https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4a534d10c28ebecbfec7c9128c525199.pdf 6d10313cf03386f702d4c99ed95b14ca PDF Text Text T 7 DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. NUMBERED LETTER Security:....^STRICTEP.. TO: •-"•"?, UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA. FR0M. NO: THEtCANADIAN EMBASSY,#,t, PARIS, ¥7. fee Date: France, *&..tf.X.l.ffl. Enclosures: tW?. Air or Surface Mail: Reference: , Fr^nph. p.ef.ep.Qe. .?p.W-fiy. Subject: ^X£ Post File No: Ottawa File No. 7) J< /I' t> .&*t9-A ft " % 4% s^> References One of the questions asked Daridan this week during the National Defence College visit to the Quai d'Orsay related to French policy concerning the manufacture of nuclear weapons in the light of recent developments. Daridan replied by referring to the recent decision of the United States to supply short range missiles to its NATO partners ^\°l and also to proposed arrangements whereby United States' nuclear warheads would be stored somewhere in Europe with the understanding that the decision to use them in case of emergency would be made by the United States. He went on to say that France had taken the lead in attempting to have these arrangements modified to that the decision to use nuclear weapons in case of Soviet aggression should be 1 made by the NATO Supreme Command and not by a single meiribe^ of the Alliance. Only thus could Western European membersj have the feeling that their territories could be effective! defended from the start instead of being liberated after : -W«> having been overrun and occupied. The French Government, " Daridan went on, would continue to pursue this aim. Franc* be in a position to make nuclear weapons 7~& * would in any case in a few years1 time. The ultimate decision whether or not French nuclear weapons should be made would be taken iri the light of prevailing conditions at that time* CU7&tfti*"/**^ h~* eu*J C £<s> 3 ?)/i^^€> &An0#f T>\n Internal Circulation 4t7/z,fr7S&&.c*-pd £fa&aa*£4r%a-*-S-- ^Z£77<U~ r /^t # Distribution to Posts l(j\ LONDON NATO P a r i % 2. ^ Daridan's remarks are in line with the stand taken . by ta> Mollet Government last summer during the Euratom debate in the National Assembly. You will recall that one of the conditions placed by the majority on their approval, of French continued participation in Euratom negotiations was that the treaty should in no way preclude the carrying out of a weapon programme by France and the pursuing of preparations already begun for atomic explosions. The members of the Cabinet who shared this point of view i*#*^ Radicals and ex-Gaullists, conceded to their Socialist colleagues that France might commit itself vis~&-vis ita Euratom partners not to have atomic explosions before 1961 by which time it is believed French technological research will have come to fruition. Since last summer, there have been persistent indications that the French attitude on the subject of nuclear weapons has remained unchanged and Daridan's answers this week constitute a further confirmation of this attitude. The French position on this issue is reflected in their approach to the question of the prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons in current disarmament negotiations. As-you know, M. Pineau reiterated this approach in Bonn when he said that the French could hardly be expected to renounce the manufacture of these weapons unless there were definite A0027623 47-000047 Kxt. l«2A(Bev.2/52) �w 2 - indications that the three nuclear powers were accepting similar obligations leading to the reduction and destruction of their stock of nuclear weapons. 3» The French position on this matter should be considered in the light of what has been called the French "white paper" on defence which was outlined orally by the Minister of National Defence, M. Bourges-Maunoury, during his press conference of May 11. The position which he then announced was clarified in the interview which he and a number of defence officials gave to LE FIGARO on May 21st. There had been indications even before the release of the British White Paper that the results of the reappraisal of French defence policy which has taken place during the last twelve months or so, would be the subject of a State paper but so far the only announcements made are those referred to above. The Government may have come to the conclusion that the final shape of the new defence programme can hardly be put in black and white until the impact of the present economic crisis has become more apparent. h+ The Defence Minister recalled at first that the French military establishment had three main objectives which were 1) the protection of French territory against external threats in accordance with France r s commitments as a member of the NATO Alliance; 2) the maintenance of internal security in the metropolitan territory and 3) the protection of French overseas territories against external threats and internal subversion. Having said this M« Bourges-Maunoury proceeded on the assumption that French forces would have to be equipped for three kinds of emergency namely 1) a nuclear w a r / 2) conventional hostilities and 3) revolutionary warfare. It thus appears that the French have definitely decided against relying unduly on nuclear weapons and consequently reducing their conventional and armed forces on a mass scale. Judging from the remarks to LE FIGARO of General Ailleret in charge of "special weapons", the