; and b. Fly Through. ATC may instruct an aircraft to fly through at any time and aircraft must acknowledge this command. A pilot may elect to fly through for any reason and must inform ATC as soon as it is safe to do so. Aircraft flying through must regain or maintain their circuit altitude. 16/32 Ch 3 000104 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information 102.8 - Vehicle Traffic on Aerodrome 1. For Canadian operations, only line vehicles are allowed on the ramp. 102.9 Fuel Dumping - Area and Procedures Ref: 1 CAD HQ Uniform Spill Reporting Protocol 1262-1 6 July 1998 TBP 102.10- DICP Review ofOMDM Ref: http://winnipeu.mil.ca/a3ar/Pubs/DICP pubs/Minhad UAE.doc At ref Division 1CP carried out a review of the approached at Minhad airfield. The following approach plates reflect this review. 17/32 Ch 3 000105 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information 102.11 - Approach Plates Modified in accordance with DICP Review INSTRUMENT APPROACH CHART - CAB AD ELEV 174 FT DUBAI / Minhad ILS/DME RWY 27 (Cot c+d+e) GMC 121.925 290.5 TWR 118.55 24811 APR 122.50 252.8 HEIGHTS RELATED TO THR RWY 27 055'So’ MSA ’■ 2400 25 NM from MIN VOR 2400/^25 NM Seole liSOO.OOO . HEIGHTS IN I KT 03 2£ 2.000FJ 10' src ■ 'minhad IMN KJ9.9 i 'Ji 6 DME MIN\115.2 / .11 DME T. IMN DME CH 99X 'Off, 09ff ^fe-267 280MATZ FUS 13 DME. SFC MIN 620 / / 0'7 MSA 2400 25 NM. jo-tig; .1 src «> , 055,10’, 2500 MISSED APPROACH: Climb '.0 2500 FT. , p55'|20’, MIN VOR/OME B* 13 DME MIN 11 DME 6 DME 100-- IMN FAF (GP INOP) CP 1190 *»*»• RDH 53 I----- 1------ 1------ 1------ 1 NM FROM 8 9 10 11 12 THR RWY 27 A Circling o: Procedure not authorized with DME INOP ALS INOP VIS changed: ILS 3/4 LOC 1 3/4 5 I ° 5 3 2100 — 267 IMN < ____ ELEV I7f (THR 27) OCA (OCH) ILS CAT I Straight-in GP INOP Approach 551 TL FL150 TA 13000 IMN I 3 DME Continue straight J ahead to 3 DME • (west of) MIN. I Then Left Turn to join holding at MIN VOR. o ’24' 05530' 5 , 374 (200) D___ 1/2 700 (526) 1 1/4 B 960 (786) NM Altitude ONH rr Ground Spaed NTS Rota of Doacent j FT/MIN Central Air Base - Minhad 1380 (1206) 3 2 1/4 DUE from THR E _2_ 3 520 60 820 1110 80 ICO 120 140 160 295 395 495 590 690 790 5 1410 1700 6 2000~ Procedure reviewed for TERPS by 1 CAD HQ DICP 7 Aug 02 18/32 Ch 3 000106 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information F AD ELEV 174 FT INSTRUMENT APPROACH CHART - CAB I DUBAI / Minhad VOR/DME RWY 09 (Cat C+D+E) IGMC 121.925 290.5 i TWR 118.55 248.1 ; APP 122.50 252.8 HEIGHTS RELATED TO AD ELEV — ‘ ' 055T0' ", MSA 2400 25 NM - .' from MIN VOR 055'30- ' BEARINGS ARE MAGNETIC ALTITUDES 4 ELEV IN FEE! -------- —-------- MSA-.. Scole 1:500,000 2400£25 NM from MIN VOR NM 1. R62 SFC irr AVOR/DMEFAF S DME MIN 11 DM MIN I —090 510 1 MINHAD 260L. 087' ^27<T= IS I. 11 DME MIN Ml juopn 576 *620 \ SEC *17 617 ■:«i, SFC MSA / from MIN VOR SFC , , psspy. , p55|W , 6 DME 2100 -s 087— OST AL NM FROM MIN VOR S 12 150* ELEV 174_________ (AD ELEV) 11 10 9 OCA (OCR) VOR/DME o . » Climb to 2500 FT. Continue straight ahead to 3 0ME (east of) MIN VOR. Then Right Turn to join holding ot MIN VOR. MAPI 510- ■ MISSED APPROACH: I FAF IF i\ 2500 I —■1V MIN I __ I- from MIN'^VOR 124‘ 055(30', MIN VOR/DME 11 DME MIN MSA ; ' •2400. 25 NM- UNI b 2400 25 NM ' 8 7 6 A 5 3 4 2 1 0 c B D____ 1 3/4 720 (582) E Stroighl-in Approach •O I Circling a: Procedure not authorized with DME INOP 3 a 960 (786) Central Air Base - Minhad 5 i 2 3 Altitude QNH n 610 890 1160 1440 1720 KTS 60 80 100 120 140 160 FT/MIN 285 380 475 565 650 755 Rate of Descent 3 17380 (1206)3 ‘.M Ground Speed LU 2 1/4 DME from MIN 4 • \6 2000 Procedure reviewed for TERPS by 1 CAD HQ DICP 7 Aug 02 19/32 Ch 3 000107 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information AD ELEV 174 FT INSTRUMENT APPROACH CHART - CAB J' I-' ' MSA:' 'v MSA •- 1—r—1—i—r—| 055'bo' ' e^Tfu/sso/x' < 2400-25 NM J from MIN'VOR I '......... bl ' 7/ DUBAI / Minhad VOR/DME RWY 27 (Cat C+O+E) GMC 121.925 290.5 TWR 118.55 248'. 1 APP 122.50 252.8 HEIGHTS RELATED TO AD ELEV MSCT - Stole 1:500,000 2400r/25 NM. from MIN VOR 'till NM Inn? • - ' i25-. TO' . ‘ ' SFC I 03 25 W-flEI 10' SFC V: & 550 XyWF* ^1^%. \ I (moofI \lNHAD MM MIN\115.2 r ^9oy/M 335 1 I /? I p55'|1 O', 2500 MISSED APPROACH: Climb to 2500 FT. Continue straight X" ahead to 3 DME » (west of) MIN. Then Left Turn to join holding at MIN VOR. I I i I s ■ J' , , J517 ^4554^ I , , . <o *o. ftssrpcr, , MSA R51 f> MSA I 13 DME . MIN 620 &/\ t/018 \ Z15,000£T\ SFC X 017 WL SFC I / \B50/ src / I . ■ A . ■ 055,30', OCA (OCH) VOR/DME U r ................. y/ MIN VOR/DME ir 1 8 DME MIN 100--^ I 2 OWE MIN MAPI 0 2 >r FAF 13 DME MIN _ I I — 267 2100 IF .5'' 925 A__ I ____________ ELEV 174 (AD ELEV) 3 T> 1 [SZS]^ MATZ fJJ-45 -’•WPH ... 2400 25 NM/ g, from MIN VOR' 26£! A----- 1Q£ 25oo 28<y Li 13 DME \MIN MIN .A534 I !5’X 8 d'M£'4 ‘ " / DME CK.99X 3 A 4 5 B 6 7 8 9 10 NM FROM MIN VOR/DME 12 11 I _D__ 1 1/2 C 800 (626) E Straight-in Approach 1 I 'I ______ Circling__________________ Procedure not authorized with DME INOP ALS INOP VIS changed: 2 UJ 3 o Ground Speed Rate of Descent 3 I Central Air Base - Minhad 1380 (1206) 3 2 1/4 960 (786) DME from MIN Altitude QNH NM n KTS FT/MIN 3 520 60 295 4 ~82? 80 395 5 6 7 1110 1410 1700 140 100 120 590 690 495 8 2000 160 790 Procedure reviewed for TERPS by 1 CAD HQ DICP 7 Aug 02 20/32 Ch 3 000108 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information © VOR/DME N 2501.5 E 5520.9 + 174 MINHAD AIR BASE 60 THRESHOLD RWY 09 N 2501.5 E 5521.3 + 140 A B WEST RAMP N 2501.3 E 5521.8 + 160 RAMP 2 N 2501.3 E 5522.1 + 162 c =4 o 7=5 NORTH ATC RAMP 1 N 2501.3 E 5522.5 + 165 E EAST RAMP N 2501.4 E 5522.8 + 165 F THRESHOLD RWY 27 N 2501.6 E 5523.1 + 174 27 21/32 Ch 3 000109 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /‘information Section 103 EMERGENCY RESPONSE/PROCEDURE 103.1 - Emergency response plan (ERP) 1. LRP emergency response plan shall be to initiate the LRP callout in accordance with the LRP Callout Chart at 100.1 para 2. As required, LRP Ops shall also contact: a. Minhad Bops - 89-40099 or 89-40111, 04 221 5150 (commercial); b. Minhad Ground - 121.925 MHz c. NSU Ops-Local 4110. 103.2 - Crash equipment 1. General. Minhad is a Category 6 airfield. 22/32 Ch 3 000110 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Section 104 ARMAMENT SAFETY ORDERS - AIRCREW 104.1 - Armament Safety Orders The following Armament Safety Orders are to be observed by all personnel. 104.2 - Parking/Loading Areas for Aircraft Loaded with Bomb Bav Stores TBP 104,3 - Loaded Aircraft - Security Refs: A. 1 CAD Order Vol 3, 3-203 Annex F B. QPM C. W11300-1 (W Comd) 20 April 1994 1. Civilian Airfields. Security details, requirements and considerations for loaded aircraft located at civilian airfields are detailed at ref. Contract security guards are authorized and preferred over crewmembers. Any incurred costs are to be paid similar to field or other civilian support agencies. 