https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c054e4573b35d0c55ae0e8f22e196545.pdf 100af7e1dd7d5eb25abcdf33b340ad42 PDF Text Text SECRET P00B3?£ PBAFg Juno f , 1987. EBKOBAaPUH FOR ran i s m s Atonlo ucapona Polioy and the "fourth Power." Problea the Problea of Fourth Fotssre m m m * * m m m t m ~ m * m m m m m m m m * m m m m m \ i w I W I W I I J I m n HI I M « I H • — - m m m m Canada has for oooo tins pursued a polioy designed to licit tho possession end nanufaotur© of nuolear warheads to as few oountrles as possible, He hav© pursued thio end because of the olear danger to peace that would result if those rarheado tser© to be possessed by unstable or irresponsible goveranents. The Canadian covermaont has not yet, however, formulated a definite polioy in regard to its owa possible requlrenents for nuolear warheads* nor has it considered what attitude it should adopt to the nanufaoture or use of nuolear warheads by SASO aectoer nations other than tho U.K. and the U.S. 2. It now seens essential for Canada to find answers to these two vital and related problems, fhe need for answers has been nade sore apparent by a reoent request firon the French eorcrraaent to purohase Canadian uranium* for in a preiininary approach France has cade it olear that she will not accept a aystea of safeguards whioh would ensure that uraniun supplied by Canada would nob be used to assist, at least indirectly, in the mnufaotur© of melear warheads. 8. , In addition France is known to hav© asked both the ' .S. and the U.S. to assist her In oanufaoturing suoh warheads. We vey* told at Benauda that neither the U.S. nor the U.K. «i 8 h France to undertake a nuolear weapons* programs. She U.K. has sorely delayed giving a reply to Freneh requests for assistance, and it is clear that neither of those atonio powers tmmm been able so far to define a olear polioy towards th© attempts of a "fourth powor" - .,.2 A0027625 88-000245 �- 2 ** SECRET mi in .in 1.1 that is to say, a power other than tho U.S., ths °.K., or the U.S.8.B. - to undertake a nuclear weapons1 programs. Any success France night have say be expected to spur other European countries to similar efforts. Oernany, for instance, night cooperate and if the Paris Treaties can be suitably revised night expect later to acquire or even nanufaoture nuolear Tswapons herself. A development of this kind would cost likely lead in a nunber of years to ether HATO nsnber nations following suit. Canada as a Fourth Power 4. Canada* s arxaed foroes have no taaediatc roquir«asnt for nuclear warheads, but within a ffcw years will likely require certain specified short-range defensive weapons arsted with snail atonlo warheads - the so-called tactical weapons. The 9.3. air* foroe is already using one suoh weapon in the air defenoe of Berth Anorloa and has been given authority to use it over Canada. For teohnioal reasons the ft.CA.F, does not at present wish to adopt this particular weapon, but it spending large amounts to obtain sn alr-to-alr guided taiasil© that would be nor© effective if it were to be araad with a nuolear warhead. Hhen such a weapon is available, and if a nuolear warhead could be obtained fron tbe U.S. or the U.S., it would be hard for the Governneafc to justify not using it while the U.S. publioly claims that suoh weapons are ouch nor© effootivo than others* §t ' - In tfeis paper references ar© nad© to tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. It is recognised that this distinction cannot properly b© nad© always, and that "tactical" and "strategie" should not necessarily be taken to izaply snail and large yields respectively. Th© height of explosion, the rang© of the delivery systsa together with other footers are significant. However, fbr tho purposes of the policy outlined in this paper the phrase "tactical nuolear weapons" is intended to nean a specific delivery systeea araed with a specific nuclear warhead whioh would not be considered a serious throat by a na^or nuolear power, A strategic nucloar weapon is one Whioh would be so considered. . A0027625_89-000246 �-s- 6. srcRia? On the other hand neither the Chiefs of Staff nor any other govowaaeat authority has suggested that Canada should at any tine seek to a m herself with long-range weapons arced with large atonic warheads designed for offensive action - th© oo-oalled "strategic" weapons. Cor is there any reason to believe that it would bo to Canada's nilltary or ooononio advantage to nanufaoture whatever tactical auclear weapona our farces cay eventually require, Canada's Present Involveneat 6. Canadian participation in Hhe production of nuolear warheads so far has been largely United to supplying uraniun and plutoniun to the °.S. Recently, however, a contract has been nade hereby Canada will supply uraniun to the 0 •&« Although it is primarily intended for the dovelopnent of power in the U,E., sons of this Canadian uraniun cay he used for the nanufaoture ci nuclear warheads. Although Canada has cooperated in oertain United respects in the U.K.'s weapons prcgraarae, we have don© so only with reluctance and have privately expressed our concern that the U.S. has found it necessary to nanufaoture nuolear warheads. 