https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5d217f81b42ea24574143c439af3138c.pdf 8a7ccee38f66ccafba594080f8ddf970 PDF Text Text SiiSS S3E"= CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (3U-i ™^j™ ^ ^ ^ CSC/JS ^ JUL /3 ilo3. r «rS3 yy,.,.4.^e^ if j/o'f 3 F:XKMPLA)RE — N- COPY OP.I ail^ALj,Jg[GLISH J i bA_ HATO SECRET DOCUMENT ^J.'j*»-a!i>u»yiiifieij3ii3aasije* 22nd J u l y . ~ 1 9 T BRAFTjLGREgfcggNT KETOSEN THE PARTIES TO TffE t NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY FOR CO-OPERATION REGARDING ATOMIC INFORMATION Biln Mii»w^wiP»iii' ii*!mt£mas*^m*ammmmmmm*4Lmm<im.».*:im*Mjyi<mfmmmmns!mm - tmimammmmm Note by the Secretary General» Chairman of the* Council " i M i i u . i i * M M M * a ^ • ^ . 1 . 1 * 1 t t r i t a OU • a i f ' > n « > * M W I attach hereto a memorandum from the United States Permanent Representative (Annex A) covering the draft of a new agreement for co-operation regarding atomic information (Annex B), v/hich would supersede the agreement approved in 1955 (vide C~M(55)31). 2* I suggest that the Council may, as a first step, wish to establish a Working Group •omposed of legal and security experts to examine this draft and to consider any amendments which nations may wish to suggest. 3» If the Council decides to establish such a V/orking Group, governments will obviously wish for time to study the draft agreement before being in a position to give instructions to their respective representatives on the Group, It is, however* obviously desirable that consideration of this draft agreement should proceed with the minimum delay. I suggest, therefore, that the IVorking Group should meet in the first week in September, In the meantime, the United States Delegation is ready to answer any questions on this draft agreement which delegations may wish to pose, \ (Signed) p.U. STIKKER 0-EAM/KA.TO, Paris, XVIe. NATO SECRET �V H7 ~3~ 'WJ HA3Q g s e a ^ aKMES7X~^y 5 MEMORANDUM BY THE UNITED SfATBS DBI^GATION ON PRQgQSED'"Ig*SBffl^^ 13th July, X363 This memorandum contains comments upon the proposed new Agreement for Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information, transmitted to the Secretary General on 16th July, 1963 by the United States Delegation. 2. In preparing the new agreement, we have been motivated by a desire to share with our allies in NATO, to the full extent that United States law will permit, all the information on employment of atomic weapons for mutual defense purposes that is vital to the military plans of the Alliance and to the political and strategic consensus upon which our collective, military capacity depends. * 3o The proposed agreement is designed to permit ths communication within NATO aad among the member nations of the atomic information necessary for political direction and military planning* It is not only an agreement with HATO; , it is also an agreement with each of our partners in NATO* With respect to information on the employment and use of atomic weapons, its application is expected to be considerably more comprehensive.than bilateral agreements we have entered into with certain NATO nations over the past years to promote the objectives of the Alliance. tfe regard the proposed agreement as notable for the breadth of information whioh it encompassesand the extent and variety of communication that it cdhteffiplat.es within NATO and among the allies. • - • -• 4. pit is also notable in another equally important respect; the proposed agreement places Upon the Secretary General the responsibility of supervising the security program within all NATO civil and military elements to which atomic Information will be disseminated.1 Ve consider this to be an important responsibility for the Secretary General, but one which1is essential, in the United States view, to make possible the co-operation which we contemplate under the proposed agreement, .5. A second important responsibility is also imposed upon the Secretary General and derives from the fact that this agreement anticipates exchange of atomic information among member nations in addition to international agencies and military commands. This responsibility requires the Secrotary General to conduct an inspection program in all NATO civil and 1 military elements and in all member nations where atomic 1 information has been received under the proposed agreement In order to determine that the standards, procedures and practices required by the agreement are being observed within NATO and member nations* '...-5- gmsgagu �' NATO SECRET -4~ 6„ Finally, provisions are included in the proposed agreement for a practice the United States has pursued in - bilateral arrangements with eight of the member nations, namely: making periodic security reviews to assure that measures exist for protection of the atomic information made available under the agreement and that these measures are in fact being applied on a day-to-day basis, 7. There follows a somewhat more detailed description of some of the Articles in the text. Scope of Information Covered 8. The Technical Annex to the Agreement is very broad and, in.fact, except for the provisions of Section II, exhausts the authority of the United States to co-operate under Section 144(b) of the United States Atomic Energy Act. Paragraphs A through L of the Technical