https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/14ffee97b29f462b1eaa54bb29aa9e38.pdf 064e15266f427645352b23f40d5e7b07 PDF Text Text COPY SECRET 2 6 J u l 57 NUCLEAR WARHEADS POR CANADIAN FORCES 1. The recent statement by Mr. Dulles concerning the possible stockpiling in NATO countries by the USA of nuclear weapons has c e r t a i n implications for Canada. I t i s assumed that the USA w i l l wish to carry out such possible stockp i l i n g without amending t h e i r present l e g i s l a t i o n governing the control of atomic energy and, t h e r e f o r e , t h i s could only be undertaken i f such weapons remained i n the custody and ownership of the USA, 2. Canadian requirements for weapons with nuclear warheads might be considered in three categories; (a) Those for forces assigned to the Suoreme Allied Commander, Europe. (SACEUR) (b) Those for forces earmarked for the Supreme Allied Commander, A t l a n t i c (SACLANT) (c) Those for forces for the a i r defence of North America in Canada.. 3 . (a) Canadian requirements i n Europe for her forces assigned to SACEUR for some time t o come w i l l be limited to ground-to-ground missiles of a close support type for the Canadian Army and an a i r - t o - a i r missile for the RCAF. (b) For forces earmarked for SACLANT, the foreseen requirements are for an a i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e , surface-to-air m i s s i l e and possibly depth bombs and torpedoes with nuclear warheads. (c) For the a i r defence of North America i n Canada there is,, or w i l l b e , a requirement for an a i r - t o - a i r missile and a s u r f a c e - t o - a i r m i s s i l e . h_ The main probiens a r i s i n g from the stockpiling of such weapons would appear t o be those associated with storage, maintenance and c o n t r o l . In Europe, these problems would seem to be n e g l i g i b l e as far as Canada i s concerned, since the weapons would be stored in other NATO countries and would only be made a v a i l a b l e t o Canadian forces when required, and the p o s i t i o n of ownership, therefore, would not a r i s e u n t i l war commenced, 5, The problems of s t o r a g e , maintenance and control i n Canada would be considerable: (a)To begin with, the import, export, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , ownership and use of a l l nuclear energy i s vested in the control of the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada under the present Atomic Energy Control Act and, therefore, while permission could presumably be obtained from the Atomic Energy Control Board for the import, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and storage of such weapons, i t would mean amendment to t h e Act i f control and ownership of such weapons had to remain with the USA, I (b) To make effective use of such weapons they would need to be stored close to the u n i t s which would be employing them. In the case of the RCAF, t h i s would involve storing these weapons wherever an a i r defence unit i s based. At present, this would mean special storage and maintenan«e f a c i l i t i e s at or near S t . Hubert, Ottawa, North Bay, Comox and b a g o t v i l l e . In addition to the RCAF a i r defence u n i t s there are c e r t a i n USAF a i r defence u n i t s located on leased bases i n Canada, namely at Pepperel Air Force Base i n Newfoundland, and Goose Bay, Labrador, and special f a c i l i t i e s would be required a t these locations a l s o . I t i s presumed, however, t h a t the cost of such f a c i l i t i e s at these locations would be borne by the USA, In the case of the Navy, t h i s would involve storing these weapons at or near Halifax, and possibly Vancouver. • • •— A0027625 83-000240 �- 2_ (c) Although detailed information on the storage and maintenance of nuclear warheads is not readily available, what information we havd indicates that earth mounded reinforced concrete explosive magazines, or storehouses equipped with forced air ventilation and heat would be necessary. No radiation hazards under such normal storage conditions are known to exist. Since it is believed that certain component parts of a nuclear warhead must be stored separately, it may be necessary for the Service unit to have a minimum of two such buildings. However, as we have no information to indicate what special maintenance or inspections are necessary during storage, and what special facilities ' are needed for the preparation, assembly, and check out of nuclear devices, it would be necessary to obtain such information from the USA before being able to determine all the implications regarding storage of such nuclear weapons, (d) Consideration should be given to an equitable.basis for the cost of providing storage and maintenance on Canadian bases, 6. Now that the proposed plan for the integration of the operational control of the air defence forces of Canada and the United States is accepted, it may be possible to work out a practical basis for the control of such nuclear weapons required by the RCAF, with control and ownership vested in the U.S. Air Defence Commander and arrangements for the automatic release of such weapons to the RCAF, in the event of a declaration of an appropriate alert* A similar arrangement might also be worked out between the U.S. Commander-in-Chief Atlantic (SACLANT) and the Canadian Sub-Area Commander in Halifax, for the release of nuclearweapons to the RON, This would probably mean the stationing of a United States Service officer at each of the Canadian bases where nuclear weapons are stored, who v/ould represent the U.S. Commanders and have nominal custody of the weapons. Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, Ottawa, 26 Jul 57. A0027625 84-000241 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00923 Title A name given to the resource Summary of Possibility of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 26-Jul-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived ÒAtomic weapons - Canadian policy,Ó RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5960, file 50219-AM-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en