https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/8c4df7069741eda111a5a59c4a19d0d8.pdf a230c52e68eccf6b2c86669bbb6b546e PDF Text Text . 09/14/99 848 1128 PRllNY OF CANADA ----------------------10:57 FAX 212 ➔ P$E la) 002/0lJ ... ·- BeJ>ort· of the Security Council Mission to Indonesia, s to 12 September 1999 . L Index Objectives of� Mission, paragraph 1 Programme and sumxrwy of meetings, paragraphs 2 - 12 Analysis, paragraphs 13 - 16 Conclusions. paragraphs 17 - 25 Recommendations, paragraphs (I) � (vii) IL Composition of the Mission Ambassador Martin Andjaba (Namibia), .Mission Leader Ambassador Hasmy Agam. (Malaysia) Ambassador Alphons (The Netherlands) Ambassador Danilo Turk (Slovenia) Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom) Mr. Francese Vendrell (UN Secretariat), Deputy Personal Representative of the Secretary-General Hamer ID. Objectives of the Mission 1. The Security Council Mission (SCM) was tasked to dis�uss with the Government of Indonesia (GoI) concrete steps for the peaceful implementation of the 5 May Agreement. The Mission was to welcome the undertaking by the Government of lndcnesia to fulfil its obligations under the 5 May Agreement, but to note that the Government's efforts so far had not been able to prevent an intensification of violence in the Territory. It was to state its particular concern at the recent campaign of violence against UNAMET and urge the GoI to ensure security and to allow UNAJvfET to implement its mandate without hindrance. The Mission was asked to stress that the people of East Timar had made a clear choice in favour of independence, that their will must be respected and that the intemational community looked foIWard to working with the Gol in bringing East Timor to independence. IV. Programme and summary of meetings 2. Briefing from,lJN and UNAMET staff (819.J-; The briefings described unequivocally the deterioration in the security and humanitarian situation in East Tim.or since the announcement of the ballot result, in contrast with the attempt by the Indonesian authorities to give a reassuring account. This and other briefings 002592 �212 848 1128 PRMNY OF CANADA --- -------. -------- FA.I -- --- 09/14/99 10:58 -+ PSE �003/013 2 left the SCM in no doubt that large elements in the military and police authorities had been complicit in organizing and supporting the action of the militias. Meeting with Foreign Minister Alatas (8/9): The S� <?On�eyed to� 3. Alatas the grave concern of the Council over the current situatl.on m East Timor, and expressed its wish to work with the Go! in a spirit of pragmatism and cooperation to address the security and hmnanitarian situation. The SCM emphasized the need to ensure that UNAMET and international relief organizations be allowed to return to East Timor and cany out their functions fully. A final withdrawal ofUNAMET would send a very bad signal of the failure of the government to stabilize the situation. FM Alatas expressed Indonesia' s shared concern over the crisis in East Timor, but insisted that while the Government would welcome any assistance in providing humanitarian relief, it would not contemplate any foreign militaxy presence in East Tim.or before the Indonesian parliament met and addressed the outcome of the popular consultation. Until then, Indonesia should be: allowed to resolve the security situation. The SCM stressed that if the situation were to continue deteriorating while the Government did not accept the offer of help from the international community, Indonesia would be subjected to severe international criticism. Meetings with the Jakarta Diplomatic Cor:ps(8/9 and I0/9): The SCM 4. discussed the current situation in East Timor with Jakana-based Ambassadors. A number of Ambassadors firmly underscored the complicity by the Indonesian military and police in the actions of the railitia and described a coordinated campaign to rid the Territozy of all foreign presence. Concerns were also expressed that the Government no longer had control over the military, at least with respect to the situation in East Timar, where the military was willfully contradicting the policy of the government. The Ambassadors strongly supported the idea of the visit of the SCM to East Timer. They expressed doubts that the GOI would agree to cooperate with an international security force in East Tim.or. Following the SCM's visit to East Tim.or, Ambassadors were briefed on the Mission's findings. 5. Meeting with Madam Megawati Soekarnopuni(S/9): The SCM explained its objectives and asked Madam Megawati to refrain from treating any emerging willingness of the Go I to accept an international security presence as a stick with which to beat the Government. She agreed. but declined to go public in support of the idea of international intervention. She criticised President Habibie strongly for agreeing to the 5 May Agreement process when, as she alleged, his legitimacy as leader of Indonesia was fading away. The SCM declined to get into the domestic political aspects. 