https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d66ec4163d99cf12a079636926258cff.pdf 5dffbb51814f86c9406e9f087bb2da59 PDF Text Text C-M( 63)63 QUOTE N O . . . " MEMORANDUM „ . \% ' >....'./...<.. NATO SECRET .DOCUMENT OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE G E N E I ^ V ^ ~ TO: Cft^° F\L't ^ -^"h iCTkY ,/<L/ * Executive Secretary of the Joint Special Weapons Policy Committee Draft Agreement Between NATO Members for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information In your memorandum CSC 2108-1 ID 15 (JSUPC) dated 1 Aug 63 you have asked me to compare the m/n draft Agreement with the present Agreement on this subject signed in 1955 and to comment on the draft. You have also asked whether a DND legal representative should be on the working group referred to in Mr. D. U. Stikker's note of 22 Jul 63. 2 In so far as the last point is concerned, I do not think DND legal representation is necessary. The Agreement is essentially a technical one and while it imposes certain obliga- . tions on Canada, these are more or less in the field of security. 3 The draft Agreement in form is essentially the same as -the 1955 Agreement except there has been added to it a second annex described as a "Security Annex", U Unlike the 1955 Agreement which was limited to the provision of information to NATO, the present Agreement contents lates provision of information to member states as well as to NATO. This of course, has necessitated certain changes and additions to -the 1955 Agreement, 5 With the exception of certain security and procedural provisions the changes have mere technical or.operational significance than legal. Those changes having legal connotations will be discussed in that light. 6 Article II of the draft which is essentially Article I of the 1955 Agreement and which provides the basis upon which information will be given has been amended by the addition of the words, "and other military applications of atomic energy" at the end of each clause and the addition of a new clause "d" concerning the development of delivery systems. The effect of these changes is to broaden the basis upon which the US Government will divulge atomic information. 7 Article II of the 1955 Agreement contained restrictions on the dissemination by a recipient of information obtained under the Agreement. These provisions are carried forward into Articles IV and V of the draft. It will be noted that information received by member States from NATO can only be given to persons where there is what amounts to a "need to know requirement". Information so received or otherwise under the Agreement cannot be transferred to unauthorized persons or persons beyond the jurisdiction of the recipient member nation. Information can be transmitted to NATO but not to other member States except with the authority of the US. 8 The obligation of reporting as contained in paragraph 2 of Article IV of the 1955 Agreement is now contained in Section VI of the Security Annex where it is described in somewhat greater detail. . . . ,/2 �NATO SECRET DOCUMENT 9 Article VI of the draft contains a new provision which purports to protect the State providing information under the Agreement, Under this article the recipient State takes and uses the information at its own risk. The article is included as article V of the Canadian - US bilateral agreement on Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes. 10 Article VII of the draft provides for the communication of information by other member States and reads in part, "Parallelling the undertakings of the United States of America . . . . to the extent they deem necessary will communicate. . . . ". Apparently this is an endeavour on the part of the US to ensure that other member states having an atomic weapons development program will also make information available. 11 Article IX(3) of the draft provides for the termination of the Agreement. The formula adopted in the 1955 Agreement was to make the Agreement's term coincide with that of the North Atlantic Treaty. The present draft provides for termination by mutual agreementjOrPbylthe Agreement being superseded. Notwithstanding termination, however, parties remain under an obligation to safeguard information obtained pursuant to the Agreement. 12 No provision is made in the present draft for the accession of a new State to NATO. It may be that the provisions of Article VTI(2) as contained in the 1955 Agreement were inserted with a view to the Federal Republic of Germany joining NATO and are not now considered necessary. The fact that the provision no longer exists should not present any real difficulties should the problem arise. 13 Article X of the draft merely brings information communicated under the 1955 Agreement within the scope of the draft Agreement. 14 In the Technical Annex which was called the Secret Annex to the 1955 Agreement an item included in the earlier Agreement has not been brought forward. This is Item 2 (Interchangeability of Nuclear Components), Item 7 (Intelligence - Soviet Capabilities) of the 1955 Agreement would now appear to be covered by Item E of the Technical Annex . In other respects the Technical Annex is more comprehensive. 15 The meaning of the expression "no information on other military applications of atomic energy . . . . " as used in Section 2 of the Technical Annex is not understood. This is particularly so having regard to the amendments referred to above in paragraph 6 concerning Article II of the draft where the same expression is usedj i.e., other military applications of atomic energy. 16 The Secretary General is responsible for supervision of the NATO security programme with respect to all NATO organizations (including units in NATO) which receive information under the Agreement. Paragraph C of Section I of the Security Annex refers. It will also be noted that this paragraph apparently contemplates the possibility of member States retaining responsibility for the supervision of security-over_their own military units receiving such information but(X can fincP'no further provision as to the circumstances or arrangements necessary for such retention of res- ponsibility, & <^^ , 'yiZLv Aju^sslo 6A , _. . ji^yuLtx; 17 Under paragraph A of Section X of the Security Annex the y Secretary General is charged with the responsibility of having con"/gt ducted security inspections by qualified personnel or agency designated , a . . ./3 000384' �NATO SECRET DOCUMENT by him, at least once every twelve months, of all NATO military and civilian elements and member nations which have received US atomic information. 18 The first paragraph of Section IX concerning the right of US security working groups to examine the security measures of NATO agencies and member nations is somewhat ambiguous in that it is not clear whether this right can be exercised prior to the receipt of atomic information or subsequent to such receipt. However, in the case of Canada such visits are in fact contemplated in the bilateral agreement between Canada and the US •<•*-*• y , , vj,/L«>-« *.< yt *. JLA"rTt<r*<-t. v 19 - The working group (will probably be J examining) j u s t how these various inspection and supervisory r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w i l l be carried o u t , 20 Paragraph F of Section I l i m i t s dissemination of information t o nationals of member States on a need to know b a s i s . This means t h a t regardless of s e c u r i t y clearances held non-national members of a force could not be allowed access to such information. While t h i s might r a i s e p r a c t i c a l problems, the p r i n c i p l e involved here was recognized in paragrapti2 of A r t i c l e VI of the 1955 Agree- ment. $>-, A^o y^U jysK^ <Lo~c£y£*y&. €s/-^p^^y^tU. J^yiid ^xyzyntA^'/oAaL^JL^*- ZSJL S^s-trx^it s-y^OUtriULf &> **^h 'yv&SLL*sx7--6*rt*n*. ^ e^SSh^e^^, 21 In addition to the foregoing i t i s noted t h a t no pro- *" v ^f L Q k«, visions have been included respecting protection of patent r i g h t s . 77 ~" While c e r t a i n provisions are contained in the NATO Security Agreement u e C - M(55)15(Final) referred t o in para A of Section I of the Security <^y^u Annex, t h i s aspect of the matter should be reviewed by the Patents ^ e> ^» Section, ADM/Requireraents. ~~ 22 Material forwarded with your memorandum under reply i s returned herewith. / JPW/Ef 2 2201 ( W / j . Laws on) Brigadier Judge Advocate General 000386 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04918 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum from JAC to JSWPC Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 15-Aug-63 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived NATO Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information, RG24-B-1, vol. 21471, CSC 2108-1-AC-228, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of National Defence Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource NATO, nuclear weapons Description An account of the resource Draft Agreement Between NATO Members for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en