Annex include all categories of information that the United States can foresee may be required by the Alliance. In addition, Paragraph M of the Technical Annex, subject to the provisions of Section II, permits the communication of "such other information as may be determined by appropriate United States authorities to be necessary for the support of NATO and transferable under provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Agreement." The new NATO Agreement would permit communication of information on the use of any atomic weapons which are made available for use by or which are in support of the Alliance. Flexibility of Communications r rr.'i'i r ' m nmwi n 11 IITTTTI nr IMMHI • n "' " ~ - i * IT n n - • "rii~mi 9. While the present NATO Agreement permits communication of information to NATO, including its civil and military . agencies and commands, and prohibits communication beyond the urisdicti.on of NATO, the proposed Agreement would permit Article II) the United States to communicate atomic information to NATO and to its member nations. It would also permit (Article IV, Paragraph 5) NATO to communicate United States atomic information to its member nations. In addition member nations receiving information under this Agreement may communicate it to NATO and, wheji^authorized^by the United States, to other member nations. Special arrangements, such as CABAL, which were necessary to permit communication to the North Atlantic Council and specified individuals in capitals under the existing Agreement would not be required under the new Agreement* Such arrangements would, of course, remain available for those cases where their use would be appropriate. Even in those cases where use of CABAL or other special arrangements might be deemed necessary, all of the provisions of the new Agreement would also be applied to atomic information communicated by the United States. Atomic information, once determined under the requirements of United States law to be available to NATO, could be disseminated in accordance with the M T O SECRET -4- �^ - -5- NATO SECRET security requirements of the Agreement to those who need it in relation to NATO functions. Effect on Existing of New Arrangements 10. Article.VII is similar to Article V of the 1955 Agreement. The purpose of the article is to obtain agreement that, if any member nation decides to communicate to NATO information of the type that may be communicated by the United States under the Technical Annex to the Agreement, the communication will be made under terms and conditions, which are the same as or similar to those specified in this Agreement. No member nation will therefore be assuming any undertaking different from that of any other member nation, including the United States. While it is intended to encourage such communications, the commitment to provide information is. limited to the extent that a contributing nation may decide to do so. At the same time, this article imposes no requirements on member nations with respect to the terms and conditions under which other atomic information not transmissible under ' this Agreement or classified non-atomic information may be communicated to NATO or to another member nation. Moreover. it imposes no requirements or prohibitions on any member nation with respect to any agreement, bilateral or multilateral_. regardless of the type of information involved, that is not entered into on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It has no effect upon existing arrangements, including bilateral Agreements for Co-operation between the United States and NXTO1 members in the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. Security 11. Unlike the existing Agreement, the new NATO Agreement contains a Security Annex, which incorporates existing NATO security regulations and establishes additional special security requirements applicable to United States atomic information. Paragraphs A and B of Section I of the Security Annex obligate all elements of NATO, as well as member nations, to implement the security program required by the Agreement, and, as indicated below, to undergo security inspection by the Secretary General. Paragraph C of Section I of the Security Annex provides that the Secretary General will be "responsible for supervising the application of the NATO security program for the protection of atomic information in all elements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which receive atomic information under the Agreement." This paragraph allows the responsibility as it pertains to the atomic capable units of assigned or earmarked forces to be that of either the Secretary General or the nation concerned, as determined by agreement within NATO. This was done to allow for arrangements to accommodate operational requirements. -5- NATO SECRET �jjfeO SECRET mmT%o: . ' -6- 12. We consider the supervisory responsibility of the Secretary General to include the overall direction and control of the NATO Security program in NATO military and civilian elements for protection of -inf ormation communicated undex. the..,, agreement. This supervision would be exercised through the enforcement of NATO security regulations and the requirements of the agreement. Supervision also connotes the authority to require correction