https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/686dc5f5e09c212479d7dd07ed6ff84b.pdf 8484a2256a0c44470a6f5b2f11734bc6 PDF Text Text THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA THIRD DRAFT ' SECRET May 30, 1957. MEMORANDUM FOR MINISTERS Atomic Weapons Policy and the "Fourth Power" Problem The Problem of Fourth Powers Canada has for some time pursued a policy designed to limit the possession and manufacture of nuclear weapons to as few countries as possible. We have pursued this end because of the clear danger to peace that would result if these weapons were to be possessed by unstable or irresponsible governments. The Canadian government has not yet, however, formulated a definite policy in regard to its own possible requirements for nuclear weapons, nor has it considered what attitude it should adopt to the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons by NATO member nations other than the U.K. and the U.S. 2. It now seems essential for Canada to find answers to these two vital and related problems. The need for answers has been made more apparent by a recent request from the French government to purchase Canadian uranium} for in a preliminary approach France has made it clear that she will not accept a system of safeguards which would ensure that uranium supplied by Canada would not be used to assist, at least indirectly, in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. 3. In addition France is known to have asked both the U.S. and the U.K. to assist her in manufacturing such weapons. We were told at Bermuda that neither the U.S. nor the U.K. wish France to undertake a nuclear weapons' programme. The U.K. has merely delayed giving a reply to French requests for assistance, and it is clear that neither of these atomic powers have been able so far to define a clear policy towards the attempts of a "fourth power" - that is to say, a power other than the U.S., the U.K., or the U.S.S.R. - to undertake a nuclear weapons' programme. Any success France might have may be expected to spur other European countries to similar efforts. Germany, for instance, might cooperate and if the Paris Treaties can be suitably revised might expect later to acquire or even manufacture nuclear weapons herself. A development of this kind would most likely lead in a number of years to other NATO member nations following suit. Canada as a Fourth Power 4. Canada's armed forces have no immediate requirement for nuclear weapons, but within a few years will likely require certain specified short-range defensive weapons armed with small atomic warheads - the so-called tactical weapons. The • • » Ct A0027625 102-000259 �- 2 SECRET U.S. airforce is already using one such weapon in the air defence of North America and has been given authority to use it over Canada. For technical reasons the R.C.A.F. does not at present wish to adopt this particular weapon; but is spending large amounts to obtain an air-to-air guided missile that would be more effective if it were to be armed with a nuclear warhead. When such a weapon is available, and if a nuclear warhead could be obtained from the U.S. or the U.K., it would be hard for the Government to justify not using it while the U.S. publicly claims that such weapons are much more effective than others. 5. On the other hand neither the Chiefs of Staff nor any other government authority has suggested that Canada should at any time seek to arm herself with long-range weapons armed with large atomic warheads designed for offensive action - the so-called "strategic" weapons. Nor is there any reason to believe that it would be to Canada's military or economic advantage to manufacture or to test whatever tactical nuclear weapons our forces may eventually require. Canada's Present Involvement 6. Canadian participation in the production of nuclear weapons so far has been largely limited to supplying uranium and plutonium to the U.S. Recently, however, a contract has been made whereby Canada will supply uranium to the U.K. Although it is primarily intended for the development of power in the U.K., some of this Canadian uranium may be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Although Canada has cooperated in certain limited respects in the U.K.'s weapons' programme, we have done so only with reluctance and have privately expressed our concern that the U.K. has found it necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons. 7. Moreover, as the largest exporter of uranium, Canada has taken a lead in international councils in advocating the imposition of effective safeguards over uranium or reactors exported for peaceful purposes. Such safeguards would serve the dual purpose of helping to preserve peace and providing an international environment in which uranium could be sold on the basis of commercial rather than military considerations. These are safeguards to be exercised either by an international agency or by the supplier under a bilateral agreement, and are designed to ensure any such exports or the fissionable products that may result from them cannot be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. As a result the French request for uranium to be supplied without satisfactory safeguards poses a difficult problem for Canada which would be aggravated if France were also to ask us explicitly for assistance in a nuclear weapons' programme. 