002593 �10:58 FAX 212 848 1128 OF CANADA �-- ----- ----- ------PRHNY 09/14/99 .. PSE laloo41013 3 ): �- �nsmao �pealed in 6. Meetings with Mr. X;mana Gusmao(9/9 and 12/9 es m East T�or. He the strongest terms to the SCM to act immediately to save -� , rather, it was stated categorically that East Tim.or was not in a state of civil� East suffering what amounted to a campaign by the mili� to e� Timorese and lay waste to its cities, possibly with the mtent to partl.tton the Territory. He reported that u TNI battalions bad entered the Temtoiy fro11:1 �est Tim.or, and stated that, should this "invasion" reach the westernmost ofFalintil's four cantonment sites, Falintil would have no choice but to defend itself. There were currently thousands of imemally displaced persons seeking refuge at the cantonment sites. Following the Mission�s visit to Dill, Mission representatives called on Mr. Gusmao to brief him on the situation on the ground. When it became evident that the GOI were about to announce their w:i]ljngness to cooperate with the intemational community, Mr. Gusmao was encouraged to put out a statement in .measured and conciliatory terms. . . 7. �eting with President Habibie (9/9): The SCM conveyed to the President th.at the situation in East Timor had gone far beyond the acceptable, and asked the President to consider the offer of assistance from the interna.tional comm.unity. President Habibie rejected any foreign military presence before the Indonesian parliament had acted on the consultation result. He said this would send the wrong signal to Indonesians regarding the militaiy, and risk the BalkanizatJ.on of lndonesia.. The SCM underlined the fundamental point that the degree of confidence which the Security Council would have in Indonesian actions would be directly related to the ex.tent to which UNAfvffiT could deploy and operate normally. The President agreed that it was essential to keep UN.AfvfET in East Timar, and maintained that security for the UNAMET compound would be redoubled and its water and food needs met. The SCM reached agy-eement with the President that it would travel to Dili, both to assess the situation first hand and to show its support to UNAMET. On preparations for phase I.IL the SCM suggested that bringing forward the preparation of the security element of the UN' s responsibility for the Tenitory would be a way of contributing to the maintenance of security in phase II. President Habibie rejected the idea. 8. Meerinf.! with General Wjranto and the General Staff; (9/9) 'While acknowledging that there were problems in East Timor, General Wiranto stated that the 1NI was committed to handling the situation, however complex. After the results of the balloting were announced. the pro-integration group, concerned about what it considered to be biased behaviour on the part of UNAMET s� had erupted into violence. A further complication was that a substantial number of the police and military in East Timer were local East Timorese, and were thus in his words, "understandably" against independence. Linguistic and cultural differences 002594 �PRMNY OF CANADA -- ---------------- 09/14/99 10:59 FAX 212 848- 1128 -+ PSE �00S/OlJ 4 coupled with the size of the territory had made the work of the TN! �ore difficult. General Wiranto had full confidence that martial law would allow his forces to stabilize the situation and begin to tend to the needs of the refugees. In his view� pro-integration anger at UNAMET was so high that the situation would only deteriorate further if UN troops were brought in now. The Mission contested his analysis throughout and pointed to the lack of political will on the _part of the Gol. News coming in during the meeting of violence against the UNAMET compound graphically illustrated the General's misplaced confidence. Meeting with Indonesian NGO re.presentatives (10/9): A group of 9. Indonesian NGO leaders met with two members of the SCM to convey their concerns and discuss the East Tim.or situation. The group presented a joint statement singed by 15 NGOs which called for: immediate Security Council meetings to decide on the sending of a peace-keeping force to East Tim.or; the Gol to take concrete steps to stop the violence in East Tim.or by complying with the S May Agreement and arresting militias, and; the Go! to immediately lift the martial law in East Timor. 