of non-compliance with security regulations. We recognize that the supervisory function may be exercised through the existing organizational structure, civilian or military, with heads of subordinate elements ultimately responsible, through channels, to the Secretary General for this purpose. The inspection functioh alone« however, is fact:finding in nature and does not, in the absehee of the supervisory function, entail authority to direct corrective action. .: 13. Section X of the Security Annex provides that the Secretary General will establish a comprehensive program tot the security inspection of elements of NATO and its member nations receiving information under the agreement and that copies of inspection reports will be furnished to the United States. Sub-paragraph A of this section provides that inspection will be made by "qualified personnel or HATO . agencies designated by the Secretary General." The intent of this provision is to permit the Secretary General to utilize, to the fullest extent that he desires, inspection programs carried out by NATO agencies within NATO, particularly in military commands and elements. Notwithstanding this utilization of inspection activities, it is also intended that the Secretary General, through an expanded and strengthened NATO Security Bureau, will conduct inspections on a sampling* basis at all levels within NATO and member nations to which atomic information is communicated under this Agreement* • 14. Section IX of the Security Annex contemplates that the United States will "examine and view at first hand the procedures and practices of the agencies of NATO and of the agencies of member nations responsible for protection of documents and information communicated under the Agreement*V 15. All of these security provisions are considered essential and they complement the provisions authorizing increased co-operation. NATO SECSgP -6- 000391 �fcg^g AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE RmftRDING "ATOMIC IiNPOBtM/^TIOgr"""" The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed et Washington on 4th April, 1949j, Recognizing that their mutual security and defense requires that they be prepared to meet the contingencies of atomic warfare, and Recognising that their common interest will be advanced by making available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member nations information pertinent thereto, and Taking into consideration the United States Atomic Energy Act of 195U, as amended, which was prepared with these purposes in mind, Acting on their own behalf and on behalf of ths Nerth Atlantic Treaty Organization, Agree as follows: ARTICLE I In accordance with and subject to the requirements o£ the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the United States of America will, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues to make substantial and material contributions to the common defense and security, from time to time communicate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member nations, while making such contributions, atomic information in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, provided that the United States of America determines that such co-operation will' promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to its defense and security* ARTICLE II The United states of America will communicate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including its military and civilian elements, and to member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization requiring the atomic information in connection with their functions related to NATO missions, such atomic information as is deterioined by the United States of America to be necessary to: -7- 000392 �NATO SECRET -8- (a) the development of defense plansj (b) the training of personnel in the employernent of and defense against atomic weapons and other military #***> applications of atomic energy; ^ J (c) the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and othsrL military applications of atomic energyj and (d) the development of delivery systems compatible with the atomic weapons which they carry. /y«*-*> ARTICLE III 1. Co-operation under t h i s Agreement w i l l be c a r r i e d out by the United S t a t e s of America i n accordance with I t s applicable laws. 2. Under this Agreement there will be no transfer by the United States of /jnerica of atomic weapons, nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons or nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving Restricted Data. 3The information communicated by the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement shall be used exclusively for the preparation or implementation of NATO defense plans and. activities and the development of delivery systems in the common interests of NATO. ,Y &7*^2 p<*y~ J f < A »» ymAja- * $*^ ARTICLE IV "1. Atomic information communicated pursuant to this • Agreement shall be accorded full security •proxectimr~nndeJ' applicable North Atlantic Treaty Organization regulations and •procedures, agreed security arrangements, and national leglsla4]Ti tion and regulations. In no case will the North Atlantic . G"1 JJL: Treaty Organization or its member nations maintain security standards for the safeguarding of atomic information less restrictive than those set forth in the pertinent North Atlantic Treaty Organization security regulations and other agreed security arrangements in effect on the date this Agreement comes into force. 