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RCMP GRC A75-3 (82 04) 7530-21 029-5463 'Ji 000001 �A? 2 Serial No.: EA-2-83 DP No de serie: AE-2-83 DT SECRET November 24, 1982 le 24 novembre 1982 BACKGROUND PAPER DOCUMENT D*INFORMATION TITLE: TITRE: Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada Le terrorisme et ses repercussions pour le Canada Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs and Solicitor General of Canada Vice-premier ministre et secretaire d'fitat aux Affaires exterieures et Solliciteur General du Canada 000002 �4 -2- SECRET DOCUMENT D1 INFORMATION LE TERRORISME ET SES REPERCUSSIONS POUR LE CANADA TABLE DES MATIERES Paragraphe I. II. Objet 1 Genese 5 A. B. C. III. Menace pour le Canada K. Terroristes armeniens Mouvement de resistance palestinien Terrorisme irlandais Partisans des luttes ideologiques en Amerique latine Exiles cubains anti-castristes Mouvement khalistan Nationalistes portoricains Armee rouge japonaise Groupes terroristes europeens Terrorisme yougoslave a) Activites anti-yougoslaves b) Interventions de 1'Etat yougoslave Terrorisme d'Etat L. M. Nouveaux problSmes de securite Perspectives A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. IV. Cooperation internationale A. B. C. D. V. Aspects politiques et juridiques Services de renseignements Services policiers internationaux a) Interpol b) Programme de liaison policiere Interets communs Ressources et limites nationales A. I Definition du terrorisme Caract^ristiques des groupes terroristes Terrorisme en sol canadien Processus du renseignement a) Introduction b) Collecte des renseignements c) Rassemblement des donnees d) Analyse e) Diffusion de 1' information f) Groupe d'evaluation des menaces exceptionnelles 5 6 10 13 19 24 26 28 31 32 36 37 38 40 41 43 47 49 53 55 56 58 65 65 67 68 68 69 70 72 72 72 73 78 79 80 83 000003 �4' SECRET 3 BACKGROUND PAPER TERRORISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA INDEX Paragraph I. II. Object 1 Background 5 A. B. 5 C. III. The Threat To Canada A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K. L. M. IV. Armenian Terrorists Palestinian Resistance Movement Irish Issue Latin American Support Groups Anti-Castro Cuban Exiles The Khalistan Movement Puerto Rican Nationalists Japanese Red Army European Domestic Terrorist Groups Yugoslav Terrorism (a) Anti-Yugoslav Activities Yugoslav State Counter­ (b) Activities State Terrorism Environmental and Anti-Nuclear Movement Perspectives International Cooperation 6 10 13 19 24 26 28 31 32 36 37 38 40 41 43 47 49 53 55 56 58 65 Political and Legal Security Intelligence International Police Arrangements (a) Interpol (b) Police Liaison Program Common Interests 65 67 68 68 69 70 National Capabilities and Limitations 72 A. Security Intelligence Process (a) Introduction (b) Collection (c) Collation (d) Analysis (e) Dissemination Special Threat Assessment Group (f) 72 72 73 78 79 80 83 B. Countermeasures Control of Movements of Suspected ( a) Terrorists Abroad (i) Ports of Entry (ii) 34 A. B. C. D. V. Terrorism Defined Characteristics of Terrorist Groups Canadian Experience 84 85 86 000004 �4 -4B. C. VI. VII. SECRET Contre-mesures a) Controle des deplacements de presu­ mes terroristes (i) A 11 etranger (ii) Points d'entree b) Protection (i) Personnalites canadiennes et points vitaux (ii) Missions etrangeres et dignitaires en visite (iii) Interets canadiens a I'etranger 92 101 Planification d'urgence a) Echelle nationale b) Mesures precises (i) Aviation civile (ii) Secteur maritime (iii) Secteur nucleaire 103 103 107 107 110 111 84 84 85 86 91 91 Lutte antiterroriste 112 A. Tactiques a) Role de la police b) Mesures offensives speciales 112 112 116 B. Aspects politiques et role des medias a) Aspects politiques b) Role des medias 122 122 125 Systemes de communications Annexe: 126 Etude intitulee "Le terrorisme international: tendances et perspectives", 8 avril 1981 000005 �4 ■> SECRET 5 Paragraph (b) C. VI. Annex Contingency Planning (a) National Specific (b) Civil Aviation (i) Maritime (ii) Nuclear (iii) 91 91 93 101 103 103 107 107 110 111 Response to Terrorist Incidents 112 A. 112 112 B. VII. Protection Canadian Officials and (i) Vital Points Foreign Missions and (ii) Visiting Dignitaries Canadian Interests Abroad (iii) Tactical (a) Police Role (b) Special Assault Response Requirements 116 Political and Media (a) Political The Media (b) 122 122 125 Communications Systems 126 Study Entitled "International Terrorism Trends and Prospects 8 April 1981" 000006 �J- -6- SECRET DOCUMENT D 1 INFORMATION LE TERRORISME ET SES REPERCUSSIONS POUR LE CANADA I. OBJET 1. Le present document a pour objet de repondre bridvement a un certain nombre de questions qu'ont suscitees les recents actes de terroristes armeniens. Dans quelle mesure le Canada a-t-il ete, est-il et sera-t-il une cible pour les terroristes? De quels moyens le gouverneraent canadien dispose-t-il a I'heure actuelle pour lutter contre le terrorisme? Quelles conditions ou restrictions nuisent aux efforts deployes pour empecher que le Canada soit perqu comme un pays ou des actes terroristes peuvent etre commis impunement, et accroissent ainsile risque de nouveaux actes du genre? 2. Pour repondre a ces questions, il a fallu avant tout passer en revue les moyens dont dispose le Canada, ainsi que les besoins et exigences a ce chapitre. La participation d'un certain nombre de ministeres et d'organismes a ete sollicitee, refletant le caractere interministeriel de I'action gouvernementale contre le terrorisme. Le present document represente la premiere analyse concertee de cette question. 3. Il a ete decide que 1'approche la plus utile consistait en premier lieu a definir le terrorisme, puis a aborder les etapes suivantes de devaluation de la menace, des mesures preventives, dont la protection et la planification d'urgence, pour enfin conclure avec les moyens tactiques et publics de lutte contre le terrorisme. 4. Le present document ne vise pas a examiner en detail le phenomena du terrorisme ni a evaluer de fagon circonstanciee les ressources et les problemes. Il se veut toutefois une source d'information permettant de determiner les mesures requises pour faire echec a la menace existante et prevue. II. GENESE A) Definition du terrorisme 5. Par terrorisme politique, on entend tout acte ou toute menace de violence destine a terrifier pour servir des fins politiques. Le terrorisme international se definit comme 1’execution d'actes de terrorisme politique diriges contre des tierces parties etrangeres. 000007 �< 7 SECRET BACKGROUND PAPER TERRORISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA I. OBJECT 1. The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief response to a number of questions which arise from recent acts by Armenian terrorists. To what extent has, is and will Canada be a target for terrorists? What is the Canadian Government's present capability to deal with terrorism? What conditions or limitations hamper efforts to prevent Canada from being perceived as a country where terrorist acts can be committed with impunity and thus increase the risk of further terrorist acts? 2. To answer these questions it was first neces­ sary to review the existing capabilities and require­ ments. This required the participation of a number of departments and agencies, reflecting the interdepart­ mental nature of the governmental response to terro­ rism. The preparation of this paper is the first time such a concerted inventory has been conducted. 3. It was determined that the most useful approach was to begin with the definition of terrorism and proceeding through the sequential steps of threat assessment, preventative measures including protection and contingency planning, and concluding with the tactical and public response to a terrorist incident. 4. Although it is not the intent of this paper to discuss in detail the phenomenon of terrorism, nor to provide a detailed evaluation of capabilities and problems, it is the intention to provide sufficient information to identify measures required to counter the present and the foreseen threat. II. BACKGROUND (A) Terrorism Defined Political terrorism is any act or threat of 5. violence designed to generate fear to achieve a politi­ cal end. International terrorism is defined as those acts of political terrorism which affect foreign third parties. (B) Characteristics of Terrorist Groups 6. Terrorism developed into a worldwide pheno­ menon in the late 1960's as politically motivated organizations in various countries began employing the tactic of terror to gain publicity and support for their political causes. 000008 �i- -8B) SECRET Caracteristiques des groupes terroristes 6. Le terrorisms est devenu un phenomene mondial a la fin des annees 1960 lorsque des organisations a vocation politique dans divers pays ont commence a user de la terreur pour se faire connaitre et rallier des appuis a leurs causes politiques. 7. Jusqu'S present, les terroristes ont eu recours aux techniques suivantes: detournements d'avions, lettres piegees, enlevements, attentats a la bombe, assassinats et prises d'otages, dont la prise d'assaut de certaines ambassades. Les attentats a la bombe viennent au premier rang des actes terroristes; ils sont suivis des assassinats et des attentats. 8. Les groupes terroristes s'entraident de diverses fagons (partage des camps d'entrainement, echange de documents de voyage, fourniture d'armes et d'explosifs, etc.). Par ailleurs, certains Etats controlent ou dirigent des groupes terroristes ou leur fournissent une aide. 9. Les groupes terroristes, tels les Armenians, possedent plusieurs caracteristiques qu'un gouvernement doit prendre en compte lorsqu'il considers les moyens d'action a prendre contre eux. La plupart ont une organisation a 1'echelle Internationale, souvent composes de petites cellules clandestines; ils sont determines, bien entraines et equipes, mobiles et, au besoin, capables d'exercer leurs activites sans aucune aide dans le pays cible. Les terroristes modifient leurs tactiques suivant les contre-mesures prises par les gouvernements. C) Terrorisms en sol canadien 10. C'est dans les annees 1960 que le terrorisme a fait son apparition au Canada. En effet, ces annees ont ete marquees par les activites du FLQ et quelques incidents isoles diriges contre des etablissements et des interets cubains, sovietiques, israeliens et yougoslaves au Canada. On a arrete et deporte des membres d'organisations terroristes internationales, comme 1'Armee rouge japonaise et le Front populaire de liberation de la Palestine. D'autres ont visite le Canada dans des circonstances suspectes ou y etaient en trans i t. 11. C'est la tenue des Jeux olympiques de 1976 qui a incite le gouvernement canadien a etudier plus a fond le terrorisms et a se pencher particulierement sur 1’aide susceptible d'etre fournie par certains segments de la societe canadienne. C'est a ce moment-la d'ailleurs qu'a debute la participation du Canada aux ententes et aux consultations internationales en matiere de lutte antiterroriste. Cette periods a ete egalement marquee par la mise en oeuvre de mesures politiques et 1'elaboration d'une legislation antiterroriste Internationale, deux entreprises auxquelles le Canada a pleinement souscrit. 000009 �9 SECRET 7. Terrorist techniques to date have included: hijackings, letter bombs, kidnappings, bombings, assas­ sinations and hostage barricade situations, including embassy takeovers. Bombings account for the majority of all incidents, followed by assassinations and attempts. 8. Terrorist groups are known to collaborate in a variety of ways including the sharing of training facilities, the exchange of travel documentation, and the supplying of arms and explosives. As a matter of policy, a number of states control, direct or provide aid to terrorists. 9. Terrorist groups, such as the Armenians, have several characteristics which must be recognized when considering a governmental^resporise.^to^the_challen.qe they pose. Most have an linternaSi^ial*'organization?, often composed of small elandesSne"ce l7isT^h’ey^t'e^ determined, competent, well-equipped, mobile and, when necessary, able to operate with no support in the target country. Terrorists change their tactics in response to counter-measures taken by governments. (C) Canadian Experience 10. Canadian experience with terrorism began in the 1960's with FLQ activities and isolated incidents directed against Cuban, Soviet, Israeli and Yugoslav establishments and interests in Canada, Members of international terrorist organizations. such as the Japanese Red Army and the Popular Front for the Libera­ tion of Palestine were apprehended and deported. Others visited Canada under suspicious circumstances, or were in transit to other destinations. 11. The 1976 Olympics required increased study of terrorists and their activities including potential domestic support from certain segments of Canadian society. This was the basis of our present participa­ tion in international counter-terrorist intelligence arrangements and consultations. The period was also notable for political initiatives and the development of international law dealing with terrorism, both of which Canada strongly supported. 12. A new stage began early this year with a series of events, attributed to Armenian terrorists, beginning with a bombing in January in Toronto and culminating with the assassination of the Turkish Military Attache on August 27. Canada is now directly affected by international terrorism. III. THE THREAT TO CANADA 13. The threat to Canada and Canadian interests abroad is and will be influenced by trends and develop­ ments on the domestic and international scene. Since 1968, some 50 terrorist groups have been responsible for over 7,000 international terrorist incidents, of which 700 occurred in 1981. These terrorist groups reflect a broad spectrum of.ideologies,, nations, and ethnic grievances. While some groups have become 000010 �10 SECRET 12. Un nouveau cycle de violence a commence au debut de la presente annee par une serie d'actes terroristes attribues a des Armeniens, allant d'un attentat a la bombe perpetre en janvier, a Toronto, a 1'assassinat d'un attache militaire turc, le 27 aout dernier. Le Canada est done maintenant touche directement par le terrorisme international. III. MENACE POUR LE CANADA 13. Les tendances et les faits nouveaux sur la scene nationale et internationale continueront d'influer sur la menace qui pese sur le Canada et les interets canadiens a 1'etranger. Depuis 1968, une cinquantaine de groupes terroristes ont perpetre plus de 7 000 attentats internationaux, dont 700 en 1981. Ces groupes representent un large eventail d'ideologies, de nations et de revendications ethniques. Certains d'entre eux ont cesse toutes activites au cours des annees, mais un grand nombre continuent d'agir, et de nouveaux groupes font leur apparition. Les terroristes concentrent leurs attaques en Europe de 1'Quest, en Amerique latine, au Moyen-Orient et aux Etats-Unis. Ils tendent toutefois a elargir leur theatre d'operation comme le montrent les statistiques: 91 pays ont ete touches en 1981. Bien que les citoyens americains demeurent les cibles les plus visees, le terrorisme international a fait des victimes dans plus de 70 pays en 1981. 14. Enracine a 1'exterieur du Canada, le terrorisme international a ete et demeurera une menace pour notre pays. Il s'exerce sous deux formes principales: 1'attaque de’cibles etrangeres au Canada et les represailles contre ce dernier lorsqu'il prend des mesures contre certains membres de groupes terroristes. 15. Du fait que d'autres pays occidentaux ont ameliore leurs moyens de lutte contre les terroristes, ceux-ci peuvent etre forces a diriger leurs activites vers les pays qu'ils jugent vulnerables. Le Canada pourrait etre au nombre de ces pays en raison des succes que les Armeniens y ont remportes. Le facteur de la vulnerability pesera lourd dans les decisions que les terroristes prendront a 1'egard du Canada. Par consequent, a titre de contre-mesure, il faut montrer que nous disposons bel et bien des moyens necessaires pour prevoir et contrecarrer toutes nouvelles menaces. 16. Le terrorisme international a franchi les frontieres du Canada largement en raison de la diversite ethnique de celui-ci. Des groupes terroristes dont le centre d'operation est a 1'etranger et certains Etats cherchent a gagner des appuis au sein des communautes ethniques du Canada ou tentent d'influencer celles-ci pour parvenir a leurs fins. 17. A 1'heure actuelle, on se preoccupe surtout des terroristes armeniens et des recents attentats a la bombe attribues a "Direct Action". D'autres groupes sont egalement susceptibles de creer des problemes du meme genre. Une des difficultes principales est de 000011 J �11 -/ SECRET inactive over the years, a significant number continue to operate and new groups are emerging. Attacks are concentrated in Western Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and the USA; but the trend is towards a greater geographic spread and in 1981 incidents occurred in 91 countries. Although American citizens remain the most frequent targets, citizens of over 70 countries were victims of international terrorist incidents in 1981. r=r,--.-c. — 14. Canada has been and will continue to be threatened by international terrorism which has its political roots outside Canada. Two major types of involvement are attacks on foreign targets in Canada and retaliation against Canada for taking action against members of terrorist groups. 15. Because other Western countries have been improving their capability to deal with terrorism, terrorists may be forced to direct their activities to those countries that they perceive to be vulnerable. Canada could be so perceived because of the successes here by Armenian terrorists. The perception of vulnerability will be a major factor in terrorist decisions concerning Canada. Consequently, the appropriate counter-measure is to demonstrate that we do have the capability to anticipate and counter new threats. 16. A major reason for the spillover of inter­ national terrorism into Canada is our multi-ethnic composition. Foreign-based terrorists and certain states seek support from within Canadian ethnic commu­ nities or attempt to influence these communities to further their objectives. 17. The current preoccupation centres upon Armenian terrorists and recent bombings attributed to Direct Action. There are also other groups which have the capability to pose a similar problem. A major difficulty is to determine the domestic support and the intentions of these groups for Canada. 18. The following is a brief assessment of the groups that are of security concern to Canada. (A) Armenian Terrorists 19. There is a continuing threat of further attacks in Canada on Turkish diplomats, moderates of the Armenian community who do not condone terrorist activities or support their cause, and diplomatic missions and commercial establishments of countries that have arrested Armenian terrorists; namely the USA, France, Britain, Sweden and Switzerland. Canada is also included in this last category and there have been threats to Canadian interests both at home and abroad. 20. For several years, the Armenian community has held annual and, at times, violent anti-Turkish demonstrations in Ottawa, attended by up to 1,000 people, which occasionally required police intervention. Although there was a perceived increased 000012 �12 SECRET cerner 1'appui interne et de decouvrir les intentions de ces groupes a 1’ggard du Canada. 18. Suit une breve evaluation des groupes qui constituent un danger pour le Canada. A) Terroristes armeniens 19. La menace de nouvelles attaques au Canada pese en permanence sur les diplomates turcs, les moderes de la communaute armenienne qui n'approuvent pas les activites des terroristes ou n'appuient pas leur cause, ainsi que sur les missions diplomatiques et les etablissements commerciaux des pays qui ont apprehend^ des terroristes armeniens, a savoir les Etats-Unis, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, la Suede et la Suisse. Le Canada est egalement au nombre de ces pays, et ses interets tant a 1'interieur qu'a I'exterieur de ses frontieres ont fait 1'objet de menaces. 20. Depuis plusieurs annees, la communaute arnSnienne organise a Ottawa des manitestations annuelles contre la Turquie qui reunissent jusqu'a un millier de personnes et qui, par leur caractere parfois violent, necessitent 1'intervention de la police. Bien que 1'on ait remarque un accroissement du militantisme au sein de cette communaute, aucun signe evident ne revele 1'existence au Canada d’un soutien quelconque des activites terroristes au pays ou a I'etranger. De meme, on ne pergoit aucune menace comme telle contre le Canada. 21. Les attaques dirigees contre les diplomates turcs dans un certain nombre de pays laissent toutefois planer une menace generale sur ceux qui sont en poste au Canada. Depuis le debut de 1982, des terroristes armeniens ont revendique la responsabilite d'un certain nombre de menaces ou d’actes ou ont ete soupgonnes d’en etre les auteurs: des menaces et un attentat a la bombe contre le consul honoraire de la Turquie a Toronto; un attentat a la bombe contre les locaux de Swiss Air a Montreal; des tentatives d'extorsions et des attentats a la bombe incendiaire contre des membres moderes de la communaute armenienne; des attaques contre le personnel de I'ambassade de la Turquie a Ottawa; et, en represailles contre 1'arrestation a Toronto de quatre terroristes armeniens presumes, une tentative d’attaque a la bombe des locaux d'Air Canada a Los Angeles et des menaces proferees contre certaines missions diplomatiques canadiennes a I'etranger. 22. Les trois principales organisations terroristes armeniennes sont 1'Armee secrete armenienne pour la liberation de I'Armenie (ASALA), qui a revendique la responsabilite de la tentative d'assassinat du conseiller commercial de la Turquie a Ottawa, les Commandos justiciers du genocide armenien (CJGA), qui ont revendique la responsabilite de 1'assassinat de 1'attache militaire turc, et la Nouvelle revolution armenienne (NRA), qui ne s'est pas manifestee au Canada. Les terroristes responsables des deux actes criminels commis a Ottawa sont toujours en 1iberte. 000013 �■< 13 SECRET militancy, within the Armenian community, there was no specific evidence to indicate support within Canada for domestic or foreign-based terrorist activities nor was there a perceived threat against Canadian targets. 21. There was, however, a general threat against Turkish diplomats in Canada based on attacks that had taken place in a number of countries. Since the beginning of 1982, Armenian terrorists have either claimed responsibility or are suspected of being responsible for a number of threats or acts including: a threat and bombing directed at the Honorary Turkish Consul in Toronto; a bombing of the Swiss Air office in Montreal; extortion attempts and fire bombings against moderate members of the Armenian community; attacks against members of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa; and, in retaliation for the arrest of four suspected Armenian terrorists in Toronto, an attempted bombing of an Air Canada facility in Los Angeles and threats to a number of Canadian diplomatic missions abroad. 2 2)) The three main Armenian terrorist organiza'tetons are the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), which claimed responsibility for the attempted assassination in Ottawa of the Turkish Commercial Counsellor; the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) which claimed responsibility for the assassination of the Turkish Military Attache; and the New Armenian Revolution (NAR) which has not been active in Canada. The terrorists responsible for . the two criminal acts in Ottawa have not yet been found. 23. One difficulty in countering terrorist groups is the use of numerous names of factions and units. For example, over 20 identities have been used by ASALA to confuse and mislead authorities. (B) Palestinian Resistance Movement 24. There is no specific threat at this time from factions of the Palestinian resistance movement, although there is a continuing general threat to Israeli establishments in Canada. 25. There are active supporters of the Palesti­ nian cause residing in various major Canadian centres who are concentrating their efforts on promoting poli­ tical recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organi­ zation. Outside the mainstream of the Palestinian resistance movement there are a number of radical factions, continue to attacK moderate Palestinian leaders, Israeli officials, and non-Israeli Jews in a variety of countries. Such acts could take place in Canada. In the event of a major shift in Palestinian strategy from the present quest for political solutions to a resumption of attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets, Canada could again face a situation similar to the wave of letter bombs sent to Canadian addressees in the early 1970's. Canada or Canadian missions abroad could be expected to be targets were Canadian foreign policy to take a direction which could be perceived by some 000014 �>■ 14 SECRET 23. L'utilisation de nombreux noms de factions et d'unites entrave la lutte antiterroriste. Par exemple, 1'ASALA s'est fait connaitre sous une vingtaine de denominations differentes pour semer la confusion et derouter les autorites. B) Mouvement de resistance palestinien 24. Les diverses factions du nouvement de resistance palestinien ne constituent pas une menace specifique pour 1'instant, bien qu'une menace generale pese en permanence sur les etablissements israeliens au Canada. 25. Divers grands centres du Canada abritent des militants de la cause palestinienne, qui s'emploient avant tout a promouvoir la reconnaissance politique de 1'Organisation de la liberation de la Palestine. Il existe en marge du mouvement un certain nombre de factions extremistes, qui continuent d'attaquer les chefs palestimens moderes, les representants du gouvernement Israelien et les Juifs non israeliens dans divers pays. De tels actes pourraient etre commis au Canada. Dans le cas ou surviendrait un revirement de la strategic palestinienne, soit de la recherche actuelle de solutions politiques a une reprise des attentats contre des cibles israeliennes et juives, le Canada pourrait connaitre une nouvelle vague de lettres piegees comme celles qui ont ete envoyees a des destinataires can-adiens au debut des annees 1970. Le Canada ou les missions canadiennes a 1'etranger pourraient devenir des cibles du terrorisme palestinien si le gouvernement canadien decidait d'adopter en politique etrangere une position que certains elements Palestinians pourraient percevoir comme etant contraire a leurs interets. C) Terrorisme irlandais 26. Jusqu'ici, aucun acte de violence au Canada n'a ete rattache aux factions terroristes irlandaises. Des activites illegales ont toutefois ete menees par des partisans de 1'Armee provisoire republicaine irlandaise(APRI) et de sa rivale, 1'Association de defense de 1'Ulster (ADU). Commme ces groupes ou leurs sympathisants locaux sont les auteurs d'un nombre croissant d'attentats commis contre des cibles britanniques a 1'exterieur du Royaume-Uni, les attentats restent possibles au Canada, en particulier durant les visites de haut niveau ou la tenue d'evenements speciaux. 27. Pendant plusieurs annees, des membres bien en vue de factions opposees ont visite le Canada pour solliciter des fonds et chercher des appuis a leurs causes respectives, mais leurs demarches se sont averees plus ou moins fructueuses. Au cours des annees 1970, des partisans de 1'APRI et de 1'ADU ont ete associes a 1'expedition d'armes depuis le Canada vers 1'Irlande du Nord. 000015 �<■ 15 SECRET Palestinian elements, to be contrary to Palestinian interests. (C) Irish Issue 26. To date there have been no acts of violence in Canada linked to Irish factions; however, there have been illegal activities in support of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and its rival the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). As an increasing number of attacks on British targets have occurred outside the UK by these groups or local sympathizers, the potential remains for attacks, within Canada, particularly during high level visits or events. 27. For several years prominent officials of opposing factions have visited Canada to solicit funds and support for their respective causes but have had limited success. During the 1970's supporters of the PIRA and UDA were linked to the shipment of arms from Canada to Northern Ireland. (D) Latin American Support Groups 28. The turbulence in Central and South America, combined with increased numbers of refugees from these areas in Canada, has resulted in a number of broadlybased groups supporting programs to overthrow the existing regimes. These activities in Canada have been political and are expected to remain non-violent and do not pose a significant domestic security concern at present. 30. These activities have implicated Canada in the region's internal conflicts and increased the threat to Canadian interests in Central and South 000016 �16 D) SECRET Partisans des luttes ideologiques en Amerique latine 28. L'agitation qui regne en Amerique centrale et du Sud, conjuguee au nombre accru de refugies de ces regions au Canada, a donne lieu a la creation de certains groupes qui, dans un vaste rayon d'action, militent en faveur de programmes visant a renverser les regimes en place. Les activites de ce genre au Canada sont politiques, et elles devraient conserver leur caractere non violent. Somme toute, elles ne posent a 1'heure actuelle aucun probleme d'importance pour la securite du pays. 30. Ces activites ont implique le Canada dans' les conflits internes de la region et ont fait peser une plus grande menace sur les interets canadiens en Amerique centrale et du Sud. Par exemple, a la suite de serieuses menaces, il a fallu, en octobre 1981, faire evacuer partiellement 1'ambassade du Canada au Guatemala pendant un certain temps. E) Exiles cubains anti-castristes 31. Bien qu'il n'y ait au sein de la communaute cubaine du Canada aucun soutien manifeste des organisations terroristes anti-castristes formees d'exiles cubains et basees aux Etats-Unis, ces groupes constituent bel et bien une menace generale pour les interets cubains et sovietiques et pour les entreprises canadiennes qui commercent avec Cuba. Les deux attentats a la bombe incendiaire contre le consulat cubain a Montreal en 1980 et 1981 sont les deux incidents les plus recents en date dont ces groupes aient ete responsables au Canada. 000017 �17 SECRET America. For example, a serious threat in October 1981 required the partial temporary evacuation of the Canadian Embassy in Guatemala. (E) Anti-Castro Cuban Exiles 31. Although there is no identifiable support within the Cuban community in Canada for anti-Castro Cuban exile terrorist organizations based in the USA, these groups do pose a general threat against Cuban and Soviet interests, and Canadian businesses trading with Cuba. The most recent incidents caused by these groups in Canada have been two fire-bombings of the Cuban Consulate in Montreal in 1980 and 1981. (F) The Khalistan Movement 32. The Khalistan Movement for an independent state in the Punjab has been actively supported by some members of the Sikh community in Canada. 33. This organization has established three information offices to disseminate propaganda in Canada in Vancouver, Winnipeg and Toronto. There have been confrontations between Sikhs and diplomatic representa­ tives of India and this has raised security concerns during high level visits to North America. Activities within Canada will be influenced by developments in India which have to date resulted in a number of deaths. 34. There have been allegations made by the Government of India that a Canadian citizen residing in British Columbia is a terrorist leader who committed political murder in India. His extradition was re­ quested by India, but denied. Indian allegations have also been made that Sikhs in Canada have been receiving military training in preparation for returning to India to conduct terrorist activities. There has been no evidence to confirm these allegations; however inci­ dents in India and protests conducted in Canada, combi­ ned with suspected contacts between the Canadian Sikhs and the movement, warrants continuing investigations. 35. The recent departure to India of several Sikhs, who are citizens of India and residents of Canada, may increase Canadian involvement as their declared purpose is to take part in demonstrations and to be arrested, thereby increasing Canadian awareness of the Khalistan Movement. (G) Puerto Rican Nationalists 36. The six terrorist groups seeking the indepen­ dence for Puerto Rico have not conducted any activity outside of Puerto Rico and mainlaind USA. Puerto Rican terrorists are known, however, to have contact with members of a non-aligned Marxist-Leninist organization in Canada. There is no specific threat from these groups to USA interests in Canada; however, the proxi­ mity of Canada to the USA could prompt them to mount attacks during visits by senior American representa­ tives or as a result of domestic counter-measures taken by USA authorities. 000018 �18 F) SECRET Mouvement khalistan 32. Certains membres de la communaute sikh du Canada sont de fervents partisans du Mouvement khalistan pour la creation d'un Etat independant dans le Pendjab. 33. Cette organisation a etabli a Vancouver, Winnipeg et Toronto trois centres d'information pour diffuser de la propaganda au Canada. Des affrontements ont eu lieu entre des Sikh et des representants de 1'Inde, ce qui a souleve des- problemes de securite lors de la visite de dignitaires en Amerique du Nord. L'evolution des activites de ce groupe en sol canadien sera fonction des evenements en Inde qui, jusqu'a maintenant, ont fait plusieurs victimes. 3 4. Selon les allegations du gouvernement de 1'Inde, un citoyen canadien residant en Colombie-Britannique serait un chef terroriste qui a commis un meurtre politique en Inde. Ce pays a demande son extradition, mais celle-ci a ete refusee. Selon d'autres allegations indiennes, des membres de la communaute sikh du Canada recevraient une formation militaire avant de retourner en Inde pour y mener des activites terroristes. Toutes ces allegations se revelent non fondees. Toutefois, des incidents survenus en Inde et des manifestations tenues au Canada, ajoutes a des presumes contacts entre les Sikh du Canada et le Mouvement, justifient la poursuite des enquetes § ce sujet. 35. Le recent depart pour 1'Inde de plusieurs Sikh qui sont citoyens de 1'Inde et residents du Canada peut mettre ce dernier davantage en cause, puisque leur objectif avoue est de prendre part a des manifestations et de se faire arreter pour ainsi sensibiliser davantage les Canadiens au Mouvement khalistan. G) Nationalistes portoricains 36. Les six groupes terroristes militant en faveur de 1'independance de Porto Rico n'ont mene aucune activite a 1'exterieur de ce territoire et des Etats-Unis continentaux. Cependant, les terroristes portoricains ont des contacts avec des membres d'une organisation marxiste-leniniste non alignee au Canada. Ces groupes ne menacent pas expressement les interets americains au Canada, mais la proximite des Etats-Unis pourrait pousser ces groupes a organiser des attentats durant des visites de hauts fonctionnaires americains au Canada ou en represailles de contre-mesures internes prises par les autorites americaines. H) Armee rouge japonaise (ARJ) 37. A 1'heure actuelle, 1'Armee rouge japonaise ne menace pas expressement le Canada ni les interets japonais qui s'y trouvent, mais elle continue de preoccuper les autorites du fait d'activites anterieures qui ont mis en cause le Canada. Un des terroristes de 1'ARJ s'est rendu au Canada avant de participer en 1972 au massacre de 1'aeroport Lod de Tel-Aviv. Par la suite, 1'interception et 1'expulsion 000019 �19 (H) SECRET Japanese Red Army (JRA) 37. At the present time the Japanese Red Army (JRA) does not pose a specific threat to Canada or to Japanese interests in Canada, but it continues to be of concern because of previous activities involving Canada. A JRA terrorist was in Canada prior to taking part in the 1972 LOD Airport massacre. The later interception and deportation to Japan of two other members resulted in an official warning by the JRA of retaliation against Canada. Although inactive since 1977, intelligence indicates that the JRA still exists, members are located in the Middle East, and they may re-emerge on the international scene. (I) European Domestic Terrorist Groups 38. There are a number of terrorist groups in Europe that have confined their activities to that continent and therefore are not considered to pose a specific threat to European interests in Canada or to Canadian interests in Europe. There is no identifiable support in Canada for these groups. A potential threat does exist due to their demonstrated capability and the trend towards broadening the range of their targets to include foreigners. 39. (J) Yugoslav Terrorism 40. There is a continuing threat against Yugoslav establishments in Canada from Croatian and Serbian extremists and developments in Yugoslavia could increase this threat. The policies of the Yugoslav Government and its counter-activities within the Croatian and Serbian communities in Canada will continue to create a security problem within Canada and affect relations between Canada and Yugoslavia. (a) Anti-Yugoslav Activities 41. As part of international movements, there are a number of organizations throughout Canada who promote separatist aspirations. Their tactics have ranged from peaceful cultural activities and demonstrations to providing safe haven to fugitives and acts of violence against Yugoslav establishments. The recent arrest and sentencing in the USA of several Croatian terrorists, including one Canadian citizen, has been a major set back for the extremists. While the Serbians have been inactive in recent years, the Croatians have increased the means to articulate their national aspirations by the holding in Toronto, in January 1982, of the International Croatian National Congress, and the opening in October of the Croatian National Congress Information Office in Ottawa. Both of these events 000020 �20 SECRET vers le Japon de deux autres membres a amene I'ARJ a adresser un avertissement officiel de represailles contre le Canada. Selon les renseignements disponibles, I’ARJ existe toujours bien qu’elle soit inactive depuis 1977, et elle compte des membres au Moyen-Orient qui pourraient reapparaitre sur la scene Internationale. I) Groupes terroristes europeens 38. L'Europe compte plusieurs groupes terroristes qui ont limite leurs activites a ce continent et qui, par consequent, ne presentent une menace specifique ni pour les interets europeens au Canada ni pour les interets canadiens en Europe. Ces groupes ne beneficient d'aucun appui connu au Canada. Toutefois, ils constituent une menace possible du fait de leur capacite averee et de leur tendance a inclure des etrangers au nombre de leurs cibles. J) Terrorisme yougoslave 40. Les extremistes serbes et creates constituent une menace permanente pour les etablissements yougoslaves au Canada, menace que pourrait accentuer I'evolution de la situation en Yougoslavie. Les politiques du gouvernement yougoslave et ses interventions au sein des communautes serbe et croate du Canada continueront a menacer la securite du pays et a nuire aux relations canado-yougoslaves. a) Activities anti-yougoslaves 41. Il existe en divers endroits du Canada des organisations qui, dans le cadre de mouvements internationaux, soutiennent des aspirations separatistes. Leur action a pris diverses formes, allant des activites culturelies et des manifestations pacifiques au refuge offert a des fugitifs et aux actes de violence commis contre des etablissements yougoslaves. Les extremistes ont essuye derniSrement un revers important lorsque plusieurs terroristes creates, dont un citoyen canadien, ont ete arretes et condamnes aux Etats-Unis. Bien que les Serbes soient inactifs depuis quelques annees, les Creates ont intensifie les moyens de faire valoir leurs aspirations nationales en tenant a Toronto, en janvier 1982, une reunion internationale du Congres national create et en ouvrant, en octobre de la meme annee, un bureau d'information du Congres national croate a Ottawa, Le gouvernement de la Yougoslavie s'est oppose energiquement a ces deux initiatives. 000021 �21 SECRET were strenuously objected to by the Yugoslav Government. i 42. The level of anti-Yugoslav activities in Canada will be influenced by: internal measures taken by the Yugoslav Government against dissidents; the stability of the Yugoslav Federation; and Yugoslav Intelligence Service counter-activities against visitors to Yugoslavia and within Yugoslav communities abroad. (b) Yugoslav State Counter-Activities The sensivity of the Yugoslav Government over 43. perceived threats to its national integrity is reflec­ ted in the expulsion of dissidents and activists, an aggressive program to monitor and manipulate ethnic communities, and on occasion, to eliminate political opponents residing abroad. It has recently been implicated in the attempted murder of a political dissident in the Federal Republic of Germany. 45. The opening Office is expected to Yugoslav intelligence the Croatian National of the Croatian Information cause Canada to be a focus for activities aimed at discrediting Congress. 46. For years, the Yugoslav Government has strenuously pressed the Canadian Government to prohibit acts of dissent and protest, claiming that permitting these acts gives support to terrorism, even though such acts of dissent are permitted under Canadian law. Canada has repeatedly rejected the Yugoslav claim that the Croatian National Congress is a terrorist organization. (K) State Terrorism 47. Yugoslavia has not been alone in using terro­ rist tactics to eliminate political opponents in other countries. Certain states are known to support and direct terrorist activities in pursuit of specific national objectives. In 1981 alone, 21 victims were killed and 28 injured in state-sponsored international terrorist attacks; the majority occurred in the Middle East or were directed against expatriates or diplomats of Middle East countries. These activities are usually very selective and discreet in order to avoid unfavourable political repercussions. To permit states to deny responsibility, they often employ or support terrorists abroad to carry out campaigns against their enemies. 48. Directly or indirectly, certain states are known to provide training, arms, ana logistical support to terrorist groups and liberation movements that use terrorist tactics. There are suspicions about the role played by 000022 �22 SECRET 42. L'intensite des activites anti-yougoslaves au Canada dependra de trois facteurs: les mesures internes prises par le gouvernement yougoslave contre les dissidents; la stabilite de la Federation yougoslave et les interventions du Service du renseignement yougoslave aupres des personnes qui se rendront dans ce pays de meme qu'au sein des communautes yougoslaves a 1'etranger. b) Interventions de I1Stat yougoslave 43. La sensibilite du gouvernement yougoslave aux menaces pergues contre son integrite nationale se reflete dans 1'expulsion de dissidents et d'activistes, ainsi que dans 1'application d'un programme offensif visant a surveiller et a manipuler les communautes ethniques et, a 1’occasion, a eliminer les opposants politiques qui resident a 1'etranger. Ce gouvernement a ete recemment implique dans la tentative de meurtre d'un dissident politique en Republique federale d'Allemagne. 