8. In an attempt to find answers to the problems with which Canada is already faced, a group of senior officials «oncerned has reviewed these matters and decided to recommend to Ministers a policy which, if it were first to be accepted by the U.S. and the U.K.,. might over a period of time limit the possession of nuclear weapons by fourth powers to an extent that would not seriously disturb such equilibrium as at present exists between the major powers. Any success the policy might ... *.o A0027625 103-000260 �- 3 - SECRET have will depend not only upon acceptance by the U.K. and the U.S. but also upon agreement within NATO itself. We may expect that among the NATO powers there will be resistance from France and Germany, and that there will be objections from non-NATO countries - particularly from India to some aspects of the policy. But the overwhelming importance of the goal to which the policy is directed, together with Canada's particular ability to advance effective arguments for its acceptance, appear to justify an attempt to overcome the difficulties which may be anticipated. The Objective of a New Policy 9. The purpose of the policy will be to prevent, or at least delay and discourage any fourth power from manufacturing any nuclear weapons or otherwise acquiring such weapons of a range or size sufficient to enable it to attack another nation effectively. The logic of such a policy is that the consequences of nuclear warfare are now known to be so frightful that it must be prevented at almost any cost. If only the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. possess these so-called strategic nuclear weapons, there is a reasonable chance that the present uneasy equilibrium of power can be maintained for many years. But the addition of any fourth power to this delicate balance will inevitably increase the instability and hence the risk of war. 10. In particular; if large-yield atomic warheads and long-range weapons can be manufactured or were to be possessed bj countries with unstable or irresponsible governments the danger will be accordingly increased. Within NATO itself France presents the most immediate danger because she undoubtedly has the technology to produce such weapons and has a history of political instability since World War II which is aggravated by a large communist party. Nor can we have full confidence in this respect in either Western Germany or Italy. Outside NATO India and Japan can hardly be considered sufficiently politically stable to merit the complete confidence which would alone justify their possession of strategic nuclear weapons. 11. In addition, if any fourth power can be prevented or dissuaded from manufacturing nuclear weapons, the chances of reaching an agreement to end weapon tests and the possible biological dangers from radio-active fall-out will be better. Any new power manufacturing nuclear weapons would foresee the need to test them and would therefore oppose any international action designed to put an end to tests. 12. The group of officials recognizes that the most desirable means of preventing any fourth power from manufacturing strategic nuclear weapons would be by an international disarmament agreement. They noted that the U.S. has recently proposed that any fissile material produced after March 1958 by any nation should thenceforth be used only for peaceful purposes and should be subject to effective controls to this end. If such a proposal were to be generally accepted it would largely solve the fourth power problem. For this reason Canada will no doubt support it strongly, in spite of future limitations it may impose upon our sales of uranium and plutonium. However, in spite of evident Russian interest in this disarmament proposal, no great optimism can be based upon it. Therefore it seems desirable for Canada to attempt to form a new policy designed to achieve similar, though more limited, ends. ...4 A0027625 104-000261 �4 - SECRET Introduction of Nuclear Weapons in Shield Forces in NATO 13. It does not appear reasonable to deny to the smaller NATO partners the right to streamline their shield forces in the same manner as the United States and the United Kingdom have done by the introduction of small nuclear warheads for air defence and ground support weapons. It appears possible to limit the use of nuclear warheads to certain specified short-range air defence and ground support weapons which are to be released to the NATO partners in the near future. These v/eapons would consist of HONEST JOHN, a ground-to-ground missile; MATADOR, an air-to-gr6und missile; and some air defence weapons of the NIKE type* 14. Such atomic weapons in limited range and size would not enable a NATO power to embark with hope of success on a war against a major power possessing larger, long-range weapons; nor should this modernization programme, including the possession of limited nuclear weapons, provoke a preventive war by a major power. There would certainly be considerable danger if the smaller weapons were to be used in a limited or local conflict, but there can be little doubt that they will be needed for an effective air defence and to strengthen the shield forces of Western Europe. Thus it is proposed that the other nations in NATO should be assisted to re-organize their shield forces in a similar manner to those of the Nnited Kingdom and the United States, which includes the limited possession of nuclear warheads for air defence and ground support weapons. This is consistent with the proposals discussed in NATO, the United Kingdom and Germany in recent months. 