https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/485c706746a42a99877502f83916e9a2.pdf 6d0e2e0ac30931c2aa19ba207346b559 PDF Text Text D.L. ( l ) J . J . McCardle/P. Tremblay/ho'd £62/1- /9/M'</0 ys The Acting Under-Secretary Secret August 9, 1957 Defence Liaison (1) Division Export of Oranium and the "Fourth Power11 Problem You asked for our comment on Mr. Bryce's argument in his letter of July 29 that it will be difficult to present the problem of uranium exports to Cabinet on its own and without presenting, at the same time, the larger question of the Canadian attitude with respect to possession of nuclear weapons by "Fourth Powers". 2. In general, this Division would agree with Economic Division that, in spite of the undoubted relationship between the Canadian views on uranium export and on the "Fourth Power" problem, it should be possible to seek the Government's views on the first question separately. 3. The reasons for our agreement with the views of Economic Division may be summarized as follows; (a) There is as yet no completely agreed view at the official level on the "Fourth Power" problem and it may take some considerable time before this is achieved. On the other hand, we are being pressed to define our uranium export policy as several countries are now anxious to open negotiations with us on this matter; (b) The policy suggested in the draft memorandum which it is proposed to submit to Cabinet on export of uranium is consistent with the fundamental assumption of the paper on the "Fourth Power" problem, i.e., the desirability of providing control on the military uses of nuclear components. In the former memorandum it is envisaged that such control would be exercised A0027625 72-000229 �V 2 through a self-denying ordinance on the part of "Fourth Powers" coupled with the controlled supply of nuclear weapons (both as to quantity and as to nature) by the U.S., probably through SACEUR. 4. Whatever subsequent discussion takes place over the "Fourth Power" problem it is certain that this basic assumption will not be altered and we run no risk therefore, in defining our policy over export of uranium, of prejudicing the stand we might eventually take regarding the "Fourth Power" problem as a whole. The further study of the "Fourth Power" problem may only bring about changes of significance regarding certain aspects of the problem which appear to bear no direct relation to the proposed Canadian export policy of uranium, namely: 1. Should Canada take an initiative with a view to crystallizing U.S. and U.K. policy regarding the "Fourth Power" problem? 2. What are the best ways and means of reducing the difference in status between the two nuclear powers in NATO and the other members of the Alliance? 3. To what extent could NATO machinery be used to exercise effective control over the supply of nuclear weapons by the U.S. and the U.K. to their allies? 5. Our conclusion therefore is that even though our views on the "Fourth Power" problem may undergo some changes, these changes should not be of such a nature as to prove inconsistent with the policy on export of uranium for which Cabinet approval is being sought at the moment. 6. At the same time, we believe that consideration might be given to a few changes in the draft memorandua for Cabinet on the export of uranium which might serve to meet Mr. Bryce's firmly held view to some extent. The core of the suggested policy on the export of uranium would certainly seem to be our desire to discourage the production of nuclear weapons by "Fourth Powers". It might be wise in the draft memorandum to Cabinet on uranium export, therefore, to underline this fact to a greater degree than the present draft does. It might be suggested as well that the policy set out in the draftraemorandumwould have to oe subject to revision in the light of developments in (a) the disarmament talks in London, (b) United States policy with respect to the stockpiling of nuclear weapons for NATO uses, and (c) any general Canadian initiative on the "Fourth Power" problem along the lines of that which has been * 'A0027625 73-000230 �- 3 " under discussion between senior officials of the Canadian - Government. 7. We have one or two other suggestions to make about the drafting of the paper on export of uranium which are set out in note form below: Page 5: There is no mention in the first paragraph of the possibility that the Three Power (U.S., U.K. and Canada) view on the "Fourth Power" problem may not hold the day. Ministers should probably be made aware that this is only a view held by the Three Powers and could be upset by a number of developments, Including the action of the USSR, or the determination of another power to manufacture nuclear weapons no matter what the economics of the situation may be. Perhaps if we pointed out as well that, while the three countries share this general policy objective, very little has been done at the moment to implement the policy. Page 7: The last sentence in the first paragraph is not entirely consistent with the suggested policy. We are planning to insist on controls in the case of some countries arfct not of others (US and UK). Here, and in other sentences of the draft, this important fact is not stressed as we believe it probably should be so that there may be no misunderstanding on the part of Ministers, Page 8; The problems which we would face in applying the suggested uranium export policy are examined in the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 8. It seems to us that there is a problem which is not touched upon. Would lt be worth examining briefly the problem which might arise out of domestic, political and economic difficulties which might arise in the following circumstances: if we became suppliers of a steady customer and for progressively larger amounts of nuclear materials, would we be able to resist diversion by that country of nuclear material,, in years to come,to military uses. 8. In view of Economic Division's responsibility for handling the export of uranium question, you may consider it appropriate for them to prepare a reply to Mr. Bryce's letter of July 29 Incorporating these comments we have made with which yuu are in agreement , Defence Liaison (1^Division A0027625 74-000231 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00927 Title A name given to the resource Message from Defence Liaison to the Acting Under-Secretary Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 09-Aug-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived ÒAtomic weapons - Canadian policy,Ó RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5960, file 50219-AM-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource Export of Uranium and the "Fourth Power" Problem Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en