https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1ee6a87ea5989f24e5b47794147d37cd.pdf 29b4974b223db83bc5aac8f7a15e0c7e PDF Text Text DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. (DUPLICATE) NUMBERED LETTER TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR % EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA. - . FROM: j yy THE CANADIAN DELHJAflOH 150 THS HORTH Reference: 0 ,. f ^ c "^ ty "'SECRET ATLANTIC c W c i L , PARIS % Our Telegram Nos 2198 ef October 23* 1963 Subject: Draft Agreement on Atomic Information / Date:.".... .ifeveaber* •§ j -1969 • • Enclosures: mmt. Air or Surface Mail:.. •ft>to> • Post File No: fafak Ottawa File No. References CCOS Internal Circulation f ou will by new have received copies of AC/228-^P/l, Thle is a clean draft of the Agreement as it emerged f roe the second round of discussions in the Working Group on October 16 to IB, The covering note explains which passaged have been generally agreed ad reforendua end which remain the object of alternative proposals* 2* The second round of discussion revealed three matters of substantial disagreement. The first, and most important, arose treat the fundamental difference of approach between the French and United States delegations which we have reported. Roughly speaking, the United States view is that the Agreement will in practice cover1 transmission of atonic information by the United States. The Agreement should reflect this* The possibility that other countries might eventuality give information under the Agreement, to the extent it needs to be taken account of, can no dealt with in a single Article. The French view is that the Agreement ought to be multilateral and that the language throughout should reflect its multilateral nature, notwithstanding the fact that the United States io likely in practice to be by far the largest donor of inforaation under it. Therefore it is not enough to put in one Article dealing with the possibility that other countries might give information, while leaving all the other Articles in language which reflects only United States interests. The proper solution, in the French view, is to delete the single Article referring to the possibility of transmission of information by other countries and apply multilateral formulae throughout. 3. The second important point of disagreement, again between the French and United States delegations, has to do with the powers of the Secretary General. We have reported the nature of this disagreement before. It has led the French authorities to propose alternative language in Article Iff. Distribution to Posts 4. The third point ef substantial disagreement is between the British and United States delegations. It has to do with the last Article of the draft. In the British view, inforaation eomnunieated under the 1955 Agreement should continue to be treated under the rules of the 1955 Agreement for practical reasons. This is notwithstanding the fact that the 1955 Agreement is abeut to be superseded. The United States view is that the balance of practical advantage is in favour of surpassing the 1955 Agreement entirely, keeping only a single set of security regulations in force, and assimilating documents already circulated under the 1955 Agreement to the new procedures to be provided for in tho present Agreement. This difference of opinion has led to the alternative proposals which appear at the end of Article n . • ••2 (Ext. 182C(!teT. 2/52) 000307 �- 2 - 5* SECRET The following additional comments may be helpfuls PREAMBLE 6* In paragraph 3, it was agreed that "meaber states" rather than "member nations" should be used here, and that this form should be adhered to throughout the text. 7* If the French concept of the Agreement is accepted, the wording of paragraph 4 would have to be altered to include a reference to "the laws in force in the other member states of the Alliance". ARTICLE I g, Alternative French and Iftiited States proposals have been put forward, tou will notice that the United States text has been somewhat modified to take account of your original objections to obscurities in it. It also contains, within square brackets, your suggestion for an addition which would be related to the suppression of Article III. For further comment on this point see the paragraphs below on Article III. ARTICLE II 9. The ttoited States dealwith the point we had raised in the first round of discussion about the meaning of "their functions related to NATO missions'1* The intention of the original drafters had been to find some formula which would be as broadly stated as possible but within the framework of NATO. The phrase "mutual security and defence purposes" used in bilaterals was not satisfactory because it had implications going beyond the framework of NATO. 'She intention was that thia phrase should be interpreted as being equivalent to "the defence purposes of NATO as a whole"* We suggested that this interpretation be recorded in an agreed interpretative minute* It was agreed that, for the purpose of interpreting this passage and a nuniber of others in the draft, it would be desirable to prepare such an agreed record when the Agreement was put in final form* ARTICLE III 10. Here again, the United States and French delegations have proposed alternative language. We put forward your proposal for suppressing this Article and for including a reference in Article I to take account of possible future United States legislation* The. United States delegation have subsequently spoken to us privately about your v|ews on Article III. They asked whether you insisted on its deletion. They made/rather unconvincing argument attempting to distinguish between the purpose served by Article I and the purpose served by Article III« While they naturally believe Article III does embody a valid distinction, they stated frankly that the real reason for its inclusion was the familiar one that the language of the Article was designed to secure easy passage of the Agreement through the Congress* We were reminded that, unlike other types of international agreements to which the United States is a party, agreements on atomic energy must lie before Congress for sixty days and are subjected to particularly close scrutiny* Therefore the drafters tried to stick as closely as possible to language with which Congress is already familiar and has approved. We were asked if you would not withdraw your proposal for deleting Article III* We said we had no authority to withdraw the suggestion and could only undertake to report this conversation to you. The United States delegation believes there is little hope of persuading the authorities in Washington to accept the suggestion. If you wish to press the point, however, our impression is that it will be