45. L'ouverture du Bureau d'information create devrait faire du Canada un centre d'interet oQ le Service du renseignement yougoslave travaillera a discrediter le Congres national croate. 46. Depuis des annees, le gouvernement yougoslave exerce regulierement des pressions aupres des autorites canadiennes pour obtenir que les actes de dissension et de protestation soient interdits, alleguant qu'autoriser de tels actes equivaut a soutenir le terrorisme, meme si ces actes de dissension sont licites au Canada. Le Canada a rejete a maintes reprises 1'affirmation du gouvernement yougoslave selon laquelle le Congres national croate est une organisation terrorists. K) Terrorisme d'Etat 47. La Yougoslavie n'est pas seule a user de tactiques terroristes pour supprimer 1'opposition politique dans d'autres pays. On salt que certains Stats apportent un soutien aux terroristes et dirigent meme leurs activites dans la poursuite d'objectifs nationaux specifiques. En 1981 seulement, le terrorisme d'Stat international a fait 21 morts et 28 blesses, la majorite de ces attentats ayant eu lieu au Moyen-Orient ou etant diriges contre des expatries ou des diplomates de pays de cette region du globe. Ces activites sont en rdgle generale executees suivant des procedes tres selectifs et discrets afin d'eviter toutes repercussions politiques defavorables. Pour pouvoir nier toute responsabilite, les Stats en cause ont recours a des terroristes a 1'etranger ou leur fournissent une aide pour ecraser leurs opposants. 000023 �23 SECRET (a) 49. 50. 51. 52. (b) 53. 000024 �4 24 SECRET 48. a) 49. 50. 51. 52. 000025 �25 SECRET 54. 55. (L) Emerging Security Concerns 56. In addition to the security concerns posed by ethnic or state terrorist groups, there is a growing concern regarding popular issues which may be exploited by extremists resorting to violent tactics in pursuit of their own objectives. One example is the growth of the environmental and anti-nuclear movement in Canada which has been encouraged by several issues, focusing on nuclear disarmament and furthered by the decision to test USA cruise missiles in Canada. 57J) The movement has attracted support from a 'cross-section of society; people of all ages and from all walks of life. Support is evident from a demonstration held in Vancouver that involved some 30,000 participants and more recently in Ottawa with some 15,000 attending the demonstration. A movement of this size, organized around legitimate political issues can provide an opportunity for subversives or radicals to attempt to achieve their specific objectives. Nevertheless, the size and diversity of the movement makes it difficult to divert it towards extreme positions. There is, therefore, no reason to believe that the movement will depart from the policy of peaceful protest.^>This does not preclude some Canadians or foreign-based groups from exploiting the issues of the movement to carry out acts of civil disobedience and acts of violence such as those carried out by unknown individuals who have identified themselves as the Di’rect-—Action-group-. (M) Perspectives 58. A terrorist threat now exists in Canada and to Canadian interests abroad and cannot be ignored by the Canadian Government. In Canada, specific threats by Armenian terrorists and Direct Action, and the varying degrees of threat posed by other groups demonstrate the present need to provide corresponding levels of protection to the representatives of l’5^j= countries;: Britain, Cuba, Egypt, France, Iran, Iraq, 000026 �26 SECRET b) 53. 54. c) 55. L) ■ Nouveaux problemes de securite 56. Aux problemes de securite que pose le terrorisme d'fitat ou celui de groupes ethniques s'ajoute le probleme de plus en plus serieux des questions "d'actualite" que pourraient exploiter certains extremistes qui usent de la violence pour parvenir a leurs propres fins. A titre d'exemple, 1'expansion du mouvement ecologique et antinucleaire au Canada, phenomena favorise par divers facteurs, notamment le desarmement nucleaire, et, par effet d'entrainement, la decision du gouvernement d‘autoriser les essais de missiles de croisiere americains au Canada. 57. Le mouvement a gagne L'appui de gens de tous ages et de toutes conditions sociales. Une manifestation tenue a Vancouver a regroupe 30 000 participants et une autre, plus recente, a rassemble quelque 15 000 personnes a Ottawa. Un mouvement d'une 000027 �27 SECRET Israel, Lebanon, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the USA, the USSR and Yugoslavia. Abroad, specific threats from Armenian terrorists have been received by Canadian diplomatic and commercial establishments. Additional vigilance and security measures have been implemented at some 40 locations. 59. Present terrorist tactics are expected to continue throughout the decade. Bombings and assassination attempts are the primary concern as they provide the terrorist with an effective means of attacking with a minimum risk. 60. While few nationalities will be exempt from international terrorist attacks, the majority of the targets will be American, followed by British, French, Israeli, Turkish and Iraqi. The majority of persons now attacked are diplomats, followed by dissidents and . prominent exiles. This trend towards diplomatic targets is expected to continue. 61. While to date, international terrorist incidents have been concentrated in certain countries of Western Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and the USA, the trend is towards a broader geographic distribution. 62. . To a varying degree, any group capable of operating internationally poses a threat to Canada and foreign interests in this country. At this time, the /following are receiving increased attention as security /concerns: 63. The existing threat will be influenced not only by international trends and developments, but also by measures taken by Canada. If Canada is perceived to be vulnerable and without effective capacity to anticipate and counter new threats, the threat to Canada and Canadians can be expected to increase correspondingly. 64. (A study examining international terrorism, identifying and assessing those new developments and trends that may be emerging in the 1980's which have implications for the Western democracies, including Canada, is provided in the attached annex). IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (A) Political and Legal 65. A number of political and legal measures have been taken by the international community to discourage terrorist acts that increasingly challenge the normal conduct of diplomatic and economic relations. Canada has actively participated in the development and implementation of a series of international conventions 000028 �28 SECRET telle envergure, gravitant autour de causes politiques legitimes, peut fournir a des elements subversifs ou radicaux 1'occasion de tenter de parvenir a leurs fins particulieres. Cependant, 1'importance et la diversite du mouvement font qu'il est difficile de le faire devier vers des positions extremistes. Par consequent, il n'y a pas lieu de croire que le mouvement s'ecartera de sa^politique de protestation pacifique. Ce qui n'empechera pas certains Canadiens ou groupes etrangers d'exploiter les causes que defend le mouvement pour faire executer des actes de desobeissance civile et de violence comme ceux qu'ont commis des inconnus qui s'identifient sous le nom de "Direct Action". M) Perspectives 58. Le terrorisme menace a I'heure actuelle le Canada et les interets canadiens a I'etranger; le gouvernement ne peut pas meconnaitre cette realite. Au Canada, les menaces specifiques proferees par les terroristes armeniens et "Direct Action" et les menaces posees, a des degres divers, par d'autres groupes font qu’il est necessaire a I'heure actuelle d'assurer une protection adequate aux representants de 15 pays: Grande-Bretagne, Cuba, Egypte, France, Iran, Irak, Israel, Liban, Pologne, Suede, Suisse, Turquie, Stats-Unis, URSS et Yougoslavie. Des missions diplomatiques et des etablissements commerciaux canadiens a I'etranger ont regu des menaces precises de terroristes armeniens, et il a fallu renforcer les mesures de surveillance et de securite a une quarantaine d'endroits. 59. Les tactiques terroristes actuelles devraient se poursuivre tout au long de la decennie. Les attentats a la bombe et les tentatives d'assassinat sont les deux actes les plus a redouter, puisqu'ils constituent pour le terroriste un moyen efficace d’attaquer en courant le moins de risques possible. 60. Le terrorisme international epargne peu de nationalites, mais il vise en grande majorite les Americains, puis les Britanniques, les Frangais, les Israeliens, les Tures et les Irakiens. Aujourd'hui, les diplomates sont la principale cible des terroristes; viennent ensuite les dissidents et les exiles bien en vue. Cette tendance a viser les diplomates se poursuivra vraisemblablement. 61. Jusqu'a present, le terrorisme international a concentre ses attaques dans certains pays de 1'Europe occidentale, de 1'Amerique latine et du Moyen-Orient, ainsi qu'aux Etats-Unis, mais il tend a etendre son rayon d'action. 62. Tout groupe pouvant operer a l'echelle Internationale constitue, a des degres divers, une menace pour le Canada et les interets etrangers dans ce pays . 000029 �29 SECRET for the promotion of the safety of civil aviation including hijacking; for the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents; and hostage-taking. The Economic Summit has supported political and practical measures, including sanctions as expressed in the 1978 Bonn Declaration on Hijacking and the July 1981 Ottawa Statement on Terrorism. 66. Despite differing national perceptions of terrorism ("One man's terrorist is another man's free­ dom fighter"), most of the international law regarding terrorism has been developed by identifying specific acts deemed unacceptable by the international communi­ ty, regardless of the political motive prompting such acts, and by enunciating the principle of "extradition or prosecution" of alleged offenders. These legal conventions are implemented by suasion, not sanctions or penalties, and many countries have not yet adhered to them nor demonstrated the political will to make them effective. For example, over 20 countries have granted asylum to terrorists following a hostage situation. The implementation of the Bonn Declaration, which was to require sanctions against offending states, has been most difficult because national econo­ mic and political interests usually outweigh the commitment to counter terrorism. (B) Security Intelligence 67. Security intelligence on terrorist activities is included in the exchange of information between Canada and specific foreign governments as part of established intelligence communications and liaison arrangements. This intelligence program is conducted in conformity with established governmental guidelines and procedures. (C) International Police Arrangements (a) Interpol 68. Interpol facilitates the exchange of informa­ tion or requests for assistance on criminal matters between Canada and the other 132 member countries. Canadian participation is determined by whether the crime is covered by a Canadian statute and whether successful extradition is probable. Canada and other nations when hosting major international events use Interpol channels to exchange information on persons who may pose a threat to the event or participants. The Interpol charter places limitations on the dissemi­ nation of political information. (b) Police Liaison Program RCMP personnel are posted abroad to develop and maintain liaison with law enforcement and security agencies, subject to ministerial restrictions with respect to agencies of countries identified as human rights violators. The original purpose of this program was to assist in the screening of potential immigrants and visitors, but has 69. 000030 �30 SECRET 63. La menace existante dependra non seulement des tendances et des evenements internationaux, mais aussi des mesures que prendra le Canada. Si celui-ci est per?u comme un pays vulnerable, denue des moyens efficaces de prevoir et de contrecarrer toute nouvelle menace, il lui faudra s'attendre a ce que son territoire et ses citoyens soient exposes a un danger qui augmentera en consequence. 64. (L'annexe ci-jointe examine le terrorisme international, cerne et evalue les faits nouveaux et les tendances qui, susceptibles d'apparaitre dans les annees 1980, auront des repercussions sur les democraties occidentales, y compris le Canada.) IV. COOPERATION INTERNATIONALE A) Aspects politiques et iuridiques 65. La communaute internationale a pris un certain nombre de mesures politiques et juridiques pour reprimer le terrorisme qui fait de plus en plus entrave a la conduite normale des relations diplomatiques et economiques. Le Canada participe activement a 1'elaboration et 11application d'une serie de conventions internationales destinees a proteger 1'aviation civile, entre autres, centre la piraterie aerienne, a prevenir et a reprimer les prises d’otages ainsi que les crimes commis centre les personnes jouissant d'une protection internationale, y compris les agents diplomatiques. Les pays membres du Sommet economique ont souscrit a une serie de mesures politiques et pratiques, dont les sanctions qui ont ete enoncees en 1978 dans la Declaration de Bonn sur la piraterie aerienne et en juillet 1981 dans la Declaration d'Ottawa sur le terrorisme. 66. En depit des divergences de vues sur la notion de terrorisme ("le terroriste pour 1' un -est combattant de la liberte pour 1'autre"), le droit international applicable en la matiere est etabli sur la base d'actes bien definis, juges inacceptables par la communaute Internationale sans egard aux motifs politiques qui sont a leur origine, et du principe "aut dedere aut punire" (livrer ou punir les presumes contrevenants). L'application de ces conventions est assuree par la persuasion, et non par des sanctions ou des peines. Bon nombre de pays n'ont pas encore adhere 3 ces instruments et n'ont pas manifests la volonte politique necessaire pour les appliquer effectivement. Par exemple, plus de 20 pays ont accorde 1'asile politique a des terroristes impliques dans des prises d'otages. Par ailleurs, il a ete particulierement difficile de mettre en oeuvre la Declaration de Bonn, en vertu de laquelle des sanctions devaient etre prises contre les Etats contrevenants, oarce que les interets economiques et politiques des pays concernes 1'emportent generalement sur 1'engagement a combattre le terrorisme. 000031 �31 SECRET been extended, by necessity, to include a number of other concerns including international terrorism. (D) Common Interests 70. International terrorism requires an international response. The major forums for the development of effective counter-measures to meet common interests include: (a) regular bilateral Canada-U.S.A. consul­ tations with participation of all departments and agencies having similar responsibilities and recognizing the critical need for transborder coopera­ tion; (b) periodic meetings of experts of Economic Summit countries to advise on ways of dealing with international hijacking and other forms of terrorism; (c) NATO consultations on terrorist trends and developments in member nations, and the security of military facilities and personnel in Europe, but excluding the political aspects of terrorism; (d) consultations between federal police and security officials in Canada and their counterparts abroad concerning specific terrorist groups; (e) conferences and meetings based on common association, such as the annual Common­ wealth Security Conference. 71. The need for advisory and technical assis­ tance in areas related to counterterrorist capability has been identified by certain developing countries and international organizations. Initial steps are being taken to contribute to improving the capabilities of other countries in the areas of police administration, safety of civil aviation and crisis management. V. NATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS (A) Security Intelligence Process (a) Introduction 72. Through the security intelligence process, information is collected, collated, analyzed and the finished product disseminated so that appropriate measures may be taken. The process operates within established guidelines. The effectiveness of the process is affected by the difficulty in differentiating between legitimate dissent and activities which may be the prelude to violence and terrorist acts. This difficulty was identified by the McDonald Royal Commission. On the international scene, the process is also affected by differing perceptions of what constitutes a terrorist act and the nature of 000032 �32 B) SECRET Services de renseignements 67. Dans le cadre de programmes etablis de communication de renseignements et d'ententes de liaison, le Canada echange avec d'autres pays des renseignements sur les activites terroristes. Ce programme de renseignements est execute conformement a des lignes directrices et a des procedures gouvernementales etablies. C) Services policiers internationaux a) Interpol 68. L'Interpol facilite 1'Echange de renseignements ou de demandes d'aide concernant des questions criminelles entre le Canada et les 132 autres pays membres. La participation du Canada est dEterminee selon que le crime est visE par une loi canadienne et que la procEdure d'ex tradition risque d'etre menEe a bien. Lorsque de grands evEnements internationaux se tiennent sur leur territoire, le Canada et d'autres pays utilisent les voies de communication de 1'Interpol pour Echanger des renseignements sur les personnes susceptibles de compromettre la tenue des EvEnements ou de menacer leurs participants. Les statuts de 1'Interpol restreignent la diffusion de renseignements politiques. b) Programme de liaison policiere 69. a 1'etranger, des agents de la GRC sont charges d'etablir et de maintenir la liaison avec des services de securite et de police, sous reserve des restrictions ministerielles applicables aux services de certains pays qui sont reconnus comme des violateurs des droits de la personne. Ce programme avait pour objet a 1'origine de faciliter la pre-selection des immigrants et des visiteurs potentiels, mais il a EtE Elargi, par la force des choses, de fagon a englober certains- autres secteurs, comme le terrorisme international. D) Interets communs 70. Le terrorisme international appelle une reaction Internationale. Les principaux mecanismes d'Elaboration de contre-mesures efficaces pour servir des interets communs comprennent: a) les consultations bilaterales regulieres entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis, avec la participation de tous les ministeres et organismes qui ont des responsabilites du meme genre et qui reconnaissent le besoin imperieux d'une cooperation transfrontaliere; b) les reunions periodiques d'experts des pays membres du Sommet Economique, qui donnent avis et conseils sur les fagons de lutter centre la piraterie aerienne et d'autres formes de terrorisme international; 000033 �33 SECRET intelligence or assessment that should be exchanged. This leads to inconsistencies vis-a-vis exchanges and the adoption of tactics to counter such acts. (b) Collection 73. The Security Service has the clear responsi­ bility for the collection of intelligence in the area of international and domestic terrorism. It is a broad responsibility considering the numerous known and emerging terrorist groups, with diverse motivations, that are part of the present international scene, and recognizing that any of them might conduct activities in Canada. The Security Service must assure that its data base on these terrorist groups is sufficient to be the basis of timely assessments for government on the threat these groups present to Canada and to provide intelligence support during a terrorist incident. Ideally, the Security Service should, through its collection of information, be aware of developments in Canada and abroad, and be able to predict that a terrorist act in Canada is imminent, and thus to thwart it. This is not, however, always possible. 74. Like all agencies of government, the Security Service has limited resources and is required to assign priorities; thus some groups will receive major atten­ tion, whereas those with a lower priority will remain in a passive collation or monitoring mode. 75. Canadian society includes a wide range of ethnic groupings and among the foreign-based terrorist groups there are many motivated by causes with which ethnic groups in Canada can readily identify, The attitudes within ethnic communities may range from relative indifference, through passive support to active support from a small segment prepared to engage in terrorist acts. It is from these last individuals that foreign-based terrorist groups seek support when planning to stage an incident in Canada. It is also these same individuals that the Security Service is challenged to identify and to prevent from actively supporting foreign terrorists. 76. While the question of limited resources is a major factor in the ability of the Security Service to meet this challenge, it is not the greatest restric­ tion. In a democratic society where legitimate dissent is recognized in law and practice, the investigation of ethnic or other interest groups is particularly sensi­ tive even if the purpose is to identify elements sympa­ thetic to terrorist causes within those groups. 77. The Security Service is governed by a mecha­ nism of internal control which prohibits the investi­ gating of acts of dissent and authorizes investigations only on individuals who, through unsolicited informa­ tion, are reported to be violence-prone, who are iden­ tified by allied agencies as being terrorist sympathi­ zers and supporters, or who come to Security Service attention through investigations of the terrorist threat. Many potential terrorists supporters can thus remain unknown to the Security Service and may be 000034 �! 34 SECRET c) les consultations de 1'OTAN sur les tendances et les faits nouveaux concernant le terrorisme dans les pays membres et sur la securite des installations et du personnel militaires en Europe, a 1'exclusion toutefois des aspects politiques du terrorisme; d) les consultations sur certains groupes terroristes entre la police federale et les services de securite du Canada et leurs homologues etrangers; e) les conferences et les reunions d'associations, comme la Conference annuelle du Commonwealth sur la securite. 71. Certains pays en developpement et certaines organisations internationales ont mis en lumiere le besoin de services consultatifs et techniques dans des domaines lies a 1'antiterrorisme. Des mesures initiales sont actuellement prises pour contribuer a 1'amelioration des ressources d'autres pays dans les domaines de 1'administration policiere, de la securite de 1'aviation civile et de la gestion des crises. V. RESSOURCES ET LIMITES NATIONALES A) Processus du renseignement a) Introduction 72. Le processus du renseignement permet de recueillir, d'assembler et d’analyser 1'information et de diffuser le produit fini de maniere que les mesures appropriees puissent etre prises, Le processus obeit a des lignes directrices etablies, Son efficacite est diminuee du fait qu'il est difficile de distinguer entre la dissension legitime et les activites qui peuvent preluder a des actes de violence et de terrorisme. Cette difficult? a du reste ete relevee par la Commission royale McDonald. Au niveau international, le processus se heurte par ailleurs a une divergence des perceptions quant a la definition de 1'acte terroriste et a la nature des renseignements ou des evaluations qui pourraient etre echanges. Cet etat de choses donne lieu a des incoherences en ce qui concerne les echanges et les tactiques elaborees pour contrecarrer les actes terroristes. b) Collects des renseignements 73. Le Service de securite est expressement charge de la collecte des renseignements relatifs au terrorisme international et national. C’est la une vaste responsabilite si I'on tient compte du nombre de groupes terroristes connus et nouveaux, partisans de causes diverses, qui agissent actuellement sur la scene internationale, et si I'on admet que n'importe quel de ces groupes peut mener des activites au Canada. Le Service de securite doit s'assurer que sa banque de donnees sur ces groupes est suffisamment complete pour servir a la preparation d’evaluations opportunes, a 000035 �35 SECRET involved in terrorist acts in Canada without its foreknowledge. In many such cases the Security Service, like most security services in the democratic world, is forced to react after the fact, not having had the security intelligence necessary to prevent the terrorist incident. The recent Armenian terrorist activities are the best examples of this. (c) Collation 78. Intelligence relevant to terrorist matters is centralized in a computerized data bank maintained by the Security Service. This is complemented by access to national criminal record systems and other Canadian intelligence facilities. (d) Analysis 79. Accurate and timely analysis of this volumi­ nous and varied information is critical to the deci­ sion-making process whether at the national policy level or for operational requirements. Different departments have particular requirements and differing analytical capabilities to meet their needs. Analyti­ cal capabilities are now developed through experience and departmental training programs. Through the Intel­ ligence Advisory Committee and the Security Advisory Committee, existing analytical resources are brought together to discuss trends and developments, assess threats and identify issues requiring departmental follow-up action. Analytical resources are limited and departmentally-based, precluding a cohesive approach to long-term research, with the result that the response to terrorism in Canada has tended to be re-active. (e) Dissemination 80. The next step is to ensure prompt delivery of information and assessments to those departments and agencies on a "need-to-know" basis to enable them to take appropriate action. Assessments and situation reports are communicated directly among responsible departments as well as through either the Security Advisory Committee or Intelligence Advisory Committee. 81. Immediate and specific threats are communi­ cated directly to responsible departments and agencies through the "Terrorist Alert" system subject to the limits of existing communications facilities and secu­ rity restrictions. 82. Recent Armenian terrorist acts have emphasi­ zed the need to review the requirements of various "consumers", and to develop a common threat assessment format (including the probability of attack) that can be disseminated in a readily usable form. (f) Special Threat Assessment Group 83. The Special Threat Assessment Group (S.T.A.G.) was established by the Solicitor General in 1976, to assess the credibility of nuclear, biological and chemical threats and to identify resources required 000036 �36 SECRET 1'intention du gouvernement, sur la menace que presentent ces groupes pour le Canada, et pour venir appuyer les operations lorsque survient un incident terroriste. Idealement, le Service de securite devrait, grace a la collecte de renseignements, etre au courant de 1'evolution de la situation au Canada et a 1'etranger, et etre en mesure de predire qu'un acte terroriste est sur le point de se produire au Canada et, partant, d'y faire echec. Toutefois, ce scenario n'est pas toujours possible. 74. A 1'instar de tous les organismes gouvernementaux, le Service de securite a des ressources limitees et il est tenu d'etablir des priorites. Ainsi, certains groupes regoivent davantage d'attention alors que les groupes moins prioritaires ne feront I'objet que de collectes de renseignements ou de surveillance ponctuelle. 75. La societe canadienne renferme une grande variete de groupes ethniques qui peuvent facilement s'identifier aux causes que soutiennent bon nombre de groupes terroristes etrangers. Les attitudes des communautes ethniques peuvent osciller entre 1'indifference relative, le soutien passif et 1'appui actif d'une petite faction prete a se livrer a des actes terroristes. C'est le soutien de ces factions que les groupes terroristes etrangers recherchent lorsqu'ils envisagent de provoquer un incident au Canada. Ce sont ces memes factions que le Service de securite est appele a depister et a empecher de soutenir activement les terroristes etrangers. 76. La question des ressources limitees est certes un facteur important en ce qui concerne la capacite du Service de securite de relever ce defi, mais ce n'est pas la principale restriction. Dans une societe democratique oQ la dissension legitime est reconnue en droit et dans la pratique, la question des enquetes menees aupres de groupes ethniques ou d’autres groupes d'interet est particulierement delicate, meme lorsque le but vise est de determiner en leur sein les elements qui epousent les causes terroristes. 77. Le Service de securite est soumis a un controle interne qui interdit les enquetes sur les actes de dissension et n'autorise la tenue d'enquetes que sur les personnes qui, sur la foi de renseigneraents non sollicites, sont considerees comme des partisans de la violence, qui sont reconnues par des organismes allies comme etant des sympathisants terroristes, ou encore dont 1'existence est portee a 1'attention du Service de securite par le biais d'enquetes sur la menace terroriste. De nombreux partisans en puissance des mouvements terroristes peuvent ainsi rester inconnus du Service de securite et etre impliques dans des actes terroristes au Canada sans que celui-ci ait ete informe au prealable de leur existence. Dans bien des cas de ce genre, le Service de securite, a 1'instar de la majorite de ses pendants dans les pays democratiques, se voit contraint de reagir apres coup, n'ayant pu disposer des renseignements de securite necessaires pour empecher 1'incident terroriste. Les 000037 �37 SECRET should a threat be carried out. The S.T.A.G core ele­ ment is composed of federal scientists in Ottawa supported by other specialists across Canada. (B) Countermeasures (a) Control of Movements of Suspected Terrorists 84. The objective is to detect terrorists attempting to enter Canada. The first opportunity to prevent entry is through the pre-screening of visa applicants abroad. The second line of defence is at the port of entry. The effectiveness of this program is dependent upon accurate and timely intelligence made readily available to the officers controlling entry to Canada. The absence of identity control mechanisms within Canada, as compared to many other countries, makes control of entry our principal means of prevent­ ing terrorists from reaching their targets inside Canada. (i) Abroad 85. Of the 50 million foreign visitors entering Canada each year, few require visas and those who do are for employment and immigration purposes. Mandatory pre-screening procedures, specifically for counter­ terrorism purposes While it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of this program, it is unlikely to deter the determined professional terrorist from seeking entry into Canada. (ii) Ports of Entry 86. The customs inspector is the first official to screen a visitor and to determine the admissibility of persons and goods. Visitors are only referred to an Immigration Officer if suspected of being inadmissable. 87. The procedures to exclude any person from admission to Canada at a point of entry require that the person be identified as a member of the inadmissible classes. The immigration procedures may involve voluntary departure on the issue of either an exclusion or of a deportation order. Should the determination of the person's inadmissibility be based solely on criminal security intelligence, there is provision in the Immigration Act to permit the issue of a certificate, signed by both the Solicitor General and the Minister of Immigration, that denies access to the information to an adjudicator at an immigration enquiry and is prima facie evidence that the individual is an inadmissible person as described in the certificate. Any action to deny entry can result in threats of retaliation by terrorist groups thus increasing the risk to Canadian interests at home and especially abroad. 000038 �38 SECRET recentes activites terroristes armeniennes en sont le meilleur exemple. C) Rassemblement des donnees 78. Le Service de securite regroupe dans une banque de donnees informatisee des renseignements relatifs au terrorisms. A cstts activity s'ajouts 1'acces aux systSmes nationaux de casiers judiciaires et a d'autres services canadiens de renseignement. d) Analyse 79. L'analyse juste et opportune de cet important volume de renseignements varies est essentielle au processus decisionnel, que ce soit pour definir la politique generale a 1'echelle nationale ou pour satisfaire aux exigences operationnelles. Les divers ministeres ont des besoins qui leur sont propres et des capacites analytiques differentes pour satisfaire a ces besoins. L'experience et les programmes de formation ministeriels servent a developper ces capacites a 1'heure actuelle. Par 1'entremise du Comite consultatif des renseignements et du Comite consultatif de la securite, les ressources analytiques existantes sont mises en commun pour permettre de discuter des tendances et des developpements, d'evaluer les menaces et de recenser les questions qui exigent un suivi de la part des ministeres. Comme les ressources analytiques sont limitees et bashes dans les divers ministeres, il ne peut y avoir de recherche a long terme coherente, ce qui explique pourquoi la reaction du Canada face au terrorisms a habituellement pris la forme d'une action apres coup. e) Diffusion de 1'information 80. L'etape suivante consiste a assurer la diffusion rapide de 1'information et des evaluations aux ministeres et organismes qui "ont besoin de savoir" pour leur permettre de prendre les mesures appropriees. Les evaluations et les rapports d'etape sont communiques directement entre les divers ministeres responsables ainsi que par 1'entremise du Comite consultatif de la securite ou du Comite consultatif des renseignements. 81. Les menaces immediates et precises sont communiquees directement aux ministeres et organismes responsables au moyen du systeme d'"alerte terrorists", sous reserve des limites des installations de communications existantes et des restrictions relatives a la securite. 82. Les recents actes terroristes perpetres par des Armenians ont fait ressortir la necessity de passer en revue les besoins des divers "clients" et d'elaborer une formule commune d'evaluation des menaces (y compris la probability d'une attaque) qui pourrait etre diffuses sous une forme pratique. f) Groupe d'evaluation des menaces exceptionnelles 000039 �> 39 SECRET 88. The Immigration officers at 54 of the 306 Canadian ports of entry have terminals giving access to a computerized data storage and retrieval system which includes the identities of several hundred known and suspected terrorists (as well as many thousands of criminals, deported persons and other types of undesi­ rable aliens). 89. Immigration officers at other ports of entry, inland offices, all customs officers at major international airports and at some USA-Canada border crossing points are dependent on a manual Microfiche Reader Lookout System which is inadequate and time­ consuming. It cannot be regularly used to process all non-resident travellers entering Canada at the rate required. Therefore, the security intelligence or other information which could contribute to the detec­ tion of terrorists at ports of entry is of limited value under the present system because it is not readi­ ly available in a usuable form. 90. During high-profile international events in Canada and when specific alerts are issued, vigilance has been increased. However, intensive screening procedures have been the exception because of unfavou­ rable reaction by the travelling public and the air industry. (b) Protection (i) Canadian Officials and Vital Points 91. In addition to the general responsibility to provide a secure environment for all residents, the Federal Government has, by Cabinet Directive, or historical practice recognized the need to provide for the security of the Royal Family; the Governor General and his family; the Prime Minister and his family; Federal Ministers of the Crown; Supreme and Federal Court Judges; and other persons designated by the Solicitor General. Besides persons, installations and facilities vital to national security have been identified as "vital points" to facilitate protective measures in the event of a threat or emergencies. 92. In the absence of a specific threat, ongoing security coverage is provided only to the Governor General and the Prime Minister and their families. This security includes both 24 hour residential and personal security. (ii) Foreign Missions and Visiting Dignitaries 93. Under international and Canadian law, the Federal Government has specific responsibilities to take measures for the protection of "internationally protected persons", including foreign diplomatic and consular establishments and personnel, and certain visiting dignitaries. To meet these obligations pro­ tection is provided on the basis of the threat as assessed by Canadian officials, which may differ from the threat as perceived by foreign governments. 000040 �40 SECRET 83. Le Groupe d'evaluation des menaces exceptionnelles (GEME) a ete etabli par le Solliciteur general en 1976 pour evaluer la credibilite des menaces nucleaires, biologiques et chimiques et pour determiner les ressources necessaires au cas ou de telles menaces seraient mises a execution. Le noyau de ce groupe est forme de scientifiques federaux postes a Ottawa et secondes par d'autres specialistes un peu partout au Canada. B) Contre-mesures a) Controle des deplacements de presumes terroristes 84. L'objectif consiste 3 depister les terroristes qui cherchent a entrer au Canada, La premiere mesure de prevention possible reside dans la pre-selection des personnes qui demandent un visa a 1'etranger. Un deuxieme controle se fait aux points d'entree, Ce programme ne sera efficace que dans la mesure oO les agents charges du controle des entrees au Canada pourront avoir facilement acces a des renseignements exacts et opportuns. L'absence de mecanismes de verification des identites au Canada, comine c'est le cas dans bien d'autres pays, fait du controle des entrees notre principal moyen d'empecher les terroristes d'atteindre leurs cibles au Canada meme. i ) A 11etranger 85. Des 50 millions de visiteurs qui viennent au Canada chaque annee, peu ont besoin d'un visa et, le cas echeant, ce titre de voyage sert a des fins d'emploi et d'immigration. La pre-selection obligatoire, qui a expressement pour objet de prevenir le terrorisne, est limitee a trois pays seulement: la Libye, 1'Irak et la Republique democratique populaire du Yemen. Bien qu'il soit difficile de mesurer 1'efficacite de ce programme, il y a peu de chances qu'il parvienne a dissuader un terroriste professionnel aux intentions bien arretees de chercher a entrer au Canada. ii) Points d'entree 86. Le douanier est le premier fonctionnaire qui filtre les visiteurs et determine 1'admissibilite des personnes et des biens. Les visiteurs ne sont diriges vers un agent d'immigration que si 1'on doute de leur admiss ibi1ite. 87. Suivant les regies de procedure, 1'entree au Canada, a quelque point que ce soit, peut etre interdite a une personne si cette derniere est identifiee comme faisant partie de i'une des categories de personnes inadmissibles. Les regies d'immigration peuvent entrainer le depart volontaire apres la signification d'une ordonnance d'exclusion ou d'expulsion. Si la non-admissibilite d'une personne 000041 �41 SECRET 94. In Ottawa there are 99 diplomatic missions with 669 resident diplomatic officers plus support personnel and family members. Outside Ottawa there are 345 consular missions with 684 consular representatives plus dependents. There are also United Nations agen­ cies, the most important being the International Civil Aviation Organization headquarters in Montreal with 288 representatives. 95. In the National Capital Region, all diploma­ tic offices and ambassadorial residences, and the designated Canadian premises are provided with 24-hour coverage by the RCMP Embassy Patrol. It consists of 81 personnel and has a rapid response capability. The Embassy Patrol is closely coordinated with municipal and provincial police forces who have criminal juris­ diction in the event of an incident. 96. When there is a generalized threat, the Embassy Patrol may be supplemented by the employment of armed civilian security guards at foreign missions and diplomatic residences. The Chief of Protocol of the Department of External Affairs, in consultation with the RCMP, is responsible for the authorization of the employment of civilian guards. The threat and action of Armenian terrorists directed primarily at the repre­ sentatives of Turkey and secondarily at several other foreign missions has more than doubled the need for civilian guards. To meet this requirement, the 1982-83 Department of External Affairs protective budget for /I civilian guards has been increased from $2.8 to $6.5 y million dollars. 97. Although these armed civilian guards may act as a deterrent against an unsophisticated attacker, their primary role is to alert the appropriate police authorities. 98. When intelligence is developed which indi­ cates a specific or imminent threat against a diplomat or diplomatic mission, the RCMP provides immediate pro­ tection. 99. The Armenian threat has demonstrated the limitations of our capability to provide protection in the event of a serious, specific threat against the representatives of a country or group of countries with a large diplomatic establishment in Canada. There are, at present, eleven staff members at the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa, one representative at ICAO in Montreal and a former honorary consul of Turkey in Toronto. In con­ trast, the U.S.A., which is often a primary target of international terrorism, has 43 diplomatic officers in Ottawa, seven consular missions and many other poten­ tial symbolic targets, such as airlines and multi­ national establishments which have not been immune to attack in the past. Therefore, should there be a requirement to provide additional protection to other foreign missions, the RCMP would be hard-pressed to adequately ensure the safety of the diplomatic commu­ nity in Canada without additional resources, such as military personnel. 000042 �42 SECRET est fondee excl usivement sur des renseignements relatifs a la securite ou aux activites criminelles, il est possible en vertu de la Loi sur 1'immigration d'etablir une attestation, signee par le Solliciteur general et le ministre de 1'Immigration, qui refuse a un arbitre 1'acces a 1'information durant une enquete en matiere d'immigration et qui constitue une preuve suffisante a premiere vue que 1'individu en question n'est pas admissible, selon qu'il est mentionne dans 1'attestation. Toute mesure ayant pour effet de refuser 1'entree peut se traduire par des menaces de represailles de la part de groupes terroristes et, partant, compromettre davantage les interets canadiens au pays et tout particulierement a 1'etranger. 