104.4 - Sono Launch Tube Restriction 1. Due to the possibility of dropping sonos, etc., Aurora SLTs must be empty for all flights except operational, ASW training or authorized trial missions. In particular, pilot proficiency and pilot training flights that involve touch-and-go landings arc prohibited when SLTs are loaded. 104.5 - Armament Load - AMRS Certification Ref: A. SSO AEM 091 091605Z SEP 91 B. C-l 2-140-000/MB-002, Part 2, Sect 75 1. To ensure that the Aircraft Captain is aware of the aircraft armament state, the form CF 338 (yellow) Aircraft Armament State, will identify the type and number of stores loaded and will be certified by the armament up-loading Crew Chief. 2. A "Nil" entry will be made and signed by an authorized AVN Tech when no armament stores are carried. Although SKAD is not a weapon, the CF 338 shall reflect "LOADED" to indicate the Bomb Bay status (similar to Pannier). The "ARMED" and "DE­ ARMED" blocks should be crossed out or marked "N/A" as they relate to maintenance action for weapons only; SKADs are to be Readied or Safetied by Checklist. 104.6 - Signal Underwater Sound (SUS) Charges Safety Precautions 1. Aircrew are reminded of the potential danger involved in handling SUS charges because of the explosive content. 2. Stores readied for use, but not expended, shall have safety devices re-installed before being returned to the storage compartment. 104.7 - ASW Stores Safety Precautions 1. Safety precautions and procedures as laid down in 1 CAD ORDERS, Aircraft Operating Instructions (AOIs), checklists, and squadron aircrew orders and instructions are to be observed during loading, pre-flight, releasing and jettisoning of all ASW stores carried in the Aurora aircraft. 2. Any changes made by technicians or aircrew to the sono load (internal or external) are to be noted and signed on the Sono Load Sheet by the individual making the change. 3. Disposal of time expired stores will be routinely flown out of theatre on swap aircraft. 104.8 - Action in Event of Hang-up or Misfire Ref: 1 CAD Orders, Vol 3, Book 4, Chapter 105 1. In the event of a hang-up or misfire, all action required by AOIs, checklists, squadron orders and instructions to release the weapons shall be carried out over an operative range or over open water. If the armament cannot be successfully released or fired, all armament controls and switches shall be turned to OFF or SAFE, and the route chosen to return to Minhad shall be over the most sparsely populated areas. 2. Air Traffic Control shall be informed when an aircraft is to land with suspected hang-up or misfire. On landing, bomb bay equipped aircraft shall be taxied directly to the HCA, located at either end of runway. The Aircraft Captain shall not attempt to open the bomb bay doors until armament personnel arrive on the scene to assess the situation. The Aircraft Captain shall remain with the aircraft until armament personnel arrive on the scene, al) non-essential personnel shall evacuate to a safe distance (2,000'). 3. If the aircrew receive indication of an armament problem with a SKAD equipped aircraft before take-off or subsequent to landing, the Aircraft Captain shall NOT declare an emergency. However, if this occurs with an aircraft carrying torpedoes the 23/32 Ch 3 000111 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information aircraft captain shall declare an EMERGENCY with Air Traffic Control. local Aircraft Maintenance Instructions (AMIs) when deployed. 104.9 - Ditching/Crash Landing with Explosives 104.13 - Uploading/Downloading of Aircraft 1. If a ditching or crash landing is imminent and explosive stores are being carried on the aircraft, the Captain shall: 1. The uploading/downloading of SKAD may be carried out in aircraft parking spots. a. b. if practicable, jettison stores as per procedures detailed in 1 CAD Orders Vol 3 art 3-201. This action is to be taken only when, in the opinion of the Captain, the risk is less than that of attempting a landing with weapons on board; and ifjettison action cannot be taken prior to landing, ensure that all armament switches are placed "OFF" or "SAFE". 2. If no fire occurs, the aircraft shall be guarded until an AWS Tech or salvage party arrives. The Aircraft Captain shall notify the salvage crew if explosives remain onboard. 3. If fire occurs, explosions may take place at any time. There is no safe period after which no explosions will occur. Tests show that the majority of explosions occur between two and five minutes after commencement of fire. Explosions and the resulting debris arc dangerous over a wide area. Pyrotechnics do not create a great danger of explosion but they will bum intensely and give off a dense cloud of smoke. 4. The Captain of the aircraft shall ensure that the aircraft involved is not tampered with in any way after landing until cleared by the MFC or designate. 104.11 - Accident Investigation In the event of any accident involving explosives, pyrotechnics, or armament equipment which inflicts injury on any crew members or causes damage to the aircraft or its equipment, the evidence shall not be disturbed until a qualified Armament Officer has investigated, unless by so doing the safety of the aircraft is jeopardized. 104.12 - Munitions Handling Refs: A. C-09-153-001/TS-000 B. B-GA-297-001/TS-000 1. Munitions such as CADS, flares and smokes which require disposal shall be handled LAW refs and NOTE: IAW HN MOU, Bomb Bay Weapons are not authorized. If Bomb Bay weapons are authorized, upload/download locations will be promulgated. 104.14 - Arming/De-arming of Aircraft 1. Arm/De-arming of SKAD may be carried out at aircraft parking spots. NOTE: IAW HN MOU, Bomb Bay Weapons are not authorized. If Bomb Bay weapons are authorized, arm/de-arm locations will be promulgated. 104-15 - Touch and Go Landing with Ordnance Touch and go landings with loaded SLTs/PSLTs or Bomb Bay stores arc prohibited. 104.16 - Air Weapons Occurrence Reporting Ref: B-GA-297-001/TS-000 1. Accidcnts/incidents involving air weapons or the malfunctioning of a weapon system shall be reported immediately upon return to LRP Det Flight Safety Officer by submitting a Flight Safety Report. 2. If an aircraft is on deployment or is forced to land away from Minhad, the Captain shall report the occurrence to LRP Det Flight Safety Officer, file a Flight Safety Report and ensure local armament orders arc complied with. 104,17- Small Arm Procedure Onboard the Aircraft 1. Each crew will designate an Aircraft Weapons Safety Officer (AWSO). The AWSO will be responsible to ensure that all personal weapons are proven safe prior to and after being allowed on the A/C. The ASWO will also ensure magazines are inspected and stored in the ammo box held in the aft storage compartment (jail) prior to flight. 