15. Specifically, it is proposed that, after consultation with the U.S. and the U.K., Canada crystallize this new policy by proposing that NATO should collectively and explicitly agree that no member nations except the U.S. and the U.K. will manufacture any nuclear weapons, nor assist any nation but the U.S. and the U.K. in such manufacture. It would also be proposed that these two nuclear powers - in particular the U.S. would then have the obligation of providing on loan specified tactical nuclear weapons to other members of NATO requiring them for the common defence but not making them. In putting forward this proposal, Canada would undertake herself to accept the limitations which it imposes upon her. 16. Under existing U.S. legislation U,S. forces would have to retain not only ownership but also formal custody of the nuclear warheads to be provided to NATO members, and the provision of the weapons subject to this control might represent the first stage of implementing the policy we have in mind. But in discussions with U.S. authorities Canada should propose that the U.S. government should seek to amend the present legislation in such a way as to permit NATO member nations to take control of the weapons under a loan arrangement and subject to the right of inspection to ensure that the warheads are not converted into strategic weapons. Such action by the U.S. would assist greatly in securing the support of France and Germany for this proposal. 17. As evidence of her serious intent, Canada would offer to provide as Mutual Aid, within reasonable financial limits, uranium required for the manufacture by the U.S. or the U.K. of the warheads to be lent to other NATO nations. At the same time Canada would declare her willingness to sell uranium for . . .o A0027625 105-000262 �5 - SECRET peaceful purposes to any NATO member or group of members under a system of inspection to be operated not by Canada but by a joint NATO inspection organization. It seems probable that, if this policy of the provision of limited nuclear warheads were accepted, a joint inspection system of the kind proposed would provide adequate safeguards and would be more palatable to the purchasers than controls exercised by the supplier or by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This opinion is supported by the reaction of certain countries to Canada's announcement that Bilateral Agreements covering the sale of uranium would contain control provisions similar to those contained in Article XII of the Statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency; 18. An important additional factor in deterring the attempts of fourth powers to manufacture nuclear weapons is their knowledge of the enormous costs involved. Expenditures on such a scale are inconsistent with the concept that NATO members should provide defence forces consistent with their economio potential, and should not weaken their economic, and hence their ultimate military, strength by undertaking burdens which they would find difficult to carry and which can better be carried elsewhere in the alliance. National prestige or fears, which may cause fourth powers to disregard these economic facts, may in some measure be met by a policy which would provide limited nuclear weapons to NATO members without financial strain. Difficulties Presented by the New Policy 19. The advantages of the proposed policy have already been set out, and Canada would appear to be the logical proposer. The U.S. and also the U.K, might be suspected of attempting to preserve a favoured position. Nevertheless the difficulties and obstacles which lie in the way of the policy must be reckoned with, 20. Essentially the policy requires that the continental members of NATO, and also Canada, agree to deny themselves the use of nuclear weapons of deterrence and the power and prestige in international affairs which are associated with such weapons. The limitations which would thus be self-imposed may appear more real to NATO members since they are aware that in theory the U.S. and the U.K. could abandon the continental land mass to the Soviet Union. But they are also aware that British and American forces are stationed in Europe as hostages against any such abandonment, and that the whole concept of the alliance is one of collective defence. Consequently it seems probable that on reflection NATO members may be prepared to accept the logic of the policy which is in essence an extension of present defence philosophy of contributions made within the limits of members economic resources. 21. The problem of national prestige cannot be -overlooked. This may be most acute in the case of France, and any French government which seeks to gain national acceptance of the policy may meet with political difficulties. It is understood that there was a split on this general issue in the recent French cabinet, and it seems possible that a fair measure of support might be won provided that sufficient face-saving devices can be contrived to cover both the principle and presentation of the new policy. Similar difficulties may be ...6 A0027625 106-000263 �6 - SECRET encountered in Germany. Under the Paris Treaties, however, Germany cannot openly demand the right to manufacture nuclear weapons; nevertheless she may endeavour to block adoption of the policy in order to leave herself freedom of action at a later time. It seems probable that other NATO members may support Canada's proposals. The New Policy and Non-NATO Powers 22. The acceptance of the policy by NATO would have to be accompanied by a consistent attitude towards powers outside the alliance. Essentially this would mean denying all non-NATO powers any assistance in manufacturing any nuclear weapons. Whether or not at a later date specified tactical nuclear weapons might be provided under due safeguards to particular allies or regional groups outside NATO vrould be a matter for later consideration. Whether or not this step were eventually to be taken, it will remain necessary to impose on non-NATO countries and indeed on all countries not known to be making nuclear weapons - the requirement that the export to them of materials, equipment and technical services for atomic energy programmes must be accompanied by safeguards to ensure that no fissile material can be diverted to weapons production. 