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JULES LEGER ~«**te .4$**f*t**!3l %& 1MB* CSfelJittt * "^v . - /" A0027623 38-000038 �ejK I. ea Draft Paragraph* for xenarandaa to Cabinet en the *Fearta Power* rra&len , 12. I t i« r*eopii**d tbat taa aaat M t . a f a c t a x y leans uf ..-.favantia^ aay t t h newer f r o * aeaafaetwring aaalaar wea,ane would I M an later-net *enai dlMraament agvaaaaat. Th* $1.5. aaa vacantly proceed that aay fleeianaoie a e t e r i a l e produced a f t e r Hare* 19*$ ahouiu, provided an effective ayete& af control had aaaa accepted, a* used aaly f a r non-wee, one •tvaaaat under interaatienei eeperviaiea. i f such a proposal we-re t a be generally agreed i t would salve taa ata power problem aa f a r a* tha Manufacture of nuelear waapana l a concerned Koroover, seeaue* i t ia connected with ©tbe. ..-osaAs f o r redactions 9i e a i s t i a i stockpile* af fiaeieneble s a t e r i a i * aaa nuelaax waapana ay aaaa* af transfers ta stocks under international euporvisien aad oecauee i t would be iaplewntod only a* part of a progress* -ving redaction* i n arsed f o r e * * and eanvantiaaai ariweaente, acceptance of soon a ,;r*p*aal would diminish and render laaa argent tlsa preeeur** f a r taa emergence of t t h powere peaeeaeln*; aaalaar waapana a r having miciaar waapan* under tbeir operational eootrei ar having aaalaar waapana aa t a * i r t e r r i t o r y earnartcaa f a * aaa lay t h e i r forees. I n aaaa aa approach tnere la aa need t a seek ta diatinguiato between the danger* of aaaafaotwra and the dangers of peeeeesieo 99 * t b paaara or to try to draw a l i n e between long aad snort range a r a u a t e ^ i c and t a c t i c a l ar offensive Mid eafeaelve e r deterrent aad opera t l a n a i war bead*. Mar ie i t necessary to pra^ee to guard against tne «*cr**nc* of a %th atanufactaring; power ay expediting t b * emergence of N W I H paaara peeceaslag ar controlling nuclear eeapeae of 999m a*s- fhe & pre .-opeeai appears to be tba ©oct (bleb baa y * t tmmn advanced m d i a a r a a ^ n t ne&ot1jtm. aawever, although tba Soviet Union appear* anal oaa ~*acb aofae dlttfMfa*e;it agree ent and i n particular t a 1 .. a A0027623 39-000039 �•HI • 2 •» solve the 4t»* power praalaa in aaeb a aay as ta ensure tbat gernaay $999 aat eearg* aa taa @*n*f*ctarer or paaaaaaar af nuclear weapane* it would seem everly epti*i*tlc to r*iy an agreeaent being reached aieng tba ii»M af tba above V osais. It therefore *ee~s desirable ta ceaeider a i u native policies wnicb sight offer partial solutions ta the ttb pewer problea* particular canaideration has aaaa given ta a poaaifeie statea which aight serve to prevent a %th power faaaufacturis^ iarge-eeeie aaci«ar eeapaaa arieing anong t HATO weabar*» although it would not affect aaeb atber paaeibie eon tenders aa japan* India and Sw*d*n. Introduction af laelMr weapon* la S a l e m fercee m MATO it daea aat appear laaaonabia to refuse to assist atber MTQ aaewber* in gradually etraan»lin«ng their ebield fore** in th* aaa* wanner a* th* United States aad the United Singdea h*v* done isjf tbe latradoetian af maall oaeleer wartaead* for air dafeaea aad grauad aappart aeapaaa. 1 be paaeibie to ttait tbe paaaaaaion ef aaeiear wartwaa® ta certain specific chert-range air defease and graaad aappart aeapaaa which are to be released to the MATO partners la tbe aaar future. Thca* aMpana woald consist of HOMUIT JQttb# a *£reuad-to~grouod aleeiles WATADGB, aa air-to-ground wiesile, and 99m air defease waapaaa ef tba Uim it. type, Such ataai* weapons af Halted range aad *i*e aaald aat enable a KAXO pewer to e%uarx oa a ear against a «ajar power pa»**a*iag larger# long-range aeapaaa af aaaa retaliation with tba aopa of succees, aar should tbia aederaixatiaa progreiaae, lasladlng tbe