2. If carried onboard the A/C individual 9MM Pistols will be carried in the appropriate holster with no magazine loaded. 24/32 Ch 3 000112 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de Io Loi sur I'accis a I'information 104.18- Fuel Dump Procedures Aircraft requiring to dump fuel shall coordinate with Minhad tower. 25/32 Ch 3 000113 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information 26/32 Ch 3 000114 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Section 105 AIRCREW PROFICIENCY 105.1 — Pilots Ref: A. 1 CAD ORD 5-504 Annex A App 1 B. 1 CAD Response to MPSET TAV, 23 Sep 2002 1. Supervised Training. The requirement to conduct a quarterly supervised training flight on the deployed PSTC qualified senior pilot is waived. However, every effort should be attempted to conduct the required quarterly sequences when MPSET or 404 Sqn are in theatre. 27/32 Ch 3 000115 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program Memorandum 1010-2 (UFSO) 19 Mar 03 Distribution List JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH WEST ASIA LRP DET FLIGHT SAFETY PROGRAMME 1. Attached at Annex A is the initial Op Apollo flight safety programme. 2. The most successful aspects of other programmes have been incorporated with the intent of continuing what has proven to be a successful system, with tailoring to the specific situation of the deployment. The FS program will be in a quarterly format to tie into the schedule of briefings and ground training. The highlights for improvement of the Flight Safety Programme will continue to be enhanced safety through continuing educational initiatives. 3. UFSO. Comments regarding additions or amendments would be appreciated and may be passed directly to the Det //original signed by// F. Bigelow LCol CO LRP Det 4100 Annex A: Joint Task Force South West Asia LRP Det Flight Safety Programme And Annual Accident Prevention Plan Distribution List Action WFSO Info OFC AFC MFC TFC UFSO UMFSO/ AMCRO AMO CC's 000116 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /‘information s.15(1) Def Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH WEST ASIA LRP DET FLIGHT SAFETY PROGRAMME AND ANNUAL ACCIDENT PREVENTION PLAN 1. This programme has been prepared in consideration of the following: a. b. Education (1) Increasing the level of education has been identified as essential if we wish to continue to improve the level of safety within all realms of Detachment operations (2) Participation among all Detatchment personnel is important in order to raise the stature and importance of safety in daily procedures and practises (3) Improvement in the flow of flight Safety information ensuring that it is smooth, timely and efficient Aircraft (1) limited resources in both spare parts and aircraft (2) high operational tempo (3) c. d. Manpower (1) aircrew (2) groundcrew - affected by trade restructuring in (4) lack of access to training aids and limited resources for training in theatre (5) rate of flying time - over days Historical Background (1) There is a significant amount of information available highlighting Aurora incidents/accidents to use as training material. Both our own experiences since 1981 and those of our Allies can serve this purpose. 2. The presentation of the following subjects is considered essential to minimise the potential for accidents. The topics are to be presented and discussed on Ground Training Days, regular morning briefings, crew checks, during supervised training flights and by MPCCs and Crew Chiefs with crewmembers. a. Aircraft AOI review with emphasis on known deficiencies and recurring flight safety incidents Orders review in light of recent Airforce wide changes on structure and procedures b. Supervisors Ensuring that Squadron supervisors recognise both the limitations of the aircraft and the members c. Operations (1) FD1 failures 000117 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program d. e. f. g- (2) Asymmetric handling and associated hazards (3) Low level handling and associated hazards (4) Ground operations / procedures for both Ground and Air crew (5) Fuel management (6) Crew resource management - CRM (7) Ditching and bailout (8) Emergency procedures (9) INS/GPS limitations Environment (1) Temperature Extremes and Seasonal changes (2) Wildlife activity Physiological (1) Fatigue and crew rest on deployed operations (2) Disorientation in IMC or night (3) Drug and alcohol usage (both over and under counter) Psychological (1) Stress management (2) Maintaining focus due to Boredom Associated Air Operations Facilities (1) ATC awareness and participation (2) Emergency/Crash response review 3. The UFSO will direct the programme, according to the attached time line, which has been divided into quarters. The Det UFSO will maintain a close liaison with both the Ops and Maintenance sections to ensure a co-ordinated effort, and that the respective trades receive appropriate representation. 4. The following methods of information dissemination are available: a. Briefings (1) Morning - A review of new and relevant historical incidents. Specific topics supported by overhead slides and videos. (2) Ground Training Day - To include guest speakers, and major topics briefings. (3) Crew MPCCs I Crew Chiefs - Written briefs using the distribution list system to ensure continuity of information disimenation. 000118 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program b. c. Bulletin Boards (1) located in Ops briefing area and groundcrew servicing. (2) reflects current issues and incidents with posters and articles. (3) items will be relevant, varied and rotated on a timely basis to avoid stagnation and to encourage interest. Aircrew Information File Maintains its high posture requiring the aircrew to sign as having read. d. Directorate of Flight Safety Brief Conducted annually for all Det personnel. e. Seasonal Briefings Conducted as required usually in conjunction with a ground training day. f. Magazines and Publications To be reviewed and acquired to ensure relevancy and completeness. 