2* The Secretary General of NATO shall be responsible for the supervision of the security program in all NATO military and civilian elements. tjJU& ## ^ 3. Atomic information communicated by the United States y* r^ pursuant to the Agreement will be made available through channels - ^/>for communicating atomic information now existing or as may be f hereafter agreed. ' * * • Mwmrmmc^mt • • • m IMM.II • �k8 Atomic information communicated or exchanged pursuant tc this Agreement shall not be communicated or exchanged by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or persons under its jurisdiction to any unauthorized persons or, except as provided in paragraph 5 of this article, beyond the jurisdiction of that Organization. 5* Unless otherwise specified by the United States, United States atomic information provided to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may be communicated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to its member nations as necessary to carry otft functions related to NATO missions, provided that dissemination of such atomic, information within such member nations is limited to those specific Individuals concerned with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization missions for which the information is required. Member' . nations agree that atomic 'information so received from the North ] Atlantic Treaty Organization" or otherwise pursuant to this Agreement will not be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the recipient member nation, provided that it may be communicated to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or, when authorized by the United States, to other member nations requiring the information for functions related to NATO missions. ARTICLE V Other provisions of this Agreement notwithstanding, theP Government of. the United States of America may stipulate the degree J j to which any of the atomic information made available by\it tc NATO &*• (S or member nations may be disseminated, may specify the categories , of persons who may have access to such information, and may ImposeJ*&t& 3t such other restrictions on the dissemination of information as it deems necessary. ARTICLE VI The application or use of any information communicated-^, under this Agreement shall be the responsibility of the Party receiving it; the Party communicating the information does not provide any Indemnity or warranty with respect to Its application o use* ARTICLE VII Paralleling the undertakings of the United States of America , under this Agreement, the other parties, to the extent they deem <JA$J necessary, will communicate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including its military and civilian elements and to member nations, the same types of information subject to the same or similar terms and condifcionsspecified herein. .9- NATO SECRET �NAEQ SECRET Alff&X B t o " -10- ' •i"-»lii. i Ml i<Hi I in.flpi ARTICLE VIII For the purposes of this Agreement: (a) "Atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic $pei+&energy, exclusive of the means for transporting er propelling the "rf*^ device {where such means is a separable and divisible part of the ^ j T t > device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for TPQ development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test " v device. - (b) "Atomic information" means information which Is (cK e designated "Restricted Data" or "Formerly Restricted Data" b y the 4 W * -^ Government of the United States- of America; information which is /•rfQrfy' designated "Atoinicu by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; or <*fJJ ' information which is comparably designated by any other NATO member • nation. ' ARTICLE IX 1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon receipt b y the kv | Government of the United States of America of notification from all * Wv| \ Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty that they are bound b y the terms of1 the Agreement,; • 2 . The Government of the United States of America will inform the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and all Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of each notification and of the entry into force of this Agreement. & 3. This Agreement shall remain in force until terminated b y mutual agreement or superseded b y another agreement, it being y/\ «/i understood, however, that termination of this Agreement as a whole . *~ '' 1r shall not release any'party from the requirements of this Agreement pjicwj*-* ' to safeguard information made available pursuant to it. ARTICLE X ? This Agreement shall upon its entry into force supersede the Agreement between the Parties to the "North Atlantic Treaty for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information, signed at Paris on 22nd June, 1955, it being understood, however, that information fo*** communicated under that Agreement shall b e considered for all purposes to have been communicated under the provisions of this * Agreement. In witness whereof the undersigned Representatives have signed the present Agreement on behalf of their respective States, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO SECRET -10- 000395 �-11M? \ NATO SECREf ANNEX~B~ t o mzmr Xione a t P a r i s t h i s _ _ „ <lay of . 