peseeselea af Halted range aaalaar weapons, pravo«te a preventive war by a najar paaar. (Ia this connection Oeraeey is a apeclai ease which will be discuses eeaesat* paragraphsbelow.) we should aat attentat te aint/ise the grav* daagars of a general war if tba eaailer weapon* were used. However, a decision ba* • »*3 A0027623 40-000040 �•hi . .'J- i already been taaen by two MATO paaara, tbe U.S. aad tba 9.E., to straagtbeo their groan* force* and air defence* ia western Europe with tbeee weapona. Thus it ia prepeeed tnat aa recognise th ** •**• atber aatieae ia MATO aay alee aiab to reorganise their shield farces in a similar manner to those af the United Ming*** and t:a> United S U t e s , wblch would entail tba Halted possession of neeleer warheads for air defence and graaad support waapana. Thia is consistent with th* proposals concerning United KiafOew Had Oaraan piaaa which were dlaewaaed in MATO in recent aeatbe. ii>. Specifically, it ia prepeeed that, after consult- atioii with the Ualted states and tne United aogdea, daneua crystallise this aew policy by prepeeiag t;<ai nuclear warheads for air defence and ground I I aeapaaa abauld b* aad* available la gradual stagaa ta SATO aaabera. Tne naclea warhead* would be stored in stockpiles under tba fer&ai caatady af tbe sapraaa Allied Ceamander la Europe. SACKUK aaald have to give hi* permission before tbe warheads were used in any clraeaetsa*** Mid be would give it only aft* r*c*i th* authorisation of th* KATO Caaaeil. Thia weald be la line with tbe Interpretation aade by SATO Foreign Ministers, inclading Mr. Sallea, and by Senate! 0'ueather, of US ti, the report of taa Hilltary CeamittM af HATO on tba aaat effective pattern af MATO Military atrength over tbe Beat few year*. This report waa approved 'by SATO at ite maiateriai Meeting la i*ce*»er 195b, Ite interpretation left to #e**va*eate through tba HATO council rather than ta tba MATO nilltary authoritlee the decision aa to when HATO aaalaar waapana would be used. 16. initially, th* nuclear werhMda aaald be provided to other SiATO countries by the U.S. or taa U..v.» a,though atber MATO eaaatriM weald aet be prevented froa aanufacturiag tbeau Saner tbe policy we propose they aaald be free but A0027623 41-000041 �- A . would not be encouraged ta de ea. Tba eupply af U.S. and U.it. warhMds under a nilltary aid prngrsrw** would, aa taa contrary, be deaignad to 31 •courage atber HATO eeuatriea froa saraufacturing tnea. Mftaaavar other HATO cowatrie* did begin ta aaaafacture their awn they weald eeaee ta reaeive the Mutual aid supply fraa the HJI* aad the U Under tbe aew policy the nuelear warbeeq* nautufaetured by aay other HATO aaaber aaald also be under tba custody of SAdUR and would ba placed la tbe aaaa atoeispiles with the warhead* provided ta taa country concerned by taa U.3. er H.M. Tbe new policy would, af course, require aa elaborate eyetaat of inapeetlaa ta aabe sure that all warheads provided ta er aanafactwred ly HATO countries were kept ia the = >:; ,.:.,.; a y .. 7. ',. ... .XP7C-. •>., T-a, 5 ...:7. y,.7 ..«.,, :,.,7U„, be carried eut yy a Joint HAfo inspection argaalMtion ar pass inly ty th* H 8 Awaiimnt control Ageawy aa behalf ef HATO la MKU eaaatriM* 17« fa facilitate the laoaabing of tnie aaa policy Canada aigbt offer ta provide aa Hatual Aid, within reasonable financial Hmita, tba aftnlam required far tbe aanufaetar* by tba V.&* or the U.&. af tbe waraeade far tba aaaatriae Thia Mutual Aid eupply aaald aat be extended ta atber HATO eeantrlM if and whan they began ta mn, fee turc tneir aaa Mrheads far these waapana. Satil thi* policy la accepted, Canada ia only free ta aell uraaiua in anail, experiaaaSal raaetor quant it ice. one* this pelley la accepted Canada aaaald be able to M i l araaiaa ware freely ta other MATO partner*. A separate aoaorandua is using safeaitted aa this subject. . Si y.,:-.. 