88. Dans 54 des 306 points d'entree au Canada, les agents d'immigration disposent de terminaux leur donnant acces a un systeme de stockage et de rappel de donnees informatisees qui fournit, entre autres renseignements, les identites de plusieurs centaines de terroristes connus ou presumes (ainsi que celles de milliers de criminels, de personnes expulsees et d'autres types d'etrangers indesirables). 89. Les agents d'immigration en poste aux autres points d'entree, le personnel des bureaux situes au Canada, tous les douaniers dans les grands aeroports internationaux et a certains points frontaliers canado-americains doivent travailler a 1'aide d'un systeme manuel de signalements sur microfiches qui est insatisfaisant et requiert beaucoup de temps. Il ne peut etre utilise regulierement pour examiner au rythme voulu les fiches de tous les voyageurs non residents qui entrent au Canada. En consequence, les renseignements sur la securite ou d'autres types d'information qui pourraient contribuer au depistage de terroristes aux points d'entree n'ont qu'une valeur limitee dans le cadre du present systeme du fait qu'ils ne sont pas accessibles sous une forme de consultation pratique. 90. On redouble de vigilance lorsque d'importants evenements internationaux ont lieu au Canada ou que des alertes particulieres sont donnees. Toutefois, les controles intensifs ont ete exceptionnels a cause de la reaction defavorable du public voyageur et de 1'Industrie aeronautique. b) Protection (i) Personnalites canadiennes et points vitaux 91. Outre sa responsabilite generale de veiller a ce que tous les residents au pays puissent vivre dans un environnement sur, le gouvernement federal a, historiquement ou en application d'une directive du Cabinet, reconnu la necessite d'assurer la securite de la famille royale, du gouverneur general et de sa famille, du Premier ministre et de sa famille, des ministres federaux de la Couronnne, des juges de la Cour supreme et de la Cour federale et d'autres personnes designees par le Solliciteur general, De plus, certains etablissements et installations 000043 �43 SECRET 100. Although Canada has an international legal obligation to provide measures for the protection of foreign representatives, it can only recommend and offer protection as the final decision rests with the target. We are responsible for providing protection but do not have the authority to impose protection, even though we are perceived by the public to be responsible if an incident should occur. (iii) Canadian Interests Abroad 101. Abroad, specific threats from Armenian terrorists have been received by Canadian diplomatic and commercial establishments. Additional vigilance and security measures have been implemented at some 40 locations. This threat is the most recent faced by the Canadian Foreign Service. 102. There are some 4,000 members of the Canadian Foreign Service Community serving at over 100 locations abroad. The Department of External Affairs has completed a detailed review of the Personal Safety Program, and its conclusions, which if implemented, will also increase the capability to advise private Canadians and corporations abroad. This study of further measures to prevent the loss of life and injury resulting from terrorist and criminal acts and civil disorder is now under consideration by the Treasury Board. The protection of Canadians and Canadian interests abroad is the legal responsibility of the host government but various forms of unilateral self-protective measures are needed to complement local resources, especially when the of host governments lack capabilities or the will to provide adequate protection. (C) Contingency Planning (a) National 103. Following the October 1970 events, a study was undertaken to examine the Government's capability to respond to crises, and as a result, the "lead Department" concept was adopted for dealing with emer­ gencies including terrorist acts. 104. By specific Cabinet designation (CD240-76RD), the Solicitor General is the "lead Minister" for coordinating the federal government response to hostage and related incidents; the Secretary of State for External Affairs has a similar role for such incidents outside Canada involving Canadian interests. Other federal departments and agencies contribute special expertise and equipment as required to assist in resolving any situation. The responsibilities of the lead Minister include: coordination of the federal response; consultation with colleagues during the emergency; reporting to Parliament; chairing any ad hoc committee of Ministers formed to manage the response; and, coordinating the release of information to the media. 000044 �44 SECRET primordiaux pour la securite nationale ont ete designes "points vitaux" pour faciliter 1'application de mesures de protection en cas de menace ou d'urgence. 92. En 1'absence d'une menace precise, seuls le gouverneur general et le Premier ministre et leurs families sent proteges en permanence, 24 heures sur 24. (ii) Missions etrangeres et dignitaires en visite 93. En vertu du droit international et des lois canadiennes, le gouvernement federal est expressement charge d'assurer la protection des "personnes jouissant d'une protection-internationale", de meme que des etablissements diplomatiques et consulaires etrangers et de leur personnel, et de certains dignitaires en visite. Pour satisfaire a ces obligations, les services de securite assurent une protection suivant la menace qu'evaluent les fonctionnaires canadiens, et cette evaluation peut differer de celle des gouvernements etrangers. 94. A Ottawa, on compte 99 missions diplomatiques, 669 agents diplomatiques residents, en plus des employes de soutien de ces missions et des families de ces agents et employes. A 1'exterieur d'Ottawa se trouvent 345 missions consulaires et 684 representants consulaires et leurs families. Vient s'ajouter le personnel de divers organismes des Nations Unies, le plus important d'entre eux etant 1'Organisation de 1'aviation civile internationale, dont le siege social, situe a Montreal, compte 288 representants. 95. Dans la region de la capitale nationale, le service de patrouille des ambassades de la GRC veille 24 heures sur 24 a la securite des bureaux diplomatiques et des residences d'ambassadeurs, ainsi que des locaux canadiens designes. Cette patrouille, formee de 81 membres, a une capacite d'intervention rapide; elle travaille avec 1'etroite collaboration des forces policieres municipales et provinciales qui, en cas d'incident, ont competence en matiere criminelle. 96. En cas de menace generalisee, le service de patrouille peut etre augmente par 1'embauche de gardes de securite civils armes dans les missions et dans les residences diplomatiques. Le chef du Protocole du ministere des Affaires exterieures, de concert avec la GRC, est charge d'autoriser 1'embauche de gardes civils. Les menaces et les actes de terroristes armeniens diriges principalement a 1'endroit des representants de la Turquie et, accessoirement, centre diverses autres missions etrangeres ont fait plus que doubler le besoin de gardes civils. A cette fin, la portion du budget de 1982-1983 du ministere des Affaires exterieures reservee a 1'embauche de gardes civils est passee de 2,8 a 6,5 millions de dollars. 97. Meme si ces gardes civils armes peuvent contribuer § dissuader un attaquant inexperimente, leur role premier est d'alerter les autorites policieres competentes. 000045 �45 SECRET 105. Terrorist acts are offences under the Crimi­ nal Code and therefore fall under the jurisdiction of provincial attorneys-general. The investigation of this criminal activity rests with the police force having criminal jurisdiction and is rarely the RCMP. Because such acts could have serious national and international implications and ramifications, the Federal Government has a major interest in the outcome; therefore, federal authorities have established chan­ nels of communications with provincial counterparts to facilitate consultation during crises. 106. Exercises are held periodically to test the political and tactical response capability. Partici­ pants include planning officers of different levels of government and various departments and agencies and occasionally representatives of foreign governments. The value of such exercises would be enhanced by increased participation of responsible decision-makers. (b) Specific (i) Civil Aviation 107. With the upsurge of international aircraft hijackings in the early 1970's, the Canadian Airport and Aircraft Protection System was implemented and is updated on a continual basis to maintain the effective­ ness of the response to new trends and developments. 108. The most evident element of this protection system is the pre-boarding screening of passengers. There has been no hijacking of a commercial aircraft originating within Canada since 1974, in large part due to the deterrent effect of this measure which has been accepted and is now expected by the travelling public. This protective system is complemented by RCMP detach­ ments at key airports. The total annual cost of $15 million is equally shared by the air carriers and the Federal Government. 109. Contingency plans for acts of unlawful inter­ ference against civil aviation are tested on a regular basis by exercises involving Canadian departments and agencies at all levels. Close operational liaison is maintained between the Department of Transport and the United States Federal Aviation Administation. (ii) Maritime 110. The vulnerability of vessels, harbours, the Seaway, oil terminals and offshore oil rigs to poten­ tial terrorist acts has been recognized and studies have been undertaken. A federal-provincial working group, chaired by the National Harbours Board Police, has studied maritime terrorism and has met with American and European experts. As a result, a number of issues, including complex territorial jurisdictional matters, have ben identified. A recent Department of Justice analysis of jurisdictional issues was a preliminary step toward resolution of these problems. In the meantime, there is no police or other force with the specialized tactical capabilities necessary to 000046 �46 - SECRET 98. La GRC intervient sur-le-champ lorsque, d'apres les renseignements recueillis, une menace a expressement ete proferee contre un diplomate ou une mission diplomatique, ou lorsqu'il y a danger imminent. 99. Les terroristes americains ont fait la preuve de notre capacite limit^e a fournir une protection lorsqu'une menace serieuse et precise est proferee contre les representants d'un pays ou d'un groupe de pays qui ont un effectif diplomatique important au Canada. A 1'heure actuelle, 1'ambassade de Turquie a Ottawa compte 11 employes, un representant de la Turquie travaille a 1'OACI a Montreal et un ancien consul honoraire de ce pays reside a Toronto. En comparaison, les Etats-Unis, qui sont.souvent la cible premiere du terrorisme international, ont 43 agents diplomatiques a Ottawa, sept missions consulaires et bien d'autres cibles symboliques possibles, telles les societes aeriennes et les multinationales, qui ont fait 1'objet d'attaques par le passe. En consequence, s'il fallait fournir une protection supplementaire a d'autres missions etrangeres, la GRC aurait peine a assurer une securite adequate a la communaute diplomatique sans 1'aide de ressources additionnelles, tel du personnel militaire. 100. Meme si le Canada a, en vertu du droit international, 1'obligation de faire le necessaire pour assurer la protection des representants etrangers, il ne peut que recommander et offrir la protection necessaire, car la decision finale incombe aux personnes qui ont ete choisies pour cibles. Nous devons assurer leur protection, mais nous n'avons pas 1'autorite voulue pour la leur imposer, meme si le public nous tient pour responsables en cas d'incident. (iii) Interets canadiens a 1'etranqer 101. A 1'etranger, des etablissements diplomatiques et commerciaux canadiens ont regu des menaces precises de terroristes armeniens. Des mesures additionnelles de surveillance et de securite ont du etre prises a une quarantaine d'endroits. Cette menace est la plus recente en date dirigee contre le service exterieur du Canada. 102. La communaute du service exterieur du Canada compte environ 4 000 membres dissemines dans plus de 100 missions a 1'etranger. Le minist^re des Affaires exterieures a termine 1'examen detaille du Programme de securite personnelle, et ses conclusions, si elles sont appliquees, aideront a mieux conseiller les Canadiens et les societes canadiennes a 1'etranger. Cette etude des mesures additionnelles destinees a empecher les pertes de vie et les blessures qui pourraient resulter d'actes terroristes et criminels et de desordres civils est actuellement examinee par le Conseil du Tresor. La protection des Canadiens et des interets canadiens a 1'etranger incombe legalement au gouvernement hote, mais diverses mesures unilaterales d'auto-protection s'imposent en complement des ressources locales, tout particulierement du fait que la majorite des gouvernements hotes n'ont pas les moyens ou n'ont pas 1'intention de fournir la protection necessaire. 000047 �47 SECRET react effectively to an offshore terrorist incident in the maritime environment. (iii) Nuclear 111. The use of nuclear materials by a terrorist group has been assessed as minimal. Nevertheless, the disastrous consequences of such an act, or even a credible threat, requires all Western nations, includ­ ing Canada, to impose appropriate security measures on sensitive nuclear materials at facilities and in transit. The nuclear sub-committee of the Security Advisory Committee, chaired by the Atomic Energy Control Board, is the focus of exchanges among Canadian and foreign experts and the establishment of consultative procedures for use during a nuclear threat or incident. Close cooperation in the areas of threat assessment and tactical response has been developed with American counterparts. VI. RESPONSE TO TERRORIST INCIDENTS (A) Tactical (a) Police Role 112. The response to an incident may involve a ■crime in progress, such as a hostage-taking or hijacking, or the investigation following an offence such as an assassination. While these serious crimes have significant national and international implications and, therefore, are of strong federal interest, the investigation and prosecution of such crimes lie exclusively with the local jurisdiction. Where the responsible police force is not the RCMP, federal authorities will offer assistance and investigative resources but cannot direct the investigation, even though local capability and understanding of the national and international ramifications may be limi­ ted. Although local authorities may seek federal police assistance, frequently it can only be provided by diverting RCMP resources from meeting their assigned responsibilities. Clearly, this is an inadequate response to what is a federal problem. 113. Because terrorist groups are international and clandestine in nature and may have a domestic support cell in one city and conduct an operation in another city or area, a number of jurisdictions will normally be involved, a factor which hinders a coordinated police response. 114. The complexity of the present Canadian situa­ tion can be illustrated by the recent attacks against Turkish diplomats in Ottawa. The investigation of the criminal acts is the responsibility of the Ottawa Police Department who are being assisted primarily by the RCMP in addition to other police departments such as Toronto, Montreal and the Ontario Provincial Police. 115. Other categories of organized crime such as narcotic trafficking and security frauds have been generally recognized as being beyond expected capabili- 000048 �48 C) SECRET Planification d’urgence a) Echelle nationale 103. A la suite des evenements survenus en octobre 1970, une etude a ete entreprise pour evaluer la capacite du gouvernement a faire face aux crises. Il en est resulte 1'adoption de la notion de "ministere responsable" dans les cas d’urgence comme les incidents terroristes. 104. Le Cabinet a convenu dans sa decision 240-76RD que, d'une part, le Solliciteur general est le "ministre responsable" de la coordination de 1'action gouvernementale dans les cas de prises d'otages et d'incidents connexes et que, d'autre part, le secretaire d'Stat aux Affaires exterieures joue un role similaire dans le cas d'incidents a 1'etranger qui mettent en jeu des interets canadiens. D'autres ministeres et organismes federaux fournissent competence et materiel speciaux, selon les besoins, pour aider a regler toute situation. Au nombre des responsabilites du ministre responsable figurent les suivantes: coordonner 1'action federale; consulter ses collegues pendant que dure la situation d’urgence; faire rapport au Parlement; presider tout comite special de ministres charge de gerer cette action; et coordonner la diffusion de 1'information aux medias. 105. Comme les actes terroristes sont des infractions au Code criminel-, ils sont de la competence des procureurs generaux des provinces. La responsabilite des enquetes sur cette activite criminelle incombe a la force policiere qui a competence en matiere criminelle. Il s'agit rarement de la GRC. Le gouvernement federal s'interesse au premier chef a 1'issue de tels actes parce qu'ils risquent d'avoir des ramifications et des incidences serieuses sur les plans national et international. C'est pourquoi les autorites federales ont cree des reseaux de communication avec leurs homologues provinciaux pour faciliter la consultation durant les crises. 106. Des exercices se tiennent periodiquement pour mesurer 1'efficacite des moyens d'action aux niveaux politique et tactique. Au nombre des participants se trouvent des agents de planification de differents paliers de gouvernement ainsi que de divers ministeres et organismes et, occasionnellement, des representants de gouvernements etrangers. Une plus grande participation des principaux decideurs a ces exercices en rehausserait la valeur. b) Mesures precises (i) Aviation civile 107. Le systerne de protection des aeroports et aeronefs canadiens fut etabli par suite de la recrudescence des actes de piraterie aerienne a 1'echelle internationale au debut des annees 70. II est mis a jour reguli§rement de fagon que 1'efficacite 000049 �49 SECRET ties of local police departments, although this has generally not yet been recognized with respect to ter­ rorism. The law enforcement effort with regard to terrorist activities has been localized, of uneven competence, intermittent, uncoordinated and widely dis­ persed. The national anti-terrorist capability will remain fragmented as long as the federal authority does not have the primary investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction for these crimes. There have been few experiences in Canada requiring a national police response to terrorist acts, however the assessed terrorist threat for the 1980's indicates the need to create a ..centralized capability to coordinate a national’ responses For this reason, consideration is being given to possible means to reflect the national character of the problem and ensure that the federal autho,rity is balanced with federal jurisdiction both in terms of investigative and prosecutorial responsibility and accountability. (b) Special Assault Response Requirements 116. Police departments have greatly diverse capa­ bilities to contain or intervene in unplanned hostage­ barricade situations which normally involve common criminals or mentally deranged persons, and where the objective is rarely to gain publicity. The police response is designed to contain the situation and resolve it. 117. A hostage incident conducted by a terrorist is completely different in nature from incidents invol­ ving common criminals. The terrorist carefully plans the operation in order to obtain maximum publicity and to challenge authority and is prepared to inflict death and injury. Although the objective of negotiation is to avoid violence while not to grant significant con­ cessions, there may be the need for forceful armed intervention by specially trained and equipped person­ nel to counter the well-trained and equipped terrorist. 118. At the request of Cabinet in November 1977, a comprehensive study was completed. A subsequent submission to Cabinet for the formation of a special hostage rescue force was jointly made by the Solicitor General and the Minister of National Defence in November 1978. A decision was deferred because of financial constraints. 119. The security requirements for hosting the 1981 Ottawa Economic Summit included the need to have such a force. A temporary team, composed of 28 RCMP officers, was formed. Training facilities and tactical and logis­ tic support were provided by the Department of National Defence. Fortunately, the team was not required and was disbanded after the Summit Conference. 120. Despite recognition by the Federal Government of the need to develop this capability and despite continuing representations by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and the Canadian Airline Pilots 000050 �I 50 SECRET de la capacite d'intervention soit maintenue et adaptee aux tendances et aux developpements nouveaux. 108. L'element le plus evident de ce systeme de protection est le controle de securite auquel sont soumis les passagers avant 1’embarquement. Depuis 1974, aucun avion commercial en provenance du Canada n'a ete detourne; cette situation est due en grande partie a I'effet de dissuasion de cette mesure que le public voyageur accepte et considers meme necessaire. Des detachements de la GRC dans les principaux aeroports viennent completer ce systeme de protection. Le cout total annuel de 15 millions de dollars est reparti egalement entre les societes de transport aerien et le gouvernement federal. 109. Des exercices appelant la participation de ministeres et d'organismes canadiens a tous les niveaux se tiennent regulierement pour mettre a 1'essai des plans d'urgence destines a contrecarrer les interventions illegales contre 1'aviation civile, Une etroite liaison operationnelle est maintenue entre le ministere des Transports et la Federal Aviation Administration des Etats-Unis. ( i i ) Secteur maritime 110. Il est maintenant reconnu que les navires, les ports, la Voie maritime, les terminaux petroliers et les installations de forage petrolier au large des cotes sont des cibles potentielles pour les terroristes, et des etudes ont ete entreprises a ce sujet. Un groupe de travail federal-provincial, preside par la police du Conseil des ports nationaux, a fait une etude du terrorisme maritime et a rencontre des experts americains et europeens. Cette etude a permis de cerner un certain nombre de questions de fond, dont le probleme complexe de la competence territoriale. Une analyse effectuee recement par le ministere de la Justice sur les questions de competence a marque un premier pas vers la solution de ces problemes. Dans 1' intervalle, aucune force policiere ou autre ne dispose des moyens tactiques specialises qu'il faut pour reprimer un incident terroriste dans 1'environnement maritime. ( i i i ) Secteur nucleaire 111. Selon les evaluations, il est fort improbable qu'un groupe terrorists brandisss l'arme nucleaire. Neanmoins, Iss consequences desastreuses d'un tel acte, ou meme d'une menace credible, exigent de toutes les nations occidentales, y compris le Canada, qu’elles imposent des mesures de securite appropriees a 1'egard des matieres nucleaires dangereuses, qu’elles soient dans des installations ou en cours de transport. Le sous-comite des questions nucleaires du Comite consultatif de la securite, preside par la Commission de controle de 1'energie atomique, sert de centre d'echanges entre experts canadiens et etrangers et permet 1'etablissement de mecanismes de consultation applicables en cas de menaces ou d'incidents nucleaires. Une collaboration etroite s’est etablie 000051 �51 SECRET Association, no national hostage rescue force exists in Canada. At this time, several alternative proposals for the development of this special tactical capability are being developed by the Solicitor General and the Minister of National Defence for the consideration of Cabinet. 121. In addition to the identified requirement for a land-based special tactical capability, there is a need for a complementary capability in the marine environment. (B) Political and Media (a) Political 122. Politically-motivated terrorism is calculated to provoke a political response. The political respon­ se may be more deliberate and thoughtful than the imme­ diate requirements of the media but they have an impact on each other. The repercussions of a terrorist event may continue in the political realm long after the media has lost interest in the event. One element of political risk is that within the context of freedom of expression and dissent, political figures may support political causes which could subsequently inspire terrorist acts. 123. It is difficult to assess the extent to which resolutions adopted by provincial legislatures and the House of Commons supporting the Armenian grievances may have encouraged an escalation of violence and contri­ buted to a domestic support base for later acts of terrori sm. 124. The Canadian policy on terrorism is based on the principle that regardless of the political motive, acts of violence are unacceptable as a means of achieving political objectives. Unfortunately, the distinction between the criminal act and the political motive is not always apparent to the public. The public perception is understandable as the media combine reporting on the terrorist act with commentary on the nature and validity of the political grievance. A challenge for politicians and government representa­ tives is to determine how to express recognition of political aspirations and not appear to sanction the use of violence nor to antagonize foreign governments which may be involved. (b) The Media 125. The dramatic nature of a terrorist act is, in part, to gain media attention and to promote support for the political cause. As part of the Government's effort to counter terrorism, there is a need to increase the media's awareness of their role in the terrorism phenomenon and to encourage reporting that would emphasize the criminal nature of terrorist acts rather than commenting on the validity of the political cause. A federal proposal to conduct a seminar on police-news media relations was considered but given low priority because of financial constraints. 000052 �52 SECRET avec les Americains dans les secteurs de devaluation des menaces et de la preparation des moyens tactiques. VI. LUTTE ANTITERRORISTE A) Tactiques a) Role de la police 112. L'action antiterroriste variera selon que le crime est en cours d'execution (prise d'otages ou un detournement d'avion), ou qu'il a deja ete commis (assassinat). Ces crimes graves ont certes d'importantes repercussions nationales et internationales et, par consequent, interessent grandement les milieux federaux, mais il reste que les etapes de 1'enquete et des poursuites relSvent exclusivement des autorites locales. Dans les cas ot3 la GRC n'est pas la force policiere concernee, les autorites federales fournissent leur aide et les ressources necessaires a 1'enquete, mais elles ne peuvent pas conduire 1'enquete comme telle, meme si les moyens locaux et la comprehension des ramifications nationales et internationales peuvent etre limites. Il arrive souvent que la Gendarmerie royale, pour repondre a une demande d'aide d'autorites locales, doive se priver de certaines de ses ressources qui ne sont pas remplacees dans 1'intervalle. Il s'agit la, de toute evidence, d'une solution insuffisante a un probleme federal. 113. Parce que les groupes de terroristes sont, par nature, internationaux et clandestins et qu'ils peuvent compter sur le soutien d'une cellule locale dans une ville et mener une operation dans une autre ville ou region, plusieurs competences seront normalement concernees, et c'est la un facteur qui nuit a la coordination de 1'action policiere. 114. Les recents attentats centre des diplomates turcs a Ottawa illustrent la complexite de la situation actuelle au Canada. La responsabilite de 1'enquete des actes criminels incombe au corps policier d'Ottawa, qui est seconde principalenent par la GRC en plus d'autres corps policiers comme ceux de Toronto et de Montreal et la Surete provinciale de 1 'Ontario. 115. On reconnait generalement que d'autres formes de crime organise tels que le trafic de stupefiants et les fraudes de valeurs depassent les moyens escomptes des corps policiers locaux, mais 1'observation n'a habituellement pas ete appliquee au terrorisme jusqu'a maintenant. L’effort de la lutte anti terroriste a ete jusqu’a maintenant localise, de qualite inegale, intermittent, denue de toute coordination et largement disperse. La force antiterroriste nationale demeurera fragmentaire tant que les autorites federales ne seront pas investies de la competence principale en matiere d'enquete et de poursuite a 1'egard de ces crimes. Rares sont les occasions au Canada ou 1'action de terroristes a necessite 1'intervention d'une force policiere nationale. Toutefois, la menace terroriste evaluee pour les annees 1980 fait ressortir la 000053 �* 53 VII. SECRET COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 126. An effective counter-terrorism program is not possible without the communications capability to permit both the necessary exchange of classified infor­ mation, and sensitive consultations between numerous departments and agencies within Canada and abroad. There are several different federal communications systems reflecting departmental operational require­ ments which have various degrees of compatibility and capability. This situation hampers the rapid dissemi­ nation of information. These limitations have been identified during normal counter-terrorist operations, terrorist alerts and exercises. These inadequacies are not unique to counter-terrorist needs, but are common to other national security and emergency preparedness requirements. Several studies of federal government secure communication requirements and capabilities, have resulted in recommendations that have not yet been implemented because of financial, technological and jurisdictional difficulties. Deputy Drime Minister and F/j of State for External Affairs Secretary 1IJ ' /T lit it or General /of Canada 000054 �54 SECRET necessite de creer une force centralisee qui serait chargee de coordonner l'action nationale. C'est pourquoi on envisage actuellement certains moyens qui permettraient de refleter le caractere national du probleme et de faire en sorte que le pouvoir federal soit proportionnel a la competence federale sur le plan tant de la responsabilite que du controle en matiere d'enquete et de poursuite. b) Mesures offensives speciales 116. Les corps policiers disposent de moyens fort varies pour contenir des prises d'otages inopinees ou intervenir dans de telles situations, qui sont normalement le fait de criminels de droit commun ou de naiades mentaux; les auteurs de ces actes recherchent rarement la publicite. L'action policiSre a pour objet dans ces cas de contenir une situation et d'y mettre f in. 117. Une prise d'otages organisee par un terroriste est, par nature, completement differente des incidents mettant en cause des criminels de droit commun. Le terroriste, pour sa part, planifie avec soin 1'operation afin d'obtenir le maximum de publicite et de defier les autorites, et il est meme pret a tuer et a blesser. Bien que 1'on ait recours a la negociation pour eviter toute violence, sans toutefois accorder de concessions importantes, il peut etre necessaire de faire intervenir une puissante force armee, entrainee et equipee specialement pour ce genre de situation, et qui devra venir a bout du terroriste, tout aussi bien entraine et equipe. 118. Une etude exhaustive du sujet a ete realisee a la demande du Cabinet en novembre 1977. Le Solliciteur general et le ministre de la Defense nationale ont presente conjointement au Cabinet, en novembre 1978, un memoire recommandant la formation d'une force Speciale d'intervention en cas de prise d'otages. La question est restee en suspens en raison de contraintes budgetaires. 119. Pour des raisons de securite, le Canada s'est vu oblige de constituer une telle force a 1'occasion du Sommet economique d'Ottawa en 1981. Composee de 28 agents de la GRC, Le ministere de la Defense nationale a mis a sa disposition des camps d ' entrainement et des services de soutien tactiques et logistiques. Heureusement, 1'equipe n'a pas eu a intervenir et a ete demantelee une fois le Sommet termine. 120. Le Canada n'est dote d'aucune force nationale d' intervention en cas de prise d'otages, meme si le gouvernement federal reconnait la necessite de mettre au point une telle force et meme si 1'Association canadienne des chefs de police et 1'Association canadienne des pilotes de lignes aeriennes persistent a en recommander la creation. Le Solliciteur general et le ministre de la Defense nationale travaillent 000055 �55 SECRET BLANK 000056 �56 SECRET actuellement a 11 elaboration de plusieurs nouvelles propositions, que le Cabinet etudiera ulterieurement, concernant la creation de cette force tactique Speciale. 121. En plus de cette force tactique terrestre, il faudrait mettre au point une force maritime complementaire. B) Aspects politiques et role des medias a) Aspects politiques 122. Le terrorisme politique vise a provoquer une reaction politique. Celle-ci peut etre davantage reflechie et deliberee alors que les exigences des medias sont davantage axees sur le present, mais 1'une et 1'autre composante ont une influence reciproque. Les repercussions d'un acte terroriste peuvent continuer a se faire sentir dans le domaine politique longtemps apres que les medias auront cesse de s'y interesser. Dans le contexte de la liberte d'expression et de discussion, il y a risque que des figures politiques epousent des causes politiques qui pourraient par la suite inspirer des actes terroristes. 123. Il est difficile d'evaluer dans quelle nesure les resolutions adoptees par les assemblies legislatives des provinces et la Chambre des communes pour montrer leur soutien de la cause armenienne ont contribue 3 1'escalade de la violence ainsi qu'a 1'etablissement au pays d'une base d'operation a partir de laquelle ont subsequemment ete menes les actes terroristes que 1'on connait. 124. La politique canadienne contre le terrorisme est fondee sur le principe suivant lequel tout acte de violence, quel qu'en soit le motif politique, est un moyen inacceptable de parvenir a des fins politiques. Malheureusement, la distinction entre I'acte criminel et le motif politique n'est pas toujours evidente pour le public; pareille perception est comprehensible puisque les reportages des medias sur I'acte terroriste s'accompagnent de commentaires sur la nature et la justesse du grief politique. Les hommes politiques et les representants des gouvernements doivent voir comment il est possible de reconnaitre les aspirations politiques des interesses sans sembler sanctionner pour autant le recours a la violence ni contrarier les Etats concernes. b) Role des medias 125. Par essence, I'acte terroriste est dramatique en partie du fait qu'il vise a attirer 1'attention des medias et a faire avancer une cause politique. Dans le cadre de sa politique de lutte antiterroriste, le gouvernement doit sensibiliser davantage les medias a leur role vis-a-vis de ce phenomene et encourager la realisation de reportages qui mettront en relief la nature criminelle des actes terroristes plutot que de commenter la validite de la cause politique. Une proposition federale a ete avancee pour organiser un 000057 �57 SECRET BLANK 000058 �58 SECRET seminaire sur les relations entre la police et les madias, mais, a cause des restrictions budgetaires, elle n'a pas ete mise au rang des priorites les plus pressantes. VII. SYSTEMES DE COMMUNICATIONS 126. Un programme d1 anti terrorisme n'est efficace que s'il est combine a un reseau de communications qui permet a la fois 1’echange necessaire de renseigneraents secrets et la tenue de consultations delicates entre de nombreux ministeres et organismes du Canada et de 1'etranger. Le gouvernement federal est dote de differents systemes de communications qui sont etablis en fonction des besoins operationnels des ministeres concernes, et qui ont divers degres de compatibility et des possibilites variables. Cette situation entrave la diffusion rapide de renseignements. Ces restrictions ont fait surface au cours d'activites anti terroristes, d'alertes terroristes et d’exercices reguliers. De telles lacunes nuisent non seulement aux besoins en matiere d'antiterrorisme, mais aussi a d'autres besoins en matiere de securite nationale et d'intervention en cas d'urgence. Plusieurs etudes portant sur les besoins et les possibilites en communications sures du gouvernement federal ont donne lieu a des recommandations qui n'ont pas encore ete mises en oeuvre a cause de problemes d'ordre financier et technologique ainsi que de competence juridique. Vice-pin nier ministre et Secreta re d'Etat aux Affaire! exterieures olliciteur general du Canada 000059 �c A 59 SECRET i BLANK 000060 �n 60 SECRET ANNEXE TERRORISMS INTERNATIONAL TENDANCES ET PERSPECTIVES le 8 avril 1981 000061 �c » 4 « 61 SECRET ANNEX INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM TRENDS AND PROPECTS 8 APRIL 1981 000062 �» 62 LE TERRORISME INTERNATIONAL: SECRET TENDANCES ET PERSPECTIVES Introduction 1. Par sa nature meme, le terrorisme politique est une question emotive. Cependant, vu comme une technique ou une methode de conflit, il peut etre assujetti a un examen plus objectif qui facilite une intervention eclairee et utile. 2. R£cemment, le terrorisme a ete utilise a plusieurs fins d'ordre politique: pour forcer les gouvernements a faire des concessions bien precises ou a changer leurs politiques; pour miner 1'Etat de 1'interieur en vue de s'emparer du pouvoir; a des fins plus esoteriques, telle que la vague "revolution globale", poursuivies par quelques groupes radicaux; enfin, par certains gouvernements, pour contraindre ou supprimer leurs adversaires politiques. 3. Il importe peu que les terroristes soient animes de sentiments hostiles envers le gouvernement ou soient soutenus par celui-ci. Toute etude des tendances doit prendre en consideration toutes les formes de violence politique, d'envergure internationale ou nationale. Pour cette raison, le present expose ne se limite pas a quelques categories etroites, rigides et fonctionnelles de terrorisme ni a certaines formes de terrorisme politique. Les terroristes adaptent invariablement leurs methodes a la situation du pays, sans tenir compte de la portee internationale ou nationale de leurs activites; terroristes, guerilleros ou defenseurs de la liberte, leurs methodes se ressemblent beaucoup. Si 1'on veut surmonter le defi que represents le terrorisme pour 1'ordre etabli, il faut avant tout en comprendre les causes et les motivations. Definition du terrorisme 4. En deux mots, 1'objet du terrorisme est de terrifier. Le terrorisme est un acte pose ou une activite exercee pour intimider, pour creer un climat d'incertitude ou de crainte dans une collectivite dont les valeurs et les attentes sont symbolisees par une victime ou une cible choisie. Contrairement a la violence criminelle, le terrorisme s'exerce dans un milieu socio-politique particulier sur lequel il cherche a agir. Les terroristes s'attaquent a la collectivite et a son systeme de valeurs en commettant des actes choisis pour 1'effet percutant qu'ils produiront et pour 1'attention generalisee qu'ils mobiliseront. Le terrorisme est done une activite soigneusement planifiee pour provoquer une reaction d'ordre politique. 5. Ces elements sont reunis dans la definition suivante du terrorisme politique: utilisation, a des fins politiques, de la violence ou de menaces de violence centre un groupe limite de personnes en vue de creer un climat de peur dans la population, Le terrorisme international, par extansion, se definit 000063 �s c '* * ri 63 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: SECRET TRENDS AND PROSPECTS Introduction 1. By its very nature political terrorism is an emotive issue. If it is viewed as a technique or method of conflict, however, it is possible to offer a more objective examination and thus facilitate an informed and effective response. 2. Recently, terrorism has been used in pursuit of several political objectives: Firstly, terrorists have attempted to force governments to grant specific concessions or to make policy changes. Secondly, terrorism has been used as a means of undermining a state from within in order to permit a seizure of power. A more esoteric objective, such as the vague "global revolution" expounded by some radical groups, is a third. Finally, some governments have used terrorist techniques to coerce, suppress or eliminate political opponents. 3. It makes little difference whether the perpetrators of terrorist acts are motivated by anti-government goals or are government sponsored, All forms of political violence, whether international or domestic, must be considered when trends are being treated. For this reason, this paper is not bound within narrow, rigidly defined functional categories or political boundaries. Terrorists invariably adapt to the particular circumstances of the countries in which they operate, and regardless of whether they are labelled international or domestic; terrorist, guerrilla or freedom fighter, their methods are very similar. Understanding the causes and motivations of terrorism is the first step toward successfully meeting the challenge this phenomenon represents to established order. Terrorism Defined 4. Simply stated, the purpose of terrorism is to terrify. Terrorism is an act or activity undertaken for the purpose of intimidating and creating uncertainty or dread in a community whose values and expectations are represented by a selected victim or target. Unlike criminal violence, terrorism exists within a particular socio-political context which its practitioners seek to influence. Terrorists attack the community and its value system through acts chosen for their shock effect in order to attract widespread attention. Terrorism is thus a carefully planned activity calculated to provoke a political response. 5. These elements are encompassed by defining political terrorism as: any act or threat of violence designed to generate fear in an audience wider than the immediate victims in order to achieve a political end. International terrorism, by extension, is defined simply as those acts of political terrorism which affect foreign third-parties. 000064 �* ••c X 64 SECRET simplement comme 1'execution d'actes de terrorisme politique diriges contre des tierces parties etrangeres. 6. Le terrorisme politique s'attaque essentiellement a trois causes: i) Nationalisme d'une minorite, secessionisme ou separatisme d'une ethnie Les organisations terroristes qui soutiennent ces causes aspirent a une plus grande autonomie, a la recuperation d'un territoire perdu ou a 1 ’ independance. Certains de ces groupes peuvent professer une ideologic politique, mais leurs motifs sont avant tout d'ordre nationaliste ou ethnique. ii) Extreme gauche Les groupes de 1'extreme gauche pretendent posseder une ideologic coherente, qui s'apparente habituellement au marxisme, et affirment vouloir provoquer des changements economiques, sociaux et politiques fondamentaux. L'anarchisme, dans la mesure ou ce nouvement a ete associe avec la gauche par le passe, peut etre situe dans cette categorie. iii) Extreme droite Ethnocentriques, les terroristes d'extreme droite cherchent souvent a maintenir le statu quo devant la menace que representent a leurs yeux les gauchistes. Leur champ d'activite se limite generaleraent a la scene nationale. Les objectifs des terroristes et le role des medias 7. Les moyens de transport et de communications modernes offrent au terrorisme un grand choix de cibles et un auditoire international. Les actes spectaculaires des terroristes attirent 1’attention des medias et engendrent chez la population une peur de leur rayon d'action et de leur force de frappe, qui est davantage 1'effet de la publicite que d'une puissance veritable. Il en resulte que le citoyen ordinaire voit maintenant comme une menace personnelle des actes qu'il avait cru diriges presque exclusivement contre des personnalites politiques, les gens riches et celebres. Les efforts de la societe pour lutter contre le terrorisme font dorenavant partie du quotidien. 