10. Visit to Dili (1 J/9): The Mission had highly useful meetings with local military commanders, toured the town and visited the UNAMET compound. The Mission also met with Bishop Nasciemento. While there were no security incidents during the period of the visit, the Mission was left with a strong sense of shock at the destruction which had taken place, concern at UNAMET' s severe loss of confidence in the security provided by the local forces, and distress at the desperate state of the displaced population. A large media party represented this to the outside world. During the course of the visit, it became clear that General Wiranto•s views had also undergone a change. 11. President Habibie's :press statement and the mission's visit with the Pres1dent (12/9); Shortly before a scheduled visit with the Mission. President Habibie annowiced to the press that while the Indonesian defence forces had done their utmost under -very difficult and complex circumstances to stabilize the situation in East Timor, they had had to recognize that there were limits to what they could further achieve. He had, therefore. informed the Secretary-General of Indonesia's reacliness to, unconditionally, .. accept international peace keeping forces through the UN from friendly nations to restore peace and security in Ea.st Timor, to protect the people, and to implement the results of the direct ballot of 3 0 August 1999". Foreign Minister Alatas would travel to New York to prepare for the implementation of the cooperative effort between the UN and the Government of Indonesia. 002595 �09/14/99 --------- 10:59 FAX 212 848 1128 PRl!NY OF CANADA -+ PSE 5 12. During the subsequent meeting with the �sion, the �ident �ressed his Government's wilJjngness to allow for evacuanon to Australia of the mtemally displaced persons in the UNAMET compound; to facilitate air drops of food and other necessities to other internally displaced persons in the hills; as well as to ensure that Falintil would not come under attack by the militias. V. Analysis 13.- Reports from the Secretary-General to the Security Council during phase 1 of the popular consultation described the impunity with which pro-autonomy militias were allowed to cany out violent activity. It was apparent to the Mission, through its own observation and through discussion with UN staff: that tlris activity could not have occurred without the involvement of large elements of the Indonesian military and police. Briefings by UNAMET staff in Jakarta and Dili described how� during post-consultation violence which forced the closure of UNAMET' s regional offices. there were clear instances when police and TNI forces stood aside to allow militias into to,;vns to conduct organised and coordinated campaigns of arson and terror. One aim of this was to rid the Territory of any international presence, including UNAMET, humanitarian workers and the media. thereby limiting outside observation. Another was to implement a coordinated. forced relocation programme in which tens of thousands of East Timorese have been moved to West Timor_ There were consistent reports of the direct involvement of large elements of the TNI and police in this forced relocation campaign. The organised and coordinated nature of this campaign, the Territory-wide effort to force out UNAMET and other international presence and the lack of adequate response to militia violence despite overwhelming superiority of TNI and police all support the view that militia activities were organised and supported by parts of the TNI. 14. There was clearly a disconnect between the situation on the ground and the assessment of the situation in East Timar as presented by President Habibie and his senior advisers. They descri�ed the post-ballot violence as stemming from disgruntled pro-autonomy supporters angry at perceived UNAMET bias, with the Indonesian military struggling to resolve the latest expression oflong-stanciing strife between East Timorese . However. as already outlined above. the widespread destruction on the ground was neither the result of popular sentiment nor civil war. Rather, there were clear signs that the violence could. as many UNAMET staff described it. be "switched on and off". During its 11 September meeting with Defence Minister General Wiranto, the SCM received word that militias were at that very moment attempting to loot vehicles from the UNAMET compound. When General Wiranto had his staff check on the situano� he was �006/013 �-----------09/14/99 10:S9 Fil 212. 848 1128 PIU!NY OF CANADA __ -+ PSE laJ 007 /013 •. 6 apparently told at first that the situation at the compound w� n�rm� desp�te the seriousness of the actual circumstances. The SCM had the distinct III1press1on that when the General traveled to Dili along with the Mission and toured the city, he had not been prepared for the extent of the destruction. Accurate fust-hand _ information as to the situa�on on the ground may well have conmbuted to the change in GoI policy. 