17:7 a W H W a w W M k M M H 10. •• - a *t U S . . , . - , , . , . . , ™ . , - , . - I . . . . . . . ; . » • ; • * . . , . - « . , . . . . • , . , , . -,-,,,... ,- v.,a Nt , T -J.-, . . • . « , . , . - - • * » . w a d W W l M B j B * J H M a * M B I The aew pal ley preaanta eevemi difficulties which • • aJ A0027623 42-000042 �- 5 •est be reckoned with. Under preeant U.S. legieietloa W.S* faroee would nav* ta ratala formal custody af tba aaalear warheads to be provided ta HAfO «e»b*rs. Oar policy t b M rests an tba aaaa tbat tbe S.S. Cosgrsss weald agree ta peralt tbe U.8. Oeverwaent ta previa* HATO atMbara with auclear M r b M d * far tbe tactical, defeaaive weapona described ia paragraph 13 under tba safeguard* af tbe aea policy, unless, a* in tba aaaa af tea U.&., the U.S. Oevenaoent can provide aueh warbeade without aatadaaat ta Was preaeat legi aia tion. If Ceagiaaaloaal eaaaaat i* needed, it should be f*cilitat*d by tbe fact that 3A0HUH ie and will probably always be a U.S. eltiaaa bat it aaet be recognised tbat Congraaelonal eaaaaat aay still prove vej-y difficult ta oatain. If aeeaaaary te this ead, it aigbt ba poeeiole ta partaa aa atber HATO aanaare tbat tba troope aaintaining cu*tody af tbe ataewpllaa should always be United Statea troope when aay of the aaalaar wameadt la the* were ef U.S. origin. 19* Tbe new policy ia Meed ae a distiaetioa between lens raage, atrategio, offeaalva weapon* of .aa** retaiiatioa aad abart-range, tacticsi, defensive weapaat af taa type Motioned ia paragraph 13. Thle diatiactiaa is apea to tides at) tba ground tbat tba nuclear aartbMSt of tb* their effect tbat eve© a ao-eaiied "Mali* aaa can be uaed la a etretegle reiMi conversely tactical roles ara M i a * envleaged far acme of tba staia powerful ones. HeoatMieea tbe gaaerai distinction between tbe taa type* af weapons aeaaa valid far tba abort-tam purpose af tbe new policy. Tba policy ie deaigaed ta cover tbe aeat •.Va y..y - .. . a ti c -• o a - ;« . y „ .:,..<. y- . a .,a.a .. ,S . aaalaar warbeade w i n at Made available te the HAfO i ..6 A0027623 43-000043 �-1 JMW-' jti-ri •jiao - 6 partners and when MATO aaabere atber than the U.S. aad M.A will either aet be producing their aaa naclaar aarbeade ar will have aerely began to do ae. A M M will ean*, beMve. when taa policy will ^* overtaken aad outmoded by ev*nt*; peeeibly a diMrsa^ant agreeaent and alwest eertamiy fartb*r d**eiopi&*nta in tbe aaaafactur* of warheads, such a* tbe production af high peeer, e^ailer weight, "«**an* aaaa ueable in eit-r»er a tactical ar a strategic rale, which will further clar tbe distinction between tbe warhead* theaseives aa far a* the teres *tactiMx" and n atfMte&u M ara eaaearaed Then, aaald aaaa* tbe aaly valid reaaiaint criteria will oa the type ef laanchiag ar delivery apparatus and tha aafeaa.ve I offenslea objectives ef tba wear. Maither criterion will he applicable ta determine what warhead* should M provided to or manufactured by MATO acabera under tne .aaa pelic It t u t s evident that at that stag* the policy would have te aaaa under review and it aigbt then be possible to aet up an effective HATO control *y*t*M ever tbe launching apparatuses for waapana with nuclear warhead*. Saab a eeatrol weuld be facilitated by the livelihood tbat tba United states w regain tbe sain aaaafaetarer of tbeM apparatuses, taaagb a further eaapUMtias aaat ba adaitted la tbe fact that eaaa HAfO aeahera are capable of aanufaeturing aueh apparatuses if they decide ta devote the aeeeesery resources to this pax-pOM. The new policy Might baeana difficult to retain aaaa tba aaa greead ferae* of tbe HAfO aaaMfa ateaaa equipped 4 weapaaa largely or entirely dependent en nuclear warheaad aad tbeir air defences btetaia similarly dependent. HATO eeatier* would then ba unable to take effective action to repel inveeien until the HAfO Geuncii's concert bad aaaa .:. a M kS* i A0027623 44-000044 �esp i •— - I21. Anetbei --.