8- h. Methods of Feedback (1) Safety Comment Forms - available in ops and servicing. (2) Annual safety survey and in house safety surveys. (3) Flight Safety Committee meetings. Flight Safety Bulletin Maintained by the D/UFSO to include both military and civilian Flight Safety articles and incidents, with emphasis on MP related operations and a distribution that ensures circulation to all Det personnel. OP APOLLO DET ANNUAL TIMETABLE SUBJECTS 1st Quarter (Jan - Mar) a. Change posters to highlight -weather considerations - taxiing in congested areas - fatigue - self - medication - fuel considerations - situational awareness - disorientation - ordinance safety - POL handling -FOD - tool control b. UFSO to review Flight Safety training / course requirements and seek the CO’s approval for nominated personnel to be forwarded to the WFSO for subject courses and staffing as crew flight safety reps 000119 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I’information Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program c. Brief Squadron on Flight Safety Stats during every FS briefing for the previous year at the first ground training day d. Brief the proper procedures for filing Initial FS reports while on deployment e. Brief crews on crew resource management f. Lectures to crews on bird migration and nesting g- Seasonal brief (Spring) h. Review FDI risk mitigation plan 2nd Quarter (Apr - Jun) a. Change posters to highlight: - wind shear -FOD - thunderstorm hazards - near misses - ATC interaction - over water weather hazards - aircraft towing and marshalling operations - fuel management b. Brief on filing FS Initials c. Brief deployed operations and their inherent FS challenges d. Brief FDI failures without warning flags e. Review the proper use of safety equipment for both air and ground crews f. Review marshalling procedures and responsibilities 3rd Quarter (Jul - Sep) a. Change posters to highlight: - self medication - drug and alcohol use/abuse -CRM - thunderstorm hazards - disorientation - maintenance safety practices b. Prepare a Flight Safety survey that is informal in nature for both air and ground crew personnel. c. Review crash response procedures with DETCO, D/DETCO, OFC, MFC, WFSO, AMO d. Brief on Det procedures for filing of Flight Safety initial reports and investigation procedures 000120 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information Attachment 1 - LRP Det Flight Safety Program 4th Quarter (Oct -Dec) a. Change posters to highlight: - pressing in poor weather - wind shear - taxiing occurrences - tool control - white out - near misses - festive season hazards - low flying - air weapon safety - fuel management b. Briefing on hazards associated with pressing the weather during low-level flight c. Present briefing on air weapons safety d. Brief FDI risk mitigation plan and the hazards associated with FDI failures e. Review FS plan for the present year and adjust as required in preparation for publishing the next year's FS Plan in December MAINTENANCE SPECIFIC SUBJECTS TO BE ACTIONED THROUGHOUT THE YEAR 1. The squadron Maintenance Flight Safety NCM shall ensure that the following practices are in place: a. b. c. F.O.D, Prevention (1) Conduct FOD prevention lectures and briefings (2) Ensure FOD collectors are easily accessible and used by all personnel (3) Investigate each FOD incident and assist the UFSO in developing preventative measures Tool Control Program (1) Ensure all personnel adhere to tool control procedures (2) Conduct tool serviceability checks Emergency Procedures Familiarization (1) All maintenance personnel involved with aircraft handling will be informed of crash crew procedures (2) Briefings on Det fire drills and fire response exercises will be carried out quarterly 000121 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgui en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program d. e. f. g- h. (3) Fire-fighters shall give familiarization lectures and schedule practices once per rotation (4) Ensure that appropriate personnel are informed on the procedures to follow in the event of hot brakes (5) Ensure that all personnel involved in aircraft refuelling are familiar with pertinent safety orders and fuel handling procedures Safety Precautions General (I) Ensure work areas are kept clean and free of all debris and contaminants (2) Ensure appropriate precautions are taken near aircraft, eg. hydraulic warning signs (3) Discuss the dangers involved in using compressed gases, eg. nitrogen and compressed air Safety Procedures in the Vicinity of Aircraft (D Approaching and leaving running aircraft, eg. rotating props (2) ESD hazards (3) Refuelling, parking and starting procedures (4) Monitor vehicle and ground handling equipment operation around squadron and transient aircraft (5) Ensure towing procedures are correct and speed is appropriate for the prevailing conditions (6) Ensure proper safety equipment is worn on the flight line, eg. ear defenders, anti-static clothing and eye protection Seasonal Changes (D Ensure ground crew are briefed on requirements of seasonal changes (2) Hazards associated with high winds and reduced visibility Flight Safety Procedures (1) Crew Chief responsibilities with regards to the dissemination of FS information (2) Ground Crew responsibilities and procedures with regards to filing incident reports (3) Brief all Ground Crew on the Squadron Flight Safety Program as a whole Ground Training Davs Maintenance Flight Safety personnel will give Flight Safety specific briefings at each ground training day on maintenance related subjects and topics. AIR WEAPON SPECIFIC SUBJECTS TO BE ACTIONED THROUGHOUT THE DET 000122 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program The Air Weapons Safety program encompasses all maintenance and operational air weapons activities, including flying operations, from the moment that the air weapons are removed from storage until they are delivered on target or returned to storage. In order to cover this scope of the program the following items will be actioned: a. b. Education and Training (1) all Det personnel, tailored to their exposure to air weapons in the course of their duties, that will cover all hazards associated with air weapons and explosives used within the Det (2) Ensure that all personnel involved with air weapons activities are fully versed on emergency response procedures to situations requiring EOD assistance. (3) Ensure that all personnel involved with air weapons activities fully comprehend emergency response procedures regarding Otto Fuel spills. This will include, as a minimum, two Otto Fuel response drills per year that will be conducted in conjunction with the Fire Hall (If required). (4) Continuation and improvement upon the present courses to train weapon load crew personnel. Inspections and Standards (1) Monthly inspections of Det air weapons work areas and explosive storage sites to ensure that facilities, materiel and equipment is safe, adequate and authorized. (2) Conduct an annual internal Air Weapons Safety Survey (Int AWSS) IAW B-GA-297-000/TS-001. (4) Maintain proficiency of qualified load crewmembers to ensure operational effectiveness and periodically monitor to ensure that procedures are safe, standard, current and approved. 