necessary to take the matter up bilaterally in Washington. ARTICLE IV 11. The French and United States delegations have proposed alternative language here, as reported above* �- 3- SECRET 12* There was considerable discussion about the reference in this Article to "the jurisdiction" of NATO. In response to questions frem delegations, the NATO Legal Advisor conceded that the concept of "the jurisdiction of NATO" was an unsatisfactory one* The same problem had arisen in the drafting of the 1955 Agreement, It would be very difficult to list briefly categories of international civil servants in all the various organs of NATO who were subject to the disciplinary powers of the Secretary General, Nevertheless, the implementation of the 1955 Agreement had not given rise to any practical difficulty on this point and it was by relying on the concept that the CABAL regulations had been justified* 13* We were able to inform the Legal Advisor after the second round of discussion that you approved his suggested amendment to our proposed rewording of Article IV(4)» (lour telegram DL-3180 of October 21). The related question of the status of the Annexes is dealt with below, ARTICLE V 14* Here again, there are alternative French and United States texts* ARTICLE VI 15* You will notice that a paragraph has been added to cover propriet-ary rights. The wording was proposed by the United States delegation. It is, of course, open to the standard French objection that it refers only to the transmission of information by the United States. ARTICLE VII 16, This is a new Article, incorporating your suggestion for dealing with the relationship between this Agreement and bilateral agreements. The suggestion that there should be an addition in this language appeared to be well received by most representatives* The addition ef a new Article at this point alters the numbering of all the subsequent Articles from that followed in the first draft* ARTICLE VIII 17, The alternative proposals here illustrate most clearly the difference between the United States and French concepts* In the French view, if multilateral language were used-elsewhere in the text, there would be no need for this Article. ARTICLE IX 18, Once again, alternative French and United States texts are proposed, ARTICLE X 19, Provision has been made in this draft for the possibility of increases in the membership of NATO (paragraph 2). At British suggestion, the , wording of the earlier draft has been changed in paragraph 1 to refer to [notification by the parties "that they are willing to be bound" by the new Agreement. Your suggestion that the word "unanimous" should be used in this Article was accepted*. , ARTICLE XI 20, , The first paragraph raises the problem described above of whether the -security system under the 1955 Agreement should be superseded, as the United States believes, or should be retained for the purposes of protecting documents distributed under the 1955 Agreement, as the British maintain* The members of the Working Group were not in a position to settle this matter. It is essentially a practical question. The British believe that, on the whole, it would be more 1 troublesome to try to apply a new system to documents that have been distributed .j • ••#4 000309 �\ - 4 - SECRET since 1955 than simply to continue in force the system under which they were originally distributed. Representatives agreed to find out frcm their authorities what the practical implications were ef r these alternatives and which alternative their authorities preferred* TECHNICAL ANNEX 2I# Discussion raised the problem already reported to you of ensuring that the Annexes have legal status as an integral part of the Agreement itself, while avoiding having to register them with the United Nations, As well as the suggestions in your telegram DL-1380, which we discussed after the meeting with the Legal Advisor, a number of suggestions were made in the course of the second round of discussion for dealing with this problem* These are reflected at several points in the new draft* You will notice that there is a preamble suggested to the Technical Annex stating that the Annex forms an integral part of the Agreement* At the same time, it is suggested that the legal status of the Annexes should be assured, as was the case in 1955, through having both of than signed. However, in order to ensure that these separate signatures do not carry an implication that the Annexes are separate documents, a simplified signature form is proposed. Thus you will notice that full treaty language is only used in Article XI, i.e* in the text of the Agreement itself; whereas the signatures to the Annexes would appear without any such introduction* The Legal Advisor hopes you will agree that this combination of devices will give the Annexes legal status, but as an integral part of the Agreement, not as separate documents, without raising the question of having to register them with the United Nations* SECURITY ANNEX 22* The Security Annex was considered by the Working Group and except for minor amendments and unresolved difficulties encountered as a result of French and United States differences relating to Article IV(2), was approved ad referendum* 23* The United States attitude to Section IX is now reported to be as followst the United States propose to make visits and inspections under the Agreement prior to the receipt of information and will try to reduce the frequency of visits as a background of successful inspections is built up* 24* We would welcome your comments on the revised draft Agreement. The date of the next meeting of the Working Group has not been fixed* However, for the second round of discussions it proved very useful to have your instructions w e H in advance* If you have further views you wish us to put forward, we would recommend that you send them to us without waiting for the date of the next meeting to be fixed, so that we may discuss them in advance with the NATO Legal Advisor and with delegations as required* ^IGNATIEFP THE DELEGATION � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04946 Title A name given to the resource NATOParis to External Numbered Letter no. 1424 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 05-Nov-63 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived NATO Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information, RG24-B-1, vol. 21471, CSC 2108-1-AC-228, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of National Defence Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource NATO, nuclear weapons Description An account of the resource NATOParis to External Numbered Letter no. 1424 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available 05-Nov-63 Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en