-leu that will probably arise is that no HAfO eeaatry will wish to fovaawear tbe right to Manufacture th* whale finally of nuclear waapoas aad ta develop and use tbe short- and loag-raage Mtbads af M i l very. This is an tbe aaeteaptlon tnat tbe U.3. (aad aaa the O.&.) will not agree to place the warheads far ail it* long-ran^e, strategic naelMr W M P O M under SACEUR's custody and HAfO Sauncil Matrol, If only on th* sound practical grounds that S decision 9$ the MATO Council could aat be given quickly enough ia tbe eircMMtaacea where tbe u.£ would wlab ta use its iong-raage deterrent weapons, (if they could not a* uaed quickly, they aaald, of course, C M S * to be deterrents.) 22. Ae ipentioaed in paragraph it ahevc, OorMay la aa exceptional and difficult case. Because of ita divisien and its geo&raphleai aaeitian, ho*tiliti*a involving HATO are aere likely to creak eat alaag the border between tbe taa Seaaaalc* in Berlin th*n at any other paint in tbe HATO area. A revolt ia Baet Ocraaay aaald areata an extreaely delicate actuation becauM of the teaptatiaa af beat Oenaana to go to the assistance af their laat Qeraan brethren. Moreover, tbe classic invasion rout* te Western Europe lie* acroee tbe north SeraSn plain. 23. for all these reason* tn* Serasae aay mil wish to bave aceeat to nuclear weapons In aaaa af aeed. Although they are explicitly beuad by tbe Pari* Treatlea aot to aanufactare ataxic, biological ar eneaical weapons, they are technically aad acientif leaily able to deMlap their mm nuclear weapoM sad aay la th* futur* M * k a revision ef their obligations aader the f a n * Treaties if they ara net aatlafled with alternative aeaaarea to uake it paeelble far tnea ta Mfead tbaaMlvee with tbe latest tactical weapons. At th* aaaa tine there ie strong opposition within Oeraaay ... 11 A0027623 45-000045 �.* » -6to aavfler^ar*Govemasnt sanufaaturins nuclear weapons. A HAfO policy which Med* nuclear waa P O M available to ****** aread iSSSSS in M M of M r taigbt therefore Mtisfy Oeraan public opinion aad aaat Oeraeny's atMntiai defence requireaente, although no on* can predict tbat la tbe long rwn, if other MATO countries each a* yraa«e ara to develop their aaa atonic weapons, e*r»any (pasalbly in eeeperttiea altb Fran.. aay net aia* wish to Manufacture ita aaa. t%. Aitheagh, as aaa abated in paragraph it above, tba supply af auclear weapons under SACEUa's cuetody Sad MATO Council central in peacetime to MATO MtMbara should aot erevoke a preventive war, tbe Soviet Union's genuin* aiara at tbe proa,cet of Oeraaay either Manufacturing ar pasaataiag it* awn nuclear weapon* should aot be aaS*r-«atiMated. .hough Senaftny could aat eaberk aa a war far tbe liberation of last Oenatay with any base of outcast, a Oaraaay aSaufacturing or passeMlng it* aaa ateaic weapon* even under th* safeguard* w* prepee* would be very anxiously regarded by tba Soviet Union, since Ocraamy aaald be ia a pealtion ta involve the atber HATO poaers. S*asr*M*l af . ntssiaU hftbd Pt si w, i»r. A0027623 46-000046 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00894 Title A name given to the resource Message from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Mr. Bryce Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 29-May-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived ÒAtomic weapons - Canadian policy,Ó RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5960, file 50219-AM-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource Draft paragraphs Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en