8. La publicite des medias est done une condition essentielle au succes du terrorisme. Elie permet aux terroristes de se faire connaitre au public et d'exposer leurs causes. Sans la publicite, les terroristes demeurent faibles, impuissants a faire les manchettes de 1'actualite qui attribuent au symbolisme de 1'acte une importance beaucoup plus grande que celui-ci n'aurait dans des circonstances normales. Outre qu'ils sensibilisent la societe aux actes de 000065 �a 65 SECRET 6. Political terrorism is engaged in by individuals within three broad categories; (i) Minority Nationalist, Seccessionist or Ethnic Separatist; Terrorist organizations associated with these causes are committed to achieving greater autonomy, recovering lost territory or gaining independence. Some of these organizations may embrace a political ideology, but their primary motives are nationalistic or ethnic. (ii) Extreme Left-wing; Terrorist organizations in this category claim to be in possession of a coherent ideology, usually some form of Marxist dogma, and profess to be dedicated to bringing about fundamental economic, social and political change. Anarchists, insofar as anarchism has been historically associated with the left, may be placed within this category. (iii) Extreme Right-wing; Right-wing terrorists are ethnocentric and are often associated with maintaining the status quo when faced with a perceived threat from the left. They tend to confine their activities to the domestic arena. The Objectives of Terrorists and the Role of the Media 7. Modern mass transportation and instant communications have presented to terrorists a wide range of targets and a world audience. Spectacular acts of terror attract media attention and engender in the public a fear of the terrorists' range and striking capacity that is more a result of publicity then the perpetrators' actual capability. As a result, terrorist activity, once associated almost exclusively with attacks against political figures, the wealthy and the highly visible, is now perceived by ordinary citizens as a direct personal threat. Society's attempts to cope with terrorism have become common features of everyday life. 8. Media exposure consequently is a feature of and a requisite for successful terrorism. Through the media, terrorists may project themselves and their cause into public awareness. Without publicity, terrorists remain impotent, unable to capture the headlines which give the symbolism of the deed a far greater importance than the actual act could evoke in normal circumstances. While the media heighten the consciousness of the world to the campaigns of terrorists, they also report on the activities of guerrillas and national liberation campaigns, and in the process confuse the terminology used to describe each form of struggle. 000066 �> 66 SECRET terrorisme, les medias presentent des comptes rendus sur les guerillas et les campagnes de liberation nationale et, ce faisant, confondent la terminologie utilisee pour decrire chacune des formes de lutte. Distinctions entre le terrorisme, la guerilla et les nouvenents de liberation nationale 9. Peu d'individus ou d'organisations qui provoquent deliberement la terreur se qualifient de terroristes; ils affirment tous tendre vers un but plus £leve. C'est uniquement la conception du but a atteindre qui distingue le terrorisme de 1'acte criminel ou de quelque autre forme de violence, Ainsi, une meme activite peut etre perque par certains cornme la manifestation legitime d'une lutte politique et, par d'autres, cornme un acte de terreur reprehensible. 10. Quoique les guerilleros aient souvent recours a des mesures de terreur, le terrorisme n'est qu'une technique auxiliaire qui leur permet d'atteindre leur principal objectif strategique. Ils luttent afin de voir le jour oG ils seront assez forts pour contester directement le pouvoir et la legitimite de 1'Etat. Les actes terroristes de la guerilla visent ordinairement des cibles bien precises du regime et ont pour objet de repandre la crainte chez les dirigeants et leurs partisans plutot que de faire naitre un climat de peur general. A cette fin, ils doivent gagner la confiance du peuple et creer une dualite de pouvoir. Contrairement aux terroristes qui exercent leur activite dans de petite cellules dispersees et qui rarement occupent ou controlent un territoire, les guerilleros font partie integrante de la collectivity oG se trouve leur champ d'operation. La guerilla met done invariablement en presence des partisans et des civils armes qui tentent d'edifier des bases de soutien politiques et militaires tout en cherchant a demanteler les grandes forces militaires de I'ordre etabli. 11. Le terne "mouvement de liberation nationale" s'applique generalement a des groupes largement enracines dans la base, qui livrent bataille contre des autorites qu'ils perqoivent cornme un pouvoir etranger occupant ou controlant leur territoire. Ces groupes, cornme ceux de la guerilla, ont besoin de la sympathie et de 1'appui du public et s'appuient sur de vastes infrastructures politiques et militaires dans des zones qui echappent au controle du gouvernement ou qui sont situees hors du pays meme. Au stade actuel de leur evolution, les mouvements de liberation nationale fonctionnent non plus cornme de simples guerillas, mais plutot cornme des formations mobiles capables d'affronter et de detruire des forces armees conventionnelles sur un terrain de combat. Ces nouvements peuvent evidemment avoir use du terrorisme a une etape donnee et peuvent continuer de le faire au stade final de leur lutte. 12. Toutes les campagnes livrees par des groupes partisans ou paramilitaires ne peuvent cependant etre qualifiees de guerillas ou de luttes pour la liberation nationale. C'est le cas notamment de la "guerilla 000067 �1 ft «. S' 6 67 SECRET Distinctions: Terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, National Liberation Movements 9. Few individuals or organizations employing terror describe themselves as terrorists; all proclaim some higher purpose or greater end. It is only the assessment made of these ends which distinguishes terrorism from criminal or other forms of violence. Thus, the same activity can be perceived as a legitimate manifestation of political struggle by some, while at the same time, as an act of reprehensible terror by others. 10. Although guerrillas often use terror, terrorism is an auxiliary technique in their move towards their primary strategic objective. Guerrillas work toward the day when they are strong enough to challenge directly the power and legitimacy of the state. Terrorist acts by guerrillas are usually directed at specific targets within the regime and their aim is to spread fear among rulers and their supporters rather than to create random fear. To accomplish their objective they must win the confidence of the populace and create a situation of dual power. In contrast to terrorists who operate in small dispersed cells and rarely occupy or control territory, guerrillas are members of the community in which they operate. Guerrilla war, therefore, invariably involves partisans and armed civilians who are attempting to build political as well as military bases of support while striking against larger, conventional military forces. 11. The term national liberation movement has usually been applied to broad-based groupings engaged in waging campaigns against what they perceive as an occupying or controlling foreign power. These groupings, like guerrilla forces, depend upon a measure of public sympathy and support and the existence of broad political and military infrastructures operating within zones outside of government control or outside the country itself. At this phase of their development, national liberation movement forces no longer function purely as guerrillas, but rather as mobile formations capable of confronting and destroying a conventional armed force in open battle. National liberation movements may of course have used terrorism at some stage and may continue to do so during this final phase of their campaign. 12. Not all campaigns waged by partisan or para-military groups, however, can be termed guerrilla warfare or campaigns of national liberation. Such is the case with the so-called urban guerrillas. Although they have adopted the rhetoric of the classical guerrilla strategists and quickly gained public attention through spectacular and daring acts of violence, they have been generally unsuccessful in their bids to marshall popular opinion or receive widespread support. Consequently, urban guerrillas have been left only with terror which, to some, has become the end in itself. 000068 �4 68 SECRET urbaine". Bien que ce mouvement ait adopte le style des strategistes de la guerilla classique et ait rapidement frappe 1'attention du public par ses actes de violence spectaculaires et audacieux, il n'a pas reussi, en general, a rallier 1'opinion ou 1'appui du grand nombre. La guerilla urbaine a done ete reduite a la seule terreur, qui, pour certains, est devenue une fin en soi. Terrorisme utilise ou soutenu par 1'Stat 13. Dans le cadre de leur politique etrangere, certains Etats fournissent une aide aux terroristes ou aux organisations qui usent du terrorisme. Cet appui se manifesto par des fonds, une formation et 1'asile. Certains pays sont lies de pres a un vaste eventail d'organisations terroristes qui ont leur centre d'operation a 1'exterieur du Moyen-Orient, et ils leur accordent 1'asile. 14. Certains gouvernements se livrent eux-memes a des actes de terreur. L1 assassinat, 1'enlevement et 1'emprisonnement secret sont devenus, dans quelques pays, des noyens-acceptes de reprimer la dissidence et de supprimer 1'opposition. 15. Comme les operations de la guerre classique deviennent de plus en plus couteuses et risquees, certaines nations ont recours au terrorisme comme moyen d'action politique direct et percutant. Il est en plus utilise la ou la diplomatie et la persuasion ont echoue ou, croit-on, risquent d'echouer. Cooperation entre les organisations terroristes 16. Les actes terroristes les plus spectaculaires des annees 70 ont ete executes en collaboration. L'enlevement des ministres arabes responsables du petrole au siege social de 1'OPEP en 1975 etait 1'oeuvre d'une equipe composee de membres de la Faction de 1'Armee rouge allemande (FAR), du Front populaire pour la liberation de la Palestine (FPLP) et de 1'infame terroriste venezuelien Carlos. Des terroristes de la FAR et du FPLP ont de nouveau complete en 1976 dans le detournement d'un aerobus frangais vers Entebbe et le FPLP a dirige, un an plus tard, le detournement d'un avion de la Lufthansa vers Mogadiscio pour manifester son appui a la FAR, qui avait enleve 1'industrialiste allemand Han Martin Schleyer. 000069 �(' 69 SECRET State and State Supported Terrorism 13. As a matter of foreign policy, a number of states provide aid to terrorists or organizations which have used terrorism. State support of terrorist organizations has taken the form of financing, training and the provision of safe havens. Some countries have come to be closely associated with, and have provided sanctuary to, a wide spectrum of terrorist organizations based outside the Middle East. 14. Some governments have engaged directly in acts of terror. Assassination, kidnapping and secret imprisonment have become, in some nations, accepted methods of attempting to quell dissent and eliminate opposition. 15. As conventional warfare grows more costly and more hazardous, some nations are resorting to terrorism as a direct and effective method of political action. When diplomacy and persuasion have failed, or are believed likely to fail, terrorism is increasingly chosen as an alternative. Co-operation Among Terrorist Organizations 16. The most spectacular terrorist incidents of the 1970s were those which involved co-operation between terrorist groups. The kidnapping of Arab oil ministers at OPEC headquarters in 1975 was the work of a team composed of members of the German Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Popular Front For the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the infamous Venezuelan terrorist, Carlos. RAF and PFLP terrorists combined again in 1976, hijacking a French airbus to Entebbe, and a year later the PFLP lead the hijacking of a Lufthansa aircraft to Mogadiscio in support of the RAF kidnapping of German industralist Han Martin Schleyer. 17. Although there continue to be a few reports of meetings between terrorist groups, ethnically based terrorist organizations have tended not to integrate or closely co-ordinate their activities with others. Given this factor and a general decline in ideologically based left-wing terrorism, the co-operation evident among terrorist groups in the 1970s will likely not be a prominent feature in the next decade. General Trends The world has endured successive cycles of terrorist activity directed at both domestic and 000070 �1 > a >l 70 SECRET 17. Quoique 1’on signale encore, de temps 3 autre, des rencontres entre representants de certains groupes, les organisations terroristes de nature ethnique ont peu tendance a coordonner de pres leurs activites avec celles des autres. Vu cette tendance et un declin general du terrorisme chez les nouvenents ideologiques de gauche, il est peu probable que la cooperation entre les groupes terroristes, qui a marque les annees 70, soit un trait dominant de la nouvelle decennie. Tendances generales 18. Depuis le debut du siecle, le monde a traverse des cycles successifs d’activites terroristes dirigees contre des cibles tant nationales qu1 internationales. Le dernier cycle de violence terroriste a commence vers la fin des annees 60 et se poursuit au debut des annees 80. La fin des annees 60 et le debut des annees 70 ont ete marquees par d'importants changements: nouvelles idees et attitudes, montee de la tension sociale, soulevements interieurs et conflits internationaux. 19. En meme temps que les Etats-Unis intensifiaient leurs forces militaires en Asie du Sud-Est, emergeait un mouvement politique connu sous le nom de "nouvelle gauche". C'est 1’echec de ce phenomene politique qui a suscite au sein des societes industrielles du monde occidental un desenchantement tel qu'un element de la jeunesse decida d'adopter des moyens plus radicaux pour concretiser son ideal de socialisme. Ainsi, plus ou moins simultanement, le FAR anarchiste se constituait en Republique federale allemande, 1'ARJ nihiliste voyait le jour au Japon et, aux Etats-Unis, les Students for a Democratic Society creaient 1'organisation Weathermen. Ces groupes, qui pretendaient s'attaquer aux problemes sociaux et politiques du Tiers Monde, furent les artisans d'une decennie secouee par des actes terroristes spectaculaires. Les nombreux groupes nationalistes et secessionistes ne manquerent pas de profiter de la publicite des medias et s'orienterent de plus en plus vers le terrorisme. 20. Dans les democraties industrielles avancees, le reve de la revolution que nourrissaient les terroristes ne s'est jamais materialise. Sauf quelques rares exceptions, les activistes desenchantes et vieillissants des annees soixante ont renonce a leur reve ou se sont soumis moralement, physiquement ou politiquement au regime gouvernemental qu'ils avaient resolu de contester. Ils ont echoue non pas parce qu'ils manquaient de moyens, mais parce qu'ils croyaient a tort pouvoir acculer les gouvernements dans une position de plus en plus repressive et impopulaire par des actes de violence bien planifies et choisis pour leur puissant effet de propagande. Ils negligeaient un fait fondamental: les populations satisfaites economiquement sont stables. En effet, le terrorisme suffit rarement de lui-meme pour menacer la survie des regimes democratiques. 000071 �«> 4. • ♦ 71 SECRET international targets since the turn of the century. The latest round of terrorist violence began in the late 1960s and has continued into the 1980s. The late sixties and the first years of the seventies were a period of dramatic change involving new ideas and attitudes, escalating social tension, domestic upheavals and international strife. 19. Concomitant with the United States military build-up in South East Asia, what is commonly known as the "new left" emerged as a political force. It was this political phenomenon which, in failure, created within western industrial societies an element among the youth so disenchanted as to take up more radical means to achieve their ideal socialist communities. Thus, more or less simultaneously, the anarchist RAF developed in the Federal Republic of Germany, the nihilist JRA formed in Japan and the Students for a Democratic Society gave rise to the Weathermen in the USA. These groups, which purported to identify themselves with the social and political problems of the Third World, contributed to a decade of spectacular terrorist ventures. The media attention which their activities succeeded in attracting was not lost on the wide range of nationalist and seccessionist groups, and increasingly they too began to turn to terrorism. 20. In the advanced industrial democracies, the terrorist strategy for revolution never materialized. With few exceptions, the aging disenchanted activists of the sixties have either abandoned their dreams or have themselves fallen, morally, physically or politically, to the government forces they chose to challenge. Their failure has not been due to lack of skill, but rather to their mistaken belief that governments could be drawn into an increasingly repressive and unpopular posture by well planned acts of violence chosen for maximum propaganda effect. They overlooked the basic fact that economically satisfied populations are also stable ones. Terrorism is rarely sufficient in itself to threaten the survival of democratic political systems. 21. The kidnappings and murders of diplomats and business leaders in Brazil, Argentina and elsewhere have resulted in few real gains. Terrorism is occurring less frequently and many rural guerrilla/ terrorist organizations of the sixties and seventies, like their ideologically motivated counterparts in the industrialized countries, have fallen to government forces. Military authorities have taken control in several South American countries. In Central America, however, owing mainly to the inability of the governments there to appease peasant unrest, to increase production and to improve social conditions, the conflict has shifted from sporadic violence to popular uprisings and civil wars. 22. As for the Palestinians, their cause is unquestionably more widely known as a result of terrorism than would otherwise have been the case. These gains were at least in part due to factors such as escalating oil prices, which were not related to the 000072 �♦ •* *> 72 SECRET 21. Les enlevements et les meurtres de diplomates et de chefs d1 entreprises au Bresil, en Argentine et ailleurs ont fait peu de gains veritables. La frequence du terrorisme a diminue et de nombreuses organisations rurales de guerilleros et de terroristes, actives dans les annees soixante et soixante-dix, se sont pliees, comme leurs pendants ideologiques des pays industrialises, au regime gouvernemental en place. Dans plusieurs pays d'Amerique du Sud, les militaires se sont empares du pouvoir. En Amerique centrale, toutefois, le conflit qui se manifestait par des actes de violence sporadiques s’est transforme en soulevements populaires et en guerres civiles, essentiellement parce que les gouvernements sont incapables d'apaiser 1'agitation paysane, d'augmenter la production et d'ameliorer les conditions sociales. 22. Pour ce qui est des palestiniens, il ne fait pas de doute que c'est a la suite de leurs actes de terrorisme que leur cause est devenue beaucoup mieux connue. Leurs gains sont en partie attribuables a des facteurs tels que I'escalade des prix du petrole, qui n'avaient rien a voir avec les tactiques terroristes. Les attaques des Palestiniens, cependant, ont laisse des traces de haine et d'aigreur qui continuent de faire obstacle a la negociation. Le terrorisme a en fait entrave le reglement de la question palestinienne. Les dirigeants palestiniens les plus moderes sont done venus a la conclusion que le terrorisme peut maintenant les empecher d'atteindre leurs buts. 23. De la mosaique de groupes terroristes qui ont vu le jour depuis deux decennies, ce sont surtout les organisations constitutes de minorites nationales ou ethniques qui ont survtcu. Les separatistes basques, bretons et corses ainsi que les nationalistes creates et armeniens sont plus determines que jamais a atteindre leurs objectifs. Les mouvements secessionistes gagnent de 1’ampleur dans les Antilles. La Grande-Bretagne continue d'etre ebranlee par le problerne seculaire irlandais et la question palestinienne conserve son importance. Comme peu de ces groupes nationalistes et ethniques projettent une revolution radic.ale et globale, ils persisteront vraisemblablement. Ces extremistes ne rallient pas leurs partisans par des promesses utopiques ou des notions abstraites; ils se fondent, pour obtenir le soutien necessaire, sur le lien qui se cree entre les membres d'un groupe culturel distinctif. Par ailleurs, I'ecart grandissant entre les pays riches et les pays demunis et la pauvrete liee a 1'urbanisation dans les pays en voie de developpement s’associent a un rejet des valeurs du monde occidental et contribuent a provoquer 1'eveil de la conscience nationale chez de nombreux groupes culturels. C'est la poursuite de ces causes qui engendrera la plus grande partie de la violence a 1'interieur et a 1'exterieur de frontieres qui ont ete tracees sans egard pour la repartition d^mographique des differentes ethnies. 24. Le terrorisme est devenu un serieux obstacle a 1'autorite de la loi et au processus judiciaire. Il 000073 �* v c 73 SECRET Palestinian terrorist tactics. The attacks of the Palestinians, however, have left a residue of hatred and bitterness which continues to impede negotiation. As a result, terrorism has detracted from a solution to the Palestinian question. Consequently, the more moderate Palestinian leaders have come to share the view that terrorism may now be counterproductive to the attainment of their goals. 23. Of the mosaic of terrorist groups which have emerged in the last two decades, the main surviving organizations are those that are based upon national or ethnic minorities. The Basque, Breton and Corsican separatists and the Croatian and Armenian nationalists are as serious as ever in the pursuit of their objectives. Seccessionist movements are gaining momentum in the Caribbean. Great Britain remains troubled by the centuries-old Irish problem, and the Palestinian question continues to exist as an issue of importance. Few of these nationalist and ethnic terrorist groups possess any plans for sweeping, all-encompassing revolutionary change, and therefore are likely to endure. The appeal of ethnic extremists is not found in utopian promises or abstract notions; rather, the basis of their support is the bond of membership in a distinctive cultural group. As well, the widening gap between rich and poor nations and the poverty associated with urbanization in the developing countries have combined with a rejection of western values to generate a strong national consciousness among many national groups. It is the pursuit of these causes which will result in much of the violence within and across those state boundaries which have been drawn without consideration for ethnic settlement patterns. 24. Terrorism has become a serious obstacle to the rule of law and the judicial process. It directly challenges the authority of the state and to some extent undermines public confidence in established institutions. Developed democracies have paid a price, because of terrorism, in terms of restrictions on individual freedoms, Martial law occasionally has been imposed. Most of the world's airports are under constant surveillance; passengers are subject to security inspections; and yet no air traveller can feel safe from terrorist attack. Official mail must be x-rayed for explosives before delivery; embassies in many capitals are heavily guarded; diplomats and businessmen can no longer function without varying degrees of fear of being kidnapped or murdered; and the world's statesmen work and travel under costly and inhibiting restrictions. 25. The critical question for governments is not whether terrorism will continue, but what form it will take. Terrorism is not likely to be discarded by those who might seek advantage by attacking Western values. As the public becomes numbed by repeated hijackings, bombings and hostage-takings, it is well recognized that terrorists aould turn to ever greater acts of destruction in order to retain media attention. Scenarios for mass destruction have been postulated to include attacks against city water supplies, and — 000074 �* 74 SECRET conteste directement le pouvoir de 1'Etat et, jusqu'a un certain point, mine la confiance de la population dans les institutions en place. Les democraties industrialisees paient le prix du terrorisme par les restrictions qu'elles doivent imposer aux libertes individuelles. A preuve, le recours a la loi martiale a 1'occasion. La plupart des aeroports du monde sont sous constante surveillance, les passagers doivent se soumettre a des inspections, et aucun voyageur aerien n'est a 1'abri d'une attaque terroriste. Le courrier officiel a livrer est passe aux rayons X au cas ou des explosifs y auraient ete dissimules; dans de nombreuses capitales, les ambassades sont solidement gardees; les diplomates et les hommes d'affaires ne peuvent plus faire autrement que de nourrir la crainte, plus ou moins vive, d'etre enleves ou tues; partout au monde, les hommes d'Etat travaillent et voyagent dans des conditions couteuses et contraignantes. 25. La question cruciale, pour les gouvernements, est non pas de savoir si le terrorisme persistera, raais plutot quelle forme il prendra. Le terrorisme risque peu d'etre abandonne par ceux qui croient pouvoir contester avec succes les valeurs occidentales. Comme la sensibilite du public s'emousse devant la recurrence des detournements d'avion, des attentats a la bombe et des prises d'otages, c'est un fait bien connu que les terroristes pourraient recourir a des actes de destruction encore plus sensationnels pour retenir I'attention des medias. On a imagine divers scenarios dans lesquels des terroristes se livraient a des actes de destruction generale sur les canalisations d'eau des villes et, fait plus grave.encore, sur des installations nucleaires. Ceux-ci pourraient toujours, en outre, se procurer du materiel chimique ou bacteriologique radioactif et viser des cibles economiques telles que pipe-lines, installations portuaires et recoltes. Il est cependant improbable que les terroristes politiques en viennent a ces moyens d'action car, en depit de la publicite donnee aux faits spectaculaires, il est prouve que leurs methodes restent bien en-dega du niveau de perfectionnement atteint par la technologie et 1'armement modernes, et il devrait vraisemblablement continuer d'en etre ainsi. 26. La plupart des terroristes politiques possedent de profondes convictions et restent a 1'ecoute de 1'opinion publique. Ils cherchent a influencer les gens afin d'atteindre un certain nombre d'objectifs. A leurs yeux, detruire en bloc pour le plaisir de detruire est le propre du criminel. Les terroristes politiques continueront probablement de choisir des cibles semblables a celles du passe et ils en resteront sans doute aux armes faciles a obtenir et de puissance limitee. 27. En Somme, le terrorisme politique a atteint une periode de stabilite et il restera, prevoit-on, a peu pres a ce niveau tout au long de la decennie. Aucun regain de 1'activite terroriste n’est prevu. Les terroristes politiques continueront cependant a vouloir profiter au maximum des moyens de communications electroniques et tenteront de manipuler les medias pour 000075 �/ - 75 - SECRET even more serious — against nuclear installations. There is also the possibility of radioactive, chemical or bacteriological material being obtained and used by terrorists, and of attacks by terrorists on economic targets such as pipelines, harbour facilities and food crops. The prospects of political terrorists resorting to such actions, however, are improbable. Despite the publicity given to the spectacular, terrorists have a proven and well established record of operating far below the level of available technology and weaponry and are likely to continue to do so. 26. Most political terrorists are sustained by powerful convictions and are attuned to public opinion. They seek to influence people to achieve certain limited objectives. In the view of political terrorists, mass destruction for its own sake is in the realm of the criminal. Political terrorists will probably continue to choose targets similar to those of the past, and their weapons will likely remain those that are easily obtainable and of limited power. 27. In sum, political terrorism has reached a plateau and it is expected to remain at or near this level throughout this decade, An upsurge in terrorist activity is not anticipated, Political terrorists. however, will continue to seek maximum advantage from instant communications and will attempt to manipulate the media to dramatize certain issues. There is a continuing probability of isolated and sporadic attacks against government establishments and representatives, commercial interests and businessmen, and international meetings and summits, with minority nationalist and secessionist groups leading the way. As well, state and state-supported terrorism will remain features of international political life. 000076 �\ 76 SECRET dramatiser certains faits. Par ailleurs, il est toujours probable que certaines organisations, et notamnent des groupes de nationalistes minoritaires et de secessionistes, lancent des attaques isolees et sporadiques contre des institutions gouvernementales et leurs reprsentants, des entreprises cornmerciales, des homines d'affaires, des assemblies internationales et des reunions au sommet. En outre, le terrorisme utilise ou soutenu par 1’etat restera une des caracteristiques de la vie politique internationale. 000077 �1/ ♦ *1. Government of Canada Gouvernement du Canada CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET DATED FROM A COMPTER DU g'3-0'? -Ol TO JUSQU’AU 82-U~3o AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE — A METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS — NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS * FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE — POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTERIEURE VOIR FILE NO. — DOSSIER N VOLUME (4 GC31d 7540-21-857-8809 000078 �RCMP GRC Classification FICHE DE SERVICE TRANSIT SLIP BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN IA 195-128 (Vol. 3) j j Comments | Commentaires 1 Perusal and P.A. Lire et dasser 83 NOV 29 S/Sgt. N.E. Kyle C/Sup.U-dT . VenneTr- I Date FROM - DE TO-A I | Action | Donner suite I I j Prepare Reply I Rediger une r6ponse I Brief Pr&parer un exposi F | Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier I I Return with Current File I Retourner avec le dossier actuel ~] Check Records | Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET CABINET PAPER ON TERRORISM REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (Si Cespace le permet, rtpondre sur cette formu(e) .Mr ._L ep_C1p u tie r_caJJ ed thj s _AM_.(_83_N.O V_2 9_)__a nd„a d vls_e_d_t h.e_fp 1J owj ng.:. lhe_Cabjnet_Cpmmttep_on D efence_and_Fo.relgn_Ppllp.y_(C.C.DEP.)_e.xam.i.ned — the Ca^bJnet_Pa.p.er oji Terrprl^yejterday_(_83_N0_V_28._.)_.and_agree.d_tha.t. rv there was a need for urgency in_regard .tP_the_r.ecpmme.ndatjpns_a.s_s.et— .out_in_the„pa.pe.r.__Al.so.,_that_the_Paper_b.e._re.fer_r.ed_to_th.e_C.CS.I_for----- .tojjpwzup.__ Mr._ClQutier_j.n.fo.rmed_that_the._RCO_wj.lJ_be_communjcat.iji.g— wjth_the_yar.ipus_d.epartments„o.n_th.is_ma.tte.r_wjth.inLthe_next_week_or_so .It_seems._that_.thp„P.CO_pJans_to_g.et_the_prjpcj.p.ai..t.og.ethe.r_to_de.te.rmi.ne a_structure.Zme.c.ha.ni.sm_to_de.ve]pp_a_n.atjpna.l_anti^ter.r.orJsm_p.r_ogr-am----- I to e.SC^<‘ K *- O) M P.A. -A.C. io £ o £ •o < Diary Date - Dare d'agenda Meeting Date - Date de riunion Date MilJN' 000079 �RCMPGRC DEMANDE DE PHOTOCOPIES REQUEST FOR PHOTOCOPIES DATE *?>//. J? 9 REQUESTED BY (PRINT NAME)/ DEMANDEUR (NOM EN LETTRES MOULEES) ROOM N«/N" DE PIECE TITLE OF DOCUMENT OR FILE N?.0F REPORT/TITRE DU DOCUMENT OU N® DE DOSSIER DU RAPPORT DATE OF DOCUMENT/REPORT DATE DU DOCUMENT/RAPPORT N® OF COPIES/NB DE COPIES l ft (9$~- /J-tT TOP SECRET TRES SECRET □ CLASSIFICATION ■CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIEL SECRET SECRET UNCLASSIFIED, NON CLASSIFIE RESTRICTED DIFFUSION RESTREINTE IBICES oXjirectives REQUIREMENTS ORJNS^RjjcMoNS/T) 11 \ ... ■J ........... REQUESTED BY (SlONATURj^) / SIGNATURE DU DEMANDEUR SSF283 (81/08) I n CO PlES^RECEI VE0 ) COPIES RE^UE^XirJlTlALES) BRANCH/SOUS-DIRECTION ____ P.A. N"/N» A C. 000080 �-) * ■* » - Z>'-. / f • «/ -S c^t v .*“•• c. vP V>V‘ S'’ * 000081 �’ RCMPGRC TRANSIT SLIP Classification FICHE DE SERVICE SECRET________ BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIREA LA MAIN IA195-128__________ I TO-<4 ■ S/Sgt. M. Prentice Date FROM - DE _________ £L._Ua29_ S/Sgt. 5. Gilles S/Sgt. N.E. Kvle S/Sgt. M. Swim NCO i/c Research & Briefing Unit I | 1 Comments | Commentaires I || Donner suite I | I Prepare Brief I Preparer un expos6 I I I Return with Current File | Retoumer avec !e dossier adue! I I Perusal and PA | J Lire et dasser II Prepare Reply | J R&diger une riponse I | I Make Rle(s) I Ouvrir un dossier I I I Check Records | Verifier les dossiers I Action SUBJECT - SUJET Re: Meorandum to Cabinet - Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (SiEespace !e permet. ripondre sur cede formulel This refers to our previous exch_ange_of correspondence in regard to the above noted caption. Attached for vour information is an updated annex entitled "Threat to Canada" dated 1983.11.21. It is a suppJ.ernent to the Memorandum to Cabinet. On this date (19S3.11.29) Mr. Leo Cloutier of the Solicitor General's Office informed that the Cabinet Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy had considered the submission at its meeting on 19S3.11.28. The Committee members concurred with the urgency surrounding this matter. In the end, they decided to refer the paper to the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence for action. According to Mr. Cloutier, the next step in this process is for the PCO to write to the principal departments within the next week or so to assure compliance with the Cabinet directive. co d> I I I r 1/ ^<3 V t I r________________ 18* \ _______________ < cir’/\Ctp.A.-AC. g co Mte - Date d'agenda ” Oat7 Meeting Date - Dare de reunion ___ ^3 lnit.//V° *■ 000082 �- 2 If you require any additional information in regard to this matter please contact me. (993-3542) 000083 �SECRET RELATIF AU MEMOIRE AU CABINET 359-83MC MENACE POUR LE CANADA le 21 novembre 1983 000084 �SECRET Menace pour le Canada La presente Annexe a pour objet a) d’evaluer 1*importance des menaces terroristes dans l'€tat actuel des choses et de decrire les mesures prises en provision de visites et d'gvgnements internationaux importants, plus particuliSrement la visite du Pape, les Jeux olympiques de 1984 a Los Angeles et les Jeux d’hiver de 1988 a Calgary; et b) de fournir des renseignements 5 jour sur la menace que font peser les groupes et les Etats dont il est question dans le document d'information. Visites et £v£nements internationaux importants Les evenements internationaux qui, de par leur nature, attirent 1'attention de la communaute internationale du fait de la couverture assuree par les medias-sont des occasions dont cherchent 2 profiter des groupes et des particuliers pour defendre leur cause par des moyens pacifiques ou par la violence. Le massacre des Jeux olympiques de Munich en 1972 en est un triste exemple. C'est ce qui incite les gouvernements 2 consacrer des ressources importantes a cette question afin d'empecher que des actes pareils ne se reproduisent. Les vastes et multiples mesures de s6curit€ qui doivent etre prises dans le cadre d'evenements sp^ciaux afin de d^courager les terroristes et autres criminals, de protSger les participants et les installations et, tout de meme, de permettre au grand public et aux medias d'y prendre part, n^cessitent une planification et une coordination d'envergure, a 1'Schelle tant nationale qu'internationale. Comme ce fut le cas pour les Jeux olympiques de Montreal et le Sommet £conomique d'Ottawa, des efforts extraordinaires sont dSployes en vue de la visite du Pape, et des ressources considerables y sont affect€es. En ce qui concerne la visite du Pape, les Jeux olympiques de Los Angeles et les Jeux d’hiver de Calgary, il n'existe aucune menace precise pour 1'instant. Toutefois, il existe un certain nombre de groupes qui sont suffisamment motives et qui disposent des moyens necessaires pour profiter de ces occasions pour monter une attaque et faire parler d'eux dans les medias. La visite du Pape constitue un evenement qui, par son envergure, est sans pr£c€dent pour les autorites canadiennes chargees de la security et de la protection. La vie du Pape a et£ plusieurs fois mise en peril, et c'est ce qui explique la necessity d'une planification et d'une collaboration precises et detaillees. Comme le Pape participera 2 des Svenements importants dans huit provinces au cours de sa visite, il est capital que soient partagees les fonctions de s£curit€ parmi les trois paliers de gouvernement, etant donne le chevauchement des competences. La moiti§ du budget de 14 millions de dollars alloue au Groupe de travail du gouvernement canadien pour la visite du Pape est consacr^e 2 la s^curitS. Les Jeux olympiques de 1984 a Los Angeles accentueront 1'importance et 1'utilisation des mecanismes de consultations et d'echange de renseignements avec les Etats-Unis. Le Canada a partagS avec les autorit^s am£ricaines 1’experience acquise lors des Jeux olympiques de Montreal. Il y a eu divers ^changes sur des preoccupations et des interets mutuels, en particulier en matiere de detection des terroristes et des armes qui transitent par le Canada avant d'entrer aux Etats-Unis. Il faudra faire face aux pressions et aux exigences accrues 000085 �2 SECRET amends par cet €v€nement, qui se dgroulera a l'ext€rieur du Canada, et ce, avec les ressources et les capacitSs actuellement affect^es a la lutte centre le terrorisme. Quant aux Jeux d'hiver de 1988 a Calgary, le nombre de participants y sera moins Sieve et 1'SvSnement revetira, sur le plan international, moins d'importance que les Jeux olympiques de MontrSal ou de Los Angeles. Il faudra en 1'occurrence augmenter les capacitSs normales pour planifier ou mettre en oeuvre un programme de sScuritS adSquat intSressant tous les paliers de gouvernement et faisant appel aux relations internationales. Groupes et Etats qui constituent actuellement une menace sur le plan de s6curite Les groupes qui sont en mesure de poser des actes terroristes font peser en permanence une menace dont 1'ampleur varie et exige en consequence la prise de contre-mesures diverses au Canada et a 1'Stranger, notamment la protection des missions consulaires et diplomatiques et de leur personnel. Les missions de seize pays au Canada font 1'objet d'une protection extraordinaire. La menace globale, telle qu'elle est actuellement Svaluee, demeurera inchangee, du moins dans un avenir previsible, et les budgets alloues a la protection ont Ste augmentes. Terroristes armSniens La menace qui pSse sur tous les interets turcs demeure considSrable dans le monde entier. Jusqu'5 maintenant en 1983, les terroristes armSniens ont revendiquS la responsabilitS de plus de 40 incidents, notamment 1'assassinat de deux diplomates turcs. Les groupes de terroristes arm£niens sont une menace permanente pour tous les pays qui ont emprisonn£ un des leurs ou qui le traduisent devant les tribunaux, tout particuliSrement la France, les Etats-Unis, le Royaume-Uni, la Belgique, les Pays-Bas, le Portugal, la Suisse et le Canada. A la menace qui plane sur les interets frangais s'ajoute 1'appui qu'accorderait 1'Iran a 1'ArmSe secrete armenienne pour la liberation de 1'Armenie (ASALA). Les principaux risques pour les interets du Canada a 1’Stranger viennent de 1'ASALA et sont liSs a des Svenements qui concernent plus particulierement le Canada, notamment la condamnation en aout 1983 de trois membres de 1'ASALA accuses d'avoir voulu faire sauter le terminal de marchandises d'Air Canada a Los Angeles, et les proces pour extorsion et fraude, actuellement en instance a Toronto. Il en a rSsulte des alertes a la bombe aux bureaux d'Air Canada a San Francisco, et des menaces dont on soupgonne 1'ASALA d'etre 1'auteur concernant les missions consulaires du Canada a Philadelphia et New York. Le Canada a montre qu'il Stait dSterminS a lutter contre le terrorisme armenien, en dSpit des consequences, en offrant une recompense de 100 000 dollars a quiconque lui fournirait des renseignements sur la ou les personnes responsables des attaques contre deux diplomates turcs a Ottawa. Terrorisme palestinien Les £l£ments radicaux qui militent en marge du principal courant du mouvement de resistance 000086 �SECRET 3 palestinienne continuent de reprysenter une menace pour les ytablissements israyiiens et americains ainsi que pour les ytablissements d'Etats arabes moderys qui se trouvent en sol canadien. Les combats qui se poursuivent entre factions palestiniennes et le r61e jouy par les Syriens laissent penser que certains yiyments de la rysistance palestinienne pourraient reprendre 1'action terroriste en dehors du Moyen-Orient. Par le passy, les terroristes palestiniens s'en sont pris surtout aux pays d'Europe de 1'Quest. Par ailleurs, les yvenements du Liban ont aussi crye des tensions au sein des communautes arabes du Canada. La question irlandaise Jusqu'a prysent, les factions irlandaises n'auraient commis aucun acte de violence au Canada. Cependant, des actes illegaux y ont ety perpytres par leurs partisans. Les attentats centre des cibles britanniques demeurent possibles, en particulier durant les visites de haut niveau ou la tenue d'evynements spyciaux. Groupes de solidarity avec 1'Amerique latine Les activit^s en sol canadien de certains groupes qui militent en faveur du renversement des rygimes en place en Amerique centrale et en Amerique du Sud devraient demeurer non violentes. Advenant une intervention directe des Americains dans la region, certaines personnes pourraient etre tentyes d'exercer des represailles en s’attaquant aux interets americains au Canada. Exiles cubains anti-castristes Bien qu'on ne rel§ve au Canada aucun signe d’appui 3 des organisations terroristes d'exiles cubains anti-castristes installees aux Etats-Unis, ces groupes ont meny des actions terroristes contre des missions cubaines au Canada, et ils continuent de faire peser une menace sur les intyrets cubains et soviytiques. Mouvement khalistan Certains membres de la communaute sikh du Canada sont de fervents partisans du Mouvement khalistan pour la cryation d'un Etat indypendant dans le Pendjab. Jusqu’ici, ils n'ont fait que participer 5 des manifestations, mais ils pourraient poser des gestes violents contre des diplomates indiens. Si la situation se dyteriore en Inde, de tels gestes seront d'autant plus probables. 