15. It was clear to the SCM that martial law, implemented on 7 September, had not succe�ded in stabilising the situation. In Dill, there appeared little left for the · militias to loot by the time of the SC�s arrival on 11 September. Despite assurances by the authorities that UNAMET's security would be a prime objective of martial law, on 10 September Aitarak militia were allowed freely past TNI and police check-points into the environs of the UNAMET compound. UNAMET then observed TNI soldiers assisting the militia in their attempt to loot UNAMET vehicles. When UNAlvfET Military Liaison Officers came under direct threat and demanded that TNI act to stop the militiamen, the TNI soldiers informed them that they had no orders to shoot the militia. Direct evidence such as this, as well as the destruction of the city as a whole, made a nonsense of the argument that martial law might solve the violence which had befallen East Tim.or. 16. It was also apparent that the military emergency was unable to respond adequately to the humanitarian crisis in East Timor, despite assurances by the authorities that this was one of its aims. The campaign of militia terror and forced relocanon had created a crisis which was going largely unobserved and unobservable at the time of the SCM. It has gone largely unreported that a considerable numbers of militiamen entered East Timor from West Timer to bolster the actions of the· militia there. There were widespread reports of militias taking pro-independence supponers and activists from the displaced populations in transit and in West Timor. There were also reports that the tens of thousands of East Timorese who had fled to the Falintil cantonment sites and elsewhere in East Timor were perilously clo�e to starvation. VI. Conclusions 17. It became increasingly clear to the Mission during its visit that the accounts given by the GoI of events in East Timor and of action taken by Indonesia to carry out its responsibilities under the 5 May Agreement did not tally with the briefings provided by UN staff and senior diplomatic representatives in Jakarta and Dili, nor with events observed on the ground. Confronting the Gol with their lack of credibility in this regard contributed to the development of policy in a positive direction. �09114199 848 1128 ---------------ll:OO FA.I. 212 PR.lfNY OF CANADA -- ➔ PSE � 008/013 7 18. The involve�ent of large elements of the Indonesian military and police in East Tim.or in organising and backing the unacceptably violent actions of the militias has become clear to any objective observer and was �knowledged publicly by the Minister of Defence on 11 September. The repeated failure of the defence forces. in spite of.their undotlbted capability, to cany out the Govemment>s obligations and assurances to provide security to UNAMET, international oreaoiz.ations and the population as a whole, meant that the Indonesian authorities were either unable or unwilling to provide the proper environment for the peaceful implementation of 'the 5 May Agreement The introduction of martial law on 7 September did not alter this state of affairs. Cooperation between the GoI and the international community therefore became essential for effective implementation; and the Gors recognition of this on 12 September is to be welcomed. This cooperation must be directed above all to providing security and basic needs to all sections of the East Timorese population without discrimination and to the refugee population in West Tim.or. 19. In humanitarian terms. the situation of the majority of the population in East Timor and of the refugee population in West Timor is extremely grave. While further detailed analysis and assessment is necessary, there is an urgent need to address this problem, ideally with the full cooperation of the Indonesian authorities. Action is needed to deter further violence by the pro-autonomy militias or clashes between the militias and the pro-independence Falinti.l. 20. There is strong prima facie evidence of abuses of international humanitarian law committed since the announcement of the ballot result on 4 September. This needs further investigation. UNAMET's report of 11 September (attached) is relevant in this respect. 21. Although the Mission made it unequivocally clear that the security and operability of UNAMET was an important criterion of Indonesian performance in carrying out its responsibilities, the relevant authorities allowed UN.AlvfET' s situation to deteriorate during the Mission's stay. UNM1ET's security will need to be kept under constant review, and evacuation of Dill arranged if necessary, until an international security force is present on the ground. The security and welfare of the IDPs in the UNAMET compound require special attention. The Secwi.ty Council Mission pays tribute to the Head and staff of UNAMET, and to the members of UN and international humanitarian organizations still working in and on East Ti.mer. for their courage and determination in upholding the standards and practices of the United Nations in appalling circumstances. 