19 . i n t h e English and French language, both being equally a u t h o r i t a t i v e , i n a s i n g l e o r i g i n a l which s h a l l be deposited i n the archives of t h e Government of t h e United S t a t e s of America. The Government of t h e United S t a t e s of America s h a l l transmit c e r t i f i e d copies thereof t o a l l t h e s i g n a t o r y and acceding S t a t e s . For the Kingdom of Belgium: For Canada: For the Kingdom of Denmark: For France; For the Federal Republic of Germany: For the Kingdom of Greece: \ For Iceland: For Italy: For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg: For the Kingdom of the Netherlands: For the Kingdom of Norway: For Portugal: For Turkey: For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: For the United States of America; -ii- amjfes. �-13- NATO SECRET ANNEX B t o ggJBBT T^HNICAL.AJ'jyEX. TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE NORTH A.TLANTIC TREATY FOR CO-OPERATION ~ REGARDING ATOMIC INFORMATION * J , I <{ »""*" The following implementing provisions are agreed to by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty in connection with the Agreement signed this day for co-operation regarding atomic information of which this Annex is a part. SECTION I Subject to the terns and conditions of the Agreement, the types of atomic information which the United Stated of America may make available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member nations are: ta A. As may be necessary for mutual defense planning, training, and logistical requirements, information concerning the numbers, locations, types, yields, arming, safing, command and © control, and fuzing of those atomic weapons which can be made available for use by or in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. B. Effects to be expected or resulting from the detonation (53 of atomic weapons. C. Response of structures, equipment, communications, and personnel to the effects of atomic weapons, including damage or casualty criteria. D. Methods and procedures for analyses relating to the effects of atomic weapons. Til* Information on the capabilities of potential enemy nations for atomic warfare. F. Information on atomic weapons required for attainment of delivery capability with, specified atomic weapons wliich can be made available for use by or in support of NATO, including information required for evaluation cf atomic weapons systems to determine IIATO requirements and strategy. G* Information regarding delivery systems, including tactics and tocliniques and duties of maintenance, assembly, delivery and launch crews required for attainment of delivery capability v/ith specified atomic weapons. H. To the extent that they will influence NATO planning, / the results to be expected from the strategic air offensive. I. Information required for attainment of compatibility of 5* specified atomic weapons with specified delivery vehicles. �\ ~li|~ NATO SECRET. ANJ-XEX-Bto • M M M ' • • J, Safety features of specified atomic weapons and of the operational systems associated with such weapons and information necessary and appropriate for "salvage and recovery operations incident to a weapons accident. K. Information required in planning for and training of personnel in the employment of and defense against atomic weapons and including information concerning: 1, Military uses of isotopes' for medical purposes; 2. L«•' attacks. Defense against radiological warfare. Information regarding civil defense against atomic M* Other information as may be determined by appropriate United States authorities to be necessary for support of NATO and transferable under provisions of the Atomic Energy Act'of 195^-» as amended, and the Agreement. SECTION II . X.^ No information on other military applications of atomic energy, military reactors, or naval nuclear propulsion plants, will be communicated under the Agreement. Done at Paris this _. day of ,19 • ,_ _..> in the English and French languages, both being equally authoritative,, For the Kingdom of Belgium: For Canada: For the Kingdom of Denmark: For France: For the Federal Republic of Germany: For the Kingdom of the Netherlands: For the Kingdom of Norway: For Portugal:. For Turkey: , For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: For the Kingdom of Greece: -IV 000398 �-*' V _15_ HATO SECRET sw^RsrVto^ g-xraiH For I c e l a n d : For I t a l y : For t h e Grand Duchy of Luxembourg: For t h e United S t a t e s of America: -15- NATO SECRET 000399 �-17- NATO CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX-B "to mzmr •••• SECURITY ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE 1T0RTO ATLANTIC TREATY FOR COOPERATION REGARDING —' — —• ^ATOMIC INFORMATION • iLjji.i»j i |i'W il ^H|i » •• II *Hm**mt**mimma This Annex sets forth the security measures which NATO and the member nations shall apply to safeguard atomic information made available by the United States to NATO and its member nations pursuant to the Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information (referred to hereinafter as "the Agreement") of which this Annex