https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2c64ffdfe03f19c6907b5dc51d67b214.pdf 028f94989baf0409b4818cd0aa60bea7 PDF Text Text s D E P A R T M E N T OF E X T E R N A L AFFA Subject. i^te Jffl.11.11 ,^......C.^..^x^/^ryPuMic.tio„ a M YORK TIMES Arms and the Atom—IV An Appraisal of How Budget Is Affected By Need for Varied Weapons Array By HANSON W. BALDWIN Many contradictions and compromises in United States and foreign defense policies a r e an inescapable and inherent result of the technological revolution in warfare and of budgetary restrictions. From time to time t h e now familiar generalization is reiterated—that billions could be saved if t h e Pentagon were reorganized, if all the services were merged into one, and so on. This is a glib and easy assertion, but it misses the main point. The huge expense of defense ! today is the result of developing . . . -,-— -- .-,.•.land maintaining many different and gradual reauRTons in the siz new weapons systems, each of: e ° / othe w reserve fleet. savings But main British them extremely costly, and of will be made by sharp reducmaintaining a t tof h emen samein time sizable numbers uni tions in numbers of men and and by emphasizing pre- greatly reduce- t h e Army,, the form. Nuclear a r m s a n d con- units paredness for nuclear war a t the ventional a r m s are harnessed in expense of a capability for con- Marines and the Navy, and save billions. the same team. ventional war. Varied weapons systems proBut this in turn would comThis decision, dictated not by mit u s t o a n inflexible s t r a t e g y ; ' vide versatility. The more there a r e of them military prudence b u t by eco- if our vital interests were chalthe more difficult t h e defense nomic necessity, follows closely lenged we could answer only the abortive British and with a t o m bombs. And t h e utiliagainst them. And if a nation upon French attack on Egypt - last maintains a military capability fall. This attack might have zation of nuclear weapons might ranging from the delivery of had an entirely different ending bring on the very holocaust we, thermonuclear weapons upon an had it been mounted six t o eight were trying t o avoid total and enemy's city to action by a weeks earlier when t h e climate unlimited nuclear war. squad of riflemen it h a s t h e of world opinion w a s different. Strategy Must Dominate inestimable advantage of freeBut Britain could n o t take' We must, in other words, be dom of strategic choice. I t can military action; able to fight total war or limited decide how t o react when its conventional vital interests a r e threatened; it sooner; even a t t h a t time her: war; we must be able to fight capabilities were so can utilize force graduated t o conventional stripped down t h a t ' it took with or without nuclear -weapthe occasion; it c a n make t h e weeks to mobilize ships, planes ons. punishment fit t h e crime. Our strategy, as Henry A., and reserves. I t can, of course, save money Britain in other words is Kissinger has pointed out, mustf if it reduces its available weapincreasing her calculat- dominate a n d direct our techons systems. In doing so i t r e - clearly ed risk and reducing her stra- nology; weapons must not dicduces its freedom of choice and tegic flexibility. I n her case this t a t e strategy. Any flexible stratits total military capabilities; it is a necessity, not a choice. e g y , a strategy t h a t reduces cal-' increases its calculated risk. culable risks t o acceptable proCompromises Necessary portions, m u s t emphasize graduThe United Kingdom In our case there is no such ated forces, from rifle bullets t o < This is what the tfnited King-i necessity. Any defense policy,, megaton weapons. "dom h a s done, because of eco- of course, must represent com-j We have been trending more nomic necessity, in its new d e - promises; the sky is not the fense program. I t h a s reduced limit. A choice between the and more toward dependence up on nuclear force. Yet unless we numbers of men sharply and it Jupiter and the Thor intermedi retain an across-the-board capahas reduced its capability to ate range ballistic missiles—if bility we face the impossible react with conventional forces both promise approximately dilemma that, according t o Robto enemy action. I t has, in fact, equal performance characteris- ert Endicott Osgood, our present by abandoning some of its over- tics—does not represent any ap- policies tend t o pose. In his new seas bases and commitments, preciable increase in the nation's book, "Limited War—The Chalfrankly relinquished a n y inten- calculated risk. lenge to American Strategy," tion of defending these interests. T h e elimination of one or the Mr. Osgood states and resolves Some of the reductions, of other missile, or the merger of the dilemma: course, a r e logical and sound; -both into one system, may save "America's capacity for total they represent real savings. The s o m e millions. B u t the elimina- war is a prerequisite for t h e elimination of t h e small British tion of t h e entire intermediate restriction of warfare, b u t ungarrison in Bermuda is reason- r a n g e ballistic missile weapons less the nation c a n also wage able. Bermuda is under the system would save billions—but limited w a r successfully, Comshadow of the United States; a t a very great and unjustifiable munist aggression may force the we maintain bases there, and increase in our calculated risk. United States t o choose between Washington would never allow B u t t h e pressure for big sav- total war, non-resistance, or inany non-British power to seize ings, plus t h e pressure of those effective resistance. Such a the island. ' who believe in-an atomic strat- three-pronged dilemma would be The projected scrapping of the egy, is forcing u s toward far disastrous for America's miliolder British battleships is greater risks. If we concen- tary security and her diplomatic sound; these play but a mar- trated our military capabilities position the only rational course ginal role in w a r today. The)solely on deliveries of nuclear is t o develop a strategy capable, United States Navy could well weapons of all types, primarily of limiting warfare and fighting save money by retirement o f | b y planes and missiles, we could i limited wars successfully." some of our older battleships*L ^ — — -A0027623 79-000079 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00871 Title A name given to the resource New York Times article Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 17-May-57 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived ÒAtomic weapons - Canadian policy,Ó RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5960, file 50219-AM-40, pt. 1.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Description An account of the resource Arms and the Atom IV Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en