https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f3a27ea594abb97d528d0f7c348ccc87.pdf 0e066ee18ba5726ad4f8abeb5c2ee2b1 PDF Text Text S S C RE T X N-14.24. November 5, 1963 TO; The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Ottawa^ Canada FROMs The Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council, Paris Reference; Our Telegram No. 2198 of October 23, 1963 Subject; Draft Agreement on Atomic Information o 9 0 o o « < i e o o o o o o o o e o o o o a o o « o o a a # » • * o o o • * o t o o o o o o o o • * « o o o o Q « o e « o « o > » « o o •»»*••• # • « < > © « • • • • « You will by now have received copies of AC/228-WP/1. This is a clean draft of the Agreement as it emerged from the second round of discussions in the Working Group on October 16 to 18, The covering note explains which passages have been generally agreed ad referendum and which remain the object of alternative proposals. 2<. The second round of discussion revealed three matters of substantial disagreement. The first, and most important. arose from the fundamental difference of approach between the French and United States delegations which we have reported« Roughly speaking. the United States view is that the Agreement will in practice cover transmission of atomic information by the United States. The Agreement should reflect this. The possibility that other countries might eventually give information under the Agreement, to the extent it needs to be taken account of, can be dealt with in a single Article. The French view is that the Agreement ought to be multilateral and that the language throughout should reflect its multilateral nature, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is likely in practice to be by far the largest donor of information under it» Therefore it is not enough to put in one Article dealing with the possibility that other countries might give informations," while leaving all the other Articles in language which reflects only United States interests. The proper solution, in the French view, is to delete the single Article referring to the possibility of transmission of information by other countries and apply.multilateral formulae throughout. 3» The second important point of disagreement, again between the French and United States delegations, has to do with the powers of the Secretary General. We have reported the nature of this disagreement before. It has led the French authorities to propose alternative language in Article IV. U« The third point of substantial disagreement is between the British and United States delegations. It has to do with the last Article of the draft. In the British view, information communicated under the 1955 Agreement should continue to be treated under the rules of the 1955 Agreement for practical reasons. This is notwithstanding the fact that the 1955 Agreement is about to be superseded. The United States view is that the balance of practical advantage is in favour of suppressing the 1955 Agreement entirely, keeping only a single set of security regulations in force, and assimilating documents already circulated under the 1955 Agreement. This difference of opinion has led to the alternative proposals which appear at the end of Article XI. 5= The following additional comments may be helpful. PREAMBLE 60 In paragraph 3j it was agreed that "member states" rather than "member nations" should be used here, and this form should be adhered to throughout the text. 7. If the French concept of the Agreement is accepted, the wording of paragraph /. would have to be altered to include a reference to "the laws in force in the other member states of the Alliance". n o o a o A y> 000302 �=2- S"S"C"R S T ARTICLE 1 8« Alternative French and United States proposals have been put forward. You will notice that the United States text has been somewhat modified to take account of your original objections to obscurities in it. It also contains, within square brackets _ your suggestion for., an addition which would be related to the suppression of Article III. For further comment on this point see the paragraphs below on Article III. ARTICLE II 9. The United States deal with the point we had raised in the first round of discussion about the meaning of "their functions related to NATO missions". The intention of the original drafters had been to find some formula which' would be as broadly stated as possible but within the framework of NATO» The phrase "mutual security and defence purposes" used in bilaterals was not satisfactory because it had implications going beyond the framework of NATO. The intention was that this phrase should be interpreted as being equivalent to "the defence purposes of NATO as a whole". We suggested that this interpretation be recorded in an agreed interpretative minute. It was agreed that, for the purpose of interpreting this passageJ and a number of others in the draft, it would be desirable to prepare such an agreed record when the Agreement was put in final form. ARTICLE III 10. Here agains the United States and French delegations have proposed alternative language <, We put forward your proposal for supporting this Article and for including a reference in Article I to take account of possible future United States legislation. The United States delegation have subsequently spoken to us privately about your views on Article III. They asked whether you insisted on its deletion. They made a rather unconvincing argument attempting to distinguish between the purpose served by Article I and the purpose served by Article III„ While they naturally believe Article III does embody a valid distinctions, they stated frankly that the real reason for its inclusion was the familiar one that the language of the Article was designed to secure easy passage of the Agreement through the Congress. We were reminded that, tinlike other types of international agreements to which the United States is a partys agreements on atomic energy must lie before Congress for sixty days and are subjected to particularly close scrutinyo Therefore the drafters tried to stick as closely as possible to language with which Congress is already familiar and has approved. We were asked if you would not with-** draw your proposal for deleting Article III. We said we bad no authority to withdraw the suggestion and could only undertake to report this conversation to you. The United States delegation believes there is little hope of persuading the authorities in Washington to accept the suggestion. If you wish to press the point, however, our impression is that lt will be necessary to take the matter up bilaterally in Washington. ARTICLE IV 11. The French and United States delegations have proposed alternative language here, as reported above. 