000087 J �SECRET 4 Terrorisms yougoslave Les extrymistes creates et serbes font toujours planer une menace sur les etablissements yougoslaves au Canada, et involution de la situation en Yougoslavie pourrait accentuer cette menace. La politique du gouvernement yougoslave et ses interventions au sein des communautes serbe et create du Canada continueront a poser des problSmes de security, et a nuire aux relations entre le Canada et la Yougoslavie. Terrorisms d'Etat Nous savons que certains Etats soutiennent ou dirigent des actions terroristes dans le but d'atteindre des objectifs nationaux bien def inis, comme la suppression d'opposants politiques dans d'autres pays. Dernierement, 1'intensification du terrorisme d'Etat a yte illustrye de fa?on dramatique Ces derniers attentats ont fait augmenter la crainte que d'autres Etats dyjS connus pour recourir au terrorisms pourraient accroitre leurs activites et etre imites par d'autres Etats qui pergoivent le terrorisms d'Etat comme un moyen efficace de poursuivre des objectifs politiques. A cet egard, le Canada devra continuer a faire preuve de vigilance. Il faudra aussi tenir compte des repercussions politiques que pourraient avoir les mesures que prendrait le Canada pour dycourager et yiiminer les actes criminals qui violent le droit et les pratiques internationales. Nouveaux problemes de security Vu la plus grande sensibilisation du public a diverses nouvelles causes (d^sarmement nucl^aire, Agalite de la femme, ycologie, etc.), la possibility que des extr^mistes, se rgclamant de la notion d'"action directe", etendent leurs activites terroristes pour attirer 1’attention du public pr£occupe les instances chargees d'assurer la security et d’appliquer la loi. L’expression "action directe" renvoie davantage a une notion et 5 certaines activitys, qu'a une organisation. Elie est frequemment utilises dans les ouvrages d'anarchistes recommandant 1’action directe ou positive pour faire valoir de supposees revendications. Rien ne laisse croire qu’au Canada "Action directe" soit une organisation structures. C'est en mai 1982 que l’expression "action directe" a ete associye pour la premiere fois a ces activitys terroristes au Canada. En effet, c'est a cette epoque qu'elle est apparue dans un communique ymis par un groupe pour la protection de 000088 J �SECRET 1'environnement revendiquant la responsabilite de 1'attentat a la bombe qui a cause des dommages evalues 5 $ 45 millions a une centrale hydro-eiectrique auxiliaire de la Colombie-Britannique. L'expression est reapparue dans un communique revendiquant la responsabilite de 1'attentat a la bombe perpetre en octobre 1982 centre la societe Litton Systems (Canada) de Toronto, attentat qui a cause des blessures a trois policiers et quatre agents de securite et occasionne des dommages de $ 5 millions. Le communique condamnait la participation de la societe Litton a la fabrication de systSmes de guidage destines aux missiles de croisiSre. "Wimmins Fire Brigade", qui a revendique la responsabilite des cocktails Molotov lances dans trois points de vente de bandes videos de la Colombie-Britannique, en guise de protestation contre la pornographic. Cinq residents de la Colombie-Britannique, connus sous le nom de "Squamish Five" (ou "Vancouver Five" ou "Oakalla Five"), font actuellement 1'objet de poursuites relativement a ces incidents. Ils sont egalement accuses d'avoir comploter pour utiliser des explosifs dans le but d'endommager le brise-glaces "Terry Fox" et pour commettre des actes de sabotage contre des aeronefs et des reservoirs de carburant a la Base des Forces canadiennes de Cold Lake, en Alberta. Ces cinq personnes sont en outre accusees de possession illegale d’armes a usage control^, ainsi que d'un certain nombre d'autres deiits, dont le vol d'explosifs, d'equipement et de vehicules. Des groupes d'individus de meme opinion ont 3te identifies en Ontario et au Quebec. L'un de ces individus est Ken Deyarmond, qui, a la suite d'un incident survenu a Toronto le 27 septembre 1983, est accuse de tentative de voie de fait a 1'endroit du Premier ministre Thatcher. En avril et mai 1983, au Quebec, des individus s*identifiant a des groupes appeles "Action directe", "Groupe action directe" et "Friction directe" ont revendique la responsabilite d'une s^rie d'attentats S la bombe. Ces attentats, qui ont vis§ notamment les quartiers du Regiment Black Watch et une des installations de Petro-Canada a Montreal, n'ont cause que des dommages mineurs et personne n'a £te bless4. Conclusion La gravite de la menace pour le Canada est directement fonction de trois facteurs: les tendances 000089 �SECRET 6 de la situation internationale et les Svenements qui, 5 ce chapitre, ont des repercussions au Canada et sur nos interets a 1'Stranger; les groupes et individus ayant recours 3 1'"action directe"; et les contre-mesures prises pour combattre le probleme. Il n’y a aucun doute que les possibilites d’attentats au Canada et centre ses interets a 1'Stranger s'accroitront si, aux yeux des terroristes, le Canada ne manifesto pas la determination de prSvoir et de contrer leurs menaces et ne dispose pas des moyens de le faire. 000090 �RCMPGRC TRANSIT SLIP ‘ aOACZZca_____ BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN TO-A oYc 'O' //? Z/^-Z^_______ FROM - DE 0^6 Date ■-7^0 \ 0 / 0 FsW^I i Syfc^T £1X2. E | | Comments ] Commentaires I Perusal and P.A. \ Lire et dasser I I Erepare Brief VTPr&parer un expose Action Donner suite >—y I Return with Current File I Retoumer avec le dossier actuel I Check Records Verifier les dossiers Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier Prepare Reply | Rediger une reponse k____ •jrAT cZ _L-&_Q Xaa-OI^. | . Classification FICHE DE SERVICE SUBJECT - SUJEE -Oaza/ d* //oJuA <7M ____________ _______________________ / / REMARKS (Use same A-5 fZr Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (Silespace le permet, rdptndre sur cette lormule) f Z^L- A &4ZAcrJa . ^/Ud^A(/ZlA_AA7__/tA4^^_ $ Z^AAex^D __ ’■-. _____________________ ________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ o_AAd Zt^A fl-jyo..___ ... __ Z^C___ -h _c<C.&.££-_4iL. .#£_&&, -_ ___ fits -- -<p^= 32^ !?ta 2 'A A - k fl —A— c. „£■ Al ^o \ - Date d'agenda bnZKL^ Meeting Qpte - Dau reunion zf Z2Pd i. SLAlJ^P A f.A jO P.A.-AC. ( Date Init.//V' ,000091 l �Y TRANSIT SLIP RCMP GRC Classification FICHE DE SERVICE SECRET BIN BD File No. - N° drossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN JO-A TAIQS-IP# ST.11.24 aZaZd=2. A/O i /c IDlLZlpexations. SZSgiz._J!LJE._Kyle^ Ops. 1XTC0 i‘ /c_ Re_S_e.arch.__ & Rriflfing- Unit. D.G, I| Comments I Commentaires I | I Perusal and P.A. | Lire et dasser I I Action | I Donner suite | I Prepare Reply | Rudiger une r&ponse I | J Prepare Brief | Preparer un expose I Make File(s) J Ouvrir un dossier | Return with Current File | Retourner avec le dossier actuei | I I Check Records ] Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET Cabinet Paper on Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada. REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (SiEespace le permet, repordre sur cette formule) J' This_as_f.ur_th.e.r_t_o_Upl.._McJy_or£s..A-5—o£L£L9B3_.J1..23-..__As wa5._s_t_o.o_d._by_.th.e-----_C.CEDE_on_1933_.Jl_.J4. __ AttJi.c.hM_i.s__the_updat^d^nnex_on_tKe_2Jhr^tJo_a_a.n.ad.a2'_p.o.rjJon_o.fat.h^Jfe_mQ^^______ _ A£C.oinmr.._£. A..R_.Rfi3L>Ei.r-^-t_o.^_Pjioi^cj31y^EoJ.ic.ing^ho is_jLh_e_RCMP_r&piie^nt^^^ already reviewed the annex and concurs with its content. We seek the approval of the D.G. . On 1933.11.24 Mr. Ed Wilier, External Affairs, provided the fol 1 owing information.;______________________ _______ 5£ d> 2 N rj 6 CP ID s ££ Mr. Shoemaker wishes to raise the consciousness i). of the Cabinet members to the potential dangers REVIEWED posed to Canada by indigenous groups Therefore, Mr. Leo Cloutier r Solicitor General*s Office, and Mr. Andre Morin ££0-2 1084 External Affairs, are at present redrafting the portion dealing with Emerging Security concerns SECURITY SERVICE RECORDS P.A. -A.C. CO E ID i - Date d'agenda ~~ || Meeting Date - Date de reunion Date ~ \n«../N° 000092 I ’ �y » - 2 - to more accurately reflect the current developments ii) Mr. Caron, PCO, has been informed of the present status of the paper. iii) the submission is on the agenda for the 1983.11.28 meeting of the CCFDP. In view of the short time that we have been given to complete this task, please afford it your priority attention. 000093 �------------------------- *———r-y—■ V! i 7------- SECRET If 'p p i' I--. ■ !•> Mt Threat'to Canada » '• The purpose of this Annex is to'(a) provide a current threat assessment and description of measures being taken concerning high profile international events and visits, in particular the Papal Visit, the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games and the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics; and (b) to update the assessed threat posed by the groups and states described in the Background Paper. B' ■' ■ High Profile International Events/Visits M.;'' International events that by their nature and scope attract •" » fe.!Bp ' ft world-wide attention through the media, present an opportunity for a wide variety of groups and individuals to engage in peaceful and violent conduct for political purposes. Dramatic examples were the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre and the attempt on the Pope's life at the Vatican. As a consequence, governments have devoted major resources to prevent similar recurrences. The comprehensive and extensive security arrangements required for special events in order to deter terrorists and other criminals, to , b? - protect participants and facilities, and still accommodate the media and p <■ o v' < A. C. public reasonable assess require detailed planning and coordination, both : p' ■ dp nationally and internationally. The extraordinary effort and resources which were committed to previous events such as the Montreal Olympics and I BL ' MM ; • ; • •• . . the Ottawa Economic Summit are being similarily applied to the Papal Visit. - fep Visit or either the Los Angeles-or Calgary Olympics. However, a number of There is at this time no identifiable specific threat to the Papal : |f :’■ fellIt'; groups have the motivation and capability to seize the opportunity to mount an attack to exploit the assured media coverage. ■' i . . k'M ,M■ •” * .. ‘j’ • •- 'P ' ■■■ W j? fP. it. . h : f- ■ i > :m • • ‘ > ■ . f.- i i 000094 i �SECRET - 2 The Papal Visit will be a monumental event unparalleled by any previous experience faced by Canadian security and protective authorities. There have been several fMwroow- attempts and numerous threats to the Pope's life$ emphasizing the need for precise and detailed V’t: ; I planning and cooperation. As the visit will include major events in eight provinces, the overlapping jurisdictions require the sharing of security functions in terms of federal, provincial and municipal responsibilities. Security accounts for half of the $14 million budget allocated to the Canadian Government Papal Visit Task Force. g’.ib Bi. I■ The 1984 Los Angeles Olympic will place increased jv..’ importance and demands on existing consultations and security intelligence exchange arrangements with the USA, Canadian experience resulting from the Montreal Olympics >•!?!•;. has been shared with 'the USA authorities. There has been a variety of exchanges on mutual concerns and interests, in particular the detection of terrorists and arms entering Canada en route to the USA. The increased demands and pressures generated by this event occuring outside of Canada will have to be accommodated within 4 ;' • : /- existing counter-terrorist resources and capabilities. The 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics will have fewer participants and a lower international profile than the ;> •1- Montreal or Los Angeles Olympics. Normal capabilities k<\v£, for cv<n4* will to be to plan or implement an appropriate security program involving all levels of government and drawing on international relationships. i j'. Groups and States that are of present Security Concern The groups that have the capability to commit :4- terrorist acts pose an ongoing threat of varying degrees requiring differing levels of counter-measures within * 000095 �SECRET 3 - Canada and abroad, including protection to diplomatic and consular missions and personnel. Missions in Canada of sixteen countries are receiving extraordinary protection. aistsseA vj! || The over alia threat io .aGDOGOod -fro remain at least at it present level for the forseeable future and protective budgets have been increased. Xi Armenian Terrorism Hv ■ The threat to all Turkish interests remains at a high level world-wide. •:fv " . So far in 1983, Armenian terrorists have claimed responsibility for over 40 incidents including the assassination of two Turkish ■■■ There is a continuing threat from Armenian diplomats. fterrorist groups against all countries having members in jail or before the courts: specifically France, the. USA, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland and Canada. <?: H •' W’'" ii. The threat trhe. French interests iuura. been -bhe. Armenian compounded by reports of Iranian support for ASA-foA-r Stcref +\^e kiberocFion of Armenia. (^ALA ). The principal threat to Canadian interests abroad continues to come from ASALA of the-thc-oe. trials which are of particular relevance to Canada, namely the Xk •i ?x: /h;' ■s * conviction in August 1983 of the three ASALA members for the attempted bombing of the Air Canada cargo terminal in Los Angeles and the trials related to extortion and fraud charges pending in Toronto. Consequences have included bomb threats directed to Air Canada in San Francisco and Canadian suspected ASALA threats concerning consular missions in Philadelphia and New York. Canadian Government determination to proceed against Armenian terrorism, despite the consequences, was demonstrated by the offer of J responsible. informalion °n personCs i a reward of $100,000 .i, .n r.pnnt? ?^the attacks against two Turkish diplomats in Ottawa. j ■ . I'4 000096 �4 - SECURT Terror Palestinian t<C',sls,t*aTi c There continues to be a threat to Israeli, USA, and moderate Arab establishments in Canada from radical elements outside the main stream of the Palestinian f n-» Resistance Rovement, ?■! Current fighting between Palestinian factions and Syrian involvement has raised concern that w'rHVin-Hne. Adas+miav> resi stance. n->ovc.mentsome elements/\might resume terrorist activities outside the Middle East, In the past, Palestinian related terrorism has been concentrated in Western European countries. Events in Lebanon have also created tension among Arab ethnic communities with/nCanada. Irish Issue SI To date there have been no acts of violence' in Canada linked to Irish factions.^-4xsw«uex^"There have beenjKovoever^ illegal activities in support of them. There is the O£cun«+’ potential for attacks 4-»-British targets, particularly ' i I b.:-. ■ i hi i A- during high level visits or events. Latin American Support Groups The activities in Canada of groups supporting the overthrow of. those existing regimes in Central and South America are expected to remain non-violent. American intervention in t'heJ’ ’ A direct oh* could prompt individuals to retaliate against USA interests -ewU. Canada. A. I- . -X. i I 000097 �SECRET - 5 Anti-Castro Cuban Exiles Although there is no identifiable support within Canada for anti-Castro Cuban exile terrorist organizations based in the USA, these groups have carried out terrorists actions against the Cuban missions in Canada and continue Cuban And to pose a threat against^Soviet interests. i-! Khalistan Movement The Khalistan Movement for an independent state IS . . in the Punjab*©-actively supported by some members of the I Sikh communityACanada. Activities within Canada have been confined to demonstrations but there is the potential for whidi H likely violence against Indian diplomatic representatives^if increase. i conditions within India deteriorate. Yugoslav Terrorism \ li i •i There is a continuing threat against Yugoslav/ establishments in Canada from Croatian and Serbian ■ic-.' extremists and developments in Yugoslavia could increase r.i this threat. i The policies of the Yugoslav Government and its counter activities within the Croatian and Serbian ■?: r- communities in Canada will continue to create a security i problem within Canada and affect relations between Canada and Yugoslavia. State Terrorism J Certain states are known to support and direct ■ 1! 1 terrorist activities in pursuit of specific national objectives, including the elimination of political opponents in other countries. The growth of state-supported terrorism has been dramatically brought to world attention •j 000098 �SECRET 6 • !/ • 'hese recent incidents have heightened the concern that other states previously known to employ terrorist tactics. may escalade their activities and be imitated by other states who perceive state supported terrorism as an effective instrument to further policy objectives. The implications for Canada in terms of state-sponsored incidents occurring I in Canada will continue to require attention. There is also the political implication of what can be done to e, discourage and eliminate these criminal acts 4-e- violato^w. .as# international law and practice. Emerging Security Concerns MJ • of Because of increasing public awarenessAemerging I .'• io C =:■ issues (e.g. nuclear disarmament, women’s rights, and ecology), the likelihood that extremist adherents to the "direct action" concept will conduct further terrorist activities to attract attention and publicity to these issues is a concern to both the security and law enforcement authorities. The term "direct action" is a concept and a activity as compared to an organization. j[t has frequently been used in anarchist writings calling for direct- or positive action to resolve a perceived grievance. \rtrrch- in-tri-nnes’Hro—e-x4-G^pt^b-14-o^o«G@^a, 000099 w �7 i, U)<L.S The first time that the term "Direct Action"-weassociated with terrorist activity in Canada was in May .4 •! • 'i;-' - 1982, when "Direct Action" appeared in the communique o_ : claiming responsibility for the bombing ofABritish Columbia hydro sub-station valued at $45 million as a i means of environmental protest. r The name was again applied in the communique claiming responsibility for the October 1982 bombing of Litton Systems (Canada) in Toronto, resulting in injuries to three policemen and four >• security and $5 million in property damage. communique condemned The Litton's involvement in the production of guidance systems for the cruise missile. .t "Wimmins Fire Brigade" that ciaaimed responsibility for the firebombing of three video i stores in B.C. as a protest against pornography. 1 Five British Columbian residents are at present on trial for charges relating to these incidents and are in custody. Similar link-minded groupes of individuals have been identified in Ontario and Quebec. A-i !■ Mr ■ ■'! :'G In Quebec during April and May 1983, 1 individuals' identifying themselves with "Action directe" ) "Groupe action directe" and "Friction directe" claimed responsibility for a series of bombing attacks. The targets included the Black Watch Armoury and a Petro-Canada facility in Montreal resulting in only minor property damage and no personal injuries. To date investigation into these incidents have failed to uncover the individuals responsible or any relationship among the three groups concerned. 000100 �8 SECRET Conclusion The Seriousness of the threat to Canada will be directly affected by international trends and developments : and by the counter-measures which are employed to combat 4'hoi' the problem. There is no doubtA rtthe potential for attacks ’i 'l+ 14 within Canada will increase if wa -a-r-e- viewed by terrorists as lacking the resolve to counter such threats. B ■■ ■!r: :■! 000101 X �. RCMP GRC TRANSIT SLIP Classification FICHE DE SERVICE ^£^^£■7- BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier , /■ff-/S-Sf' • HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN 5 ___ /9 /»y'-'v"- I | Action | Donner suite I | | Comments | Commentaires i | I | I Perusal and PA. | Lire et dasser ■] Prepare Reply | Rudiger une reponse I I I Prepare Brief \ Preparer un expose I Make File(s) ' J Ouvrir un dossier \C« C* Retun? wJhJStffrent File £\}'Retoutneravec!e dossieractuel »*'* Check Records Verifier les dossiers < s . S\JB^CX-SUJET REMARKS (Use same A-§4or Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (SiI'espace le permet, ripondre sur cette formule) CD cT: CM 9 CM 6 M in IK 10 !f^faie d agenda ____ P.A. -AC. Meeting Date - Date de reunion Date lnit.//V° .000102 �. RCMP GRC . Classification FICHE DE SERVICE TRANSIT SLIP BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier 1 • HANDWRITE - ECRiREA LA MAIN FROM - DE TO-A _ S Comments Commentaires Action Donner suite Prepare Brief Priparer un exposi Return with Current File Retourner avec le dossier actuei Perusal and P.A. Lire et classer Prepare Reply Rediger une reponse Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier Check Records Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT SrfJtr ~7. REMARKS (UstZame A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (SiI'espace le permet, repordre sur/fetie lormule, fay-. 'a :^<24 W£^ 7 TfrtlL s. * c 5 CT) 9 CN d s 2 § s in 4 Diary Date - Date d'agenda I Meeting Date - Dare de reunion Date lnit./W° ,000103 �RCMP GRC TRANSIT SUP Classification FICHE DE SERVICE BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRiRE A LA MAIN FROM - DE TO- A Comments Commentaires Action Donner suite I I Perusal and P.A. Lire et ciasser Prepare Reply R6diger une reponse I | | Prepare Brief | Priparer un exposi Return with Current File Retourner avec le dossier acttie! "1 Make File(s) | Ouvrir un dossier Check Records Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARDUES ISiI'espace !e permet, repordre surfptte formule) ■_____ ....................................... I __ ___________ 5 0^1 . 7) O 3 co in £ 1 in < P.A. -A.C. Diary Date - Date d'agenda Meeting Date - Date de reunion Date Init.//V° 000104 �RCMPGRC REQUEST FOR PHOTOCOPIES DEMANDE DE PHOTOCOPIES REQUESTED BY (PRINT NAME)/ DEMANDEUR (NOM EN LETTRES MOULEES) nA0 i\Jo^ PfiM N«ZN" DE PlJcE _____ TITJJ OF DOCUMENT OR RILE N« QP^tEPORT/TITRE DU DOCUMENTT OU OU2/ -------------------------------------------DE DOSSIER DU RAPPORT ^7 J .... Sf * t DATE OF DOCUMENT/REPORT DAW OU DOCUMENT/RAPPORT ............... — • // J « < >7/ V / x-7'' ! r N* OF COPIES/NBR€ DE COPIES >r ' CLASSIFICATION i’ll ^-CONFIDENTIAL 'I I CONFIDENTS L TOP SECRET ' TRES SECRET SECRET SECRET RESTRICTED DIFFUSION RESTREINTE UNCLASSIFIE NON A aou\irect\es "■ ■ ■ REQUIREMENTS OR INSTRUQJIOIMS/EXIGENCES^ v DUOEMANDEUR COPIER IECEI copXsj (ECZ / 5^ ’ 0* D (INITIALS) (INITIALES) c. BRANl SOUS-DIRECTION P.A. N»/N« A C. ("7^/ onoio5 �1 ■ ■> ' . K ■ v-* * •U ’ I . ' - x « . * • I* ♦ ! jUcIiVED^ 5 | f«0V24 ISBJ 1 PLACtfc ON FILE U ■ j ~ »m 0 ott-o. tf. z.'-' n• . RitKiiAi 'M'V ;.' CY r*. \ v)-. .- ,A - ■ * ' '• ' > V ’-\s \ k \ '*'* • -J V” * ‘s> z-s- v> <„ -^ • . s r__ 1 1 ■ r 1 , \ •• • . ■>■ - >> ■ \ 000106 �MRCMPGRC DEMANDE DE PHOTOCOPIES REQUEST FOR PHOTOCOPIES ROOM N"/N" DE PIECE REQUESTED BT (PRINT NAME >/OEMANDEUR ( NOM EN LETTRES MOULEES > /I/ TITLE OF DOCUMENT I/M .i^^-ZT2- N° N« OF OF REPORT/TITRE REPORT/TITRE DU OU DOCUMENT OU N* DE DOSSIER DU RAPPORT DATE OF DOCuTJeNT/REPORT DALE OU OOCUMENT/RAPPORT ...t.tt.t..-:.'....... t...:...... ................................... ................................................................................................ N* OF COPIES/ NBRE DE COPIES * I I TOP SECRET J TRES SECRET □ ' CLASSIFICATION SECRET CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTS L SECRET RESTRICTED DIFFUSION RESTREINTE UNCLASSIFIED, —-'LL\fQ NON CLASSJElE-^’x/\ „ ’ \ A —— REQUIREMENTS OR INSTRUCTIONS/.E-XIGENCES OU DIRECTIVES \__________ ................ \... El...ES _________________________ (Signature> / signature REQU, /.Qi'. I (81/08) > du oemandeur COPIES Rl COPIE SX IVEO (INITIALS) )E^?INITlALES> =s=- BRANCH/SOUS-OIRECTIOH P. A. N’/N« A.C <467 ,000107 �• ’• A' T X?-,. >. . r ■X A i 5 K;? I riniAt . tr.D J A. ~ 4 c V - .^O’- -■^ > jv- <'“x X ’ V '• '•<' ?x ? r •< x • ’ % x-\.' \ ' x“ > ■ 'u> '•.'■'xj■' ■■>. Vx ■ V ■" 000108 �ANNEX THREAT TO CANADA Revised November 21, 1983 000109 �Threat to Canada The purpose of this Annex is to (a) provide a current threat assessment and description of measures being taken concerning high profile international events and visits, in particular the Papal Visit, the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games and the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics; and (b) to update the assessed threat posed by the groups and states described in the Background Paper. High Profile International Events/Visits Internationl events that by their nature attract world-wide attention through the media, present an opportunity for groups and individuals to exploit them to gain publicity for their cause by peaceful or violent conduct. A dramatic example was the 1972 Munich Olympic As a consequence, governments have devoted J Massacre. I major resources to prevent similar recurrences. The measures necessary to deter terrorists, to protect participants and facilities, and still accommodate the media and public assess require detailed planning and coordination, both nationally and internationally. There is at this time no identifiable specific threat to the Papal Visit or either the Lost Angeles or Calgary Olympics. However, a number of groups have the motivation and capability to seize the opportunity to mount an attack to exploit the assured media coverage. The comprehensive and extensive security arrangements required for special events entails precise and detailed planning and cooperation both nationally and internationally. i The extraordinary effort and resources which were committed to previous events such as the Montreal Olympics and the Ottawa Economic Summit are being similarity applied to the Papal Visit. 000110 �SECRET 2 The Papal Visit will be a monumental event unparalleled by any previous experience faced by Canadian There have been security and protective authorities. several previous attempts and numerous threats to the Pope's life; emphasizing the need for precise and detailed planning and cooperation. As the visit will include major events in eight provinces, the overlapping jurisdictions require the sharing of security functions in terms of federal, provincial and municipal responsibilities. Security accounts for half of the $14 million budget allocated to the Canadian Government Papal Visit Task Force. The 1984 Los Angeles Olympic will place increased importance and demands on existing consultations and security intelligence exchange arrangements with the USA. Canadian experience resulting from the Montreal Olympics has been shared with the USA authorities. There has been a variety of exchanges on mutual concerns and interests, in particular the detection of terrorists and arms entering Canada en route to the USA. The increased demands and pressures generated by this event occuring outside of Canada will have to be accommodated within existing counter-terrorist resources and capabilities. The 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics will have fewer participants and a lower international profile than the Montreal or Los Angeles Olympics. Normal capabilities will require to be augumented to plan or implement an appropriate security program involving all levels of government and drawing on international relationships. Groups and States that are of present Security Concern The groups that have the capability to commit terrorist acts pose an ongoing threat of varying degrees requiring differing levels of countermeasures within 000111 �SECRET 3 Canada and abroad, including protection to diplomatic and consular missions and personnel. Missions in Canada of sixteen countries are receiving extraordinary protection. The overall threat is assessed to remain at least at it present level for the forseeable future and protective budgets have been increased. Armenian Terror ism The threat to all Turkish interests remains at a high level world-wide. So far in 1983, Armenian terrorists have claimed responsibility for over 40 incidents including the assassination of two Turkish diplomats. There is a continuing threat from Armenian Terrorist groups against all countries having members in jail or before the courts: specifically France, the USA, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland and Canada. The threat the French interests have been compounded by reports of Iranian support for ASALA. The principal threat to Canadian interests abroad continues to come from ASALA in light of the three trials which are of particular relevance to Canada, namely the conviction in August 1983 of the three ASALA members for the attempted bombing of the Air Canada cargo terminal in Los Angeles and the trials related to extortion and fraud charges pending in Toronto. Consequences have included ?! bomb threats directed to Air Canada in San Francisco and . I suspected ASALA threats concerning our consular missions <i in Philadelphia and New York. Canadian Government determination to proceed against Armenian terrorism, despite the consequences, was demonstrated by the offer of a reward of $100,000 in connection with the attacks I against two Turkish diplomats in Ottawa. 000112 �SECRET 4 Palestinian Resistance Movement There continues to be a threat to Israeli, USA, and moderate Arab establishments in Canada from radical elements outside the main stream of the Palestinian Resistance Movement. Current fighting between Palestinian factions and Syrian involvement has raised concern that some elements might resume terrorist activities outside the Middle East. In the past, Palestinian related terrorism has been concentrated in Western European countr ies. Events in Lebanon have also created tension among Arab ethnic communities with Canada. Irish Issue To date there have been no acts of violence in Canada linked to Irish factions; however, there have been illegal activities in support of them. There is the potential for attacks in British targets, particularly during high level visits or events. Latin American Support Groups The activities in Canada of groups supporting the overthrow of those existing regimes in Central and South America are expected to remain non-violent. J •I A direct American intervention in the area could prompt individuals to retaliate against USA interests and Canada. 000113 �SECRET 5 An t i-Castro Cuban Exiles Although there is no identifiable support within Canada for anti-Castro Cuban exile terrorist organizations based in the USA, these groups have carried out terrorists actions against the Cuban missions in Canada and continue to pose a threat against Soviet interests. Khalistan Movement The Khalistan Movement for an independent state in the Punjabis actively supported by some members of the Sikh community Canada. Activities within Canada have been confined to demonstrations but there is the potential for J ! violence against Indian diplomatic representatives if conditions within India deteriorate. Yugoslav Terrorism There is a continuing threat against Yugoslave establishments in Canada from Croatian and Serbian extremists and developments in Yugoslavia could increase this threat. The policies of the Yugoslav Government and its counter activities within the Croatian and Serbian communities in Canada will continue to create a security problem within Canada and affect relations between Canada and Yugoslavia. State Terrorism Certain states are know to support and direct terrorist activities in pursuit of specific national objectives, including the elimination of political opponents in other countries. The growth of state-supported terrorism has been dramatically brought to world attention 000114 �SECRET 6 These recent incidents have heightened the concern that other states previously known to employ terrorist tactics, may escalade their activities and be imitated by other states who perceive state supported terrorism as an effective instrument to further policy objectives. The implications for Canada in terms of state-sponsored incidents occurring in Canada will continue to require attention. There is also the political implication of what can be done to discourage and eliminate these criminal acts in violation of international law and practice. Emerging Security Concerns Because of increasing public awareness emerging issues (e.g. nuclear disarmament, women's rights, and ecology), the likelihood that extremist adherents to the "direct action" concept will conduct further terrorist activities to attract attention and publicity to these issues is a concern to both the security and law enforcement authorities. The term "direct action" is a concept and a activity as compared to an organization. it has frequently been used in anarchist writings calling for direct or positive action to resolve a perceived grievance which continues to exist public concern. There is no indication that "Direct Action" in Canada is a structured organization. 000115 •* �I SECRET 7 I The first time that the term "Direct Action" we associated with terrorist activity in Canada was in May 1982, when "Direct Action" appeared in the communique claiming responsibility for the bombing of British Columbia hydro sub-station valued at $45 million as a means of environmental protest. The name was again applied in the communique claiming responsibility for the October 1982 bombing of Litton Systems (Canada) in Toronto, resulting in injuries to three policemen and four security gards and $5 million in property damage. The communique condemned the Litton's involvement in the production of guidance systems for the cruise missile. axso oenevea to oe the "Wimmins Fire Brigade" that claimed responsibility for the firebombing of three video stores in B.C. as a protest against pornography. I Five British Columbian residents are at present on trial for charges relating to these incidents and are in custody. Similar link-minded groupes of individuals have been identified in Ontario and Quebec. i In Quebec during April and May 1983, 'individuals' identifying themselves with "Action directe" "Groupe action directe" and "Friction directe" claimed responsibility for a series of bombing attacks. The targets included the Black Watch Armoury and a Petro-Canada facility in Montreal resulting in only minor property damage and no personal injuries. 000116 I �8 SECRET Conclusion The seriousness of the threat to Canada will be directly affected by international trends and developments and by the counter-measures which are employed to combat the problem. There is no doubt the potential for attacks within Canada will increase if we are viewed by terrorists as lacking the resolve to counter such threats. I 000117 �p.. SECRET RELATING TO CABINET DOCUMENT 359-83MC THREAT TO CANADA ! November 21, 1983 ! 000118 �SECRET Threat to Canada The purpose of this Annex is to (a) provide a current threat assessment and description of measures being taken concerning high profile international events and visits, in particular the Papal Visit, the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games and the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics; and (b) to update the assessed threat posed by the groups and states described in the Background Paper. High Profile International Events/Visits International events that by their nature attract world-wide attention through the media, present an opportunity for groups and individuals to exploit them to gain publicity for their cause by peaceful or violent conduct. A dramatic example was the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre. As a consequence, governments have devoted major resources to prevent similar recurrences. The comprehensive and extensive security arrangements required for special events in order to deter terrorists and other criminals, to protect participants and facilities, and still accommodate the media and public reasonable access require detailed planning and coodination, both nationally and internationally. The extraordinary effort and resources which were committed to previous events such as the Montreal Olympics and the Ottawa Economic Summit are being similarily applied to the Papal Visit. There is at this time no identifiable specific threat to the Papal Visit or either the Los Angeles or Calgary Olympics. - However, a number of groups have the motivation and capability to seize the opportunity to mount an attack to exploit the assured media coverage. The Papal Visit will be a monumental event unparalleled by any previous experience faced by Canadian security and protective authorities. There have been several attempts and numerous threats to the Pope's life emphasizing the need for precise and detailed planning and cooperation. As the visit will include major events in eight provinces, the overlapping jurisdictions require the sharing of security functions in terms of federal, provincial and municipal responsibilities. Security accounts for half of the $14 million budget allocated to the Canadian Government Papal Visit Task Force. ■ The 1984 Los Angeles Olympic will place increased importance and demands on existing consultations and security intelligence exchange arrangements with the USA. Canadian experience resulting from the Montreal Olympics has been shared with the USA authorities. There has been a variety of exchanges on mutual concerns and interests, in particular the detection of terrorists and arms entering Canada en route to the USA. The increased demands and pressures generated by this event occurring outside of Canada will have to be accommodated within existing counter-terrorist resources and capabilities. f ■ The 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics will have fewer participants and a lower international profile than the Montreal or Los Angeles Olympics. Normal capabilities will have to be augmented for this event to plan and implement an appropriate security program involving all levels of government and drawing on international relationships. 000119 �I 2 SECRET Groups and States That Are of Present Security Concern • The groups that have the capability to commit terrorist acts pose an ongoing threat of varying degrees requiring differing levels of countermeasures within Canada and abroad, including protection to diplomatic and consular missions and personnel. Missions in Canada of sixteen countries are receiving extraordinary protection. The overall assessed threat will remain at least at its present level for the forseeable future and protective budgets have been increased. Armenian Terrorism The threat to all Turkish interests remains at a high level world-wide. So far in 1983, Armenian terrorists have claimed responsibility for over 40 incidents including the assassination of two Turkish diplomats. There is a continuing threat from Armenian terrorist groups against all countries having members in jail or before the courts: specifically France, the USA, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland and Canada. The threat pose to French interests has been compounded by reports of Iranian support for the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). The principal threat to Canadian interests abroad continues to come from ASALA and relate to trials which are of particular relevance to Canada, namely the conviction in August 1983 of the three ASALA members for the attempted bombing of the Air Canada cargo terminal in Los Angeles and the trials related to extortion and fraud charges pending in Toronto. Consequences have included bomb threats directed to Air Canada in San Francisco and suspected ASALA threats concerning the Canadian consular missions in Philadelphia and New York. Canadian Government determination to proceed against Armenian terrorism, despite the consequences, was demonstrated by the offer of a reward of $100,000 for information on person(s) responsible for the attacks against two Turkish diplomats in Ottawa. Palestinian Terrorism There continues to be a threat to Israeli, USA, and moderate Arab establishments in Canada from radical elements outside the main stream of the Palestinian resistance movement. Current fighting between Palestinian factions and Syrian involvement has raised concern that some elements within the Palestinian resistance movement might resume terrorist activities outside the Middle East. ' In the past, Palestinian related terrorism has been concentrated in Western European countries. Events in Lebanon have also created tension among Arab ethnic communities within Canada. Irish Issue To date there have been no acts of violence in Canada linked to Irish factions. There have been, however, illegal activities in support of them. There is the potential for attacks against British targets, particularly during high level visits or events. Latin American Support Groups The activities in Canada of groups supporting the overthrow of those existing regimes in Central and South America are expected to remain non-violent. A direct i\ 000120 �3 SECRET Anti-Castro Cuban Exiles i Although there is no identifiable support within Canada for anti-Castro Cuban exile terrorist organizations based in the USA, these groups have carried out terrorist actions against the Cuban missions in Canada and continue to pose a threat against Cuban and Soviet interests. Khalistan Movement The Khalistan Movement for an independent state in the Punjab is actively supported by some members of the Sikh community in Canada. Activities within Canada have been confined to demonstrations but there is the potential for violence against Indian diplomatic representatives which is likely to increase if conditions within India deteriorate. - Yugoslav Terrorism There is a continuing threat against Yugoslav establishments in Canada from Croatian and Serbian extremists and developments in Yugoslavia could increase this threat. The policies of the Yugoslav Government and its counter activities within the Croatian and Serbian communities in Canada will continue to create a security problem within Canada and affect relations between Canada and Yugoslavia. State Terrorism Certain states are known to support and direct terrorist activities in pursuit of specific national objectives, including the elimination of political opponents in other countries. The growth of state-supported terrorism has been dramatically brought to world attention by recent incidents I These recent incidents have heightened the concern that other states previously known to employ terrorist tactics, may escalade their activities and oe imicacea oy ocner states who perceive state supported terrorism as an effective instrument to further policy objectives. The implications for Canada in terms of state-sponsored incidents occurring in Canada will ! i 000121 �.1 I 4 SECRET continue to require attention. There is also the political implication of what can be done to discourage and eliminate these criminal acts which violate international law and practice. I Emerging Security Concerns Because of increasing public awareness of emerging issues (e.g. nuclear disarmament, women's rights, and ecology), the likelihood that extremist adherents to the "direct action" concept will conduct further terrorist activities to attract attention and publicity to these issues is a concern to both the security and law enforcement authorities. i The term "direct action" is a concept and a activity as compared to an organization. It has frequently been used in anarchist writings calling for direct or positive action to resolve a perceived grievance. There is no indication that "Direct Action" in Canada is a structured organization. il The first time that the term "Direct Action" was associated with terrorist activity in Canada was in May 1982, when "Direct Action" appeared in the communique claiming responsibility for the bombing of a British Columbia hydro sub-station valued at $45 million as a means of environmental protest. The name was again applied in the communique claiming responsibility for the October 1982 bombing of Litton Systems (Canada) in Toronto, resulting in injuries to three policemen and four security guards and $5 million in property damage. The communique condemned Litton's involvement in the production of guidance systems for the cruise missile. ! the "Wimmins Fire Brigade" that claimed responsibility for the firebombing of three video stores'in B.C. as a protest against pornography. Five British Columbian residents known as the "Squamish Five" (or "Vancouver Five", or "Oakalla Five") are at present on trial for charges relating to these incidents as well as for conspiracy to use explosives to damage the icebreaker Terry Fox and to commit acts of sabotage against aircraft equipment and fuel tanks of the Canadian Forces Base at Cold Lake, Alberta. Thy are also under indictment for unlawful possession of restricted weapons and for a number of other offences such as theft of explosives, equipment and vehicles. Similar like-minded groups of individuals have been identified in Ontario and Quebec. One of these individuals is Ken Deyarmond who is accused of attempting to assault Prime Minister Thatcher in Toronto on September 27, 1983. i In Quebec during April and May 1983, individuals identifying themselves with "Action directs", "Groupe action'directs" and "Friction directe" claimed responsibility for a series of bombing attacks, The targets included the Black Watch Armoury and a Petro-Canada facility in Montreal resulting in only minor property damage and no personal injuries. 