7. Etoreover, as th© largest exporter of uraniun, Canada has taken a lead in international councils in advocating the ISH position of effective safeguards over uraniun or reactors exported for peaceful purposes. Such safeguards would serve the dual purpose of helping to preserve peace and providing aa international envirtxaasnt in which uraniun could be sold on tbe basis of ocranoroiai rather than nilltary considerations. These ar© safeguards to b© exercised either by an international agency or by tho supplier under a bilateral ©greenest, ond ar© designed to ensure that aay such exports or th© fissionable naterlala that nay result f*o» then cannot be used for the nanufaoture of nuolear warheads. As a result the French request fcr uraniun to be supplied without • ••& A0027625 90-000247 I �8ECRJ3f - 4 - satiifaotory safeguard© poses a difficult problea for Canada which would be aggravated if France were alao to ask us explicitly for assistance in a nuolear weapons' program©. 8. In an attest to find answers to the problems with vkleh Canada ia already faced, a group of senior officials ©esteemed has reviewed these natters and decided to reoocnend to Oinisters a policy which, if It were first to be accepted by th© U.S. and the U.K., night for a nunbor of years at least linit the possession of nuolear weapons by fourth powers to aa extent that would not seriously disturb suoh equilibrium as at present exists between the najor powers* It also night well avoid a fourth power entering upon the nanufaoture of nucloar wai&eads. Any success the polioy night hav© will depend not only upon acceptance by tho U.K, end the U.S, but also upon agreeaent within HATO itself. £e nay expect that aaong tho KATO powers there will be resistance froa France and Oernany, and that there will b© objections froa noa-SATO countries • particularly froa India - to son© aspects of the policy. But the overwhelming importance of tits goal to which the polioy is directed, together with Canada's particular ability to advance effective arguments for its acceptance, appear to justify an atterapb to overcome ike difficulties whioh way be anticipated. The Objective of a % w Polioy «»i| UK n in I n m » mn nr 9. im 1 wamteeeemmaaeaeaaaama. The purpose of th© policy will be to prevent, or at least delay and discourage any fourth power fron nanufacturiag eny nuclear weapons or otherwise acquiring such weapons of a range or else sufficient to enable it to attack another nation effectively. The logic of such a policy is that the consequences of nuclear warfare are now Imown to be so frightful ;ftiat it nust b© prevented at alaost any cost. If only tho U.g,, th© U.K., and the U.S.S.B* possess these so-called strategic nuclear weapons, there is a • ••5 A0027625 91-000248 �- 6 - SECRET reasonable chance that the present uneasy equilibrium of power can be naintained for sons years* But the addition of any feurtfe power to this delicate balance will inevitably increase the instability aad hence th© risk of war* 10, m particular, if large-yield ©tonic warheads and long-range delivory systems can be manufactured or were to b© possessed by countries with unstable or irresponsible governments the danger will be aooordlngly increased. Within HATO itself France presents the seat iasediate danger because she undoubtedly has the technology to produce such weapons and has a history of political instability since World War II which Is aggravated by a large ooantnist party. Kor can we have full confidence in thi© respect in either Western Germany or Italy, Outside SATO India and Japan can hardly be considered sufficiently politically stable to merit tbe conplete confidence whieh would alone justify their possession of strateglo nuolear weapons* 11. In addition, tho acre fourth powers are discouraged froa manufacturing nuolear weapons, the better will be the chances of reaching an agreeaent to end weapon tests aad the possible biological dangers fron radio-active fall out* Any new power manufacturing nuclear weapona would foresee the need to test then and would therefor© oppose any international action designed to put an ©nd to tests* IS* At the sane tine it is desirable that the SATO allianc© should develop its full nilltary potential by analog Itself with th© nost aodera weapons* If 1AT0 iff permitted a full