000123 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Attachment 1 LRP Det Flight Safety Program OP APOLLO AIRCRAFT CRASH / SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT RESPONSE In the event of aq crash or significant incident involving a CP-140 Aurora during Operation Apollo, all operations, flight and maintenance personnel must be aware of the protocol to be followed. After initial emergency response is notified, the following items must completed: □ Advise the NSU Commander local 4155 or cell: 456-0850 □ Advise the LRP Detachment Commander local 4100 or cell: 624-5592 □ Advise LRP Det Ops local 4101/4109 or cell: 624-5781 □ Warn the Directorate of Flight Safety (DFS): 1-800-WARN DFS (1-800-927-6337) □ Advise the respective Wing Commander, 14 Wg and/or 19 Wg □ Call tower/ATC. Secure the tapes, if possible, and quarantine them. □ Quarantine the crew, log books, and all AMCRO paper work. □ Arrange medical examinations for the crew. □ Retrieve the voice and Flight Data Recorders from the site if possible and secure them. Note the location where they were found. □ Secure the crash site and preserve evidence. □ Take aircraft fluid samples if required (fuel, hydraulic oil) □ Arrange for photo technician to photograph the site and other applicable evidence. □ UFSO shall interview all witnesses separately as soon as possible. F. Bigelow Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Officer Long Range Patrol Detachment 000124 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information Attachment 3 - LRP Det NBC Concept of Operations JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH WEST ASIA LRP DET NBC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS This Concept of Operations has been drafted as an all-encompassing document to address Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) issues that could affect the operational success of the Long Range Patrol Detachment (LRP) mission. It is imperative that all personnel assigned to the LRP detachment be familiar and understands the issues discussed within. 1. NBC trained personnel a. Lieutenant Louise Forget, has been assigned duties of NBC Officer for LRP Det. She is a qualified Unit NBC Defence Officer and can be reached at BB 46 Room 12, at LRP Operations (Bldg 6) ext 4109 or on cellular phone: 624-5781 b. WO John Doucette, has been assigned duties of NBC NCM for LRP Det. He can be reached at BB 48 Room 19, at LRP Operations (Bldg 6) ext 4204 or on cellular phone: 624-0850. Cpl Dave Bishop, has been assigned duties of LRP Radiation Safety Officer (RADSO). He is Advanced RADSO qualified and can be reached at BB 48 Room 4 or at LRP Maintenance ext 4140 c. d. NSU NBCD Section, has NBCD subject matter expert. They can be reached at building 24, ext 4172 or on cellular phone at 624-5763. 2. Threat and Risk Assessment a. The estimate of the likelihood and extent of injury to deployed personnel and damage to facilities and equipment given a defined political and/or military situation and defined factors are known as “Threat Assessment”. b. “Risk Assessment” can be defined as a commander’s estimate of mission goals weighed against the threat assessment. A risk assessment will consider many factors including own vulnerability, potential gain/advantage, the threat, available countermeasures and the impact on mission success. Following this assessment, the commander may make decisions or take action including changes to protective measures or operational tasks. c. The current NBC threat to deployed personnel at Camp Mirage is updated by NDHQ Ottawa (DG Int) and promulgated through the chain of command by the LRP Intelligence section to the CO LRP Det immediately. 3. Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) a. There are varying levels of MOPP. The decision on the MOPP dress state will be made by the CO NSU after consideration of the local NBC threat and hazard information, meteorological conditions and mission/task of the units concerned. The climate in the UAE is generally very hot and sunny. Personnel performance degrades significantly in this type of climate and this factor should be taken into consideration when assigning MOPP levels. b. The current MOPP level assigned for LRP personnel is MOPP READY (Modified). Personnel B-l/3 000125 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information s.15(1) Def Attachment 3 - LRP Det NBC Concept of Operations will have their C4 mask available (with recent modifications completed), Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) issued and available within 5 minutes. Any changes to the MOPP state of dress will be promulgated immediately through the chain of command. The different MOPP levels are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 4. Equipment and Training a. Each member of the LRP Det has received at a minimum, pre-deployment training from their home units in the care and use of their IPE and associated equipment. All personnel should be in possession of the following protective equipment: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. b. When ordered, Medical Counter Measures (MCM) may be distributed to counteract any effects of suspected nerve agents. These MCM will be distributed to personnel who have received a medical briefing on their use by a medical officer and have the proper documentation indicating so. Furthermore, it is imperative that all personnel review procedures for use of MCM’s as well as first aid procedures and self-aid procedures. The Medical Section currently holds the following MCM’s: 1. 2. 3. 4. LRP Personnel are to store their personal equipment where they spend the majority of their time and ensure it is maintained in good working order. Any discrepancies are to be reported to LRP NBC Officer immediately. NBC training at the airbase for the LRP Det will be limited and will only be attempted on a non-interference basis with flying operations. Selected personnel will conduct training on detection devices and equipment as the opportunity arises and under the direction of NSU NBC Officer. Periodic refresher training will be conducted on LRP Ground Training Days and will utilize available resources from the NSU NBC Section. c. B-2/3 000126 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information Attachment 3 - LRP Det NBC Concept of Operations 5. Operations in an NBC Environment Operating in an NBC environment can be challenging both physically and psychologically. Given a. the extremely limited decontamination facilities available at Camp Mirage, operations in a contaminated environment are neither prudent nor plausible. Therefore, in the event of an increased NBC threat to personnel and equipment at Camp Mirage, the priority for the LRP Det is to consider relocating the two CP 140 aircraft