is a part. In the event a member of NATO other than the United States makes atomic information available pursuant to Article VII of the Agreement, such information shall be safeguarded by security measures no ; less restrictive than those set forth in this Annex. SECTION I GENERAL A. NATO security regulations, ho less restrictive than those which are presently set forth in C-M(55)l5(Final) and the Confidential Supplement of 1st January, 1961 thereto, as well as. the security measures specified in this Annex, shall be applied by NATO military and civilian elements and by member nations to atomic information, communicated pursuant to tJTe '• Agreement. B. The security program as implemented by all NATO military and civilian elements and by member nations receiving atomic information pursuant to the Agreement shall be comprehensive in scope and shall carry out the security requirements provided for in this Annex. C. The Secretary General shall be responsible for supervising the application of the NATO security program for the protection of atomic information in all NATO military and civilian elements which receive atomic information under the Agreement. This responsibility shall extend to the North Atlantic Council, the Secretariat, the Military Committee, the Standing Group, and all other NATO civilian and military agencies, commands, committees, bodies, groups or other organizational units to which information is communicated under this Agreement; except that in instances where a member nation retains the authority to exercise this supervisory security responsibility over its military units which receive information under this Agreement, the responsibility shall remain with and be exercised by the member nation concerned. D. No individual shall be entitled to access to atomic information solely by virtue of rank, appointment, or security clearance. �^> NATO CONFIDENTIAL *mm 1 to — ^-M(63)5r ' E.' Access to atomic information made available to NATO shall be limited to nationals of NATO countries, parties to the Agreement, who have been granted security clearances in accordance with Section II of this Annex and whose responsibilities require access to the information. F. Access to atomic information made available to a member nation pursuant to the Agreement shall be limited to its nationals who have been granted security clearances in accordance with Section II of this Annex, and whose duties require access in order that the member nation, can fulfill its responsibilities and commitments to NATO. SECTION II PERSONNEL SECURITY A. No individual shall be granted a security clearance for access to atomic information unless it is determined that such clearance will not endanger'the security of NATO or the national security of the member countries of NATO. B. - Prior to affording access to atomic information, the determination of eligibility (decision to grant security clearance) for each Individual to be afforded such access shall be made by a responsible authority of the government of the individual concerned. C. The decision as to whether the granting of a security clearance is clearly consistent with the interests of security shall-be a determination based on all available information. Prior to this determination, an investigation shall be conducted by a responsible government authority and the information developed shall be reviewed in the light of the principal types of' derogatory information which create a.question as to an individual's eligibility for security clearance, as these are set forth in Section III of the Confidential Supplement of 1st January, 1961 to C-M(55)l5(Final). D. The minimum scope and extent of the investigation shall be in accordance with the standards set out in. Section II of the Confidential Supplement to C-M(55)l5(Final), except that a background investigation shall be required for clearance for access to atomic information classified Secret for individuals other than members of the armed.forces or civilian personnel of the military establishments of the member countries. E. Each establishment handling atomic information shall maintain an appropriate record of the clearance of individuals authorized to have access to such information at that establishment. Each clearance shall be reviewed, as the occasion demands, NATO COB-FIDEffPIAL -18 000401 �to insure that it conforms with the current standards the individual's employment, and shall be re-examined priority when information is received which indicates employment involving access to atomic inf oamati on may consistent with the Interests of security,, applicable to gig a matter of that Continued no longer be PF,. Effective liaison shall be maintained in each country .between the national agencies responsible for national security end the authority responsible for making clearance determinations to assure pronpt notif ioatlon of information with derogatory iogpll* cations developed subsequent to the grant of security clearance* SECTION III --•-;.. PHYSICAL SECURITY A* Atomic information shall be protected physically against espionage, sabotage, unauthorized access or any other hostile activity. Such protection shall be commensurate with the importance of the security interest involved. B. Programs for physical security of atomic information shall be established so as to assure: 1. Proper protection pf properties ahd materials on hand for immediate use, in storage or in transit. 