000122 �- 5 SECRET Conclusion : The seriousness of the threat to Canada will be directly affected by: international trends and developments spilling over into Canada and impacting on our interests abroad; domestic groups and individuals resorting to "direct action"; and, the counter-measures which are employed to combat these problems. There is no doubt that the potential for attacks within Canada and against Canadian interests abroad will increase if we are viewed by terrorists as lacking the resolve and capabilities to anticipate and counter the threat. i I i I I I 1 i i I • I 000123 �SECRET I RELATIF AU MEMOIRE AU CABINET 359-83MC I MENACE POUR LE CANADA - i le 21 novembre 1983 ! ■ i i 000124 �1 SECRET Menace pour le Canada La presente Annexe a pour objet a) d'evaluer 1'importance des menaces terroristes dans l'£tat actuel des choses et de decrire les mesures prises en prevision de visites et d'evenements internationaux importants, plus particulierement la visite du Pape, les Jeux olympiques de 1984 a Los Angeles et les Jeux d'hiver de 1988 a Calgary; et b) de fournir des renseignements a jour sur la menace que font peser les groupes et les Etats dont il est question dans le document d ' information. Visites et evenements internationaux importants : Les evenements internationaux qui, de par leur nature, attirent 1'attention de la communaute Internationale du fait de la couverture assuree par les medias sont des occasions dont cherchent a profiter des groupes et des particuliers pour defendre leur cause par des moyens pacifiques ou par la violence. Le massacre des Jeux olympiques de Munich en 1972 en est un triste exemple. C'est ce qui incite les gouvernements a consacrer des ressources importantes a cette question afin d'empecher que des actes pareils ne se reproduisent. Les vastes et multiples mesures de securite qui doivent etre prises dans le cadre d'evenements speciaux afin de decourager les terroristes et autres criminels, de proteger les participants et les installations et, tout de meme, de permettre au grand public et aux medias d'y prendre part, necessitent une planification et une coordination d'envergure, a 1'echelle tant nationale qu'internationale. Comme ce fut le cas pour les Jeux olympiques de Montreal et le Sommet £conomique d'Ottawa; des efforts extraordinaires sont deployes en vue de la visite du Pape, et des ressources considerables y sont affectees. En ce qui concerne la visite du Pape, les Jeux olympiques de Los Angeles et les Jeux d'hiver de Calgary, il n'e’xiste aucune menace precise pour 1'instant. Toutefois, il existe un certain nombre de groupes qui sont suffisamment motives et qui disposent des moyens necessaires pour profiter de ces occasions pour monter une attaque et faire parler d'eux dans les medias. I La visite du Pape constitue un evenement qui, par son envergure, est sans precedent pour les autorites canadiennes chargees de la securite et de la protection. La vie du Pape a ete plusieurs fois mise en peril, et c'est ce qui explique la necessity d'une planification et d'une collaboration precises et detaillees. Comme le Pape participera a des evenements importants dans huit provinces au cours de sa visite, il est capital que soient partagees les fonctions de s^curite:parmi les trois paliers de gouvernement, etant donne le chevauchement des competences. La moitie du budget de 14 millions de dollars alloue au Groupe de travail du gouvernement canadien pour la visite du Pape est consacr^e a la securite. Les Jeux olympiques de 1984 a Los Angeles accentueront 1'importance et 1'utilisation des mecanismes de consultations et d1^change de renseignements avec les Etats-Unis. Le Canada a partage avec les autorites americaines 1'experience acquise lors des Jeux olympiques de Montreal. Il y a eu divers ^changes sur des preoccupations et des interets mutuels, en particulier en matiere de detection des terroristes et des armes qui transitent par le Canada avant d'entrer aux Etats-Unis. Il faudra faire face aux pressions et aux exigences accrues 000125 �2 SECRET amen^es par cet 5venement, qui se deroulera a 1'extgrieur du Canada, et ce, avec les ressources et les capacites actuellement affectees a la lutte contre le terrorisme. , Quant aux Jeux d'hiver de 1988 a Calgary, le nombre de participants y sera moins eleve et l'£v£nement revetira, sur le plan international, moins d'importance que les Jeux olympiques de Montreal ou de Los Angeles. Il faudra en I'occurrence augmenter les capacites normales pour planifier ou mettre en oeuvre un programme de securite adequat interessant tous les paliers de gouvernement et faisant appel aux relations Internationales. Groupes et Etats qui constituent actuellement une menace sur le plan de securite i Les groupes qui sont en mesure de poser des actes terroristes font peser en permanence une menace dont 1'ampleur varie et exige en consequence la prise de contre-mesures diverses au Canada et a 1'etranger, notamment la protection des missions consulaires et diplomatiques et de leur personnel. Les missions de seize pays au Canada font I'objet d'une protection extraordinaire. La menace globale, telle qu'elle est actuellement evaluee, demeurera inchangee, du moins dans un avenir previsible, et les budgets alloues a la protection ont ete augmentes. Terroristes armeniens La menace qui pese sur tous les interets turcs demeure considerable dans le monde entier. Jusqu'S maintenant en 1983, les terroristes armeniens ont revendique la responsabilite de plus de 40 incidents, notamment 1'assassinat de deux diplomates turcs. Les groupes de terroristes armeniens sont une menace permanente pour tous les pays qui ont emprisonng un des leurs ou qui le traduisent devant les tribunaux, tout particulierement la France, les Etats-Unis, le Royaume-Uni, la Belgique, les Pays-Bas, le Portugal, la Suisse et le Canada. A la menace qui plane sur les interets fran?ais s'ajoute 1'appui qu'accorderait 1'Iran a 1'Armee secrete armenienne pour la liberation de 1'Armenie (ASALA). i Les principaux risques pour les interets du Canada a 1'etranger viennent de 1'ASALA et sont lies a des gvenements qui concernent plus particulierement le Canada, notamment la condamnation en aout 1983 de trois membres de 1’ASALA accuses d'avoir voulu faire sauter le terminal de marchandises d'Air Canada a Los Angeles, et les proces pour extorsion et fraude, actuellement en instance a Toronto. Il en a result^ des alertes a la bombe aux bureaux d'Air Canada a San Francisco, et des menaces dont on soup^onne 1'ASALA d'etre 1'auteur concernant les missions consulaires du Canada a Philadelphia et New York. Le Canada a montre qu'il etait determine a lutter contre le terrorisme armenien, en d£pit des consequences, en offrant une recompense de 100 000 dollars a quiconque lui fournirait des renseignements sur la ou les personnes responsables des attaques contre deux diplomates turcs a Ottawa. Terrorisme Palestinian 1 Les elements radicaux qui militent en marge du principal courant du mouvement de resistance 000126 �SECRET 3 palestinienne continuent de representer une menace pour les etablissements israeliens et americains ainsi que pour les ;etablissements d’Etats arabes moderes qui se trouvent en sol canadien. Les combats qui se poursuivent entre factions palestiniennes et le role joue par les Syriens laissent penser que certains elements de la resistance palestinienne pourraient reprendre 1'action terroriste en dehors du Moyen-Orient. Par le passe, les terroristes palestiniens s'en sont pris surtout aux pays d'Europe de 1'Quest. Par ailleurs, les evenements du Liban ont aussi cree des tensions au sein des communautes arabes du Canada. La question irlandaise : Jusqu'a present, les factions irlandaises n'auraient commis aucun acte de violence au Canada. Cependant, des actes iliegaux y ont ete perpetres par leurs partisans. Les attentats centre des cibles britanniques demeurent possibles, en particulier durant les visites de haut niveau ou la tenue d'evenements speciaux. Groupes de solidarite avec 1'Amerique latine ' Les activates en sol canadien de certains groupes qui militent en faveur du renversement des regimes en place en Amerique centrale et en Amerique du Sud devraient demeurer non violentes. Advenant une intervention directe des Americains dans la region, certaines personnes pourraient etre tentees d’exercer des represailles en s'attaquant aux interets americains au Canada. Exiles cubains anti-castristes ’ Bien qu'on ne reldve au Canada aucun signe d'appui 3 des organisations terroristes d'exiles cubains anti-castristes instaliees aux Etats-Unis, ces groupes ont mene des actions terroristes centre des missions cubaines au Canada, et ils continuent de faire peser une menace sur les interets cubains et sovietiques. ! ■ Mouvement khalistan Certains membres de la communaute sikh du Canada sont de fervents partisans du Mouvement khalistan pour la creation d'un Etat independent dans le Pendjab. Jusqu'ici, ils n'ont fait que participer a des manifestations, mais ils pourraient poser des gestes violents centre des diplom.ates indiens, Si la situation se dSt£riore en Inde, de tels gestes seront d'autant plus probables. 000127 �I SECRET 4 Terrorisme yougoslave Les extremistes creates et serbes font toujours planer une menace sur les etablissements yougoslaves au Canada, et involution de la situation en Yougoslavie pourrait accentuer cette menace. La politique du gouvernement yougoslave et ses interventions au sein des communautes serbe et create du Canada continueront a poser des problemes de securite, et a nuire aux relations entre le Canada et la Yougoslavie. Terrorisme d'Etat ! Nous savons que certains Etats soutiennent ou dirigent des actions terroristes dans le but d’atteindre des objectifs nationaux bien definis,, comme la suppression d'opposants politiques dans d'autres pays. Dernierement, 1'intensification du terrorisme d'Etat a ete illustree de fagon dramatique par plusieurs attentats, i attentats ont fait augmenter la crainte que d’autres Etats deja connus pour* recourir au terrorisme, pourraient accroitre leurs activites et etre imites par d'autres Etats qui pergoivent le terrorisme d'Etat comme un moyen efficace de poursuivre des objectifs politiques. A cet egard, le Canada devra continuer a faire preuve de vigilance. Il faudra aussi tenir compte des repercussions politiques que pourraient avoir les mesures que prendrait le Canada pour decourager et eliminer les actes criminels qui violent le droit et les pratiques internationales. ■ I Nouveaux problernes de securite Vu la plus grande sensibilisation du public 3 diverses nouvelles causes (desarmement nucleaire, egalite de la femme, ecologie, etc.), la possibilite que des extremistes, se reclamant de la notion d’"action directe", etendent leurs activites terroristes pour attirer 1'attention du public pr^occupe les instances chargees d'assurer la security et d'appliquer la loi. L'expression "action directe" renvoie davantage S une notion et S certaines activites, qu'a une organisation. Elie est frequemment utilisee dans les ouvrages d'anarchistes recommandant 1'action directe ou positive pour faire valoir de supposees revendications. Rien ne laisse croire qu'au Canada "Action directe" soit une organisation structure, C'est en mai 1982 que l'expression "action directe" a ete associee pour la premiere fois a ces activites terroristes au Canada. En effet, c'est a cette epoque qu'elle est apparue dans un communique emis par un groupe pour la protection de 000128 �SECRET 5 1'environnement revendiquant la responsabilite de 1'attentat a la bombe qui a cause des dommages evalues a $ 45 millions a une centrale hydro-electrique auxiliaire de la Colombie-Britannique. L'expression est reapparue dans un communique revendiquant la responsabilite de 1'attentat a la bombe perpetre en octobre 1982 centre la societe Litton Systems (Canada) de Toronto, attentat qui a cause des blessures a trois policiers et quatre agents de securite et occasionne des dommages de $ 5 millions. Le communique condamnait la participation de la societe Litton a la fabrication de systemes de guidage destines aux missiles de croisiere. "Wimmins Fire Brigade", qui a revendique la responsabilite des cocktails Molotov lances dans trois points de vente de bandes videos de la Colombie-Britannique, en guise de protestation centre la pornographie. Cinq residents de la Colombie-Britannique, connus sous le nom de "Squamish Five" (ou "Vancouver Five" ou "Oakalla Five"), font actuellement I'objet de poursuites relativement a ces incidents. Ils sont ^galement accuses d'avoir completer pour utiliser des explosifs dans le but d'endommager le brise-glaces "Terry Fox" et pour commettre des actes de sabotage centre des aeronefs et des reservoirs de carburant a la Base des Forces canadiennes de Cold Lake, en Alberta. Ces cinq personnes sont en outre accusees de possession illegale d'armes a usage controle, ainsi que d'un certain nombre d'autres'delits, dont le vol d'explosifs, d'equipement et de vehicules. Des groupes d'individus de meme opinion ont ete identifies en Ontario et au Quebec. L'un de ces individus est Ken Deyarmond, qui, a la suitedd'un incident survenu a Toronto le 27 septembre 1983, est accusS de tentative de voie de fait a 1'endroit du Premier ministre Thatcher. En avril et mai 1983, au Quebec, des individus s' identifiant a des groupes appeles "Action directe", "Groupe action directe" et "Friction directe" ont revendique la responsabilite d'une serie d'attentats 1 la bombe. Ces attentats, qui ont vise notamment les quartiers du Regiment Black Watch et une des installations de Petro-Canada a Montreal, n'ont cause que des dommages mineurs et personne n'a ete bless£. Conclusion La gravite de la menace pour le Canada est directement fonction de trois facteurs: les tendances 000129 �I; I I ■ SECRET 6 de la situation Internationale et les evenements qui, a ce chapitre, ont des repercussions au Canada et sur nos interets a I'etranger; les groupes et individus ayant recours a 1'"action directe"; et les contre-mesures prises pour combattre le probleme. Il n'y a aucun doute que les possibilities d'attentats au Canada et contre ses interets a I'etranger s'accroitront si, aux yeux des terroristes, le Canada ne manifesto pas la determination de prevoir et de contrer leurs menaces et ne dispose pas des moyens de le faire. 000130 �/ . SECRET RELATIF AU MEMOIRE AU CABINET 359-83MC MENACE POUR LE CANADA ! le 21 novembre 1983 000131 �SECRET Menace pour le Canada La presente Annexe a pour objet a) d'evaluer 1'importance des menaces terroristes dans 1'etat actuel des choses et de decrire les mesures prises en provision de visites et d'Svenements internationaux importants, plus particuliSrement la visite du Pape, les Jeux olympiques de 1984 a Los Angeles et les Jeux d'hiver de 1988 a Calgary; et b) de fournir des renseignements a jour sur la menace que font peser les groupes et les Etats dont il est question dans le document ;d'information. Visites et evenements internationaux importants : Les evenements internationaux qui, de par leur nature, attirent l'attention de la communaute Internationale du fait de la couverture assuree par les medias sont des occasions dont cherchent 3 profiter des groupes et des particuliers pour defendre leur cause par des moyens pacifiques ou par la violence. Le massacre -des Jeux olympiques de Munich en 1972 en est un triste exemple. C'est ce qui incite les gouvernements 3 consacrer des ressources importantes a cette question afin d'empecher que des actes pareils ne se reproduisent. Les vastes et multiples mesures de securite qui doivent etre prises dans le cadre d’evenements speciaux afin de decourager les terroristes et autres criminels, de proteger les participants et les installations et, tout de meme, de permettre au grand public et aux medias d'y prendre part, necessitent une planification et une coordination d'envergure, a 1'echelle tant nationale qu'internationale. Comme ce fut le cas pour les Jeux olympiques de Montreal et le Sommet 4conomique d'Ottawa, des efforts extraordinaires sont deployes en vue de la visite du Pape, et des ressources considerables y sont affectees. ; En ce qui concerne la visite du Pape, les Jeux olympiques de Los Angeles et les Jeux d'hiver de Calgary, il n'existe aucune menace precise pour 1'instant. Toutefois, il existe un certain nombre de groupes qui sont suffisamment motives et qui disposent des moyens necessaires pour profiter de ces occasions pour monter une attaque et faire parler d'eux dans les medias. La visite du Pape constitue un evenement qui, par son envergure, est sans precedent pour les autorites canadiennes chargees de la securite et de la protection. La vie du Pape a ete plusieurs fois mise en peril, et c'est ce qui explique la necessite d'une planification et d’une collaboration precises et detaillees. Comme le Pape participera a des evenements importants dans huit provinces au cours de sa visite, il est capital que soient partagees les fonctions de securite parmi les trois paliers de gouvernement, etant donne le chevauchement des competences. La moitie du budget de 14 millions de dollars alloue au Groupe de travail du gouvernement canadien pour la visite du Pape est consacr^e 3 la s£curit£. ; Les Jeux olympiques de 1984 a Los Angeles accentueront 1'importance et 1'utilisation des mScanismes de consultations et d'echange de renseignements avec les Etats-Unis. Le Canada a partage avec les autorites americaines 1'experience acquise lors des Jeux olympiques de Montreal. Il y a eu divers ^changes sur des preoccupations et des int£r£ts mutuels, en particulier en matidre de detection des terroristes et des armes qui transitent par le Canada avant d'entrer aux Etats-Unis. Il faudra faire face aux pressions et aux exigences accrues 000132 �2 SECRET amenees par cet evenement, qui se deroulera a I'extSrieur du Canada, et ce, avec les ressources et les capacites actuellement affectees a la lutte contre le terrorisme. i 1 Quant aux Jeux d'hiver de 1988 a Calgary, le nombre de participants y sera moins eleve et 1'evenement revetira, sur le plan international, moins d'importance que les Jeux olympiques de Montreal ou de Los Angeles. Il faudra en I'occurrence augmenter les capacites normales pour planifier ou mettre en oeuvre un programme de securite adequat interessant tous les paliers de gouvernement et faisant appel aux relations internationales. Groupes et Etats qui constituent actuellement une menace sur le plan de securite ! Les groupes qui sont en mesure de poser des actes terroristes font peser en permanence une menace dont 1'ampleur varie et exige en consequence la prise de contre-mesures diverses au Canada et a I’etranger, notamment la protection des missions consulaires et diplomatiques et de leur personnel. Les missions de seize pays au Canada font 1'objet d'une protection extraordinaire. La menace globale, telle qu'elle est actuellement evaluee, demeurera inchangee, du moins dans un avenir previsible, et les budgets alloues a la protection ont §te augmentes. Terroristes armeniens * , La menace qui pese sur tous les interets turcs demeure considerable dans le monde entier. Jusqu'a maintenant en 1983, les terroristes armeniens . ont revendique la responsabilite de plus de 40 incidents, notamment 1'assassinat de deux diplomates turcs. Les groupes de terroristes armeniens sont une menace permanente pour tous les pays qui ont emprisonn£ un des leurs ou qui le traduisent devant les tribunaux, tout particulierement la France, les Etats-Unis, le Royaume-Uni, la Belgique, les Pays-Bas, le Portugal, la Suisse et le Canada. A la menace qui plane sur les interets frangais s'ajoute 1'appui qu'accorderait 1'Iran a 1'Armee secrete armenienne pour la liberation de 1'Armenie (ASALA). ' Les principaux risques pour les interets du Canada a I’etranger viennent de I'ASALA et sont lies a des evenements qui concernent plus particulierement le Canada, notamment la condamnation en aout 1983 de trois membres de I'ASALA accuses d'avoir voulu faire sauter le terminal de merchandises d'Air Canada a Los Angeles, et les proces pour extorsion et fraude, actuellement en instance a Toronto. Il en a result^ des alertes a la bombe aux bureaux d'Air Canada a San Francisco, et des menaces dont on soupgonne I'ASALA d'etre 1'auteur concernant les missions consulaires du Canada a Philadelphie et New York. Le Canada a montre qu'il etait determine a lutter contre le terrorisme armenien, en depit des consequences, en offrant une recompense de 100 000 ■dollars a quiconque lui fournirait des renseignements sur la ou les personnes responsables des attaques contre deux diplomates turcs a Ottawa. Terrorisme palestinien i Les elements radicaux qui militent en marge du principal courant du mouvement de resistance i 000133 �SECRET 3 palestinienne continuent de representer une menace pour les Stablissements israeliens et americains ainsi que pour les .etablissements d'Etats arabes moderns qui se trouvent en sol canadien. Les combats qui se poursuivent entre factions palestiniennes et le role jou§ par les Syriens laissent penser que certains Elements de la resistance palestinienne pourraient reprendre 1'action terroriste en dehors du Moyen-Orient. Par le passe, les terroristes palestiniens s'en sont pris surtout aux pays d'Europe de 1'Quest. Par ailleurs, les evenements du Liban ont aussi cree des tensions au sein des communautes arabes du Canada. La question irlandaise ' Jusqu'a present, les factions irlandaises n'auraient commis aucun acte de violence au Canada. Cependant, des actes illegaux y ont ete perpetres par leurs partisans. Les attentats centre des cibles britanniques demeurent possibles, en particulier durant les visites de haut niveau ou la tenue d'evenements speciaux. Groupes de solidarity avec 1'Amerique 1atine Les activites en sol canadien de certains groupes qui militent en faveur du renversement des regimes en place en Amerique centrale et en Amerique du Sud devraient demeurer non violentes. Advenant une intervention directe des Americains dans la region, certaines personnes pourraient etre tentees d'exercer des represailles en s'attaquant aux interets americains au Canada. 1 Exiles cubains anti-castristes i Bien qu'on ne releve au Canada aucun signe d'appui a des organisations terroristes d'exiles cubains anti-castristes instaliees aux Etats-Unis, ces groupes ont mene des actions terroristes contre des missions cubaines au Canada, et ils continuent de faire peser une menace sur les interets cubains et sovietiques. Mouvement khalistan I i Certains membres de la communaute sikh du Canada sont de fervents partisans du Mouvement khalistan pour la creation d'un Etat independant dans le Pendjab, Jusqu’ici, ils n'ont fait que participer a des manifestations, mais ils pourraient poser des gestes violents centre des diplomates indiens. Si la situation se deteriore en Inde, de tels gestes seront d'autant plus probables. 000134 �SECRET 4 - Terrorisme yougoslave ! Les extrymistes creates et serbes font toujours planer une menace sur les etablissements yougoslaves au Canada, et 1'evolution de la situation en Yougoslavie pourrait accentuer cette menace. La politique du gouvernement yougoslave et ses interventions au sein des communautes serbe et croate du Canada continueront a poser des problemes de security, et a nuire aux relations entre le Canada et la Yougoslavie. Terrorisms d'Etat I Nous savons que certains Etats soutiennent ou dirigent des actions terroristes dans le but d'atteindre des objectifs nationaux bien definis, comme la suppression d'opposants politiques dans d'autres pays. DerniSrement, 1'intensification du terrorisme d'Etat a ete illustree de fagon dramatique par plusieurs attentats, Ces derniers attentats ont tait augmenter la crainte que d'autres Etats deja connus pour* recourir au terrorisme, pourraient accroitre leurs activites et etre imites par d'autres Etats qui pergoivent le terrorisme d'Etat comme un moyen efficace de poursuivre des objectifs politiques. A cet egard, le Canada devra continuer a faire preuve de vigilance. Il faudra aussi tenir compte des repercussions politiques que pourraient avoir les mesures que prendrait le Canada pour dycourager et eliminer les actes criminels qui violent le droit et les pratiques internationales. Nouveaux problemes de securite I • Vu la plus grande sensibilisation du public a diverses nouvelles causes (desarmement nuciyaire, egality de la femme, ecologie, etc.), la possibility que des extremistes, se reclamant de la notion d'"action directe", etendent leurs activites terroristes pour attirer 1'attention du public pr£occupe les instances chargees d'assurer la security et d'appliquer la loi. L'expression "action directe" renvoie davantage a une notion et M certaines activites, qu'a une organisation. Elie est frequemment utilises dans les ouvrages d’anarchistes recommandant 1'action directe ou positive pour faire valoir de supposees revendications. Rien ne laisse croire qu'au Canada "Action directe" soit une organisation structures. i C'est en mai 1982 que l’expression "action directe" a yte associ£e pour la premiere fois a ces activites terroristes au Canada. En effet, c'est a cette epoque qu'elle est apparue dans un communique £mis par un groups pour la protection de 000135 J �SECRET 5 1'environnement revendiquant la responsabilite de 1’attentat a la bombe qui a cause des dommages eva'lues a $ 45 millions a une centrale hydro-electrique auxiliaire de la Colombie-Britannique. L’expression est reapparue dans un communique revendiquant la responsabilite de 1'attentat a la bombe perpetre en octobre 1982 contre la soci6t£ Litton Systems (Canada) de Toronto, attentat qui a cause des blessures a trois policiers et quatre agents de securite et occasionne des dommages de $ 5 millions. Le communique condamnait la participation de la societe Litton a la fabrication de systSmes de quidaqe destines aux missiles de croisiere. •■wimmins tire brigade", qui a revendique la responsabilite des cocktails Molotov lances dans trois points de vente de bandes videos de la Colombie-Britannique, en guise de protestation contre la pornographie. Cinq residents de la Colombie-Britannique, connus sous le nom de "Squamish Five" (ou "Vancouver Five" ou "Oakalla Five"), font actuellement I'objet de poursuites relativement a ces incidents. Ils sont Sgalement accuses d'avoir comploter pour utiliser des explosifs dans le but d'endommager le brise-glaces "Terry Fox" et pour commettre des actes de sabotage contre des aeronefs1et des reservoirs de carburant a la Base des Forces canadiennes de Cold Lake, en Alberta. Ces cinq personnes sont en outre accusees de possession illegale d'armes a usage controle, ainsi que d'un certain nombre d'autres delits, dont le vol d'explosifs, d'equipement et de vehicules. Des groupes d'individus de meme opinion ont ete identifies en Ontario et au Quebec. L'un de ces individus est Ken Deyarmond, qui, M la suite d'un incident survenu a Toronto le 27 septembre 1983, est accuse de tentative de voie de fait a 1'endroit du Premier ministre Thatcher. i | En avril et mai 1983, au Quebec, des individus s'identifiant a des groupes appeles "Action directe", "Groupe action directe" et "Friction directe" ont revendique la responsabilite d'une serie d'attentats a la bombe. Ces attentats, qui ont vise notamment les quartiers du Regiment Black Watch et une des installations de P£tro-Canada a Montreal, n'ont caus£ que des dommages mineurs et personne n'a ete blessg. I Conclusion ! La gravite de la menace pour le Canada est directement fonction de trois facteurs: les tendances 000136 �<■ 6 SECRET de la situation Internationale et les evenements qui, 5 ce chapitre, ont des repercussions au Canada et sur nos interets a I'etranger; les groupes et individus ayant recours a 1'"action directe"; et les contre-mesures prises pour combattre le probleme. Il n'y a aucun doute que les possibilites d'attentats au Canada et contre ses interets a I'etranger s'accroitront si, aux yeux des terroristes, le Canada ne manifesto pas la determination de prSvoir et de contrer leurs menaces et ne dispose pas des moyens de le faire. ! 000137 �RCMPGRC REQUEST FOR PHOTOCOPIES DEMANDE DE PHOTOCOPIES DATE REQUESTED BY (PRINT NAME)/ DEMANDEUR(NOM EN LETTRES MOULEES) ROOM N*/N* DE Piles TITLE OF DOCUMENT ORFILE N’ OF REPORT/TlTtfE DU DOCUMENT OU N» DE DOSSIER DU RAPPORT DATE OF DOCUMENT/REPORT DATE DU DOCUMENT/RAPPORT V'J'/Z-ZO N* OF COPIES/NBRE DE COPIES j CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET TRES SECRET SECRET SECRET RESTRICTED DIFFUSION RESTREINTE UNCLASSIFIED, NON CLASSIFIE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIEL RevTewEd REQUIREMENTS OR INSTRUCTIONS/EXIGENCES t i ou direMfiv^s IS84 .... SECURITy... ........ - • •' :• V f. . • I' REQUESTED BY (SIGNATURE) / SIGNATURE OU DEMANDEUR COPIES RECEIVED (INITIALS) COPIES REpUES (INITIATES) BRANCH/SOUS-OIRECTION P.A.N»/N« A.C. ^^6 SSF 283 (81/08 > ■000138 �• 'J ■ ” 5 RECEIVED i i i KCC ‘ 2:cnu« -x ?? ’•.£ MAR 2-1994 >..*■ -PLACED ON'JI’-E ?■ 't 1 l! I'INITIAl w«. DATt IKt. Bt. H E A i E /. i « •li l 000139 �4 Government ofCanada Gouvernement du Canada J’ File No. — Dossier N‘ To - 7^ From — De Date o /J 'O j Tel No. - N° de tei [—| Please call I I Pn^re d appeier Returned your call Vous a rappeie I—I Will call again I—I vous rappeiiera Date JI____ |—11 Action I | Donner suite ’ Time — Heure I i—| Approval I I Approbation I Comments I Commentates | I I Draft reply I Projet de reponse I I As requested I—I Comme demand^ | | Signature I I ... FICHE DE SERVICE ACTION QUEST 7540-21-868-3907 ’ Ext. — Poste ( I Wants to see you I—I Desire vous voir Message received Dy Message recu par (—| Note & return | | Noter et retourner STy^Note & forward ’ et faire suivre pflNoti □z ter ‘passer 000140 �RCMP GR REQUEST FOR PHOTOCOPIES. REQUESTED BJ '(PfelNT NAME)/DEMANDEUI DEMANDE DE PHOTOCOPIES DATE MEH LETTRES MODULES 1 ROOM N«/N’ DE PlScE TITLE OF DOCUMENT OR FILE N« OF REPORT/TITRE DU DOCUMENT OU N« OE-CtiSSIER OU RAPPORT DATE OF DOCUMENT/REPORT DATE DU DOCUMENT/RAPPORT ,,/x /.fe-zar. N* OF COPIES/NBRE DE COPIES CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET TRES SECRET SECRET SECRET RESTRICTED DIFF USION RESTREINTE UNCLASSIFIED,^ NON CLASS1Fi£< CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTS L REQUIREMENTS OR INSTRUCTIONS/^IGENCES OU DIRECTIVES^ \ ---- -X ■ ......................................................... .Y... ..................................... REQUESTED BY (SIGNATURE) / SIGNATURE DU DEMANDEUR COPIES RECEIVED (INITIALS) COPIES REQUES^HNITIALES) BRANCH/SOUS-DIRECTION P.A. N*/N° A.C. ,000141 SSF 283 (81/08) �i i i • |T I ; -'***■• y REC£IV!-D ir 5 /; • -0V14 1S3J P LA C : 3 II I . F:-.' % in: * IUC t. it. »» ,ai I ft. . 000142 �♦ ’^ofGovernment Canada Gouvernement du Canada MEMORANDUM F TO A NOTE DE SERVICE SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SECURITE SECRET Commi ss ioner OUR FILE — N / REFERENCE L .d \r r FROM DE L SUBJECT OBJET ___________ IA 195-128 YOUR FILE - V/REFERENCE A. Director General Security Service DATE J 83-11-10 Cabinet Paper on Terrorism and its Implications for Canada You will recall that a Memorandum to Cabinet (MC) was to be drafted on the subject of terrorism and its implications for Canada. This has now been completed. As you can see from reading the attached memoranda, the DCI has expressed concern that the CIB role had been understated in the submission. In order to bring you up to date on the situation, I have attached a note describing the process involved in drafting the MC . I am satisfied that the final submission is the best that could be expected, given the varied interests it depicts, and adequately represents all areas of the Force. The MC has now been distributed to the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy members. Should you feel, however, ( that the document does not adequately express the involvement l<d [M of CIB, you or the Solicitor General may wish to verbally ll 'M MlAaddress that aspect when meeting with the Cabinet Committee. D. D. G. J. A. »/<&) A/Commr. General 83- 11- IS 1, Encl. D f* M P SECURITY SERVICE COM^SS»O^’S a '^y I s- "S*7 If 4** GC 177 000143 7540-21-798-8998 i �Government of Canada Gouvernement du Canasta FICHE DE SERVICE ACTION REQUEST To - A File No — Dossier N° From — De /S'gO |—| Please call I I Pridre d appeier I I | Returned youi call I Vous a rappeie ’ Tel. No — N° de tel [ Ext. — Poste i I |—I Will can agam I I Vous rappellera J Time — Heure Date l |—| Action I | Donner suite I I | Comments I Commentates | I As requested I—I Comme demand? I I Wants to see you I—I Desire vous voir Message received by Message recu par |---- 1 Approval I | Approbation (—| Note & return | | Noter et retourner I—I Draft reply I I Projet de rfeponse I I | I I Note & file I—I Noter et ciasser | Signature | Note & forward I Noter et faire suivre 000144 GC 1 �RCMPGRC Classification FlCHE DE SERVICE TRANSIT SLIP SECRET____________ BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRiRE A LA MAIN TO-A IA W-l 2 S_________ FROM-DE Date R.M. Chick, In N.E. Kyle. S/Sgt. J A/Offiperi/c "D" Ops. NCO i/c Research nd S3..11,_QZ. Briefing Unit -ucti 0/ O' Comments Commentaires [ I Perusal and P.A. I /./re et dasser Action " Donner suite Return with Current File Retourner avec !e dossier actuei Prepare Brief Preparer un e pose Prepare Reply | Ridiger une ripo se 8’- I I Make File(s) |_| Quvrirundos ier Check Records Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET . l—i Cabinet Paper on Terrorism REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) R. C. M. P. ___ - REMAROUl S /Sftesjtate f^permet. fj^id/i^ufiette formula) This submission has been changed to comply with instructions recently received from the Officer i/c "D" Operations. 0 y- co £ cn o —X—_—_a_ CM 6 2 rg 6 co m < P.A. - A.C. Diary Date - Date d'agenda Meeting Date v Datede reunionr Oate Init./Af* .000145 �RCMP CRC /• -' • h/ Classification FICHE DE SERVICE TRANSIT SLIP BIN 8D A/RfTE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN File No. - N° du dossier IA19.5—128_________ Date FROM - DE TO -A _________ 83.11.Q3_ L___ S/_Sgt._A.X,_G.iUe_§. Protective Policing _SZSgt.__N.E.._Kyle_ S/3gt. M.JSwim ._Unit ___ NCIB I | I Comments I Commentaires I Action I I Donner suite I | 1 Perusal and PA. J Lire et classer I | Prepare Reply | REdiger une reponse I I Prepare Brief I Preparer un exposi | [ I | 1 Make Filets) | Ouvrir un dossier I | 1 Return with Current File J Retourner avec le dossier actue! I Check Records j Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT -SUJET Re: Cabinet Paoer on Terrorism___________________ REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (Si lespace le permet. reponare sur cette lormuiei Reference to our previous correspondence. The .attached.self-explanatory ..letter, from Mr. J.A.L. ..Cloutier of the .J4in.istry._of .the. Sol icitor_Ge neral .to ..External..Affairs is forwarded for your information, and any action which you may feel appropriate. It was provided to .us by *4r. Ed. Wilier of.External Affairs. Please .note_..that__paragraph three, deals .wit.h the HARP ..submiss ion. This ^spectj-may be ..of. particular .interest to.. ".C.’.’_ Directorate. ■<- • ■■ • • .’I a I s*_ 7^ I 3 Diary Date - Date <fagenda P.A. -A.C. Meeting Date - Date da reunion Date tnrt.//V ■000146 �Solicitor General Cui ludu Sollrcileur general Canada SECRET OTTAWA KIA 0P8 September 29, 1983 T)0' 1 E. A. .-Wilier Mr. E.A.^.-Willor ,* Director x' Emergency Preparedness Division Bureau of Intelligence Analysis and Security Department of External A : f a i r s Lester 13. Pearson Bui Idi •s 125 Sussex Drive Ottawa, Ontario KIA 0G2 > Dear Mr. Wilier: In response to Mr. M_chaei Shens tone 1s letter, ZSE-(M)-437 of September 13, 1983, Mr. Shoemaker has asked me to advise you that he concurs with the preposed update to be provided Ministers on ’Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada1. With respect co Armenian terrorism you may, however, wish to indicate that the ’Armenian Revolutionary Army’ attack against the Turkish Embassy compound in Lisbon for the stated purpose of occupying the premises for two days constitutes a marked deviation ?rom the Armenian terrorist tactics of assassination and bombing. rh -{t •'tf. O' As you know, we made the point in the Threat Assessment portion of the HARP documents that because of the widespread and lasting publicity arising from armed occupations, we could expect Armenian terrorists to adopt such activities. Since it’s nice to be proven right (rather than stubborn) it may be useful to bring this factor to Cabinet attention. Yours sincerely, v(- L • Iv- jf OCl '1 1303 Director Contingency Planning Division Police and Security Branch Canada ’^Cu Zs't 000147 �RCMP GRC TRANSIT SLIP Classification FICHE DE SERVICE BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRiRE A LA MAIN Comments Commentaires I | "I Perusal and P.A. | Lire et dasser . suBJE™ I AAuAt/UA Date FROM - TO-A / . , . Action Donner suite Prepare Brief Preparer un exposi Return with Current File Retourner avec le dossier actuei Prepare Reply Rddiger une riponse Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier Check Records verifier les dossiers . /AAAiAAAL- REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply wfien space permits) - REMARQUES ISil'espace le permet. ripondre sur cette formule) 4 J. I I V /■ & Ct 2Fy t7> ■*'> ° N 6 ro X) s g tn < P.A. -A.C. Diary Date - Dare d'agenda Meeting Date - Dare de reunion Date lnit.//V° 000148 �Government XT ' of Canada I TO A L r FROM DE Gouvernement du Canada MEMORANDUM 1 ’ A.A. Roy, A/Commr., Drrector, Protective Policing SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SECURE SECRET OUR FILE - N / REFERENCE IA 195-128 YOUR FILE - V / REF£RErj/E F.J. Bossj , A/Commr., D.D.G. (O' 6) DATE L_ SUBJECT OBJET NOTE DE SERVICE 1983 j Federal Cabinet for Canada. 01 per on Terrorism and Its Impli ations The purpose of this ma orandum is to infor: /you that the Solicitor General's of ice has replied to/ xternal Affairs letter ZSE-(M)-437. TheVSolicitor General*s letter dated 1983.09.29 is attached. You should be aware that Mr.\J.M. Shoemaker has agreed with the proposed update to be provided X° o Ministers on "Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada?./ The Lisbon incident which is referred e\red to in Mr. L. Cloutier's letter certainly does reinforoe thX the, importance of having a , "Special Assault" capability /in n place pla before acts of terrorism occur. Likewise, his proposal that -Chis point be brought to Cabinet attention has ,/rit. If yo\ concur, it could be raised during the oral b efing sessionX F.J. Bosse, A/CommrJ, D.D.G. (Ops) / Attachment cc A/CommrR. R. Schramm Direct< Crimi 1 Investigation ^7 -""'Xi Qi ■^7 3. // o pC 7/7. GC 177 7540-21-798-8998 000149 �Government of Canada Gouvernement du Canada MEMORANDUM NOTE DE SERVICE SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SECURITE TO D/C (Cr. Ops.) A OUR FILE/NOTRE REFERENCE YOUR FILE/VOTRE REFERENCE FROM DE D.C.I. OATE 83.10.06 I- SUBJECT OBJET CANADA/USA CONSULTATION ON TERRORISM, WASHINGTON D.C, Reference attached, ”C” Directorate was represented for the first time at last year's meeting convened here in Ottawa by External Affairs. Insp. Deevy of NCIB attended. I I F The meeting was not found to be enforcement-oriented and many of the discussions dealt in a very broad way with such subjects as international adherence to hi-jacking treaties, security at special events (Olympics), etc. There was no benefit in having ”C” Directorate represented. Based on last year’s experience, it is recommended that as in previous years, the RCMP continue to be represented by the Oi/c ”D", Operations and the D.P.P. j a / / !i ■ R.R. Schramm, A/Commr., Director, Criminal Investigation. Atts. V'.'s: 000150 �RCMP GRC Classification FICHE DE SERVICE TRANSIT SLIP BIN BD CONFIDENTIAL File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIREA LA MAIN TA1QS-1 28 .TO -A "D k___ AZ0fl£i.cexrj I | | Comments | Commentaires ! I | I Perusal and P.A. | Lire et dasser I | Operations Date Kyle, S/Sgt. from R-.RI._Chi.ck., L 83.11.01 NCO i/c Research and I Action I Donner suite ' Prepare Brief | Preparer un expose Prepare Reply | Rediger une rGponse I ' I Make File(s) | Ouvrir un dossier Return with Current File Retourner avec le dossier actue! | ! I Check Records ] Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET Re: Cabinet Paper on Terrorism REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (Si I'espace le permet, rGpondre sur cette formula) .... . The attached ..Memorandum_has_Le.e_Q_p.^ of^heJJ^ib^—anij.s_jLn_comp_li^ ___ Qf_1.9_83_.J.0^4,__ (Tab^A.)______________________________________ Please return file to,Research and Briefing Unit. -&)■ __ & 2 cn IN ° s M P.A.-A.C. m £ Q 6 03 in <• Diary Date - Date <fagenda Meeting Date - Date de reunion Date Init.