https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5d8a6af39359ed18b639248701334eb0.pdf b748091dd9d810074d9d78373d61b219 PDF Text Text D.L. ( l j J . J . ilcCardle/ms ^i^cWc United Nations Division CONFIDENTIAL Hay 23, 1957 Defence Liaison (1) Division Your memorandum of May 22. Lp/f-A^b -<4 Prohibition of the Use of Nuolear '.eapons. You have asked for our urgent comment on the formula vdth respect to the prohibition of the use of nucloar weapons, v/hich was set out in paragraph 7 of your telegram V-314 of May 11. 2. This Division sees no objection in principle to the formula. V.'e do, however, think it has practical limitations. These limitations may perhaps be serious enough that we should not press the formula any further than we have already with United States representative. Our idea has been planted; it should perhaps be allowed to develop itself in American thinking a little more thoroughly before we involve the Canadian Government further in bringing it to fruition. 3. The practical limitations that we see are that the formula would put some slight limitation on the United States deterrent but not sufficient limitation to make the formula attractive enough to the Soviet Union to bring about a more forthcoming Soviet attitude. As we read the formula, the only limitation which it implies is that there would be no unilateral entry (by the United States, for example) to a struggle between two powers, unless one such power, the victim, asked the United States for assistance employing the use of all means of retaliation.at its disposal. The United States pattern of alliances with so many countries would cover a large number of would-be victims of aggression, and it seems likely to us that such victims would appeal for ... 2 A0027623 57-000057 �- 2 - CONFIDENTIAL United States assistance. We believe that, in practice, the United States would give assistance, in answer to suoh a call, in a manner calculated to localize the struggle. V.e do not believe, hov/ever, that the United States Government would be prepared to commit itself in advance not to use certain weapons in its arsenal. One of the important pillars of the doctrine of massivo retaliation is to keep a potential aggressor guessing, so that he must assume the worst, i.e. massive nuclear retaliation, if he embarks upon the path of aggression. We doubt very much that the United States Government would be prepared to go further than it has in defining what is meant by the application of force "selectively and with discrimatxon". The Soviet Union is aware that the United States did not use atomic weapons in the Korean war, even at a time when Allied forces were in pell-mell retreat. Ve doubt if the Hussians should expect to be any clearer than they are at the moment about United States intentions. 4. Oae recent indication of United States Intentions to keep the potential enemy in doubt, comes from a speech last week by General Twining, who is soon to be Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. He observed that if there were powers that wished to enlarge local battles, they would do so regardless of v;hat weapons the United States might use. He indicated his belief that the potential aggressor should know that the United States was prepared to use its best weapons, although it would use its force selectively and with discrimination. The last phrase echoes statements made by many senior United States officials, including the Secretary of State. <S1®N6D) J. A, McCORDIGt Defenoe Liaison (l) Division A0027623 58-000058 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00888 Title A name given to the resource Message from Defence Liaison to United Nations Divison Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23-May-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived ÒAtomic weapons - Canadian policy,Ó RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5960, file 50219-AM-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en