https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d3a8ae0fb7e6b88081afd74c98f38117.pdf 44b82dcc78593df509cf8c0496e4d272 PDF Text Text CSC 2108-AC/22S(JSWPC; ^ yg'/Ls^.L*. Tp^ 15 November 1963 f- Aide Memoire on negotiation of a Revised Agreement Between HATO Members for • - • * .. ,. Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information 1. On 22 May 1955 an agreement was signed by NATO members covering \ cooperation regarding atomic information. This agreement provided for the release of atomic information by the United States to NATO to be used exclusively for the preparation of and In implementation of NATO defence * plans. Release of atomic information was restricted to that required fori a. the development of defence plans; b. the training of personnel in the employment of and defence against atomic weapons} and c. the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons. 2. As shown above, release of atomic information under the 1955 Agreement was restricted to data of a very general nature useful only in broad planning. As the deployment of U.S. nuclear capable weapons In NATO progressed it became necessary to release further information to specific countries and this was accomplished by means of bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the country concerned. These bilateral agreements provided for the exchange of additional information required by countries accepting U.S. weapons systems. Although until August 16, 1963, Canada had not signed a bilateral agreement with the U.S. which would make U.S. nuclear warheads available for the Canadian Forces, a Canada/US bilateral* agreement was signed in 1955 and amended in 1959 which provided for the exchange of atomic information exceeding that available under the NATO Agreement of 1955. Such a bilateral was possible by virtue of the contribution by Canada to joint US/Great Britain/Canadian nuclear research programmes * 3. On July 16, 1963 the U.S. Delegation transmitted to the Secretary General, NATO a proposal for a new "Agreement for Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information", to replace the 1955 NATO Agreement. The new Agreement permits a more extensive release of atomic information than that allowed under the 1955 NATO Agreement and, in some cases, the bilateral agreements.,between the y 000266 �-2s^SeSe SSCRBT and individual NATO members. Information can be released under the -*' new Agreement as necessary fors * •* a. the development of defence plans; b. the training of personnel in the employment of and defence against atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy; c* the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications . of atomic energy; and d. the development of delivery systems compatible with the atomic weapons which they carry. 4,. In the case of Canada, the information which can be made available under the proposed new NATO Agreement does not exceed that which 1 B available under the US/Canada bilateral agreement of 1959• The latter document contains identical provisions for information-as in paragraphs 6(a) to (d) above plus a further item covering "research, development and design of military reactors to the extent and by such means as may be agreed." Although \ the new NATO Agreement will benefit NATO as a whole, and thus Canada in her NATO role, the greatest benefit is derived by those countries lacking a , bilateral agreement with the U.S. or those with bilateral agreements more • restrictive than the US/Canada agreement. 5. ' — Following the U.S. proposal for a new NATO Agreement, the Secretary General circulated draft copies of an agreement together with a covering U.S. memorandum to all delegates suggesting formation,of a Working Group composed of legal and security experts to consider the, proposal. This suggestion was approved by Council and to date two Working Group meetings have been held; 9-11 September and^lS-18 October 1%3'rP . 6. • Prior to the first meeting the Department of .External Affairs requested and obtained DND comments on the draft agreement which together with External Affairs comments were forwarded to the Canadian delegation. It was not considered necessary to send representation from Canada to the Working Group. DND comments were provided by Service members of the Joint Special Weapons Policy Committee, the Joint Security Committee, the Judge Advocate General and the Deputy Minister's office. No major objections to the draft were raised but clarification was sought on a number of legal �, , y -3- SSCR5T .1 i.. . . r 1 11 ' a s p e c t s of the agreement.' TfefcasgejAty-of-these-have, subsequently been y r — . — . j — • — ^ — ' re solved |bJia^thi5~refflainder-are-under -TeontlnuIttg-^eview^jfi^t^^Work^K" Group. 7. As a result of the second series of discussions (16-18 October 1963) a revised version of the draft Agreement was passed to* all members of the Working Group which reflects the current position on controversial points in the document. Apart from minor points on which one or more delegations have reserved judgment, the areas of major disagreement are between the United and France and the States/ United States and Great Britain. In each case, alternative proposals are included in the revised draft. 8. The US/French disagreement is on two aspects. The first is a fundamental difference In approach. The U.S. view Is that since, in fact, the Agreement covers a flow of information from the U.S. to the other members of NATO the wording of the agreement should reflect this fact whereas the French view is that the agrement should be entirely multilateral in nature reflecting that the information may be provided by any NATO member. The second French objection is in connection with the powers of the Secretary General regarding security which reflects strong French views on the status of international staffs in relation to the national authorities of the NATO member countries. 9* US/teritish disagreement Is less basic and concerns the relationship between the new Agreement and the 1955 Agreement. The U.S. view is that the new Agreement should completely supersede the 1955 Agreement including control of information released under the latter. The British consider that information communicated under "the 1955 Agreement should continue to be treated under the rules of the 1955 Agreement for practical reasons. 10. Further resolution of the differences outlined above cannot be expected pending further study of the revised draft by Working Group members. It was agreed at the 16-18 October 1963 meeting that the Working Group will be reconvened to discuss the revised draft at a date to be decided by its Chairman* 000268 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04951 Title A name given to the resource Aide Memoire Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 15-Nov-63 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived NATO Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information, RG24-B-1, vol. 21471, CSC 2108-1-AC-228, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of National Defence Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource NATO, nuclear weapons Description An account of the resource Aide Memoire on Negotiation of a Revised Agreement Between NATO Members for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en