https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4284add4396ab8c84962da60d3bae8fc.pdf bcdef71aa10d9663e0b4c7985aa87518 PDF Text Text '·'- ,_,,. '- " r·. (ATk, [_I•).. ,,�., 1�i.., )a,\) . .. "' - i\;.:i-, f1'--!.C.J , .. ,_;;, �(i U � ,VJ� ,'J The Hon Lloyd Axworthy PC .MP Minister for Foreign Affairs Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Lester B Pearson Building 125 SussexDrive. Ottawa Canada COPIED LETTER Dear Minister Further to our telephone conversation of 18 February, I thought it appropriate to also write to you to provide you with our appreciation of the issue and our thinking regarding an appropriate international response. I am writing in similar terms to Foreign Ministers of like-minded countries. By way of introduction, let me say that Australia does not consider itself a party principal to the dispute. Nevertheless, we have a deep national interest in seeing it resolved in a comprehensive and internationally acceptable way. We are prepared to assist the parties to find a resolution to the problem. It is my particular concern that East Timor' s transition - whether to autonomy or to independence - be peaceful and orderly. This would be in the best interest of all concerned, and would help ensw-e the maintenance of a secw-e regional environment. Australia's position, which the Prime Minister, Mr Howard, conveyed to President Habibie lastDecember, is that the prospects for a smooth transitioh and for reconciliation would be best served by the East Timorese being granted an act of self-determination after a substantial period of autonomy. The likelihood of this outcome, however, is now much diminished. The Indonesian Government is contemplating East Timorese independence as early as 1 January 2000, should the autonomy offer be rejected. Clearly any grant of independence by that date would present enormous challenges to the Indonesian Government, the East Timorese, and also the international community. While we recognise that the UN process is still playing itself out and would not wish to preempt the final decision of the East Timorese regarding autonomy, it would nevertheless be prudent to begin thinking about how the international community might be able to assist in ensuring a smooth transition. At this stage I would see two main ways the international community could assist in the process. The first would be for countries to work individually and, as appropriate, in concert, to encourage the Indonesian Government, but also the East Timorese leaders and the Porruguese Government, to adopt a very careful and responsible approach to the transition. We should urge them to consider realistically the time it would take to prepare the East Timorese for self-rule and for assembling any international support effort. 001407 �We should also encourage them to consider the sequencing of steps leading to the transition and. in particular, the need for effective internal East Timorese reconciliation before any withdrawal of existing security authorities and their replacement by alternate arrangements for ensuring internal security. The East Timorese, too, should be under no illusion regarding their responsibility for ensuring internal order and avoiding the emergence of radical and provocative ideologies and conflicts that, in part, precipitated the events of 1975. The second way we could help would be to start giving careful thought to developing a package of administrative and developmental assistance to enable East Timor to cope with the challenges of either broad-ranging autonomy or independence. With regard to the former, we would naturally need to consult closely with the Indonesian Government and the UN. The sorts of assistance required would be very much influenced by the terms of the autonomy package, and would presumably be modest in comparison with what would be required under independence. If East Timor gains independence it would face a large number of very pressing needs, starting from the provision of skilled professionals to run the administrative, health and education systems, and including the creation of new institutions of state - a central bank, a judiciary. an internal security force, and a new legislature, which would need to be established following elections. It is possible a UN transition administration would need to be set up. The Indonesian Government certainly envisages handing over responsibility for East Timor to the UN and Portugal if the autonomy package is rejected. Any UN effon would naturally require the support and endorsement of member states, in particular those in a position to contribute to iL The question of a possible UN Peacekeeping force may also need to be addressed at some poinL We would not regard a peacekeeping force as an opfion of first recourse. We would hope that the need for such a force would not arise and that the parries would work out their differences in a spirit of goodwill and reconciliation. The parties should be encouraged to work towards solutions that do not rely on external peacekeepers. All of these are complex issues. It would be very wonhwhile for like-minded countries to keep in close contact, and to begin engaging relevant international financial institutions and specialised UN agencies. given the speed with which the issue is evolving, I would suggest we establish an informal contact group. Points of contact in the first instance could be through our missions in New York and Jakarta, augmented as necessary by meetings between capitals-based officials. I understand the Secretary of my Department will be meeting your Permanent Representative in New York shortly. I have asked my officials to keep in close touch with yours. Yours sincerely Alexander Downer 23 February 1999 001408 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource East Timor and Indonesia Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Downer to Axworthy Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 02-23-99 Subject The topic of the resource Indonesia, East Timor Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Language A language of the resource en Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDET0005 Description An account of the resource Alexander Downer, foreign minister of Australia, letter to Lloyd Axworthy. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Type The nature or genre of the resource Text