French decision seems to have been taken on objective military grounds. While he discarded vast military formations such as those used in the last war, the General argued that Wte some kind of a "shield" was still required in any circumstances, M. Boi Maunoury however did not hide the fact that a drastic dismantling of its conventional military establishment ws beyond France's means both from a social and financial point of view, bearing in mind the range of activities ai the number of men involved and also the compensations whicT would have to be paid for breach of arms contracts* 5* This led the Minister to underline the difficulty of revising the military establishment in view of the current economic situation. The consequences of the Algerian war and the tremendous expenses involved in providing modern weapons made the task much more difficult, A choice had to be made and those concerned with this choice had come to the conclusion that a satisfactory compromise could be found within the limits of a normal military budget which in the French view should represent10$ of total expenditures i.e. some 130# billion francs as of today. This compromise would involve savings amounting*] \ to appradmately 70 million francs as part of the economic drive undertaken by the Moilet Government. 6, In essence the new French programme consists in t*if-^ creation of highly mobile mechanized units assisted by a/ tactical air force. The number of these units would be/ "much less than the 200 divisions of 1939", They wiOjf A0027623 48-000048 �. 4 ... / Z. . • ~ *- 3 serve in the case of external threats and will be used at the same time as a reserve to be drawn upon according to the needs of the Supreme Command. There will be in addition "territorial" units especially adapted for internal warfare of a subversive nature. 7* The new mobile units will be armed with nuclear weapons. The freneh air force will also of course be furnished with these weapons* The Minister did not commit himself on the question whether or not these weapons would be French made* 8, In the field of armaments, the new programme will give absolute priority to weapons of reprisal (within certain limits as to size) over defensive _yjms» M. Bourges*Maunoury pointed out that the latter were'wrthin Freneh financial and technical capabilities. Additional reasons for concentrating now onwapons of reprisal are that the possibility of counter-attacking with nuclear weapons is after all the best insurance against war; furthermore defensive weapons are yet inadequate and are likely to be for some time. Another consideration in French military thinking is that missiles are likely for all practical purposes tq take the place of aircrafts within the next decade or so,. 9* With all the above factors in mind including France's financial and technological means, French experts and industrialists have been instructed to devote theii immediate attention to the production of a light bomber to be used in nuclear counter-attacks which would be adapted from the latest heavy fighter aircrafts. Priority will at the same time be given to the study of a special type of "semi-ballistic" ground to air missile capable of intercepting strategic bombers on any part of French territory. It is hoped that the special missile will be ready by 1965* Upper limits of fifteen tons for the aircraft and thirty tons for the missile have been placed ' in order to keep in line with economic capabilities. A good deal of attention will also be given to the building up of a large fleet of transport planesf The fact that priority will be given to means of reprisal and that the new programme will proceed on the assumption that missiles will in due course replace aircrafts does not preclude the use for some time to come of supersonic fighter aircrafts or air to air missiles. These will be put into operation in the near future. 10 t While pointing out that the new programme would involve a complete over-haul of the military call up, '^ neither the Defence Minister nor his advisers dealtg with the possibility of a reduction of the present level ef French manpower which the new programme might permit, and to our knowledge the press has not alluded to this possibili:' ^ M„ Bourges-Maunoury referred however to the eventual return of "Nato units provisionally sent (to Algeria) for the ^ duration of the crisis"* /A 11, The new programme was announced on the eve of the political crisis and the interview to the FIGARO was actually published on the day the Mollet Government fell, To our knowledge there has as yet been little if any reactior to the programme and the only press comment we have seen is that of LE MONDE \tfhich remarked incidentally that the Bourg&j Maunoury programme which seemed altogether sound could hard] become a reality as long as the Algerian problem remained at1 dead centre* *^ Yl 1 A0027623_49-000049 A Ttiff Embassy* � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00893 Title A name given to the resource Numbered Letter from the Canadian Embassy, Paris, France, to the Under-Secretary of State of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 25-May-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived ÒAtomic weapons - Canadian policy,Ó RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5960, file 50219-AM-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource French Defence Policy Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en