//V° 000151 �I • RCMPGRC Classification FICHE DE SERVICE TRANSIT SLIP BIN BD r File No. - N° du dossier DWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN FROM - DE TO-Zi Date (f-J /0 ?7 Comments Cogvpernair^s Action Donner suite I | Perusal and P.A. ^jre ej^c/asser Prepare Reply RAdiger une rAponse I I | | Prepare Brief | PrAparer un exposA ~l Make File(s) | Ouvrir un dossier | | Return with Current File | Retourner avec le dossier actue! Check Records J X/Aritier les dossiers REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES ISiI'espace lepermet, rApondre sur cette lormule) —___ F- _____________ r &&- 7? /' £ X r*j 9 6 co kD s o 3 co tn < Diary Date - Date dagenda — ______ v Meeting Date - Date de rAunion cf) in.4# QJ ' \! -A.C. ite. Init./A/0 .000152 �Government of Canada -- * ' 4 Gouvernement du Canada MEMORANDUM NOTE DE SERVICE SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SECURITE TO A L_ A/Commr. J.A. Roy, Director, Protective Policing. SECRET OUR FILE/NOTRE REFERENCE J IA 195-128 YOUR ALE/VOTRE REFERENCE Director.General, Security Service. FROM DE DATE _l subject OBJET 1983 October 27 FEDERAL CABINET PAPER ON TERRORISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you that the Solicitor General's office has replied to External Affairs letter ZSE-(M)-437. Mr. L. Cloutier's letter dated 1983.09.29 is attached. You should be aware that Mr. J.M. Shoemaker has agreed with the proposed update to be provided to Ministers on ((Terrorism and its Implications for Canada)). The Lisbon incident which is referred to in Mr. L. Cloutier's letter certainly does reinforce the importance of having a ((Special Assault)) capability in place before-acts of terrorism occur. Likewise, his proposal that this point be brought to Cabinet attention has merit. If you concur, it could be raised during the oral briefing session. J.B. Giroux, Director General, Security Service. Attachment c.c.: A/Commr. R.R. Schramm, Director, Criminal Investigation. • NEK/tl 000153 �■ X, Jjovernm^pt Ir1” •' of Canada r TO A L FROM DE Gouvernement du Canada MEMORANDUM “I J.A. Roy, A/Commr., Director, Protective Policing SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SECURITE SECRET OUR FILE — N / REFERENCE J n F.J. Bosse, A/Commr., D.D.G. (Ops) IA 195-128 YOUR FILE - VZ REFERENCE DATE L_ SUBJECT OBJET NOTE DE SERVICE j 1983.11.01 Federal Cabinet Paper on Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you that the Solicitor General's office has replied to External Affairs letter ZSE-(M)-437. The Solicitor General's letter dated 1983.09.29 is attached. r■ You should be aware that Mr. J.M. Shoemaker has agreed with ’ the proposed update to be provided to Ministers on "Terrorism [and Its Implications for Canada". The Lisbon incident which is referred to in Mr. L. Cloutier's letter certainly does reinforce the importance of having a "Special Assault" capability in place before acts of terrorism occur. Likewise, his proposal that this point be brought to Cabinet attention has merit. If you concur, it could be raised during the oral briefing session. F.J. Bosse, A/Commr., D.D.G. (Ops) Attachment cc GC 177 A/Commr. R.R. Schramm Director Criminal Investigation 7540-21-798-8998 000154 �r - RCMP GRC Classification FICHE DE SERVICE TRANSIT SLIP BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier WRITE - tCRIRE A LA MAIN .TO -A FROM - DE J. A. Venner Of fl CAT 83.10.24 NCO i/c Research & perat ions i Date S/Sgt. N.E. Kyle Briefing Unit DTK G (r f.tfjZo) in- ?1F. I | Comments | Commentaires [ | ~] Perusal and P.A. | Lire et classer Action _ _ Donner siftie C. M. P. I Prepare Brief Pr6parer un expose ------------- ~ T SERVICE Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier 1 Rediger . .jdiger une rdpont r6ponse | I | Return with Current File _] Retourner avec !e dossier actue! ~| Check Records Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET Federal Cabinet Paper on Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMAROUES (SiI'espace le permet, ripondre sur cette formule) The._attache.d_me.morandums_to_Dir_e..c.tor_,_Erotect.iv.e._Eol.i.cing^ ---------------and_Director.,_Criminal_Iny.estigatio.n-hav.e_Jje.en.-pr.epar-ed_for —the-------s ignat.ure_o.f_t-h.e_D.._G_.__This_has_b-e_en._ c2e.are-d_thr.o.ugh_Insp ._Chi.ck_.and. Supt.._J_..A^M._Des.chenes^_T--------- ------------------------------ ,---------------------------------El ease .return _fil e_c.op.y_t.o__Res e ar_c.h_A_Bri.efing_Unit_f.or--------------------processings------:-------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- IL- ' T z^glLIL fcj? C v v, £ ID tT) tN 9 OJ 6 ,-n P.A. - A.C. ifl co o 3 co m < Diary Date - Date d'agenda Meeting Date - Date de reunion Date lnit./AI0 000155 �RCMPGRC REQUEST FOR PHOTOCOPIES DEMANDE DE PHOTOCOPIES DAT] REQUESTED BY (PRINT NAME)/ DEMANOEUR(NOM EN LETTRES MOULEES I ROOM N»/N» DEFACE GW7 TITLE OF DOCUMENT OR FILE N® OF-REPORT/TITRE OU DOCUMENT OU N® OE DOSSIER DU RAPPORT DATE OF DOCUMENT/REPORT DATE DU DOCUMEMT/RAPPORT N® OF COPIES/N8RE OE COPIES / CLASSIFICATION 1 TO£ SECRET I- TRES SECRET SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIEL i RESTRICTED' ; DIFFUSION RESTREINTE > UNCLASSIFIED, NON CLASSIFIE REQUIREMENTS OR INSTRUCTIONS/EXIGENCES OU DIRECTIVESiCQA "■V 123^ 4 REQUESTED BY (SIONATURE) / SIGNATURE DU DEMANOEUR s [ COPIES RECEIVED (INITIALS) ■ ’ IES REVUES (INITIALES) BRANCH/SOUS-DIRECTlOH P.A.NVN* A C. __ 000156 �TA£cbived # s I WAR 2 1M4 I r ’ •• i i 1 FLAC£0 Oti f.H0 ! 3---- —__ rt. ? DA« u»«-» oy, initmi I i —^4 000157 �MEMORANDUM TO: FROM: SUBJECT: F.J. Bosse Deputy Director J.A. Venner Officer i/c " D " Operations Security Service ! ! + ! ! + ! ! ! ! ! + ! ! + ! ! CLASSIFICATION SECRET YOUR FILE xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx OUR FILE IA195-128 DATE 1983.10.26 + ! I + ! ! ! ! ! + ! ! + Cabinet Paper on Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada This refers to the DCI's memoranda of 1983.09.27 and 1983.10.19 in which he expressed concern that the CIB role had been understated in the submission to Cabinet on "Ter­ rorism and Its Implications for Canada". e J I asked S/Sgt. N.E. Kyle to reconstruct the precise steps taken in the production of this paper. His report follows. As you will recall this subject was initially raised on 1982.09.10 at a meeting the Commissioner had with Mr. de Montigny Marchand of External Affairs and the Deputy Solic­ itor General who was accompanied by Mr. J.M. Shoemaker. Following the above meeting, the Commissioner wrote to A/Commr. D.W. McGibbon, Director, Protective Policing (DPP) (copy attached - Appendix A), informing him it had been decided that a committee would be formed to prepare a paper for Cabinet consideration with respect to a number of issues that touch on security matters. The paper was to be devel­ oped very quickly over the following two or three weeks and, although the makeup of the committee was not fully iden­ tified at that time, he named the DPP to be his representative. The Commissioner also requested reque s ted that a representative of the Security Service assist A/Commr. REVIEWED .ft Z zll_ Jf IV ✓ rco p ’f.M 000158 l< _ AUJ �McGibbon throughout so that discussions touching on the security threat for Canada could be addressed, as well as security policies in the broader context. Moreover, the Commissioner asked to be kept informed of critical issues as the paper was being developed. The next step in the process was a meeting of the Steering Committee on 1982.09.14, chaired by Mr. E.P. Black of External Affairs, attended by over 30 officials, reflecting the variety of departments and agencies with an interest in the subject. The RCMP delegation was headed by A/Commr. McGibbon. D.W. McGibbon. On 1982.09.16 a working group met to draft paper. the paper. It was chaired by a representative of External Affairs and was comprised of representatives, either partic­ ipating or advising, of key departments. There were: The Ministry of the Solicitor General (Police and Security Branch); the RCMP (Security Service, Criminal Investigation, Protective Policing, and Foreign Service Directorate); National Defence; Immigration; Customs; Transport (both Civil Aviation and Ports-Canada); Atomic Energy Control Board; and Communications. This drafting group, after some discussion, concluded that a sub-committee of two would make an initial attempt to prepare a preliminary draft drawing on the numerous written and oral contributions provided by the drafting group. The sub-committee consisted of a member of External Affairs and a member of the Security Service, They worked full time until 1982.09.30 when the preliminary working paper was completed, and circulated to members of the drafting group for review and comment. working The preliminary paper was a brief, yet comprehensive, descriptive document which identified a vari­ ety of limitations and requirements and suggested that there were differing types of solutions, some financial and others legislative or international. At that stage, the problem facing the drafting group was to attempt to package these diverse considerations in a manner that would not only be clear and useful to Ministers, but would also indicate where authority was needed for necessary action. The diversity of players further complicated this task. Still, the drafting group produced a first draft on 1982.10.14 for submission to the Steering Committee. Comments received on the original paper from the PCO, and others indicated the need to be more specific in the section on the threat to Canada, Canada. For example, in the area ot. state terrorism it was noted that, "Canadian experience has included the need to expel certain Middle East diplomats, and further unacceptable activities can be anticipated.” This and similar cryptic references to the Palestinian 2 000159 �resistance movement were considered inadequate as they did not describe the nature or the degree of the security con­ cern. To meet this requirement a more detailed, yet rela­ tively brief, threat assessment was prepared and included in the second draft. Then, on 1982.11.02 the D.G. met with Mr. E.P. Black of External Affairs, Mr. J. Caron of Privy Council Office (PCO), and Mr. J.M. Shoemaker of the Ministry of the-Solicitor General for the purpose of discussing the second draft which by now consisted of a Memorandum to Cabinet and a Dis­ cussion Paper. The following conclusions were reached at this meeting: 1) the Discussion Paper was a useful first-time inven­ tory combining the threat to Canada with a description of Canadian capabilities and limitations; 2) subject to further revisions to the Security Intel­ ligence Process portion, and other minor changes, the Discussion Paper would be updated and put into final production. It was later agreed that the Discussion Paper be dubbed a Background Paper to avoid placing two discussion papers before the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy (CCFDP) Mirror Committee; the draft Memorandum to Cabinet and the process for 3) its consideration were discussed extensively, particularly the recommendation which had clarified that the major issue was the need to have a "center point" to coordinate policy and the allocation of resources of a number of departments; 4) several existing mechanisms were discussed as options (i.e.,, (i-e. either the PCO or the Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence be assigned the responsibility to establish a structured national counter-terrorism program), program), but it was concluded that the Mirror Committee should have an opportunity to discuss these options before making recommendations to Ministers ; and 5) to guide discussions of the Mirror Committee, it was decided to have a brief "Mirror Committee Discussion Paper" prepared which would at the same time form the basis of the final Memorandum to Cabinet. On 1982.12.01 External Affairs circulated the Mirror Com­ mittee Discussion Paper and Background Paper to the CCFDP Mirror Committee for inclusion in the agenda for their meet­ ing on 1982.12.07. It should be noted that this Background 3 000160 �Paper, ments, which is dated 1982.11.24, with a few minor amendis the final version. The Commissioner and A/Commr. McGibbon subsequently attended the CCFDP Mirror Committee meeting on 1982.12.07 when the terrorism paper was introduced by Mr. de Montigny Marchand of External Affairs. The Mirror Committee discussion car­ ried the "process" of this paper one step further, by iden­ tifying the envelope question to be at least as important as determining a "home" for a counter-terrorism program. Finally, they concluded that External Affairs and the Minis­ try of the Solicitor General should jointly redraft the paper and include specific reference to the envelope issue in both the discussion of the subject and the recomm­ endations. Following this, the paper was to be forwarded to the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence (CCSI). The submission, however, was never sent to CCSI choosing to route to CCFDP instead. (A copy of the DPP's A-5 dated 1982.12.08 is attached - Appendix B.) On 1982.12.17, External Affairs furnished us with the draft Memorandum to Cabinet based on the Mirror Committee's Discussion Paper that was considered on 1982.12.07. They sub­ sequently sent us the final version of the Memorandum to Cabinet dated 1983.02.17. It had been amended to reflect the views expressed by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs at the 1982.12.07 meeting of the Mirror Committee and others later, including those of the Security Service. Although the final Memorandum to Cabinet of 1983.02.17 was signed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Solicitor General of Canada sometime during the early spring of 1983, it still has not appeared on the agenda of the CCFDP. Because there was an indication that the Memorandum to Cabi­ net and the Background Paper were to be considered by the CCFDP in 1983.09, the documents were reviewed during 1983.08 by representatives of the Department of External Affairs and the Ministry of the Solicitor General, including the RCMP Security Service. As a number of events had taken place since the drafting of the paper, the reviewers, acting on the premise that all interested departments had concurred with the final Memorandum to Cabinet and Background Paper, concluded that, despite the relative age of the submission, these later events were in keeping with the threat assessment and the important elements of the Memorandum to Cabinet and Back­ Paper; ground Paper; namely, the issues, conclusions and the recommendations remained the same. 4 000161 �These anticipated general developments and events did not appear to be sufficient to warrant amending, re-printing and re-issuing either or both documents. The reviewers recognized , however, that Ministers might find it useful to have a summary of recent events. Therefore, an annex was prepared as an update and forwarded by External Affairs to the PCO for approval. Their concurrence was subsequently obtained, Then, External Affairs sent the annex, with a letter (ZSE-M-437 of 1983.09.13), to Mr. Shoemaker and the D. G. for concurrence and/or comments on the updated annex, (Copy attached - Appendix C.) The D.G., in turn, forwarded the External Affairs letter and the annex to both the DPP and DCI for their approval. approval, (Copy attached - Appendix D.) The DPP in his reply to the D.G. on 1983.09.23 concurred with the proposed update annex. (Copy attached - Appendix E. ) Then, on 1983.09.27, the D.G. received a memorandum from the DCI. In this letter, the D.C.I. expressed the opinion that the Memorandum to Cabinet did not reflect the concerns which had been outlined by the Director, Criminal Operations, to Commi s s ioner in his memorandum dated 1983.03.28. the Commissioner (Co­ pies attached - Appendix F.) He, therefore, asked that these concerns be taken into account before the submission is presented to the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Defence Policy (CCFDP). As the Director, Criminal Operations letter of 1983.03.28 had not been sent to the Security Service beforehand, this was the first occasion we learned of the DCI's concerns about certain aspects of the paper. I, sub­ sequently, addressed these issues in my letter to you on 1983.09.29 which was, in turn, forwarded to the DCI. (Copy attached - Appendix G.) This, however, did not satisfy the DCI, and he wrote to the D.G. again on 1983.10.19. (Copy attached - Appendix H.) In his second letter, the DCI indi­ cated that the CIB role has been understated in the paper and, as such, tends to leave one with the feeling that ter­ rorism is basically a Security Service responsibility. I wish to assure you that this was not the intention. Two days after External Affairs had circulated the letter (ZSE-M-437 of 1983.09.13), and the annex, they were informed by Mr. Caron of the PCO that PCO had published and circulated the submission, along with the updated annex, to the CCFDP Committee members. Upon reflection, Mr. Caron realized that the PCO should have waited for the concurrence of the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the RCMP before circulating the paper. Even so, he did not consider this issue to be a serious problem, He suggested that if further amendments to the submission are needed, they can be pre­ sented orally at the time presentation is made to the CCFDP. 5 000162 �1 I am of the understanding that the DCI was kept fully informed on a continuing basis of the status of the paper, representative on the drafting group took an Indeed, his active part in the development of this submission and, in particular, the "Background Paper". In this regard,' he was a major contributor to the portions dealing with the tac­ investigative, tical, investigative, and prosecutorial, responses to specific incidents and INTERPOL. Likewise, he had signif­ icant input to the aspect relating to the Special Hostage Rescue Force and, to a lesser extent, the area touching on the Police Liaison Program. You will appreciate that the various drafts were undertaken with a view to maintaining the substance of the original contributions and, at the same time, written in a style con­ sistent throughout. In conclusion, considering that the original task was to quickly prepare a brief information paper on this subject; that there were a number of departments involved in the evo­ lution of the Memorandum to Cabinet and Background Paper and that each had its own priorities and interests, I feel that this paper represents a compromise among all of the partic­ ipating departments. Moreover, I am basically satisfied that the paper fulfills the original requirements as out­ lined in the Cabinet's directive of 1982.09.09. (Copy of the PCO letter of 1982.09.24 in this regard is attached Appendix I.) I think you might agree with me that the paper will also serve as a useful document to raise the consciousness of the Cabinet with regard to the terrorist threat currently" facing Canada, and to identify the key security measures which ought to be taken. I am attaching a copy of the final Memorandum to Cabinet of 1983.02.17, the Background Paper dated 1982.11.24 and the updated annex of 1983.08.31 on this subject for your infor­ mation (Appendix J). Yours truly, ■O-f-ricer i/c "D" Operations Security Service 6 000163 �. RCMP GRC TRANSIT SLIP Classification FICHE DE SERVICE BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN Date FROM-DE Comments Commentaires Action Donner suite Prepare Brief Priparer un exposG I ^/.I'heturh with,Current File* L | RetourneFavec le dossie^actuel Perusal and P.A. Lire et dasser Prepare Reply R^dioer unerttoonse Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier I \ Vl'Check Records | I Verifier ie$ dossils'* SUBJECT - SU/ET / 7) / ___________ TjGfiLLf REMARKS (Use same A-5 forPeply when space gettr(.ts}/-/REMARQUES (Subspace le permet, ripondre sur cette formule) \ \ -J -V u- S XI ‘—diary Date - Date d'agenda #7//A P.A. -A.C. leeting Date - Date de r£unic f/leetin. Date 7 Init.//V° 000164 �. 1 .* ■ Government of Canada Gouvemement du Canada MEMORANDUM NOTE DE SERVICE SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SECURITE Director General, Security Service TO A SECRET OUR FILE/NOTRE REFERENCE J P-1-76 YOUR F1LE/VOTRE REFERENCE FROM DE D.C.I. DATE 83-10-19 subject OBJET Cabinet Paper on Terrorism and its Implications for Canada This is further to my correspondence of 83-09-27 and in reference to a memorandum submitted to the DDG from the Officer i/c 'D' Operations. It is my position, and has been all along, that the role of C.I.B. personnel has not been suitably reported with respect to the captioned subject. I would acknowledge that some of the issues have been commented on in a general sense, however little emphasis was placed on specifically detailing those areas where C.I.B. Peace Officers perform key intelligence gathering and/or investigative roles. With reference to the most recent submission of C/Supt. J.A. Venner, I would like to present the following observations: Para. 7: The domestic scene in Canada has been a more serious problem than the international scene. C.I.B. personnel have demonstrated a need for local intelligence gathering, analysis of same and follow-up action during incidents of domestic terrorism such as the Doukhaboor episodes, yet no reference is made to this in the Memorandum to Cabinet. Para. 20 & 23: It may not have been the intent to suggest that Security Service has the exclusive responsibility to thwart terrorist activities, however for want of any reference to the CIB function, this is the inference one draws. Accurate and timely analysis of intelligence is critical in the police decision making process and as such Security Service .../2 000165 �I•» 2 would of course be a significant source of intelligence to law enforcement. Para. 34: I have some difficulty with line 12 of the MC which begins, 'There have been few experiences,..' and would in fact take exception to the word 'few'. The number of such incidents should not be the issue, but more so, whose responsibility is it and how should it be handled. The national coordination of such incidents lies within the CIB purview and this should be more clearly articulated to Cabinet. ' In closing, the CIB role has been understated and as such tends to leave one with the feeling that terrorism is basicaldiy a Security Service responsibility. R.R. chramm, A/Commr., Director, Criminal I igation. D. D. G. 83- 10- 14 R. C M. PSECURJTY SERVICE j a j. A-' . 000166 �RCMP GRC TRANSIT SLIP Classification FICHE DE SERVICE BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN TO-xi FROM - DE t>Yc. I | I Comments | Commentaires I | —I Perusal and P.A. | Lire et dasser I | Date O-. | Action | Donner suite I | ~| Prepare Brief | Priparer un expose | | | Prepare Reply | Rudiger une r6ponse I | I Make File(s) _] Ouvrir un dossier I | , | Return with Current File | Retourner avec le dossier actuel ~| Check Records J Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET (777 /wed REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space p^mits) - REMARQUES (SiFespace le permet, r^pondre sur cette formule^ . ______________ C __ ................................................................................................____________________ ______________________________ B rag ----------------- j/y— ? I /( Vljiry Date - Dare d'agenda — —) -■ Meeting Date - Date de reunion 3 ■ Vs' Date. iCi \ I PA.-A.C. Init./Af* 000167 �RCMPGRC REQUEST FOR PHOTOCOPIES DEMANDE DE PHOTOCOPIES ROOM NV N® OE PIECE REQUESTED BY JPRINT NAMEI /DEMANDEURINOM EN LtyfTRES MOUIEES) zZ/ /^WoR DATE/JF DOCUM£XlTRER0RT opcu^Ent/rapport TITLE OF DOCUMENT OR FILE N® ok REPORT/ TITRE DU DOCUMENT OU N® DE DOSSIER OU RAPPORT aBATH'DU ........ . ^’OfZoPIES/NBRE ' / DE COPIES ~7^/Q^6^Z^/^.assification X CV onfidential TOP SECRET TRES SECRET SECRET SECRET RESTRICTED DIFFUSION RESTREINTE UNCLASSIFIED^ NON CLASSIFIE CONFWEN.TIEL _________________________________________________________________________________ Ai.1 Mi REQUIREMENTS OR INSTRUCTIQNS/EXIGENCeS 00 DIRECTIVES ■ reo'6/sTeo4Iy j/ion. S . .. L1' ................... \S'............. l.l...^ •/ zz© tfp V - SIGNATURE DU DEMANDEUR COPI&SRJ COPIE S>F ZED (INITIALSI 'S(INITIALES) BR< d£ M H/SOUS-D'RECTION PA. N*/N*A.C. S') �- • \ I ■( 4 1 >v-. i<*. ... ••■■W’--- \ k i t \ *" ... V v \\ ... I'v^'A'A'X^ .. V.A. . ■1 / I I <*■ -■ » i i wl ' V-— WlTlKt. . ==^—”^000169 �REQUEST FOR PHOTOCOPIES RCMPGRC REQUESTS DEMANDE DE PHOTOCOPIES DATE 7ft-/O~ 0'3 (PRINT NAME) / DEMANOEUR NOEURp*OM EN LETTRES MOULEES) ROOM N'/ N* DE PlfcCE Gw? DATE OF DOCUMENT/REPORT DATE DU DOCUMENT/RAPPORT TITLE'OF DOCUMENT OR FILE N- OF REPORT/ TITRE OU DOCUMENT OU N« DE DOSSIER DU RAPPORT N* OF COPIES/NBRE DE COPIES , CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET TR&S SECRET RESTRICTED DIFFUSION RESTREINTE □ UNCLASSIFIED, NON CLASSIFIE ___________________________________ 0 I. . . ex CONFIDENTIAL ^CONFIDENTIEL SECRET SECRET .REQUIREMENTS OR INSTRUCTIONS/EXJGENCES OO’DIIRE£3$/ES ■jj v<5 \ ..... in .<« A _ a’. “KteraESTEeSru^ONATyaE)/.SIGNATURE DU DEMANDEUR I JrW7SSF 283 (81/08) COPIES RECEIVED (INITIALS) COPIES REQUESdNlTlALES) B^NCH^SOUS-DIRECTION P.A.N«/N«A.C. ■000170 �Kr « fe *<>*W filf * 7"’SiriAi I ■ r 000171 �1 [ScMr Gfcj TRANSIT SLIP Classification FICHE DE SERVICE BIN BO File No. - N° du dossier J-/). /rs-'/'Z & • HANDWRITE - ECR!RE A LA MAIN TO - A FROM - DE. Date ______________ Comments Commentaires Action Donner suite Prepare Brief Preparer un exposi Return with Current File Retourner avec le dossier actue! Perusal and P.A. Lire et dasser Prepare Reply Rediger une reponse Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier Check Records Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJEE , REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - QtMARQUES (Si t'espace le permet, ripondre sur cette formule) ('CSV'-O. P-/-2rf> c'Z’ X ---- 2 t------stf s - «• S 6 CO in co o 6 co \ -------------- 9 'v_____ Diary Date - Date d'agenda 1 Meeting Date - Date de reunion PA-AC Date Init./AZ* in < L 000172 �; .j, — RCME'GRC k TRANSIT SLIP Classification FICHE DE SERVICE BIN BD SECRET File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRfTE - ECR/RE A LA MAIN TO-A FROM - DE Acting Deputy Commissioner, Criminal Operations Date Director, Protective Policing 83-03-16 1 Comments Commentaires Action Donner suite Prepare Brief Preparer un exposi Return with Current File Retourner avec le dossier actuel Perusal and PA. Lire et dasser Prepare Reply Rudiger une reponse Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier Check Records Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET MEMORANDUM TO CABINET - TERRORISM AND IT'S IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (Sii'espace le permet. r^pondre sur cette formula) a copy of the final version of the Memorandum to Cabinet for submission to the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Solicitor General. .W. McGibbon, A/Comm'r., Director, Protective Policin ____________ & " —-------- - !»-■ ! ,.,LQ. py= s g m < P.A. -A.C. Meeting Date - Date de riunion Date lnit.//V° 000173 �a1 i2 It is also necessary to refer to paragraph 115 on page 22 where the need for national coordination is alluded to. It is not at all clear whether this is intended to refer to a national CIB capability or a Security Service capability. It certainly should be the former and that should be clearly articulated. In summary then, it is our view that overall the Cabinet Memorandum does not adequately reflect the law enforcement responsibility in terms of the prevention and detection of terrorist acts and the absence, at the present time, of a national CIB capability to deal with such situations. This is a serious flaw in the memorandum which must be cor-r^cBed.. sI R.R.' Schramm, A/Commr., Director, Criminal Investigation. COMMISSIONER FORWARDED 83.01.28. Since you are on the Mirror Committee for this Cabinet Memorandum, you may wish to consider strengthening the document to recognize the role of criminal operations of the Force in the field of terrorism. You have the draft document which was referred to you earlier. I am also attaching a copy of the response by Justice to the legal issues relative to the establishment of a Special Hostage Rescue Force. p- Originajli^gncd by H. -Jansen, Deputy/ Commissioner, Criminal Operations. or Att. c.c. ir D.C.I. D.P.P. I? . pas / .1 R d/lA/ ccs ■"’•J IM; / �Government of Canada Gcuvernement du panada MEMORANDUM NOTE DE SERVICE SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SECURITE TO A SECRET D/C Crim. Ops OUR FILE/NOTRE REFERENCE J YOUR FILE/VOTRE REFERENCE FROM DE D.C.I. OATE 83-01-27 SUBJECT OBJET Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada NCIB have reviewed this Cabinet Memorandum with me, with the conclusion that it is incomplete since it does not focus adequate attention and thrust on the peace officer role in terms of the prevention and detection of terrorist activity in Canada. This lack of focus operates to make the memorandum one dimensional. For example, paragraph 73 concludes with the statement that Security Service should be able to predict that a terrorist act in Canada is immi­ nent and thus to thwart it. It is silent on the peace officer responsibility in terms of prevention and detection. -2 This lack of emphasis on the peace officer role is compounded by paragraph 74 wherein it is indicated that the lack of Security Service capability to predict and thwart terrorist's acts is due to a lack of Security Service resources. In my view, that is not the issue since they do not have the exclusive responsibility to predict and thwart terrorist acts. Law enforcement, particularly in terms of the RCMP, must have concurrent responsibility in these areas. These same concerns are again evidenced in paragraphs 105 and 106 on pages 20 and 21 of the memorandum. They need to be totally rewritten to incorporate the peace officer role and more accurately reflect the current CIB function of the RCMP in terms of coordinating and assisting both municipal and provincial authorities in terrorist investi­ gations and indeed taking an active role in such investi­ gations. For example in Special "0" alone have so far devoted 8367 hours to surveillance in the cities of Montreal and TorontQ-^S- Qfk top of this, NCIS resources in both centres have ' substantially committed to assisting and furthering both investigations. Another point to be made is that the memorandum mus updated in respect to comments regarding Direct Act. See last sentence of paragraph 57 on page 12. € received /RE£U L£ cf in. 83- op ? 7 D'’C^»r. (Cr. <1000175^ .../] a- • Co.T.m. — A. ‘ �RCMP'GRC Classification FICHE DE SERVICE TRANSIT SLIP BIN BD File No. - /V° du dossier • HANDWRITE - iCRIRE A LA MAIN FROM - DE 10-A Date __ _ Comments Commentaires Action Donner suite Prepare Brief Preparer un expose Return with Current File Retourner avec le dossier actuel Perusal and P.A. Lire et classer Prepare Reply Rudiger une riponse Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier Check Records Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET / rtx: ,r . i ,u______ C~7*zZ / J* y xO r T r REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES ISilespace le permet, ripondre sur cette formula) _____ << re 4/ <O J 7" ■/ r _____ co v. d rs 9 CM d 2 I 9 P.A. -A.C. Diary Date - Date d'agenda Meeting Date - Date de reunion Date ,nit/,yL7y/ ^000176 �' i^MPGRA Classification FICHE DE SERVICE TRANSIT SUP SECRET BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIREA LA MAIN TO-A FROM - DE Comments J Commentaires I" | Action Donner suite I Perusal and P.A. | Lire et dasser I Prepare Reply Rediger une reponse I Date Prepare Brief | Preparer un expose I Make File(s) | Ouvrir un dossier | j I Return with Current File I Retourner ayecle dossier actuel ”1 Check Records | Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET TERRORISM AND ISTS IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA REMARKS (Use same A-5for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES ISiI'espace le permet. repondre sur cette formule) The Chairman's comments were that prior to acceptance of this type of proposal that the government has to decide how much money it wishes to spend on security and that right now it has no envelope to go to. The final result was that Mr. Black would redo the paper, in conjunction with_ Solicitor General and that it would be presented to the Security and Intelligence Committee. ■o ■— .cGl on, A/Commr Director - Protective Policing s J Dc( /a ft/d f/£> o CM d> s 8 P.A.-AC. , Drary Date .. 2, ~ Meeting Data- Date de Meeting Di Date de rtunic (7 Date lnit.//V° 000177 4 I �RCMPGRC TRANSIT SLIP Classification FICHE DE SERVICE 8IN BD SECRET__________ File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIREA LA MAIN GP 195-111-1 IL TO-A FROM - DE Date I DEPUTY,COMMISSIONER _(CR. OPS...) __D-P.P____________ dc/ I ■ t'/r Vd-i# - tComments I [ | Commentates I | l~ I I Perusal and PA. Lire et classer I | Action J Donner suite I Prepare Reply | Rediger une reponse I I I Prepare Brief J. Pr&parer un expose I Return with Current File J Retourner avec le dossier actuel I | I Make File(s) J Ouvrir un dossier I | I Check Records J Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET TERRORISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA___________ REMARKS (Use same A-5 tor Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (SiI'espace lepermet, ripondre sur cette formute) t ... .. As Y°u are aware .1 attended, the Mirror. Committee-meeting, with ■ the Commissioner on 82.12.07 when this paper was introduced by Deputy Minister - Foreign Policy, Department of External Affairs and.thereafter spoken to by A. P. Black _f rom the Security, and Intelligence Division It.-was initially stated that it.was a joint External.Affairs/Solicitor General paper and it was suggested that _it._should ..be. converted, quickly -to-a------------Cabinet Document,.and. go.forward with..the-paper _"A -Proposal -for-the Formation of a Special.Hostage Rescue Force? After considerable discuss.iqp._it was apparent that the committee- ----had no delegating responsibility and was not able, to handle.matters involving multi-department.discussions. involving- different envelope- ---- -- — committees. I am not .fully familiar .with the...inter-governmental<?committeesystem but gathered ..from the conversation that-it was-necessary that ■ — this particular_document._gp_t.Q__the__S.ecurity_and—Intelligence—Commi-ttiee-------where it could, receive. ..consideration. My under-----standing is that ..this..taaiii lings paper.„goes .to. a_lesser....committee -and 1 find it difficult .to..understand, how it. is..possible-to have an important paper such.as this .receive_the..sanction-of —government — IE RECEIVED/RECU LE <0 Office of the — Bareau du o CM 6 -------•c't .. 2 2 § 3 P.A. -A.C. D.C- J-' Diary Date - Date d'agenda - Meetit '■■■: (Cr. Ops) 5. • Centro. — P. C. Date |lnit.//V® — z 000178 �' IUr------------cmpgrc Classification FICHE DE SERVICE TRANSIT SLIP SECRET BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN FROM - DE TO-A L D/COMMR. (CR. OPS) Date 82-12-06 1/C N .C . I .B. OFFICER Comments Commentaires Action Donner suite Prepare Brief Preparer un expose Return with Current File Retourner avec le dossier actue! Perusal and P.A. Lire et dasser Prepare Reply Rediger une reponse Make filets) Check Records Verifier les dossiers Ouvrir un dossier SUBJECT - SUJET ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA TERRORISM AND REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMAROUES ISil'espace le permet, repondre sur cette formule) Paper reviewed as requested. The main CIB references, a s you know, are page J_3 .paragraphs- 68 and 69, page 20, paragraph J05 and pages 22 a_nd 23 • I 1 a r gel y ag ree w i t h the paper, although it does have a strong secur i ty inte11igence/security service orientation with much less emphasis on C I B needs and respons i b i1 i t i es Points of poss i b1e (although they are there). i nterest : page 15, paragraph 73. The first sentence could be construed as meaning the Security Service has the primary, if not exclusive, responsibility for "the collection of intelligence in the area of international and domestic terrorism" other PDs wou1d see it that way . I don 1t think RCMP CIB or I also wonder if the eventua1 Security Service mandate will allow them to collectintelligence i n all areas that CIB would be interested in from a criminal terrorist particul perspective ar!y , d ome Stic terrorism. Page 22. The stance that Security Service is responsible for intel 1 paP-en are in i n CIB a largely fact the responsibi1itie response role with role with no «0 cn a central!zed ca p a b i y, Pa ragra ph 115 not es the need fora o CM 6 CO . . ./2 10 r* £ § co m < Diary Date - Date d'agenda Meeting Date - Date de reunion feSCEIVEDl R^W-LECIP.U ul - tarnau & P.A. - A C. ite SF iZjlnitfi/'fi _________ I 000179 DlCommr. IM. S. - Co;nrx - P. c. �' |RCMP GRC] Classification FICHE DE SERVICE transit BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN FROM - DE TO - A Date Comments Commentaires Action Donner suite Prepare Brief Preparer un expose Return with Current File Retourner avec le dossier aduel Perusal and P.A. Lire et dasser Prepare Reply Rudiger une reponse Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier Check Records Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (Silespace !e permet, ripondre sur cede formule) 2 coordinate the national response, etc., but CIB needs and interests are not nearly as extensively articulated as Secur i ty Serv i ce. may be reason why this page There is the case . 12 (end of par a graph 57) . The Direct Action reference/^ does not mention the specific acts of serious violence. B.C. Hydro station at Qualicum Bay on May 31. The bombing of the The bomb explosion a t L i tton Systems Canada Ltd., Toronto, October 14. It may be useful to include these. Appendix "A" (Secu ri t y Serv i ce documen t) . Graphically illustrates the litany of ASALA and JCAG offences that have occurred since January 1975 . Page 5 shows a sudden and subsequent arrival of this activity in Canada. An illustration of the impact terrorism is having on CIB operations Attached i n the event is the surveillance area units have given some of collecting criminal i s of some assistance. "A", "C" and "O" Divis i on Spec i a 1 "0" I 0,000 hours to the Armen i an situation, one third of which was overtime. so it Some of i t , of course, was for purposes intelligence and/or counter survei1 lance operations. * 3 P.A. -A.C. 3 3 •n Diary Date - Date tfagenda Meeting Date - Date de reunion Date lnit.//V« • 000180 �RCMPGRC Classification FICHE DE SERVICE TRANSIT SLIP BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN FROM - DE 10-A Date Comments I j Action Commentaires | J Donner suite I | 1 Prepare Brief I Preparer un expose | Return with Current File I Retourner avec le dossier adue! Perusal and P.A. Lire et dasser I I Prepare Reply j Rudiger une reponse I | I Make File(s) J Ouvrir un dossier I | I Check Records J Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (SU'espace le permet, repondre sur cette lormule) - 2 coordinate the national response, etc., but CIB needs and interests are not nearly as extensively articulated as Security Service. There may be reason why this Is the case. - page 12 (end of paragraph 57). The Direct Action reference/ does not mention the specific acts of serious violence. The bombing of the B.C. Hydro station at Quail cum Bay on May 31. The bomb explosion at Litton Systems Canada Ltd., Toronto, Toron to October 14. it may be useful to Include these. - Appendix "A" (Security Service document). Graphically Illustrates the litany of ASALA and JCAG offences that have occurred since January J 1975. Page 5 shows a sudden and subsequent arrival of this activity in Canada. Attached in the event It Is of some assistance. - An illustration of the Impact terrorism is having on CIB operations is the surveLl 1 ance area. "A", "C" and "0" Division Special “0" units have given some 10,000 hours to the Armenian situation, one third of which was overtime. 5 CM d 2 § Q J Some of it, of course, was forP.A.purposes -AC. of collecting criminal operatIons. w Diary Dare - Deiei'agenda 4 [/// Z. Meeting Datf- Oate'de reunion BE / - tai' /N° J ^^000181 /I% 4 �-1------- —_____ RCMPGRC SLIP -------- —~l Classification FICHE DE SERVICE transit SECRET BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HMOWfmE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN FROM07hcER 1/C N.C.I .B. LTO'fl/C0MMR. (CR. OPS) Comments Commentaires Action Donner suite I I "I Prepare Brief | Preparer un expose Perusal and P.A. Lire et dasset Prepare Reply Rediger une reponse I "1 Make File(s) I Ouvrir un dossier $2-12-06 I Return with Current File I Retourner avec le dossier actuel i "1 Check Records I Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET TERRORISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (Si /'espace le permet. repondre sur cette formule) The main CIB references, as you know, are Paper reviewed as requested. page 13, paragraphs 68 and 69, page 20, paragraph 105 and pages 22 and 23 I largely agree with the paper, although It does have a strong security Inte11 Igence/securIty service orientation with much less emphasis on CIB needs and responsibilities (although they are there). Points of possible interest: - page 15, paragraph 73. The first sentence could be construed as meaning the Security Service has the primary. If not exclusive, responsibility for "the collection of Intelligence In the area of International and domestic terrorism". other PDs would see It that way. I don't think RCMP CIB or I also wonder If the eventual Security Service mandate will allow them to collect Intelligence In all areas that CIB would be interested in from a criminal terrorist perspective, particularly domestic terrorism. I page 22. The stance that Security Service Is responsible for intelligence does not appear corrected or qualified elsewhere In the paper, In fact the CIB responsibilities are reflected In a largely response role with <o 9 "* i ■ ■ ■ ■ ... ................... — ■■ I. W. -• * —I—. w. ---------------- '---- '--- 1 - , ~ I —I, r —. dM < ................................... "----------- ---------------- --- - . .............................. ................. ■■ — .../2 tn !co I I—II' - - - ■ -------------- --- Paragraph 115 notes the need for a centralized capability to _____ Diary Date - Date d'agenda Meeting Date - Date de reunion P.A—AC. Date ' Ilnit./lV- 000182 �RCMP.GRCi TRANSIT SLIP Classification FICHE DE SERVICE BIN RD SECRET Filo No. - N° du dossier • HAN.DWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN FROM TO -A I I1 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER (CR. OPS ) | I 1 Comments Commentaires I | Action | Donner suite I I Perusal and P.A. I Lire et dasser I | Prepare Reply J Hediger one rdponse ' DE Date D,P . P . 82.12.03 Prepare Brief Preparer tin exposi j [ Return with Current File • | Retourner avec ie dossier actuei Make Filets) Ouvrir un dossier I I [ Check Records Vdrilier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET MIRROR COMMITTEE DISCUSSION PAPER REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMAROUES <Si t'espace le permet, repondre sur cette lormulel When attending the Bilateral discussions Canada/U.S. On Terrorism yesterday I was handed the nost recent copies of the Discussion Paper and Background Paper concerning Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada, As you will note the covering memorandum indicates the Mirror Commit tee w i 1 I be d i scussing these documents at their meeting on 82.12.07. I have only had an opportunity to give them a cursory review and I see no significant changes since the last draft that I sent forward. I a in forwarding two copies and you will wish to pass one to the Commissioner who is a member of the Mirror Committee to prepare him in advance Eor this meeting. i. I i i D. W. McGibbon, A/Commr, Director Protective Policing 3 P.A. -AC Diary Date - Dare d'agenda Meeting Date - Date de reunion Date JI < .... I 000183 �r x RCMPGRC TRANSIT SLIP Classification FICHE DE SERVICE BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN FROM - DE TO-A Date Comments Commentaires Action Donner suite Prepare Brief Preparer un exposi Return with Current Ale Retourner avec le dossier actuel Perusal and PA Lire et classer Prepare Reply Rediger une reponse Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier Check Records Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES ISil'espace le permet, repondre sur cette lormulei d/xr r ___ c______________ _ JS-Om.