2. The establishment of security areas, with controlled access, when deemed necessary by reason of the sensitivity, character* volume and use of the classified properties and materials and. th© character and location of the building or buildings involved. Perimeter barriers, natural or structural, shall be established when considered necessary to prevent or impede access by unauthorized individuals when the characteristics of the properties or. materials involved are particularly sensitive or revealing. A. 3. A system of controlled access which shall embody procedures for a competent authority to authorise accessj accurate methods of personnel identification and accountability for identification media; and a means of enforcing limitations on movement within, and access to, security areas. h. The above will be in addition to the procedures set forth in Section IV C-M(55)15(Final). SECTION IV CONTROL OF ATOMIC INFORMATION,. • A. Information control programs shall be maintained which will have for their basic purposes: 1. Control of access. -19- NATO CONFIDENTIAL • �Ni5Sft CONFIDENTIAL . -20- AKMx!B_to 2. Ready ace aunt ability commensurate with the degree of sensitivity. . . " • " ' 3. Destruction when no longer needed. B. Security classifications applied by the United States to atomic information communicated under the Agreement shall be observed .at all. times. Regradlng or declassification may be done only with the approval of the United States. C. Docamenta containing United States atomic information communicated under the Agreement shall bear NATO markings and a security classification equivalent to that assigned by the United States, followed by the word "Atomic". In addition, the following marking shall be entered on the document In the language of the document: ..' . ._:.". '_ "This document contains U.S. atomic information (Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data) made available pursuant to the NATO Agreement for Cooperation Regarding '"-•' Atomic Information signed (date) and will be safeguarded accordingly." D. Accountability records shall be maintained for all" Top Secret and Secret documents,, and for. all documents on which special limitations have been placed in accordance with Article V of the Agreement. These records shall show the identity of all recipients of documents on Which special limitations have been placed and shall note the vise made of information contained therein, . E, Reproductions, including extracts and translations, of documents containing United States atonic information bearing: the markings specified in paragraph C above may be made under the • following rules: •=•*•-'.•• 1. Documents classified Secret and Top Secret may be reproduced only with the prior approval of the United States. Such documents shall bear a suitable notation to this effect. . In emergencies when prior approval cannot be obtained in tine, - this rule may be-waived, but the United States shall be so . informed by the most expeditious mea*ns. 2. Documents classified Confidential may be reproduced only as necessary to meet current requirements, 3. Reproductions, including extracts and translations, shall bear all security markings (including the marking described in paragraph C) found on the original document and shall be placed under the accountability controls applied to the original document. Where paragraphs bear separate NATO CONFIDENTIAL -20- �21 - gftg-Q gOgglDEMTlAL AMEOTto ESSEI • classifications, the security classification of documents containing extracted atomic information shall bear the classification of the paragraph with the highest classification from which extracts were taken and where appropriate the marking • specified in paragraph C. Accountability controls for extracted atomic information shall be as provided in paragraph D of this section. Further, such special limitations aB may have been placed on the original document shall apply to documents containing the extracts. F. Documents prepared to record atomic information received under the Agreement by oral or visual means shall bear the markings specified in paragraph C above and shall be subject to the rules for 'accountability ahd control applicable to the level of classification "Involved .'•-•• '•":"..••'.•;••. '.'•••• SECTION V 3MISSI0N : •• • v. : Communications by the United States of atomic information under the Agreement, including oral and visual communication, shall be through channels now existing or as may be hereafter agreed. .. To assist the Secretary General in the discharge of his security responsibilities under the Agreement, the United States shall provide the Secretary General with sufficient information to Identify each written communication- of atomic information by the United States and each communication authorized by the United States under the Agreement.. • . SECTION VI REPORTS . — i i a n j i . 