22. 002598 �o9/l4/99 11:00 FA.I 212 848 1128 P.RMNY OF CANADA ------------------- -+ PSE ijj 009/0lJ 8 23. Preparation of UN action to fulfill its responsibilities under phase ID �f the 5 May Agreement could be advanced to dovetail in with the enhanced secunty to be provided by international security cooperation in phase II. 24. Consideration should be given to the regional and international importance of Indonesia and to Indonesia's need for support in its transition to full democracy and a successful market economy. This is an extremely sensitive time in internal Indonesian politics. But the problem of East Tim.or demands priority because of . the intensity of its humanitarian crisis and because of ineffective Indonesian action so far in responding to Security Council resolutions implementing the 5 May Agreement These two factors could be brought together because the implementation of the 5 May Agreement will contribute to the successful process of tranSition for Indonesia. 25. This Mission of the Security Council was above all dedicated to helping the Government of Indonesia to develop their understanding of the international community's perception of the East Timer crisis. Our task was significantly assisted by the Government's realization that the international community gave priority to East Timor and was beginning to take action to signal this in concrete terms. The Indonesian Government's announcement of 12 September was the result. The �ork of the Security Council Mission should be viewed in that wider context. Vll. Recommendations (I) The grave humanitarian crisis in East Timar should be given the topmost pnority by the United Nations, in terms both of supply of basic needs to the displaced population., including in West Tim.or, and of insistence that the Gol provide access and security to UN and international humanitarian organisations. (ii) The Security Council should welcome the decision of the President of Indonesia to invite an international peace-keeping force to cooperate with Indonesia in restoring peace and security in Ea.st Timar and should adopt a resolution without delay to provide a framework for the implementation of this proposal. (iii) Toe Secretary-General, advised by his Special Representative in East Tirnor, should consider reducing to a minimum, or if necessary evacuating. the UNA.MET deployment in Dili before the arrival of an international security presence, provided that the safety and welfare of the IDPs in the UNAMET compound has been satisfactorily arranged. nn�i::.qq �=---------------��!_ __ 09/14/99 11:01 FA.I 212 848 1128 PR.MNY -+ PSE �010/0lJ 9 (iv) The Security Council should consider authorizing an advance party of the international security presence to undertake urgent and essential tasks in and around Dili related to UNAMET and the provision of burnanitarian supplies. The Secretary-General should be invited to submit plans for the advance (v) preparation of UN action in phase m in ways which contrll>Ute to the more effective implementation of phase Il under the new circumst.ances. (vi) The Security Council should hold the Go! to its obligations under phase II of the Agreement, both before and after the arrival of an international security presence, with particular insistence on the proper care ofIDP's and on curtailing the role of the militias and preventing any clashes between the militias and the Falintil. (vii) The Security Council should institute action for the investigation of apparent abuses of international humanitarian law on the ground in East and West i Tmer since 4 September. UN Security Council Secretariat 13 September 1999 002600 �09/14/99 PRlfNY OF CANADA -------------------- 11:01 FAX 212 848 1128 __ ..:_PSE falo111013 The Destruction of East Timor since 4 Sept The events witnessed in East Tunor since 4 September represent the fulfilment of the worst threats made by the pro-autonomy campaign� and their Indonesian gove�ent supporters. In the guise of a backlash against the vote for independence.. what has actually happened is nothing less than a systematic implementation of a "'scorched earth" policy in East Timor, under the direction of the Indonesian military. A de�ed assessment of the situation in East Timor is impossible at this time. UNAMET has been completely pinned down in the HQ compound, and, c:x:ccpt for certain essential tasks. has been unable to make any direct observation in Dili, let alone in the rest of the territory. We receive many WlConfirmed reports of deaths and �or atrocities, some of which, thankfully, have proved to be unfounded. The follo"".ll:1& conclusions come from our �ous asses�t of a variety of sources of infonnation. Widespread destruction: In Dili it would apear that virtually every home or building has been syst_cmatically looted of its contents, and a large proportion of them have been burned. The central business district has been entirely gutted. Militias and TN! soldiers have been observed over the past few days loading trUCks with equipment and �pplies taken from these horoes, and the dock in Kupang. West Timor, is said to be bulging with kitchen applicances for sale. We believe that similar sitll.c!tions exist in other" regions, such as Ai!eu. Emiera and Maliana. . ·:.... �...