https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2eb2fb40841dba17879b36a537b926df.pdf 975fd67880bf965e02866509d2f032de PDF Text Text Defence Liaison (1)/J.A. McCordick/th' x Mr. W.D. Matthews Mr. J.W. Holmes Economic Division European Division United Nations Division Defence Liaison (1) Division SECRET May 24, 1957. s ^ ' f-AMP{<!* n> Atomic Weapons Policy and the Fourth Power We regret that through an oversight our memoranda to the Under-Secretary of May 13 and May 16 were not referred to you prior to the discussion In his office on May 17. Copies of these two memoranda are now attached. 2. We have had an opportunity of examining Mr. Reece's re-draft of paragraphs 13 to 27 of the draft Memorandum to Cabinet and have the following general comments to make in addition to a number of minor points concerning drafting and clarification of the text which have already been passed to Mr. Reece. 3. We think that the re-draft still goes too far in attempting to distinguish between "long-range strategic defensive or deterrent nuclear weapons" and "short-range tactical defensive nuclear weapons".* Specifically, we propose that changes be made in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the re-draft. Paragraph 22 might read as follows: "The new policy cannot be neatly based on a distinction between long-range strategic offensive weapons and short-range tactical defensive weapons. This distinction is one whose validity seems to be becoming increasingly dubious, especially with the prospect of high power, smaller weight, •clean' war-heads which can be used in tactical or strategic roles. The only valid criteria seem * We also consider very risky the implied assumption that "small" nuclear weapons might be used without the near certainty of sparking a major war. • • »2 A0027623 51-000051 �SECRET - 2 to be the type and range of launching apparatus and the defensive or offensive aims of the user. Neither criterion can determine what war-heads should be provided to or manufactured by NATO members under the new policy. (And it would doubtless be impossible to set up any workable NATO control system over the actual weapons and launching apparatus.)" The first part of paragraph 23 might read like this: "In addition, it will probably be politically impossible to get such NATO members as France and Germany to foreswear the right to manufacture the whole family of nuclear weapons and to develop short and long-range methods of delivery. Since It would almost certainly be politically impossible to persuade the U.S. (and now perhaps the U.K.) to place the war-heads for their longrange nuclear deterrent under NATO control, It would probably be impossible to persuade France or Germany to place such war-heads of their own manufacture under NATO control". The next sentence in paragraph 23 reads: "This difficulty Is aggravated by the fact that it is easier to manufacture large 'dirty' nuclear war-heads or bombs than it is to make small 'clean' war-heads for tactical, defensive weapons." It would probably be desirable to check with DRB concerning the wording of a sentence which refers to the ease of manufacture of the new "clean" war-heads. 4. The re-draft, in our opinion, would be Improved if it gave a little more emphasis to the difficulty of obtaining United States concurrence in our proposals. We would therefore like to see the fourth and fifth sentences of paragraph 18 read as follows: "Our policy, therefore, rests on the hope that the U.S. Congress will agree to this. The fact that • • * -5 A0027623 52-000052 �SECRET - 3SACEUR is and will probably always be a U.S. citizen might facilitate Congressional consent, but it must be recognized that such consent may prove very difficult to obtain." 5. Paragraph 19 may not be very clear to Ministers. This Is not surprising, when it is realized that the position in NATO with regard to the consent of governments to the use of NATO nuclear weapons is not fully clarified. We think therefore that this paragraph might well be expanded, using some of the material contained in our memorandum of May 16 to outline the present position, admittedly far from clear-cut, regarding the political decision to use nuclear weapons. This paragraph could then go on to explain that our new policy will mean that the consent of governments will have to be expressed through the Council. It is our view in this Division that It will be extremely difficult to convince Congress on this point and impossible if the Council decision had to be unanimous. 6. We disagree with the argument contained in that part of paragraph 25 which begins "A possible solution to this difficulty ...". Despite the fact that the political directive approved by the Council in December, 1956, placed greater emphasis on "incidents such as infiltrations, incursions or hostile local actions" on the NATO periphery, the same directive confirmed that NATO must be able "to deal with armed aggression (other than the incidents just referred to) In accordance with the concept of 'forward strategy', counting on the use of nuclear weapons at the outset ...". Therefore, if any part of the NATO area Is directly attacked, and we interpret the word "Invasion" in paragraph 25 to mean this, then NATO strategy still calls for Immediate nuclear retaliation. It Is true that the Alliance hopes to limit the means of dealing with Incidents which are unavoidably vaguely defined as "infiltrations, incursions, etc.", but an invasion of, or direct attack on, NATO territory will be met by all means of retaliation at NATO's disposal, and it seems to us therefore impractical and unrealistic to propose that an Invasion be met ...4 A0027623 53-000053 �SECRET - 4 initially with non-nuclear war-heads pending the arrival of authority to use nuclear war-heads. Actually the paragraph concerned admits in its last sentence the probable unworkability of such an arrangement and it Is probably desirable therefore to re-word this paragraph considerably to take account of the stage mentioned in its first sentence. 7. As the foregoing comments will have suggested, we are doubtful about the chances of developing a workable policy along the lines of the re-draft. Some improvements In the policy in the direction of greater workability and acceptability may have occurred to other divisions. 8. Of relevance to this subject is paragraph 6 of telegram No. 1136 of May 23 from London reviewing the Canadian position on disarmament, which states: "With regard to nuclear tests, cessation, limitation and registration pose three separate though related problems. We would assume first of all that we still hold that the cessation of tests should not be singled out for priority treatment but should be included in a disarmament agreement which would include provisions designed to diminish the threat of nuclear attack. We would be interested in learning your views on the argument concerning tests which Moch has used on several occasions, namely that France could readily agree to cessation of tests but only in conjunction with cessation of production since France (and probably any other country not possessing nuclear weapons but capable of making them) could not agree to renounce her right to develop nuclear weapons while the three nuclear powers continued their weapons programmes. We have been wondering whether we might not also take a similar position in the Sub-Committee since of the five countries represented it is applicable only to France and Canada and presumably applies as much to ourselves as it does to France." J. A. M c C O B P i e ^ Defence Liaison (1) Division . c . Mr.^^ee eece X A0027623 54-000054 </ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00891 Title A name given to the resource Message from Defence Liaison to Economic, European, United Nations Divisions Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 24-May-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived ÒAtomic weapons - Canadian policy,Ó RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5960, file 50219-AM-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource Atomic Weapons Policy and the Fourth Power Problem Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en