12. There was considerable discussion about the reference in this Article to "the juris diction "of NATO.. In response to questions from delegations, the NATO Legal Advisor conceded that the concept of "the jurisdiction of NATO" was an unsatisfactory one. The same problem had ariseain the drafting of the 1955 Agreement. It would be very difficult to list briefly categories of international civil servants in all the various organs of NATO who were subject to the disciplinary powers of the Secretary General. Neverthelessj the implementation of the 1955 Agreement had not given rise to any practical difficulty on this point and it was by relying on the concept that the CABAL regulations had been justified. 13° We were able to inform the Legal Advisor after the second round of discussion that you approved his suggested amendment to our proposed rewording �^ -3of Article I V U ) . (Your telegram DL-3180 of October 21). of the status of the Annexes is dealt with below. SEC RET The related question ARTICLE V I4.0 Here again, there are alternative French and United States texts. ARTICLE VI 15° You will notice that a paragraph has been added to cover proprietary rights. The wording was proposed by the United States delegation. It is, of course, open to the standard French objection that it refers only to the transmission of information by the United States. ARTICLE VII 16. This is a new Articles incorporating your suggestion for dealing with the relationship between this Agreement and bilateral agreements. The suggestion that there should be an addition in this language appeared to be well received by most representatives. The addition of a new Article at this point alters the numbering of all the subsequent Articles from that followed in the first draft. ARTICLE VIII 17. The alternative proposals here illustrate most clearly the difference between the United States and French concepts. In the French vlewj if multilateral language were used elsewhere in the text, there would be no need for this Articleo ARTICLE IX 18. Once again, alternative French and United States texts are proposed. ARTICLE X 19» Provision has been made in this draft for the possibility of increases • in the membership of NATO (paragraph 2). At British suggestion, the wording of the earlier draft has been changed in paragraph 1 to refer to notification by the parties "that they are willing to be bound" by the new Agreement. Your suggestion that the word "unanimous" should be used in this Article was accepted*ARTICLE XI 200 The first paragraph raises the problem described above of whether the security system under the 1955 Agreement should be superseded, as the United States believes , or should be retained for the purposes of protecting documents distributed under the 1955 Agreement$, as the British maintain. The members of the Working Group were not in a position to settle this matter. It is essentially a practical question. The British believe that, on the whole, it would be more troublesome to try to apply a new system to documents that have been distributed since 1955 than simply to continue in force the system under which they were originally distributed. Representatives agreed to find out from their authorities what the practical implications were of these alternatives and which alternative their authorities preferred. TECHNICAL ANNEX 21» Discussion raised the problem already reported to you of ensuring that the Annexes have legal status as an integral part of the Agreement itselfs while avoiding having to register them with the United Nations. As well as the suggestion in your telegram DL-1380, which we discussed after the meeting with the Legal Advisor, a number of suggestions were made in the course of the second round of discussion for dealing with this problem. These are reflected at several points in the new draft. You will notice that there is a preamble suggested to the Technical Annex stating that the Annex forms an integral part of the Agreement. At the same time, it is suggested that the legal status of the Annexes should be assured, as was the case in, 1955, through having both of them signed. However, in order to ensure that these separate �-U- S BC'R a T signatures do not carry an implication that the Annexes are separate documents, a simplified signature form is proposed. Thus you willnotice that full treaty language is only used in Article XI, i.e. in the text of the Agreement itself; whereas the signatures to the Annexes would appear without any such introduction. The Legal Advisor hopes you will agree that this combination of devices will give the Annexes legal status, but as an integral part of the Agreement, not as separate documents, without raising the question of having to register them with the United Nations. SECURITY ANNEX 22. The Security Annex was considered by the Working Group and except for minor amendments and unresolved difficulties encountered as a result of French and United States differences relating to Article IV(2), was approved ad referendum^ 23The United States attitude to Section IX is now reported to be as follows: the United States proposes to make visits and inspections under the Agreement prior to the receipt of information and will try to reduce the frequency of visits as a background of successful inspections is built up„ 24. We would welcome your comments on the revised draft Agreement. The date of the next meeting of the Working Group has not been fixed. However, for the second round of discussions it proved very useful to have your instructions well in advance. If you have further views you wish us to put forward, we would recommend that you send them to us without waiting for the date of the next meeting to be fixed,, so that we may discuss them in advance with the NATO Legal Advisor and with delegations as required. Go IGNATIEFF THE DELEGATION 000305 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04947 Title A name given to the resource NATOParis to External Numbered Letter no. 1424 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 05-Nov-63 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived NATO Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information, RG24-B-1, vol. 21471, CSC 2108-1-AC-228, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of National Defence Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource NATO, nuclear weapons Description An account of the resource NATOParis to External Numbered Letter no. 1424 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available 05-Nov-63 Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en