____ 1 f.£ Stxs.f ■" s s r.r-.a/c/. „<£> __ ------- s __________________ L. ± Ic RECEIVED Officeoft u DEC 3 isaz D. CJ----------------D. E. C. 5 8 6 m m £ o E in PA-AC. Diary Date - Dare dagenda Meeting Date - Date de reunion Date lnn.//V° 000184 �r RCMP GRC Classification FICHE DE SERVICE TRANSIT SUP BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN TO-A ^~L /'S' FROM - DE Date P, su- / x~ t?3 Comments Commentaires Action Donner suite Prepare Brief Preparer un expose Return with Current File Retoumer avec le dossier actuel Perusal and PA. Lire et classer Prepare Reply Rediger une reponse Make Filets) Ouvrir un dossier Check Records Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET J ___ __________________________ A /-to. REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES ISiEespaie le permet. repondre sur cette formulel XZ3 A-4. ___ ... ”7a“ 0 / / 47-4 ....Orff _ ___ /^/de./C^ryt yy<4jp^zt_>r </ S S ? 1 I tn 4 ----------------------- /^/■t s ~ <£g Diary Date - Dare d'agenda 7?a/ g/f co* _Z.JL_ »---------- y^f/. /.T.___ ____ /^L7-Z. KK1ing Date - Date de reunion At stSaZT P.A. - A.C. ee "J Date ~P7~s*-i9 “9 .000185 �■ rcnPISc TRANSIT SLIP Classification FICHE DE SERVICE BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier ZA/73-/Z8 • HANDWRITE - ECRiRE A LA MAIN Date FROM - Dl AL___ 83.0 7 30 Comments Commentaires Action Donner suite Prepare Brief Preparer un expose Return with Current File Retourner avec le dossier actuei Perusal and P.A. Lire et dasser Prepare Reply Rediger une r6ponse Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier Check Records Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET i -m. c /3- P._______ REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARftVES ISiI'espace le permet, repondre sur cette formulel iAZ-<^—5. & e. 7 , yj ------------ a U) N 9 CM \I co <i \ 10 w-— Diary Date - Dare d'agenda P.A. -A.C. Meeting Date - Date de reunion Date lnit./N° ,000186 �TERRORISM BACKGROUND Terrorism is a relatively new phenomena in Canada and. generally speaking, police departments in this country have no police resources specially trained and permanently com- mitted to this problem. Nor is there any planned and collective response by police departments across the country when terrorist problems and their criminal activities in Canada do occur. Each offence is investigated by the local police department, bearing in mind the limits of their information, their jurisdictional and travel constraints. and other local law enforcement priorities, etc. While this addresses a particular offence, it does not investigate the overall terrorist problem that gave rise to that offence. and will commit further terrorist acts in future. Unfortu­ nately, terrorist conspiracies to further political aims are seldom localized and will transcend several boundaries. It would be surprising if those responsible for the GUNGOR and ALTIKAT incidents were not only very quickly out of Ottawa and out of the province, but out of the country as well. Similarly, it would be surprising if orders to carry out those shootings did not come from someone outside Canada as well. Within the RCMP, and with only a few exceptions, there have been no CIB personnel specially trained and permanently .../2 000187 �2 - committed, either pro-actively or reactively, to investigating the existence and criminal activities of terrorist elements in Canada. altered that. The GUNGOR and ALTIKAT shootings have Substantial RCMP CIB resources have been temporarily diverted from more traditional RCMP responsibi­ lities (organized crime) to work with the Ottawa City Police in investigating the terrorist acts committed here, and to work elsewhere in the country with other police departments and with the Security Service in seeking to identify and investigate other elements in Canada of the same Armenian terrorist organizations. The Armenian experience has underlined the police need in this situation, and in any Canadian anti-terrorist program generally, for an ability to immediately mobilize, and then maintain, a concerted and coordinated police effort, crossing a number of police jurisdictions. The difficulty of this becomes evident considering (1). the local police departments have criminal jurisdiction. (21 local police departments are very limited in the time and effort they can give to investigating such offences in their own area, and more particularly to investigating matters effecting other areas of the country, and C3)_ RCMP CIB efforts are constrained to the.extent that the personnel they can temporarily commit to these matters are very limited. Additionally, they are investigating in what amounts to another police jurisdiction. .../3 000188 �3 - albeit on a national law enforcement problem. The latter has not constituted a serious problem in the current situation with the RCMP being welcomed as a partner in the overall investigation, in fact carrying much of the investigative load in cities outside Ottawa. Nonetheless, these are all elements that impact detrimentally on the effective- ness of any Canadian anti-terrorist program or response. CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE In any Canadian anti-terrorist program, criminal intelligence becomes a very key essential for reason of: - forewarning police authorities and government of the existence, strategies and planned criminal activities of terrorist elements in Canada. - allowing for appropriate preventative and protective measures to be put in place, and then adjusted as the threat level increases or subsides. - Properly focusing police investigative and evidence gathering efforts in support of such charges as criminal conspiracy. - Reactively, providing information and leads for follow-up investigation of any terrorist acts that are committed in Canada. .../4 000189 �4 In most cases, local police departments will co-operate to the extent of sharing information that comes to their attention. It would not be realistic, however, to expect they would commit scarce resources, at the expense of local law enforcement priorities, in the interest of participating in a long range national anti-terrorist criminal intelli- gence program. The program cannot be otherwise than national and long range if it is to successfully and system­ atically develop, collect and centralize all available terrorist related intelligence in Canada for purposes of analysis, decision and dissemination to government and to the police. Thus, the criminal intelligence component of any effective national anti-terrorist program, in terms of collection. centralization and analysis of information, has to be viewed as a Federal responsibility exercised through the RCMP. It follows as well, for the same reasons, that the Federal Government, in the national interest, has the responsibility and the only police force with national capabilities, to undertake a continuing program dedicated to the detection and investigation of terrorist related criminal activities in Canada. Otherwise, law enforcement efforts will be localized, intermittent, uncoordinated and widely dispersed. .,./5 000190 / �5 Local enforcement priorities will often take precedence over matters regarded important in the national interest. Above all else, there is need for a stable cohesive element in this multi-force, multi-jurisdictional problem facing police and government in attempting to effectively combat terrorist activities in Canada. Only a Federal police force can be expected to have the capability to launch and maintain a fully coordinated police action across the country. The RCMP has the historical involvement in protective and national security matters, and a working relationship with major police departments across the country, that makes that possible. In fact, in some major Canadian cities, the RCMP has long been a partner with other police forces in joint forces operations formed for purposes of addressing other criminal concerns. GENERAL Canada’s vulnerability to terrorist acts was proven by the GUNGOR and ALTIKAT shootings. Police in Canada are not presently equipped to properly investigate and defend against such terrorist activity. Not nearly enough is known about the existence, make-up and strategies of terrorist elements that constitute a threat to Canada’. There must be an improved intelligence gathering process on terrorist persons and organizations, and on .../6 000191 �6 those individuals and groups supporting their activities in one capacity or.another. From a federal law enforcement perspective in Canada, there is need to have in place across the country, a Federal police capability specially trained and knowledgeable in terrorist activities, working pro-actively with both the Security Service and local police forces in monitoring and developing criminal intelligence on matters of a terrorist related concern. That same Federal law enforcement capability, again working cooperatively with the Security Service and local police departments, would be the federal means of seeking to ensure that multi-force, multi-jurisdictional terrorist related criminal offences are fully investigated, the federal authority rendering any investigative or coordination assistance that may be required. All criminal intelligence on terrorist related matters, deve- loped by that federal law enforcement capability, or collec­ ted from other police departments or sources, should be centralized and analyzed along with Security Service intelli- gence from domestic and international sources. ! This will assist government and police in making well informed decisions on combative and protective anti-terrorist measures and determining the best courses of investigative and prosecutive action. .../7 000192 �-7- The Problem Terrorist can come from anywhere at anytime and strike at anything or anybody for any reason. Even when the target of a suspected terrorist act is known, e.g. , a Turkish mission in Canada , there still remains the almost Impossible questions of what building, car or mission emp1oyee, and in what city and at what location, and at what time and by what means. means . The possible targets are countless as are the ways and means of attacking those targets, of that rests And not Al 1 in the hands of a terrorist. only are these decisions probably made by persons outside Canada, but so probably, are the persons tasked to carry out the terrorist assignments. Judging by the way the attacks have been carried out in Canada so far, those by the J.C.A.G. particularly, the terrorists are trained to at least a certain level of professionalism. Matters that presently impact detrimentally on any effective Canadian Anti-terrorism response Inadequate international terror i st intelligence, either because Canada is not accessing all available international sources, or the information is just not there to be accessed. I nadequate, if not negligible, domes t i c i n te11 i gence, .../8 000193 �-8- with very I i m i ted international intelligence, and minimal domestic intelligence, Canada, at least in the Armenian remains very vulnerable. situation, Law enforcement in Canada , RCMP and other police forces have not been spec i a I Iy tra i ned to deal with international terrorism and have no resources permanently committed to deal with this problem, either pro-active or re-active. Thus, until very recently when some RCMP resources resou rces in some cities were temporarily re-deployed from other traditional police responsibilities capability criminal matters (organized crime) there was wa s no CIB police in Canada actively monitoring and collecting intelligence on terrorist related persons and in Canada. Moreover, when serious terrorist acts in Canada did occu r, and follow-up investigations were required in various areas of the country, there was no one police department or police force with the jurisdiction, o r the mandate, to be des i gnated a s the leader to coordinate and be accountable for al I investigative action, Thus , i t became a situation of local police departments having primary investigative responsibility in their own jurisdiction, and giving the investigation the time and attention consistent with their perception of the overall need and their responsibility to respond to local law enforcement priorities. RCMP CIB, and RCMP Security Service on a cooperative basis, could only work in a support role, and, in fact, did very much of the investigative workload in the cities outside of Ottawa. Other problems directly or i n d irectly related to this matter Does the level of our immigration enforcement make it possible for terrorists to slip in and out of Canada easily. . . ./9 000194 �-9- Does our citizenship and Immigration laws make it too difficult to deny citizenship and remove from Canada, persons who were directly or indirectly connected with terrorist activities, e.g., the A persons charged in Toronto. City Police Forces are a re very limited in the time and effort they can give to investigating matters related to terrorist acts, particularly when those acts are comm itted in cities or areas of the country other than their own. Further comp I i cat i ng this is that some of the information reaching us, particularly from security intelligence agencies comes with restrictions preventing the dissemination beyond the RCMP. W ithou t that information, it is often difficult for municipal police forces to appreciate the priority that should be accorded the investigation. Municipal police forces are primarily concerned with offences that have or may occur in their area, and are quick to want to respond to those situations, It would be difficult to convince them not to respond in order to accommodate a more long range national or or international Does the RCMP have any tactical investigation. response team to react to a terrorist incident. I s there need for special training at the Canadian Police College to make investigators more knowledgeable in the areas related to extremist activities. 000195 �♦ Solicitor General Canada Solliciteur gGnGral Canada SECRET OTTAWA KIA 0P8 September 29, 1983 Mr. E.A.. iller, Director Emerg Icy Preparedness Division Bureau of Intelligence Analysis and Security Department of External Affairs Lester B. Pearson Building 125 Sussex Drive Ottawa, Ontario KIA 0G2 Dear Mr. Wilier: In response to Mr. Michael Shenstone's letter, ZSE-(M)-437 of September 13, 1983, Mr. Shoemaker has asked me to advise you that he concurs with the pro­ posed update to be provided Ministers on 'Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada'. With respect to Armenian terrorism you may, however, wish to indicate that the 'Armenian Revolutionary Army' attack against the Turkish Embassy compound in Lisbon for the stated purpose of occupying the premises for two days constitutes a marked deviation from the Armenian terrorist tactics of assassination and bombing. fa rh As you know, we made the point in the Threat Assessment portion of the HARP documents .that because of the widespread and lasting publicity arising from armed occupations, we could expect Armenian terrorists to adopt such activities. Since it's nice to be proven right (rather.than stubborn) it may be useful to bring this factor to Cabinet attention. Yours sincerely, £ .. Director OCT 4 19B3 ier Contingency Planning Divisio: I'AR Police and Security Branch Canada I SECU?-‘ ’7 StRV’iCt 000196 �REQUEST FOR PHOTOCOPIES RCMPGRC DEMANDE DE ' PHOTOCOPIES DATE 69. n / REQUESTED BY (PRINT NAME)/ DEMANDEUR (NOW EN LETTRES MOULEES) ROOM N*/N° DE PlfeCE /3A DATE OF DOCUMENT/REPORT DATE DU DOCUMENT/RAPPORT . XUMENT OU N® DE DOSSIER OU RAPPORT ... ' N» OF COPIES/NBRE DE COPIES 3 CLASSIFICATION. TOP SECRET TRES SECRET RESTRICTED DIFFUSION RESTREINTE . CONFIQI NTIAL CONFTO :ntiel /SECRET. SECRET I UNCLASSIFIED NON CLASSIFIE V* REQUIREMENTS OR INSTRUCTIONS/EXIGEyC£S'<OU DIRECTIVES_______________ r...... » t REQUESTED BY (SIGNATURE) / SIGNATURE OU DFMANDEUR COPIES RECEIVED (INITIALS) COP^E^Rf^^S ( lNlT 1AL E S l BRANCH/SOUS-DIRECTION P.A. N®/N® A.C. 000197 �z 4$ 2> * 7 .<b / 000198 �1 / * Governmeni ofr ada Gouvernemeni du Canada MEMORANDUM 1 NOTE DE SERVICE Sf Cuftllr. Ci ASSfl ICAIION-Df SfCUftHf SECRET DDG (Operations) OUBtlll-N'ftfffKfNCf L i r i IA 195-128 >OU» Ulf - VIBt If Bl "Cl Officer i/c "D" Operations FROM Of i) 1.1 ( 1983-09-29 L SOHHC OF// ? Cabinet Paper on Terrorism and its Implications for Canada The purpose of this is to answer the issues you raised with me on 1983-09-28. The points you wished addressed were: a) When will the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defense Policy be meeting to discuss the submission on Terrorism? b) What is the current status of our review? c) What was the extent of the participation by the CIB representative on the drafting com­ mittee? Point (a) was discussed with Ed Wilier, External Affairs, and the following obtained: The earliest the submission could be put forward to the CCFDP now is 1983-10-03. The Honourable Allan MacEachen, Minister for External Affairs, normally chairs these meetings but he may not be available on October 3rd and, if such is the case, he will not be free until after October 31st. In his absence, the Minister of Defense, Honourable Jean-Jacques Blais, may chair the meeting but this is considered a remote possibility. Point (b) Although some time has elapsed since the drafting of the Paper, the reviewers (External Affairs, Sol. Gen. and Security R 1 r OCT 3 W -r SERVICE records 000199 �SECRET 2 IA 195-128 Service), acting on the assumption that all involved had concurred with the BP and MC, concluded that the important elements of the submission, the issues, the conclusions and the recommendations were still valid. Therefore, the annex was prepared as an up­ dating and circulated to the Sol. Gen. and DG for concurrence. Subsequently, corre­ spondence was forwarded to the DPP and DCI for their concurrence by the DG. The DPP replied to the DG on this matter on 1983-09-23 (copy attached) and concurred with the annex; and the DCI's reply was received on 1983-09-28. He indicated that the MC did not reflect the concerns outlined in the D/C Criminal Ops. memo to the Commissioner dated 1983-03-28. Incidentally, this memo was not copied to the DG. The DCI asked that these concerns be taken into account before the submission is presented to the CCFDP. These concerns have been addressed in the attached Appendix "A" . It is still our understanding that the Special Hostage Rescue Force submission will be discussed by the CCFDP, along with the BP and MC. Two days after External Affairs had circulated their letter (ZSE-437) requesting the concurrence of Mr. Shoemaker and the Director General on the annex, they received correspondence from the Privy Council Office (PCO) indicating they had gone ahead and circulated the submission together with the annex to the CCFDP committee members without waiting for the concurrence of the Sol. Gen. and the RCMP. Mr. Wilier indicated he will follow this aspect up with Mr. Joseph Caron, PCO, on 1983-09-29 and will inform us whether this action did, in fact, take place. If this is the case, it may not be possible to make any revisions to the Paper at this late date. An option, of course, would be for the Commissioner to ask the Solicitor General to raise the CIB issues at the CCFDP meeting. Point (c) From the outset, the representative of the DCI actively participated in the efforts of the • • ./3 000200 �I 3 S E C R E T IA 195-128 working group relative to the BP and MC. In fact, he had significant input into the portions dealing with the tactical, investigative and prosecutorial responses to specific incidents, the special hostage rescue force, INTERPOL and Police Liaison programme. For further details concerning the involvement of the CIB in this matter, see attached Appendix "B". In summary, considering the number of departments involved in the development of the submission and each with their own pri­ orities and interests, this paper represents a compromise among all the participants. The various drafts were under­ taken endeavoring to maintain the substance of the original contributions and at the same time written in a style consis­ tent throughout. I hope that the foregoing answers your concerns in this matter. J.A. Venner, C/Supt. Officer i/c "D" Operations Attachment AAM/al 000201 �APPENDIX "A" The following observations are submitted to address the items raised by the DCI in his memo dated 1983-09-27. Para. 7 When the Background Paper was finalized in November, 1982, only limited information was available on these emerging issues. They, however, have been assessed in more detail in the annex to External Affairs letter ZSE-418 dated 1983-08-31. The Dukhaboors and FLQ issues were discussed by the Working Group during the preparation of the paper but were considered dated. Although there have been some home-grown terrorist activity in Canada, based on current information available, the main terrorist threat to Canada will be posed by groups or individuals who support for­ eign based terrorist groups. Para. 18 Although this aspect is not included in the MC, it is covered in Part IV - Page 29, Para. 69 of the BP. Paras. 20 & 23 It was not the intent here to suggest that the Security Service had the exclusive responsibility to "predict and thwart terrorist acts" but to outline the security intelligence process. More­ over, the law enforcement function is covered under "Tactical, Investigative, and Prosecutorial Responses to Specific Incidents" on Page 15 of the MC. Para. 34 The concern about the need within the RCMP to have primary responsibility assigned is recognized and covered within Paras. 33 & 34 of the MC, as well as in the BP. Line 14 of paragraph 34 of the MC, for instance, states "the terrorist threat for the 1980's indicates the need to create a centralized capability to co-ordinate a national response". 000202 �APPENDIX "B" RCMP CIB role in the development of the Memorandum to Cabinet (MC) and the Background Paper (BP). The purpose of this brief is to provide you with an accurate picture of the role of CIB in the development of the role of CIB in the development of the MC and BP. In addition to as­ sessing our file, IA 195-128 - "Federal Cabinet Paper on Terrorism and its Implications for Canada", CIB file P-1-76 - "Anti-Terrorist Contingency Planning", was reviewed. Outlined below is a chronology of CIB's role in the develop­ ment of the MC and BP as gleaned from their file. 82-10-01 A-5 from OIC NCIB to DCI providing a copy of a preliminary working draft. This was pro­ vided to members of the drafting group by XA, their memo ZSPE-343 dated 82-09-30 refers. 82-10-08 A-5 from DPP to D/Commr. Criminal Ops. pro­ viding a copy of the draft memorandum. 82-12-05 A-5 from D/Commr. Criminal Ops. to OIC NCIB requesting a review on a priority basis of the draft of 82-11-24. 82-12-06 A-5 from D/Commr. Criminal Ops. to Commissioner outlining his concerns. Criminal Ops. scribbled some notes on the side on pages 12, 15 and 22. 82-12-06 A-5 from OIC NCIB to D/Commr. Criminal Ops. outlining his comments on the draft paper. 83-01-04 A-5 from DPP to D/Commr. Criminal Ops. provid­ ing a copy of "P” Directorate's revised copy of the MC and BP dated 82-12-13. No signifi­ cant changes had been made concerning protec­ tion. ("P" Dir. was satisfied with the draft). Footnote to A-5: "Have this reviewed from Operations perspective and advise me of any problems now". (Initials believed to be that of D/Commr. H. Jensen). Footnote: 83-01-27 to QIC NCIB "For further attention". Memo from DCI to D/Commr. Criminal Ops. on It was his review of the Cabinet Memorandum, the DCI's view that the MC does not adequately . ../2 000203 �- 2 - reflect the law enforcement responsibility in terms of the prevention and detection of terrorist acts ... A forwarding minute to the Commissioner from D/Commr. Criminal Ops. with the comment that "you may wish to consider strengthening the document...". 83-03-16 A-5 from DPP to Acting D/Cbmmr. Criminal Ops. with a copy of the final version of the MC. Footnote to OIC NCIB: "Please examine in light of previous draft and highlight the areas where changes have been made". 83-03-24 Memo from DCI to D/Commr. Criminal Ops. com­ menting on the MC of 83-02-17. Detailed comments on paras. 7, 18, 20, 23 and 34. 83-03-28 Memo from D/Commr. Criminal Ops. to Commissioner reiterating the comments of DCI's memo of 83-03-24. 83-09-16 Memo to DCI from DG requesting concurrence and/or .comments on the MC and BP. 83-09-27 Memo to DG from DCI requesting revisions be made to take into account concerns outlined by D/Commr. Criminal Ops. NOTE: This is the first indication we have that the DCI did not concur with the information contained in the MC and BP. (Last correspondence on file). 000204 �?, hcmp ohc rz • Classification FICHE DE SERVICE TRANSIT SLIP BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier //4- /75 'iJ-fr • HANDWRITE - ECRIREA LA MAIN Date FROM - DE GJ. | ; 1 Comments J Commentaires i ~1 Perusal and P.A. I Action ____ I Donner suite I Prepare Reply Rediger une riponse Lire et dasser SUBJECT - SUJET 7 Prepare Brief _____ I Preparer un expose Return with Current File Retourner avec le dossier actual I Check Records Verifier les dossiers I Make File(s) I Ouvrir un dossier (ULAA/MaXvvX_______________________________ IgUaIa REMARKS I Use same A-5 for Reply whj> space permits) - REMARQUES (Si I'espace le permet. repondre sur cette formule) C12^A-A_a5m cL —■ J Cl zvr\ C,. ~1T)J 4-^C 'U ^\XAjV-<LA>6vXS. cXa . .^AhdLU .. "T-O-aXa^vg "-7^Kjg 9^-v^a4<' c2_J <ULz_XuX- £ c^xcX- JI c>-^V cX CL (3 ¥ /U (L 3 ■ T - (,Ti) - cL _^^z^bWV X rfJ 07 7 <x> X4 <J> o c£o7ju d g 6 S lf> < '4<> ■H ff x. PC-O D»arv£lJte - Date d'agenda ■AAyrrud------- / Meeting Date - Date de reunion e ttdJ s 7- - rxJLx^r, P A A CCpnAz Date * ' lnit.//V° 000205 j �> l«MP(.l« Classification FICHE DESERVICE TRANSIT SLIP BIN BO File No. - /V° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN Date FROM - DE TO -A Comments Commentates Action Donner suite Prepare Brief Preparer un exposi Return with Current File Retourner avec le dossier actuel Perusal and P.A. Lire et classer Prepare Reply Rediger une reponse Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier Check Records Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (Si I'espace le permet. repondre sur cette lormule) ec Fd p C. n 1 b-t/ cs_^> ■ C Ckbri <3-rrJlAAL-A_ 5 £ 8 CM d P.A. - AC. £ o 6 co < Diary Date Date dagenda Meeting Date - Dale de reunion Date \mUN‘ 000206 �1 tara. 20-1 suggest it is not the exclusive responsibility of the Security Service "to predict and thwart terrorist acts". Law enforcement is heavily involved in this area in terms of prevention, detection and investiga­ tion. Surely, it is the responsibility of the Security Service to provide timely and accurate intelligence to law enforcement to permit the peace officer to prevent (thwart) detect and investigate such crimes. I recog­ nize the roles of immigration and others in the lines of defence. Para. 23 - Accurate and timely analysis is critical also to the police decision making process. There is also need for collection, collation and analysis by law enforcement. The Security Service would of course be a significant source of intelligence to law enforcement. Para. 34 ■ Line 12 states "There have been few experiences in Canada requiring a national police response", There have been quite a number of incidents requiring a response by this Force. II would agree that there have been problems associated with the Altikat murder, the Gungor attempted murder, the Cross kidnapping, etc from a federal perspective due to the lack of primary investigative responsibility assigned to the RCMP. We do have a need within the RCMP to have primary responsi­ bility assigned for certain of these crimes (FLEUR I). If that is so, we will have to improve our structure for response and coordination. My purpose in drawing this to your attention is to have you consider whether or not the document as drafted has a balance of focus. If you conclude that it has not, you will have an opportunity at the next Foreign and Defence Policy Mirror Committee to comment. H. Jensen, Deputy Commissioner. C.C. D.C.I. ' D.P.P. (■ 4' L p/ PM v r / 0/ r 4 t// </ n i I v dr *-o ■ I 1 F- i?: 1 r Sv 000207 �LETTERBOOK COPY - * ’joyernment X - of Canada < , Gouvemement du Canada MEMORANDUM MHS/dl NOTE DE SERVICE SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - O£ SECURITE SECRET Director General, Security Service TO A J L FROM IA195-128 D.C.I. DE DATE 83-09-27 SUBJECT OBJET Federal Cabinet Paper on Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada The most recent Memorandum to Cabinet has been reviewed and „ I note it does not reflect the concerns outlined by the I D/C Criminal Ops. to the Commissioner in his memorandum I dated 83-03-28 (copy attached). ■3 . ■------------------------------- - ■■ .. I would Cask that the appropriate revisions_be_ made to take into account the concerns expressed before the submission .. is presented to the Cabinet Committee on Foreign & Defense Policy. Schramm, A/Commr., Director, Criminal Investigation. > Encl. c.c. Director , •P' Directorate R OCT 3 1985 security opcoeds 000208 �J*. 2* * . Government of Canada Gouvernement du Canada MEMORANDUM r io n SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SECURITE SECRET COMMISSIONER A NOTE DE SERVICE OUR FILE - N / REFERENCE L J r —i DEPUTY COMMISSIONER CRIMINAL OPERATIONS FROM DE YOUR FILE - V/REFERENCE DATE L SUBJECT OBJET P-1-76 1983.03.28 Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada Memorandum to Cabinet - 1983.02.17 The above Memorandum to Cabinet dwells on the role of Security Service without sufficient balance in terms of the law enforce­ ment role of peace officers in terms of prevention, detection, investigation and maintenance of peace and order, The slant could in my view be somewhat misleading, I will deal with paragraphs of particular concern. 7 Para. I feel there is insufficient recognition of the internal threat. Activities ’such as the bombings/ firebombings by the Direct Action group at BC Hydro­ Dunsmuir, Litton Industries-Toronto, Red Hot Video Studios-Vancouver area are a form of domestic terro­ rism as well as sabotage. The Cruise Missile issue has potential for further problems. ( The Dukhaboors.used terrorism as a strategy and to this day, the occasional incident occurs. They had political objectives relative to schooling issues. -V J The F.L.Q. story involved terrorism, bombing, kid­ napping etc and is well known, hence does not need to be repeated. k'X^The ■/'for domestic scene has been a more serious problem Canada than the international scene. I do not believe the paper gives adequate recognition to this fact. Para. 18 - Our Liaison Officers are involved in the exchange of .criminal and security intelligence (line 5). V IT- .../2 000209 RC 177 7540-21 798-8998 �. '-/2 ■ r ura. 20-1 suggest it is not the exclusive responsibility of the Security Service "to predict and thwart terrorist acts". Law enforcement is heavily-^involved in this area in terms of preventiondetection and investiga­ tion. Surely, it is the responsibility of the Security Service to provide timely and accurate intelligence to law enforcement to permit the peace officer to prevent (thwart) detect a-nd investigate such crimes. I recog­ nize the roles of immigration and others in the lines / of defence. • Para. 23 - Accurate and timely analysis is critical also to the police decision making process. There is also need for collection, collation and analysis by law-enforcement. The Security Service would of course be a significant source of intelligence to law enforcement. Para. 34 / Line 12 states "There have been few experiences in Canada requiring a national police response". There have been quite a number of incidents requiring a response by this Force. I would agree that there have been problems associated with the Altikat murder, the Gungor attempted murder, the Cross kidnapping, etc from a federal perspective due to the lack of primary investigative responsibility assigned to the RCMP. We do have a need within the RCMP to have primary_responsibility assigned for "certain of these crimes (FLEUR I). If that is so, we will have to improve our structure .for response and coordination. My purp'ose in drawing this to your attention is to have you consider whether or not the document as drafted has a balance of focus. If you conclude that it has not, you will have an opportunity at the next Foreign and Defence Policy Mirror Committee to comment. J % i H-r-<Jensen, Deputy/Commissioner. C.C. fo.C.I. D.P.P., 3° 000210 �Government ' Gouvemement W Canada du Canada 77®' '•'<* i: > '■I-"-/;1'-. . MEMORANDUM NOTE DE SERVICE security - classification . oe TO A OUR FILE/HOTRE REFERENCE J GP-195-111-1 “1 FROM OE YOUR FILE/VOTRE REFERENCE IA 195-128 Director, Protective Policing SUBJECT OBJET SECURITE SECRET Director General, Security Service L ■A? OATS 83.09.23 Federal Cabinet Paper on Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada In response to your memorandum of 1983.09.16’ with attachments, the annex to External Affairs letter (ZSE-418), dated 1983.08.31, has been reviewed here and is concurred with. Copies of MC and BP as provided are being retained. I ft l\ I ■ F.F. Fedor, C/Supt., for Director, Protective Policing. z\ ; . * / 000211 �RCMP GRC TRANSIT SLIP Classification FICHE DE SERVICE BIN BD • HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN FROM - DE. r | | Comments | Commentates I | I Perusal and P.A. | Lire et dasser Action | Donner suite | [ 1 Prepare Reply | Rudiger une rdponse | H Prepare Brief | Preparer un exposd | I | I Make File(s) J Ouvrir un dossier [ | I Return with Current File | Retourner avec le dossier actue! ~] Check Records | Verifier les dossiers REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (Si lespace le permet, ripondre suftette formula) ___ st'*'— _______ 0 5 o Rs tM-Je W--------' g s m < l/Diary Date - Dare d'agenda P.A. -A.C. Meeting Date - Date de r^ungn OCT 3 1903 Date __________________ SECURITY SERVICE RECORDS lnit.//V° ,000212 �RCMP GRC TRANSIT SLIP Classification FICHE DE SERVICE BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier • HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN TO-A FROM - DE Comments Commentaires Perusal and P.A. Lire et classer Prepare Reply Rddiger une riponse Date Prepare Brief Preparer un expose Return with Current File Retourner avec !e dossier actue! Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier Check Records Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (Si t'espace le permet, rdpondre sur cette formulel 5 j) 9 CN 6 tn m r* £ § Diary Date - Date d'agenda Meeting Date - Date de reunion Date Init.//V° CD in < 000213 �RCMP GRC TRANSIT SLIP Classification FICHE DE SERVICE BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN JO -A FROM - DE Date Comments Commentaires Action Donner suite ' I Prepare Brief ] Preparer un expose Return with Current File Retourner avec le dossier actuel Perusal and P.A. Lire et ciasser Prepare Reply Rediger une reponse I | I Make File(s) | Ouvrir un dossier Check Records Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMAROUES (Sirespace le permet. repondre sur cette formule) ■ DfiS £ ZD O (N 3 s co o 6 co in P.A. -A.C. Diary Date - Date d'agenda Meeting Date - Date de reunion Date lnrt./A/° .000214 �Classification FICHE DE SERVICE TRANSIT SLIP RCMP GRC BIN BD • HANDWRITE - ECR!RE A LA MAIN FROM - DE TO-A Date c>/_e — Comments Commentaires Action Donner suite Prepare Brief Preparer un expose Return with Current File Retourner avec ie dossier actuei Perusal and PA. Lire et ciasser Prepare Reply Ridiger une riponse Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier Check Records Verifier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET yn . . / REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (Si 1‘espace !e permet, repondre sur cette formule) ^<2 £ <£> cn o nj d m in P.A. - A.C. co § s m < Diary Date - Date d'agenda Meeting Date - Date de reunion Date lnit.//V° 000215 �RCMPGRC • HANDWRITE - ECRIRE A LA MAIN SECRET BIN BD File No. - N° du dossier , IA195-12S B- .TO-A R.M. Chick, In I Classification FICHE DE SERVICE TRANSIT SLIP Date FROM - DE 33 .OQ. 16 Cpl. A/a/D—2 via S/Sgt. M. Prentice glu-l QIC LSoPS, 4 rg-cy^, 0/Q £> (fr/gp <'3 Comments Commentaires Action Donner suite Prepare Brief Preparer un expose Return with Current File Retourner avec le dossier actuei Perusal and P.A. Lire et dasser Prepare Reply Rediger une reponse Make File(s) Ouvrir un dossier Check Records \Z6rrfier les dossiers SUBJECT - SUJET Re: Proposed Draft Memo for Signature of D.G. REMARKS (Use same A-5 for Reply when space permits) - REMARQUES (SiI'espace le permet, ripondre sur cette formula) The attached correspondence has been prepared for the D.G.*s signature. As there is some urgency attached to this matter, any priority which you could afford it would be most appreciated. ---------- /7 C/ T ____ LA____ u LULL p . 0rGr _____ I______ p c p- ' |_ SPrURlTY 11^= I OCT jpiv/te? V 5 6 N 9 I <N 6 co tn Hl Dtirf bite/- Date d'agenda P.A. -AC. Meeting Date - Date de reunion Date Init./W 000216 �RCMPGRC REQUEST FOR PHOTOCOPIES DEMANDE DE PHOTOCOPIES DATE 577) <59/95 REQUESTED BY (PRINT NAME) Z OEMANOEUR (NOM EN LETTRES MOULEES) ROOM N«Z N« OE PIECE 35 (s’) /ty_____ DATE OF DOCUMENT/REPORT DATE DU DOCUMENT/RAPPORT TITLE OF DOCUMENT OR FILE N® OF REPORT/ TITRE DU DOCUMENT OU N® DE DOSSIER DU RAPPORT A' . ■ //? 2T -? o 9 ■ N* OF COPIES/NBRE DE COPIES P £ CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET TRES SECRET RESTRICTED DIFFUSION RESTREINTE d_l—SECRET CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIEL SECRET UNCLASSIFIED, NON CLASSIFIE REQUIREMENTS OR INSTRUCTIONS/EXIGENCE OU DIRECTNyf \ - ,To I? REQUESTED BJ (SIONATURE)Z SIGNATURE DU OEMANOEUR COPIES RECEIVED (INITIALS) COPIES RMUES(INITIALES) _______________ SF 283(81/08) BRANCH/SI IRECTION .. P.A.N«/M"A,C.' 000217 �i ’ r 4 :td'.c I I f i 3E?^ placed ov* f.’.t jYi , — •— C- p. I I 1 ----- fI Al DM' 000218 �* |fJjL'*- Government II t of Canada Gouvernement du Canada MEMORANDUM r SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SECURITE • D.W. McGibbon, A/Commr., A Director, ■ Protective Policing SECRET OUR RLE - N / REFERENCE J rJ.B. IA195-12S YOUR FILE - V / REFERENCE Giroux, 1 Director General, Security Service. FROM DE .J Re: r* DATE L SUBJECT OBJET NOTE DE SERVICE 19S3.O9.16 Federal Cabinet Paper on Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada. Attached are copies of External Affairs letters (ZSE-41S) dated 19S3.OS.31 and (ZSE-437) dated 19S3.O9.13, as well as the annex which will inform you of the current status regarding the memorandum to Cabinet (MC) and the Background Paper (BP). I understand that the Submission is now scheduled to be considered by the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defense Policy (CCFDP) during the remainder of this month or early October. The MC and BP were recently reviewed by the drafting group. It was concluded that despite the fact that the paper is now dated the main portions of the submission, namely, the issues, the conclusions and the recommendations remain the same. At the same time, it was agreed that the Ministers might find it useful to have an assessment of current events, and to modify the portion dealing with the Special Threat Assessment Group. Consequently, the annex attached to the letter (ZSE-437) was prepared, and the concurrence of the PCO was obtained to have it circulated together with the letter to the Ministers informing them of the date and time the MC and BP will be considered by the CCFDP. Before replying to External Affairs, I would appreciate receiving your concurrence and/or comments on this matter at your earliest convenience. I am attaching copies of the NIC and BP for your convenience and retention. ORIGINAL SIGNED BY J.B. Giroux, Director General, Security Service. W^cc: GC 177 R.R. Schramm, A/Commr. Director, Criminal Investigations NEK/gh 7540-21 798-8998 Ctt 3 * 000219 �T RCMPGRC DEMANDE DE PHOTOCOPIES REQUEST FOR PHOTOCOPIES DATE ROOM N«/ N" DE PliCE REQUESTED BY (PRINT NAME) /OEMANOEURINOM EN LETTRES MOULEES) /<■? /e ; /u_______ ______________ DATE OF DOCUMENT/REPORT DATE OU OOyUMEy/RAPPORT TITLE OF OOCLjWenT OR FILE N'_[ZREPORT/TITRE OU DOCUMENT OU N* OE DOSSIER OU RAPPORT J.A.............. .... V3 7 N* OF COPIES/NBRE OE COPIES L c\ CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET TRES SECRET □ SECRET ■Secret UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED DIFFUSION RESTREINTE 9 CONFIDENTIAL CO^i&DENTiEL \ NON CLASS'F.E^^X^^^ REQUIREMENTS OR INSTRUCTIONS/E)agENCgS-OU D^IRECTIVES \ \ REQUESTED BY (SIGNATURE)/ SIGNATURE DU DEMANOEUR SS<283 (81/08) COPIES RECKIVEtLPWfmLSI COPIES R£fJ«STlHITIALES) BRANCH/SOUS-DIRECTION P.A.N*/N«A.C. r 000220 �// □ . H /. §o < mw •7 000221 �CM'. (T/fc (0 Efire nF (Ulrr ^errrtnrg of ^tute for External Affair# 'f * / (S-ubinet bn I)' aux ^.ffaireiS cxierieure^ Canada D. G. SECRET 87- 39- 1 * OTTAWA, ONTARIO KIA 0G2 R. C. M. ?. 13 September 1983 SEC 3iiIX sav/tcE ZSE-(M)-437 Mr. J.E.J.B. Giroux, Director General, Security Service, Royal Canadian Mounted Police Headquarters, 1200 Alta Vista Drive, Ottawa, Ontario KIA 0R2 Dear Mr. Giroux: to 31 of by The purpose of this letter is to confirm that the PCO has agreed our recommendation that the annex to the attached letter (ZSE-418 of August) be circulated together with the letter informing Ministers the date and time the Cabinet Submission on Terrorism will be considered the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy (CCFDP). The enclosed annex is being submitted to you and to Mr. Shoemaker for concurrence. As indicated in the attached letter the annex was prepared by this Department in consultation with representatives of the Ministry of the Solicitor General, including the RCMP Security Service. I should be grateful if you would inform Mr. E.A. Wilier, Director, Emergency Preparedness Division (ZSE), of your concurrence and/or comments at your earliest convenience. I also understand that the Cabinet Submission on "Terrorism and Its Implications for Canada" may be put before the CCFDP in late September or early October. Yours simcerely, bisg \ M. dLu-ZZ*-*^ - Michael Shenstone Assistant Deputy \/V E D Political and Ini irnatTonaL^^ Security Affairs-------- —jw^'2'----OCT 3 1983 SECURITY SERVICE RECORDS 000222 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDAI00040 Title A name given to the resource A-2012-00614 Release Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived A-2012-00614 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Library and Archives Canada Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource RG146, Vol 5491, File Number NAC 2004/04/14 NAC HIST IA 195-128-40, Part 3 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access Informal Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF