https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/38987eb3223fb002cd6c35da994abc8d.pdf 5f842d756b0f96c2e84595549bcf0cfd PDF Text Text \<UPRIVY COUNCIL »«l*ii«SBftS3E: I B U R E A U D U C O N S ii l L P R I V E OFFICE / CANADA Ottawa, June 6 t h , 195 J u l e s Leger, E s q . , Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Dear Mr. Leger: I have now had an opportunity to study your letter of June 4th on the 'Fourth Power' problem as well as the first instalment of suggested amendments enclosed with your letter of May 29th on the same subject. I am writing to suggest some means of reconciling the views of your department as expressed in these letters with those of the rest of our group as proposed in the third draft of the memorandum dated May JOth, and with which I had thought you had agreed in general substance at our earlier meetings. There is such a radical difference between the views of your department and the views we had reached in our previous meetings that I thought it would be desirable to have another meeting, but before the meeting I think we should explore the possibilities of some reconciliation. I suggested to General Foulkes that he might discuss with you the substance of the problems relating to the use of the weapons and the NATO arrangements. I gather that he has not yet done so. The first problem we should consider, I think, is that of timing. I do not want to rush consideration. either by officials or Ministers, of what is a most important problem and of a proposal that y A0027625 133-000290 *7.loajt(Oa$ �- 2Canada should take some initiative on it. On the othW hand, there is a good deal of activity going on in this field, not only at the Disarmament Sub-Committee but in NATO and in the capitals of our allies, and I am not sure whether any ideas that we might put forward would be much less effective in September and October than in June and July. I think we should consider this time element on Monday. If we cannot get this subject before the Cabinet Defence Committee next Thursday morning, we have not much hope of getting any proper collective Ministerial consideration of it before late August or early September. Perhaps, however, it would be wiser to leave it for further discussions of substance between officials during the next few weeks and not try to get anything to Ministers until late in the summer. In regard to the substance of the proposals, I get the impression that you have in mind a SACEUR-Council control that would have to be exercised at the time of any crisis before the weapons were used, although this is only implied rather than stated in your draft. I think that such an arrangement is impractical in regard to the use of nuclear anti-aircraft weapons and I vrould think that is probably the case with regard to others as well. Your own suggested paragraph 20 recognizes this possibility. I would suggest that we propose that the Council would instruct SACEUR, inadvance as to the clrclMstances "under' which these_va^iousspe£ific types of weapons^ouWT^e used - there may be different circlMstah'Fe^TC weapons than, say, for HONEST JOHN. SACEUR in turn would then delegate his authority, subject to the U.S. law if necessary, to his subordinate commanders to the extent necessary to get it to a practical operating level. This would ^ ™ ^ ^ M — * F * in—TTTTTTatnTiilTTMF J..LII UTTI'Tia . .J.TIUMI • •• »II H •III. lin I n 'I I,' I * " * " "•—1 |'"|'" '" •*• • • • • • • • m - i . i * t>»|i»niil*'T"e lw ''l* •"•'»", " " ^ - . A0027625 134-000291 �- 3 preserve the principle that you appear to have in mind and could be covered; and I think it is worth some effort to achieve. In fact I think this could be covered by reasonably modest changes in the wording of the new paragraph 15 you have proposed and to which I am suggesting amendments below. Your draft is not clear as to whether the U.S. and the U.K. tactical nuclear weapons would also be under ^ACEu^'ahd^ouncil^H^rgTOr-r" "TKe ^mpTlca,El6h^^TS~TKa,t•""t'he-^"woulQ™-^^";-""•"—"I would think we should not be firm on this point in discussing it with the U.S. and the U.K. If the Council is going to lay down policy and a general instruction to SACEUR in advance, this would surely be one which would be consistent with what the U.K. and the U.S. will be doing in regard to their own units on the continent and those units will in any case be under SACEUR command. Consequently it seems to me that one would not need to be specific that the formula you are suggesting would apply to other than those weapons that are provided on loan or as mutual aid. Perhaps, however, this is a vital point in the view of your department which will require discussion in substance. I may say I find it hard to believe that a decision of France on this major issue would really be dependent on the nature of the arrangements between SACEUR and the Council in respect of U.S. and U.K. weapons which they themselves produce. In regard to procedure, I would much prefer one single memorandum along the lines our group has had in mind than to have a separate one on uranium export policy. The immediate issues with which Ministers are faced are those in the field of uranium exports but they are now well aware of the relation of it to this 'Fourth Power' problem. A0027625 135-000292 �_ 4 It seems to me that a single longer memorandum makes more of a logical whole in this field than would two separate ones. I have not yet seen what your officers have in mind on the export situation, however, and until I do I am not familiar enough with what they feel is deficient In the group draft and needs to be spelled out separately. In regard to the form of the memorandum, your department has suggested so many changes, some of them so radical and so many of them admonitory rather than leading to recommendations, that I am somewhat at a loss as to what to suggest in reaching agreement on a text. I find myself unconvinced of the need for a number of the changes in detail, but perhaps the others in the group whom I have not yet been able to consult will be prepared to accept them subject to