and modern growth in th© nilltary field, whioh is th© only field of co-operation which it has been able to develop adequately m far, the alliance wiil not be in danger of losing it© vitality. The objective of th© new polioy would be to allow HATO to develop its military potential und©r a control syotea which would nininis© the fourth power problea while, at the sans tine, reducing and softening th© differences in status between th© two "nuclear powers" in HATO end th© ©thor members of tbe alliance. A0027625 92-000249 �- 0 - IS* SFCRET It is recognised that the nost satisfactory means of preventing any fourth power from manufacturing nuolear wturheads would be an international disarmament agreeaent* She U.S. has recently proposed that any fissloaahle «a*e*« produced after March 1968 should, provided en effective system of control had been aooepted, be used only for non-weapons purposes under international supervision. If sueh a proposal were to be generally agreed it would sol DO th© fourth power problea as far as the manufacture of nuolear warheads is concerned. Moreover, because it is connected with other proposals for reductions of existing stookpllea of fissionable materials and nuclear warheads by neans of transfers to stocks under international supervision and because it would be implemented only as part of a progrataae involving reductions in armed foroes and conventional amamants, acceptanc© of such a proposal would diminish aad render less urgent the pressures for the emsrgeac© of fourth powers possessing nuolear weapons or having nuclear weapona unddr their operational control or having nuolear weapons on their territory earmarked for ue© by their forces* Th© U.S. proposal appears to be the cast practical which has yet been advanced la disarmament negotiations. However, although th© so*iet Union appears anxious to reach ©on© disawament agreeaent and in particular to solv© the fourth power problea in each a way as to ensure that (jemany does not emerge as th© manufacturer or possessor of nuclear weapons, it would seen overly optimistio to rely on agreement baing reached along the lines of the above U.S. proposals. It therefor© seems desirable to consider alternative polioies afoioh might off ar partial solutions tc th© fourth power problem. Particular consideration has been given to a possible system whioh night serve to prevent or dissuade any SATO aanber becoming a fourth pctaar manufacturing nuolear warheads. ...? A0027625 93-000250 �SECRET - ?- Introduction of luolear Weapons in Shield Foroes in EATO 14. It doss not appear reasonfiblo to r@tv.BQ tc assist othor HATO nembore in gradually streamlining their shield foroes in the o&rte manner aa tha U.S. «n4 th© U.K, hams done by tho introduction of nuclear warheads for air <3»feno© and ground support weapons. It tsi$A perhaps ba possible to limit th© possession of nuclear warheads to certain specific short-rang© air defence end ground support vmpeas which ar© to be released to the BATO partners in th© near future. These weapons would consist ef BOHEST JOSH, a ground-to-ground niasilej possibly KA3ADCR, also a ground-to-ground missile* and son© air defence weapons of th© WIW type* 15. Suoh atomlo weapons of limited range aad else would not enable a M&SQ power to embark on a war against a major power possessing larger, long-range weapone of mass retaliation with th© hop© of success! nor should this modernization programo©, including the possession of limited rang© nuolear weapons, provoke a preventive war by a major power* tJ© should not attest to minimise th© grave dangers of a general war if the smaller weapons war© used. However, a decision has already been taken by two HATO powers, the U.S. and the U.K., to strengthen their ground forces and air defences in Western Europe with these weapons* Thus it is proposed that w© recognise that th© other nati4ss.fi In BATO may also wish to reorganise th©ir shield forces ia a similar manner to those of the U.K. and tho U.S., whioh would entail the limited possession of nuolear warheads for air defence end ground support weapons* Thia is consistent with the proposals concerning U.K. and German plans vhich were discussed in HATO ia r eoent Dontha, 16. Specifically it ia proposed that, if the U.S. and th© U.K, agree after consultation, Canada crystallise this new policy by proposing at BATO that oertain specified nuclear warheads for specified air defenoe and ground support weapons should b© mads ,,.9 A0027625 94-000251 �8 - SECRET available on loan by tho U.S* (and to a nominal exteat by the U.K.) to othor HATO mssibera who require thcsa* These nuolear warheads would be stored in stockpiles un<3er tho formal custody of SACEUR. They -oould bo used only in accordance with the specific