23. We must recognize that this policy can only be effective if the Soviet Union also adopts a similar policy in its own interest. There is a clear danger that the Soviet Union would be tempted to give assistance without due safeguards in order either to make mischief among the western allies, or to damage western interests in the eyes of the "uncommitted" powers. Nevertheless, the real interests of the Soviet Union with regard to the "fourth power" problem seems to be similar to those of the U.S. and the U.K. There is also evidence that the Russians believe that exports of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes should be subject to controls. 24. It seems probable that many non-NATO powers will be prepared to support the objectives of the new policy insofar as it prohibits the unrestricted manufacture of nuclear weapons. They may, however, be expected to raise strong objections that they have not been included in the provision of atomic v/arheads for specified defensive weapons and hence unreasonably denied the ability to defend themselves against aggression. The force of this objection will depend upon whether at a later date a decision is taken to extend the new NATO policy to other allied regional groups. 25. It also seems likely that some non-NATO nations will object to the imposition of controls over material, equipment and services exported to them for use in nuclear power programmes. India already provides an instance of this attitude, founded on national pride and bolstered by her ability to supply fuel for the CIR research reactor at a high cost from her own lowgrade ores. While it appears increasingly doubtful whether India will in fact wish to obtain fuel from Canada for the CIR reactor it might possibly be in Canada's interest to decline such a request if we felt sure that by doing so we would be making a real contribution towards the achievement of effective international controls. Objections from India and other non-NATO countries will undoubtedly affect somewhat our relations with them ...7 A0027625 107-000264 �7 SECRET and reduce our opportunities for developing and establishing new markets for Canadian uranium. However, it appears that Canada can afford to accept these consequences for a period, particularly considering that until 1962 a very substantial market for Canadian-produced uranium is guaranteed under current contractual arrangements with the United States and the United Kingdom. On balance it would seem that the potential advantages of the new policy would warrant acceptance of certain sacrifices at least for the period necessary to explore the possibilities under the new policy. 26. A final consideration must be the attitude of the major producers of uranium or reactors who are not members of NATO. Our most important competitor as a supplier of uranium is undoubtedly South Africa. Should any such supplier be prepared to export without applying effective controls, Canada could not and indeed should not attempt to maintain a policy which would then be ineffective and would merely deny us markets. It therefore seems desirable for Canada to attempt to persuade the South African government and subsequently others of the desirability of the new policy and of the need to maintain effective controls over the export of uranium to any fourth power. 27. Although we must recognize that France and India may embark on a weapons' programme from their own resources, it is probable that the new policy will at least delay and limit the programmes of fourth powers not willing to cooperate. In this connection it does not seem probable that the Soviet Union would trust her satellites sufficiently to provide them with nuclear weapons, and no other country is likely to be able within a long period of time to produce or obtain long-range delivery systems capable of threatening Europe, Russia or North America - thus provoking a major war. Recommendations 28. In the light of the arguments set forth in this memorandum, the group of officials recommends that Ministers concerned approve in principle the policy proposed - particularly the steps outlined in paragraphs 15- 17. It also recommends that Ministers authorize the Department of External Affairs, in conjunction with National Defence and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, to begin preliminary discussions of the new policy with appropriate civil and military officials in Washington. Any further action would depend on the result of these discussions and subsequent consideration by the Cabinet. 29. In the meantime, it is proposed that the uranium export policy announced by the Minister of Trade and Commerce on February 18, 1957, should be firmly maintained for both NATO and other nations, and that an attempt should be made to persuade the government of South Africa to follow a similar policy for the imposition of effective safeguards. To be signed by: General C. Foulkes Mr. J. Leger Mr. Yi.J. Bennett Mr. A.F.W. Plumptre Mr. R.B, Bryce A0027625 108-000265 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00918 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum for Ministers  Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 30-May-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived ÒAtomic weapons - Canadian policy,Ó RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5960, file 50219-AM-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource Atomic Weapons Policy and the "Fourth Power" problem - third draft Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en