consideration of changes in the substance. I have no serious objection to many of the changes in form, provided that we are in substantial agreement on the substance of v/hat we want to recommend on this important matter. After studying your suggestions in detail, I would make the following proposals for a compromise draft which I hope you can consider before our meeting on Monday. I shall have a revision along these lines prepared for consideration then if you think well of it. The following comments are related to the group draft of May 30th and refer to the suggestions in your two letters as read together. Paragraph 1 I do not see the need for watering down this paragraph as you have suggested when it is our own secret internal memorandum in question. I do not see why it is injudicious to discuss the relative stability of some of our allies when that Is central to the issue that is troubling us. . A0027625 136-000293 �- 5Paragraph 2 No change suggested. Paragraph 3 I would prefer to leave in the last two sentences and hksve re-drafted- the later paragraphs on Germany taking this into account. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 No changes suggested. Paragraph 7 To be changed as you suggest. Paragraph 8 I would accept your first suggestion but I would prefer not to accept the others. Adding the words "or manufacture" in the context you have suggested in the first sentence changes the substance significantly here. If you prefer, we could add at the end of this sentence something to the effect "and might well avoid a fourth power entering upon the manufacture of nuclear v/eapons". I would prefer to keep the last two sentences notwithstanding the comment in your letter because I cannot see that the Council-SACEUR proposal that we are making will really remove the French and German objections and I think we should make Ministers aware early In our argument that we are proposing something quite serious that v/ill encounter difficulties. Paragraph 9 To be changed as you suggest. A0027625 137-000294 �- 6Paragraph 10 Again I would like to retain this reference to lack of stability in France and to lack of full confidence in our recent enemies. This memorandum is a purely domestic document asking Ministers to approve a difficult initiative which is bound to get us into some difficulties with our French and German allies and it seems to me we should not pull our punches in arguing for It. If the argument is wrong in substance, that is another matter and we should discuss it on its merits. Paragraph 11 To be changed as you suggest. New paragraph following paragraph 11 , Your suggestion here for a new paragraph 11 is acceptable to me if its first two sentences can be put positively and constructively rather than the way they are, and also if the third sentence which I consider highly_djjig^rous is eliminated. As paragraph 20 oTThe group draft recognized, we are asking Canada and other NATO countries, apart from the U.S. and the U.K., to remain second class powers and we think that we and they should remain such for good reasons. On the other hand, I would not throw in a provocative group of catch words like this without arguing the matter in its context as we have tried to do. The last sentence of this new paragraph should not be necessary now if we retain the present paragraph 18 which I am suggesting below. Paragraph 12 This should be revised as you propose (in your first letter) but I hope that you would agree A0027625 138-000295 �- 7to -omit the fifth and sixth sentences which I think are unnecessarily critical of the conclusions that we reach. I would also suggest that the last sentence of this paragraph should read as follows: "Particular consideration has been given to a possible system which might serve to prevent or dissuade any NATO member becoming a fourth power manufacturing nuclear weapons." Paragraph 13 This should be changed as you suggest but without the word "small" in the first sentence which is unnecessary. I think "might perhaps be possible" Us weak in the second sentence, but if your department does not feel more convinced than that, I do not want to ask you to say more than you believe. It is possible that the last sentence will have to be changed in view of what Mr. Zimmerman tells me about MATADOR, both because it is a ground-to-ground missile and because it seems to me it has a large enough range and potential size of yield that may make it the type of weapon we would not wish to have possessed by a fourth power. This we should discuss in substance. Paragraph 14 I think your suggestions here are satisfactory but I would eliminate the sentence you put in brackets as being unnecessary in view of what we say later about Germany. Paragraph 15 This of course is the central point. I would be prepared to accept your proposal of substance that we should not ask NATO to declare that no member state should become a fourth nuclear power, if you feel that this would better achieve what we have in mind. A0027625 139-000296 �-8 I would also accept your proposal in regard to the role of the Council if It is changed in substance in accordance with what I have said above. I would therefore suggest that your revision be further revised to read as follows: "15. Specifically it is proposed that, if the U.S. and the U.K. agree after consultation, Canada crystallize this new policy & by proposing at NATO that certain specified nuclear warheads for specified air defence "^^ and ground support weapons should be made available ^V on loan by the U.S. (and to a nominal extent by the U.K.) to other NATO members who require them.. These nuclear warheads would be stored in "B'trockpiles under the formal custody of SACEUR. They would be used only in accordance with the specif! • nm ""•' •""im •''jaSmifeiueaatafiimmiimi.imnuae.ai^ »>l^rr;mlMM^Kim,mmma^i»,JmiMml,,mfl.