· :,: ; ... ,,;·;,,:•.::.-<::--1 Ji Forced displacement: Similarly, reports have been received from all over the western part of East Timor of massive forced displacement of the population to refugee camps in West Timer. The preparation of such camps was publicly announced by General Wiranto in late August, ostensibly to receive the mass of people who would be voluntarily fleeing East Timor in the aftermath of the vote. It now appears chat efforts are underway to permanently disperse these people all around Indonesia. But the terror has not ended with their displacement. We have reliable and corroborated reportS that the militia/TN! are at this moment combing the refugee camps with lists looking for students, intellectuals and activists, then taking these people away. The entire urban population of Dili has either fled to the hills or been forcibly relocated outside of East Timor. There are unconfumed reports that a triage was performed before deparrure, and that large groups have disappeared. We have received reliable eyewitness testimony that people were carefully checked and interrogated during transit, and that certain individuals were killed and thrown overboard. In Kupang there are reportedly tens of thousands of IDPs, and a large East Timorese militia presence is roaming the streets, terrorizing the local population. and the East Timorcse !DPs in panicular. In our view, this massive forced relo�ation outside of East Timor has bceo. designed to give the impression oflarge-scaJ.c dissatisfaction with the vote, a situation of civil war, and to bring large groups of the population under Indonesian control away from the 002601 �-------------09/14/99 11:02 FAX 212 848 1128 ------- PRHNY OF CANADA • PSE �012/0lJ spotlight of international attention. But it cannot be ruled out that these are the first stages of a genocidal campaign to stamp out the East Timorese problem by force. Selective execution of srudcnts, intellectuals and activists: In addition to the killings reported. as part of the relocation programme, there are many reports of deaths in East Timor. In paxticular, many pro-independence activists and other community leade� including the clergy, are feared to have been killed in reprisal for their support, real or impli� for the independence option. There arc also reports of mass killings in various locations, including Dili and the IDP camp in the church in ·suai. It is clear that these crimes against hutnanity are part of a "scorched earth policy... The reduction of East Timor to rubble, aside from teaching the Timorese a lesson and sabotaging their chances of a successful transition to in9-epcndence, sends a warning to. other potential break-away regions of Indonesia. But the· worst may be yet to come. Much of the population remains very vulnerable to staryation,or attack. The proindependence �erillas are, as·far as we knqw, still concentrated in ccttain areas,· and the political leadership are concentrated in Dare. quite close to Dili. Food and water • shortages are becoming critical, and we cannot rule out further military operations against these populations. : .·- � .i . ·.. ';,,· ..._:. � . ..• . ,. .. ,.:,,.,..--� ..,...,. ·. :_ � -·--·t ... _.· . . .· This destruction has not been conducted by frustrated and insecure civilians. That is the myth which the Indonesian authorities are striving to convc;y. The evidence for a direct link between the militia and the military is beyond any dispute and ha$ been overwhelmingly documented by UNAMET over the last four months. But the scale and thoroughness of the destruction of East Timar in the past week: has demonstrated a new level of open participation of the military in the implementation of what was previously a more veiled operation. This open military role has now been legitimized by the invocation of martial law.. UNAMET Political Affairs 11 September 1999 : -.· .. 002602 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource East Timor and Indonesia Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Report of the Security Council Mission to Indonesia Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 09-08-99 Subject The topic of the resource Indonesia, East Timor Description An account of the resource Report of the Security Council Mission to Indonesia. 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