to safe havens before a perceived threat becomes imminent. This will ensure “survivability” of the assets and afford the opportunity to continue operations from another location almost immediately. The primary priority as stated, is to remove the airframes from the potential hazard in a timely and efficient manner. Every effort will be undertaken to evacuate as many personnel as possible on each aircraft, however, in an increased threat environment it may be necessary to launch the aircraft with only a minimum crew to ensure the assets survive. The remaining personnel and equipment will then be under the control of CO NSU and subject to his evacuation plan. NBC trained personnel will remain in theatre to perform reconnaissance functions and decontamination duties under the guidance of the NSU NBC Officer. This will include those personnel who have received only familiarization training. b. In the event of an increase in the NBC threat level, the notice to personnel will be initiated by CO LRP Det or DCO LRP Det via utilization of the LRP Recall list and/or other means. If required, the rendezvous point for LRP personnel is between BB 46 and BB 48 located on the accommodation side of Camp Mirage. Further direction on information or procedures will be given when all are accounted for. It is imperative that supervisor’s be aware of their personnel’s whereabouts at all times during an increased threat level. Conclusion This NBC Concept of Operations serves as a reminder that although the threat of an NBC attack may be minimal at this stage, adequate preparation and planning as well as education can help prevent drastic effects from chemical or biological agents. Armed with sound training and knowledge that your IPE will protect you in time of need, the hectic times that preclude or follow an NBC related incident can be kept to a minimum. NBC related literature and reference material is available through the LRP NBC Officer. B-3/3 000127 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Annex C - LRP Det Flying Orders 3000-1 (Plans) 01 Jul 03 LRP DET CONTINGENCY PLANS AIM 1. This document details the contingency plans for the LRP Det Al Minhad UAE. It is broken down into four distinct eventualities, which may result in relocation or repatriation of the detachment or a major change to the day to day operating parameters. Specifically those eventualities are: a. evacuation of Al Minhad base; b. redeployment - to another operating base in the AOR or home; c. mission change; and d. major change to operating conditions. EVACUATION 2. Evacuation may come about for a variety of reasons including but not exclusively: a. Imminent attack (conventional or non-conventional) localized at Al Minhad; b. Immediate recall by Canadian gov’t due to higher priority tasking elsewhere; and c. Immediate expulsion by HN. Regardless of the reasons for evacuation the manner of conducting the evacuation is 3. dependent upon the time frame, the operating conditions and the operational priorities. a. b. Operating conditions may include: i. under attack; ii. conventional attack expected; C -1 /12 SECRET 000128 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def c. iii. non-conventional attack expected; iv. terrorist attack expected; v. civil disturbance; or vi. civil disaster. CF, JTFSWA, Coalition or CO’s priorities may include: i. survival of personnel; ii. survival of aircraft to continue to operate; and/or iii. survival of aircraft to preserve resource/deny enemy. C-2Z12 SECRET 000129 �Pages 130 to I a 133 are withheld pursuant to section sont retenues en vertu de Particle 15(1) Def of the Access to Information Act de la Loi sur I'acces a ('information �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def MISSION CHANGE PLAN 31. Possible changes to mission may include: a. VIP transport; b. MEDEVAC; c. Humanitarian aid delivery; and d. Anti-submarine Warfare. 32. With CC130 aircraft in theatre it is unlikely the first three tasks would be assigned, however, the det is easily adapted to operate in these roles. Limiting factors include: a. Diplomatic clearance problems due to aircraft type (bomber); b. c. 33. Aircraft speed is considerably greater than CC130 so there is a remote chance that this aspect could be exploited for a high speed transport of VIP or Medevac. ASW is a conceivable role change. Limiting factors include: a. b. c. d. ASW PLAN 34. a. b. C-7/12 SECRET 000134 �■ Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def C. d. 35. 36. CHANGE TO OPERATING CONDITIONS • PLAN Changes to operating conditions at Al Minhad detailed in para 3 b. will likely cause a 37. disruption to flying operations. a. b. c. d. JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH WEST ASIA LRP DET NBC STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE PURPOSE 1. This document has been drafted as an all-encompassing document to address Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) issues that could affect the operations of the Long Range Patrol Detachment (LRP) while part of the JTFSWA. All personnel assigned to the LRP detachment must be aware of the procedures and issues discussed within this document. BACKGROUND 1. Operating in an NBC environment can be challenging both physically and psychologically. C-8/ 12 SECRET 000135 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def 2. The importance of having a proper NBCD SOP is amplified by : a. b. The asymmetric nature of the forces involved in our theatre of operations; The use of chemical weapons in the AOR during previous conflict; and GENERAL The NSU NBCD section is ultimately responsible for all NBCD measures at Camp 1. Mirage. This document specifically addresses LRP Detachment NBCD issues: training, individual protection equipment, Medical Counter-Measures, actions to be taken in flight and on the ground in the event of NBC contamination. NBCD TRAINING Each member of the LRP Det has received at a minimum pre-deployment training 1. from their home units in the care and use of their IPE and associated equipment. Furthermore, the following personnel have been assigned specific NBC duties and will provide NBCD expertise to LRP Det: a. Lieutenant Louise Forget, LRP Det NBC Officer. She can be reached at BB 46 Room 12, at LRP Operations (Bldg 6) ext 4109 or on cellular phone: 624-5781 b. WO John Doucette, LRP Det NBC NCM. He can be reached at BB 48 Room 19, at LRP Operations (Bldg 6) ext 4204 or on cellular phone: 624-0850. c. CpI Dave Bishop, LRP Det Radiation Safety Officer (RADSO). He can be reached at BB 48 Room 4 or at LRP Maintenance ext 4140. d. during R&R and HLTA periods LRP may share NBCD expertise with TAL, LRP and NSU NBCD pers; e. NSU NBCD Section. They can be reached at building 24, ext 4172 or on cellular phone