^il,,'ae military this commander would be .directIons given only of i n accordance.. wi.t .._. direSiveg^rTTrrM^^ncTrTe^^m use [ri~Iine ons. Tn s~-wotn.a oe he remainder would be as you propose.) Extra paragraph following paragraph 15 I would include here your proposed paragraph 16 revised to read as follows: "Under the policy proposed, NATO countries, other than the U.S. and the U.K., would be free to make nuclear weapons if they decided to do so, but it would be understood that they would not be assisted in any way in this endeavour by their allies. Indeed the supply of U.S. (and to a nominal extent U.K.) warheads under a loan arrangement would be designed to discourage these other NATO countries from manufacturing nuclear weapons themselves. Whenever any other NATO country began to manufacture its own nuclear weapons, A0027625 140-000297 �- 9it would cease to receive warheads on loan from the U.S. or U.K. and would, be obliged .fc&.JZgj^rn, forthwith what they have already received on loanT '"^fiTsT"""" PSTLCTWW^S^ to ensure that all warheads provided on loan were kept in the form provided and for the purpose for which they were provided and under SACEUR control. This inspection would be carried out by a joint NATO inspection organization or possibly by the MEU armament control agency on behalf of NATO in the WEU countries." Paragraph 16 I much prefer to keep this than to incorporate your suggested paragraph 18, but I would be prepared to discuss what advantages you see in your approach rather than what we have suggested. Paragraph 17 I prefer our group draft to your suggested paragraph 17. I think this is also an illustration of how desirable it is that we should not separate the export problem into a different memorandum. Paragraph 18 I would like to retain this paragraph in general subject to amendment.; Paragraphs 19 and 20 I think these are still worth retaining unless you disagree v/ith. the substance on which you have made no comment. Your proposed paragraph 19 The changes in weapons that are now being foreshadowed may blur but need not, I think, destroy the A0027625 141-000298 �- 10 - i distinction we are trying to make if, as proposed, the policy is implemented in terms of specific warheads for specific weapons, retained subject to inspection. I have been over the technical aspects of the problem with Mr. Zimmerman, Dr. Longair and Dr. Arnell and I think it is not necessary to recount these technical difficulties to Ministers at this time. Perhaps Ministers should be briefed on the technical problems when there is an opportunity. If we officials agree in substance to do what we have in mind, let us take the responsibility for advising Ministers that we believe that the technical difficulties can be surmounted. Your paragraph 20 What is now proposed for paragraph 15 would make this unnecessary and indeed it is the consideration indicated in this paragraph which it seems to me makes the revision of 15 essential even at present. Your paragraph 21 I think this detracts from the essentials of the arguments and does not contribute to the argument as a whole. Paragraph 21 I would agree with the suggestion that there should be a separate paragraph about Germany and that this one should end after the third sentence. New paragraph 21A I would suggest the following concerning Germany to cover the points In your three paragraphs 22, 23 and 24: A0027625 142-000299 �- 11 "Germany presents a special and difficult case. Presently bound by the Paris Treaties not to manufacture nuclear weapons and rent by arguments as to whether or not her forces should even use tactical nuclear weapons, she will undoubtedly wish within a few years to use at least the tactical variety. Her circumstances seem bound to lead to this conclusion. Her frontiers merge with the East;[her planes are the traditional invasion route;*) upon her will fall the main initial burden of both air and ground defence; she will shortly be much the strongest Western military power on the continent. On the other hand, she has a delicate problem in her relations with East Germany where the use of even tactical nuclear weapons might easily convert an insurrection or border incident into a major v/ar. Moreover, Russia would be apt to view with a special concern the possession of any nuclear weapons by Germany unless there was convincing reason to believe these could only be used in a limited defensive role. Many people in the west also feel strongly that Germany above all must be prevented from using her great technical capacity to arm herself with weapons which would enable her or provoke others to start a major war. The policy proposed in this paper should"make it more possible than any other that has been suggested to maintain the treaty limitations on Germany, to give her the anti-aircraft and ground defences she needs in order to be an effective member of NATO and yet keep her from acquiring the types of weapons which neither East nor West would wish her to have." Paragraphs 22 to 26 I would retain these rather than deal separately with the countries outside NATO in a different memorandum; otherwise Ministers might well feel our consideration was incomplete in this respect. A0027625 143-000300 �t - 12 Paragraph 27 To remain Paragraph 28 I cannot understand the suggestion that this accumulation of the whole should be deleted and should be put in a memorandum on sales policy where it simply does not belong. 7v.tr r^t^o Paragraph 29 As I have already indicated, I would prefer to keep this rather than have a separate memorandum on export policy. I will be glad to discuss this with you or with any of your officers on Friday or during the weekend if you so desire and will let me know so that I can come in to the office for this purpose. V ^ Yours sincerely, t^rns 47-H^f'. *c' \> A0027625 144-000301 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00955 Title A name given to the resource Message from Mr. Bryce to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 06-Jun-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived ÒAtomic weapons - Canadian policy,Ó RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5960, file 50219-AM-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource Concerning proposed amendments to the 'Fourth Power' problem Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en