nilltary directions of this eoamander, *hioh would b© given only In aocordano© with general directives of tra HATO Council regarding th© us© of such weapons. This would bo in line with the interpretation made by BATO Forolga Uinietere, including I3r. Dulles, end by General Srueathur, of UG 48, th© report of th© Military Coaeaitto© of BATO on tho moat effective pattern of BATO military strength over th® next few years. This report was approved by BATO at its Ministerial Heating in December 1954, Ite Interpretation left to Oovoraasnts through the BATO Council rather than to the HATO military authorities ths decision aa to then BATO nuclear weapons would be used. 17. Under the policy proposed, BATO countries, other than th© U.S. aaa the U.K., would be Are© to make auclear warheads if they decided to do so, but it would b© understood that they would not be assisted in any way in this endeavour by their allies. Indeed the supply of U.S. (and to a nominal extent U.K.) warheads under a loan arrangemmb would b© designed to discourage these other BATO countries froa manufacturing nuclear warheads themselves* Kheaevsr any other BATO country began to manufacture its own unclear warheads, it would cease to receive warheads on loan from tho U.S. or U.K, and would bo obliged to return forthwith what they hav© already received on loan, ^his policy would require a system of Inspection to ensure that all warheads provided on loan were kept In the form provided and for the purpose for which they wer© provided and under SACEUR control* This inspection would be carried out by a joint BATO Inspection organisation or possibly by the TSBJ armament control agency on behalf of BATO in th© £®B countries* 18* l&dsr existing U.S* legislation U.S. forces would hav© to retain not only ownership but also formal custody of th© nuclear A0027625_95-000252 �- 9 - SECRET warheads to b© provided to BATO members, ond the provision of th© warheads subject to this control aight represent tho first stage ef iraplemonting the policy wo have in Bind. But in discussions with U.S. authorities Canada should propose that th© U,s, government should s©©k to amend th© present legislation In such a way as to permit BATO aanber nations to tako control of th© warheads under a loan arrangement and subject to the right of inspootion to ensure that the warheads are not converted into strateglo weapons* Suoh action by th© U.S. would assist greatly In securing the support of France aad Germany for this proposal. 19. As evidence of her serious intent, Canada would offer to provide as Mutual Aid, within reasonable financial limits, uranium required fcr the nanufaoture by the U.S. or the U.K. of the warheads to be lent to other BATO nations. A^ the same time Canada would declare her willingness to ©ell uranium for peaceful purposes to any BATO swasher or group of marcher© under a system of inspection to be operated not by Canada but by a joint BATO inspection organisation. It seems probable that, if this polioy pf the provision of limited nuclear warheads were accepted, a joint inspection system of th© kind proposed would provid© adequate safeguards and would be acre palatable to th© purchasers than controls exercised by the supplier or by the International Atonio Energy Agency* This opinion ia supported by th© reaction of oertain countries to Canada's announcement that Bilateral Agreements covering the sale of uranium would contain control provisions similar to those contained in Article XII of the Statute for the international Atomic Kaergy Agency* 20. An important additional factor in deterring the attests ©f fourth powers to manufacture nuolear warheads is their knowledge of ths enormous oosts involved. Expenditures on such a scale ar© Inconsistent with the concept that BATO asmbers should provide defenc© forces consistent with their economic potential, end should not weaken ...10 A0027625 96-000253 �SECEET - 10 - their economic, and hence their ultimate military, strength by taad&rtafcing burdens t&loh they would find difficult to oarry and whioh can better bo carried olse&her® in th© alliance, national prestige ©r tears, which may cause fourth poasr© to disregard thoao economic facta, may in some measure bo a©fe by a policy whioh would provide licitod nuclear weapons to BATO asis&ere without financial strain* Difficulties ^resented by the Hcsy Polioy 21* The advantages of tho proposed policy have already been 8©t cut, and Canada would appear to be the logical proposer. Sh© U.S. ead also the U.K. night b© suspected of attempting to preserve a favoured position, fievertholoss tho difficulties and obstacles which lie In the way of the policy oust be reckoned witfc^ 23* Essentially the polioyaeaas that the eontineatal msj&ers of BATO, and also