at 624-5763 or through NSU Ops local 4110 and Cellular 454-6583. NBC training for the LRP Det will be limited and will only be attempted on a non­ 2. interference basis with flying operations. NBCD qualified personnel will conduct training on NBCD detection and equipment as the opportunity arises and under the direction of NSU NBC Officer. Periodic refresher training will be conducted on LRP Ground Training Days and will utilize available resources from the NSU NBC Section. NBCD EQUIPMENT LRP Personnel are to store their personal equipment where they spend the majority 1. of their time and ensure it is maintained in good working order. Any discrepancies are to be reported to LRP NBC Officer immediately. All personnel should be in possession of the following protective equipment: C-9/ 12 SECRET 000136 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT The estimate of the likelihood and extent of injury to deployed personnel and damage 1. to facilities and equipment given a defined political and/or military situation and defined factors are known as "Threat Assessment". The current NBC threat to deployed personnel at Camp Mirage is updated by NDHQ Ottawa (DG Int) and promulgated through the chain of command by the LRP Intelligence section to the CO LRP Det immediately. 2. “Risk Assessment” can be defined as a commander’s estimate of mission goals weighed against the threat assessment. NBC Risk management balances the importance of preventing casualties against the degradation in operational effectiveness that result from adopting restrictive protective measures. 3. Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) is the NBCD dress readiness level that has been decreted by the Commanding Officer after consideration of the local NBC threat and hazard information, meteorological conditions and mission/task of the units concerned. The current MOPP level on Camp Mirage is MOPP READY (Modified). The MOPP level in effect is posted on buiding 29, just by the gate on the ops side of the camp as well as by the LRPVTAL HQ building. The different MOPP levels are: MEDICAL COUNTER-MEASURES (MCM) 1. When ordered by CO NSU or CO LRP, Medical Counter Measures may be distributed to counteract any effects of suspected nerve agents. The following MCM will be distributed to personnel through the LRP Det Chain of Command and the CO shall be advised when all personnel have received their MCM. It is important that all personnel review procedures for use of MCM’s as well as first 2. aid procedures and self-aid procedures. C-10 /12 SECRET 000137 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def 3. The LRP Medical Counter-Measures are currently held by the FMed Section and can be accessed through the following personnel: Capt McMahon, Pharmacist, local 4148, cell 655-3795 and WO Sheath, 4176, cell 552-4154. Personnel required to spend more than 24 hrs on duty outside Camp Mirage area can receive their MCM by sending an e-mail to the FMed section. NBCD OPERATIONS 3. In the event of an increase in the NBC threat level, the notice to personnel will be initiated by CO LRP Det or DCO LRP Det via utilization of the LRP Recall list and/or other means. If required, the rendezvous point for LRP personnel is between BB 46 and BB 48 located on the accommodation side of Camp Mirage. Further direction on information or procedures will be given when all are accounted for. It is imperative that supervisor's be aware of their personnel's whereabouts at all times during an increased threat level. In the event of an NBC attack, LRP personnel are to seek cover from any liquid precipitation and wait for further instructions. Immediately after an attack, it is essential personnel remain in their shelter in order to prevent dissemination of contamination to other personnel and equipment. 4. The LRP Det recognize the Host Nation siren alarm as depicted in Annex A. Furthermore, NSU NBCD cell will be announcing any NBCD information through the PA system. LRP members must also be aware of the metal on metal warning signal that can be used by anyone detecting NBC contamination. A detailed plan for NBC operations can be found at the end of this document. LRP 5. members should be prepared to take the following actions to limit the exposure of aircrew and airplane to NBC contamination. C-ll / 12 SECRET 000138 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information I SECRET s.15(1) Def C. CONCLUSION Although the threat of an NBC attack is minimal at this stage, adequate preparation and planning as well as education can help prevent drastic effects from chemical or biological agents. Furthermore, NBC related literature and reference material is available through the LRP NBC Officer. C -12 /12 SECRET 000139 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Annex D - LRP OP DIRECTIVES 3180-1 (LRP Det CO) 01 Jul 03 No. Reference I 03/001 (amended) 1. Telecon LT(N) Stromberger, JOCC Bahrain, CTF 57.2 17 Feb 03 Standoff ranges: CTG 50.6 (CTF 50) direction (3) 2. CTG 50.6 (CTF 50) COALITION FORCE OPTASK SCC SUPP (U) 152210ZJUL02 3. CTF 151 OPTASK SCC (C GCTF) SUPP 241729Z APR 03 Updated 30 May 03 D- 1 18 SECRET 000140 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def No. Reference 03/002 1. ROEIMPL/JTFSWA 031-2003 2. STANDING OPTASK CTG 50.4 (CTF151) 3. OPTASK SCO SUPP 152210Z JUL 02 CTG 50.6 (CTF 50) 4. Search and Rescue Iranian Maritime Boundary-10 Jul 02 Territorial Waters General: In accordance with international law and as depicted on current navigation charts (usually 12 nm from a country's coastline). (3) Iran: When operating in the vicinity of Iran, crews shall respect the Iranian claim of sovereignty, 12 nm from lowest waterline using straight baselines. Use only Canadian national direction for reference. All other states in vicinity of GOO/SOH/SAG: Lower water line plus 12 nm Search and Rescue: If a distress call comes from the territorial waters of another state, an aircraft can enter those waters, without permission, when: 1. Someone is in danger of being lost at sea. 2. The aircraft will only engage in bona fide efforts to render emergency assistance to save lives. 3. The location of the danger or distress is reasonably well known, thus the aircraft will not conduct area search. 