1 . I ' I I . H i v . ! • • • • A. Each member nation and NATO military and civilian element which receives U.S. atonic "information -under the Agreement shall submit by 31st March oof each year through the Secretary General to the United States a report containing the following: 1, A list of all atonic documents received from the United States during the 12 months ending 31st December of the previous year;! • "2. A record of the distribution and use of the documents listed in paragraph 1 above; and 3. A certification that a physical muster has been made of all atomic documents for which the nember nation or NATO military or civilian .element is accountable under the Agreement. The certification shall include a list of all documents unaccounted for, with a statement of the results of the investigation of the loss and the corrective action taken. -21- NATO CONFIDENTIAL �NATO*. CONFIDENTIAL ' -22- B. If U.S. atomic Information communicated under the Agreement is compromised by loss of documents or any other means, an immediate' report including all information concerning the compromise shall be made to the Secretary General and tha United States. ; A SECTION VII SECURITY' EDUCATION Member nations and NATO military and civilian elements receiving information under the Agreement shall maintain an adequate program to assure that all Individuals who are authorized access to • atonic information are informed of their responsibilities to safeguard that information. The program shall include a specific initial indoctrination and orientation, periodic re-emphasis of individual responsibilltes aid a termination interview stressing the continuing responsibilities for protection of atonic information, SECTION VIII '"""*."". SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED CONTRACTS Every classified contract, subcontract, consultant agreement or other,arrangement entered into by Parties to the Agreement, the performance of which involves access to atomic information exchanged under the Agreement, shall contain appropriate provisions imposing obligations on the private parties involved to abide by the security arrangements set forth in this Annex. SECTION IX CONTINUING REVIgWOF SECURITY SYSTEM It is reeognized that effective and prompt implementation of security policies can be materially advanced through reciprocal visits of security personnel. It is agreed to continue a thorough exchange of views relative to security policies, standards and procedures and to permit U.S. security working groups to examine and view at first hand the procedures and practices of the agencies of NATO and of the agencies of member nations responsible for the protection of documents and inf ormation communicated under the Agreement, such visits to be undertaken with a view to achieving an understanding of adequacy and reasonable comparability of the respective security systems. The Secretary. General of NATO will be informed of these -visits and reports 'setting forth pertinent findings of the United States working groups will be furnished to him following each visit. All visits will be carried out in cooperation with the national security authorities of the countries concerned. �SECTION X SECURITY INSPECTIONS A. Security inspection of all NATO military and civilian *' elements and member nations which have received U.S. atomic inf ormation under the Agreement shall be made regularly „ 'but not less often than once every twelve months, by qualified personnel or agency designated by the Secretary General. ••'•" P B. The inspectors shall examine all phases of the security program and within thirty days after the completion of the inspection shall submit to the Secretary General a written report that shall include a list of any deficiencies found in the application of th© security regulations. C. The Secretary General shall initiate aetion to we^rect deficiencies after the receipt of an inspection reporte D. Copies of these Inspection reports shall be mads available by the Secretary General to countries which have contributed atomic information to NATO pursuant to the Agreement ands consistent with other provisions thereof and as may be appropriate, to the installation inspected, the national security authority concerned, and ths military headquarters. Done at Paris this day of _ : _ _ ^ . 19___s in the English and French language s,~Doth be ingequalXy™author it at ive. For the Kingdom of Belgium: For Canada: For t h e Kingdom of Deranark: For F r a n c e : For the Federal Republic of Germany: For the Kingdom of the Netherlands: For the Kingdom of Norway: For Portugal: For Turkey: For t h e U n i t e d Kingdom of G r e a t B r i t a i n and N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d : For t h e Kingdom of Greece* -23~ NATO COKFIDSNTI^L �TO CONFIDENTIAL JWJSX B • -2U- to For I c e l a n d : } For I t a l y : For t h e Grand Duchy of Luxembourg: For t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s of America: NATO COWTDF:I?TTAT: � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW04916 Title A name given to the resource NATO Document C-M(63)63) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 02-Jul-63 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived NATO Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information, RG24-B-1, vol. 21471, CSC 2108-1-AC-228, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of National Defence Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource NATO, nuclear weapons Description An account of the resource Draft Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en