Canada, would in effeot deny themselves the us© ©f nuolear weapon© of deterrence and tho poser and prestige in international affairs which er© associated with such weapons* The limitations which would thus be self-imposed nay appear mro real to BATO members sine© they are aware that in theory th© U.S. and the U.K. could abandon the continental land mass to th© Soviet Union. But thoy are alio aware tlmt British and American foroes are stationed in Europe a© hostages asainct any such abandonment, aid that the tihole coacept of the allicaoe la one of collective defence. Consequently it seems probable that on reflection BATO members may be prepared to aooept the logic of the polioy whioh is in essene© an extension of present defence philosophy of contributions cad© within th© limits of asxafrero* economic resources. 2S, The problem of national prestige cannot be overlooked* This may be noet acute in th© case of France, and any French government Tshioh seeks tc gain national acceptance of the policy nay meet vdth political diffieuitie©. It is understood that there was a split on this general issue in th© recent Frenoh cabinet, and it seams possible that a fair measure of support might b© won provided tha* A0027625 97-000254 �— • •i suffiolect ffcoe-aavinc devices can b© contrived to cover both the principle aad presentation of the new policy* 24, Germany presents a special and difficult case. Presently bound by the Paris Treaties act to manufacture nuclear weapons and rent by arguments as to whether or net her forees should even use tactical nuolear weapons* she will undoubtedly wish within a few years to use at least the tactical variety. Her circumstances eeea bound to load to this conclusion* Her frontiers merge with the East i her plains ar© the traditional invasion route j upon her will fall th© main initial burden ©f both air and ground defenoej eh© will shortly b© much the strongest Western ailitary power on tbe continent. On the other hand, eh© has a delicate problea in her relations with East Germany where the us© of even tactical nuolear weapons might easily convert an insurrection or border incident into a major war. tloreover, Russia would be apt to view with a special concern th© possession of any nuclear weapons by Germany unless there was convincing reason to believe these could only be used in a limited defensive role. iSany people in the west also feel strongly that Germany above all oust be prevented from using her great technical capacity to aim herself with weapons whioh would enable her or provoke others to start a major war. The policy proposed in this paper should make it sore possibl© than any other tha* has boon suggested to maintain the treaty limitations on Germany, to give her the anti-aircraft and ground defences she needs in order to b© an affective member of HATO and yet keep her from acquiring the types of weapons which neither Bast nor West would wish her to hav©. The Bew Policy and Hon-BATO Powers 26. The acoeptanoe of the polioy by BATO to uld have to be accompanied by a consistent attitude towards powers outside th© alliance. Essentially this would mean denying all noa-BATO powers aay assistance • ••12 A0027625 98-000255 �- 12 - SECRET in aamifaeturing any nuclear warheads* Whether or not at a later date specified tactical nuclear weapons might be provided under du© safeguards to particular allies or regional groups outside HATO would be a natter for later consideration. Whether cr not this step were eventually to be taken, it will remain necessary tc ir^ose on nen-BATQ countries - and indeed on all countries not known to be making nuolear warheads - the requirement that th© export to them of materials* equipaent and technical services for atomic energy programme must be accompanied by safeguards to ensure that no fissile material can be diverted to the production of warheads, 28. We oust recognise that this polioy can only be effective if the Soviet %iora also adopts a similar policy in its own interest. There is a clear danger that the Soviet Union would be tespted to give assistance without due safeguards in order either to ntfee mischief among the western allies, or to damage western interests in the eyes of th© "uneoseaitted" powers* nevertheless, the real interests of th© Soviet Union with regard to the "fourth power" problea seems to b© similar to those of the U.S. and tte U.K, there is also evidence that the Russians believe that exports of nuolear materials for peaoeful purposes should be subjeot to controls. 