4. Entry into TTW will only be made after all attempts to employ other resources have failed to protect life (eg: friendly/neutral warships, local SAR agencies, commercial shipping) (4,5) 03/003 Updated 30 May 03 D-2/8 SECRET 000141 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def No. Reference 03/004 LRP Det Comd Direction Comms NAVCOMs are to Open and Close watch with KEEPTRACK at the beginning and end of each mission. Once you open watch, it is IMPERATIVE that you notify KEEPTRACK when you no longer require flight following (i.e. when you chop to the ACU). If no response from KEEPTRACK on HF call c/s WATCHDOG on same circuits as a back-up. If unable HF comms with KEEPTRACK or WATCHDOG use IRIDIUM to phone KEEPTRACK or have the ship call on your behalf. If you are within UHF range, messages to KEEPTRACK can be relayed through Icy Ops. 003/005 LRP Det Comd Direction Request Feedback on Comms with KEEPTRACK be included in Purple remarks 003/006 Tactical SITREPs When able Crews are to conduct a Tactical Sitrep Swap with relieving MPA, eg. RAF NIM. A swap of all tracks is not practical but significant info should be passed such as Areas covered; last Area covered; contact density; HIVs in area; disposition of force; etc. 003/007 GOO AIR CONTROL ISSUES CTG 50.4 301015Z Jan 03 Position Reoortina 003/008 GOO SCC JOIN PKG CTG 50 4 030755Z Feb 03 Frequency Monitoring All Air Units operating in or transiting GOO shall monitor VHF-AM 123.45 MHz or UHF SSC Coord 313.45 MHz 003/009 Primary hailing frequency is CH 13 VHF-FM Updated 30 May 03 D-3/8 SECRET 000142 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def No. Reference 03/011 LRP Det Comd Direction 003/012 Email 10 Feb 03 COMUSNAVCENT/COM FIFTHFLT-ITCS(SW) 03/013 Omani Restricted Area OO(R)-15and SOH Transit Passage CTG 50.4 (CTF 151) 040945Z Feb 03 03/014 JOCC Bahrain Purples TACNAVs/MPCCs are to ensure that they are prepared to provide a complete accounting of the mission's activities from takeoff to landing in the Purple Narrative. Crew Logs are not optional for these missions. All logs are subject to review and are required for post­ flight reports and archival purposes. The Purple narrative shall identify the total number of contacts investigated and how many COI/CCOI vessels were detected. Do not report GCTF naval forces in the purple (see Brief Book page 36 for complete list of countries) To assist CTG 50.4 with tracking which vessels have been hailed previously, indicate in the Contact Narrative when a vessel has been hailed by your Event. The Purple Remarks shall indicate the total number of Hails carried out. (plus #COIs, CCOIs, #HIVs, #VOIs, #Merch, #Fish, #Queries) 003/015 COMUSNAVCENT/COM FIFTHFLT OPORD 1000-01 Subsurface contacts All contacts will be investigated during SSC missions. Once determined the contact is subsurface, report and request direction from ACU. LRP Det Comd Direction Email: LNO Bahrain 24 Jan 03 Updated 30 May 03 D-4/8 S E C R ET 000143 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRETI s.15(1) Def No. Reference 003/017 LRP Det Comd Direction Standard Equipment Crews shall conduct their missions with ALL standard aircraft equipment. All aircraft equipment (pubs, cameras, laptops, etc.) must be removed from the airplanes at the end of each mission and returned to Mission Support. 003/018 LRP Det Comd Direction All contacts should be photographed unless it interferes with the tasking assigned by the ACU. Photos of only VOIs, COIs, CCOIs, and HIVs will be saved on the laptop. All other images will be kept on flash cards. 003/019’ LRP Det Comd Direction 8 Mar 03 IFF Transponder | 003/020 (removed) Updated 30 May 03 D-5/8 SECRET 000144 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgut en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def Reference No, 003/021 CTF 57 Email LNO CTF 57 16 Mar 03 Significant Incidents Crews are to treat the following events as significant incidents: C. When queried (non-standard) by air traffic or other controllers; D. Operational incidents that affect aircraft safety or the conduct of the mission. Notes. • • • • Crews are not to go out of their way to establish comms with the A/C unless flight safety is an issue. Crews are reminded that'Neutral'A/C are non-friendly. Treat all encounters with caution and take all steps necessary to protect classified information. Non-coalition air and maritime assets monitor maritime communications traffic and have used it to query coalition forces. Coalition maritime forces operating in the AOR have encountered overflights of P-3, F-27, Atlantique, Mirage, and F-4 aircraft. Crews are reminded to be vigilant, Reporting. Significant Incidents shall be reported via a separate Significant Incident Report (SIR), and should be mentioned in the Purple or MISREP. The SIR shall contain the following information: time and position duration of encounter communications details how did A/C detect each other did the other A/C 'sneak-up from what direction did it approach any indication of tasking of the A/C any other information thought to be relevant to the incident CTF57 requires this information as soon as possible after the incident. 003/022 (removed) TTW Standoff Updated 30 May 03 D-6/8 SECRET 000145 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accis a /'information SECRET s.15(1) Def No. Reference 03/023 1. LRP Det Comd Direction 24 Mar 03 (email) 2 Commanders Intent SOH-Western Traffic Separation Scheme Transit (CTF 151) 210945ZMAR03 03/024 1. LRP Det Comd direction 29 May 03(email) On-Station Delays As the OPCON authority, CTF-57 tasks the on-station times (usually six hours in duration). In the event that ramp snags or weather delays a take-off, crews shall normally complete the six hour on-station period. However, the trip may be cut short if: a. the tasked mission has been completed and the OTC (usually CTF 151) has no further tasking, or b. Crew day or fatigue issues prevent the safe completion of the mission, or c. The crew swaps the surveillance mission with a relieving MPA. CTF-57 does not require a Green-dev for any delays less than 3 hours. However, they shall be advised of the revised on/off station times through either the Mission Support Office or Keeptrack. Amendment Date Original 28 Feb 03 CH1 8 Mar 03 003/001 amended. 003/019, 003/020 added CH2 22 Mar 03 003/002 amended, 003/010 removed, 003/021, 22 added CH3 25 Mar 03 003/023 added CH4 27 Mar 03 003/001, 002 amended, 003/022 removed CH5 29 Mar 03 003/020 removed Updated 30 May 03 D-7/8 SECRET 000146 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documen t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET s.15(1) Def CH 5 29 May 03 003/024 added CH 6 30 May 03 003/001 amended Updated 30 May 03 D-8/8 SECRET 000147 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDAF (Operation APOLLO) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource LRP ROTO 2 - END TOUR REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED - 01 JUL 03 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 01-Jul-03 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource A-2019-03644 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Library and Archives Canada, RG24, 3350-134 Binder Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDAF00004