https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/38f2424ccb4aee8dde3c39525e590725.pdf 6be4e84062d035a5c93642964dd856a8 PDF Text Text &c^>&J DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM MR. REECE TO: #$? Security ...5BPSET. Date FROM : . . . . M r . .P.^y.JSJQ^/A ?fff• • 9M?$1&li/M:J. REFERENCE: £ May .£?,.. 1 # 7 . . File No. 5? / ^ YOtJft"Kfi-t>'RA'PT' OP "PARAGRAPHS 1 3 TO 2 7 OP THE SUBJECT: .MEMpRANDIjM TO. CABINET. ON .SHE. kEJJ. P.QWER.. PROBLEM... We are still unhappy about the general trend of the memorandum. Basically it appears designed to impose on our allies restrictions from which our prospective enemies and other non-members of NATO would be free. The original paper seemed to have as an essential premise the theory that it is the manufacture and not the possession or operational control of nuclear weapons by a Ij.th power which would constitute a danger. Par from seeking to restrict such possession or control by a 2j.th power the main inducement to forego manufacture was to be the prospect of early acquisition of certain nuclear weapons. Another b asic premise appeared to be the contention that there is a valid distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. It also appeared to be assumed that it is more likely that the U.S. Senate would agree to a system for providing nuclear weapons,for example to Prance and Germany, which would be acceptable to them than that the Soviet Union would set its hand to a partial disarmament agreement and that the time factor involved would be shorter. We have the impression that the basic philosophy of the paper is still affected by these premises and we have substantial doubts as to the first two. 2. Some specific points are as follows: 3« In paragraph 13 the first sentence might read, "It does not appear reasonable to refuse to assist the smaller NATO partners in streamlining...etc.". The e e ed. A0027623 59-000059 �-2- second sentence might begin, "It might perhaps be possible to limit...etc.". It may be desirable to add at the end of^the paragraph something to the following effect: /"However, it should be borne in mind that in" a "further ' ^--^ / stage of devolution the nuclear warheads might come into • / the possession and full control of other national forces. ' ,' The possibility would then exist that they could be used , ' with other means of delivery than those originally provided y / and that their component materials might be refabricated ' into fewer but more powerful warheads". _ •"" '''-vij.. In paragraph llj., following the first sentence it would seem appropriate to enter a caveat about Soviet concern over the possible arming of Germany with nuclear weapons. 5« In connection with paragraph 15* we have an impression that there was some discussion at the Bonn Ministerial Meeting early this month about the kind of functions suggested for Saceur. 6. In connection with paragraph 17, it seems to us that once the uranium is acquired by another power it loses its previous identity. It would not be easy to ensure that Canadian supplies were devoted solely to short-range defensive weapons. There is also the question of the procedure for defining such weapons and keeping the definition up-to-date. We are inclined to think that any scheme for Mutual Aid would have to be based on a rather general undertaking to provide at Canadian expense stated quantities of uranium for processing by the United States and the United Kingdom. L» at* 7. Although we are not at present prepared to propose alternative wording, it seems to us that the questions of control and decision dealt with in paragraphs 18 to 21 require further review so that Saceur as an individual*would not be placed in a position to limit the rights of a government which was the victim of aggression to take immediately all measures of self-defence-available to it. • JUw •. ^ (M xAs£~J^ $*" *"" ^ J t r &" f-^-7^^ ...3 A0027623 60-000060 �-38. In connection with paragraph 22, we are doubtful of the validity of the distinction even at present. We are unaware of any designs of weapons which j are in a range of power which is of a lower order of o 7^°%.^- magnitude than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki **j . ,^X which strike us as having been used strategically. » 9. We are aware of no proposals for agreement with the Soviet Union on controlling and limiting long-range nuclear weapons such as are suggested by paragraph 2ij.. The U.S. scheme for gradual reduction of stockpiles has no reference to the nature of the weapons which would be removed. Any such scheme would probably involve insurmountable complexities. 10. In connection with paragraph 25, it seems to us that the means of delivery being developed for nuclear warheads and some of those now existing are so costly that their use with ordinary high explosive would be of doubtful soundness,at least on a large scale. 11. A final general reflection is that Prance in particular, because of her experience last November, may not wish to be bound formally and publicly not to use nuclear weapons except with the consent of the NATO Council. She found her freedom of action in Suez compromised by her incapacity to respond to Soviet threats of assault by a reference to her own rockets and nuclear weapons. Whatever may have been the exact part played by the Soviet threats in the decision to halt operations at the preeise stage which was the case, it seems probable that in retrospect it will appear to Prance that she could have risked another day or two of fighting in order to secure the canal had she possessed a counter-threat and been under no restrictions as to its use. United Nations Ui vision c.c. Mr. Holmes Mr. Matthews European Div. Economic Div. D.L. (1) DiV. A0027623_61-000061 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00887 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum from U.N. Division to Mr. Reece Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 23-Mar-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived ÒAtomic weapons - Canadian policy,Ó RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5960, file 50219-AM-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource Your Re-Draft of Paragraphs 13 to 27 of the Memorandum to Cabinet on the 4th Power Problem Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en