27. It seems probable that many non-BATO powers will be prepared to support the objectives of the new policy insofar as lt prohibits the unrestricted manufacture of nucloar warheads. ?h©y nay, however, be expected to raise strong objections that they have aot been Included in the provision ef atonic warheads for specified defensive weapons and hence unreasonably denied the ability to defend themselves against aggression. The foroe of this objection will depend upon whether at a later date a decision is taken to extend the new BATO policy to other allied regional groups* 28. It also seems likely that soae nen-BATO nations will obj©et to ths imposition of controls ovwr material, ©quipamt and . e,18 A0027625_99-000256 �- IS - SECRET "^ eaaeaaamaaaaam services ©aborted tc them for us© ia nuclear power programmes. India already provides an instance of this attitude, founded on national pride and bolstered by her ability to supply fuel for th© GIB research reactor at a high cost froa her own lowgrad© ©r©a* While it appears increasingly doubtful whether India will inf aot wish to obtain fuel froa Canada for the CIR reactor it might possibly be in Canada's interest to decline suoh a request if we felt sure that by doing so we would b© making a real contribution towards the achievement of effective international controls* Objections frcm India and ether nen-BATO countries will undoubtedly affect somewhat our relations with then and reduce our opportunities for developing and establishing new markets for Canadian uranium. However, it appears that Canada can afford to accept these consequences for a period, particularly considering that until 1982 a very substantial market for Canadian-produood uranium is guaranteed under ourrent contractual arrangements with th© U*S, aad the U.K, On balance it would seem that the potential advantages of tba new polioy would warrant acceptance of certain sacrifices at least for the period necessary to explore the possibilities under the new policy* 29, A final consideration exist b© tho attitude ©f th© major producers of uranium or reaotera who ar© not naebers of SATO. Our most iaq?ortant eaapetltor as a supplier cf uranium is undoubtedly South Africa. Should any suoh supplier be prepared to export without applying effective controls, Canada would aat and indeed should not attenpt to maintain a polioy whioh would then be ineffectiv© and would merely deny us market©. I* therefore seeas desirable for Canada to attesapt to persuade th© South African government and subsequently others of the desirability cf th© new policy and of th© need tc maintain effective controls over th© ©sport of uranium to aay fourth power* 80. Although we must recognise that Franc© and India aay e»» bark on a weapons' programme from their own resources, it is probable A0027625 100-000257 �— 14 — SECRET that th© new policy will at least delay and limit the programmes of fourth powers not willing to cooperate. In this connection lt does not seen probable that th© Soviet Union would trust her satellites sufficiently to provide them with nuclear weapona, and no other country is likely to be abl© within a long period of time to produce or obtain long-range delivery systems capable of threatening Europe, Bussl* or Borth America • thus provoking a major war* Recommendations i n I I SI, i - I I r ' ' i r 1 1 - i i i i i i i i n i i i • In th© light of the arguments set forth in this memorandum, the group of officials r o c o m m d s that Ministers ©cnoemed approve in principle the polioy proposed - particularly the steps outlined in paragraphs 16- 17. It also reoonnsnds that Ministers authorise the Department of External Affairs, in conjunction with Bational Defenoe and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, to begin preliminary discussions of tho new polioy with appropriate civil and military officials in tfeahlngten. Aay further action would depend on th© result of thes© discussions and subsequent consideration by the Cabinet. 32* In th© meantime, it is proposed that the uranium export policy announced by the Minister of Trad© and Bommeree on February 18, 19S7, ahould b© firmly naintained for both SATO and other nations, and that aa attempt should b© nad© to persuade th© government of South Africa to follow a similar policy for th© iaposltion of effective safeguards* To be signed by* General C. Foulkes Kr* «T« Leger Ur. ueJ, Bennett Mr. A.P.W, Fiumptr© Mr. 8.B* Bryce A0027625 101-000258 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00919 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum for Ministers Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 07-Jun-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived ÒAtomic weapons - Canadian policy,Ó RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5960, file 50219-AM-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource Atomic Weapons Policy and the "Fourth Power" problem - fourth draft Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en